Commission staff working document - Annex to the Proposal for a Regulation to the European Parliament and to the Council concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short stay-visas - Extended Impact Assessment {COM(2004)835 final}
Date: 2004-12-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, EU visa policy, admission of aliens, disclosure of information, impact study, information system

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 28.12.2004 
SEC(2004) 1628 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Annex to the  

Proposal for a Regulation to the European Parliament and to the Council 

concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between 
Member States on short stay-visas 

EXTENDED IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2004)835 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Purpose of the Extended Impact Assessment............................................................... 3 

Problems in the current situation.................................................................................. 3 

Inefficiencies in the implementation of the common visa policy ................................ 4 

Visa application fraud and travel document fraud ....................................................... 4 

Visa shopping............................................................................................................... 5 

Limitations of checks at external borders .................................................................... 5 

Ilegal Immigration........................................................................................................ 5 

Application of the Dublin II Regulation ...................................................................... 6 

Internal Security and terrorism..................................................................................... 6 

Impacts on bona fide travellers .................................................................................... 6 

Political objectives and orientation set out by the Council .......................................... 6 

Policy Options.............................................................................................................. 7 

Option 1: No VIS ......................................................................................................... 7 

Option 2: Entry-Exit-System ....................................................................................... 8 

Option 3: Visa Information System without biometrics .............................................. 8 

Option 4: Visa Information System with biometrics ................................................... 9 

Impacts of the policy options ....................................................................................... 9 

Benefits and costs of Option 1: No VIS..................................................................... 10 

Benefits and costs of Option 2: Entry-exit system..................................................... 11 

Benefits and costs of Option 3: VIS without biometrics ........................................... 13 

Benefits and costs of Option 4: VIS with biometrics................................................. 16 

Impact summary tables .............................................................................................. 20 

Flanking Measures to balance negative impacts........................................................ 23 

Proportionality of the data stored............................................................................... 23 

Disproportionality of the storage of scanned documents........................................... 23 

Proportionality of the use of data ............................................................................... 24 

Data protection safeguards:........................................................................................ 25 

Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................ 26 

Stakeholder Consultation ........................................................................................... 27 

1. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

2.6. 

2.7. 

2.8. 

3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

6.4. 

7. 

8. 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
8.1. 

8.2. 

9. 

9.1. 

9.2. 

Member States............................................................................................................ 27 

Public consultations ................................................................................................... 28 

Commission draft proposal and justification ............................................................. 29 

Proportionality and European added value of the options ......................................... 30 

Final Policy choice..................................................................................................... 31 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
1. 

PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

The  establishment  of  the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  represents  one  of  the  key 
initiatives  within  the  EU  policies  aimed  at  supporting  stability  and  security.  Given 
the potential for significant impact arising from action in this field, the Commission, 
in its Annual Policy Strategy for 2004, decided that an Extended Impact Assessment 
should be carried out. The Commission further decided that the responsible services 
(Directorate  General  Justice  and  Home  Affairs)  due  to  the  significant  crosscutting 
impacts  and  the  high  political  significance  would  be  assisted  by  an  inter-service 
steering  group  including  the  most  concerned  services.  This  decision  ensured  that 
horizontal  multi-sectoral  aspects,  in  particular  economical  and  social  impacts  could 
be  taken  into  account  in  the  process  as  early  as  possible.  The  task  of  this  steering 
group  was  to  define  the  scope,  to  monitor  the  progress  of  the  Extended  Impact 
Assessment and to supervise the completion of the impact assessment report. 

The  Commission  decided  further  to  consult  an  external  contractor,  who  had  to 
provide  the  Commission  with  a  wide  range  of  supporting  services  to  assist  the 
responsible  services  and  the  inter  service  steering  group  in  the  preparation  and 
conduction of the Extended Impact Assessment. These services consisted of analysis 
of existing data, collection of additional information and providing general advice or 
studying specific points (e.g. data protection and the use of biometrics). 

The  Contractor  provided  the  methodological  tools  in  line  with  the  Commission’s 
guidelines  and  the  handbook  on  impact  assessments.  He  carried  out  an  integrated 
assessment  of  the  direct  and  indirect  impacts  of  a  range  of  policy  options,  defined 
after  careful  analysis  of  the  problems  and  objectives  by  using  the  appropriate 
analytical methods and participatory approaches in the framework of the meetings of 
the  Interservice  Steering  Group  and  with  Member  States  experts.  The  Extended 
Impact  Assessment  focused  on  the  estimation  of  the  potential  impacts  of  various 
options under consideration for the VIS. Economic/financial impacts were taken into 
account  as  well  as  social/political  ones.  Furthermore  proportionality  of  the  storage 
and the use of data as well as data protection issues have been considered. 

2. 

PROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION 

The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the 
common borders between the Benelux countries, Germany and France aimed at the 
abolition  of  the  checks  at  internal  borders.  The  Schengen  Convention  created  a 
common area where checks at internal borders are abolished and checks at external 
borders for all Schengen States were to be carried out in accordance with a common 
set  of  rules.  Another  flanking  measure  of  the  lifting  of  internal  border  controls  is 
common visa policy. Currently there are 15 States which apply in full the Schengen 
acquis on visas. These Schengen States are 13 Member States of the European Union 
plus Norway and Iceland. Furthermore an Agreement between the European Union, 
the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  latter’s  association 
with  the  implementation,  application  and  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis  was 
signed on 26 October 2004 but needs to be ratified. Neither the United Kingdom nor 
the  new  Member  States,  which  acceded  the  EU  in  May  2004,  are  currently 
participating  in  the  common  visa  policy.  At  present  there  are  134  third  countries 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
whose  citizens  are  required  to  have  a  visa  issued  by  a  Member  State  to  enter  the 
territory  of  Schengen  States.  Current  statistics  show  that  Member  States  receive 
about 12 million visa requests per year. Based on these figures, it is expected that the 
number of visa requests will reach 20 million as of 2007, taking into account the new 
Member States.  

The  study  has  identified  the  following  main  problems  inherent  in  the  current 
situation: 

2.1. 

