Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa : the role of the European Union.
Date: 2005-03-01
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: common security and defence policy, conflict prevention, crisis management, development policy, peacekeeping, sub-Saharan Africa, the EU's international role

Occasional Paper

April 2004

n°51

Fernanda Faria

Crisis management in
sub-Saharan Africa
The role of the European Union

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Occasional Papers

April 2004

n°51

by Fernanda Faria

Crisis management in
sub-Saharan Africa
The role of the European Union

The author worked at the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, from 1990
to 1998 as an in-house research fellow dealing with Mediterranean political and security issues,
and later as an associate researcher at the European Centre for Development Policy Manage-
ment, Maastricht, as the Portuguese appointee to the Centre’s programme on ACP-EU relations
and EU development policy. Since 1999 she has been working on European development and 
foreign and security policy-related projects as a freelance researcher and consultant.

1

Contents

1

2

3

Summary  

Introduction

Root causes of conflicts in Africa

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives
for crisis management in Africa

3.1 Initiatives by regional and subregional organisations in Africa:

capabilities, limitations and potential

3.2 Bilateral initiatives to enhance African national and regional

capabilities for crisis management

3.3 Multilateral initiatives

4

EU policy towards Africa

4.1 A new EU development policy or the ‘politicisation’ of aid?
4.2 Developing African regional and subregional institutions

and capabilities

4.3 Coordination with other international organisations
4.4 Shared views and priorities between the Commission and

the Council?

Operation Artemis in Bunia, DRC: a test case for the EU?

5.1 The background
5.2 How it unfolded
5.3 Framework and objectives
5.4 Political control and strategic direction of the operation
5.5 Organisation and command structure of the operation
5.6 Perception and analysis of the outcome of the operation
5.7 Interaction with the humanitarian agencies
5.8 Post-conflict intervention of the EU in the DRC

Impact of Operation Artemis on EU crisis management policy and ESDP

6.1 Impact on the issue of EU capabilities
6.2 Towards a single EU command structure?
6.3 The need to address the issue of financing for CFSP and ESDP operations
6.4 Civilian-military cooperation and complementarity with other EU

instruments

5

6

2

5

7

9

11

12

19

26

31

32

34

36

37

39

39

40

41

42

42

43

44

45

47

48

48

49

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7

a

Conclusions: prospects for EU crisis management policy on Africa

Annexes

a1 Regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan Africa
a2 African and UN peace missions (map)
a3 Abbreviations
a4 Bibliography

53

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62

63

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3

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

4

Summary

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

The increasing number and complexity of crisis situations in Africa and the declining interest of
the international community in the region in the aftermath of the Cold War has led many
African states and organisations to take a more proactive stance in their attempts to find solu-
tions to their own problems. Significant efforts have been made by African regional and subre-
gional organisations and their member states to develop mechanisms and adapt their structures
in order to be able to respond to crisis situations in the region. However, structural, logistical,
operational and financial weaknesses, besides political mistrust and ‘conservatism’, remain
obstacles to the development of their capabilities to deal with conflicts in the region. 

Some Western countries, unwilling to intervene but aware of the problems in Africa, have

created programmes to support and develop African capabilities to prevent, manage and
resolve conflicts in the continent – France, the United Kingdom and the United States having
important programmes in this respect. Although these vary considerably, they all focus in one
way or another on providing training, equipment or financial assistance to African countries
directly or through regional organisations. Other countries and international organisations
have also included this dimension in their policies or activities towards some African coun-
tries/regions. At the multilateral level, bodies like the EU, the UN, the OSCE, the World Bank
and others are increasingly focused on peace and stability in Africa. 

The role of the European Union is, in this regard, an interesting case of policy changes and
shifting priorities. Relations between the EU and African countries were for a long time essen-
tially economic and development oriented. This remains the fundamental dimension of EU-
African relations, but the issue of conflict prevention has gained increasing importance in the
overall EU policy towards Africa since the early/mid-1990s. The main focus of current EU pol-
icy is on addressing the root causes of instability and violent conflict. More recently the EU rein-
forced its commitment to support African organisations’ capabilities and efforts to deal with
crises in the region, through the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, while coordinating efforts
with other international organisations (the UN in particular) and donors aimed at supporting
peace-related efforts in Africa, at the institutional and operational levels. Furthermore, the EU
has engaged militarily in preventing escalation and supporting conflict resolution efforts in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the summer of 2003, EU (with non-EU) forces were
deployed to Bunia (in the eastern district of Ituri, DRC) under an EU-led crisis management
operation, Artemis, under a UN mandate and French command. Operation Artemis illus-
trated EU engagement in Africa and in crisis management in general, and provided an exam-

...

5

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

ple of how EU key actors (institutions and member states) coordinated and cooperated to set up
the operation. It was also a good illustration of the potential of combining the EU’s various tools
to address conflict-related situations, from conflict prevention to post-conflict intervention, and
of the complementarity between diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, financial and
development instruments. 

The EU intervention in DRC also raised concerns with regard to the overall EU priorities in
crisis management, in this case regarding its policy towards Africa. Some perceive it as privileg-
ing military instruments for crisis management to the detriment of civilian crisis management
and conflict prevention instruments and policies. However, the emphasis of EU crisis manage-
ment instruments and policy is likely to remain on its civilian dimension for a number of rea-
sons, including financial ones, although it is widely recognised that it is important to be able to
resort to military instruments and capabilities when necessary.

6

Introduction

I n the aftermath of the international commu-

nity’s  failure  to  act  against  the  genocide  in
Rwanda, there has been increasing interest in,
and a growing number of initiatives for conflict
prevention, management and resolution in sub-
Saharan Africa. With the disengagement of the
international community from African issues,
particularly  after  the  failed  intervention  in
Somalia in 1993, African states and organisa-
tions  have  taken  up  much  of  the  burden  of
peacekeeping  and  crisis  management  in  the
region. They have established institutions and
mechanisms to deal with crisis management but
they all, without exception, face serious (finan-
cial, operational and to some extent also politi-
cal) constraints.

The 

community 

international 

has
responded to the Africans’ willingness to take
responsibility for dealing with the security prob-
lems  of  the  continent,  and  their  limitations,
with a number of bilateral and multilateral ini-
tiatives aimed primarily at reinforcing African
capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve con-
flicts in the region. On some occasions, critical
ad  hoc  support  was  given  to  United  Nations
(UN) and African-led peace support operations.
The most significant capacity-building initia-
tives  have  actually  been  bilateral:  France,  the
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  have
developed furthest their assistance programmes
to support African capabilities. 

Since the early 1990s, the perceived failure of
development policies and the increasing num-
ber of violent conflicts in the region, particularly
internal ones, have to some extent put greater
pressure  on  European  policies  towards  the

region. The disruptive impact of conflicts on the
region has negative consequences for the Euro-
pean  Union’s  cooperation  and  development
efforts in Africa. They also have a direct impact
on the EU in areas such as migration, organised
crime and, more recently, on the perceived risk
of creating ‘safe heavens’ for terrorist organisa-
tions. This has further accentuated the need for
a  more  active  European  policy  and  for  more
immediate actions to contain and resolve vio-
lent conflicts that hinder European and interna-
tional  efforts  to  support  development  in  the
region. The EU-led Operation Artemis in Bunia
(Ituri district, Democratic Republic of Congo),
under French command as framework nation,
was perceived by many as a test case for the EU’s
capabilities and political will to engage and suc-
cessfully lead this kind of military operation. Its
importance may well lie beyond the immediate
results of the operation, that is, the stabilisation
and  pacification  of  Bunia  and  surrounding
areas to allow for the return of internally dis-
placed  persons  (IDP),  the  resumption  of
humanitarian support and open the way for the
reinforced  UN  mission  (MONUC)  that  took
over on 1 September 2003.  The impact of this
operation is likely to be felt not only internally
within the EU, but also in relations with other
actors and partners: with African countries and
regional organisations, but probably even more
so  in  relations  with  the  UN,  NATO  and  the
United States.  

Chapters  2  and  3  of  this  paper  focus  on,
respectively, the root causes of violent conflicts
and instability in sub-Saharan Africa,1 and the
various regional and international (bilateral and

1 Sub-Saharan  Africa  comprises  48  countries:  all  African  states  with  the  exception  of  North  African  countries  (Algeria,  Egypt,  Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia).

1

7

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

multilateral) efforts undertaken so far to rein-
force regional capabilities in Africa to prevent
and  deal  with  internal  and  cross-border  con-
flicts. Chapter 4 deals with EU policy towards
Africa and how the EU is trying to adapt and
respond to challenges in this region. Operation
Artemis, its context, objectives, organisation and
outcome are the subject of chapter 5. Chapter 6

analyses its impact on EU crisis management
policy and the European Security and Defence
Policy  (ESDP).  The  paper  ends  with  some
remarks on the prospects for EU crisis manage-
ment policy towards Africa in the aftermath of
Operation Artemis and of the most recent devel-
opments  in  European  security  and  defence
policy.

8

Root causes of conflicts in Africa

A frica has undergone significant changes ever

since decolonisation in the early 1960s. A
new process of change started with the end of
the Cold War, and a ‘wave of democratisation’ in
the early 1990s did in fact produce some success
stories, but it also left in place some dictatorial
regimes. Periods of change have also been peri-
ods of turmoil and violent conflict. To quote UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan: 

Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been
fought in Africa, the vast majority of them
intrastate in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the
53  countries  of  Africa  were  afflicted  by
armed conflicts, accounting for more than
half of all war-related deaths worldwide and
resulting in more than 8 million refugees,
returnees and displaced persons. The conse-
quences  of  those  conflicts  have  seriously
undermined Africa’s efforts to ensure long-
term stability, prosperity and peace for its
peoples.2

Compared with this gloomy picture of Africa
in the mid-1990s, the early years of the new mil-
lennium are somewhat more positive. There are
fewer major armed conflicts around the world
now than in the late 1990s (21 in 2002 – the low-
est  figure  since  1998),  but  Africa  (along  with
Asia) still leads on that front.3 Despite the end of
the  war  in  Angola,  and  progress  in  the  peace
talks in Sudan and in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), many parts of Africa, stretch-
ing from Sierra Leone and Liberia to Sudan and
Somalia, are still affected by violent conflicts.
Even in those cases where war has come to an

end or peace seems close at hand, the long-last-
ing  human,  social  and  economic  effects  of
armed conflicts are likely to be a major challenge
to durable peace and development in the coun-
tries and regions concerned. At the beginning of
2003, there were 4.6 million people in Africa of
concern to the UNHCR. The vast majority were
refugees  (almost  3.4  million),  in  addition  to
many  IDP  (more  than  700,000),  returned
refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people.
Six African countries (Angola, Burundi, Sudan,
Somalia, DRC and Eritrea) were in the ‘top 10’
countries of origin of major refugee population
in 2002, the vast majority of them seeking refuge
in neighbouring African countries.4

Colonialism  has  often  been  blamed  for
Africa’s  conflicts.  The  colonial  heritage  does
provide a partial explanation to some of the root
causes of recent conflicts in Africa, but that is
not the only explanation for the recent history of
African  countries.  The  imposition  of  bound-
aries  that  did  not  correspond  to  indigenous
social  and  ethnic  dynamics  certainly  did  not
help to create a sense of national unity upon
which the political leadership could rely. Fur-
thermore,  the  inherited  economic  infrastruc-
ture only perpetuated the dependency of former
colonies, as it did not meet their needs as new,
independent  states.  Nor  had  the  indigenous
populations acquired the necessary skills that
would have best prepared them for statehood.
Centralisation, and in many cases authoritari-
anism, were the political responses adopted by
many  post-colonial  regimes.  The  nature  and
perception of political power in some African

2 Secretary  General  Report  to  the  UN  Security  Council  (UNSC)  on  The  causes  of  conflict  and  the  promotion  of  durable  peace  and  sustainable
development in Africa, April 1998.
3 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, ch. 2; http://www.sipri.se/pubs/yb03/ch02.html.
4 UNHCR, Refugees by Number 2003 Edition, 1 September 2003; http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texts/vtx/home?page=search.

2

9

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

states was in itself a source of conflict: the ‘win-
ner takes all’ logic of power did not favour polit-
ical pluralism, power sharing or smooth transi-
tions of power. The multi-ethnic fabric of popu-
lations within most African states has often led
to a politicisation of ethnicity – the 1994 geno-
cide in Rwanda being one of its most extreme
examples. 

During the Cold War, the two ‘blocs’ sup-
ported and legitimated authoritarian, oppres-
sive and corrupt regimes in search of allegiances
in Africa. Their influence in the region has often
created,  fuelled  and  perpetuated  conflicts
(namely by providing governments with finan-
cial and military support) when that served their
interests; but that influence also helped to con-
tain some conflicts. After the end of the Cold
War, there was a general decrease of economic
and political support and interest in the region
on  the  part  of  the  superpowers  and  Western
countries,  including  towards  their  former
colonies.  The  legitimacy  of  many  African
regimes started to be questioned more openly;
internal  opposition  became  more  vocal  and
more openly declared. The state itself was in cri-
sis: the lack of accountability and transparency
of most African regimes, increasing corruption,
mismanagement,  imposed  centralisation  and
inefficient  bureaucracies,  failed  economic
choices and the inability to respond to the most
basic  needs  of  their  populations  were  visible
almost everywhere. In many cases, the state was
increasingly  noted  for  its  absence,  as  social
responsibilities  were  taken  up  by  non-state
actors supported by international donors, non-
governmental organisations and UN agencies. 
However, the impact of the new internal and
international environment had different conse-
quences  in  different  African  countries  and
regions. In some cases, longstanding conflicts
were finally brought to an end and the parties
agreed to a peaceful transition into democracy.

Some southern African countries (e.g. Namibia,
Mozambique, South Africa) provide good exam-
ples of this, and although not every country in
the subregion could be said to have made sub-
stantial progress towards peace and stability or
increasing  pluralism,  the  general  picture  was
nevertheless more positive than in the previous
decades. Other parts of Africa sank into growing
domestic unrest and violence, which ultimately
led to brutal intrastate conflicts. 

Apart  from  the  war  between  Ethiopia  and
Eritrea, all major conflicts in Africa during the
last decade have been intrastate conflicts. Yet
they have proven to be a major problem for their
region, and in some cases they have also fuelled
conflicts in neighbouring countries. The prolif-
eration  of  armed  groups  and  militias  (some-
times used by external political forces to wage
proxy wars in neighbouring countries, but not
always fully controlled by them), and the inabil-
ity of state authorities (where the state has not
collapsed  or  disintegrated)  to  control  their
movements  or  confine  them  to  national  bor-
ders, the proliferation of small arms, and the
growing influx of refugees, have contributed to
further destabilise the region and pose a major
challenge to the ability of states to govern. Eco-
nomic decline and growing poverty in Africa, the
struggle among communities for access to land,
water  or  control  over  oil  and  rich  mineral
resources have also been at the origin of, or have
partially  contributed  to,  some  internal  and
interstate conflicts.  

Despite  this  gloomy  general  backdrop,
recent evolution on the political front in sub-
Saharan Africa does show some positive signs
and certainly a greater willingness of Africans to
deal with some of their major problems and con-
flicts in the region. Hopefully, the international
community will follow and provide the neces-
sary support. But the challenge is huge and the
risks of falling back are still high.

10

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis
management in Africa5

Since the end of the Cold War, the United

Nations has substantially increased the
size and scope of its peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeeping tasks have grown larger and more
complex as they applied increasingly intrastate
conflicts  and  involved  a  growing  number  of
civilians along with military personnel. These
tasks  include:  creating  political  institutions;
working with state and non-state actors to pro-
vide emergency relief; protecting humanitarian
aid; defending safe areas; maintaining law and
order;  organising  and  conducting  disarma-
ment,  demobilising  and  reintegrating  former
fighters; clearing mines; providing good offices
for peace building; organising and conducting
elections; and promoting sustainable develop-
ment. In some cases, the UN has gone even fur-
ther, to assume the administration of countries
in post-conflict situations, like Kosovo and East
Timor. Such a change could hardly have been
made without problems and difficulties, which
led the UN to rethink and scale back some of its
operations, particularly in the aftermath of the
intervention  in  Somalia  in  1993.  Compared
with 1993, when there were 75,000 Blue Helmets
deployed  in  UN  peacekeeping  operations,  in
mid-1999 there were only about 12,000. Propor-
tionally,  that  reduction  was  even  greater  in
Africa. While in 1993 there were 40,000 peace-
keeping forces on the whole African continent,
by June 1999 there were less than 1,600 – but cer-
tainly not because Africa had become a conti-
nent of greater peace and security. 

However, as of late 1999, with renewed out-
breaks of violent conflict threatening to spill
over again into neighbouring countries, the UN
approved new peacekeeping missions in Africa
(Sierra  Leone  and  DRC  in  1999,  Eritrea  and
Ethiopia  in  2000,  Liberia  in  2003).  By  late
November 2003 there were nearly 31,500 UN
military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa, and
this number will increase to more than 40,000
once the force in Liberia reaches its full autho-
rised  strength  of  15,000  (until  30  November
2003,  nearly  5,600  personnel  had  been
deployed). 

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognises a
role for regional organisations in the mainte-
nance  of  international  peace  and  security.6
While the UN can rely on European/Western
regional organisations to maintain and enforce
peace and security on the European continent,
few regional organisations in the world have the
financial, logistical and human resources and
capabilities  these  organisations  have,  not  to
mention  the  degree  of  political  dialogue  and
cooperation that allows them to function. That
is  certainly  still  true  with  regard  to  African
regional and subregional organisations, despite
the significant progress made by African states
in addressing some of these constraints. Some
Western  countries,  unwilling  to  intervene  in
conflicts in Africa but aware of the problems
there, have created programmes to support and
develop African capabilities to deal with conflict
situations.  Although  these  programmes  vary

5 Information in this chapter is based to a large extent on the following sources: Eric G. Berman & Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa:
Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000); Eric G. Berman, French, UK, and US Policies
to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: current status and future prospects (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002); Eric G.
Berman, ‘The provision of lethal military equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping policies towards Africa’, in Security Dialogue, vol. 34,
no. 2, June 2003, pp. 199-214.
6 Articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter.

3

11

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

considerably,  they  all  focus  in  one  way  or
another  on  providing  training,  equipment  or
financial assistance to African countries directly
or through regional organisations. France, the
United Kingdom and the United States are the
countries that have the most developed assis-
tance programmes. Other European and non-
European  countries  have  also  integrated  this
dimension  into  their  policies  towards  some
African countries/regions.

At the multilateral level, organisations like
the EU, the UN, the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World
Bank (WB), and to some extent others like the
Commonwealth,  the  Community  of  Por-
tuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), the Organ-
isation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF),
and other groups of countries are increasingly
focused  on  peace  and  stability  in  Africa,  and
some are supporting and developing initiatives
to enhance African capabilities to prevent, man-
age and resolve conflicts in Africa. Given the par-
ticular focus of this paper on the EU role, EU ini-
tiatives and policies towards sub-Saharan Africa
will be addressed separately in chapter 4. 

As a preliminary general comment, it should
be  understood  that,  despite  some  apparently
frenetic activity and the burgeoning initiatives
supposedly aimed at reinforcing African capa-
bilities to deal with conflict situations, in many
cases effective action falls short of rhetoric.

