From America's protégé to constructive European : Polish security policy in the twenty-first century.
Date: 2004-12-30
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European security, Iraq, Poland, United States, common foreign and security policy

Occasional Paper

December 2004

n°56

Marcin Zaborowski

From America’s protégé to
constructive European

Polish security policy in
the twenty-first century

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Occasional Paper

December 2004

n°56

by Marcin Zaborowski

From America’s protégé to
constructive European

Polish security policy in
the twenty-first century

Marcin  Zaborowski  is  Senior  Research  Fellow  at  the  Centre  for  International  Relations, 
Warsaw,  Poland,  and  Lecturer  in  European  Politics  at  Aston  University,  Birmingham,   
United Kingdom. He was a visiting fellow at the EUISS earlier this year.

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Contents

Summary  

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Introduction

Understanding Poland’s ‘instinctive’ Atlanticism

Poland’s strategic culture: the past in the present

The Iraq war — from enthusiastic endorsement to disappointment

Polish policy towards CFSP and ESDP

Outlook: towards a committed European posture

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Summary

From America’s protégé to constructive European

Following the events of 11 September 2001, Poland emerged as one of the United States’s key
allies, arguably its protégé, in Central and Eastern Europe. The close affinity of interests on
security matters between the United States and Poland became particularly apparent in Iraq,
where Warsaw proved to be a strong and highly vocal supporter of Washington. However, at the
same time, Poland has been progressively drawn into the internal workings of the EU, and as a
consequence its perspectives on European security have evolved towards a more ‘EU-positive’
attitude. This, coupled with disappointment over the war in Iraq, has meant that Poland’s
Atlanticism is increasingly questioned, with calls for a more pro-European attitude growing.
This paper will reflect upon these debates and argue that Poland’s Atlanticism is indeed chang-
ing. Focusing on the Iraq conflict and perspectives towards the EU’s security ambitions, this
paper will show that Warsaw has strived to reconcile its Atlanticism with a concomitant engage-
ment in the European Union’s CSFP and ESDP. The paper concludes that Poland’s Atlanti-
cism is likely to be toned down in the future as Poland becomes more focused on developing its
policies in an EU context and in cooperation with individual member states.

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From America’s protégé to constructive European

4

Introduction

S ince the early 1990s Poland has emerged as

one  of  the  United  States’s  closest  allies,
arguably  its  protégé,  in  Central  and  Eastern
Europe. After Washington became dedicated to
pursuing  the  Eastern  enlargement  of  NATO,
America became the security guarantor that the
Poles had craved since the late eighteenth cen-
tury. For America, Poland represents a middle-
sized  power  whose  successes  with  building
democracy and market reforms after 1990 mark
it  out  from  its  regional  peers,  and  especially
from  the  states  of  former  USSR.  The  United
States also sees eye to eye with the Poles on a
whole range of foreign policy issues, which was
illustrated  when  Warsaw  readily  contributed
troops to Kosovo, Afghanistan and especially
Iraq where the Polish military contingent is the
third  largest  (after  the  United  States  and  the
United  Kingdom)  and  Poland  took  formal
responsibility for one of the occupation zones.
Consequently, especially in the period immedi-
ately after 11 September 2001, Poland appeared
to be closer to the United States than many of its
long-standing West European allies. Poland has
also  been  praised  and  branded  in  the  United
States as a ‘new European,’ as opposed to the
‘old  Europeans’  France  and  Germany,  who
opposed  the  United  States’s  policy  on  Iraq.
However, as will be shown in this paper, Poland’s
Atlanticism is becoming more questioning, and
it is evolving in response to two major develop-
ments:  Poland’s  EU  membership  and  disap-
pointment with America’s leadership in Iraq. 

The  crisis  in  transatlantic  relations  that
erupted  post-9/11  presented  Poland  with  a

choice that it did not want to make. Warsaw sub-
sequently  based  its  response  on  two  sorts  of
arguments, the first historical and the second a
mixture of political and economic calculations
based  on  a  seemingly  ‘rational’  cost-benefit
assessment of the current situation. The first set
of considerations is deeply entrenched in Polish
strategic  culture  and  as  such  it  is  unlikely  to
change in the foreseeable future but the imme-
diate political calculations, which led Warsaw to
become one of the United States’s closest allies
during the war in Iraq, could be challenged by a
turn  of  events.  It  is  argued  here  that  this  is
exactly what has happened. The continuing lack
of stability and meagre prospects for implanting
democracy in Iraq, as well as the evident failure
of Warsaw to secure some clear benefits from its
loyalty towards the United States, prove that the
immediate political and economic calculations
that informed Warsaw’s Atlanticist choice dur-
ing the Iraq crisis were overplayed or even mis-
guided. This development coincided with War-
saw’s growing involvement in the EU – its partic-
ipation in the Convention drawing up the draft
Constitutional Treaty and EU enlargement in
May 2004. Subsequently, Poland’s former status
as a ‘friend of America’ but an outsider in the
context of the EU has been transformed, with
considerable implications for Warsaw’s attitude
towards the European project. This has been evi-
dent in Warsaw’s increasingly positive attitude
towards the deepening of the Common Foreign
and  Security  Policy  as  well  as  developing  the
European Security and Defence Policy, as was
seen during the constitutional debate. 

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From America’s protégé to constructive European

This  paper  will  show  how  Poland,  whilst
being an Atlanticist, is also, and increasingly so,
a committed member of the European Union.
These themes will be examined firstly by identi-
fying what will be called here Poland’s ‘instinc-
tive Atlanticism’ in security matters, a predispo-
sition derivative of Polish strategic culture. This
instinctive Atlanticism will then be illustrated
by examining the Polish position on Iraq and, to
a lesser extent, the EU’s CFSP and ESDP. The
paper  will,  however,  also  argue  that  Poland’s

involvement in Iraq has been unrewarding, lead-
ing to the weakening of the domestic consensus
on the general direction of Polish foreign policy.
The  paper  will  also  identify  the  evolution  of
Poland’s attitude towards the CFSP and ESDP –
from a rather sceptical to a more embracing and
forthcoming attitude. Finally, the paper with
discuss the prospects for the further evolution
of Poland’s foreign and security policy, inter alia
by considering the likely implications of the re-
election of George W. Bush.

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Understanding Poland’s ‘instinctive’ Atlanticism

Polish-American relations have been consis-

tently vibrant since the end of the Cold War,
but particularly since Poland joined NATO in
1999, when the United States singled Poland
out to be its most favoured partner in the East
and  began  grooming  Warsaw  for  this  role  in
earnest.  In  summer  2001  during  President
George W. Bush’s visit to Poland and then in the
context  of  Polish  President  Aleksander
Kwasniewski’s time in the United States in July
2002,  the  idea  that  Poland  had  become  a
regional leader was promoted and fleshed out.
In Warsaw, where Bush chose to announce the
United States’s support for the second wave of
NATO  enlargement,  a  policy  staunchly  sup-
ported by the Poles, he described Poland as ‘a
bridge and a good example’ for its neighbours to
the  east  and  the  south.1 Meanwhile,  during
Kwasniewski’s three-day state visit to the United
States in July 2002 the notion of a new form of
regional  security  cooperation  in  Central  and
Eastern  Europe  to  be  led  by  Poland  –  the  so-
called ‘Riga initiative’ – was endorsed by Bush.2
In its role as regional leader Poland also con-
tributed 2,500 troops to operations in Iraq and
is currently leading a multinational division, as
part of the stabilisation force there. 

A further manifestation of this Polish-Amer-
ican closeness with long term implications came
when  Warsaw  announced  in  December  2002
that it was to accept a $3.8 billion loan from the
US Congress to purchase 48 F-16s from Lock-
heed Martin. Not only was this development sig-

nificant by virtue of it being the largest military
loan  in  memory,3 but  importantly  it  demon-
strated the unique closeness that has transpired
between the two states and illustrates too the
likely path the relationship was set to follow. To
begin, Poland’s choice of procuring US rather
than  European  defence  systems  was  a  firm
expression of Warsaw’s Atlanticist credentials.
Furthermore,  as  noted  by  the  Polish  Ambas-
sador to the United States Przemyslaw Grudzin-
ski,  the  purchase  signified  Poland’s  desire  to
become  a  ‘mature  member  of  NATO’.  In  the
same interview Grudzinski commented that the
United States needed partners in Europe and
that ‘Poland emerges as an excellent ally of the
United States’.4 The great symbolic value of the
defence contract was explicit also in President
Kwasniewski’s speech to the West Point Military
Academy during his working visit to the United
States in January 2003. Kwasniewski applauded
the  United  States’s  leading  role  in  the  world,
stating that it is both ‘unquestionable and that
it should be exercised’, moreover he saw a role for
Poland to act jointly with the United States to
ensure that Europe and the United States work
effectively  together  in  transatlantic  security.5
Poland’s subsequent prominent role as one of
the few allies of the United States in Iraq clearly
demonstrated that its Atlanticism was not just
declaratory, and that Warsaw was prepared to
back its diplomacy with a substantial military
contribution. The importance of Poland’s place
in  America’s  foreign  policy  was  also  demon-

1 John  Reed,  ‘Warsaw  gives  a  powerful  friend  a  warm  welcome’,  Financial Times, 16/17  June  2001;  ‘Bedzie  rozszerzenie  NATO’,  Gazeta
Wyborcza, 13 June 2000.
2 ‘Poland to take advisory role with new Nato members’, American Forces Information Service, 24 September 2002. 
3 ‘Polish Pride, American Profits’, New York Times, 12 January 2003.
4 Quoted in ibid.
5 ‘President  Aleksander  Kwasniewski  pays  a  working  visit  to  the  USA’;  http://http://www.president.pl/ser/index.php3?tem_ID=
5382&kategoria=Last%20month.