Inefficiencies in the implementation of the common visa policy 

Currently a third country national can obtain a Schengen visa and travel freely within 
the territory of Schengen States. However, information about his visa application is 
routinely  held  only  by  the  Member  State  which  issued  the  visa.  If  a  bona  fide 
traveller applies for a Schengen visa again, but to the authorities of another Member 
State,  the  record(s)  of  his  last  visa  application(s)  is/are  not  readily  available  to  the 
consular authorities of the other Member State. Also, when a third country national is 
refused  a  Schengen  visa,  the  record  of  the  rejection  is  routinely  stored  by  the 
authorities of the Member State which refused the application. Apart from a rejection 
stamp  in  his  passport  (which  can  easily  be  removed  or  a  new  passport  obtained) 
authorities of other Member States do not know about such a refusal, when the same 
person applies for another Schengen visa to the authorities of another Member State. 

There  is  some  exchange  of  visa  data  in  the  current  situation  such  as  local  consular 
cooperation and VISION consultation. VISION is a Schengen consultation network 
established  for  the  purpose  of  consultation  on  visa  applications  between  central 
authorities  of  the  Member  States.  It  is  a  message  exchange  system,  based  on  the 
bilateral exchange of information. The study came to the conclusion that the existing 
information  arrangements  are  partial,  time  consuming  and  can  be  inaccurate.  The 
existing  kind  of  exchange  of  information  does  not  ensure  that  the  information  is 
always available in a timely fashion. 

2.2. 

Visa application fraud and travel document fraud 

There is a sizable proportion of people who currently try to obtain a Schengen visa 
on  dubious  grounds.  In  Germany  for  example,  around  15%  of  all  visa  applications 
were rejected or visas refused in 2002. At present Member States have difficulties in 
ascertaining  whether  a  visa  applicant  is  using  a  false  identity  to  obtain  a  Schengen 
visa. It is relatively easy to change identity by means of new counterfeit or falsified 
passports  without  it  becoming  immediately  apparent  to  consular  or  border  check 
posts.  Information  on  stolen  or  false  travel  documents  and  information  on  dubious 
references to support visa applications (persons or companies) is not readily available 
to consular posts and border checking points. The study concluded that the existing 
system  for  exchanges  of  information  does  not  ensure  that  information  reaches  the 
missions or border control points that require it and need it on time. 

Statistics  from  several  Member  States  show  that  there  is  a  large  scale  of  travel 
document  fraud.  In  France,  13,952  persons  were  carrying  false  documents  in  2002 
which was a rise of 14% compared to 2001. These fraudulent documents are either 
complete counterfeits or documents genuinely issued to another person having been 
altered  without  authority.  Often  such  original  documents  have  been  stolen  from  or 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
lost  by  the  genuine  holder.  Skilled  forgers  produce  extremely  convincing  copies  of 
passports  and  other  identity  documents,  and  of  other  documents  needed  to  obtain 
them such as birth certificates.  

2.3. 

Visa shopping 

There  exist  multiple  forms  of  bypassing  the  criteria  for  the  determination  of  the 
Member  State  which  is  responsible  for  the  examination  of  the  visa  application 
(known  as  “visa  shopping”).  In  particular,  after  refusal  of  a  Schengen  visa  by  one 
Member State, the same applicant can apply for a visa to another Member State, even 
within  the  same  country  of  application,  with  a  high  possibility  that  a  previous  visa 
refusal would not be identified. There is no formal information system for authorities 
to check whether the applicant has applied and been refused, or has failed to pursue a 
Schengen visa application previously, or indeed whether a visa has been granted to 
the individual in the past. 

2.4. 

Limitations of checks at external borders 

Existing border checks are based on the examination of the holder of the document, 
of  the  document  itself,  and  of  any  visa  contained.  In  making  such  checks,  border 
control  officers  rely  on  the  passports  shown  to  them.  If  there  is  a  need  to  check  in 
another Member State whether the visa a person carries in his passport was given to 
the holder of the passport or whether it has been transposed from another passport, 
this  is  possible,  but  is  a  time  consuming  procedure.  One  difficulty  experienced  by 
those control authorities seeking to exchange information is that their counterparts in 
other  countries  may  be  part  of  different  authorities.  The  same  applies  for  checks 
within the territories of Member States. 

2.5. 

Illegal Immigration 

In  2001,  around  360,000  people  illegally  present  in  the  EU  territory  were 
apprehended.  In  the  same  year  around  390,000  people  illegally  present  in  the  EU 
territory  have  been  removed  and  around  1.2  million  non  EU-citizens  have  been 
refused entry. 

The study showed that illegal immigration may result in a number of different modus 
operandi: 

•  By entering clandestinely 

•  By using counterfeit or falsified travel documents or visa 

•  By  using  false  or  falsified  supporting  documents  (e.g.  regarding  the  financial 

background) or making false or falsified statements in order to obtain a visa 

•  By “visa shopping” 

•  By  overstaying.  Where  statistics  exist,  they  show  that  the  overstayers  are  the 

biggest number of illegal immigrants. 

Many  of  the  apprehended  illegal  immigrants  have  no  travel  or  other  identification 
documents with them or use counterfeit or falsified documentation. In such cases the 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
identification  process  is  slow,  time  consuming  and  expensive.  In  case  people  have 
destroyed their travel documents, authorities currently do not have a readily available 
system to check the identities of the undocumented illegal immigrants. 

2.6. 

Application of the Dublin II Regulation 

The  “Dublin  II”  Regulation  (EC)  No  343/2003  defines  the  criteria  for  determining 
the State responsible for examining applications for asylum. A basic criterion for that 
responsibility is whether a Member State has issued to the asylum seeker or extended 
a visa. At the moment, Member States do not have efficient means to check whether 
an  asylum  applicant  has  had  a  visa  issued  by  another  Member  State,  verify  the 
identity of the person, and find out how long the validity of the visa is/was. All this 
information is required to identify the Member State responsible for the examination 
of  an  asylum  application.  Moreover  such  information  would  also  be  needed  for 
examining the application for asylum. 

2.7. 