3.1 Initiatives by regional and
subregional organisations in
Africa: capabilities, limitations
and potential

Regional  and  subregional  organisations  in
Africa  were  without  exception  created  to
respond  to  the  economic  and  social  develop-
ment needs of their member states. None had

the vocation to deal with internal or interstate
conflicts, and no serious attempts to include
these in their remit were made until the 1990s.
That  shift  was  to  a  large  extent  due  to  the
increasing number and complexity of crisis situ-
ations in Africa, and to the declining interest of
the international community in the region after
the end of the Cold War. African states were well
aware of the UN Security Council’s reluctance to
engage meaningfully in resolving major crises
on the continent and, as a consequence, they
have been trying for the last decade to develop
their own mechanisms and adapt their struc-
tures in order to be able to take on this new role.7
The  Organisation  of  African  Unity  (OAU,
now renamed African Union) was one of the first
to adapt. In 1993 it created the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolu-
tion. Many subregional organisations followed
suit. They changed their mandates from purely
developmental functions to encompass conflict
management. In those cases where some sort of
regional security mechanisms already existed on
paper, attempts have been made to revive them
by giving them a meaning and putting them to
work. Mediation and negotiation efforts were
made by a number of countries and organisa-
tions. Early warning systems were or are being
planned. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations  have  been  undertaken.  Often,
African responses to crisis and conflicts devel-
oped  in  an  ad  hoc  manner.  On  various  occa-
sions,  African  countries  were  able  to  put
together and coordinate a sizeable inter-African
force  to  conduct  military  operations  at  the
request of the country in need, often with the
assistance of and in coordination with Western
countries, but not always.8 Significant efforts
have been made by African regional and subre-
gional organisations and their member states,
but  structural,  logistical  and  financial  weak-
nesses remain an impediment to the effective
development of African capabilities to deal with

7 See ‘African regional and sub-regional organizations in Peace Support Operations: general principles’, paper prepared by SaferAfrica for
the SWP Workshop on the Development of African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, Berlin, 26 September 2002.
8 Intervention in Zaire (1997-99) against the incursion of Angola in Zaire territory; in Chad (1979); in Mozambique (1986-92); in the Central
African Republic (1997-98). In 1997, an African-led peacekeeping operation in Congo (Brazzaville) under UN mandate was proposed but
did not materialise, although the contributing African countries are not to blame for it.

12

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

crisis management situations, not to mention
the  lack  of  political  commitment  of  many
African states and their fear of the political and
diplomatic consequences of intervening in the
affairs of other African states, often neighbour-
ing ones. 

Initiatives and activities undertaken by these
organisations ought to be seen, first of all, as
confidence-building measures among their own
members,  before  they  can  actually  commit
themselves  and  harmonise  their  policies  to
engage in crisis management operations in the
region.  Deep-rooted  suspicion  and  rivalry
between  African  states,  particularly  between
neighbouring ones and especially among ruling
élites (even if population movement and infor-
mal trade between them is often quite signifi-
cant) has been a major handicap for the develop-
ment of subregional organisations and for con-
certed regional action/initiatives. 

Furthermore,  military  intervention  with  a
UN  mandate  has  also  been  undertaken  by
regional organisations. However, interventions
have not always been successful nor have they
always helped to resolve conflicts; in some cases
they have exacerbated them and forces interven-
ing  to  secure  or  promote  peace  have  actually
become part of the conflict.  

The table in Annex 1, on regional and subre-
gional  organisations  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,
gives some general information about the main
African  organisations,  their  aims,  structures,
and activities undertaken to support peace and
security in their respective regions, with some
general observations on their potential and lim-
itations. It is not an exhaustive list of regional
and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan
Africa. Others exist that are not mentioned here,
either because they are more technical (e.g. mon-
etary  or  customs  unions)  or  limited  in  scope
(essentially economic organisations or devoted
to particular development issues), and because
they have chosen not to adopt a more compre-
hensive approach to development that includes
the promotion of peace and security.

However,  a  brief  account  of  three  major
organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, the African
Union,  the  Economic  Community  of  West
African  States  (ECOWAS)  and  the  Southern
African Development Community (SADC), is
called for. 

The African Union
The organisation previously known as the OAU
(created in 1963) has tried for most of its exis-
tence to stay away from conflicts in Africa rather
than intervening to prevent, contain or resolve
them. The OAU Charter provided for a Commis-
sion of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
in case of conflicts, which never really became
operational. The organisation’s Charter did not
allow  it  to  intervene  before  conflicts  actually
erupted  and  therefore  no  conflict  prevention
role was foreseen for the organisation. Anyway,
African states always tried to address conflicts
outside the institutional framework and in an
informal way, either through ad hoc commit-
tees, bilateral negotiations, heads of state medi-
ation,  etc.9 OAU  pillars  have  always  been  the
principles  of  state  sovereignty,  territorial
integrity  and  non-interference  in  member
states’ internal affairs. Intervening or playing
any role in intrastate conflicts was absolutely
out of the question. These were probably noble
principles in the aftermath of independence in
post-colonial  Africa  and  were  certainly  per-
ceived  as  absolutely  needed  in  order  to  avoid
opening a ‘Pandora’s box’, but they did not pro-
vide for regional security when that was most
needed. 

In the 1990s, the increasing number of con-
flicts (and particularly of intrastate conflicts) in
various parts of Africa with disastrous impact
on stability and development in the region, the
disengagement of the international community
and the growing pressure on African states and
organisations to address these problems, either
from the international community and African
public opinion, have pushed the OAU to engage

9 Felix Nkundabagenzi, Le dialogue politique entre l’Union européenne et l’Organisation de l’unité africaine (Maastricht: ECDPM, document de travail
no. 64, 1998).

13

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

more actively in conflict prevention and man-
agement in the region. It was in the interest of
African states to give a greater role to the organ-
isation,  and  a  clear  sign  of  the  changes  came
when some states invited the OAU to monitor
and supervise elections in their countries. Since
the early 1990s, the OAU had set up a number of
observer missions in various parts of the conti-
nent (see table in Annex 2) and had used African
special envoys or representatives for mediation
and facilitation in crisis situations (e.g. in DRC). 
In June 1993, OAU heads of state and govern-
ment agreed to the establishment of the Mecha-
nism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution. The OAU Mechanism provided for a
new decision-making body, the Central Organ,
and created the Peace Fund, a separate fund of
$40 million (two-thirds provided by donors) to
quickly finance the operational activities of the
OAU Mechanism. The Peace Fund has played a
very positive role in developing the human and
material  capabilities  of  the  organisation  to
intervene 
situations,
although the lack of financial instruments was
not the only constraint on an active OAU role.
Scarce financial resources remain a key factor in
limiting actions in time and scope, but signifi-
cant progress has nevertheless been made. The
OAU has laid the basis for future operations,
namely  by  establishing  rules  of  engagement
(which allow the use of force when necessary),
and is now able to furnish the forces deployed
with basic equipment (even if more advanced
equipment would be necessary to boost its oper-
ational capabilities). 

conflict-related 

in 

The launching of the New Partnership for
Africa’s  Development  (NEPAD)  at  the  OAU
summit of July 2001 and the transformation of
the OAU into the African Union (AU) in July
2002  have  further  reinforced  trends  towards
greater pan-African cooperation and commit-
ment to address conflict-related issues on the
continent and developing African capabilities to
deal with them. As a condition for sustainable
development, one of NEPAD’s priorities is peace

and security, including building a capacity for
early warning and for the prevention, manage-
ment and resolution of conflicts. It therefore
reaffirms the commitment to strengthen exist-
ing institutions dealing with these matters and
to pursue other peace-related programmes. The
promotion of good governance is also perceived
as a tool to deal with the root causes of conflict –
that is the aim of the African Peer Review Mech-
anism  created  under  NEPAD.  At  the  institu-
tional  level,  some  important  changes  include
the  creation  of  a  Peace  and  Security  Council
within  the  AU  (due  to  enter  into  force  on  26
December 2003). This is meant to be a sort of
‘UN Security Council’ for Africa in the sense that
its role will include agreeing upon or endorsing
peace  operations  in  the  continent.  The  Peace
and  Security  Council  adopted  a  work  pro-
gramme in October 2002 that aims at increasing
cooperation  with  regional  African  organisa-
tions in conflict prevention activities and peace
support  operations.  The  AU  defence  chiefs
meeting of May 2003 announced plans for the
creation of a permanent force under the Peace
and Security Council by 2010. In April 2003, the
AU  started  deploying  its  first  peacekeeping
force, in Burundi; it is meant to be a force of
3,500 peacekeepers, but by August 2003, only
about 1,200 men (mostly South African) had
been deployed, apparently due to financial diffi-
culties.10

Plans for a more active and stronger role for
the African Union with regard to conflicts in
Africa may well face some important obstacles,
some well-known and predictable, others less so.
The lack of financial resources and weak opera-
tional  capabilities  are  well-known  problems;
cooperation between the AU and international
organisations/donors  often  address  these
issues. Less predictable but with no less impact
is the rate of HIV/AIDS affecting the military in
many African countries: some suggest that the
infection rate among military personnel in sub-
Saharan Africa could be as high as 60% (and even
higher  in  some  units  of  some  countries).11

10 The Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 201-2.
11 Ibid., p. 203.

14

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

Furthermore, many AU members are still reluc-
tant to grant sufficient autonomy to the AU or
to see the organisation engaging further in crisis
management and beyond election monitoring,
where it has proven it has the ability and the
political capacity to perform well. This reluc-
tance is partly also due to political conservatism
or the historical legacy of non-intervention and
continuing  mistrust  between  its  members.
Indeed, given this combination of factors, it is
not hard to understand why the AU Mechanism
over the past decade has made only slow and lim-
ited progress, although the renewed interest and
the significant efforts and commitment African
countries have been making in the last few years
deserve recognition. 

Notwithstanding  such  limitations,  it  is
important  to  note  that  subregional  African
organisations or inter-African coalitions gener-
ally  seek  approval  of  the  organisation  before
they engage in conflict-related initiatives (e.g.
ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra
Leone). The OAU remained, despite its weak-
nesses, a legitimate and credible organisation in
the  eyes  of  African  states.  Its  transformation
into the African Union, with effective support
from  the  international  community  and  a
stronger commitment from African actors, is
only  likely  to  strengthen  it.  The  tendency  is
towards reinforcing its role and capabilities at
the same time as subregional organisations are
also developing their own. There is no contra-
diction or rivalry in these parallel trends; on the
contrary they are mutually reinforcing. 

ECOWAS
The  Economic  Community  of  West  African
States, like all other organisations in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, was created to respond to the eco-
nomic and development needs of its member
states. However, ever since the late 1970s/early
1980s, ECOWAS has been developing institu-

tional  instruments  for  security  and  defence
(Protocols  of  non-aggression  and  of  mutual
assistance on Defence, 1978 and 1981 respec-
tively), although these aimed basically at pre-
venting attacks against each other and for about
a decade were not translated into any concrete
action. However, the 1981 Protocol was the first
time that a group of African states had signed a
defence protocol that applied also to internal
conflicts, where they were engineered or sup-
ported from the outside and could endanger the
peace and security of other member states. A
stand-by force (the Allied Armed Forces of the
Community, AAFC) and decision-making and
administrative structures were envisaged in the
1981  Protocol,  but  never  really  became  fully
operational, nor was the Protocol invoked until
1990, when the brutal civil war in Liberia broke
out  and  the  Liberian  president  formally
requested ECOWAS assistance. 

ECOWAS states, concerned with the threat
to regional stability posed by the conflict, and
well aware of Western countries’ unwillingness
to intervene, decided to set up an armed Moni-
toring  Group  (ECOMOG)  to  restore  law  and
order  in  Liberia,  create  the  conditions  for
humanitarian aid to be delivered and allow for
cease-fire negotiations. ECOMOG was actually
established  by  a  smaller  group  of  ECOWAS
member states sitting in the Standing Media-
tion  Committee  that  had  been  created  a  few
months earlier, in 1990, and was dominated by
Anglophone countries. The ECOMOG mission
in Liberia raised a lot of controversy (including
over the nature of the mission) and fuelled ten-
sions and division among member states, partic-
ularly between Anglophone and Francophone.
The significant political, economic and military
weight  of  Nigeria  increased  already  existing
fears  of  regional  hegemony.12 Francophone
countries in West Africa were particularly suspi-
cious.13 Some  ECOWAS  member  states  then
argued  that  ECOMOG  lacked  accountability

12 Nigeria contributed most of the troops, material and financial backing for ECOMOG’s first operation in Liberia. It also suffered heavy
human losses: hundreds of Nigerian soldiers are thought to have been killed in the operation in Liberia. 
13  Already  in  the  1970s,  following  the  creation  of  ECOWAS,  Francophone  states  in  West  Africa,  often  with  the  support  of  France,
established other subregional organisations in West Africa (e.g. UEMOA, CEAO, ANAD) in an attempt to weaken ECOWAS. Some of them
still exist or have been revived in the last decade.

15

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

and  legitimacy,  because  its  legal  status  was
unclear. However, political and diplomatic rival-
ries and conflicts of interest within ECOWAS
have  probably  motivated  those  accusations
more than genuine concerns about its legality.  
Ever since it was set up, ECOMOG – a non-
standing  military  force  made  up  of  soldiers
from the national armies of ECOWAS member
states – has been active almost without a break,
as conflicts in the region continued to erupt:
Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea-Bissau in 1998-99,
Ivory Coast in 2002 and Liberia again in 2003.  
ECOWAS is undisputedly the African subre-
gional organisation that has taken the lead in
conflict management in Western Africa. ECO-
MOG was set up even before the OAU had cre-
ated  the  Mechanism  for  Conflict  Prevention,
Management and Resolution in 1993. ECOWAS
has been more active in diplomatic and military
terms and has put up more sizeable peace mis-
sions  than  any  other  regional  or  subregional
organisation  in  Africa.  It  has  shown  the
strongest determination to address and resolve
conflict situations in the region. Despite many
shortcomings and the political rivalries among
its member states, it has nevertheless been able
to take action, and by acting it has considerably
improved its knowledge, practices, capabilities
and legitimacy. Compared to its first interven-
tions,  the  ECOMOG  intervention  in  Guinea-
Bissau showed significant progress (e.g., it had a
clear mandate, it was reporting to the UNSC, it
was a multilingual, Anglophone and Francoph-
one, force). Nevertheless, there were some short-
comings, namely, ECOMOG was slow to deploy
and the conflict was ultimately resolved by force
on the ground. ECOMOG’s first interventions,
particularly in Liberia in 1990-97, but also in
Sierra Leone, were marked by many problems. At
the time of its first intervention in Liberia, ECO-
MOG was also known to stand for ‘Every Car Or
Moveable Object Gone’, so bad was the reputa-

tion  of  some  of  its  ill-prepared,  ill-equipped,
unpaid and demoralised forces, and it suffered a
huge loss of men. The different political agendas
of  ECOWAS  member  states  also  hampered
ECOMOG effectiveness. Brigadier General M.
Khobe, a Nigerian army officer who was a force
commander of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, sum-
marised its operational problems as follows: 
(cid:90) excessive control by home governments and
therefore lack of coordination among ECO-
MOG forces on the ground (the force com-
mander did not have full control of the vari-
ous  national  contingents,  whose  leaders
often insisted on seeking approval from their
home  governments  or  even  went  into  the
field with different instructions from those
issued by the force commander); 

(cid:90) language differences;
(cid:90) lack of standardisation of equipment, arms

and ammunition; 

(cid:90) different  training  standards,  doctrine  and

staff procedures; 

(cid:90) poor sea- and air-lift capabilities (Nigeria is
the only ECOWAS member and sub-Saharan
African  country  with  the  capacity  for  sus-
tained heavy military sea- and air-lift);

(cid:90) absence of vital air-to-ground support assets,

particularly ground attack helicopters;

(cid:90) lack  of  logistic  support  for  some  contin-

gents; 

(cid:90) inadequate resources to deal with humani-

tarian problems; 

(cid:90) poor coordination and liaison with interna-

tional relief agencies.14

These political and operational problems of
the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (which
were partly repeated in Sierra Leone and in other
ECOMOG  operations)  were  further  compli-
cated  by  the  lack  of  consensus  among  rebel
forces with regard to ECOMOG intervention.
Some believe ECOMOG actually did more to

14 Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, ‘The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa’, in Mark Malan (ed.), ‘Boundaries of
Peace  Support  Operations:  the  African  Dimension’,  Monograph no.44,  Institute  of  Security  Studies  (South  Africa),  February  2000;
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECONOMOG.html. General Khobe also pointed out the misrepresentation of mercenary
organizations in ECOMOG operations and their manipulation of the international media. However there are different views on this issue.
For more information on ECOMOG see also Eboe Hutchful, ‘The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa’, in Mark Malan
(ed.),  ‘Whither  Peacekeeping  in  Africa?’,  Monograph no.  36,  Institute  of  Security  Studies  (South  Africa),  April  1999;
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html.

16

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

exacerbate  the  war  in  Liberia  rather  than  to
bring it to an end, and its involvement in the
Liberian conflict also contributed to the civil
war in neighbouring Sierra Leone. ECOMOG
became part of the conflict, instead of being a
neutral  force  that  would  help  to  resolve  it.
Nevertheless, ECOMOG experience in Liberia
(and subsequent interventions in the region) is
still considered as positive and successful in the
sense that: 
(cid:90) ECOWAS demonstrated its political will and
power to address conflicts in the region (and
to keep its determination in very adverse con-
ditions,  including  heavy  losses  among  its
forces); 

(cid:90) it proved able to shift the ECOMOG man-
date  from  peacekeeping  to  peace  enforce-
ment and peacemaking as conditions on the
ground  evolved,  and  to  turn  to  regional
(OAU)  and  international  (UN)  initiatives
when needed (such ability to adapt was partly
made  possible  by  the  disorganisation  and
lack of coordination and unified control of
ECOMOG contingents);

(cid:90) ultimately,  it  managed  to  rally  support
among its member states for the need to cre-
ate credible common security mechanisms.
Not only did ECOWAS survive its bad experi-
ences,  but  ties  and  cooperation  among  its
member states seem also to have been rein-
forced and improved. 

ECOWAS’s  creation,  in  1999,  of  a  Mecha-
nism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was an
attempt  to  address  ECOMOG  shortcomings,
including the command and control issue, and
the lack of involvement of ECOWAS member
states and of the Secretariat in the management
of its operations, among others. The perceived
need for an early response to potential conflicts
led the organisation to establish an alert system

in 2001. More recently, at the Abuja meeting of
May 2003, ECOWAS member states decided to
create a rapid reaction military force to respond
to conflicts in the region. It has yet to be seen
when that decision will materialise, as signifi-
cant constraints (namely financial) still need to
be addressed. 

SADC
The Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC), created in 1992, has a quite partic-
ular history. SADC was born out of the South-
ern African Development Cooperation Confer-
ence (SADCC) established in 1980 by the Front-
line States15 and Zimbabwe. The main objec-
tives of SADCC were to reduce dependence on
the apartheid regime in South Africa and to sup-
port Namibia’s struggle for independence. At its
origin, it was therefore essentially political in
nature. In the early 1990s, with the positive evo-
lution  towards  peace  and  stability  in  the
region,16 SADCC had to refocus, and it shifted
its  role  and  objectives,  previously  directed
against South Africa, to creating a regional com-
mon market. It became SADC in 1992. Notwith-
standing the fact that its focus was primarily
economic, the SADC Treaty commits its mem-
ber states to evolve common political values, sys-
tems  and  institutions,  and  to  promote  and
develop their cooperation in the area of peace
and security. Although South Africa’s accession
to  SADC  in  1994  contributed  to  the  greater
international  credibility  of  the  organisation,
mistrust and antagonism within its members
and in particular with regard to South Africa
have not fully disappeared and have continued
to  hamper  SADC  effectiveness,  economically
and politically. 

The same reasons creating conflict-related
structures  that  had  prompted  other  regional
and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan

15 The Frontline States were originally Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. It dissolved in July 1994 only, shortly before
South Africa’s accession to SADC in August 1994. 
16 The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, independence of Namibia and the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique created
a new political environment in the region, more favourable to political and economic cooperation and ultimately envisage some sort of
regional economic integration.

