Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of the EIB in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and their impact on growth
Date: 2005-03-10
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: European Investment Bank, competition law, economic growth, project evaluation, public-private partnership, report

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of the EIB in public-private
partnerships (PPPs) and their impact on growth

(2005/C 234/12)

On 27 April 2004, the European Economic and Social Committee decided to draw up an opinion under
Rule 29(2) of the Rules of Procedure, on The role of the EIB in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and their
impact on growth.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible
for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 16 February 2005
(rapporteur: Mr Levaux).

At its 415th plenary session of 9 and 10 March 2005 (meeting of 10 March 2005), the European
Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion with 153 votes in favour and
5 abstentions.

1. Introduction

This opinion draws heavily on a background paper

1.1
prepared by the EIB for the EESC in July 2004 (1).

1.2
European countries currently use the public-private part-
nership model (PPP) (concessions and other types of contracts)
in very different ways. The term PPP covers a wide range of
situations; according to the European Investment Bank (EIB)
‘the key feature of a PPP is that it involves a risk sharing rela-
tionship between public and private promoters, based on a
shared commitment
a desired public policy
outcome’.

to achieve

2. Issues surrounding PPPs and the EIB's role

2.1 A European history

2000 years ago,

transport of mail
2.1.1
the
throughout
responsibility of the emperor, while the local authorities were
responsible for the ‘stationes’, i.e. postal stations.

the ‘vehiculatio’ was

the Roman Empire,

the physical

The contract drawn up after calls for tenders by the local
authorities and managers of these huge ‘post houses’ conferred
responsibility upon the latter for their construction, upkeep
and operation for five years — a ‘lustrum’ — a fairly typical
duration for contracts in Roman law, frequently occurring in
the area of land ownership (including ‘precaria’ contracts). It
would take twelve centuries for this type of contract to re-
emerge.

Not only Emperor Augustus's postal service was based on a
concession contract, the system was used for the building of
ports, thermal baths, marketplaces and even roads.

2.1.2
In the 19th century, the European railway network
was built entirely through concession contracts, and not only
for railway building and construction works but also for
various other public services such as the supply of water, gas
and electricity, household refuse collection, telephones, etc.

2.1.3 Moreover, in most Member States, public procurement
law stems from the law of concessions.

In the 20th century,

2.1.4
the concession contract has
enabled not only the building of motorways and car parks but
tramways,
supply systems, museums, airports,
also water
underground railway systems transport,
facilities for urban
areas, the refurbishing of schools and hospitals, etc.

2.1.5 Many countries have begun to use PPPs and the EESC
has prepared a brief summary in its opinion (2) on the Green
Paper on public-private partnerships and community law on public
contracts and concessions which was adopted on 27 October
2004.

2.2 Description of the EIB's action plan

‘The European Council in October 2003, invited the
2.2.1
Commission and the EIB to explore how best
to mobilise
public and private sector financing support of the Growth
Initiative, and how to give further consideration to a number of
initiatives which should assist in the development of PPPs.

The Commission, with the support of the Bank, there-
2.2.2
after prepared a series of measures that were incorporated into
the Growth Initiative that was endorsed by the European
Council in Brussels in December 2003. The proposals focused
on the creation of the right regulatory, financial and adminis-
trative conditions to boost private investment as well as the
mobilisation of Community funding, allied with an invitation
to Member States to continue refocusing public expenditure
towards growth-enhancing areas without
increasing public
budgets.

(1) The EIB's role in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), European Invest-
ment Bank, July 2004. This document was prepared for the EESC
study group and can be requested by e-mail from the EESC Secre-
tariat: eco@esc.eu.int.

(2) EESC opinion - Public/private concessions and partnerships OJ C 120 of
20.5.2005 - on the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and com-
munity law on public contracts and concessions – COM(2004) 327 final.

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2.2.3
The EIB's proposals to the Council focused on the
provision of substantial additional resources both for TENs and
i2i (3), the two key sectors covered by the Growth Initiative (4).
The EIB undertook to (…):

treatment plants) and public buildings including government
offices, schools, hospitals and prisons. (…)’.