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From America’s protégé to constructive European

strated during the recent presidential campaign
in America. During televised debates President
Bush referred to Poland’s role in Iraq as proof of
his ability to maintain international coalitions
(flawlessly pronouncing the name of Poland’s
president ‘Kwasniewski’ on these occasions). At
the same time senator John Kerry argued that
the United States should have been more appre-
ciative of Poland’s role in Iraq.6

Overall, there is no doubt that Polish-Ameri-
can relations have been close since the end of the
Cold War, and in particular since 9/11, when
Poland emerged as one of the very few European
countries prepared to unconditionally support
American foreign policy. It is clear that strategic
considerations play an essential role in this new
intimacy  in  Polish-American  relations.  For
Poland,  the  US  presence  in  Europe  provides
reassurance  against  its  powerful  neighbours,
whilst for the United States Poland is a friendly
state located at the strategic boundary between
Eastern and Western Europe. Having said this,
these strategic considerations are bolstered, if
not underpinned, by cultural and historical fac-
tors. These include the prominent role played by
Polish generals Kosciuszko and Pulawski in the
War of American Independence of 1776 and the
ideological link between the American revolu-
tion and the failed reform of the Polish-Lithuan-
ian commonwealth in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. There is also a strong sense of gratitude in
Poland for America’s role in recreating the Pol-
ish state in 1918 (President Wilson’s 14-point
declaration)  and  in  ending  the  Cold  War.
Finally, the two nations are directly linked by the
presence of some 10 million Americans of Polish
extraction, with Chicago being the biggest con-
centration of Poles outside Warsaw. Referring to
these factors, the former American Ambassador
to Poland, Christopher R. Hill, argued that ‘the
Poles  and  Americans  have  similar  attitudes

towards security and foreign policy in general,
which is a consequence of our particular histori-
cal experiences.’7 Although, as discussed later,
Polish public opinion no longer supports US
policy in Iraq, it is certainly true that there con-
tinues  to  exist  a  congruence  of  perspectives
between Washington and Warsaw on some key
security issues. For example, not unlike in Amer-
ica,  there  is  also  a  general  predisposition  in
Poland in favour of an interventionist foreign
policy  combined  with  a  sceptical  attitude
towards multilateralism.8

In addition, there is also a strong sense in
Poland, and indeed in many other parts of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, that a close alliance
with the United States is both beneficial for its
security and at the same time enhancing for its
position vis-à-vis other European partners. Only
15 years after regaining its sovereignty Poland
continues to be uncertain of its place in Europe
and  determined  to  be  recognised  as  a  major
European player. Retaining a close alliance with
the United States is seen as conducive to these
objectives.  Consequently,  unlike  many  West
European states, Poland does not seek to con-
strain American hegemony, in fact Warsaw con-
ceives  it  as  its  interest  that  the  United  States
maintains and pursues its powerful position, as
seen in Kwasniewski’s speech at West Point. 

The Poles, as well as many other Central and
East European nations, are reconciled with the
notion that they are unable to provide for their
own security, consequently, they accept a hege-
monic international system, so long as the hege-
mon is liberal-democratic and is not a nearby
state. In addition, since until 2004 Poland was in
NATO but outside the EU there was a strong
inclination in Warsaw, particularly within cir-
cles of security experts, to perceive the relation-
ship with the United States as more inclusive
than their relations with Brussels.

6 However, Kerry failed to mention Poland as one of the United States’s allies in Iraq, which could have been a factor affecting voting
preferences of some 10 million Americans of Polish extraction. For Kerry’s views on relations with Poland in the context of Iraq, see an
interview reported in Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 October 2004.
7 Interview with Christopher Hill, Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 December 2002.
8 See ‘Transatlantic Trends 2004’, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004. 

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Poland’s strategic culture: the past in the present

T o understand Poland’s preoccupation with

security and the notion of inclusion/exclu-
sion  it  is  necessary  to  grasp  the  essence  of
Poland’s strategic culture as rooted in its geopo-
litical history. Poland’s position between Ger-
many and Russia/the Soviet Union was in the
past a source of threat to the Polish state and a
major reason for its collapse in the late eigh-
teenth century and again in 1939. This turbu-
lent history marked by inherent insecurity and
vulnerability  to  external  aggression,  coupled
with its current position as a state bordering the
former Soviet Union, means that Poland’s secu-
rity policies remain strongly concerned with, if
not fixated on, the issue of territorial defence.
Consequently,  Warsaw  decided  to  apply  for
NATO membership as early as 1992 – a policy
which quickly became underpinned by a broad
political consensus, including the former com-
munists.9 Unsurprisingly,  there  remains  a
strong preference in Poland for an American-led
NATO which is able to honour its commitments
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Warsaw’s Eastern policies are also shaped by
historical  experience  and  thus  on  occasion
appear  quite  distinct  from  the  policies  of  its
West European partners. In particular, Poland’s
policy  towards  the  East  is  characterised  by
strong support for the newly independent states
between itself and Russia.10 Poland has been the
major advocate of efforts to anchor Ukraine and
Lithuania  in  the  West;  it  supported  the  pro-
independence  movement  in  Belarus  and  pro-
moted NATO’s enlargement beyond its eastern

borders. On all of these issues Poland was sup-
ported  by  Washington,  whilst  its  European
allies  were  initially  reticent  about  greater
involvement in Ukraine or Belarus. A further
defining tenet of Polish strategic culture, which
gels with current American security thinking, is
a  disposition  towards  favouring  proactive
engagement when confronted with the threat of
regional instability. This derives from an endur-
ing facet of Polish identity – having been a victim
of  West  European  pacifism  in  the  form  of
French and British appeasement policy towards
Hitler and the subsequent failure of France and
Britain to actively defend Poland in September
1939.  This  disposition  translated  clearly  and
directly into Polish policy and public opinion
which  unambiguously  supported  NATO’s
engagement in Kosovo and the United States’s
operation in Afghanistan.11 The Polish view on
military action in Iraq was admittedly more split
(as  was  opinion  in  the  United  Kingdom),
though as noted earlier, élite support in Poland
for Washington’s policy on the issue and the role
of the UN remained strong throughout the con-
flict. 

A third characteristic of Polish strategic cul-
ture already alluded to is a rather ambivalent
position towards multilateral security institu-
tions  (with  the  notable  exception  of  NATO),
which  are  perceived  in  Poland  with  a  certain
amount of scepticism and utilitarianism, not
dissimilar to the US perspective. There remains
a  strong  Polish  conviction  that  the  prewar
League of Nations proved unable to prevent the

9 Stuart Croft et al., ‘The Enlargement of NATO’, in The Enlargement of Europe (Manchester and New York: MUP, 1999).
10 According  to  Antonio  Missiroli  the  fear  of  Russia  constitutes  the  most  distinctive  feature  of  Poland’s,  as  well  as  the  Baltic  states’
Atlanticism. See Antonio Missiroli, ‘The Central Europeans Between the EU and NATO’, Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004.
11 Olaf Osica, ‘In Search of New Role. Poland vis-à-vis Euro-Atlantic Relations’, in Marcin Zaborowski and David Dunn, Poland – A New
Power in Transatlantic Security, a special edition of Defence Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 21-39.

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From America’s protégé to constructive European

outbreak of the Second World War and effec-
tively strengthened German revisionism in Cen-
tral  Europe.  The  UN  is  perceived  in  more
favourable  terms  but  is  charged  with  having
been  unable  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  the
Cold War status quo, which left Poland on the
wrong side of the Iron Curtain. This Polish scep-
ticism towards the primacy of international law
and the UN was clearly demonstrated during the
NATO operation in Kosovo. Unlike in Germany,
no debate about the illegality of NATO action –
which did not have a UN mandate – seriously
emerged in Poland.12

Since  Poland  joined  NATO  in  1999  these

strategic cultural predispositions – a preference
for a strong US-led Alliance; a commitment to
reforms in Ukraine and Belarus and in turn a
further eastward enlargement of NATO; a lack
of faith in multilateral security institutions save
for NATO and a proclivity to use force proac-
tively – have rendered Warsaw a firm member of
the Atlanticist wing of the alliance and a feisty
adherent of the US position on almost all recent
foreign policy issues. Two particular areas where
Warsaw either came to support Washington’s
position  or  found  its  own  position  in  accor-
dance with that of the United States were the
war in Iraq and, initially, ESDP.

12 Ibid.

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The Iraq war – from enthusiastic endorsement
to disappointment

Whilst Atlanticism has been an apparent fea-

ture of Polish foreign policy since the end
of the Cold War, the level of Poland’s support for
US action in Iraq surprised many of its Euro-
pean allies, causing irritation in Berlin and Paris
and earning Poland the dubious title of ‘Amer-
ica’s Trojan donkey’.13 In fact, even some tradi-
tional promoters of Poland’s Atlanticist orien-
tation, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, expressed criti-
cism regarding what he called ‘a too-excessive
and divisive demonstration of loyalty’, which he
saw as unnecessary and damaging to Poland’s
relations with Germany and France.14 Overall,
Poland’s position during the Iraq crisis has been
distinguished by the three following policies: 
(cid:1) signing the ‘letter of the 8’, which supported
US  policy  on  Iraq  and  was  perceived  as
defying the Franco-German position;15
(cid:1) Polish special units fighting under US com-
mand during the combat operation in Iraq; 
(cid:1) Poland contributing 2,500 troops to the sta-
bilisation force and taking chief responsibi-
lity for one of the four occupation zones in
south-central Iraq since September 2003. 