17

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

Africa (e.g., lack of stability and high potential
for conflict in the region, and lack of interest
from  the  international  community  to  get
involved in conflict prevention and resolution
in the continent), also led SADC states to decide
in 1996 to create the Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security Cooperation. The SADC Organ (its
leadership rotates annually) reports to the Sum-
mit of Heads of State and is regulated by a new
Protocol  on  Politics,  Defence  and  Security
adopted  in  2001.17 Its  structure  includes  the
Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee
(ISPDC, comprised of SADC foreign ministers)
and the Interstate Defence and Security Com-
mittee (ISDSC, comprised of defence and secu-
rity ministers).18

However, the existence of defence and secu-
rity structures within SADC has not proven to
be very effective in boosting the SADC role in
conflict  management  and  resolution  in  the
region.  The  SADC  Organ  has  basically  been
inoperative, partly due to the controversy partic-
ularly between Zimbabwe and South Africa over
the status of the Organ (whether it should be
autonomous from SADC or responsive to the
SADC summit). This seems to have been solved
in  2001,  but  other  problems  remain,  due  to
regional rivalries and mistrust between SADC
member states (particularly tensions between
Zimbabwe  and  South  Africa).  Recently,  a
Mutual Defence Pact was signed (SADC sum-
mit,  August  2003).  Its  objective  is  to  ‘opera-
tionalise’ the mechanisms of the SADC Organ
for mutual cooperation in defence and security
matters  (Art.  2),  but  it  does  not  seem  to  add
more  to  what  already  exists  institutionally
within SADC in terms of boosting or reinforc-
ing  its  member  states’  commitment  to  crisis
management and resolution in the region. The
Pact provides for an institutional commitment
to collective self-defence and collective action
(Art. 6). Its main focus is once again on interstate

conflicts, and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of a member state is again emphasised
(except under Art. 7, in the terms stated in the
Protocol and upon the decision of the SADC
summit),  as  well  as  the  commitment  not  to
engage  or  support  destabilisation  actions
against a member state (Art. 8). One important
aspect  of  this  Pact,  which  reinforces  further
SADC  initiatives  to  improve  capabilities  for
joint action, is the commitment to cooperate in
defence  matters  and  facilitate  cooperation
among their armed forces and defence-related
industries (Art.9). It is, however, not clear what
the added value of this Pact is, nor what is effec-
tively new in it, other than actually reinforcing
existing policies/initiatives. 

Some SADC members have been particularly
engaged in peacekeeping and conflict media-
tion and resolution in the region and are among
the  most  active  in  deploying  multinational
forces for peace initiatives in Africa. They have
undertaken  military  operations  in  DRC  in
199819 and in Lesotho in 1998-99.20 These have
actually either been a source of tensions between
SADC member states or deepened already exist-
ing ones, with accusations of self-interest and
attempts at regional hegemony being at centre
stage of internal divisions within SADC. It is
interesting to note, however, that, despite those
rows and tensions, SADC managed to present
some  sort  of  image  of  unity  by  ultimately
‘endorsing’ those interventions. More recently
South Africa, which is actually a ‘newcomer’ to
peacekeeping activities, is playing a major role in
mediation and peacekeeping in Burundi, and in
other parts of Africa. 

SADC  has  also  regularly  organised  peace-
keeping instruction and peacekeeping training
exercises which are playing an important role in
developing  standing  operating  procedures,
involving  both  civilian  and  military  compo-
nents,  although  the  integration  of  these  two

17 In May 2003, only seven countries had ratified the Protocol. Nine ratifications are required for it to enter into force.
18 The ISDSC existed prior to the set up of the SADC Organ. It was integrated in its structure when the Organ was created in 1996, and
already before the new structure was adopted at the 2001 summit.
19 Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe participated in the Inter-African force that intervened in DRC in 1998.
20 Botswana and South Africa intervened in Lesotho in 1998-99.

18

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

components does not always seem to have been
successful. Financial and operational capabili-
ties problems are also common in SADC, as in
other subregional and regional organisations in
Africa, but the SADC potential to play a more
active and effective role in conflict management
in the region is very high. SADC has probably
the  largest  deployment  capacity  of  all  subre-
gional organisations in Africa. In DRC, Angola
and  Zimbabwe  alone  are  believed  to  have
deployed, in the early stages of the war, about
16,000 troops altogether. To what extent they
have the capacity to sustain such a large number
of forces on the ground for longer periods of
time is, however, doubtful (not to mention the
internal political and economic challenges both
countries are currently facing, although for very
different reasons). South Africa is reshaping its
military forces to make them a more credible
regional intervention force; it has embarked on
the modernisation and reinforcement of its mil-
itary  capabilities  aimed  both  at  defence  and
peacekeeping  as  well  as  disaster  relief  opera-
tions. 

3.2 Bilateral initiatives to en-
hance African national and
regional capabilities for crisis
management

France
After decolonisation, France continued to have
an active policy towards Africa and has inter-
vened regularly in the region, although some-
times in support of weak and dictatorial regimes
(particularly in the 1970s and 1980s). From the
mid-1990s,  French  interventions  in  Africa
became more rare and its military presence in
the region was reduced (from more than 8,000

troops  in  1985  to  less  than  6,000  in  2001),
reflecting  above  all  changes  in  French  policy
towards  Africa,  rather  than  a  disengagement
from the region. Those changes have translated
essentially into four main aspects: 
(cid:90) a change in the approach to African peace
and stability, centring much of its efforts on
developing  African  capabilities  for  peace-
keeping in the region, namely by preparing
units  from  existing  military  structures  of
African countries for rapid mobilisation; 
(cid:90) multilateralism,  privileging  a  subregional
approach rather than a country-by-country
approach in the attempt to boost a greater
cooperation  and  coordination  between
African countries and their forces;  

(cid:90) a broader regional focus, no longer limited to
Francophone Africa, and greater openness to
and support of other countries’ activities; 
(cid:90) transparency,  as  contributions  are  made
known to all countries and operations are
limited to peacekeeping and humanitarian
aid.21

The  French  capacity-building  programme
RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de
maintien de la paix), established in 1996, is the
centrepiece of the new French policy towards
Africa. Under RECAMP, France provides: 
(cid:90) classroom education to the armed forces and
police from more than 30 different African
countries, Francophone and non-Francoph-
one,  on  skills  relevant  to  peacekeeping,
through  courses  offered  in  France  and  in
more than a dozen military schools in Africa
supported  by  France.  Although  these  are
national military schools (most of them in
Francophone countries), they have a regional
vocation and are open to foreign nationals.
In  some  cases,  the  teaching  languages  are
both English and French (e.g. the Zambakro
School  in  Ivory  Coast)  The  skills  taught

21 Rear-Admiral Hervé Giraud, ‘Efforts at Conflict Prevention and Resolution: the French Experience’, in Franco-South African Dialogue
for  Sustainable  Security  in  Africa,  Monograph  no.50,  Institute  of  Security  Studies  (South  Africa),  August  2000,
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No50/Chap12.html.

19

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

include military observer training, battalion-
and brigade-level training, as well as specific
skills  for  the  personnel  from  the  three
branches of the armed forces and the police,
and specialised training such as communica-
tions and medicine (de-mining skills are also
envisaged). In recent years, France has also
committed itself to reinforcing African coun-
tries’ capabilities to repair and maintain mili-
tary vehicles, by providing spare parts, techni-
cians and funding (to countries with military
cooperation agreements with France). 

(cid:90) multinational field training with a regional
focus. Three multinational exercises under
RECAMP were completed by 2002 involving
countries  from  all  sub-Saharan  African
regions22 and a fourth one is planned in 2004
(in Ghana and Benin). Exercises organised by
subregional organisations (mostly in West
Africa  but  also  SADC)  were  supported  by
France with troops, equipment and financial
and logistical support. France also partici-
pates  in  routine  military  exercises  with
African countries (mostly bilateral and a few
multilateral).   

(cid:90) pre-positioning  of  materiel  to  support
African forces participating in peacekeeping
initiatives  in  the  region.  Until  2002,  there
were three depots (in Dakar, Libreville and
Djibouti).  The  materiel  pre-positioned  in
these depots is intended to equip and sup-
port  a  600-person  infantry  battalion  and
includes French-made firearms (mostly per-
sonal and a few crew-served weapons), vehi-
cles (light armoured cars, jeeps, trucks and
ambulances;  armoured  personnel  carriers
were also likely to be included), communica-
tion equipment and other non-lethal equip-
ment  (uniforms,  generators,  tents,  water
purifiers).  The  depot  in  Dakar  includes  a

100-bed  field  hospital  with  the  necessary
medical  equipment  and  support  vehicles.
This  equipment  has  been  used  on  several
occasions to assist peacekeeping missions,
including  African-led  operations  in  the
region, and to support African countries par-
ticipating  in  UN  peacekeeping  missions.
RECAMP equipment is to remain under the
control of France and is meant to be returned
to  the  depot  once  the  mission  is  accom-
plished, which has apparently always been
the case. 

French support to regional and subregional
organisations in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to
increase,  although  there  has  not  been  much
involvement of or support to regional organisa-
tions structures under RECAMP, often due to
shortcomings  of  the  regional  organisations.
France is, however, in the process of developing
links  with  and  supporting  some  African
regional  organisations  (e.g.  ECOWAS,  IGAD,
ECCAS  and  the  African  Union),  namely  by
accrediting its defence attachés to these organi-
sations. It is also providing support to ECCAS
peacekeeping  forces  in  the  Central  African
Republic (CAR). France contributes to the OAU
Peace  Fund  and  actively  supports  UN  and
African-led peacekeeping operations in Africa;
on  some  occasions  it  has  contributed  crucial
logistics and financial support. 

France has intervened on various occasions
in Africa alongside African subregional organi-
sations  or  the  UN  (or  with  its  approval)  to
restore peace or help contain a conflict. The lat-
est  examples  are  Operation  Licorne (4,000
troops) in Ivory Coast, the EU Operation Artemis
under French command in DRC, and a small
detachment  of  French  military  personnel
(about 200) in CAR.23

22 Guidimakha in Senegal and Mauritania in 1998 (participated 8 West African countries and 4 non-African countries: US and European
countries), Gabon 2000 (again 8 Central African countries and 8 non-African countries), and Tanzanite in 2002 (the 14 members of SADC
plus Kenya and Madagascar, and more than 9 non-African countries). RECAMP training exercises are planned to take place every two years.
23 For more information see the French MoD website: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces/operations/index.htm.

20

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

United Kingdom
From the mid-1970s, there were British military
advisory and training teams (BMATTs) in some
(Anglophone) African countries under bilateral
initiatives. However, in the 1990s BMATTs were
reoriented under the United Kingdom’s African
Peacekeeping Training Support Programme to
provide peacekeeping training to officers from
African countries (not just from the countries
where they were based, but also to other coun-
tries in the region). Besides classroom educa-
tion,  BMATTs  also  provided  field  training
(mostly  in  Africa).  The  United  Kingdom  also
supported  UN  and  African-led  peacekeeping
operations in the region.   

In 2001 the British government decided to
create  a  more  ambitious,  larger  and  multidi-
mensional initiative. It set up two Conflict Pre-
vention Pools: the Africa Conflict Prevention
Pool  (or  Conflict  Prevention  Initiative  for
Africa), which covers sub-Saharan Africa, and
the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which cov-
ers the rest of the world. The Conflict Prevention
Pools bring together conflict prevention pro-
grammes  and  funds  from  various  ministerial
departments in the United Kingdom: the For-
eign  and  Commonwealth  Office  (FCO),  the
Ministry  of  Defence  (MOD)  and  the  Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID).
The aim was to encourage closer cooperation,
increasing effectiveness and complementarity
between these different governmental depart-
ments working in the same area.24 The Conflict
Prevention Initiative for Africa covers a number
of  areas  and  overarching  thematic  objectives,
including:  the  control  of  the  proliferation  of
small arms and light weapons, the reduction in
the exploitation of mineral and other natural
resources for the purposes of war, inclusive gov-
ernment, security sector reform, support to pro-

grammes aimed at developing regional security
bodies and African capacity to undertake and
sustain peacekeeping operations.25 A major pri-
ority of the British initiative is containing the
spread of regional conflict in and around Sierra
Leone,  the  Great  Lakes  region,  Sudan  and
Angola. 

As with RECAMP, activities to support and
enhance African peacekeeping capabilities have
focused on education, training and equipment.
Peace support military education and training is
provided mostly in Africa through the BMATTs,
based  in  various  African  countries  (Ghana,
Kenya,  Sierra  Leone,  South  Africa  and,  until
2001, Zimbabwe). Military education and train-
ing often include human rights education. Field
training exercises are generally not provided as
part of the capacity-building programme, but
the  United  Kingdom  has  often  contributed
(financially,  with  troops,  trainers  and  trans-
portation  equipment)  to  multilateral  and
regional exercises led by African countries. The
United Kingdom has participated in exercises
under the French RECAMP programme and is
likely  to  initiate  multinational  field  training
exercises  in  the  future  (all  over  sub-Saharan
Africa and with no concentration on a particular
subregion). 

The United Kingdom does not generally pro-
vide military equipment in support of peace-
keeping operations, but two notable exceptions
were  the  support  to  ECOMOG  operations  in
Liberia  in  1999  and  in  Sierra  Leone  in  2000.
British  support  to  ECOMOG 
in  Liberia
included spare parts for vehicles, generators and
funding  for  communication  equipment.  In
Sierra Leone (1998-99), it provided even greater
support,  including  vehicles,  communication
equipment, uniforms, rations, small arms, light
weapons,  ammunition,  rifles,  mortars  and

24 For more information on the UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa and on the Global Conflict Prevention Pool see, respectively,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1011756005037  and  http://www.
mod.uk/issues/cooperation/gcpp.htm.
25 The budget of the two Conflict Preventions Pools from 2001 to 2003 earmarked more than £400 million a year to peacekeeping (in Africa
and elsewhere in the world), i.e. around 78 per cent of the total funds available. Funds from the Africa Pool are more equally distributed
in between programmes and peacekeeping; about 55 per cent of the funds allocated to the Africa Pool go to peacekeeping. Berman, 2002,
op. cit., p. 14.

21

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

rocket-propelled  grenades.  Although  such 
assistance  to  ECOMOG  and  to  countries 
contributing troops to the operation was sub-
ject to certain conditions (regarding humanitar-
ian laws and human rights standards; besides,
most  of  the  equipment  was  supposed  to  be
turned over to the Sierra Leone armed forces),
not all were apparently met. In the agreements
London concluded afterwards with the Sierra
Leone government (1999 and 2000), aimed at
promoting peace and security in the country,
supporting the democratically elected govern-
ment and upholding law and order, checks and
balances were now instituted to avoid any repeti-
tion of previous problems or shortcomings.26
These are thought to have been effective. Under
the new agreements, the United Kingdom has
provided the Sierra Leone army with a substan-
tial amount of weaponry and other equipment
and extensive training, in which education on
respect for human rights and democratic princi-
ples was included. It has also provided training
and non-lethal equipment (including commu-
nications equipment and vehicles) to the Sierra
Leone police. In the summer of 2000 the United
Kingdom  sent  (with  UN  endorsement)  more
than 1,000 troops to Sierra Leone to protect and
evacuate British citizens, secure the use of Free-
town  airport,  provide  technical  advice  to
UNAMSIL  and  help  restore  peace  and  secu-
rity.27

Support to ECOMOG operations in Liberia
and  Sierra  Leone  does  not  mean  the  United
Kingdom had an active policy of supporting the
peace efforts of African subregional organisa-
tions. Many consider it was the fear that ECO-
MOG could fail that prompted UK assistance.
However,  despite  ECOMOG’s  shortcomings,
ECOWAS has gained some respect internation-
ally for its attempts at dealing with crises in the

region, and the United Kingdom seems to be
willing to support ECOWAS’s efforts to develop
its  security-related  mechanisms  by  providing
funding and training to the ECOWAS Mecha-
nism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution,  Peacekeeping  and  Security,  pro-
vided there is real commitment by the ECOWAS
Secretariat to make it work. In November 2000,
the United Kingdom had organised a map exer-
cise with ECOWAS at the organisation’s head-
quarters,  and  similar  exercises  could  well  be
repeated  in  the  future  with  ECOWAS.  The
United  Kingdom  also  seems  to  be  willing  to
fund  efforts  by  the  East  African  Community
(EAC) to develop its peace support capabilities
(namely by providing training). British support
to  African  regional  organisations  has  been
much greater with regard to the OAU. It showed
great commitment to support the development
of  the  OAU  Mechanism,  but  funding  for  its
Conflict Management Centre was likely to be
reduced  (delays  and  bureaucracy  of  the  OAU
have not worked as an incentive).  

United States 
US programmes indirectly linked to developing
the  peace-related  capacities  of  African  states
have existed for a long time. The International
Military  Education  and  Training  Program
(IMET) was formally established in 1976, but
existed already before. It provided training and
education  to  foreign  military  including  from
African countries. IMET was later expanded in
1990 to draw in also foreign government offi-
cials and members of civil society (therefore no
longer limited to military personnel) and to pro-
vide training overseas (previously it was just in
the United States). IMET courses cover, among
other  issues,  defence  management,  civil-mili-

26 Military advisory and training officers (mostly from the United Kingdom but also from other countries) serve alongside officials at the
Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters and are also meant to serve as a liaison to army battalions in the field. For each
rifle provided by the United Kingdom, the serial number is recorded along with the name of the recipient, who is informed of it. Berman,
2002, op. cit., p. 17.
27 On the legitimacy of this and other military interventions see Martin Ortega, ‘Military Intervention and the European Union’, Chaillot Paper
45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2001), ch. 3.
28 For more information on IMET, see http://www.dsca.org.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm.

22

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

tary relations, rule of law and military justice in
accordance with human rights principles.28

However, a stronger US commitment to rein-
force African capabilities to deal with conflict-
related situations only materialised in the late
1990s, during the Clinton administration and
after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was created in
1997 as part of that policy. It included classroom
education, field training, command post and
computer-assisted  exercises,  and  some  non-
lethal equipment (generators, mine detectors,
night-vision goggles, water purifiers, communi-
cation equipment, uniforms and boots). ACRI
sought to train 12,000 African troops for peace-
keeping  over  a  5-year  period.  When  the  pro-
gramme ended in 2002, 9,000 troops had been
trained in eight countries (Benin, Ivory Coast,
Ghana,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Mali,  Senegal  and
Uganda)29 and  three  multinational  exercises
completed.  Various  African  states  that  were
involved in the ACRI programme have partici-
pated, and employed ACRI equipment, in vari-
ous UN or African-led peace-support missions
and  humanitarian  operations.  Recipients  of
ACRI  equipment  were  supposed  to  use  it  for
those types of activities and training, and not for
other  unintended uses. In order to safeguard
against such unintended uses, ACRI equipment
was checked regularly, but not in cases where
training  was  suspended  (Uganda  and  Ivory
Coast). Changes to the ACRI programme in its
last stage included engaging more fully interna-
tional  and  humanitarian  organisations  and
NGOs  in  multinational  training  exercises,  as
well as a briefing on AIDS.30

In 2000, when the peacekeeping operation in
Sierra  Leone  was  at  risk,31 the  United  States

quickly responded to ECOWAS’s appeal with
Operation Focus Relief (OFR), in which it trained
and equipped seven battalions from ECOWAS
member states (five from Nigeria and one each
from Ghana and Senegal) to serve in UNAMSIL.
OFR involved the provision of much more mili-
tary  equipment  than  ACRI,  including  lethal
equipment,  which  contributed  to  the  higher
cost  of  the  operation  in  a  shorter  period  of
time.32 Medical equipment was also provided
and instruction included human rights train-
ing. Furthermore, any military personnel impli-
cated in human rights violations could not ben-
efit  from  the  training  (for  that  purpose  each
country had to provide documentation about
the proposed recipients of OFR training and the
United  States  would  then  start  a  vetting
process).  Apparently,  OFR-trained  forces  (at
least the Nigerian units, which did not enjoy the
best reputation) were credited with being better
disciplined  and  more  skilled.  Before  the  May
2002 elections in Sierra Leone, the lethal equip-
ment provided under OFR had been accounted
for and not misused, according to US officials.  
US  interest  and  engagement  in  Africa
declined  under  the  Bush  administration,  but
that was soon to change after the 11 September
attacks (and attacks on US targets and interests
in  East  African  countries).  The  renewed  US
interest in the region had two major foci: on the
one  hand,  Africa  emerged  as  an  alternative
source of oil and gas to reduce US dependency
on energy from the Gulf,33 on the other, under
the  counterterrorism  policy  of  the  United
States,  Africa  (East  Africa  in  particular)  had
emerged as a region of concern. Weak states in
Africa are perceived as prominent candidates for
terrorist attacks, recruitment, fundraising and

29 Training in Uganda and Ivory Coast was suspended due to the political and human rights considerations. Ethiopia was also on the list
of countries that would benefit from ACRI, but because of the war with Eritrea, training was never initiated. 
30 Those changes, plus focusing on training trainers, were introduced in the Kenya ACRI programme.
31 In May 2002, 500 blue helmets were detained in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front. The force commander of the UN
peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) had long complained about the quality of the peacekeeping forces serving in the mission (ill-equipped and
poorly trained).
32 OFR lasted for only 15 months, but its financial costs were almost at the level of ACRI during the five years of the programme. 
33 Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 15-18 per cent of US oil imports. That share could well increase in the coming years with an increase
in the production capacity of countries in the region, Nigeria in particular (it has the largest oil reserves in the region). On the issue of renewed
US (and European powers) strategic interest in Africa see namely Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance’, Survival,
vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 153-72.