Internal Security and terrorism 

The  inefficiencies  in  combating  visa  shopping,  fraud  and  in  conducting  checks  are 
causing  also  inefficiencies  in  relation  to  internal  security  of  the  Member  States. 
Criminals and suspected persons could get a visa or have chances to use a falsified 
visa when entering the Schengen area. Persons involved in terrorism or in organised 
crime usually don’t travel under their own identity but alter their personal details to 
make identification more difficult. They are aware of the reliance placed by control 
authorities  on  intelligence  and  other  information  about  those  involved  in  terrorist 
activity.  They  may  also  have  substantial  financial  backing  to  allow  skilful, 
unauthorised  alternations  to  be  made  to  their  travel  documents  or  to  obtain  high 
quality counterfeits.  

2.8. 

Impacts on bona fide travellers 

Of  all  travellers  applying  for  a  Schengen  visa,  20%  are  estimated  to  be  regular 
travellers, i.e. applying for a visa several times. For these travellers there is currently 
little scope for speeding up the visa processing times which would take into account 
the  fact  that  such  travellers  have  complied  with  the  visa  and  immigration 
requirements  in  the  past,  for  example  for  professional  drivers  in  the  land  transport 
sector.  In  cases  of  lost  or  stolen  travel  documents  bona  fide  travellers  have  to  go 
through  a  complicated  process  to  establish  their  identities  to  acquire  new  travel 
documents.  There  is  also  a  high  risk  in  this  situation  with  such  stolen  travel 
documents  and  visas  used  to  enter  the  territory  of  Schengen  states  –  the  original 
holder may need to re-apply if he has not yet used the visa, and the document holding 
the visa may be used by a person not entitled to it. 

3. 

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ORIENTATION SET OUT BY THE COUNCIL 

To meet the problems inherent in the current situation, the European Council decided 
to  develop  and  establish  a  system  for  the  exchange  of  visa  data.  The  JHA  Council 
adopted on 19 February 2004 conclusions to give the necessary political orientation 
on  the  basic  elements  of  the  VIS.  According  to  these  conclusions  the  Visa 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
Information  System  (VIS)  is  “a  system  for  the  exchange  of  visa  data  between 
Member States, which must meet the following objectives: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

constitute  an  instrument  to  facilitate  the  fight  against  fraud,  by  improving 
exchanges  of  information  between  Member  States  (  at  consular  posts  and  at 
border crossing points) on visa applications and responses thereto; 

contribute to the improvement of consular cooperation and to the exchange of 
information between central consular authorities; 

facilitate checks that the carrier and the holder of the visa are the same person, 
at external border checkpoints or at immigration or police checkpoints; 

(d) 

contribute to the prevention of “visa shopping”, 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

facilitate  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  343/2003  determining  the 
State responsible for examining applications for asylum; 

assist  in  the  identification  and  documentation  of  undocumented  illegals  and 
simplify the administrative procedures for returning citizens of third countries; 

contribute  towards  improving  the  administration  of  the  common  visa  policy 
and towards internal security and to combating terrorism.” 

There  is  a  close  correspondence  between  the  specific  objectives  of  VIS  and  the 
problems  identified  and  elaborated  in  Section  2  of  this  document.  The  VIS  is 
primarily  intended  to  improve  the  implementation  of  the  common  visa  policy, 
including the use of visa data for the objectives set out in the Council conclusions. It 
should  be  stressed  however,  that  it  is  a  component  of  these  policies  and  does  not 
itself introduce new policies. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

On  the  basis  of  the  problem  analysis  and  the  objectives  set  out  above,  the 
Commission defined four policy options which were assessed by the contractor in the 
study. 

4.1. 

Option 1: No VIS 

The  first  option  highlights  the  situation  where  the  VIS  would  not  be  created. 
However the following developments in the current situation which have potential to 
contribute towards the political objectives should be noted: 

•  Implementation of common EU visa policy, including such recent developments 
as making visas more secure and difficult to counterfeit, exchanges of information 
on visa issuing trends at local consular level and establishment of liaison officers 
at immigration hot spots will be further developed. 

•  Continuing use of VISION which is a network to support current consultation of 
central  authorities.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  nature  of  VISION 
consultation process differs substantially from the comprehensive system of visa 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
information exchange system in that VISION consultation is limited to the third 
country nationals from sensitive countries and it is a process of bilateral exchange 
of information in these specific cases. 

•  Current developments of SIS II result from the necessity to connect new Member 
States, benefit from the latest developments in the field of information technology 
and allow for easy introduction of new functionalities in the system. In addition, it 
has  recently  been  agreed  that  authorities  responsible  for  issuing  visas  will  have 
access to search SIS data on blank official documents and identity papaers which 
have been lost, stolen or misappropriated. 

•  Continuing  use  of  Eurodac  database,  which  was  introduced  to  implement  the 
Dublin II regulation determining the Member State responsible for examining the 
application  for  asylum.  The  Eurodac  fingerprint  database,  which  has  been  in 
operation  since  15  January  2003,  stores  the  fingerprints  of  persons  who  have 
lodged  an  asylum  application.  It  allows  for  the  comparison  of  these  fingerprints 
and  helps  to  determine  the  Member  State  responsible  for  the  examination  of  an 
asylum application according to the Dublin II Regulation.  

4.2. 

Option 2: Entry-Exit-System 

The main aims of an entry-exit system are to enable people arriving and departing to 
be  examined,  and  for  appropriate  information  to  be  gathered,  which  is  relevant  to 
their immigration and residence status. One of the examples of entry-exit system is 
the  US  VISIT  system,  which  is  envisaged  as  a  continuum  of  security  measures, 
making full use of biometrics. When a traveller applies for a visa, his fingerprints are 
taken  at  the  consular  post  and  are  stored  in  a  central  data  base.  When  the  visitor 
comes to the country, the biometric data are used to verify that the person at the entry 
point  is  the  same  person  who  received  the  visa,  or  to  see  whether  there  is  new 
information about any involvement in terrorism or crime. Foreign visitors exiting the 
country will be required to confirm their departure at the exit points (this is currently 
at  pilot  stage  at  several  selected  US  exit  points).  This  should  demonstrate  their 
compliance  with  immigration  requirements  and  facilitate  their  future  travels.  This 
information  is  also  stored  in  the  central  data  base.  People  who  overstay  their  visas 
would  also  be  identified  in  this  part  of  the  system.  In  principle,  entry-exit  system 
would  be  a  computerised  system  for  collecting  personal  details  of  all  visa  holders 
entering and exiting the Schengen territory.  