With the exception of the United Kingdom,
none of America’s allies offered a comparable
level of support. Although the cost of transport-
ing Polish troops to Iraq has been covered by the
United States, it is extraordinary that Poland
has kept 2,500 troops there and has taken upon
itself the responsibility for stabilising almost a

quarter of that country since September 2003. It
is also worth pointing out that, next to Britain,
Poland was the only European ally of the United
States where a considerable political consensus
held on the issue at the time of the invasion of
Iraq. The main opposition parties supported the
Government’s decision to send troops to Iraq,
with objections being voiced by the fringe par-
ties,  the  populist  Samoobrona  (Self-defence)
and the far-right LPR (League of Polish Fami-
lies).16 Whilst it is true that public opinion was
divided  over  the  war,  Poland  experienced  no
mass  anti-war  demonstrations  and  certainly
nothing on the scale remotely comparable with
that seen in other countries supportive of Wash-
ington’s policy, like Britain or Spain.17

This  unprecedented  behaviour  in  Europe
begs the question about the reasons that drove
such a staunch response from the Government,
as well as the lack of a credible domestic opposi-
tion to what turned out to be a risky and radical
policy.  It  is  clear  that  Poland’s  rationale  for
engaging  in  Iraq  was  heavily  flavoured  by  its
regional specificity and as such was distinctive
from the motives of the United States or even the
United Kingdom, although there are some simi-
larities  with  the  latter  case.  For  example,  the
overwhelming  rationale  in  America  of  seeing
Iraq in the context of the war on terrorism and
the events of 9/11 had little or no resonance in
Poland. At this point Poland was not targeted by
terrorist networks and had traditionally good

13 ‘Is Poland America’s donkey or could it become NATO’s horse?’, The Economist, 10 May 2003.
14 Interview  with  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  ‘  Przez  glupote  i  fanatyzm’,  Gazeta  Wyborcza,  7  October  2003;  see  also  ‘Zbigniew  Brzezinski  dla
Rzeczpospolitej’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 April 2003. 
15 ‘Europe and America must stand united’ – letter by the ‘8’, 30 January 2003. 
16 ‘Sejm:Miller o udziale Polakow w silach sojuszniczych w Iraku’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 March 2003; ‘Debata o Iraku w Sejmie: szczyty
absurdu’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 April 2004. 
17 John Springford, ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europeans united: public attitudes towards the Iraq war and US foreign policy’, Centre for European
Reform-Background Brief; http://www.cer.org.uk.

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From America’s protégé to constructive European

relations with most Arab countries, including
Iraq. If anything, the decision to join the US-led
coalition only increased Poland’s vulnerability
to international terrorism, as indeed shown by
Osama bin Laden’s decision to include Poland
on his list of al-Qaeda’s primary targets.

Nor was the Government’s decision driven
principally by the weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) issue. Whilst this argument was empha-
sised in the United States, and even more so in
the United Kingdom and Spain, Iraq’s alleged
possession of WMDs was rarely mentioned in
the Polish debate.18 The issue simply has not fig-
ured as a ‘clear and present danger’ and has been
a  remote  concern  in  current  Polish  security
thinking. Finally, unlike the United States and
United Kingdom, Poland never had geopolitical
or major economic interests in the area. Whilst
Polish companies were present in the area in the
1970s and 1980s and Iraq owes a considerable
amount of money to Poland, this past economic
presence was too small to weigh on Warsaw’s
decision. 

On the whole, unlike the cases of the United
States and the United Kingdom, there was no
justification for Poland’s involvement in terms
of responding to a direct threat.19 Also, expecta-
tions of material and political profit were ini-
tially rare, although, as will be argued later, this
has since changed. Instead, the arguments that
dominated the Polish debate have been predom-
inantly historical and moral in nature. There is,
for example, no doubt that the most important
rationale driving Polish policy on the matter was
a demonstration of Poland’s loyalty and ability
to be ‘America’s model ally’.20 Due to its past
geopolitical vulnerability, Poland has been keen

to develop a relationship of reciprocal obliga-
tion with the United States whereby both coun-
tries would support each other in time of need.
Seen in this context, Poland’s support for the
United  States  during  the  Iraq  crisis  appears, 
in fact, aimed at developing a sense of obligation
and  responsibility  for  Poland’s  security  in 
America.21

The  second  vital  argument  concerned  the
preservation  of  NATO  and,  more  broadly,
transatlantic bonds. Again due to historical rea-
sons – seeing itself as a victim of the European
balance of power – Poland sees the continuing
presence  of  the  United  States  in  Europe  as  a
guarantor of its own security. In this context,
Poland, similarly to the United Kingdom, would
be prepared to go to great lengths to discourage
the United States from disengaging, not to men-
tion withdrawing, from Europe. Hence, like the
United  Kingdom,  Poland  believed  that  its
involvement in Iraq would achieve this.22

The third set of arguments was moral, and
concerned with disposing of the human rights
abusing regime and bringing democracy to Iraq.
Both  the  president  and  the  foreign  minister
argued that, due to its own past as a communist
state, Poland had special responsibility to sup-
port the spread of democracy to other parts of
the world.23 It was often pointed out in this con-
text that in the past Poles themselves had been
denied  democratic  freedoms  and  had  often
called for a more active role from the West in
opposing their autocratic government. It was
therefore natural for the Poles to believe that
most Iraqis wanted to get rid of Saddam, and
that they would welcome any outside help in
this process. 

18 Although the WMD was referred to by President Kwasniewski this usually took place when speaking to the foreign press; see, for example,
the President’s interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel, 29 September 2002.
19 See transcript from President’s press conference following the beginning of the invasion of Iraq: ‘Prezydent RP o dzialaniach w Iraku’,
20 March 2004; http://www.president.pl.
20 David  H.  Dunn,  ‘Poland  :  America’s  New  Model  Ally’,  in  Marcin  Zaborowski  and  David  H.  Dunn  (eds.),  Poland  –  A  New  Power  in
Transatlantic Security (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
21 See the article justifying Poland’s role in Iraq by Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, ‘Irak to takze nasza sprawa’, Gazeta Wyborcza,
13 May 2004.
22 See the article mentioned above as well as an interview with President Kwasniewski for Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 April 2004.
23 See the article by Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, ‘Irak to takze nasza sprawa’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 May 2004, and President
Kwasniewski’s interview for Der Tagesspiegel, 29 September 2002.

12

The Iraq war – from enthusiastic endorsement to disappointment

Fourthly, the Polish position needs to be seen
against the background of a broader split within
Europe and Poland’s preoccupation with being
considered as one of the ‘ins’ in the EU process.
Two developments were important in this con-
text: the Franco-German position as opponents
of the war in Iraq and Poland’s relative isolation
within the Convention on the Future of Europe.
The Franco-German opposition to the war and a
priori rejection of a second UN resolution on
Iraq prompted a fear in Poland, and indeed in
other  European  capitals,  that  their  influence
was being reduced and the EU security foreign
policy agenda determined by two states.24 At the
same time, Poland’s ambition to be represented
the  Convention’s  secretariat  was
within 
thwarted  and  its  defence  of  the  Nice  vote-
weighting system was only endorsed by Spain.
These policy developments fed into the para-
digm of ‘exclusion and inclusion’ in Polish secu-
rity thinking and consequently influenced War-
saw’s decision to sign the ‘letter of the 8’, which
was widely perceived as defying the Franco-Ger-
man attempt to speak for the whole of the EU.
Rather  than  following  the  anti-war  camp,
Poland chose to side with what appeared at the
time a more inclusive United States. It was sub-
sequently suggested in this context that Poland,
as  one  of  the  most  vociferous  and  consistent
supporters of American foreign policy and of
solidarity  between  the  United  States  and
Europe,  was  likely  to  be  among  the  group  of
states shaping the new Europe and its foreign
policy.25

In addition to these political and often his-
torically informed calculations, there were also
some  expectations  of  material  benefits  from

Poland’s  military  involvement  in  Iraq.  These
included securing privileged access for Polish
companies  in  the  reconstruction  of  Iraq  and
rearmament of the new Iraqi army. It was also
widely expected that America would recognise
Poland’s status as its close ally and change its
immigration  rules  towards  Polish  citizens  by
removing the visa requirement.26

Disappointment over Iraq

Over a year after Poland took responsibility for
security in south-central Iraq much of the Gov-
ernment’s early confidence, self-righteousness
and  optimism  have  subsided  or  disappeared
altogether. Iraq continues to be highly unstable,
a growing number of Polish troops have been
killed and very few of the expected benefits have
actually  materialised.  In  September  2004  the
vast majority of Poles, over 70 per cent, wanted
Polish troops to be pulled out of Iraq.27 Whilst
as of autumn 2004 a basic cross-party consensus
on staying in has none the less prevailed, the
issue is fast becoming a political one, with some
opposition  parties  (not  only  the  LPR  and
Samoobrona but also the PSL-Polish Popular
Alliance and perhaps even the co-governing UP-
Labour Union) being prepared to use it during
the forthcoming elections.28

On top of the continuously bad situation in
Iraq  it  is  also  apparent  that  the  Government
failed to convince the population that staying in
Iraq is in Poland’s interest. Whilst historical and
moral arguments, as outlined above, may appeal
to elites, they do not easily translate into ‘bread
and butter’ issues, which is what the majority of

24 See Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 94-5; ‘Who Speaks for Europe?’,
The Economist, 8 February 2003.
25 See President Kwasniewski’s interview for Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 April 2004.
26 ‘Polish President Appeals for a More “Open and Gracious” US’, New York Times, 4 September 2004.
27 ‘73 proc. Polakow przeciwnych obecnosci w Iraku’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 August 2004; see also Transatlantic Trends 2004, German Marshall
Fund of the United States, 2004. 
28 The UP argued in favour of the troops withdrawal till the end of 2004 (see: ‘Jaruga-Nowacka:powrot z Iraku w 2004’, Gazeta Wyborcza,
6 May 2004), whilst the PSL turned its opposition to the Polish presence in Iraq into a central point of its campaign (see ‘PSL zbiera podpisy
przeciwko obecnosci w Iraku’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 August 2004).