— use its best endeavours to expand the range of financial
instruments used including particularly financing for PPPs
(…);

Appendix 1 illustrates the extent to which ‘PPP programmes,
legal systems and government organisations [had] developed
within EU-25 (…)’ at the end of 2003.

— develop its institutional

States; with specialist

links with the Commission; with
Member
institutions
financial
(including National PPP Task Forces), as well as with the
banking and capital markets in support of increased public
and private-sector financing of these high-priority sectors.

‘The core objective for the public sector of a PPP
3.1.3
programme is to harness private sector skills in support of
improved public sector services’. (…) ‘PPPs are therefore often
characterised by the public sector:

2.2.4
The EIB's commitments made under the Growth Initia-
tive were a natural evolution and step up of measures already
taken by the Bank over the previous ten years, to encourage
greater private-sector financing of public infrastructure. (...)’.

— entering into contracts to acquire services, rather than

procuring an asset;

2.2.5
In its opinion on the Green Paper on public-private part-
nerships and Community law on public contracts and concessions (5)
the EESC highlighted significant discrepancies between the
Member States in terms of recourse to PPPs. It also notes that
local and decentralised public authorities often take a more
pragmatic approach to developing PPP programmes
than
central government.

3. The EIB's review of the development of PPPs in Europe

3.1 The characteristics of PPPs

3.1.1
‘The term “public-private partnership (PPP)” has been
in general use since the 1990s; there is, however, no single
European model of a PPP (...).

Provision of new investment

in infrastructure in
3.1.2
Europe is increasingly being carried out under a range of PPP
structures based on the principle of private sector risk taking
participation in the provision of public infrastructure through
payment by the users or by raising a charge on public funds
commensurate with the service provided or with the risk trans-
ferred to the private sector. Typical examples of such public
infrastructure are airports, railways, roads, bridges,
tunnels,
environmental facilities (such as waste incinerators and water

(3) The i2i programme is designed by the EIB Group to provide mid-
to long-term loans, equity participations and counter-guarantee
structures, and reflects the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. Further
information is available on the EIB website at www.eib.org.

(4) See the note submitted to the ECOFIN Council of 25 November

2003 – Document CA 03/515.

(5) EESC opinion - Public/private concessions and partnerships OJ C 120 of
20.5.2005 - on the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Com-
munity law on public contracts and concessions – COM(2004) 327 final.

— specifying the service requirement on the basis of outputs,

not inputs;

— linking payments to the private sector to the level and

quality of services actually delivered;

— often requiring a “whole life” approach to the design,
building and operation of project assets where it is clear
that these components cannot be delivered more cheaply
by making separate provision for them;

— seeking optimal risk transfer to the private sector, based on
the principle that risks should be managed by the party to a
transaction best able to manage the relevant risk;

— requiring the private partner to be responsible for raising
some or all of the investment finance required for the
project when it is clear that the higher financing costs are
offset by the reduction of other costs and the rapid delivery
of services;

— utilising diverse payment mechanisms, such as market
revenue, shadow tolls, capacity availability payments and so
on.’

3.2 Drivers for PPP developments in Europe

3.2.1
PPP structures (...) can be means of delivering infra-
structure developments across Europe. (…) Provided that the
public and private sectors fully exploit their advantages and the
potential synergies to be gained from cooperation, PPPs can
contribute to improved quantity and quality of public services.

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3.2.2
PPPs offer the opportunity to capture private sector
efficiencies and introduce appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms
between the public and private sector. Unfortunately this has
not always proved to be the case, especially for large IT
projects. The ability to transfer and ultimately align risks and
rewards within project structures has proved critical to the
ability of PPPs to deliver improved Value For Money to the
public sector (…).

3.2.3
Alongside reforms to public procurement rules, this
had enabled the private sector to respond positively to these
new opportunities to become involved in the delivery and
operation of public infrastructure across many EU countries
(…).

3.2.4
This also gives smaller private companies (including
SMEs) the ability to participate in large scale projects (and to
in a way that would have been
access long term finance)
problematic in conventional private sector
‘balance sheet
financed’ procurements (…).