23

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

money-laundering. In June 2003, the US admin-
istration announced the East Africa Counterter-
rorism  Initiative,  aimed  at  increasing  the
regional  counterterrorism  capacities  of  Dji-
bouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda.  A  package  of  $100  million  was  allo-
cated  to  this  initiative  over  a  period  of  15
months. That is indicative of the importance the
United States attributes to counterterrorism in
comparison to other aims of its African policy.
Although one of the stated US policy objectives
in Africa is to increase African capacity to pre-
vent, mitigate, and resolve crisis, conflict and
regional instability, the financial support given
to the latter is considerably less significant if one
takes the case of the new ACOTA programme
($10 million for 2002).34

When ACRI ended in 2002, the United States
adopted a new programme – the African Contin-
gency  Operations  Training  and  Assistance
(ACOTA) – as well as other smaller programmes
with a regional focus that, like ACOTA and pre-
viously ACRI, are aimed at increasing African
capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts and
regional instability. 

The  objectives  of  the  new  programme,

ACOTA, as put by US officials are: 
(cid:90) to  train  and  equip  African  militaries  to
respond  to  peace  support  and  complex
humanitarian requirements; 

(cid:90) to  build  and  enhance  sustainable  African

peace support training capacity;

(cid:90) to build effective command and control;
(cid:90) to provide commonality and interoperability;
(cid:90) to enhance international, regional and sub-
regional peace support capacity in Africa.

ACOTA is also meant to be more flexible and
tailored  to  each  country’s  needs,  following  a
country’s  capacity  and  needs  assessment.  Its
main focus will be on training African trainers,
in order to create a self-sustaining indigenous
training capacity and be more adapted to the
country’s  capabilities  and  needs;  it  will  also

include support to African training institutions
(in  coordination  with  European  partners).
Training will be adapted to the requirements of
the operational environment in Africa, which
often requires operations more robust than just
peacekeeping or (UN Charter) Chapter VI-type
operations. The equipment to be provided will
vary accordingly and recipients will retain the
materiel.  Another  distinctive  element  of
ACOTA  is  its  greater  subregional  emphasis.
ACOTA is expected to provide support to subre-
gional security structures.35

Another initiative following essentially the
same lines is the West Africa Stabilisation Pro-
gramme (WASP), which focuses essentially on
enhancing  the  capabilities  of  West  African
countries.  A  Pan-Sahelian  Initiative  has  also
received funding (but no lethal equipment or
even  ammunition  is  foreseen),  but  it  is  more
focused on strengthening Sahelian countries’
ability  to  counter  terrorism,  namely  through
more effective control of their territories. 

With  regard  to  support  to  African  subre-
gional organisations, prior to 2001 this was not
really a priority or a main trend in US African
policy.  OAU  and  ECOMOG  (rather  than
ECOWAS as an institution) had however bene-
fited,  prior  to  that,  from  US  assistance.  Ever
since  the  creation  of  the  OAU  Mechanism  in
1993, the United States has been an important
contributor, including to the OAU Peace Fund,
namely to help develop the Conflict Manage-
ment Centre. The little progress by OAU since
then  has  not  attracted  further  institutional
funding. The United States has, however, con-
tinued financially to support OAU peacekeep-
ing operations. It also funded ECOMOG opera-
tions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 2001, the US
approach  towards  subregional  organisations
started to change: ECOWAS and EAC officials
participated  in  different  ACRI  multinational
exercises in 2001 and 2002. The ACOTA pro-
gramme seems likely to reinforce that trend, but
it is too soon to tell. 

34 For an overview of the current Administration’s policy on Africa see http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/26772.htm.
35 ‘African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)’, presentation made to the G8/Africa Workshop on ‘The Development
of African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations’, Berlin, 26-27 September 2002.

24

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

The United States has also funded and/or
assisted in regional peacekeeping training exer-
cises led by African countries/organisations, as
well as in training exercises organised by Euro-
pean partners. On the other hand, in the sum-
mer of 2003, the United States stationed 2,300
marines off the coast of Liberia. American pres-
sure led to President Taylor’s resignation and
the establishment of ECOMIL, a UN peacekeep-
ing force to supervise transition. 

Other bilateral initiatives
Beyond the above-mentioned programmes by
France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United
States, a number of other similar bilateral initia-
tives exist. They are more limited in scope and in
the financial means made available, but some-
times no less important in the reinforcement of
African countries and regional or subregional
organisations’ capabilities to prevent and deal
with conflicts. In some cases, these bilateral ini-
tiatives allowed African peacekeeping or peace
enforcement missions to be conducted and/or
sustained. 

Bilateral initiatives generally focus on some

of the following activities/policies: 
(cid:90) support to UN and regional or subregional
peacekeeping missions in Africa, whether by
contributing  peacekeepers  or  providing
logistics  and/or
financial,  equipment, 
humanitarian  support  to  those  missions.
Almost every European and many non-Euro-
pean  countries  (including  Russia,  China,
Japan, India, Bangladesh, Korea, Australia,
Canada, Brazil, among others) have in one
way or another provided support to peace-
keeping missions in Africa, either directly to
the UN or by providing timely and meaning-
ful support to African troops participating in
peacekeeping missions in the continent who
lack the necessary capabilities. Support to
the latter often translates into logistic sup-
port  (like  supporting  the  deployment  of
their  forces  and  equipment  in  longer  dis-
tances), providing adequate equipment for

certain  types  of  missions,  sometimes  even
basic equipment, or financial support (for
instance, paying the wages of African troops).
Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany  and  the
Netherlands are some of the countries that
have  given  significant  contributions  to
African  countries  participating  in  peace-
keeping missions in Africa. Within efforts to
support peacekeeping in Africa (but also for
all sorts of relief and humanitarian emergen-
cies), it is interesting to mention NOREPS,
the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness Sys-
tem, which entails stocking humanitarian-
related  equipment  (communications  and
medical  equipment  and  supplies,  rations,
tents, etc.) in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and
Uganda. 

(cid:90) direct financial assistance to African regional
and  subregional  organisations.  Many  pro-
vide  financial  assistance  to  the  AU  Peace
Fund  (e.g.,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,
Japan,  Norway,  Sweden,  to  name  some
important contributors), but also to African
subregional  organisations  like  ECOWAS,
IGAD or SADC (Nordic countries are partic-
ularly active supporters). 

(cid:90) supporting  or  assisting  in  peacekeeping
training  for  African  forces,  in  the  donor
countries and/or in African countries. This is
done  by  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Fin-
land,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,
Norway,  Portugal  and  Sweden.  Norway  is
financing  ($2.5  million)  a  5-year  training
project for peace in Southern Africa aimed at
building capacity for conflict management
and peacekeeping.  The project covers civilian
and political aspects of peacekeeping, civil-
military  relations  and  specialised  training
for civilian police. Norway has considered a
similar  programme  also  for  West  Africa.
Denmark  has,  among  other  forms  of  sup-
port, built peacekeeping training facilities in
Zimbabwe and provided courses on defence
management  to  southern  African  forces,
supporting  efforts  to  develop  indigenous
conflict resolution strategies. 

25

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

(cid:90) support (financial, logistics or equipment)
to peacekeeping training exercises by African
subregional organisations. Sweden, Canada,
Belgium,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands  and
Norway are among those who have actively
supported training exercises by African sub-
regional organisations.

(cid:90) mediation.  Norway  is  certainly  becoming
prominent in mediation efforts, not just in
Africa but elsewhere in the world.  Portugal
too, with its very limited financial and mili-
tary  means,  has  to  some  extent  privileged
mediation  efforts  in  its  former  African
colonies (namely in Angola and in Guinea-
Bissau through CPLP) as a means to support
peace efforts in the region. 

(cid:90) conflict prevention initiatives by African civil
society. There seem to be fewer donor coun-
tries supporting such type of initiatives, but
on the other hand, these are often included in
development efforts rather than in conflict-
related policies. They also fall less into the
official domain of state-to-state cooperation
and involve essentially or for the most part
non-governmental  actors.  Some  countries
do, however, underline such type of initia-
tives in their peace-related efforts in Africa.
That is at least the case of Sweden, which has
also been, within the EU, a great promoter of
the development and reinforcement of EU
conflict prevention policy.

Some countries tend to focus their activities
in certain subregions of the African continent
(e.g. Denmark and Norway tend to concentrate
on the SADC region, although they conduct or
support activities also in other African regions).
Others, like Germany, do not have a particular
regional focus and their activities encompass all
regions  of  Africa.  Countries  with  a  colonial 
history in Africa – such as Belgium, Portugal and
maybe to a lesser extent Italy – tend to concen-
trate their efforts or develop their programmes

more  in  their  former  colonies  or  areas  of 
influence.

3.3 Multilateral initiatives

At the United Nations level (including UN agen-
cies),  there  are  various  initiatives  regarding
Africa, but generally they do not focus on build-
ing  African  capabilities  to  deal  with  conflict-
related situations. General policies in the area of
development  do  include  increasingly  a  peace
and security dimension, but their primary focus
is on conflict prevention. The UN is making an
increasing effort to coordinate its different poli-
cies and programmes for Africa. That is the main
task of the UN Special Adviser on Africa (since
1994),  who  makes  the  link  between  develop-
ment and humanitarian aid, and political and
security departments in the UN.36 More recently
(in  2000),  the  UN  created  an  Office  for  West
Africa that brings together security and develop-
ment instruments for that specific region. The
UN has also developed instruments specifically
aimed at preventing conflict and building peace.
In 2001 it developed early warning indicators (a
task  for  the  UN  Office  for  Coordination  of
Humanitarian Affairs). It has engaged in build-
ing local capacity to prevent conflict. It created
Peace-Building  Support  Offices  in  African
countries that were affected by conflicts, and
where peace is still fragile (e.g. Guinea-Bissau,
CAR), whose role is to develop integrated peace-
building and conflict prevention strategies with
all  local  actors  through  confidence-building,
political  stabilisation,  electoral  support  and
coordination of donor efforts. It also adopted
various resolutions and action programmes tar-
geting activities that threaten peace and security
in various parts of Africa, like the proliferation
of small arms and light weapons and mercenary
activities, and the often related trade in conflict
diamonds,37 and imposed sanctions on these

36 For more information on UN activities in Africa see namely http://www.un.org/esa/africa/index.htm. 
37 In July 2001, the UN Conference on the ‘Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’ adopted a Programme of Action
to  combat  such  activities.  See  also  the  UNSC  Resolution  1467  (2003).  On  the  role  of  conflict  diamonds,  the  UN  General  Assembly
approved a resolution in 2000 (UNGA Res. 55/56(2000)) and again in 2002 (UNGA Res. 56/263(2002)) targeting the role played by the
illicit  trade  in  rough  diamonds  in  fuelling  conflict.  On  the  issue  of  conflict  diamonds  see  also  the  Kimberley  process  website
(http://www.kimberleyprocess.com).

26

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

and other activities that were preventing the set-
tlement of conflicts.  

Although conflict prevention is a major pri-
ority for the UN, it is nevertheless important to
underline its conflict-resolution efforts, partic-
ularly in mediation (namely through UN special
representatives),  and  in  its  commitment  to
peacekeeping, which has increased again since
1999 (see Annex 2 for a list of current UN peace-
related operations in Africa). Indeed, UN Secre-
tary-General  Kofi  Annan  has  shown  a  keen
interest in tackling hard issues in Africa. Ever
since his 1998 report on the causes of conflict
and the promotion of durable and sustainable
development in Africa, the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral has regularly stressed the urgent need to
tackle problems in Africa (e.g. the 1999 supple-
mentary report on development in Africa, the
Millenium  report),  not  only  through  the  UN
and  its  agencies,  but  also  by  calling  on  other
forums,  and  by  engaging  in  cooperation  and
partnership with other organisations/institu-
tions (e.g. the EU, the OSCE, the G-8, the AU and
subregional African organisations). 

Some critics point out, however, that the UN
has been doing far less than it could to develop
African capabilities for crisis management and
resolution, particularly with regard to regional
and  subregional  organisations  in  Africa.  The
UNSC has relied too much on ‘burden-sharing’
with African regional and subregional organisa-
tions which suffer at least from the same if not
greater constraints than the UN itself, without
providing  them  with  the  necessary  guidance
and support for peace operations. The UN Sec-
retary General’s argument that the UN cannot
do  everything  is  understandable,  but  critics
argue that the UN could nevertheless provide
African-led missions with people who are spe-
cialised  and  experienced  in  conflict  manage-
ment and resolution. It is, however, important
to  note  that  UN  peacekeeping  missions  have
been a good ‘school’ for many African forces.
Some  African  countries  have  been  important
contributors to UN peacekeeping missions in
Africa and elsewhere in the world, particularly
since the 1990s. 

Financial  incentives  may  have  been  at  the
start  an  important  motivation,  but  the  huge
delays of UN pay back have not made it in the
end  an  attractive  deal,  financially  speaking.
More significantly, African military participa-
tion in UN operations (as well as in Western-led
multinational forces, like operations in Somalia
or in Rwanda) has allowed them to acquire expe-
rience, training and access to equipment, even if
it has not solved their major limitations (e.g.
their transportation capabilities or the ability to
sustain a sizeable force). 

The  UN  established  a  working  group  for
enhancing  peacekeeping  training  capacity  in
Africa that was reactivated in 2000, which could
provide a good forum for harmonisation and
coordination  of  international,  regional  and
bilateral efforts for building African capabilities
to address conflicts in Africa. UNDP has also
conducted a study to review the AU Mechanism
in  order  to  make  it  more  capable  and  opera-
tional. 

The OSCE has supported the monitoring of
arms proliferation in Africa at least since 1999
through the UN and subregional initiatives (e.g.
by ECOWAS). In 2002, OSCE and AU represen-
tatives met and the AU has since shown great
interest in maintaining contact and exchanging
information. The OSCE’s extensive experience
in areas such as crisis management, small arms
and light weapons, capacity-building measures,
combating terrorism, field activities and elec-
tion monitoring, are of interest to the AU and
African subregional organisations. 

The World Bank also regards conflict preven-
tion and post-war reconstruction as central to
poverty reduction, which is the major objective
of its activities. About 16 per cent of the Bank’s
total lending goes to mitigating the effects of
war.  In  1997,  it  established  a  Post-Conflict
Fund.  By  mid-2003,  there  were  95  projects
amounting to approximately $6.6 billion under
implementation in conflict-affected countries
in  Africa,  and  another  105  projects  worth 
$7 billion were under preparation. Besides pro-
viding financial support for post-conflict recon-
struction,  the  Bank  also  supports  institution

27

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

building,  good  governance,  measures  to
improve transparency in the trade of energy and
other commodities that are often linked to con-
flicts (e.g. diamonds, timber, precious metals).
The WB also manages a multi-donor Demobili-
sation and Reintegration Programme (of $500
million  for  2002-06),  which  includes  both
national and regional programmes (for exam-
ple, there is one for the Great Lakes region), as
well  as  programmes  targeting  special  groups
like child soldiers.38

Other multilateral organisations involving
African countries, like the Commonwealth, the
OIF or the CPLP, which are seen as pursuing
essentially development, cultural or linguistic
purposes, have become more politically critical
and involved in attempts to address and resolve
conflicts in Africa. 

The  Commonwealth has  in  the  last  decade
focused more on matters like respect for the rule of
law, good governance, democracy, human rights
and economic and social development. On a num-
ber of occasions it has sent electoral observer mis-
sions  to  Commonwealth  countries  (namely  to
South Africa in 1992, the Comoros in 1994 and to
the last elections in Zimbabwe). Its peacekeeping
assistance group has helped train African peace-
keeping forces and, although it does not have a
peacekeeping vocation, it assists and coordinates
African states in organising their efforts.  

The  OIF,  created  in  1970  as  an  informal
arrangement, and institutionalised as an organi-
sation since 1986, has become more involved in
conflict prevention, management and resolution
since 1998, but its efforts focus more on media-
tion  and  conciliation  attempts  (Comoros,
Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Togo). It has
also  sent  election  observation  teams  on 
several occasions. It does not seem willing, how-
ever, to engage in peacekeeping or in supporting
African peacekeeping efforts. It has essentially
become  more  political,  but  not  with  an 
operational vocation.

CPLP39 was established in 1996 as an organi-
sation  to  promote  cooperation  between  Por-
tuguese-speaking  countries  and  concerted
political and diplomatic efforts. It is not only
aimed at the promotion of the Portuguese lan-
guage. In accordance with its guiding principles,
CPLP is also committed to peace, democracy,
rule of law, human rights and social justice. Yet
CPLP was seen mostly as a ‘cultural’ organisa-
tion based on a common language. That percep-
tion only started to change in 1998 with the cri-
sis  in  Guinea-Bissau,  and  the  mediation
attempts by the organisation under the lead of
Portugal. That mediation was actually quite suc-
cessful, at least in the earlier stages of the crisis,
in that it managed to achieve a cease-fire agree-
ment in July 1998. Although it did not provide
for a general peace plan, it probably prevented
regional escalation of the conflict. The media-
tion role played by CPLP in Guinea-Bissau was
later shared with ECOWAS, which ended up tak-
ing the lead. ECOWAS was willing to deploy a
large interposition force of 5,000 men (although
less than a thousand were actually deployed and
at a very slow pace), while the CPLP put forward
a small military observer mission of 150 men.
The diverging priorities of CPLP member states,
the lack of a common strategy and financial and
organisational constraints on the formation of a
peacekeeping  force  CPLP  was  sidelined  by
ECOWAS  in  mediation  and  peacekeeping
efforts in Guinea-Bissau.40 However, the organ-
isation is still engaged in the stabilisation of the
situation in the country. In July 2003 it nomi-
nated the Nobel Peace Prize-winner and Foreign
Affairs Minister of East Timor, Ramos Horta, as
its special envoy and mediator to Guinea-Bissau.
CPLP played an important role again in Guinea-
Bissau in the aftermath of the last coup in Sep-
tember 2003 and it now plans to send an elec-
toral observation mission to the elections that
are expected to be held in March 2004.

38 More  information  on  WB  activities  related  to  the  prevention  of  conflicts  and  reconstruction  can  be  found  in  WB  website  in
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/conflict.htm.
39 The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP in its Portuguese abbreviation) includes Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, East Timor,
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São-Tomé and Principe. 
40 On the role of CPLP in the crisis in Guinea-Bissau, see Norrie MacQueen. ‘A Community of Ilusions? Portugal, the CPLP and Peacemaking
in Guinea-Bissau’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 1-26.