13

From America’s protégé to constructive European

the electorate are really interested in. And it is
apparent that Poland’s involvement in Iraq has
brought very few tangible results: only a handful
of Polish companies have been involved in the
reconstruction programmes, a major arms com-
pany,  Bumar,  lost  the  notoriously  un-trans-
parent bid for the rearmament of the new Iraqi
force  and,  perhaps  most  painfully,  Poles  still
need visas when travelling to the United States –
it is actually harder to get one now.29

As the situation in Iraq has worsened, these
pragmatic issues have moved to the forefront of
the debate, uniting the critics as well as support-
ers  of  the  war.  For  example,  the  centre-right
opposition parties, PO (Civic Platform) and PiS
(Law and Justice), which voted in favour of send-
ing troops to Iraq, have maintained their early
position but criticised the Government’s failure
to secure any tangible benefits from Poland’s
involvement in Iraq.30 Reacting to this domestic
criticism,  the  president  and  the  Government
have sought to exercise some direct pressure on
Washington. But when President Kwasniewski
raised the visa issue with George Bush, it was
made clear to him that his query was bordering
on  inappropriate  and  that  no  change  of 
policy  was  going  to  happen.  Disappointed,
Kwasniewski argued then that he was ‘hurt’ by
the visa decision and that as ‘a friend of America’
he did not understand it. He also appealed for a
more ‘gracious’ and ‘less divisive’ America.31

But, perhaps even more devastatingly for the
Government, developments since the beginning
of the Iraq war seem to undermine the validity of
some of the historical and moral arguments, as
outlined above, which guided Poland’s policy
choice in 2003. There is, for example, little evi-

dence  that  Polish  and  British  loyalty  to  the
United States prevented a split in the transat-
lantic alliance and helped to sustain America’s
commitment  to  European  security.  Poland’s
plans to engage Germany and then NATO in its
zone in northern Iraq have largely failed, leading
to further tensions rather than an improvement
in transatlantic relations.32 In the meantime,
the United States announced plans for the mass
reduction  of  its  military  presence  in  Europe.
Also the moral argument of bringing democracy
and human rights to Iraq is no longer sustain-
able in the light of the scandal over the abuse of
Iraqis in Abu-Ghraib prison. 

Overall, it is clear that, one year on, the case
for Poland’s involvement in Iraq is weaker. This
is evident not only in the attitude of public opin-
ion and increasingly in party politics but also
within  the  Government 
itself.  Following
mounting casualties among Polish servicemen
in late summer and autumn 2004, Prime Minis-
ter Belka and Defence Minister Szmajdzinski
announced a progressive reduction of the Polish
contingent in Iraq. In October 2004 Szmajdzin-
ski went further and expressed the view that the
entire Polish contingent should withdraw, irre-
spective of the situation in Iraq, by the end of
2005  following  the  expiry  of  UN  resolution
1546,  which  legitimised  the  presence  of  the
multinational force in Iraq.33 Although Szma-
jdzinski’s declaration turned out to be prema-
ture and was not made in consultation with the
Prime Minister, the Government admitted that
it  had  indeed  considered  the  possibility  of
pulling out of Iraq in 2005.34 A more critical
view of the United States and its Iraq policy has
also  emerged  in  the  attitude  of  President

29 ‘Pulaski by wizy nie dostal’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 January 2004; ‘Zapomniec o wizach’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 August 2004.
30 ‘Z Iraku na Wiejska’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 September 2004.
31 ‘Polish President Appeals for a More “Open and Gracious” US’, New York Times, 4 September 2004.
32 ‘Niemcy-Rzad wyklucza udzial trojstronnego korpusu w Iraku’, PAP, 7 May 2004.
33 ‘Poland  unexpectedly  says  troops  may  quit  in  2005’,  International  Herald  Tribune,  5  October  2004;  for  the  original  interview  with
Szmajdzinski, see Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 October 2004.
34 ‘Awantura o date’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 October 2004.

14

The Iraq war – from enthusiastic endorsement to disappointment

Kwasniewski  –  until  recently  a  staunch  sup-
porter  of  Washington’s  foreign  policy.  For
example, in March 2004 Kwasniewski caused a
storm by announcing at a press conference that
‘Poland was misled’ over the WMD issue.35 A few
months later, in an interview for the New York
Times, the President criticised the influence of
neo-conservatives in Bush’s administration and
warned the United States against the folly of
unilateralism.36

But do the Government’s recent difficulties
mean that, like Spain, Poland may turn out to be
an occasional Atlanticist and change its foreign
policy  in  a  radical  manner?  This  is  unlikely.

However, the Iraq crisis was the first case when
Poland  experienced  the  perils  of  American 
leadership  and  hegemony,  which  effectively
meant the end of the honeymoon period for the 
relationship. It is already apparent that the Iraq
experience has eroded the Atlanticist tenets of
Polish  strategic  culture,  as  demonstrated,  for
example, in the weakening political consensus
on the issue. It is also clear that disappointment
over Iraq has been one of the factors fostering
the  evolution  of  Warsaw’s  attitude  towards
CFSP and ESDP, which has been increasingly
positive.

35 In his subsequent interview Kwasniewski argued that he should have said ‘ill-informed’ rather than ‘duped’ and that he did not mean to
criticise the United States but the intelligence community (American, British and Polish) for providing false evidence; see Gazeta Wyborcza,
30 April 2004.
36 ‘Polish President Appeals for a More “Open and Gracious” US’, New York Times, 4 September 2004.

15

From America’s protégé to constructive European

16

Polish policy towards CFSP and ESDP

Warsaw’s  attitude  towards  the  EU’s  CFSP

and ESDP has undergone a considerable
evolution over the last few years. Initially there
was a clear tendency in Poland to regard the EU’s
international  ambitions  with  scepticism  and
lack of enthusiasm.37 However, more recently
and especially since Poland’s accession to the EU
in May 2004, the Polish position has become
more  constructive,  though  it  remains  heavily
flavoured by its Atlanticist, pro-American com-
mitments.  In  addition  to  the  growing  disap-
pointment  with  Washington’s  leadership,  as
discussed above, three factors can be identified
as having a defining influence on the evolution
of the Polish view of CFSP and ESDP: the issue
of inclusion and exclusion, an ambivalent atti-
tude towards the directoire method and Poland’s
eastern policy. 

5.1 From scepticism to cautious
enthusiasm 
With the first wave of NATO’s Eastern enlarge-
ment  in  March  1999,  and  having  previously
secured the status of associate member of the
Western European Union (WEU), it seemed that
the days when Poland was excluded from core
decisions  concerning  European  security  were
finally over. However, only three months later it
seemed that the goal posts were being moved
when EU leaders met in Cologne and decided to

embark upon creating a Security and Defence
Policy  (ESDP),  which  would  leave  non-EU
NATO  states,  like  Poland,  ‘consulted’  but 
crucially  ‘excluded’  from  the  actual  decision-
making process. Warsaw did not like the idea
and was not shy in saying so. Some Polish com-
mentators went as far as to argue that ESDP
would  lead  to  America’s  withdrawal  from
Europe and the return of interwar-type instabil-
ity in Europe.38 Rather calmer but clearly unen-
thusiastic  about  the  whole  enterprise,  the
defence  minister  remarked  that  ‘there  is  no
point crying over spilt milk’.39

Warsaw’s reservations about ESDP were at
this point based on two types of concerns. First,
Warsaw argued that Europeans should develop
their defence capabilities within NATO’s Euro-
pean Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), oth-
erwise  the  EU  would  be  duplicating  existing
structures, which would weaken the Alliance.
Second, Warsaw argued that the planned ESDP
excluded those European NATO members who,
like Poland, remained outside the EU at that
point in time.40 It was argued in this context
that  NATO’s  ESDI  was  more  inclusive,  as  it
involved Poland and other non-EU Europeans
in  their  capacities  as  full  members  of  the
Alliance and associate members of WEU.41

Consequently, the Polish reaction to the EU
decision to set up headline goals for the creation
of a 50-60,000-strong rapid reaction force, as
agreed in Helsinki in December 1999, was cool

37 ‘NATO: Otwarty konflikt miedzy USA i Europa’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 December 2000.
38 Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, ‘Czy NATO jest zagrozone’, Rzeczpospolita,15 May 2001.
39 Quoted  in  Olaf  Osica,  ‘CESDP  as  Seen  by  Poland’,  Reports  and  Analyses 5/01,  Centre  for  International  Relations,  Warsaw
(http://www.csm.org.pl), p. 8.
40 Rafal Trzaskowski, ‘Poland’, in Antonio Missiroli (ed.). ‘Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?’, Occasional Papers 34 (Paris: EU Institute
for Security Studies, April 2002).
41 Osica, ‘CESDP as Seen by Poland’, pp. 12-13.
42 Art. 28 Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Press Release 00300/1/99, Brussels, 11 December 1999.