3.2.5
In response to the financial problems suffered by the
public sector as a result of a political approach that favours the
in certain
private rather than the public sector and which,
countries, has for years neglected the necessary investment in
public services, the key to improving public services is a higher
level of investment and the ability to push forward projects
that might not have been possible to finance under classical
procurement procedures. However an innovative approach to
financing capital projects for the public sector can provide
better value for money than PPPs.

that

The EIB emphasises

3.2.6
‘Given that many such
projects are classified as “on balance sheet” for government
deficit accounting purposes under ESA 95 guidelines (6) the
question of government accounting treatment is but one of the
many factors that may be taken into account by governments
in their decisions to authorise an overall PPP programme and it
is certainly not the most important’. The EESC points out that
Eurostat (7) has established rules for recording PPP projects in
the national accounts of Member States. These rules take
account of:

3.2.7
The EESC acknowledges that PPPs have developed
considerably; however, many obstacles need to be overcome
before public authorities in the Member States can use such
partnerships on a regular basis.

3.3 PPPs and Value For Money

3.3.1
‘The key consideration for governments in launching a
PPP programme should be ensuring Value For Money (VFM).
(...) The “no service/no pay” principle should ensure that the
private partner is incentivised for timely delivery and operation
of project assets. (...). In certain countries, traditional public
procurements sometimes suffer from significant construction
delays and cost overruns but the same problems have also
beset some PPPs. Related to this, where life-cycle maintenance
obligations fall to the private sector, operators are incentivised
to optimise capital and maintenance spends over the project
duration (…)’, but there have also been examples of operators
exploiting their contracts when there have been unexpected
changes in circumstances or where forecasts of costs have
proved to be inaccurate.

3.3.2
The value to the public sector of risk transfer needs to
be demonstrated on a ‘case-by-case’ basis in each project in
accordance with an agreed methodology generally referred to
as a Public Sector Comparator (PSC). (…) Mechanisms for the
diffusion of best practice such as the creation of PPP Task
Forces and specialised units and the use of widely agreed
benchmarking tools to measure Value For Money can also be
extremely helpful
that several
Member States have set up teams of experts to set up PPP
it recom-
contracts and identify best practices. Furthermore,
mends wider use of systematic comparisons between projects
that are managed by public authorities and ones that are
managed by private undertakings (cost, performance, etc.). It
also recommends that a body of high-level experts be respon-
sible for coordination at European level.

(…). The EESC points out

— arrangements for transferring construction risks from the

public to the private partner;

4. EIB involvement in PPPs

— criteria for project delivery;

4.1 Financing principles

— and, occasionally, user demand.

(6) For example, in the UK, approximately 60 % of all PPP transactions

are accounted for “on balance sheet”.

(7) Eurostat decision on deficit and debt - treatment of public-private

partnerships, news release STAT/04/18 of 11 February 2004.

4.1.1
‘First and foremost, the Bank requires that all PPP
projects supported by it are financially robust, economically
and technically viable, meet the Bank's environmental require-
ments and are competitively tendered in accordance with EU
procurement rules (…).

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4.1.2 Wherever possible, EIB becomes involved in projects
at an early stage, prior to commencement of procurement with
the Bank working on a non-exclusive basis with all bidders (...)
during the bidding phase. This ensures that bidders compete
inter alia on the extent to which they pass the financial benefits
of EIB participation on to the public sector.

4.1.3
with other funders (…) is maintained in (…) structures (…)’.

The Bank's principle of providing complementarity

Therefore,

4.1.4
‘many EIB loans to PPP projects are either
bank guaranteed or monoline insured, whether to maturity, or
with release once the project has a proven operating record
(…)’.

4.1.5
‘The credit quality of the Bank's PPP portfolio is under-
pinned by the public sector support for the payment streams to
many PPP projects. Indeed, in many projects (such as the UK
PPP hospitals and schools), payment obligations lie solely with
the public sector and concessionaires are not subject to any
form of “demand risk”. PPPs also typically benefit from strong
regulatory and contractual frameworks.
(...) Finally, although
the volume of PPP activity has increased (see Appendix 2), the
loan amounts involved remain relatively limited compared to
overall lending volumes (...)’.

4.3 Loan maturities

‘Loans to PPPs are characterised by long amortising maturities’.
(Appendix 3, Table C).