28

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa 

The organisation has also stated its willing-
ness to help stabilise the situation in São Tomé
and  Principe,  in  coordination  with  regional
organisations.41 In July 1998, at sectoral meet-
ings of the CPLP, an initiative to train and pre-
pare military units for humanitarian and peace
missions was approved, as well as the creation of
a  Centre  for  Strategic  Analysis  in  Maputo
(Mozambique). In 1999, there was agreement to
create  a  peacekeeping  force  to  participate  in
humanitarian operations. In the last Ministerial
Council of the CPLP (July 2003), reference was
made to the discussions of the defence ministers
of the member countries and their consensus on
the role of the organisation in the prevention
and  management  of  regional  crisis:  there  are
plans for the elaboration of a General Protocol
of Cooperation to reinforce CPLP capacities in
that  sense.  Military  exercises  will  be  held  to
develop peace support and humanitarian opera-
tions, The Centre for Strategic Analysis will con-
tribute to the exchange of information among
strategic and military information services. 

Other informal arrangements also address to
some extent peace and security issues in Africa
(e.g. the P-3 Initiative, Franco-African summits,
Franco-British summits, the G-8), or attempt to
harmonise and coordinate bilateral policies. 

France, the United Kingdom and the United
States  began  efforts  towards  coordination  of
their bilateral initiatives only in May 1997 with
the so-called ‘P-3 Initiative’ that later in the year
expanded to other interested states. The P-3 Ini-
tiative not only coordinates programmes, but
has also begun a dialogue with African countries
on how best to promote peace and security on
the continent, and aims to foster and harmonise
donor assistance at this level.

France  and  the  United  Kingdom  have
attempted  to  further  their  cooperation  and
coordination  since  the  St-Malo  meeting  in
December 1998 by exchanging information and
sharing  embassies  and  functions  in  Africa,
although  that  initiative  is  more  directed
towards conflict prevention than towards con-
flict resolution. Their commitment to coopera-
tion in Africa was reaffirmed in their last summit
in November 2003 and extends to other areas like
peacekeeping  training  for  African  forces  and
support for subregional organisations.42

The  Nordic  countries  (Denmark,  Finland,
Norway and Sweden) are also coordinating their
efforts  in  peacekeeping  training  for  African
forces and in developing a common capacity-
building  strategy  for  the  southern  African
region. 

The  Organisation  for  Economic  Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) has also made
significant efforts to coordinate and harmonise
donors’ policies towards developing countries
in support of conflict prevention. In 1995 a spe-
cial task force was created by the OECD Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) to look at
how development cooperation could best sup-
port  conflict  prevention.  In  1997,  the  DAC
adopted policy guidelines on conflict, peace and
development cooperation and in 2001 it added
further  orientations  for  external  partners  to
help prevent conflicts.43

The G-8, at its Evian (France) summit of June
2003, agreed to help finance the creation, train-
ing and equipping of African standby brigades
by  2010,  under  the  direction  of  the  AU  and
African subregional organisations. It remains to
be  seen  whether  this  long-term  project  bears
fruit.

41 In July 2003, a brief coup overthrew the elected president. A week later, and with the mediation of the Nigerian president, a deal was
brokered between the government and the rebels, and the president was reinstated. Distribution of future oil revenues seems to have been
at the origin of the coup and probably also at the centre of the negotiations that resolved it.
42 See the Declaration on Franco-British Co-operation in Africa, Franco-British Summit, November 2003. 
43 For more information on DAC conflict-related guidelines see OECD, 2001, The DAC Guidelines. Helping prevent violent conflict; accessible at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf.

29

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

30

EU policy towards Africa

E uropean policy towards Africa has existed

ever since the European integration process
started.44 That policy was very much influenced
by the colonial links some of its member states
had  with  newly  independent  African  states.
However,  EU  policy  towards  the  region  has
evolved significantly, particularly since the end
of the Cold War. What was an almost exclusive
focus on economic and social development has
increasingly developed into a more complex and
comprehensive  policy,  where  the  political
dimension has gained importance, partly due to
the recognition of the ‘failure’ of development
policies or impact on the development of the
recipient countries. The link between peace, sta-
bility,  development  and  respect  for  human
rights,  rule  of  law,  democratic  principles  and
good governance was reinforced in EU coopera-
tion and development policies towards Africa,
either in bilateral (the EU has concluded Associ-
ation  Agreements  with  practically  all  African
countries)  and  multilateral  agreements  with
African countries.

Current relations between the EU and coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa take place first and
foremost within the framework of the Cotonou
Agreement and are based on three main pillars:
political dialogue, trade and economic coopera-
tion, and development aid. The Cotonou Agree-
ment tries to address the shortcomings of previ-

ous  agreements  by  reinforcing  the  political
dimensions of ACP-EU cooperation, namely by
enhancing the importance of respect for human
rights, democratic principles, rule of law and
good  governance,45 of  civil  society  participa-
tion, and of the need to address issues such as
the reinforcement of capacities for conflict pre-
vention and management activities. 

Since the early 1990s, the issue of conflicts in
Africa has gained particular importance in the
overall EU policy towards Africa and has been
the  subject  of  intense  discussions  within  the
European Union and with other international
partners (the OECD, the UN and OAU, among
others). Following these discussions, triggered
by a number of factors including the increasing
number of violent conflicts in Africa and the
willingness of regional organisations to tackle
these problems, in 1994, France and the United
Kingdom presented to the EU a joint non-paper
on ‘Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in
Africa’, suggesting in particular measures the
EU (and then also the Western European Union)
could take to support African capacities for con-
flict prevention and resolution.46 These changes
in approach happened at a time when the EU
was trying to have a greater political and security
role in world affairs. It was developing its Com-
mon  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and
advancing the means through which it could

44 Cooperation with African countries exists ever since the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community in 1957. In the
aftermath of decolonisation, those relations were institutionalised in the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-69, 1969-75), later replaced by the
Lomé Agreements enlarged also to Caribbean and Pacific countries.  In June 2000, in Cotonou (Benin), the ACP states and the EU signed
a new partnership agreement, named after the city where it was signed. 
45 The respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are ‘essential elements’ of the ACP-EU partnership in the Cotonou
agreement; their violation can lead to a suspension of aid. Good governance is a ‘fundamental element’ of the partnership. 
46 For  more  information  on  this,  see  Martin  Landgraf,  ‘Peace-building  and  conflict  prevention  in  Africa:  a  view  from  the  European
Commission’,  in  Ulf  Engel  and  Andreas  Mehler  (eds.),  Gewaltsame  Konflikte  und  ihre  Prävention  in  Afrika (Hamburg:  Institute  for  African
Affairs, 1998).

4

31

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

engage in activities with defence implications.47
Since 1995, the issue of conflict prevention
has  often  been  addressed  by  the  European
Council (in Council declarations, conclusions
of Council meetings, adoption of common posi-
tions and Council decisions48) and by the Com-
mission, which in 1996 issued its first Commu-
nication  to  the  Council  on  the  subject.49 EU
official documents on conflicts in Africa stress
the following key elements that constitute the
basis of EU policy with regard to conflict pre-
vention and resolution in Africa: 
(cid:90) African  pre-eminence  and  ‘ownership’  in
conflict prevention, management and reso-
lution in the region; 

(cid:90) EU commitment to support efforts in favour
of the prevention and resolution of conflicts
in Africa – a priority aim of the CFSP – in
close  cooperation  with  relevant  bodies,
namely  the  UN,  OAU  and  African  subre-
gional organisations; 

(cid:90) assistance for building African capacity to
prevent and deal with conflicts, through the
OAU and subregional organisations;

(cid:90) developing a pro-active, comprehensive and
integrated  approach,  enhancing  coordina-
tion between EU and member states’ efforts
and policies, and making coherent use of EU
instruments to best address the root causes
of violent conflicts and to support of conflict
prevention and resolution in Africa; 

(cid:90) focusing  primarily  on  conflict  prevention,
while addressing the whole cycle of conflict
and peace;

(cid:90) while privileging non-military actions, the
EU does not exclude the need to use military
means in upholding EU commitment to sup-
port peace-related efforts.  

Prior to its integration into EU structures,
the Western European Union (WEU) had also
been  discussing  ways  of  supporting  African
peacekeeping  capabilities  since  1995.  Some
areas of assistance were identified – provision of
equipment,  logistic  means  and  communica-
tions, training of personnel – but that support
never materialised for lack of either consensus
or political will.50 WEU often mentioned the
possibility of participating in missions in Africa
in  the  framework  of  the  Petersberg  Declara-
tion,51 but this never happened. 

4.1 A new EU development
policy or the ‘politicisation’
of aid?

EU  policy  on  conflict  prevention  puts  great
emphasis on addressing the root causes of insta-
bility and violent conflict. It is therefore under-
standable that the EU would seek first of all to
address the shortcomings of its development
policy. According to some observers the EU has
put almost all its eggs in one basket: 

. . . consistently with the heavy imbalance of
resources in favour of the Commission [as
compared with the Council Secretariat], the
EU is staking much on the contributions of
development cooperation and democrati-
sation  to  conflict  prevention  (through
peace  building).  Although  the  balance  is
slowly shifting, this has tended to give EU
conflict prevention thinking a dispropor-
tionately heavy focus on economics, human
rights and democratisation to the neglect of
diplomatic  conflict  prevention  measures

47 In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht replaced European Political Cooperation with a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It outlined the
(five) fundamental objectives for EU external policy action and set the framework for the development of policies with defence implications
through recourse to WEU. Later in 1992, the Petersberg Declaration stated the type of military/defence activities WEU could engage in, the
so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’.
48 A list of the main Council documents on the issue is given at the end of the paper, in ‘documents and bibliographic references’.
49 ‘The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’, 06/03/1996COM, SEC(96)
332. Other important communications from the Commission on the issue or related matters are listed in ‘documents and bibliographic
references’. 
50 UEO, ‘Note d’évaluation de l’initiative de l’UEO en matière de maintien de la paix en Afrique’, C(00)70, 13 avril 2000. 
51 In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers stated that forces from member states could be used for
‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’.

32

EU policy towards Africa

that seek to significantly alter the political
dynamics of an emerging conflict.52

The  European  Union  is  the  world’s  largest
provider of official development assistance and
humanitarian aid, and the major donor to Africa.
According to OECD data, in 2001, about 55 per
cent of total world aid was provided by the EU (EC
and member states combined),53 and more than
40 per cent of EU aid and humanitarian assistance
goes to Africa.54 EU relations with Africa are not
just limited to aid, though. Other instruments –
trade and political and financial – are also of great
importance in relations with the continent. 

In the last few years, there has been an increas-
ing effort within the EU to improve coherence
between its various instruments in the interests of
more  effective  action,  namely  by  pursuing  a
greater coordination between the Commission
Directorates dealing with foreign relations (Exter-
nal Relations, Enlargement, Trade, Development
and Humanitarian Aid) and streamlining conflict
prevention policies towards Africa (and develop-
ing countries in general). There is particular con-
cern, in some circles within EU institutions and
among some external actors, about the possible
undesired  impact  of  EU  common  policies  on
developing countries, in so far as those might con-
tribute (directly or indirectly) to local crises and
eventual conflicts. That is particularly true with
regard to trade, which is often perceived as being
less ‘development-friendly’, in that trade meas-
ures can sometimes have a negative impact on
local economic life and the social fabric, under-
mining stability and possibly even fuelling con-
flict where stability is already very fragile.    

Reform efforts include a simplification of EU
procedures  that  are  often  too  complex  and
lengthy, to say the least, and are not compatible
with the need to quickly disburse funds in order to
respond to situations of emergency, imminent cri-
sis or immediate post-conflict needs. In 2001 the
Council thus decided on the establishment of a
Rapid  Reaction  Mechanism  (RRM)55 allowing
the Commission to make use of available funds
without having to go through the bureaucratic
procedures normally required for the approval of
a development programme (which take, in aver-
age, about 18 months). The RRM has a separate
budget of €25 million per year and can be used in
a wide range of areas of EU cooperation, including
areas which are essentially political and/or emer-
gency-related  (namely  human  rights,  election
monitoring, institution building, media support,
border  management,  judiciary,  police  training
and provision of police equipment, pacification,
resettlement,  mediation,  civil  emergency  assis-
tance, rehabilitation and reconstruction). Unlike
humanitarian  aid,  which  is  meant  to  relieve
human suffering, the RRM aims to preserve or re-
establish civic structures necessary for political,
social and economic stability. It is therefore meant
to be a crisis management tool and, in that sense, it
is essentially political in nature: it allows quick
implementation of activities that can, directly or
indirectly, influence a crisis situation or a deterio-
rating political context.56

The  RRM  is  managed  by  a  unit  within  the
External Relations Directorate General (RELEX)
dealing with Conflict Prevention, Crisis Manage-
ment and ACP countries political issues, created
in late 2000.57 The role of this unit is to pursue

52 International Crisis Group. EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, 26 June 2001. IGC
Issues Report no. 2, Brussels, p. ii.
53 Out of the almost $58 billion of world aid in 2001, more than 32 billion was provided by the EC and EU member states. OECD data
can be accessed at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd.
54 Communication from the Commission to the Council. The EU-Africa dialogue. 23/6/2003. COM(2003) 316 final, p. 2.
55 EC Regulation no. 381/2001, 26 February 2001; available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/rrm.pdf.
56 On this issue and for more information and analysis on the overall issue of development and conflicts see Felix Nkundabagenzi & Federico
Santopinto, Le développement, une arme de paix (Bruxelles: Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), 2003).
57 It was first created as a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. The Africa (and ACP) expertise was added later into the unit.
This is seen by some as a means of DG RELEX increasing its role in relations with ACP countries, which have been and still are the domain
of DG Development, although to a lesser extent since the creation of EUROPAID who is now responsible for the implementation of DG DEV
(and DG RELEX) projects. As the reform process continues, there is some talk of a possible fusion between DGs RELEX and DEV.

33

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

conflict prevention goals within the work of the
Commission. It is interesting to note that a con-
flict prevention unit was initially created within
DG Development (DG DEV) in the second half of
the 1990s, and that the first Commission com-
munication on the issue related to conflicts in
Africa. 

The  Commission’s  efforts  to  mainstream
conflict  prevention  policies  into  overall  EU
external action (at the Community and inter-
governmental levels) were further reinforced by
the Commission Communication of 2001 on
Conflict  Prevention  (replacing  the  previous
communication  of  1996)  and  the  EU  Pro-
gramme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,
endorsed by the Göteborg Council of June 2001. 
Efforts to enhance coordination between EU
and member states’ policies have also been high
on the agenda. That is in principle a role for the
Heads  of  Mission  of  EC  delegations  in  third
countries,  whose  powers  and  resources  have
been reinforced by the ‘deconcentration’ policy
that has been gradually implemented since late
2001. As actors on the ground, delegations are
also expected to play an important role in the EU
conflict  prevention  and  management  policy.
Efforts are under way to coordinate donor sup-
port (within the EU but also with other donors)
to  the  AU,  and  the  aim  is  to  pursue  similar
efforts at the subregional level.

4.2 Developing African
regional and subregional
institutions and capabilities

In line with one of the principles of EU policy on
this matter – African leadership and ownership
in conflict prevention, management and resolu-
tion – the EU has actively engaged in political
dialogue with, and support of regional and sub-

regional organisations in Africa. Since 1994 the
EU  started  political  dialogue  (formalised  in
1996) with the OAU, which is seen as comple-
mentary  to  existing  dialogue  at  bilateral  and
regional  levels.  The  EU  has  shown  particular
interest in supporting the Organisation’s peace
and security efforts. It has therefore supported
the development of its Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution, and
provided financial support to the Peace Fund
and  early  warning  system,  as  well  as  institu-
tional support to the organisation. But effective
actions fell well short of expectations, partly due
to limitations on the part of both the EU and the
OAU.58 However,  since  2000,  EU-Africa  dia-
logue  and  cooperation  have  gained  a  new
momentum. 

The Africa-Europe Summit (its first meeting
was held in Cairo in April 2000, following a Por-
tuguese proposal) has, on the one hand, con-
firmed the slow progress made since the mid-
1990s, but on the other hand renewed the com-
mitment of the parties to cooperate, inter alia, in
the areas of conflict prevention, management
and  resolution,  and  peace-building.  Some
actions concerning these aims are already under
way.59

The launching of NEPAD in 2001 and the
official establishment of the African Union in
2002 have further boosted cooperation with the
African states’ commitment to playing a more
proactive and effective role in dealing with the
problems of the continent. Reactions in Brus-
sels and in European capitals in general have
been quite positive. The EU considers the AU to
be the central organisation for peace, security
and regional integration on the African conti-
nent. In April 2002, a programme in support of
AU peace-building and transition activities was
signed. Its prime objective is to fund the opera-
tional activities of the Peace and Security Coun-
cil. The programme will also reinforce the AU’s

58 Nkundabagenzi, 1998, op. cit. in note 9, pp. 14-15.
59 The  Action  Plan  of  the  Africa-Europe  Summit  (Cairo,  3-4  April  2000)  refers  namely  to  the  reinforcement  of  the  OAU  Mechanism,
strengthening capacities and efficiency of the Conflict Management Centre, operationalising the OAU early warning system, providing
political,  financial  and  equipment  support  to  peace  efforts  in  the  region,  support  disarmament,  demobilisation  and  reintegration
programmes, fight against the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons, and combat the use of anti-personnel landmines.

34

EU policy towards Africa

capacity-building  in  transitional  phases.60 It
will first and foremost finance AU mediation
and peace monitoring activities (as is the case
with  the  AU  observation  mission  in  Burundi
that  is  currently  funded  under  the  European
Commission’s RRM), but it could include sup-
port  to  peacekeeping  training,  and  logistical
and  financial  support  for  the  deployment  of
African peacekeepers. 

In November 2003, it was agreed that the EU-
Africa dialogue would be restructured around
four common priority clusters, including peace
and security issues.61 A stronger commitment
to EU support for African organisations, capa-
bilities  and  efforts  to  deal  with  crisis  in  the
region was made at the General Affairs Council
of 17 November 2003, where the EU approved a
draft  decision  (to  be  adopted  by  the  ACP-EU
Council of Ministers) on the use of European
Development Fund (EDF) resources for the cre-
ation of a Peace Facility for Africa in line with the
request made by the African Union and a Com-
mission proposal made in a recent Communica-
tion on EU-Africa dialogue.62 The Peace Facility
will support African-led operations and build
African institutions’ long-term capacity to carry
out  such  operations.  The  Commission  will 
propose  to  the  EDF  Committee  a  budget  of
€250 million from the EDF to enable the Peace
Facility to become operational before the end of
2004.63

The European Council on 12 December 2003
confirmed and reiterated its support for such
developments  as  well  as  its  commitment  to
peace efforts in Africa:  

Ministerial Troika in Rome on 10 Novem-
ber 2003.

The  European  Council  welcomes  the
developing partnership between the EU, the
UN,  the  African  Union  and  subregional
African organisations in the field of conflict
prevention,  conflict  management  and
through
development, 
NEPAD.

in  particular 

In  this  context  the  European  Council
recognises  the  importance  of  restoring
peace and security in Africa as a pre-requi-
site  for  development  and  welcomes  the
establishment  of  a  Peace  Facility  for  the
financing  of  African  peace-supporting
operations, which will provide a significant
boost to Africans’ own ability to bring peace
to their continent.