5

17

From America’s protégé to constructive European

and critical.42 The summit’s conclusion stressed
that  non-EU  NATO  states,  the  so-called  ‘six’,
would be able to contribute militarily to EU cri-
sis management missions, however this formula
lacked  any  reference  to  participation  in  deci-
sion-making and was consequently viewed by
Warsaw as not sufficiently inclusive.43 In addi-
tion, the summit failed to differentiate between
the six and other ‘interested states’, specifically
mentioning  in  the  latter  context  Russia  and
Ukraine.44 Not only, therefore, were Polish fears
of exclusion seemingly confirmed but also the
wording of the presidency’s conclusions gave rise
to speculation that whilst ESDP could under-
mine NATO it might also become a platform for
Russian influence in European security.45

Poland’s  generally  sceptical  position  on
ESDP  was  seen  in  governmental  statements.
Defence  Minister  Janusz  Onyszkiewicz  criti-
cised the EU plan as unclear and lacking in mili-
tary and operational viability.46 In his annual
address  (exposé)  to  Parliament  in  May  2000,
Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek expressed
disappointment with the EU for not consider-
ing Warsaw’s proposals for involving the six in
ESDP decision-making mechanisms. Geremek
also  called  for  a  further  strengthening  of
transatlantic ties, for which purpose, he argued,
Europeans  should  concentrate  on  the  actual
‘requirements of security’ rather than on creat-
ing new institutions.47 A similar criticism also
came from the military, who assessed the EU’s

plans to create a rapid reaction force as either
unrealistic  or,  worse,  potentially  weakening
NATO’s military cohesion.48

In  the  first  few  months  following  the
Helsinki summit, disagreements between the
EU and the group of six grew further. On the
one hand, France was pushing for the EU to
develop  a  planning  capacity  independent  of
NATO, which confirmed Warsaw’s fears that
ESDP  might  be  politicised  and  eventually
duplicate NATO. On the other hand, Turkey, a
member of the six, vetoed any possible use of
NATO assets by future European forces. This
standstill was not tackled until the Feira sum-
mit in June 2000, for which occasion Poland
submitted  its  own  proposal  envisaging  the
more comprehensive involvement of the six in
ESDP.49 With active support from the United
Kingdom, most of the Polish proposals were
agreed in Feira and shortly afterwards.50 As a
result, a ‘15+6’ committee was created with the
purpose of discussing ESDP issues between EU
member states and non-EU European NATO
members. The six were also given an opportu-
nity to take part in the Political and Security
Committee  (PSC).51 Poland  was  also  able  to
establish channels of communication with the
EU Military Committee (EUMC) and Military
Staff  (EUMS),  both  of  which  are  more  con-
cerned with the actual military capacities, act-
ing as links between the EU and member states’
military resources.52

43 Author’s  interview  at  the  Polish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Department  of  European  Security,  Warsaw  January  2001;  see  Roman
Kuzniar, ‘Nadmiar wizji, brak konkretow’, Tygodnik Powszechny, no .41, 2000.
44 See Annex IV, Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security
and Defence. 
45 Nowak-Jezioranski, ‘Czy NATO jest zagrozone’, Rezczpospolita, 15 May 2001.
46 Osica, ‘CESDP as Seen by Poland’, p. 14.
47 Speech given by Bronislaw Geremek, at the 78th Session of the Parliament on 9 May 2000; http://www.msz.gov.pl. 
48 See Trzaskowski, ‘Poland’, p. 20.
49 See  ‘Propozycje  praktycznego  rozwiniecia  postanowien  z  Feira  w  zakresie  wspolpracy  pomiedzy  UE  i  non-EU  European  Allies’;
http://www.msz.gov.pl.
50 Confidential interviews, Warsaw, January 2001; see also ‘Poland Feels Torn Between 2 Alliances’, International Herald Tribune, 6 June 2000.
51 ‘Propozycje  praktycznego  rozwiniecia  postanowien  z  Feira  w  zakresie  wspolpracy  pomiedzy  UE  i  non-EU  European  Allies’,
http://www.msz.gov.pl.
52 See Longhurst, ‘From Security Consumer to Security Provider’, in M. Zaborowski and D. Dunn, Poland – A New Power in Transatlantic Security,
a special edition of Defence Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 50-62.

18

Polish policy towards CFSP and ESDP

Overall, the atmosphere around the ESDP
substantially 
improved  after  Feira.  With
Turkey’s unconstructive behaviour in the back-
ground, the EU seemed to appreciate that War-
saw  had  made  an  effort  to  bridge  the  gap
between the EU-15 and the non-EU-6. And War-
saw was indeed anxious not to alienate the EU as
membership  negotiations  entered  the  most
intensive phase from 2001 onwards.53

The change of government from centre-right
to centre-left in autumn 2001 had no discernible
impact upon Warsaw’s European policy, its atti-
tudes  towards  the  CFSP  and  ESDP  included.
However,  developments  in  transatlantic  and
European security in reaction to the events of
9/11 prompted a change in Poland’s view of the
EU as a security actor. In particular, three factors
came to play a role in this process: the waning
importance of NATO, EU enlargement and the
leadership question in the context of European
security.

5.2 The impact of 9/11 and
EU enlargement 
In the face of America’s snub of NATO during its
campaign in Afghanistan and the Bush admin-
istration’s proclivity to rely on ‘coalitions of the
willing’,  Warsaw  had  every  reason  to  wonder
whether its reliance on the Alliance, pronounced
as a cornerstone of Poland’s security, was in fact
sustainable.54 At the same time, in Europe, Tony
Blair invited President Chirac and Chancellor
Schröder to work out a coordinated agenda for
the  EU  response  to  the  events  of  9/11.55
Although this initiative brought few tangible
results and soon after their meeting the three
leaders fell out over Iraq, the mere prospect of a
European directoire, from which they would be

excluded, was unwelcome to the Poles. 

Warsaw’s greatest fear was that, as America
lost interest in Europe and NATO, its role would
be replaced by a club of the privileged and most
powerful member states, with Poland’s influ-
ence marginalised, as had been the case during
the  interwar  period.56 Warsaw’s  readiness  to
join the ‘coalition of the willing’ and become one
of America’s closest allies in Iraq should, in part,
also be seen in this context. But more impor-
tantly here, perhaps paradoxically, the deepen-
ing  of  the  CFSP,  through  the  moderate  and
qualified extension of qualified majority voting
(QMV), came to be seen in Warsaw as a possible
instrument to counterbalance the emergence of
a ‘Europe of great powers’ as well as enhancing
European security through a more developed
ESDP.  Warsaw,  however,  stressed  that  CFSP
should  have  a  strong  transatlantic  identity,
whilst ESDP should concern itself with develop-
ing capabilities rather than institutions.57

Despite these reservations, a change of atti-
tude  in  Warsaw  towards  CFSP  and  ESDP
became apparent, no doubt partly in response to
disappointment  with  American  leadership  in
Iraq. It was also apparent that Warsaw used its
pro-CFSP/ESDP  views  to  counterbalance  the
criticism  from  those  member  states  that
accused Poland of disloyalty towards the EU.
For example, in March 2003 at the height of the
falling-out over Iraq, shortly after President’s
Chirac rebuke of Central and East Europeans
for their pro-US stance, Polish Foreign Minister
Cimoszewicz outlined Warsaw’s vision for the
future of CFSP that, while stressing the value of
transatlantic  relations,  was  also  in  favour  of
deeper integration in the area. Reflecting War-
saw’s preoccupation with inclusion, the speech
underlined the principle of equality of all mem-
ber states irrespective of their size or potential.

53 Author’s interviews in Warsaw, June 2001; see also ‘Poland Feels Torn Between 2 Alliances’, International Herald Tribune, 6 June 2000.
54 The central role of NATO is emphasised in the Polish National Security Strategy (November 2003); http://www.bbn.gov.pl.
55 ‘Guess who wasn’t coming to dinner?’ The Economist, 10 November 2001; ‘Power to the Capitals’, Financial Times, 15 October 2001. 
56 See the paper by Foreign Minister Wlodzimiesz Cimoszewicz, ‘Polska w zamecie swiata’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 June 2004.
57 ‘Future of the CFSP – lecture by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland Wlodzimiesz Cimoszewicz at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation,
Berlin, 12 March 2003’; http://www.msz.gov.pl.