4.3.1 B r e a k dow n of E IB e x p osu r e by loa n ma tu r i ty

‘As of 31 December 2003, 83 % (nominal) and 87 % (risk-
weighted) of PPP exposures related to loans with maturities of
20 years and above. The longest loan maturities are found in
social
infrastructure (principally hospitals which are charac-
terised by long economic lives and strong public sector cove-
nants) and the urban development and local transport sectors
where loan tenors typically range between 25 and 30 years
(...)’. The EESC emphasises that because of the long maturities it
will be some time before the early PPPs are concluded. It is not
therefore possible at this stage to come to a definitive judgment
on their value. Furthermore, circumstances inevitably change
over such a long timescale. The rigidity of PPPs can therefore
restrict the flexibility of the public sector to respond to new
developments which are in the public interest. (8)

4.1.6
and one half of the total investment in PPP projects.

The EESC notes that the EIB funds between one sixth

4.3.2 F u t u r e E IB e x p osu r e

4.2 The Bank's exposure to PPPs

4.2.1 E IB e x p osu r e by se ct or

the Bank provided debt

‘In 2003,
financing of a total of
EUR 2.7 billion to 17 new PPP projects. On a portfolio basis,
this took EIB's overall nominal and risk weighted exposure to
PPPs to EUR 14.7 billion and EUR 5.9 billion respectively. The
largest exposure in the PPP portfolio (...)’ is set out in Appendix
3, Table A.

4.2.2 E IB e x p osu r e by c ou ntr y

Country exposure is shown in Appendix 3, Table B.
‘Risk-
weighted exposure is currently concentrated in the UK,
Portugal and Spain’.

This displays ‘a trend towards an increase in loan maturities for
PPP projects (9). (...) It is also to be noted that such extended
terms are becoming the norm required by the public sector,
reflecting the need for loans to match, even if conservatively,
PPP projects' revenue profiles.’

5. Lessons learned from the EIB's experience of PPPs

5.1 The selection, appraisal and monitoring of PPP projects

‘Experience has shown the benefits of early dialogue between
the Bank and the relevant public authorities to identify the
most suitable projects: (...)’, enabling it ‘to focus much of its
PPP activity on priority sectors (TENs, education and i2i,
health) and in regional development areas. PPPs have made
additional demands on the Bank's appraisal, structuring and
negotiating capacity (...)’.

(8) In its opinion on Public/private concessions and partnerships, OJ C 120
of 20.5.2005, the EESC decided to conduct a long-term analysis,
based on the results gained from experience.

(9) Nearly 30 % of such future exposures have amortising maturities in

excess of 30 years.

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5.2 Procurement and state aid issues

the recent — and critical — report of the Portuguese Tribunal
de Contas on the SCUT programme (13) is a relevant example.

5.2.1
‘Appropriate, competitive procurement is one of the
key conditions for success of a PPP. The tendering process can
be a complex exercise, requiring highly-skilled people on both
public and private sides. In some cases, the development of a
PPP can involve long and costly negotiations; in other cases
(often in countries with experience of concessions) it may be
possible to simplify procurement whilst retaining competitive
pressures. Review of the procurement procedure is an essential
part of EIB due diligence on PPP projects (…)’.

The EIB's overall experience is that the performance of
5.3.3
the projects it has financed has been good.
In terms of
construction, projects have generally been completed by the
target completion dates set out in the project contracts. Within
the portfolio,
just one project has fallen significantly behind
schedule (...).

The EESC considers it necessary that,

5.2.2
in order to
contribute to a climate of healthy competition, projects
supported by the EIB should respect European competition law,
particularly legislation on public aid. The EESC recalls its stand
on the subject in its opinion on the above-mentioned Green
Paper (10).

5.3.4
In general, projects have achieved anticipated levels of
operational performance within six to twelve months of the
commencement of operations (...). Release and refinancing tests
applicable to EIB projects have normally been met at
the
appropriate time’.

5.3 The performance of PPP projects

‘National audit authorities have given particular atten-
5.3.1
tion to the performance of, as well as the Value For Money
from many PPP projects financed in their respective areas of
responsibility (...)’. To assess the performance of PPP projects,
the Committee suggests using all the available studies carried
out in all the countries with PPP projects. Although the United
Kingdom has used this instrument most
to finance public
services, other countries also have experience. Moreover,
studies from all available sources should be used for a compre-
hensive assessment, particularly as regards the experience of
the social partners, particularly the trade unions, of trends in
working conditions, and that of consumers with regard to the
quality of services.