The European Council reiterates that the
European  Union  remains  committed  to
supporting the peace processes on the con-
tinent such as in the Great Lakes, Liberia,
Côte  d’Ivoire,  Sudan,  Somalia,  Ethiopia-
Eritrea. It stresses the need to make use in a
coherent and coordinated manner of all the
instruments available to the EU, inter alia as
regards reconstruction, development and
ESDP. It welcomes the growing role played
by  the  African  Union  and  the  African 
subregional  organisations 
(ECOWAS,
IGAD, SADC) in this regard as well as in the
field of regional integration and develop-
ment.  (European  Council  Conclusions,
12 December 2003, paras. 75-78).

The European Council reaffirms the impor-
tance  of  the  partnership  with  Africa  and
welcomes  the  strengthening  of  the  EU-
Africa dialogue as indicated by the positive
and constructive outcome of the EU-Africa

The EU also has political dialogue with some
subregional African organisations - SADC and
ECOWAS – which is perceived as complemen-
tary to its dialogue with and support to the AU.
Political dialogue and cooperation with SADC

60 The EU allocated €10 million to activities of the Peace and Security Council and 2 million for institutional support of the AU transition
process.
61 The  other  three  are:  governance,  regional  integration  and  trade,  and  key  development  issues  (Final  communiqué  of  the  EU-Africa
Ministerial Troika, Rome, 10 November 2003). 
62 One of the Commission proposals is the pooling of EU aid, now scattered among different financial instruments, in support of an
‘operational EU-Africa Agenda’ if pan-African activities are to develop in the future. That ‘pool’ could help establish a continent-wide ‘Facility
for peace support operations’ to enable African partners to cover the costs of both peace support operations and capacity-building efforts
in this domain. ‘The EU-Africa dialogue’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(2003) 316 final, 23 June 2003. 
63 See the Council Conclusions of 17 November and 12 December 2003.

35

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

on peace- and security-related matters has been
hampered  by  internal  divisions  within  SADC
regarding the Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security Cooperation. The EU nevertheless pro-
vides financial support to SADC regional efforts
for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  conflict  in
Burundi and the peace process in DRC. Finally,
the EU supported ECOWAS peace efforts in the
region. It provided support to ECOMOG peace-
keeping forces in Liberia (1994-97), namely vehi-
cles, and coordinated when possible its develop-
ment  assistance  in  order  to  assist  ECOMOG
operations. The EU has also agreed to finance
the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Preven-
tion, Management and Resolution, peacekeep-
ing and security and other related peace efforts,
including the reinforcement of the capacity of
ECOWAS states and the Secretariat to control
the illicit proliferation of small arms and light
weapons.  Furthermore,  it  has  reaffirmed  its
commitment to continue its financial support
to the countries in the region that are still con-
solidating the peace process.64 The EU is also
supporting  IGAD  in  its  efforts  to  reach  and
implement a peace agreement in Sudan.

4.3 Coordination with other
international organisations
As mentioned before, the EU is engaged in coor-
dinating efforts with other international organ-
isations and other donors with regard to sup-
porting  peace-related  efforts  in  Africa,  at  the
institutional (e.g. support to the AU and subre-
gional  organisations)  and  operational  levels
(peacekeeping,  capacity-development,  etc.),
whether these are led by the international com-
munity or by regional or subregional African
organisations or actors. 

The EU recognises a primary role for the UN
in the management and resolution of conflicts
in Africa and elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that
the EU would engage in major peace efforts –
much  less  where  military  engagement  was
involved – outside the UN framework or with-
out  the  approval  or  endorsement  of  the  UN
Security Council. The EU is the largest financial
contributor to the UN system. It pays 37 per cent
of  the  UN’s  regular  budget,  more  than  two-
fifths of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations
and about half of all UN member states’ contri-
butions to UN funds and programmes, many
directly or indirectly related to peace and secu-
rity.65 The EU has also been urging the UN and
other countries to support African efforts and
ownership in securing peace and stability on the
continent. As the EU High Representative, Javier
Solana, put it in his speech on Africa at the UN
Security Council: 

‘African ownership’ can only function effec-
tively, when other countries and the United
Nations  help  to  enhance  African  institu-
tional capacities and closely cooperate with
them.66

Beyond the financial contribution of the EU
to the UN system and activities, the EU is getting
more engaged in crisis management. 2003 has
already  provided  two  major  examples  (out  of
four EU crisis management missions launched
in 2003, one of them in Africa67) of close collab-
oration between the EU and the UN in that area:
the handover of responsibilities from the UN
International Police Task Force to the EU Police
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January
2003, and the EU military Operation Artemis in
Bunia (DRC). Possible support for setting up an
integrated police unit in Kinshasa, at the request
of the UN and the DRC authorities, is under

64 ECOWAS-EU ministerial meeting of 15 October 2003.
65 EU, The Enlarging EU at the UN: Making Multilateralism Matter, January 2004.
66 EU Presidency Statement – HR Solana’s Speech on Africa at the Security Council, 29 January 2002, available on http://europa-eu-
un.org/article.asp?id=1116 .
67 The latest EU crisis management mission to be launched in 2003 is a police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(PROXIMA), launched on 15 December, the day Operation Concordia ended. 

36

EU policy towards Africa

consideration by the EU. Under the Italian Pres-
idency, on 24 September 2003 the EU and the
UN signed a declaration on cooperation in crisis
management. They agreed to establish a joint
consultative mechanism whose task will be to
examine  ways  and  means  to  enhance  mutual
coordination  and  compatibility  in  areas  like
planning, training, communications and regu-
lar  information  on  lessons  learned  and  best
practices.68

In the field of crisis management, the EU col-
laborates  closely  with  the  OSCE.  Although
OSCE areas of activity do not include Africa, its
experience in election monitoring, institution
building, confidence-building measures, small
and light weapons, among others, could be use-
ful  in  the  EU  dialogue  and  cooperation  with
African regional and subregional organisations. 
Collaboration with NATO in this particular
area has developed significantly since the start
of the negotiations on the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrange-
ments.69 Being more focused on the operational
level, it is meant to enhance EU capacities to con-
duct  crisis  management  operations  wherever
the EU considers necessary. So far, the use of
NATO assets and capabilities available to the EU
under  existing  EU-NATO  arrangements  have
only been used in Europe (military Operation
Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia),  but  there  is  in  principle  no  geo-
graphic constraint on EU-led operations (other
than operational constraints, which may help
explain the decision to limit EU-led peacekeep-
ing operations to a maximum distance of 4,000
km and humanitarian interventions to a maxi-
mum of 10,000 km). Those assets can in princi-
ple be used in whatever scenario or part of the
world the EU decides. In late November 2003,
both organisations conducted their first joint
Crisis Management Exercise to test how the EU

plans at the strategic politico-military level for a
possible  EU-led  operation  (in  a  ‘Petersberg
tasks’ scenario) with recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities where NATO as a whole is not
engaged. The focus of the exercise was on plan-
ning  prior  to  a  decision  to  take  action  and
deploy forces. 

Future collaboration between NATO and the
EU will depend very much on the evolution of
ESDP  and  the  relationship  between  the  two
organisations. Whatever the outcome, that col-
laboration is likely to develop further despite
the  political  differences  between  some  Euro-
pean  states  and  the  United  States,  as  well  as
between some EU member states. The more the
EU appears as a valid and capable partner, the
more the links are likely to develop, although
that does not exclude friction along the way.70

4.4 Shared views and priorities
between the Commission and
the Council?

Relations  between  the  Commission  and  the
Council, as well as between these two and the
European  Parliament,  have  on  various  occa-
sions been marked by differences of perspective
and priorities, often related to their different
but sometimes overlapping competences. 

The EU has a multitude of tools that range
from  economic  instruments  (economic  and
development  cooperation,  trade,  emergency,
reconstruction and rehabilitation aid) to legal
and political ones (political dialogue, mediation
or ESDP instruments) which allow it to address
in a comprehensive manner the root causes as
well as the immediate causes of conflict. As the
European Security Strategy, ‘A secure Europe in

68 On EU-UN cooperation see also the EU Presidency Statement on the review of peacekeeping operations, 16 October 2003; available on
http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2910.
69 The latest related agreement signed by NATO and the EU regards common standards to share classified information and be able to
consult and cooperate on security issues (NATO-EU Security of Information Agreement, 14 March 2003). 
70 For a point of view on this see Hans-Christian Hagman, ‘European Crisis Management and Defence: the Search for Capabilities’, Adelphi
Paper 353, 2002. 

37

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

a better world’ adopted by the European Coun-
cil in December 2003, has pointed out, this is a
quite unique advantage of the EU as compared
with other international actors. Furthermore,
unlike a single country (which can also dispose
of a varied range of instruments) the financial
means the EU can mobilise are certainly much
more significant. Other international organisa-
tions have the means, but few have such a variety
of complementary tools. Most of the afore-men-
tioned instruments the EU has at its disposal to
promote long-term peace and stability are man-
aged  by  the  European  Commission.  Instru-
ments falling within the CFSP (where the Com-
mission shares the right of initiative with the
Council) and ESDP (a fully intergovernmental
policy)  are 
responsibility
the  Council’s 
(although the CFSP budget is also managed by
the EC). 

The EU intervention in DRC was welcomed
by the Commission but it also raised some con-
cerns with regard to overall EU priorities in crisis
management, namely regarding previous Euro-
pean policy towards Africa. There are concerns
within  the  Commission  that  the  EU  Council
may be putting too much emphasis on the mili-
tary instruments for crisis management to the
detriment  of  civilian  crisis  management  and
conflict prevention instruments and policies.
Military intervention is seen as a short-term and
expensive  instrument  that,  if  isolated,  is  not
likely to have the same strong and durable long-
term political and economic impact as the other
instruments the EU has at its disposal. However,
the Commission also recognises that such crisis
management operations are indeed sometimes
necessary  and  complementary  to  other  EU
instruments.  However,  it  is  the  Commission

view that military instruments ought to be used
only when all other instruments have failed.71

The Council perspective is not fundamen-
tally different from that of the Commission in
acknowledging the primacy of long-term instru-
ments for sustainable peace and stability. How-
ever, better coordination between the various
EU means is needed, and some crisis manage-
ment instruments may need to be further devel-
oped.  As  the  European  Security  Strategy  pre-
pared by Javier Solana points out: 

Conflict prevention and threat prevention
cannot  start  too  early.  In  contrast  to  the
massive visible threat in the Cold War, none
of the new threats is purely military, nor can
any  be  tackled  by  purely  military  means.
Each requires a mixture of instruments . . .
The challenge now is to bring together the
different  instruments  and  capabilities:
European assistance programmes and the
European Development Fund, military and
civilian  capabilities  from  member  states
and other instruments. All of these can have
an impact on our security and on that of
third countries. Security is the first condi-
tion for development. Diplomatic efforts,
development,  trade  and  environmental
policies, should follow the same agenda. In
a crisis there is no substitute for unity of
command . . . Greater coherence is needed
not only among EU instruments but also
embracing the external activities of the indi-
vidual member states. Coherent policies are
also  needed  regionally,  especially  dealing
with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on
a single country basis, or without regional
support, as in different ways experience in
both the Balkans and West Africa shows.72

71 Presentation by a Commission official (RELEX, unit of conflict prevention, crisis management and ACP political issues) in a Conference
at the European Parliament on Conflict Prevention, 16 October 2003. 
72 Javier Solana, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, European Security Strategy document adopted at the European Council in Brussels,
12 December 2003.

38

Operation Artemisin Bunia, DRC:
a test case for the EU?

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European

Union  adopted  a  decision73 to  launch  its
first fully autonomous (outside the ‘Berlin-plus’
framework agreed with NATO) crisis manage-
ment military operation outside Europe. Opera-
tion Artemis, as it was code-named, was the first
ESDP operation in Africa. It took place within
the  framework  of  UNSC  Resolution  1484
adopted  on  30  May  2003,  and  the  Council’s
Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. The UNSC
Resolution  authorised  the  deployment  of  an
Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF)
in Bunia, the administrative centre of the Ituri
district in DRC, until 1 September.

5.1 The background

For nearly five years, DRC had been at war. In a
country as large as Western Europe, where the
state  administration  and  legitimacy,  and  the
rule of law, were already weak, war had further
increased the underlying problems of the coun-
try as well as the divisions, mistrust and tensions
between  ethnic  groups.  Although  the  root
causes of the conflict in DRC are indigenous,
vested interests of neighbouring countries fur-
ther helped to fuel and perpetuate the conflict.
More than 3.5 million people are estimated to
have died since 1998 as a direct or indirect result
of the conflict.74 Despite the political progress
at a national level – on 30 June, a new power-

sharing  government  was  set  in  line  with  the
peace accord signed in December 2002, in Preto-
ria75 – violence continued and reached unprece-
dented levels in the eastern district of Ituri and
the  Kivus  provinces,  where  there  were  wide-
spread and gross violations of human rights. 

Ituri has a long history of ethnic conflicts
(especially between Hema and Lendu groups,
but  lately  violence  has  spread  to  virtually  all
communities)  over  access  to  land,  mineral
resources and control of local power positions.
Conflict was however exacerbated by Uganda,
Rwanda and the DRC government in Kinshasa,
who  sent  in  their  own  military  forces  and/or
engaged in a proxy war. The continuous flow of
small arms into the area, the existence of many
rival  militias  and  their  increasing  fragmenta-
tion, and a continuous shift of allegiances has
made  Ituri  one  of  the  most  volatile,  unpre-
dictable and insecure areas in DRC. Accused of
plundering  north-eastern  Congo’s 
rich
resources, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to with-
draw  their  forces76 and  were  asked  to  refrain
from interfering in developments in the region.
Some progress was made towards the pacifica-
tion of the conflict in the district. In April 2003,
under the guidance of MONUC, the Ituri Pacifi-
cation Commission (IPC) finally started work-
ing  and  results  were  quickly  produced.  An
Interim Ituri Administration was elected, along
with an interim assembly representing all dele-
gations. MONUC was supposed to support the

73 Council decision 2003/432/CFSP.
74 Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; UNSC,
27 May 2003, p.17.
75 The pact signed in Pretoria divides 36 ministries among the government, rebel movements and pro-government militias, political parties
and representatives of civil society. The power-sharing government is expected to lead the country during the two-year transition period and
into the first democratic elections in its 43 years of existence as an independent country.
76 Under heavy international pressure, Rwanda withdrew its forces unilaterally in October 2002 and Uganda did so too in April and May
2003.

5

39

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

IPC by providing the necessary security, which it
failed to do. MONUC’s presence in Bunia was
weak both in numbers and in its mandate. In
early May, immediately after the departure of
the  last  UPDF  (Ugandan)  troops,  Hema  and
Lendu militias engaged again in extreme vio-
lence (assassinations, ethnic cleansing, looting);
MONUC  headquarters  itself  was  targeted.
MONUC was not able to protect even its own
personnel, let alone the IPC and the thousands
of IDP who were in Bunia. The humanitarian
situation in Ituri became even more dramatic.
With  a  population  of  4.6  million,  more  than
60,000 people were estimated to have died since
June 1999 as a result of the violence, not to men-
tion the many more who had been left maimed
or severely mutilated and more than half a mil-
lion internally displaced persons. The prevailing
insecurity and the lack of access to some areas
have made the provision of aid a very difficult
task. However, the degradation of the situation
from the humanitarian point of view was not
new.  For  more  than  a  year,  those  providing
humanitarian aid in Ituri had been requesting
the reinforcement of MONUC.

In the face of such a disastrous humanitarian
situation in Ituri and the revival of extreme vio-
lence that could seriously threaten the ongoing
progress at national level towards a negotiated
settlement of the conflict in DRC, the UN Secre-
tary-General appealed to UN members to form a
coalition of the willing to end the humanitarian
disaster in Ituri and work as a temporary bridg-
ing  arrangement  before  the  possible  deploy-
ment of a reinforced UN presence.77

5.2 How it unfolded

France agreed to intervene, provided (a) it was
granted a UN chapter VII mandate, (b) countries
in  the  region  involved  in  the  fighting  (DRC,
Uganda and Rwanda) officially supported its
intervention, and (c) the operation was limited

in time and scope. On 28 May, France officially
announced its intention to lead such an opera-
tion, with the contribution of other nations, and
serve as Framework Nation. Operation Mamba,
as  it  was  initially  called  by  the  French,  was
already being prepared. At the same time, the
right political conditions prevailed in the EU
context to translate this humanitarian interven-
tion into the first EU mission beyond the Euro-
pean continent. EU defence ministers had since
mid-May been discussing sending peacekeeping
troops,  and  Javier  Solana,  EU  foreign  policy
chief, was also approached by the UNSG with a
request for forces to help restore order in and
around the town of Bunia. Besides France, other
EU and UN member states had also expressed
their willingness to support such an operation,
and the United States (which, following the war
in Iraq, was keen to ease transatlantic tensions),
did not oppose in principle the idea of a small-
scale EU operation without NATO assets. The
EU had long been concerned by the situation in
the Great Lakes Region and in DRC in particu-
lar, not to mention the long history of aid and
development cooperation with the country and
the region. The European Commission Human-
itarian Office (ECHO) had since 1999 been the
only donor in the Ituri district, and it actually
proved to be a valuable partner for the military
operation  and  for  MONUC,  given  their  deep
knowledge  of  conditions  on  the  ground  (in
humanitarian, political, security and geograph-
ical terms, not to mention the fact that they per-
sonally knew some of the main players in the
region). It is also important to recall that since
March 1996 the EU had nominated a Special
Envoy to the Great Lakes Region,78 Aldo Ajello.
The EU had also been very much involved in the
support of the transition process in former Zaire
and  in  peaceful  settlement  of  the  conflict.
Through its foreign policy representative, Javier
Solana,  and  Aldo  Ajello,  it  engaged  in  diplo-
matic contacts with and in DRC, as well as with
Uganda and Rwanda.

77 For detailed information and analysis on the conflict in DRC and in the Ituri district see the ‘Second special report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UNSC, 27 May 2003; and the International Crisis Group
report on the ‘Congo crisis: military intervention in Ituri’, ICG Africa Report no. 64, Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 13 June 2003.
78 Council Joint Action of 25/3/1996 (93/728/PESC).

40

Operation Artemisin Bunia, DRC: a test case for the EU?

On  30  May,  the  UNSC  passed  Resolution
1484 authorising the deployment of a French-
led Interim Emergency Force to Bunia, which a
few days later became an EU peacekeeping mis-
sion (Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003), code-
renamed Artemis, after some changes to the ini-
tial operational plan pushed by the United King-
dom and Sweden (particularly in terms of guar-
antees on issues like child soldiers). On 12 June,
the European Council adopted the operational
plan  and  the  decision  to  launch  the  military
operation in DRC, after which deployment of
the forces started immediately. On 18 June, 400
troops were already on the ground in Bunia, and
500 in the Entebbe (Uganda) force headquarters
to assure the logistic support for operations in
the field. Full deployment of the military forces
was completed on 6 July. 

It is hard to tell whether it was France that
judged it politically advantageous – either for
the  purposes  of  its  European  policy  and/or
because of the vulnerabilities of another French
intervention  in  the  Great  Lakes  region  after
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda – to bring Oper-
ation Mamba under the EU banner, or whether
EU high officials in the Council saw it as a good
opportunity to heal the bitter political differ-
ences among member states on intervention in
Iraq and give a boost to ESDP. According to one
source, it was the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for Africa (la cellule africaine de l’Elysée)
that  proposed  it  become  an  EU  operation.79
Probably all these considerations (and eventu-
ally  others)  played  a  part  on  the  decision  by
France, EU officials and member states. In any
case, there were two parallel tracks with the UN
Secretary-General requesting support to France
and to the EU. 