4.3. 

Option 3: Visa Information System without biometrics 

Visa  Information  System  without  biometrics  would  be  an  electronic  system 
containing  information  about  the  visa  applicant  from  the  visa  application  form  and 
the  decisions  hereto  as  well  as  the  photograph  of  the  applicant,  as  introduced  as  a 
security  feature  in  the  uniform  sticker  for  the  Schengen  visas.  Access  to  enter  and 
update  visa  data  would  be  granted  to  persons  authorised  to  be  involved  in  the  visa 
issuing process or in the process to annul, revoke and extend visas. These authorities 
would  also  have  access  for  the  purposes  of  consultation.  Provided  that  visa  data  is 
required  for  the  performance  of  their  tasks,  other  authorities  with  responsibility  for 
controlling  border  checkpoints  as  well  as  other  competent  authorities  of  each 
Member State would have access in accordance with the purposes of the VIS. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
4.4. 

Option 4: Visa Information System with biometrics 

Visa  Information  System  with  biometrics  would  contain  all  the  information 
envisaged  in  VIS  without  biometrics  (and  the  same  access  and  consultation 
procedures), but crucially it will also include biometric information of visa applicants 
such as fingerprints. 

The  choice  of  the  biometric  identifier  should  follow  a  coherent  approach  for 
documents  and  databases,  as  requested  by  the  European  Council  of  Thessaloniki. 
According to the VIS feasibility study, which has been submitted by the Commission 
in  May  2003,  fingerprint  technology  provides  the  required  accuracy  to  identify 
individuals. Even if the biometric technology changes, fingerprint databases will still 
be used for a long time. Background checks to prevent threats to internal security can 
be  done  with  fingerprints,  contrary  to  for  example  iris  technology.  Further 
development  at  a  later  stage  might  enable  the  use  of  photographs  for  facial 
recognition.  The  current  proposals  for  the  introduction  of  fingerprints  in  the  visa 
sticker  foresee  a 
image  (flat  prints).  The  VIS-feasibility  study 
recommends  taking  a  ten-finger  (flat)  image  from  the  applicant.  “Flat  fingers”  are 
easier and faster to take and no physical contact is necessary between the applicant 
and the official. However, the standards and procedures for taking the biometric data, 
including  the  obligation  and  specifying  the  exceptions  for  recording  biometrics, 
should  be  laid  down  in  a  further  legal instrument  amending  the  Common  Consular 
Instructions. 

two-finger 

5. 

IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS 

The  study  assessed  the  relative  financial,  opportunity  and  possible  retaliation  costs 
and  possible  reductions  in  business  travel  and  tourism  as  well  as  the  impact  on 
privacy and human rights. Moreover the benefits of the different policy options were 
assessed.  In  this  context  “financial  costs”  mean  the  over  and  above  costs  already 
incurred  or  anticipated  under  current  arrangements  or  planned  developments. 
”Opportunity  costs”  are  those  for  visa  applicants,  both  financial  and  other  costs,  in 
terms  of  travel  time  and  travel  costs,  to  apply  for  and  obtain  a  visa  to  enter  the 
territory  of the Schengen states. “Retaliation costs” are  those which would occur if 
the  introduction  of  the  policy  options  should  lead  to  third  countries  imposing 
restrictions or additional requirements and costs on EU travellers wishing to visit the 
countries in question. 

The impacts have graphically been indicated with symbols: 

√* 

√ 

√√ 

impact conditional on the effectiveness of current 
developments and developments planned 

Small impact 

Medium impact 

√√√ 

Very significant impact 

√√√√ 

Exorbitant impact 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
5.1. 

Benefits and costs of Option 1: No VIS 

•  Financial cost: no change 

•  Opportunity costs: no change 

•  Retaliation cost: no change 

•  Reductions in business travel and tourism: no change 

•  Impact  on  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  protection  of  personal  data  and 

privacy: no change 

There would be no additional costs or social impacts, as the current situation in visa 
application process remain unchanged. 

•  Efficiencies in the implementation of Common Visa Policy: no change 

The  ‘No  VIS’  option  would  not  improve  the  current  lack  of  information  exchange 
about  visa  applications.  In  case  a  visa  information  exchange  system  is  not 
introduced, the current situation will continue, meaning that  information about  visa 
applications  of  a  third  country  national  will  be  routinely  held  only  by  the  Member 
State  which  issued  the  visa.  Such  information  would  not  be  readily  available  to 
authorities of other Member States when a third country national makes subsequent 
visa applications to the authorities of another Member State.  

•  Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √* 

Some  document  fraud  reductions  are  anticipated  through  new  functions  of  the 
Schengen  Information  System  and  improved  security  of  visas.  However,  these 
developments to increase visa security are counteracted by increasing sophistication 
of forgery and counterfeiting techniques. One can expect yet further enhancements in 
the  degrees  of  sophistication  practised  by  forgers  and  despite  exchanges  of 
information and mutual assistance on document examination techniques, it is likely 
that  there  will  continue  to  be  many  cases  in  which  falsified  documents  are  not 
identified. 

•  Increased efficiency of border checks: √* 

Some improvements in efficiency of border checks are anticipated with the probable 
introduction of new functions in the SIS II (and especially biometric data). SIS II will 
allow for the integration of the new Member States and update the technology used 
in the system. 

•  Reductions in illegal immigration and facilitation of the Dublin Regulation: √* 

Some  reductions  in  illegal  migration  can  be  anticipated  through  implementation  of 
existing  measures  and  plans  at  the  EU  level.  Some  measures  to  tackle  illegal 
migration (as far as visa policy is concerned) have already been implemented.  

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
No improvement of the current situation due to the lack of exchange of visa data to 
facilitate  the  determination  of  the  Member  State  responsible  for  examining  the 
asylum application and for the examination of the asylum application. 

•  Contributions toward internal security: √* 

Existing  instruments  and  processes  (e.g.  national  security  agencies,  Europol, 
Interpol)  can  be  expected  to  continue  to  improve  internal  security  and  reduce 
terrorism.  