5.3.2
‘Appendix 4 presents extracts from reports from the
UK National Audit Office (11). These indicate that the perfor-
mance of UK PPP projects has been generally good, particularly
in respect of cost and time performances on major infrastruc-
ture, albeit with some weaknesses in the early schools projects;
they have also been most helpful in pointing out difficulties or
errors made, notably in the IT sector which has generally
to date for PPPs. Similar
proven an unsatisfactory sector
reports (12) are also available from other national audit bodies;

(10) EESC opinion - Public/private concessions and partnerships OJ C 120
of 20.5.2005 - on the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and
Community law on public contracts and concessions – COM(2004) 327
final.

(11) Available at www.nao.org.uk.
(12) www.tcontas.pt/pt/actos/rel_annual/2003/ra-2003-res.pdf.

5.4 Sectoral priorities

5.4.1
‘As indicated above, it is a consistent observation that
the initial focus of PPP procurement in most countries is on the
transport sector. Thereafter, countries often make a progressive
migration towards other sectors (such as education, health,
energy, water and waste treatment) where the techniques of
PPP procurement are being seen to be equally valuable (...).

5.4.2
For example, the UK has placed considerable emphasis
on the importance of PPP structures in the social sectors of
education and health — the largest
the
National Health Service. Since 1997, 64 PPP hospital projects
with a capital value of GBP 11.1 billion (EUR 15.7 billion)
have been approved by the Department of Health in the UK to
commence procurement. Of these, 27 schemes with a value of
GBP 3 billion (EUR 4.3 billion) have been completed and are
operational, or are in construction (...).

in the history of

At

least

three other countries in Europe (Portugal,
5.4.3
Spain and Italy) are now bringing forward substantial PPP
programmes in the health sector.

5.4.4
It is also notable that national PPP programmes often
commence with relatively large, central government promoted
projects, with subsequent development of smaller (sometimes
repetitive) projects at local or regional government level’.

(13) The report is available at www.tcontas.pt.

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5.4.5
The Committee points to the need to take a compre-
hensive approach to research, development and innovation in
the European Union's economic policy. The Committee takes
the view that the potential of the European Investment Bank is
not exploited to the full
in this area. It therefore wishes to
encourage it to direct a sizeable amount of its resources into
this sphere, especially to applied research and innovation. This
requires a creative use of all of
the EIB's instruments —
including PPP — in the area of research, which in most cases
could well be considered a public service.

6. Comments on payment in PPP structures

6.1
‘There is considerable diversity in the structuring of
payment mechanisms for PPP projects in the EIB's portfolio,
reflecting the diversity of PPP structures in Europe (...)’.

6.2
Government payments play a vital role. ‘In some cases,
concessionaires have been directly incentivised to improve
safety (through effective maintenance, improved lighting and so
on) by payments-related to accident rates.

6.3
In practice, the Bank has noted a general tendency for
the public sector to move from toll-based to availability-based
payments in transport PPPs, however, the ability to use the
different payment mechanisms inherent in PPP structures to
achieve differing policy objectives and optimise risk-sharing is a
key characteristic and strength of the PPP (...).

common amongst other senior lenders), offers considerable
stability, robustness, experience and added value to the public
sector.

The Bank's ability to undertake upstream advisory work
7.4
with public
sector bodies on the development of PPP
programmes or on individual priority flagship projects, either
directly or indirectly (for example, through sharing or experi-
ence or secondments), has also been highly valued by the
public sector where this has been done to date (...).

7.5
Related to this, the Bank's participation in a project,
given its unique status as an “impartial” not-for-profit financier
with a public policy mission and considerable technical exper-
in building confidence
tise, can have an important effect
between the public and private parties to a transaction. One
example of the Bank's catalytic influence is the Tagus Bridge
project, the flagship project of the Portuguese PPP programme,
where this role has been particularly recognised.