There seems to be wide consensus, though,
that if there had not been the intervention in
Iraq with all the controversy and divisions sur-
rounding it, one could question to what extent
the Europeans would have intervened in DRC.
What is certain is that the decision was made on
political grounds. From the military point of
view, there were probably more problems than
advantages in bringing the operation under the
EU  banner.  In  fact,  the  French  military  were
apparently not so willing to transform it into an
EU-led  military  operation,  for  fears  that  the
decision-making process within the EU would
drag out the effective launching of the opera-
tion, which needed to be rapid and for which
they were already prepared.80

5.3 Framework and objectives

Acting  under  chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter,
which authorises the use of force when necessary,
and in close cooperation with the UN presence in
Bunia (MONUC), the main objectives of Opera-
tion Artemis, as stated in the UN mandate, were
‘to contribute to the stabilisation of the security
conditions in Bunia and the improvement of the
humanitarian situation, to ensure protection of
the airport, the internally displaced people in the
camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to
contribute to the safety of the civilian popula-
tion, the UN personnel and the humanitarian
presence in the town’.81 The deployment of such
a force, with a mandate limited in time and in
space, would prepare the ground and give the UN
time to put together a reinforced MONUC mis-
sion82 to take over on 1 September 2003, when
the IEMF mission would end. 

79 François Grignon. ‘The Artemis operation in the DRC. Lessons-learned for the future of EU peacekeeping in Africa’, IGC, in a paper
presented at the IEEI International Conference on ‘The Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations: an agenda of priorities’, Lisbon, 23-24 October
2003.
80 Interviews in the Council and in the Commission. 
81 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1484 (2003), 1. 
82 UNSC Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003) gave reinforced powers and means to the MONUC mission in Ituri. Acting under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, the new MONUC mission has now 3,800 military personnel (compared to the seven or eight hundred it had before) and
equipment (namely combat helicopters) more suited to the tasks it has to accomplish.

41

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

5.4 Political control and
strategic direction of the
operation

As defined in the Council Joint Action of 5 June
2003,  the  Political  and  Security  Committee
(PSC, or COPS in French), under the responsi-
bility of the Council to which the PSC reports
regularly,  exercised  the  political  control  and
strategic direction of the operation, including
the power to amend the operational plan, the
chain of command and the rules of engagement.
The decisions regarding the objectives and ter-
mination  of  the  operation  remain  with  the
Council assisted by the Secretary General/High
Representative. 

The  EU  Military  Committee  (EUMC,  or
CMUE in French) monitored the proper execu-
tion of the military operation and acted as the
primary  point  of  contact  with  the  Operation
Commander,  from  whom  it  received  regular
reports. The EUMC reported to the PSC on the
conduct of the operation. Contact with the UN,
the authorities in DRC and neighbouring coun-
tries, as well as with other participants in the
peace process, was the primary responsibility of
the High Representative, assisted by the EU Spe-
cial Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, in coordi-
nation with the Presidency. Contact with local
authorities, the MONUC mission and other rel-
evant international actors, as appropriate, was
the responsibility of the Force Commander.

5.5 Organisation and command
structure of the operation83
France  acted  as  the  framework  nation84 of 
Operation Artemis, with contributions from 16
other EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,

Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and
future  EU  member  states 
(Cyprus  and 
Hungary), and from Brazil, Canada and South
Africa. Apart from French troops on the ground,
there were an infantry unit from Sweden, engi-
neer units from the United Kingdom and a med-
ical team from Belgium. Other countries (South
Africa,  Germany,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Canada,
Greece and the United Kingdom) contributed
with equipment (mostly transport aircraft). 

Around 2,000 troops were deployed: 1,100 in
Bunia,  750  in  Entebbe  (Uganda)  and  100  in
Kampala. Most of the 1,100 forces engaged on
the ground in Bunia were French (about 85 per
cent),  70  troops  from  Sweden  and  100  men
(engineer units) from the United Kingdom. The
vast majority of these forces had to be deployed
(over a distance of 6,200 km), like almost every-
thing else used for the operation (around 400
combat vehicles were deployed, as well as other
military and communications equipment, fuel,
food, etc), which explains the need for a substan-
tial  number  of  forces  (about  850  in  between
Entebbe and Kampala) in the force headquar-
ters and support bases in Uganda to assure the
logistics flow. A reserve of 1,000 French forces
already stationed in other countries in Africa
was foreseen in case of need, but they were in the
end not used.

As framework nation, France had the com-
mand of the operation (General Neveux) and of
the  forces  (General  Thonier).  The  Operation
Headquarters, where the operation was planned
and conducted, was based in Paris and included
around 80 military officers from the three serv-
ices. Although the majority of them were French
officers, some 40 to 50 per cent came from twelve
other participating countries (all EU members or
future members). Four of the nine specialised
branches  into  which  the  headquarters  was
organised were under the command of officers
from some of those contributing countries. 

83 Information on these aspects was given at the press briefing on Operation Artemis, Brussels, 17 September 2003, except when indicated
otherwise, and complemented by interviews in the EU Military Staff (EUMS) of the Council.
84 On 24 July 2002, the EU endorsed the concept of ‘framework nation’ as a conceptual basis for the conduct of autonomous EU-led crisis
management operations.

42

At the operational level, the Force Headquar-
ters was based in Entebbe; it was multinational
(and not just European) and composed of one
hundred troops from the army and the air force.
A joint support base (BSVIA – base de soutien à
vocation interarmées) with 650 men was set up at
Entebbe airport, from where forces and supplies
were flown into Bunia. About 100 men were sta-
tioned in Kampala, which was the initial posi-
tion for the fighter aircraft that were afterwards
transferred to the base at Entebbe airport, and
which could also be used as an alternative base
to Entebbe if needed. French air combat means
stationed in other bases in Africa (namely Chad)
were also used in support of the forces stationed
in Bunia (the GTIAM - groupement tactique inter-
armes multinational). 

It is interesting to note that the number of
non-French  forces  that  were  engaged  in  the
headquarters was, in relative terms, much supe-
rior  to  the  number  of  non-French  troops
engaged  on  the  ground.  In  fact,  none  of  the
other contributing nations offered a substantial
number  of  troops,  nor  is  it  certain  that  the
French would have accepted it, as it would most
likely  have  complicated  coordination  on  the
ground and might have weakened the robust
position the French took against the escalation
strategy of the UPC (Union des Patriotiques Congo-
lais,  a  Hema  armed  group,  supported  by
Rwanda, who controlled Bunia after Ugandan
armed forces left and prior to the arrival of the
French forces under Operation Artemis).85 The
UPC  was  not  keen  on  an  intervention  by  the
multinational force, as this would weaken its
position.

Operation Artemisin Bunia, DRC: a test case for the EU?

5.6 Perception and analysis
of the outcome of the operation

by 

civilian  population 

The successes
EU authorities made a very positive assessment
at the end of Operation Artemis, concluding that
the EU-led force had been successful in accom-
plishing its mission.86
(cid:90) The  security  situation 

in  Bunia  had
improved significantly: the threat posed to
armed
the 
groups/militias in Bunia and the surround-
ing area diminished considerably as a result
of  the  operation  ‘Bunia  without  arms’
(launched  at  the  end  of  June)  and  of  the
determination  of  the  IEMF  to  respond  to
aggression against civilians or its own forces.   
(cid:90) The  return  of  a  significant  number  of
refugees: out of the 200,000 people who lived
in Bunia, more than half had returned to the
city at the end of August, compared with the
40,000 who were still living there at the time
of the deployment of the IEMF.

(cid:90) The revival of economic life in Bunia, with
the city markets reopening and the degree of
normalisation  of  local  economic  activity
from August onwards. 

(cid:90) Better  security  conditions  also  allowed
humanitarian support to resume and extend
further. 

Furthermore,  the  improved  security  situa-
tion  in  Bunia  allowed  for  the  Interim  Ituri
Administration  and  the  Ituri  Assembly  to
resume their work and, at the national level, it
gave a new boost to the negotiations between the
government and the armed groups. It also gave,

85 Interview at the EU Council Secretariat. 
86 Press briefing on Operation Artemis, Brussels, 17 September 2003.

43

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

as intended, time for the UN to prepare the new
reinforced MONUC mission. These key achieve-
ments  are  also  generally  recognised  by  other
actors (the humanitarian agencies among oth-
ers) and analysts.87

The shortcomings 
The  EU  (Council,  Commission  and  member
states) is presently assessing the lessons learned
from Operation Artemis. However, some short-
comings were already known prior to the start of
the operation. The lessons learned assessment
will most certainly highlight well-known weak-
nesses in European military capabilities, in par-
ticular a shortage of strategic transport,88 the
need for better and secure means for long-dis-
tance  communications,  better  information
technology, intelligence sharing and the need to
improve the interoperability of European armed
forces.  Yet,  as  stressed  by  General  Neveux,89
these weaknesses did not put the success of the
operation at risk. 

For other actors and analysts, though, the
EU-led  operation  had  other  more  important
shortcomings, some inherent in its mandate:90
(cid:90) the  time  and  location  of  the  operation
allowed only the stabilisation of Bunia and
the surrounding area, while the fighting and
violence against civilians continued outside
Bunia;91

(cid:90) although its action and determination weak-
ened  the  UPC,  it  has  not  neutralised  its
Lendu militias, thus allowing for a renewed
cycle of violence and revenge;92

(cid:90) given the limited duration of the operation,
the  effective  demilitarisation  of  Bunia  did
not really take place or was not fully accom-
plished. Weapons were no longer visible in
Bunia, but that did not mean the town was a
weapons-free  zone  –  although  it  must  be
pointed out that the task of the forces oper-
ating under Artemis was demilitarisation and
not  disarmament.  MONUC  contingents
have now been conducting systematic house
searches looking for hidden weapons.

5.7 Interaction with the
humanitarian agencies
One of the aspects that went remarkably well in
Operation Artemis according to those directly or
indirectly involved in the operation (certainly so
in the opinion of ECHO and the humanitarian
community in general) was the excellent cooper-
ation between Artemis and humanitarian agen-
cies. It is well-known that relations between mil-
itary and humanitarian organisations can often
be difficult. They operate in the same contexts,
but do not always share the same perspective
and above all use very different means. Many
NGOs, in the humanitarian and other areas, are
often reluctant to work alongside the military.
In  the  case  of  Ituri,  for  more  than  a  year  the
humanitarian community had been asking for a
reinforced  international  force  to  stabilise  the
security situation. When Operation Artemis was
being  planned,  humanitarian  organisations
wanted it to extend into the wider Ituri region in

87 See Emeric Rogier’s report of the International Expert Workshop organised by the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
on  ‘MONUC  and  the  challenges  of  peace  implementation  in  the  DRC’,  Pretoria,  17-19  September  2003,  para.  34;
www.iss.co.za/seminars/031008monuc.pdf.
88 For Operation Artemis, the strategic lift problem was solved by leasing an aircraft from Ukraine.
89 Press briefing on Operation Artemis, Brussels, 17 September 2003.
90 See Emeric Rogier’s report of the ISS workshop in Pretoria (para. 35), and IGC report on the military intervention in Ituri of June 2003.
Although the latter was published at the start of Operation Artemis, it pointed out weaknesses in its mandate.  
91 That was not, however, the mission mandate, one can argue. Artemis did, however, go beyond Bunia, sometimes up to 40 km out of the
town area. General Neveux stressed that the EU did not want to substitute MONUC nor was it necessary (Press Briefing on Operation
Artemis). 
92 There were attacks on Hema groups (by Lendu militias) in late July 2003, which led many thousands to flee to the town of Bule. Other
attacks have been reported in the media since then. The deployment of MONUC forces outside Bunia was planned to be gradual, as the
new mission would gradually build up security in the region. UN officials did not rule out the possibility of massacres in Ituri, particularly
in those areas where the presence of MONUC forces is still weak or non-existent.

44

Operation Artemisin Bunia, DRC: a test case for the EU?

order to reach the largest possible proportion of
the population in need. That was not deemed
possible given the limited timeframe and forces
available. Anyway, one of the aims of the opera-
tion was to allow humanitarian assistance to
resume and extend further, and therefore help
and facilitate the humanitarian community in
its work. That was already a good starting point.
Intelligent  planning  and  capable  human
resources also certainly contributed a great deal
to the success of the cooperation. 

The French command of Artemis had placed a
civil-military liaison officer immediately on the
ground along with the first French troops that
arrived in Bunia. His role was to link with those
providing  humanitarian  assistance  in  Bunia
and the region and, at least according to ECHO,
he  did  a  remarkable  job.  Experienced  in  the
humanitarian world and having daily access to
force commander General Thonier, the liaison
officer in question was able to create a good dia-
logue and cooperation with the humanitarian
agencies, including those that were less coopera-
tive at the beginning (apparently only one NGO
was  against  cooperation  with  the  military).
According to ECHO, there was an almost imme-
diate understanding that each could be valuable
to the other. The advantage of the humanitarian
agencies from the point of view of the military
forces under Artemis was undoubtedly their deep
knowledge on the ground. Their cooperation
was  therefore  considered  very  important,  the
more so because of the limited number of forces
engaged in the operation.93

5.8 Post-conflict intervention
of the EU in the DRC
The  EU  presence  in  the  DRC  will  continue
beyond the limited military operation in Ituri, in
its support for the peace process both at the Ituri

district level and at the national level, and for
reconstruction and development of the country.
At the national level, the EU signed (on 2 Sep-
tember 2003) a cooperation programme with
the DRC to the sum of €205 million for a five-
year period, aiming to create the necessary con-
ditions  for  long-term  stability  and  peace  by
focusing on both reconstruction of the country
(namely  infrastructures)  and  improving  the
social and political conditions. The key areas
where  substantial  aid  and  financial  support
(from  envelope  A  of  the  Indicative  Pro-
gramme94) will be channelled include the health
system,  institutional  support  to  democratic
transition  and  the  rule  of  law  (namely  the
reform of the public administration, the judicial
system and the police, and support to the elec-
toral  process),  and  macro-economic  support.
Most  of  the  non-programmed  aid  under  the
indicative programme (€34 million under enve-
lope B, out of the total allocated to the indicative
programme) will be channelled to the eastern
part of the country, to Ituri in particular. Prior-
ity areas of EU intervention in Ituri are mostly of
a civilian nature and include the following meas-
ures: 
(cid:90) support for the civil administration. The EU
has committed financial and technical sup-
port to the Ituri Interim Administration and
the Pacification Committee. €400,000 have
been allocated for that purpose and a Euro-
pean Commission technical assistance mis-
sion is already working alongside the Ituri
administration. 

(cid:90) urgent rehabilitation. 
(cid:90) re-establishment of the rule of law. EU sup-
port  in  this  area  is  envisaged  through  the
training of judges and the construction of
prisons. There is already an agreement with a
local NGO to support the re-establishment
of  the  judicial  system  in  partnership  with
other actors (MONUC, French NGOs, etc).

93 Interview with François Goemans, ECHO field expert in Ituri at the time of Operation Artemis. 
94 EDF funds allocated to the national Indicative Programmes under the Cotonou Agreement are divided into two different envelopes.
Envelope A is the EDF amount allocated to financial and technical cooperation; it is generally the most substantial amount and refers to
programmable  aid  (e.g.  macro-economic  support,  sector  policies  and  other  programmes  and  projects)  identified  in  the  Indicative
Programme. Envelope B is the EDF amount that is not programmed and is meant to cover unforeseen needs like emergency aid that cannot
be covered by the EC budget or other urgent needs that cannot be programmed in advance.

45

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

Furthermore, ending the culture of impunity
and  bringing  those  responsible  for  war
crimes to justice is something that the EU
and  other  international  actors  are  deter-
mined to do. There is currently a proposition
for  double  jurisdiction  by  a  local  tribunal
and the International Criminal Court, since
the latter can only try war crimes committed
after 2002, but some rebel leaders would pre-
fer to see the matter being dealt with domes-
tically. 

(cid:90) support for human rights activities, includ-

ing pacification activities, etc.

The  EU  is  also  supporting  disarmament,
demobilisation  and  reintegration  in  DRC
through  a  multi-regional  and  multi-donor
programme run by the World Bank. Commis-
sion funding will come from the EDF fund for
intra-ACP conflict prevention. The same fund
will also support an integrated police unit in
Kinshasa whose role is to provide security for
the transition (securing buildings, personali-
ties, etc). Support for an integrated police in
DRC  that  would  include  members  from  the
different rebel groups is being considered by
the EU.95

95 Interview with Julie Godin, DRC desk officer (DG Development, Commission).

46

Impact of Operation Artemison
EU crisis management policy and ESDP

Although limited in time, scope, geographical
area of action and the number of forces involved,
Operation Artemis was nevertheless significant
in many different ways.  
(cid:90) It was the first EU crisis management opera-
tion outside Europe, and to some the fact
that it was in Africa adds to its significance.
This does, at least to some extent, suggest EU
political willingness to act in the region and
to contribute more actively to its stabilisa-
tion, going beyond its traditional trade and
aid instruments (although that had probably
not been the main motivation for the launch-
ing of the operation). 

(cid:90) It provided an opportunity for healing polit-
ical differences between EU member states,
and especially between France and Britain,
following the controversy and friction over
the intervention in Iraq. The United King-
dom was immediately in favour of Operation
Artemis and  actually  no  member  state
opposed it (apart from Germany on its very
first reaction, quickly amended).   

(cid:90) It was the first fully autonomous EU military
operation without the use of NATO assets.
As stressed by EU representatives, it showed
that  the  EU  is  perfectly  capable  of  acting
alone. This was actually not that welcome to
NATO officials (by the United States in par-
ticular), who stressed that autonomous EU
military  operations  should  not  happen
again. Yet US ambassadors in the Great Lakes
region had been clear that the United States
was not interested in intervening in the DRC,
engaged as they were in Iraq.96 NATO also
had no desire to support Artemis, given the

priorities it had at the time, namely in the
Balkans and Afghanistan.97

(cid:90) It was decided and mounted very rapidly: it
took only 6 to 7 weeks between UNSC Reso-
lution 1484 and the deployment of the first
military  forces  in  Bunia:  on  6  July  all  the
forces  had  been  deployed  (about  3  weeks
after the start of deployment). Even decision-
making  within  the  European  Council  was
very rapid. In the end, it was political will that
really mattered. That is certainly the main
lesson to come out of this and other previous
experiences: when there is the political will to
act, operational weaknesses or institutional
constraints can be easily overcome. 

(cid:90) Coordination and cooperation among all EU
key actors involved (the French military lead-
ing the operation, Secretariat of the Council,
Commission, and member states) was very
good. No doubt human resources in Brussels
were under considerable strain, but fears of a
lack of linkage between the different actors
were in the end not confirmed. 

(cid:90) It reinforced the EU’s stance and credibility
as a capable actor in international security
and foreign policy. As such it has reinforced
EU  links  with  the  UN  in  the  area  of  crisis
management (the EU is already a major part-
ner for the UN in areas like development or
humanitarian aid). Furthermore, there was
very good cooperation with the UN, on the
ground as well as at the highest political level. 
(cid:90) With regard to the EU-NATO relationship,
and despite the negative reaction that was
expressed by some NATO allies (the United
States in particular), the EU has reinforced

96 In fact, the United States did not veto the operation in the Security Council, which it could have done, although it would have been
difficult to justify such an attitude.
97 Nicolas Fiorenza, ‘EU force seeks new mission after Congo’, European Defense, 8 September 2003.

6

47

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

its  position  and  credibility  as  an  interna-
tional actor. Artemis is one more significant
element of the development of ESDP. Opera-
tion  Concordia (in  the  Former  Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia) and the EU Police
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina are other
examples. The increasing EU activities in the
area  of  crisis  management,  whether  con-
ducted with NATO assets or not – which is
actually  not  so  important  at  this  stage,
despite  some  occasional  US  ‘hysteria’  –  is
likely  to  boost  cooperation  with  NATO
rather  than  hinder  it  in  the  longer  term,
albeit  on  probably  somewhat  different
grounds  than  previously.  There  is  a  lot  of
room for more cooperation and complemen-
tarity between EU and NATO. Furthermore,
most EU countries do not wish to see the EU
develop an alternative military capacity to
rival NATO. There is however a clear consen-
sus among EU members that the EU must be
able to act in areas where NATO has neither a
strategic interest nor the political will to do so.