•  Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: no change 

•  Other spin offs: no change 

5.2. 

Benefits and costs of Option 2: Entry-exit system. 

•  Financial cost: √√√√ 

Financial costs for an entry exit system are extremely high. The cost estimates for an 
entry-exit  system  with  biometrics  in  the  US  are  around  $15  billion,  covering  the 
introduction and operation of appropriate technology in all consular posts, entry and 
exit  posts.  It  can  be  anticipated  that  similar  costs  would  apply  to  EU  entry-exit 
system.  

•  Opportunity costs: √√ 

Opportunity  costs  for  visa  applicants  can  be  expected,  as  applicants  would  have  to 
travel to consular posts to provide biometric data. Also time will be lost at entry and 
exit  points  by  providing  and  checking  biometric  data.  The  study  comes  to  the 
conclusion that opportunity costs in this option are higher as the opportunity costs in 
VIS with biometrics. These costs would include the time and travel costs to travellers 
of providing biometric data at visa application stage and at entry and exit points. The 
Commission does not share this opinion as there were no additional travels to make. 
Checks  in  the  VIS  with  biometrics  could  equally  lead  to  further  questioning  of 
travellers. 

•  Retaliation cost: √ 

Retaliation to entry-exit system with biometrics by third countries currently requiring 
visas  for  visitors  from  the  EU  should  be  considered  as  a  risk.  At  the  moment,  in 
response  to  the  introduction  of  US  VISIT,  only  Brazil  introduced  retaliatory 
measures  by  fingerprinting  and  photographing  Americans  arriving  at  Brazilian 
airports.  Should  at  least  some  degree  of  retaliation  occur,  it  could  impose 
considerable  costs  on  EU  citizens  (time  lost  travelling  to  the  consular  post,  actual 
time giving biometrics at the consular post, entry and exit point).  

•  Impact  on  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  protection  of  personal  data  and 

privacy: √√√√ 

Impact of entry-exit system on human rights would be extensive, and there would be 
a substantial need to meet personal data protection and data security requirements in 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
particular in view of the use of biometrics, since there would be a risk of misuse. The 
study comes to the conclusion that there are very significant impacts on fundamental 
rights.  However  the  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  impacts  would  be  even 
exorbitant  as  the  entry-exit-system  does  not  only  store  data  from  the  applications 
including biometrics but also data from the movement across the borders. 

•  Reductions in business travel and tourism: √ 

Due  to  the  opportunity  costs  for  visa  applicants  and  the  extensive  impact  of  entry-
exit  system  on  privacy  and  human  rights  some  reductions  in  business  travel  and 
tourism can be anticipated.  

•  Efficiencies in the implementation of Common Visa Policy: √√√ 

Although  an  entry-exit  system  would  provide  a  continuum  of  measures  to  monitor 
the movements of third country nationals from their application for an entry visa to 
the arrival at the external border and departure from a territory, the implementation 
of such a system would go far beyond the objective of improving the implementation 
of  Common  Visa  Policy  through  better  exchange  of  information  between  Member 
States and other objectives set by the Council for a VIS. 

•  Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √√√ 

Considerable reductions in visa fraud (and some reduction in other document fraud) 
can be anticipated. The introduction of biometric data would provide a reliable base 
to establish the identity of visa applicants. It would help to establish a link between 
visa holder and traveller, and reduce the possibility of impostors travelling with visas 
issued  to  other  people.  Considerable  reductions  in  visa  shopping  could  also  be 
anticipated.  Records  of  previous  visa  applications  would  be  readily  available  to 
consular authorities when a person applies for a visa subsequently. The inclusion of 
biometric  data  would  provide  a  reliable  basis  to  confirm  the  identity  of  visa 
applicants,  and  reduce  the  possibility  for  visa  applicants  to  conceal  their  previous 
visa  application  history  (such  as  a  rejected  visa  or  removal  from  the  territory  of 
Schengen states). 

•  Increased efficiency of border checks: √√√ 

Highly efficient border checks allowing a "beginning to end" survey of movements 
will  be  possible.  The  entry-exit  system  would  provide  a  continuum  of  measures  to 
monitor the movements of third country nationals from their application for an entry 
visa to the arrival at the external border and departure from a territory. Such a system 
would allow the confirmation that the person who was issued a visa is also the same 
person who enters and leaves the territory of the state. The entry-exit system would 
also enable more efficient after-entry immigration controls, including enforcement of 
the  immigration  laws.  It  would  be  possible  to  check,  when  a  foreign  national  was 
leaving  the  territory,  whether  he  complied  with  the  immigration  requirements,  and 
this information would be available when a visa was subsequently sought, and/or on 
subsequent  arrivals.  The  inclusion  of  biometric  data  would  provide  a  reliable  basis 
for establishing the identity of third country nationals throughout the process.  

•  Reductions in illegal immigration and facilitation of Dublin Regulation: √√√ 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
Efficient  immigration  checks  could  be  anticipated  to  lead  to  reductions  in  illegal 
migration.  Undocumented  illegal  migrants  apprehended  in  the  territory  would  be 
identified  quicker  and  more  efficiently  through  the  entry-exit  system  in  case  they 
have  applied  for  a  visa  in  the  past.  The  absence  of  an  exit  check  would  reveal 
applicants who didn’t return after expiry of the visa. 

Exchange  of  visa  data  would  facilitate  the  determination  of  the  Member  State 
responsible for examining the asylum application as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 

•  Contributions towards internal security: √√ 

Biometric  information  would  allow  the  identification  and  tracking  down  the 
movements of organised criminals and terrorists, even if they use other identities to 
apply  for  subsequent  visas  or  to  cross  external  EU  borders.  This  impact  would, 
however,  occur  only  if  terrorists  and  organised  criminals  are  known  as  such.  In 
addition,  the  effects  would  be  limited  and  dependant  on  the  effectiveness  of  other 
instruments.  