7.6
Finally, the EIB has also been able to develop innovative
and flexible financing structures for PPP projects. (...). As set
out in the Growth Initiative, the Bank is also working on the
further development of an extended range of financial instru-
ments such as Guarantees; Junior and Mezzanine Debt; Infra-
structure Funds and extending its use of Securitisation as
the
appropriate to facilitate the increased participation of
private sector in the provision of public infrastructure. These
innovations, along with the value attached by other lenders to
the Bank's due diligence, are contributing to the Bank's role as
a catalyst for other sources of funding (...)’.

6.4
Given the willingness of the Commission to use Struc-
tural/Cohesion Funds to part-finance the public sector contribu-
tion in appropriate cases in the new Member States, collabora-
tion of the work of National Task Forces with DG Regio and
other Commission services is also highly desirable (...)’.

7.7
The EESC notes that the EIB can lend its support to
public authorities by reducing costs and applying a strict policy
of project evaluation and risk transfer in the implementation of
PPP projects in Member States.

7. Value added of EIB expertise in PPPs

8. Conclusions

7.1
‘EIB has brought significant added value to the PPPs it
has financed. From a financial perspective, the long loan matu-
rities and capital grace periods offered by the Bank are particu-
larly appropriate for major
infrastructure given the long
economic lives of the assets being financed and the typical
evolution of cash flows over the project life (...).

Furthermore,

7.2
the cost of EIB funds enhances public
sector Value For Money from these deals. By strengthening the
economics of projects, these features also benefit other partici-
pating financiers (...).

8.1
The EESC welcomes the EIB's significant contribution to
PPP development and to supporting growth and the improve-
ment of public services in the Member States by providing the
funds necessary to carry out work in the following areas:

— ‘trans-European networks and the modernisation of trans-

port infrastructure;

— school and university education;

In this context, the EIB's high standard of due diligence,
7.3
as well as its commitment
to holding project debt until
maturity (i.e. no selling down or syndication of debt which is

— primary and secondary healthcare; and

— environmental improvement (...).’

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the EESC recommends that

However,
the EIB should also
include funding for applied research and innovation, including
patents, which give the EU world-wide primacy.

8.2
In its opinion on the Green Paper on public-private part-
nerships and community law on public contracts and conces-
sions (14) the EESC stressed the need to:

— maintain labour, health and accessibility standards for facil-
ities which were set up through PPPs. The EIB should
ensure that
these standards are maintained during the
various stages of design, development and management of
the projects that it co-finances;

— maintain healthy competition between public and private
bodies. The EIB should therefore rigorously ensure equal
competition (legal and fiscal) between public and private
bodies. State aid in particular should not hamper contract
award procedures;

— systematically evaluate PPP projects by using a set of criteria
that reflect the financing costs of the various options avail-
able to deliver public services and the experience gained by
including employees and consu-
all the players involved,
mers.

8.3
The EESC considers that all bodies of public experts in
the various Member States should cooperate amongst them-
they can forward to the
selves and with the EIB so that
Commission accumulated experience of best practices and
launch a debate on how to improve the European legal frame-
work.

8.4
Given the scale of the EIB's exposure and its experience
of PPPs, the EESC suggests that once a year the Ecofin and
Competitiveness Councils discuss a report on PPPs,
jointly
presented by the EIB and the Commission.

Brussels, 10 March 2005.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Anne-Marie SIGMUND

(14) EESC opinion - Public/private concessions and partnerships OJ C 120
of 20.5.2005 - on the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and
community law on public contracts and concessions – COM(2004) 327
final.

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APPENDIX 1

to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

The following amendments, though rejected, were supported by at least one-quarter of the votes cast.

Point 4.1.5: After the second sentence, insert the following:

Indeed, in a number of projects it is difficult to identify what risk has been transferred to the private sector.

Reason

To be given orally.

Result of vote:

Against: 69

For: 47

Abstentions: 17

Point 5.3.2: After the second sentence, insert the following:

However, the Treasury Task Force is not regarded by some social partners as an impartial body, given its remit to
promote PPPs. Consequently its optimistic assessment is disputed, particularly since most PPPs have not reached maturity
and one of the earliest, the Skye Road Bridge, has had to be bought out by the public sector.

Reason

To be given orally.

Result of vote:

Against: 74

For: 48

Abstentions: 13