19

From America’s protégé to constructive European

Cimoszewicz also supported the creation of the
post of EU foreign minister with broad respon-
sibilities  including  some  first-pillar  issues  as
well as the moderate extension of QMV in CFSP
matters  and  in  the  implementation  phase  of
ESDP. The foreign minister also supported the
establishment  of  a  European  Armaments
Agency,  although  he  stressed  that  it  should
remain open to transatlantic armaments coop-
eration.58

In its subsequent pronouncements, the Gov-
ernment welcomed the pro-integrationist pro-
posals that emerged in the context of the Con-
vention drafting the EU constitution. The Gov-
ernment  was  particularly  forthcoming  in  the
CFSP area, supporting all major proposals put
forward by Jean-Luc Dehaene’s working group,
including the idea of a ‘double-hatted’ foreign
minister with enhanced authority and a foot in
both the Council and the Commission. Warsaw
also supported the notion of empowering the
EU with legal personality and establishing an
EU diplomatic service,59 and endorsed the idea
of developing an EU security strategy.60

Warsaw’s  attitude  towards  the  proposals
that came up in the context of Michel Barnier’s
working group on ESDP was more qualified but
none  the  less  still  overall  forthcoming.  Here,
Warsaw supported the creation of an EU Arma-
ments and Research Agency (which it has since
joined) and despite its initial objections it even-
tually came round to supporting the inclusion
of the mutual defence (solidarity) clause.61 Some
reservations emerged in the context of discus-

sions concerning the idea of enhanced cooperation,
where  Warsaw  stressed  the  need  for  this  pro-
posal  to  be  inclusive in  character,  yet  Poland
proved to be more willing to accept the notion
than other Central and East European candi-
dates.62 Whilst Poland consistently stressed the
need to respect and maintain the role of NATO,
it made several pronouncements suggesting its
openness  towards  the  idea  of  enhancing  EU
autonomous  planning  capacities  and  it  sup-
ported the British proposal to install a Euro-
pean planning cell at the NATO headquarters
(SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.63 Overall there was
a clear recognition amongst the Polish delega-
tion that the EU needed its own defence capabil-
ities,  which,  although  complementary  to
NATO, should be deployable autonomously of
the United States.64

The growing embrace of CFSP and ESDP has
also  become  apparent  in  Poland’s  attitude
towards the European Security Strategy (ESS).
The strategy was generally welcomed in Poland
and received praise for its reasonable and bold
language, its holistic approach to security and
its  appreciation  of  the  value  of  transatlantic
relations. The Poles were also satisfied with the
prospect of the EU becoming a global actor, not
shying away from international activity includ-
ing the use of force. In fact, the prevailing view in
Poland was that the provisions for the use of
force  should  be  strengthened  by  decoupling
them from a mandate of the UN Security Coun-
cil. Warsaw also pushed, unsuccessfully, for the
inclusion of a separate paragraph on transat-

58 Ibid.
59 ‘Remarks by Mrs Danuta Huebner, Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Conference on New Scenarios for
European CFSP, 23 September 2003’.
60 Fraser Cameron and Antoinette Primatarova, ‘Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention’, European Policy Institute Network Working Paper no. 5,
June 2003; http://www.epin.org. 
61 ‘Flexible Integration in the Area of CFSP/ESDP. Debates on the Provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty’ (Austrian Academy of
Science, Vienna, September 2004). 
62 Ibid.
63 ‘Remarks by Mrs Danuta Huebner, Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Conference on New Scenarios for
European CFSP, 23 September 2003’.
64 Cameron and Primatarova, ‘Enlargment, CFSP and the Convention’.
65 Olaf Osica, ‘A Secure Poland in a Better Union? EUSS as Seen by Poland’, paper submitted to the on-line series of Trier University on
national perspectives on European Security Strategy. 

20

Polish policy towards CFSP and ESDP

lantic relations.65 However, despite these reser-
vations, there is a clear recognition in Poland
that the strategy promotes a stronger and inter-
nationally more active EU, which is increasingly
seen as compatible with Poland’s interests. This
view is strongly supported by public opinion, 77
per  cent  of  which,  the  highest  percentage  in
Europe,  believes  that  Europe  should  acquire
more  military  power  to  be  able  to  protect  its
interests separately from the United States.66

The future evolution of Warsaw’s attitude
towards the CFSP and ESDP will, to an impor-
tant extent, depend on the further development
of  flexible  integration  in  these  areas  and
Poland’s  position  on  issues  such  as  structured
cooperation or enhanced cooperation or indeed any
other security-related initiatives set up outside
the remits of the existing treaties.

5.3 A member of a European
leading group?
Poland has traditionally opposed the principle
of flexible integration, on the grounds that it
would create ‘a union within the union’ and was
likely to serve as an instrument for excluding
new member states from vital decisions within
the  EU.  Hence  Poland’s  initial  reluctance  to
endorse the proposals emerging in the context
of  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe,
which, like enhanced cooperation, served to accom-
modate greater flexibility. Indeed the threat of a
‘two-speed  Europe’  was  often  used  by  other
member states, Germany in particular, to pres-
surise Warsaw into accepting a double-majority
voting system as designed in the Convention.67
As noted earlier, Warsaw also reacted with
scepticism towards the prospect of an emerging
Franco-British-German  directoire as  a  leading
group in European security matters. Poland’s

scepticism towards the notion was apparent in
its  view  of  the  trio’s  initiative  in  Iran,  which,
according  to  the  Poles,  should  have  also
included Secretary-General and High Represen-
tative Javier Solana.68 Warsaw also sharply criti-
cised the trio’s internal discussions over the IGC
2003 issues such as those held at the summit on
18 February 2004.69

However, Poland’s attitude towards the idea
of  flexible  integration  or  closer  cooperation
amongst a group of bigger member states began
to evolve as soon as it became clear that Poland
could actually be one of the ‘ins’. Rather ironi-
cally, the event that proved to accommodate the
change in Poland’s attitude was its prominent
role in Iraq, which made the Poles believe that
they could be able to play in Europe’s ‘first divi-
sion’.70 At the same time other member states,
whilst  often  irritated  by  Poland’s  behaviour,
came to see Warsaw as a natural member of the
European  leading  group.  These  two  factors
combined have prompted a change in Poland’s
attitude towards the idea of structured coopera-
tion, which became wholly positive as expecta-
tions were raised that Poland could be amongst
the élite group of member states launching the
initiative. Poland also welcomed the Council’s
suggestion  to  create 
‘battle  groups’.  On
22 November  2004  it  was  announced  that
Poland would become the major contributor to
a battle group to be formed jointly with Ger-
many, with a smaller troop contribution from
Slovakia, to be operational by 2009.

In addition to these formal arrangements,
there is also a growing possibility of Poland’s
involvement in informal arrangements among
the  group  of  biggest  member  states.  In  June
2004, Nicolas Sarkozy, then France’s Finance
Minister  and  likely  presidential  contender  in
2007, stirred controversy by arguing that France
must move away from an ‘exclusive’ dialogue

66 ‘Transatlantic Trends 2004’, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004. 
67 ‘Flexible Integration in the Area of CFSP/ESDP’, p. 20. 
68 Confidential interviews, Brussels, October 2004. 
69 ‘Flexible Integration in the Area of CFSP/ESDP’, p. 27.
70 Ibid., p. 29.

21

From America’s protégé to constructive European

with Germany and work with other big states
including the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and
Poland.71 A few weeks later a similar view was
also expressed by Edmund Stoiber, the leader of
Germany’s CSU and Gerhard Schröder’s chief
opponent in the 2002 elections.72 Whilst Poland
has not officially endorsed these ideas, not least
because during the row over the vote-weighing
system  it  portrayed  itself  as  a  champion  of
smaller states, it is none the less readily partici-
pating in informal consultations among the six
biggest states.

It  is,  however,  important  to  stress  that
Poland’s general predisposition towards flexi-
bility and cooperation with big member states is
likely to be marked by ambivalence in the fore-
seeable future. This will continue to be the case
for two reasons: Poland’s size and its economic
weakness. With a population of just under 40
million, Poland is the most populous new mem-
ber state, but in the EU as a whole it is only just a
medium-sized  power.  The  difference  between
‘big’ and ‘medium’ came to play a decisive role
during the conflict over the vote-weighing sys-
tem  with  the  four  biggest  states,  France,  the
United  Kingdom,  Germany  and  Italy,  having
evidently different interests from Poland and
Spain. It is also clear that due to its economic
underdevelopment Poland will continue to opt
for a larger budget for the EU, in which it will
find itself in conflict with the richer member
states, including the big four. The combination
of Poland’s size and its economic interests also
mean that, unlike the big four, Poland is not a
natural intergovernmentalist and a supporter of
the stronger Council of Ministers. For example,
as far as the EU’s budget is concerned, it is the
Commission that is Poland’s natural ally. 

On the other hand, whilst Poland’s general
predisposition towards teaming up with the big
four may be more problematic that it seems, the

same does not necessarily apply to second-pillar
issues – the CFSP and ESDP – where indeed the
prospects of closer cooperation with the big four
and Spain are brighter. Much will depend here
on Poland’s actual military capabilities and its
determination to reform its armed forces. So far
Poland  lacks  the  necessary  strategic  airlift
capacities that would allow it to act as a ‘frame-
work nation’ in an EU mission. Although the
number of Polish troops based in Iraq (2,500) or
indeed in other parts of the world (altogether
around  10,000)  is  considerable  by  European
standards, it is important to point out that in
most cases Poland has relied on other countries’
transport capacities. The same reason hindered
Poland’s ability to form its own battle group or
act as a framework nation in such an initiative.73
However, given the public support in Poland for
increased defence spending, the Polish govern-
ment is relatively free to modernise its armed
forces should it choose to do so.74

The other area which will weigh heavily on
Poland’s view of CFSP is the EU’s ability to play
an  active  role  in  Poland’s  eastern  neighbour-
hood and, crucially, in relations with Ukraine,
Belarus and Russia. Equally, perhaps, Poland’s
relative importance in the EU as well as in rela-
tions with the United State may depend on its
ability to carve out a regional niche for itself.