•  Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√√ 

There would be substantial advantages for bona fide travellers requiring visas as past 
visa history could be established in the same way as VIS with biometrics. This would 
be  especially  beneficial  for  regular  travellers,  who  make  repetitive  applications  for 
Schengen visas. In such cases, the entry-exit-system would contain full information 
about  a  visa  applicant  from  all  the  previous  visa  applications,  which  would 
automatically  be  available  to  authorities  in  all  Member  States.  An  additional 
advantage  of  an  entry-exit-system/VIS  with  biometrics  against  VIS  without 
biometrics is that biometric information would enable the identification of bona fide 
travellers almost beyond any doubt (e.g. in case of lost or stolen travel documents), 
and thus reducing the possibility of fraud and abuse of the visa system. 

•  Other spin offs: √√√ 

The  entry-exit  system  would  provide  a  big  stimulus  for  IT  industries,  as  it  would 
require  the  installation  and  running  of  state-of-art  equipment  to  capture  biometrics 
and perform checks of travellers in all consular authorities, and entry and exit points 
of the territory of Member States.  

5.3. 

Benefits and costs of Option 3: VIS without biometrics 

•  Financial cost: √ 

The study showed that this policy option would carry medium financial costs. To the 
Community  budget,  the  cost  is  estimated  to  be  €30  million  in  2004-2006  (one-off 
investment),  and  afterwards  €8  million  a  year  for  running  the  system.  These  costs 
would cover the operation of the central part of the VIS without biometrics system. It 
has  proved  difficult  to  obtain  the  cost  estimates  for  the  operation  of  such  a  system 
directly from the Member States. VIS feasibility study estimated that the expenditure 
for  a  medium-sized  visa  issuing  office  for  alphanumeric  data  and  photos  would  be 
€4,000  one-off  investment  costs  and  €2,000  annual  operational  costs.  Given  that 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
there  are  around  3,500  consular  posts  of  EU  Member  States  worldwide,  such  costs 
would  be  €14  million  one-off  investment  costs  and  €7  million  annual  operational 
costs.  

•  Opportunity costs: no change  

No  additional  opportunity  costs  for  visa  applicants  are  expected,  as  there  would  be 
no  change  from  current  visa  application  process.  The  personal  information  of  visa 
applicants would be collected, processed and stored in the same way as in the present 
situation. 

•  Retaliation cost: no change  

•  Reductions in business travel and tourism: no change 

No  retaliation  nor  reductions  in  business  and  leisure  travel  is  anticipated,  as  there 
would be no change from current visa application process. 

•  Impact  on  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  protection  of  personal  data  and 

privacy: √√ 

The study expects only limited impacts on the protection of personal data, since there 
will be no biometric data included. However the storage of data in a central European 
database  and  the  exchange  of  data  between  Member  States  would  significantly 
increase the number of authorities having access and potential further processing of 
data. 

•  Efficiencies in the implementation of Common Visa Policy: √√ 

The introduction of VIS without biometrics would meet the objective of facilitating 
the  implementation  of  common  visa  policy  through  better  exchange  of  information 
about visa applications. This information should not only comprise data on the visa 
application  but  also  on  the  decisions  taken  thereto  including  the  data  of  the  visa 
sticker.  It  would  ensure  that  records  about  visa  applications,  which  are  currently 
stored by the authorities of Member States where the visa was issued, are available to 
the  consular  authorities  in  all  Member  States.  VIS  without  biometrics  would  have 
beneficial  institutional  impacts,  such  as  increased  exchange  of  information  and  co-
operation, which will improve the implementation of Common Visa Policy. 

According to the Council Conclusions of 19 February 2004 on the development of 
the VIS, the technical functionalities of the VISION network for consulting the 
central authorities should be integrated into the VIS. This means that the VIS should 
not change the current system of consulting the central authorities on the basis of 
Article 17(2) of the Schengen Convention, including the background checks against 
national alert lists and data basis which are carried out according the national law of 
the Member States. However, such technical integration would avoid redundancy of 
data flow. 

•  Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √√ 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
Furthermore  some  reductions  in  visa  application  fraud  and  visa  shopping  can  be 
expected  as  comprehensive  records  of  visas  issued  (as  well  as  visas  cancelled, 
revoked,  or  annulled)  would  be  kept  electronically  and  shared  across  the  Member 
States.  When  a  third  country  national  bypasses  the  criteria  for  the  determination  of 
the  Member  State  responsible  for  examining  the  visa  application  for  another  visa 
after  rejection  of  an  application,  his  past  application  record  would  immediately  be 
available  to  consular  authorities  without  the  need  to  rely  on  rejection  stamp  in  the 
passport to provide this information. The inclusion of data on persons or companies 
issuing an invitation or being liable to pay the costs for living during the stay would 
help to identify those persons and companies which issue fraudulent invitations. This 
would be important information in the fight against visa fraud, illegal immigration, 
human  trafficking  and the related criminal organisations which  often  operate on  an 
international scale. The identification of fraudulent sponsors is not only an issue for 
the Member State in which the sponsor is resident. Given the international nature of 
illegal immigration, it seems necessary to store such kind of data at central level, in 
particular  in  such  cases  in  which  an  individual,  a  company  or  another  organisation 
has been involved in fraudulent cases dealt with by more than one participating state. 

•  Increased efficiency of border checks: √√ 

Some increased efficiency in border checks can be anticipated. If a border guard has 
access to the system to check whether a traveller was issued a valid visa, this would 
improve, to some extent, existing border checks based on the visual inspection and 
the use of document  examination  equipment to examine the holder of the passport, 
the passport itself and a visa contained in it. The inclusion of visa sticker data would 
significantly improve checks at external borders and within the territory of a Member 
State, in both directions: to detect falsified visas but also to facilitate the verification 
of bona fide travellers. 

•  Contributions  to  the  fight  against  illegal  immigration  and  the  facilitation  of  the 

Dublin Regulation: √ 

VIS without biometrics would have a minor impact in reducing illegal migration as it 
would remain difficult to identify undocumented illegals as such illegal migrants are 
unlikely to give their true identity. 

Exchange  of  visa  data  would  facilitate  the  determination  of  the  Member  State 
responsible for examining the asylum application as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 

•  Contributions toward internal security: √ 

VIS  without  biometrics  would  have  a  minor  impact  in  improving  internal  security 
and  for  the  fight  against  terrorism.  Terrorists  and  organised  criminals  (who  are 
known as such to authorities) are unlikely to give their true identity when applying 
for a Schengen visa or travelling through external borders. 