While  the  chances  that  EU  member  states
will agree to increase military expenditure are
slim, particularly in the current economic cli-
mate in Europe, the current focus is more on
enhancing rationalisation, flexibility and coor-
dination of European capabilities. That at least
is one of the aims of the European Capability
Action  Plan  agreed  in  February  2002.  Some
steps in that direction have already been taken. 
(cid:90) In May 2003, the EU Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) was declared operational, even though
it is one-third short of the intended 60,000
troops that will be available for humanitar-
ian and peacekeeping missions. 

(cid:90) In November 2003, the EU decided on the
creation of an Agency in the field of defence
capabilities, development, research, acquisi-
tion and armaments by 2004.99

At a different level, but related to the devel-
opment of EU operational capabilities, is the
need for strategic intelligence sharing and con-
tributions to strategic reserve by member states.  

6.1 Impact on the issue of
EU capabilities
Notwithstanding the likely positive impact of
Operation Artemis on EU political and defence
policy, both internally as well as in relations with
other  international  actors,  the  operation  in
Congo has also highlighted the increasing need
to address real problems over capabilities, even if
political  will  remains  the  key  issue.98 Few 
member  states,  apart  from  France  and  the
United Kingdom, have the capacity to deploy,
support and command such operations. In that
sense,  Operation  Artemis and  the  continued
engagement of the EU in crisis management in
the Balkans are likely to give a boost to ongoing
EU efforts to reinforce its crisis management
capabilities. 

6.2 Towards a single
EU command structure?
One  of  the  interesting  results  of  Operation
Artemis is the effective validation of the ‘frame-
work  nation’  concept.  Although  not  directly
related, it is nevertheless interesting to remark
that, after Operation Artemis, there is less enthu-
siasm and interest for the proposal to create a
European Defence Headquarters in Tervuren.
To  some  –  at  least  to  France  and  the  United
Kingdom, but also to others such as Greece and
Italy  who  have  been  proposed  as  potential
framework nations in possible future military
operations of this kind – the ‘framework nation’
formula has worked well. One of the concerns
with regard to this formula is liaison between
the lead nation and the European institutions in 

98 For an assessment of EU military and civilian capabilities for crisis management and the partnerships with NATO and the US, see Hagman,
2002, op. cit in note 70. 
99 General Affairs Council Conclusions, 17 November 2003. 

48

Impact of Operation Artemison EU crisis management policy and ESDP  

Brussels. That worked well in Operation Artemis,
which explains why some question the need to
adopt  another  formula,  at  least  for  the  time
being.  This  may  well  appease  those  within
NATO who are not at all keen on seeing the cre-
ation of a European Defence Headquarters and
who  perceive  this  as  a  duplication  of  NATO
headquarters. 

The ‘framework nation’ concept also appears
to some as a good solution for the EU, because of
the  still  relatively  small  size  of  the  current
EUMS, which they consider a real shortcoming
in  EU  operational  planning  capabilities.  The
need to at least test such capabilities is linked to
the decision to conduct the first joint EU-NATO
crisis management exercise with EU planning.
The framework nation formula may also allow
for greater flexibility and time for further trials
until new and more engaging formulas can be
found. It was certainly not by chance that the
command structures for Operation Artemis (in
Paris and Entebbe) were much more multina-
tional than the composition of the forces on the
ground. Most EU nations were represented in
the  Paris  Headquarters  in  what  can  be  inter-
preted to some extent as a ‘joint command post
exercise’. There will probably be some useful les-
sons learned from that perspective as well, and
this may in turn help EU decision-makers to fur-
ther evaluate the needs and constraints at this
particular level. Others may, however, see in this
formula an instrument for the most powerful
nations in Europe to use their military might to
impose a defence agenda on the EU, although
that remains to be seen of course. 

At the European summit of December 2003,
the  EU  agreed  to  establish  an  autonomous
European military planning element within the
EUMS. Its natural choice will still be to have
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, but
when  NATO  as  a  whole  is  not  engaged  –  for
instance in a region where NATO has no interest
or is not involved, like Africa – the EU will choose

whether or not to use NATO assets. In the case of
autonomous EU military operations, the first
choice  will  be  to  use  national  headquarters,
which can be multinationalised for the purpose
of conducting EU-led operations, as was the case
in Operation Artemis. Where no national head-
quarters is identified the EU can have recourse
to the operational cell within the EUMS to plan
and run the operation.100

It is now more likely that the EU will engage
in peacekeeping operations, and perhaps also in
peace  enforcement,  particularly  in  situations
where humanitarian needs are pressing and/or
the risks of an outbreak of conflict or escalation
are very high, with potentially even higher costs
to European nations. Besides, these are the types
of situations that are more likely to appeal to
European public opinion and where European
leaders will probably have less difficulty in get-
ting public endorsement for such operations (at
least  while  the  level  of  risk  remains  relatively
‘low’). 

6.3 The need to address 
the issue of financing for
CFSP and ESDP operations

101

One of the limitations of the ‘framework nation’
concept is financial. Few EU memberstates have
the capability to conduct such operations, par-
ticularly when these imply strategic capabilities.
It is unlikely that under the current financial
arrangements for ESDP, and in particular in the
current economic context, those few EU states
with the capability to act as framework nation
will be willing to accept the inherent financial
burden. In Operation Artemis, France not only
paid for its own troops (which constituted the
large  majority  of  the  forces  involved  in  the 
operation)  and  equipment,  but  also  for  the
transportation costs and the costs of the Force

100 In the December 2003 agreement, the EU has, in addition, decided to establish a small EU planning cell in NATO’s military headquarters,
SHAPE, and NATO is invited to establish liaison arrangements at the EUMS. See European Council Conclusions of 12 December 2003 and
Presidency document on ‘European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations – UK/FR/GE paper’.  
101 For an overview of this issue, see Antonio Missiroli, ‘€uros for ESDP – financing EU operations’, Occasional Paper 45 (Paris: EU Institute
for Security Studies, June 2003).

49

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

Headquarters (costs for the latter would be con-
sidered as common costs, but were none the less
borne by the framework nation).102 There is a
recognised need for the EU to find ways of shar-
ing the burden of costs. The framework agree-
ment on the financing of EU-led crisis manage-
ment  operations  with  military  and  defence
implications is to be revised, if necessary, in June
2004. The need to do so is recognised by many
players. The discussion has already been under
way for some time in the Council, but also in the
Commission,  which  can  finance  certain  con-
flict-related activities. 

Conflict prevention, post-conflict and crisis
management are also areas where the Commis-
sion  is  active  and  new  financial  instruments
have  been  created  to  address  needs  for  more
rapid action often inherent in that type of situa-
tion.  The  RRM  is  an  illustrative  example.  An
even more interesting case regards EDF. Tradi-
tionally perceived as an almost purely develop-
ment-oriented financial instrument of the EU,
the EDF is being currently reoriented to cover
peace and security related expenditures, in line
with the perception that these are necessary con-
ditions  for  sustainable  development.  In  legal
terms,  EDF  funds  cannot  be  used  to  finance
activities other than those falling under the first
pillar and thus within the Commission’s compe-
tence. However, the Commission also has legal
competence  in  areas  that  can  be  perceived  as
CFSP areas, like activities regarding conflict pre-
vention, civilian crisis management and conflict
resolution. Indeed, if one takes for instance the
case of the Strategy Paper for Burundi (2003-
2007), the EDF is funding activities aimed at
restoring peace, reconciliation, integration of
demobilised combatants, support to the judi-
cial and penitentiary system. The EDF is also
supporting regional and national programmes

administered  by  the  WB  on  disarmament,
demilitarisation  and  reintegration  of  demo-
bilised  soldiers  (namely  in  the  Great  Lakes
region). It was previously quite uncommon to
see EDF funding being channelled to such activ-
ities, although they are often of fundamental
political importance for long-term stability and
development. That seems now to be an acquis.
Furthermore,  on  CFSP  matters  the  Commis-
sion  not  only  administers  the  CFSP  budget
(under the EU budget and in accordance with
the  inter-institutional  agreement  of  6  May
1999), but also shares the right of initiative with
the Council, which can open new funding possi-
bilities for CFSP activities. ESDP is a different
matter; it is purely intergovernmental and is not
covered by the EU budget. 

An increased effort to link EU policies, in so
far as the use of civilian and military crisis man-
agement tools may be more often required in
support of long-term policies aimed at enhanc-
ing ‘structural stability’, may well lead to a more
flexible  use  of  community  financial  instru-
ments, although these are likely to be subject to
certain conditions and in limited amounts.

6.4 Civilian-military
cooperation and
complementarity with other
EU instruments

Despite  fears  by  some  inside  and  outside  the
European institutions that reinforcement of the
military dimension of crisis management may
be  pursued  to  the  detriment  of  the  civilian
dimension, the emphasis of EU crisis manage-
ment instruments and policy is likely to remain
on the civilian dimension for various reasons,

102 The General Affairs Council of 17 June 2002 (Luxembourg) approved a general framework for financing operations having military or
defence implications, confirmed by the European Council held in Seville on 20 June 2002 (see Annex II of the Presidency Conclusions). Under
the agreed framework ‘common costs’ cover costs for headquarters for EU-led operations (such as transportation costs, administration,
locally hired personnel, communications, transportation/travel within the operations area and HQs and barracks and lodging/infrastructure)
and for providing support to the forces as a whole (infrastructure, additional equipment, medical care). ‘Individual costs’ (personnel, arms,
equipment) are to be borne by each member state involved accordingly to its degree of involvement (‘the principle of ‘costs lie where they
fall’).  Furthermore,  the  Council  will  decide  on  a  case-by-case  basis  whether  the  costs  for  the  transportation  of  the  forces  and  their
accommodation are to be funded in common.

50

Impact of Operation Artemison EU crisis management policy and ESDP  

including financial ones. There is widespread
recognition that it is important to have the pos-
sibility of using military instruments and capa-
bilities when necessary, but the issue of the bal-
ance,  coordination  and  complementarity
between military and civilian power assets is very
much under discussion these days. 

Operation  Artemis may  have  exacerbated
such fears, as it was essentially a military opera-
tion. The civilian dimension was not very visible
and yet probably at least equally needed. It is
recognised  that,  for  instance,  the  issue  of  an

integrated  police  force,  urgent  reform  of  the
judicial system and support for the Ituri admin-
istration are important elements for the stabili-
sation of the situation in Bunia and in the dis-
trict beyond the EU military intervention. The
EU has already approved programmes related to
some of these areas, while others are still under
consideration.  In  that  sense,  the  benefits  of 
military efforts may prove to be short-lived if
they are not immediately accompanied by other
complementary measures. 

51

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

52

Conclusions:
prospects for EU crisis management policy on Africa

Despite  the  welcome  reaction  to  Operation

Artemis from different African and interna-
tional actors, as well as within EU institutions, it
is not likely to bring major changes to EU policy
on Africa and to the EU approach to crisis man-
agement  in  the  region.  The  EU  will  remain
attached to the essential principles of its well-
established policy. Addressing the root causes of
conflict and instability in Africa will remain the
priority and conflict prevention the privileged
approach. Political will for further EU engage-
ment in Africa already remains a key issue for an
EU of 15 member states; the upcoming enlarge-
ment  is  certainly  not  likely  to  make  Africa  a
higher priority.

However,  it  is  difficult  for  everything  to
remain exactly the same after Operation Artemis.
Short-term military operations are not the long-
term  solution  for  African  problems,  but  they
may at times be necessary and instrumental in
creating the minimal conditions for long-term
instruments to be used. How to derive the maxi-
mum  benefit  from  such  short-term  military
operations to enhance long-term goals is a key
issue  where  there  is  room  for  improvement,
whether they are EU-led or conducted by the UN
or other regional organisations. There is also a
need for better coordination of EU policies and
with  the  bilateral  initiatives  of  EU  member
states. It is, however, necessary that the latter are
willing to put their national interests in second
place  when  it  comes  to  defining  priorities  in
Africa. This may prove to be a major challenge,
although one can say that, to some extent, things
have improved. The same goes for coordination
with international organisations/actors and the
UN in particular. 

A likely impact of Operation Artemis may be a
further boost of EU policies aimed at developing
and reinforcing African capabilities to deal with
conflict-related  situations  in  the  region  and  a
greater support to peace operations by the UN
and African regional and subregional organisa-
tions in the continent. That is currently a high
priority of EU dialogue with the African Union
and other African organisations. It has been also
high on the agenda in EU dialogue and coopera-
tion with other international organisations, par-
ticularly with the UN, but also the G-8 and the
OSCE.  Programmes  or  initiatives  that  have
proved successful in building African national
and  regional  capacities  for  crisis  management
ought to be expanded, taking into account the
serious lack of capabilities of most African states
and organisations (e.g. command and control,
logistics, specialised skills like engineering and
medical  services,  communications  and  move-
ment control). One could for instance envisage
programmes like the French RECAMP, or other
bilateral initiatives by EU member states that are
focused on building African capacity for crisis
management,  becoming 
‘European’  pro-
grammes. The French government would appar-
ently be open to such a possibility, if the EU shows
political  interest.  This  could  lead  to  further
expansion and integration of this dimension into
a broader European policy towards Africa. Other
possibilities could be for the EUMS to provide
military  or  civil-military  advisers  to  African
organisations,  or  support  them  with  relevant
information  for  peace  operations  (e.g.  intelli-
gence information, imagery from the EU Satellite
Centre). Some of these ‘scenarios’ or possibilities
are currently being discussed within the EU. 

7

53

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union

However,  unlike  many  bilateral  initiatives,
the EU should continue to focus primarily on
dialogue  and  cooperation  with  and  develop-
ment of African regional and subregional organ-
isations.  Reinforcing  African  organisations
(and their capabilities) is in itself an important
confidence-building  measure  in  a  continent
torn by conflicts, where internal and regional
threats are sometimes hard to separate. 

Training and programmes for the reinforce-
ment of African capabilities to deal with con-
flict-related situations ought also to take into
account the context in which African forces are
likely to operate, and, in most cases, that is not
the  traditional  peacekeeping  context.  African
forces  have  in  recent  years  been  operating  in
rather complex conflict situations where peace-
making and peace enforcement skills have often
been required. Yet some of the initiatives aimed
at  reinforcing  their  skills  and  capabilities  are
sometimes  too  focused  on  traditional  peace-
keeping.

There  is  of  course  a  selfish  interest  in  the
whole issue of developing African capabilities
for conflict-related activities. Europeans are less
willing to engage in peace support missions in
Africa now than they were in the 1980s or early
1990s. They have continued to be involved, but
more on their own and in very specific and lim-
ited  types  of  operations  or,  as  in  the  last  few
years, in support of regional efforts (particularly
when  there  has  been  a  high  risk  that  those
regional efforts could fail). Operation Artemis is

a good example of the type of military engage-
ments Europeans might eventually be willing to
undertake in Africa, in the future: short, precise,
limited  in  scope.  Whether  EU  member  states
would be willing to intervene more often under
the EU banner rather than on their own, remains
to be seen. However, given the positive experi-
ence of Operation Artemis and the recent agree-
ments on ESDP (of December 2003) for a fairly
flexible approach to the political control of EU-
led military operations, it may become increas-
ingly difficult for EU member states to justify,
politically, engaging in such operations alone or
without  at  least  consulting  the  EU.  Further-
more, there may be some significant political
advantages in carrying out a military operation
under the EU banner, namely in terms of per-
ceived neutrality, but also in terms of a compre-
hensive approach to conflict-related situations,
to the extent that the EU can back such opera-
tions  with  supporting  policies  at  the  civilian
level in post-conflict situations, given the wide
range of instruments that it has at its disposal. 
A more open dialogue with African actors
could lead to a more effective use of resources
and probably to more flexible and innovative
approaches to crisis management in the region
and building the capabilities of African actors.
Much  depends  on  the  latter,  too.  There  have
been many European/international and African
initiatives and plans to deal with problems in
the region. It is to be hoped that those initiatives
will be followed by effective action.

54

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a2

Source: African Recovery, ECOSOC, United Nations.

62

Abbreviations

ACOTA 

African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

ACP

ACRI

ANAD

AU 

BMATT

CAR 

CEAO

African, Caribbean, Pacific

African Crisis Response Initiative

Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence

African Union

British Military Advisory and Training Team

Central African Republic

Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

CFSP/PESC

Common Foreign and Security Policy/Politique étrangère et de Sécurité commune

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CPLP

DAC

DFID

DG DEV

DG RELEX

DRC

EAC

EC 

ECCAS

ECHO

ECOMOG

ECOWAS

EDF 

ESDP 

EU

EUMC

EUMS

Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa

Development Assistance Committee

Department for International Development (UK)

Directorate General for Development (European Commission) 

Directorate General for External Relations (European Commission)

Democratic Republic of Congo

East African Community

European Commission

Economic Community of Central African States

European Commission Humanitarian Office

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

Economic Community of West African States

European Development Fund

European Security and Defence Policy

European Union

European Union Military Committee

European Union Military Staff

EUROPAID

European Commission Cooperation Office

FCO

IDP

IEMF

IGAD

IMET

IPC 

ISDSC

ISPDC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)

Internally displaced people

Interim Emergency Multinational Force

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

International Military Education and Training Programme

Ituri Pacification Committee

Interstate Defence and Security Committee (SADC Organ)

Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (SADC Organ)

a3

63

a3

64

MOD

MONUC

MOU

MS 

NATO 

NEPAD

NGO

Ministry of Defence

UN Mission in DRC

Memorandum of Understanding

Member States

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

New Partnership for Africa's Development

Non-Governmental Organisation

NOREPS

Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System

OAU 

OECD

OFR

OIF 

OSCE

PSC/COPS

RECAMP

RRF

RRM

SADC

SADCC

UEMOA

UK 

UN 

Organisation of African Unity

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Operation Focus Relief

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Political and Security Committee/Comité politique et de Sécurité (EU Council)

Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix

Rapid Reaction Force

Rapid Reaction Mechanism

Southern African Development Community

Southern African Development Cooperation Conference 

Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine

United Kingdom

United Nations

UNAMSIL

UN Mission in Sierra Leone

UNDP

UNCHR

UNSC

UNSG

UPC 

UPDF

US 

USD

WASP

WB 

UN Development Programme

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UN Security Council

UN Secretary General

Union des Patriotiques Congolais

Uganda People's Defence Force

United States

US Dollars

West Africa Stabilisation Programme (US)

World Bank

WEU/UEO 

Western European Union/Union de l'Europe Occidentale

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(cid:93) UEO, ‘Note d’évaluation de l’initiative de l’UEO en matière de maintien de la paix en Afrique’, C(00)70, 13 avril 2000.
(cid:93) UNHCR, Refugees by Number. 2003 Edition, 1 September 2003.

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For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU 
Björn Müller-Wille

EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly
Paul Luif

Space and security policy in Europe: Executive summary
Stefano Silvestri, Rapporteur

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?
Taras Kuzio

EU-Russian security dimensions
Edited by Dov Lynch

€uros for ESDP: financing EU operations
Antonio Missiroli

The Galileo satellite system and its security implications  
Gustave Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini

La question du Cachemire. Après le 11 septembre et la nouvelle 
donne au Jammu et Cachemire 
Christophe Jaffrelot et Jasmine Zérinini-Brotel

L’Union en action : la mission de police en Bosnie 
Agnieszka Nowak

La Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte de stabilité
Ralitza Dimtcheva

Iraq: a European point of view 
Martin Ortega

Iraq: the transatlantic debate 
Philip H. Gordon

Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP 
Katia Vlachos-Dengler

From candidate to member state: Poland and the future of the EU
Rafal Trzaskowski

Optimiser le processus de Barcelone 
Dorothée Schmid

L’ONU au Kosovo : leçons de la première MINUK
Eric Chevalier

Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?  The view from Central Europe
Edited by  Antonio Missiroli

A new European Union policy for Kaliningrad
Sander Huisman

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