5.4 Eastern policy

Eastern policy is one of the most distinctive and
most innovative features of Poland’s post-1989
foreign policy. Heavily influenced by the con-
cepts developed during the Cold War by the émi-
gré Jerzy Giedroyc and his associates from the
Paris-based journal Kultura, the new Eastern pol-
icy rests on three pillars: renouncing territorial
claims  against  Poland’s  eastern  neighbours,

71 ‘Sarkozy questions axis with Germany’, Financial Times, 22 June 2004. 
72 ‘Szostka zamiast osi niemiecko-francuskiej’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 July 2004.
73 Confidential interviews, Brussels, October 2004. 
74 According to recent opinion polls, 41 per cent of Poles are in favour of increasing defence spending, which is by far the highest such
proportion in Europe with the next one in line, United Kingdom, registering 28 per cent of the population in favour of increased spending
in 2004. See ‘Transatlantic Trends 2004’, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004.

22

Polish policy towards CFSP and ESDP

supporting  independence,  state  and  nation-
building in the states between itself and Russia
and, last but not least, promoting their integra-
tion  with  the  West.  Whilst  the  first  of  these
objectives was achieved immediately after the
end of the Cold War, Poland’s eastern neigh-
bours,  with  the  exception  of  Lithuania,  have
progressed  very  slowly  towards  emancipating
themselves  from  Russia  and  integrating  with
the West. It is believed in Poland that domestic
reforms and the Western integration of Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova remain intimately linked
and that the West, and the EU in particular, can
effectively influence these countries’ progress
towards democracy and the market economy. 

Whilst Poland was successful in securing the
stronger engagement of the United States in the
area, for example through the Poland-America-
Ukraine  Cooperation  Initiative  (PAUCI),  the
view prevails in Warsaw that the EU is far better
suited to play an active role towards its eastern
neighbourhood. Like other candidate countries,
Poland  has  had  first-hand  experience  of  the
effective impact of conditionality on domestic
reforms as well as international relations. War-
saw expects the EU to seek greater engagement
in the East due to its geographical proximity to
the area. 

Poland has played an active role in support-
ing, in particular, Ukraine’s closer ties with the
EU and its inclusion in various Central Euro-
pean institutions, such as the Central European
Initiative, Central European Free Trade Agree-
ment (CEFTA) and the regular meetings of Cen-
tral European presidents.75

Lately, Poland has also sought to promote a
more active approach by the EU towards Belarus
and Moldova. To this end Warsaw proposed the
establishment  of  EU’s  Eastern  dimension  as
early as 1998 – just as it was embarking on its
own membership negotiations.76 This call was

repeated in December 2002 in the Government’s
‘non-paper’ that outlined a comprehensive pro-
posal for the creation of a ‘European space of
political  and  economic  cooperation  within  a
wider Europe’.77

The crucial part of this proposal was the idea
of introducing the principle of conditionality in
relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
Depending on Ukraine and Moldova’s progress
in their domestic reforms, including democracy
and human rights, the paper proposed that they
be  offered  Association  Agreements.  Such  a
prospect  could  also  remain  open  for  Belarus
should this country move away from its current
dictatorial  form  of  government.  It  was  also
argued in the paper that, in the more distant
future, the EU should offer Ukraine the prospect
of membership if Kyiv’s engagement with the
EU and the level of its domestic transformation
permitted it. In the meantime, the non-paper
suggested that Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus be
included in the broad array of policies where
joint interests were involved, and in particular in
matters concerning cross-border cooperation,
justice  and  home  affairs.  Should  these  states
prove to be responsive partners, the paper pro-
posed that the EU might consider introducing a
more flexible visa regime towards them. In order
to promote these states’ greater technical capac-
ity and ability to cooperate with the EU, Warsaw
also proposed the further extension and devel-
opment  of  TACIS  and  other  programmes  of
technical assistance.78

Poland’s  efforts  at  developing  closer  links
with  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  Moldova  have  not
been wholly welcomed within the EU. The cur-
rent view prevailing in Brussels, both within the
Commission and the Council, is that the exist-
ing  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP),
which is explicitly a non-accession policy, is a
sufficient instrument for maintaining the EU’s

75 See ‘Poland:Eastern Relations’, Oxford Analytica-East Europe Daily Brief, 8 August 2000.
76 As mentioned in the paper by Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz, ‘The Eastern Dimension of the European Union: the Polish View’, Warsaw,
20 February 2003; http://www.msz.gov.pl.
77 ‘Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood after EU enlargement’; http://www.msz.gov.pl.
78 ‘What Does Poland Have to Offer in the Design of a New EU Eastern Policy’ – Think Tank Forum 2003 – The EU’s New Neighbourhood
Policy for the European Union, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1 July 2003; http://www.msz.gov.pl.

23

From America’s protégé to constructive European

relations with these countries, and that Poland’s
proposals are either unhelpful or counterpro-
ductive.79 It is also apparent that most member
states, with the exception of the Baltic states, do
not share Warsaw’s view that the EU should stop
prioritising Russia and see Ukraine, Moldova
and potentially Belarus as equal partners. For
example,  despite  the  regular  discussions  that
Poland maintains with Germany about Eastern
policy issues, Berlin is adamant that it continues
to see Russia as its strategic partner in the East
and rejects the idea of even a remote prospect of
EU membership for Ukraine.80 But even besides
this unfavourable climate in the EU, it is not
clear whether the countries addressed in the Pol-
ish proposals are actually themselves interested
in pursuing reforms and integrating in the EU.
Belarus,  for  example,  abandoned  its  nation-
building  and  democratic  project  in  the  early
1990s, whilst Moldova continues to be mired by
the collapse of its basic public institutions and
ethnic conflict in Transnistria. It is really just
Ukraine, whose domestic system may still evolve

towards liberal democracy and market economy
in the foreseeable future, but even there it is not
certain whether Kyiv’s determination to pursue
its proclaimed ‘European choice’ will be main-
tained. 

Despite these difficulties, it is unlikely that
Warsaw would abandon the idea of westernising
its eastern environment, which have come to be
seen in Poland in terms of raison d’état. The most
recent Polish initiative, put forward by President
Kwasniewski,  is  to  nurture  a  connection
between  Turkey’s  EU  membership  and  the
prospect of Ukraine’s accession to the EU.81 So
far, however, there are no signs of such a connec-
tion being seriously considered or accepted in
the EU. On the other hand, the prominent role
played by Javier Solana and his close coopera-
tion  with  President  Kwasniewski  during  the
recent  presidential  election  crisis  in  Ukraine
may signify the beginning of a more embracing
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  EU.82 Of  course,
much will depend on the outcome of the crisis,
which at the time of writing was still unclear.

79 Confidential Interviews, Brussels, October 2004. For the details of the ENP see ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, Brussels,
12 May 2004. 
80 ‘Szanse polsko-niemieckiej inicjatywy dla Ukrainy’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2004. 
81 ‘Poland’s vision of the EU’, International Herald Tribune, 2 September 2004.
82 ‘Ukrainian opposition blocks government buildings’, Financial Times, 25 November 2004. 

24

Outlook: towards a committed European posture

Post-Cold War Polish foreign policy has con-

sistently  aimed  to  maintain  a  balance
between its Atlantic and European dimensions
and to avoid prioritising either of them. Poland
sees its best interest in the United States and its
European partners ‘getting on well’ and transat-
lantic  relations  remaining  as  harmonious  as
possible. However, following the events of 9/11
this has simply not been the case, and the radi-
calisation of American foreign policy has cre-
ated a situation in which its European partners
have not been able to avoid making a choice.
Poland chose to support the United States and
did  so  unambiguously  and  decisively.  Subse-
quently, relations with Poland’s European part-
ners were damaged, with Germany and France in
particular. 

The re-election of President George W. Bush
in  November  2004  makes  the  possibility  of
returning  to  a  more  harmonious  state  of
transatlantic relations less likely, although not
impossible. The early signs following Bush’s re-
election are encouraging and suggest Washing-
ton’s wish to embark on a more forthcoming
approach  towards  Europeans  in  this  second
term, not least because of the situation on the
ground in Iraq. However, it is still difficult to see
why Bush would depart from his general foreign
policy style, which most European find unac-
ceptable  but  most  Americans  have  seemingly
just  endorsed.  The  defining  features  of  the
Administration’s international outlook, such as
unilateralism, a disregard for international law
and the doctrine of pre-emption, whilst possibly
set to be toned down are none the less unlikely to
be replaced by a spirit of international coopera-
tion. This opens up the question for Poland and

other Europeans of how to react if they are again
faced with the necessity of making a choice. One
cannot completely rule out that Poland might
again  decide  to  side  with  the  United  States
instead of its European partners, even when its
direct interests are not involved. However, such a
possibility is increasingly unlikely and, as the
effects of EU membership make themselves felt,
Poland’s  view  of  international  relations  will
become  more  closely  aligned  with  that  of  its
European neighbours. In other words, with time
Poland’s Atlanticism is likely to recede whilst its
sense of self-identification with the European
mainstream is likely to grow. 

Whilst Atlanticism continues to dominate
Poland’s security thinking for the time being,
there  is  also  a  growing  realisation  in  Warsaw
that a stronger and more robust EU is desirable
and  more  able  to  accommodate  its  security
interests. The reason why Atlanticism came to
dominate Polish security thinking after 1989
was to do with the nation’s unique experience,
its  geopolitics  and  its  historically  motivated
view of international relations. However, these
three  elements  are  not  constant  and  have
already started to evolve. Geopolitically, Poland
is  no  longer  threatened.  Germany  is  now
Poland’s  closest  ally  in  Europe,  and  Russia,
whilst still being ‘a state of concern’ from the
Polish point of view, is just too economically
interdependent with the EU and too geographi-
cally remote to constitute a ‘clear and present’
danger. Consequently, the geopolitical and his-
torical considerations that dominated the secu-
rity  thinking  of  the  post-Cold  War  élites  are
bound to be of lesser significance for younger
generations of policy-makers in Poland. 