•  Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√ 

There  would  be  advantages  for  bona  fide  travellers  as  past  visa  history  could  be 
established  in  VIS  without  biometrics.  This  would  be  especially  beneficial  for 

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
regular travellers who apply for a Schengen visa several times. In such cases, the VIS 
without biometrics would contain full information about a visa applicant from all the 
previous visa applications, which would automatically be available to authorities in 
all Member States. This would enable consular authorities to make more appropriate 
decisions about repeat visa applications and thus result in simplifications and shorter 
waiting times for regular travellers or in the issuing of multiple entry visas valid for a 
longer period of time. 

•  Other spin offs: √ 

VIS without biometrics will have some spin offs, also because national visa systems 
need to be adapted. 

5.4. 

Benefits and costs of Option 4 VIS with biometrics 

•  Financial cost: √√√ 

The study expects very significant financial costs of this option. For the Community 
budget the biometrics would cost €93 million in 2007-2011 for investment costs, and 
afterwards €14-16 million a year for operational costs. Concerning the costs for the 
national  systems,  two  Member  States  provided  estimates  of  costs  of  installing  and 
running  VIS  with  biometrics  in  their  consular  posts.  France  (one  of  largest  visa 
issuing Member States) indicated that the one-off investment costs would be around 
€11  million,  with  the  subsequent  annual  operational  costs  of  €1  million.  Sweden 
(Member  State  which  issues  a  small  number  of  visas)  estimated  that  the  one-off 
investment costs would be around €2.8 million with annual operational costs of €2.5 
million.  For  27  participating  Member  States,  such  costs  would  amount  to  around 
€200  million  one-off  investment  cost  and  around  €50  million  annual  operational 
costs. Such estimates are however to be treated with caution, given the lack of more 
comprehensive financial assessments from a greater number of Member States. The 
total costs, mentioned below do not include the costs for the border crossing points as 
these costs cannot be estimated at the present time. 

One-off investment costs  Annual 

operational 

costs 

Costs for the Community 

€93 million 

€14-16 million 

Costs  for 
States (national systems) 

the  Member 

Total  costs  for  VIS  and 
consulates 

•  Opportunity costs: √√ 

€186 million 

€49 million 

€246-256 million 

€55-57 million 

Opportunity  costs  for  visa  applicants  can  be  expected,  as  applicants  would  have  to 
travel to consular posts to provide biometric data. Also time will be lost at entry and 
exit points by providing and checking biometric data.  

•  Retaliation cost: √ 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
 
Retaliation  to  VIS  with  biometrics  by  third  countries  currently  requiring  visas  for 
visitors from the EU should be considered as a potential risk. 

•  Reductions in business travel and tourism: √ 

Due to opportunity costs for visa applicants and perceived invasion into privacy and 
human rights, some reductions in business travel and tourism might be anticipated. It 
can be expected that most genuine visitors will have nothing to hide and will provide 
biometric  data.  They  would  accept  a  trade-off  between  providing  personal 
information and  safer and easier travel to Europe, especially if providing biometric 
data will mean that subsequent issuing of visa will guarantee entry into the European 
Union as the security is higher and the identity of the travellers could be confirmed 
more quickly. Only a small number of people will find the taking of biometric data 
intrusive and unacceptable and may refrain from travelling to Europe. 

•  Impact  on  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  protection  of  personal  data  and 

privacy: √√√ 

The collection, storage and use of highly personalised data in a EU-wide central data 
base, such as biometrics of all travellers applying for a visa to enter the territory of 
Schengen States, would raise concerns over the proper use and protection of personal 
data  of  travellers  on  such  a  massive  scale.  The  principles  of  proportionate  and  fair 
use of personal data and high security in the system would have to be implemented in 
full. 

•  Efficiencies in the implementation of Common Visa Policy: √√√ 

Further to the support of the implementation of Common Visa Policy through better 
exchange of information about visa applications, VIS with biometrics would ensure 
exact  identification  and  verification  of  visa  applicants.  VIS  with  biometrics  will 
provide  a  strong  impetus  for  improvements  in  the  implementation  of  common  visa 
policy  and  institutional  co-operation  through  joint  consular  activities  in  third 
countries. Given the high costs of VIS with biometrics, Member States might decide 
to pool resources and proceed with common visa application centres, at least in posts 
where this is operationally feasible.  

Moreover,  if  biometric  data  is  included  in  the  VIS,  this  would  lead  to  additional 
qualitative  change  and  improvements  to  VISION  consultation  process,  as  it  would 
provide authorities with means for reliable person verification. In particular the use 
of the fingerprint data would significantly improve the possibility to detect persons 
who constitute a threat to internal security. In particular these functionalities of the 
VIS  would  strengthen  the  horizontal  task  of  visa  authorities  to  contribute  to  the 
prevention of such threats for any of the Member States. 

•  Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √√√ 

Very significant reductions in fraud and visa shopping in addition to the impacts of 
VIS  with  biometrics  are  anticipated  as  it  would  be  possible  to  identify  a  person 
applying  for  applications  in  several  consulates  and  despite  attempts  to  conceal  true 
identity or use another identity. With the use of biometric data, it would be possible 
to  identify  a  person  disregarding  the  spelling  of  the  name  or  other  personal  data. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
Biometrics  might  not  identify  the  ‘true’  identity  of  the  person,  but  it  would  fix  an 
identity to the person who applies for a visa. 

•  Increased efficiency of border checks: √√√ 

Very  significant  increases  in efficiency of border  checks  are anticipated  in  the  VIS 
with  biometrics.  The  use  of  biometric  data  would  ensure  that  the  person  who  is 
travelling  with  the  visa  is  the  same  person  for  whom  the  visa  was  issued,  and  thus 
confirm the identity of the traveller. 