6

25

From America’s protégé to constructive European

initial 

attitude 

The other main motive of Poland’s Atlanti-
cism was a reaction against being excluded from
the European decision-making process in secu-
rity matters. This was an essential determinant
of  Warsaw’s 
towards
CFSP/ESDP. Warsaw’s early reticence towards
the  initiative  originated  chiefly  from  its  con-
cerns about ESDP’s implications for the cohe-
sion of transatlantic relations, but it was only
strengthened  by  the  EU’s  initial  decision  to
exclude  Poland  and  other  Central  and  East
Europeans from some vital aspects of the policy.
However, once arrangements for accommodat-
ing  the  accession  states  had  been  reached  in
Feira, and as Poland was progressively drawn
into the internal working of the EU, particularly
in  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe,
Warsaw’s attitude towards a stronger CFSP and
ESDP became more constructive and positive. 

Clearly, since joining the EU, Poland’s, as well
as  other  Central  and  East  Europeans’,  status
changed,  and  one  of  the  major  rationales  for
Poland’s Atlanticism – its exclusion from West
European decision-making bodies – has disap-
peared. Poland seems to be fitting into the EU
more comfortably than was often predicted.79
Six months after EU enlargement, public sup-
port  for  Poland’s  EU  membership  rose  to  a
record  level  of  75  per  cent  and  the  formerly
Euro-sceptic  parties  are  either  in  decline
(Samoobrona) or are grudgingly coming round
to accept EU membership (the League of Polish
Families).80 Apart from the domestic impact of
EU enlargement, other factors that are likely to
influence the further evolution of Polish foreign
and security policy are the future development
of European security structures and the EU’s
Eastern policy.

Poland supported the institutional strength-
ening of CFSP, including moderate and quali-
fied extension of QMV, but its position on ESDP

was more conservative, focused on enhancing
capabilities  and  in  favour  of  retaining  the
strictly intergovernmental character of the ini-
tiative. Poland is, however, likely to support a
flexible approach towards the use of force, being
in favour of a more active and potentially inter-
ventionist EU. As argued in this paper, Poland is
also well disposed towards closer cooperation
amongst the six biggest EU member states in
security and foreign policy matters, although it
remains unclear whether Poland would be able
to offer adequate capabilities to join this group
in the near future. Should the EU evolve into a
more coherent and robust security actor, with
Poland’s voice being adequately represented in
it, it is likely that in the near/medium-term War-
saw would come to see European initiatives as
more relevant than NATO in meeting its secu-
rity interests. 

EU’s Eastern policy is another area of vital
importance for Poland. The existing European
Neighbourhood Policy is perceived in Poland as
too  weak  and  lacking  in  effective  leverage  on
developments outside its eastern border, includ-
ing in Ukraine and Belarus. Until Poland joined
the EU its various initiatives (such as the 2002
‘non-paper’) had a limited impact on the EU’s
Eastern policy. However, a few months into its
membership it is already apparent that Warsaw
has become one of the most effective shapers of
EU policy towards Ukraine and Belarus. Follow-
ing the first round of presidential elections in
Ukraine  and  responding  to  intense  pressures
from Poland, on 5 November 2004 the Euro-
pean Council expressed its concern about the
integrity of the campaign and called for the fair
access to the state-run media for all the candi-
dates.81 Polish politicians have also been active
in the European Parliament, where Polish MEPs
were elected to head working groups on Ukraine
and Belarus – a development which proved to be

79 Heather Grabbe, ‘Poland: the EU’s New Awkward Partner’, CER Bulletin, Issue 34, 2 March 2004. 
80 A major factor influencing attitudes towards EU in Poland has been the clearly beneficial impact of EU membership for the farming lobby,
which prior to enlargement was the most Euro-sceptic class in society. See Judy Dempsey, ‘Euroscepticism Fades in Polish Countryside’,
International Herald Tribune, 2 November 2004.
81 ‘Sukces Polski: UE apeluje do Kijowa’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 November 1994.

26

Outlook: towards a committed European posture  

of major significance in issuing the Parliament’s
resolutions  on  the  Belarussian  referendum
(October  2004)  and  Ukrainian  elections  (2
November 2004).82

In 2005 Poland will experience a major polit-
ical change, with both parliamentary and presi-
dential elections scheduled. If recent (November
2004) opinion polls prove to be accurate, the
current government will be defeated in landslide
fashion. The liberal PO (Civic Platform) and the
centre-right PiS (Law and Justice) are likely to
win and, if they stick by their promises, embark
on a thorough overhaul of the state, leading to
the end of the post-1989 Third Republic. The
new post-2005 Fourth Republic, if it ever comes
into being, may be a different state but its for-
eign and European policy would most likely be
marked  by  continuity.  Both  PO  and  PiS  sup-
ported the Government’s Atlanticist choice over
Iraq and both were in favour of EU membership.
Whilst their attitude towards European integra-
tion may have sounded sceptical on occasion –
for example in their defence of the Nice voting
system  or  in  their  (particularly  PiS’s)  critical
view of the EU constitution – it is believed here
that none of these positions was dogmatic or
ideological and could evolve if seen as consistent
with the national interest. Even more so than in
the past the future government’s approach to
the EU may depend on the latter’s Eastern pol-
icy, this time with the focus on energy security.83
The PO and PiS will be lobbying for the EU’s
help in weakening Poland’s and other countries’
in  the  region  dependency  on  Russian  energy.
Should the EU prove responsive, Poland’s per-
ception of the EU as a security provider would
certainly be enhanced and conducive with the
national agenda as seen by the centre-right. 

This paper has argued that Poland emerged
as the United States’s key ally and its protégé in
the East. The ‘instinctive’ Atlanticism inherent
in  Polish  strategic  culture  has  meant  that
Poland’s foreign policies have been in close prox-
imity to those of the United States over the past
decade. Developments since 11 September ini-
tially enhanced this closeness between Warsaw
and  Washington.  In  a  much  divided  Europe,
Poland has showed itself to be a hawk.84 Fur-
thermore,  in  the  context  of  Iraq,  a  close  fit
emerged between American and Polish stand-
points. However, subsequent disappointment
with American leadership in Iraq as well as the
lack of tangible benefits for Poland from its role
as a loyal ally, have weakened the Government’s
rationale for its Atlanticist choice. 

So  far,  Poland  has  strived  to  reconcile  its
close relations with the United States with being
a ‘constructive European’ but, as in the case of
Iraq, this has not been always possible. Although
Atlanticism is likely to guide Polish foreign pol-
icy for some time to come, if unilateralism in US
foreign policy persists, it is almost certain that
its relevance for Poland will become jaded. As
argued by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his criticism of
Poland’s  behaviour  over  Iraq,  Poland  should
never forget where it is and who its closest eco-
nomic partners are – not the United States but
Germany  and  France.85 Much  of  Poland’s
behaviour in the past was motivated by a feeling
of exclusion and of being patronised by its West
European neighbours. As long as in an EU of 25
Poland feels like an equal, it is inevitable that
Polish  foreign  policy  will  come  to  reflect  a
stronger  sense  of  belonging  to  the  European
project.

82 ‘Europa potepia rezim Lukaszenki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 October 2004.
83 I would like to thank Olaf Osica for drawing my attention to this issue. 
84 ‘European Leaders Divide Between Hawks and Doves’, New York Times, 31 January 2003.
85 Interview  with  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  ‘Przez  glupote  i  fanatyzm’,  Gazeta  Wyborcza,  7  October  2003;  see  also  ‘Zbigniew  Brzezinski  dla
Rzeczpospolitej’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 April 2003.

27

From America’s protégé to constructive European

28

Occasional Papers

All Occasional Papers
can be accessed via the institute’s website:
www.iss-eu.org

n° 55

n° 54

n° 53

n° 52

n° 51

n° 50

n° 49

n° 48

n° 47

n° 46

n° 45

n° 44

n° 43

n° 42

n° 41

n° 40

n° 39

La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne. Le rôle de l’Union
européenne (traduction et actualisation du nº 51)
Fernanda Faria

EU enlargement and armaments. Defence industries and markets of
the Visegrad countries 
Timo Behr and Albane Siwiecki; edited by Burkard Schmitt

Europe’s next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement
Mustafa Aydin

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue
Rosa Balfour

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European
Union
Fernanda Faria

For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU 
Björn Müller-Wille

EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly
Paul Luif

Space and security policy in Europe: Executive summary
Stefano Silvestri, Rapporteur

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?
Taras Kuzio

EU-Russian security dimensions
Edited by Dov Lynch

€uros for ESDP: financing EU operations
Antonio Missiroli

The Galileo satellite system and its security implications  
Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini

La question du Cachemire. Après le 11 septembre et la nouvelle 
donne au Jammu et Cachemire 
Christophe Jaffrelot et Jasmine Zérinini-Brotel

L’Union en action : la mission de police en Bosnie 
Agnieszka Nowak

La Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte de stabilité
Ralitza Dimtcheva

Iraq: a European point of view 
Martin Ortega

Iraq: the transatlantic debate 
Philip H. Gordon

Novembre 2004

September 2004

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May 2004

April 2004

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July 2003

June 2003

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December 2002

December 2002