•  Contributions to the fight against illegal immigration and facilitation of the Dublin 

II Regulation: √√ 

VIS  with  biometrics  will  have  significant  impact  on  the  fight  against  illegal 
migration.  Undocumented  illegal  migrants  who  are  apprehended  in  the  territory  of 
Member States would be easily identified with the help of biometric data.This would 
be of value, not only in checking whether they entered lawfully, with a visa, but also 
in documenting them for removal. 

Exchange  of  visa  data  would  facilitate  the  determination  of  the  Member  State 
responsible for examining the asylum application as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 

•  Contributions toward internal security: √√ 

The  improvement  of  the  assessment  of  visa  applications  including  the  consultation 
between  central  authorities,  and  the  verification  and  identification  of  applicants  at 
consulates  and  at  checkpoints  contributes  to  the  internal  security  of  the  Member 
States and towards combating terrorism, which constitutes a horizontal objective and 
basic  criterion  for  the  common  visa  policy.  Biometric  information  would  allow 
identifying applicants even if they use other identities to apply for subsequent visas 
or cross external EU borders. 

•  Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√√ 

There would be substantial advantages for bona fide travellers requiring visas as past 
visa  history  could  be  established  in  VIS  with  biometrics.  This  would  be  especially 
beneficial for regular travellers, who make repetitive applications for Schengen visas. 
In such  cases, the VIS with biometrics  would  contain full information about a visa 
applicant  from  all  the  previous  visa  applications,  which  would  automatically 
available  to  authorities  in  all  Member  States.  An  additional  advantage  of  VIS  with 
biometrics  against  VIS  without  biometrics  is  that  biometric  information  would 
enable the identification of bona fide travellers almost beyond any doubt (e.g. in case 
of  lost  or  stolen  travel  documents),  and  thus  reducing  the  possibility  of  fraud  and 
abuse of the visa system. This would particularly be useful for professional drivers in 
the  transport  sector  as  their  good  repute  record  is  more  securely  protected  in  this 
system  and  authorities  can  rely  on  the  data  provided.  This  helps  both  in  getting 
consecutive visas and passing borders. 

Visa  applicants  who  are  family  members  of  EU  citizens  will  continue  to  be  under 
obligation to travel to the consular authorities to provide their biometric data, which 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
would  entail  costs,  both  of  travel  and  of  time  spent  in  the  consular  post.  However, 
provision  of  biometric  data  would  help  to  verify  their  bona  fide  status  once  they 
apply for a visa the next time. The travel of such individuals would also be facilitated 
at  crossing  external  border,  as  the  availability  of  biometric  data  could  speed  up 
border checks. 

•  Other spin offs: √√√ 

A strong stimulus for the IT industry is anticipated, given the costs associated with 
this  policy  option.  VIS  would  require  the  installation  and  running  of  state-of-art 
equipment  to  capture  biometrics  and  perform  checks  of  travellers  in  all  consular 
authorities  of  Member  States.  Such  installation  and  training  would  occur  in  3,500 
consular  posts,  with  12,000  users.  It  can  be  anticipated  that  in  the  short  term  VIS 
would  cause  negative  impact  for  the  travel  industry,  and  authorities  need  to  be 
prepared for that through a PR campaign. It should be focused on end-customer, and 
explain why, for whom, and what benefits the system will bring to the traveller. 

5.5. 

Impact summary table 

The following table will show the costs and benefits of the different policy options1:

1 

√:Small impact-√√:Medium impact-√√√:Very significant impact-√√√√:Exorbitant impact 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Costs 

Financial costs  Opportunity 
costs for visa 
applicants 

Retaliation costs 
for EU travellers 

Reductions in 
business travel 
and tourism 

No VIS 

- 

Entry-exit 
system 

√√√√ 

VIS 
biometrics 

without 

√ 

VIS 
biometrics 

with 

√√√ 

- 

√√ 

_ 

√√ 

- 

√ 

_ 

√ 

- 

√ 

_ 

√ 

Impact on 
fundamental rights, 
in particular the 
protection of 
personal data and 
privacy 

- 

√√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

EN 

21 
EN 

 
 
 
Benefits2 

Efficiencies in 
implementation 
of Common 
Visa Policy 

Reductions 
in fraud and 
visa 
shopping 

Increased 
efficiency of 
border checks 

Reductions in 
illegal 
migration 

Facilitation 
of the 
Dublin 
Regulation 

Contribution 
towards 
internal 
security 

√* 

√√√ 

√* 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√* 

√√√ 

√ 

- 

√√√ 

- 

√* 

√√ 

√ 

Other 
spin offs 

Increased 
efficiencies 
for bona 
fide 
travellers 

- 

√√√ 

- 

√√√ 

√√ 

√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

No VIS 

- 

Entry-exit 
system 

√√√ 

√√ 

VIS 
without 
biometrics 

VIS  with 
biometrics 

√√√ 

2 

EN 

√*:impact  conditional  on  the  effectiveness  of  current  developments  and  developments  planned-√:Small  impact-√√:Medium  impact-√√√:Very  significant  impact-
√√√√:Exorbitant impact 

22 
EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
Policy options 

Advantages 

Drawbacks 

No VIS 

Low financial cost 

No improvements 

Entry-exit 
system 

Substantial improvements 
however a huge organisation step 
from the current situation, risky 
and extremely costly to implement 

Exorbitant financial costs 

Very extensive impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 

Risk of retaliation 

VIS without 
biometrics 

Moderate financial cost 

Non-financial costs low 
(opportunity costs for visa 
applicants) 

No reliable person identification and 
verification 

No substantial contribution to fight 
against illegal migration 

Some improvements in the current 
situation 

Considerable impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 

VIS with 
biometrics 

Substantial improvements in most 
domains 

High financial costs and high indirect 
costs 

No data on exits 

Extensive impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 

Risk of retaliation 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
6. 

FLANKING MEASURES TO BALANCE NEGATIVE IMPACTS 

Since the VIS is an instrument of the first pillar, the community legislation on data 
protection  (Directive  95/46/EC  and  as  far  as  a  Community  body  is  processing  data 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001) is applicable. These rules ensure the protection of privacy 
and  fundamental  rights  of  third  country  nationals  applying  for  visa  as  well  of  EU 
citizens issuing invitations with regard to the processing of their personal data. Since 
background checks against data in their national alert lists and data bases are carried 
out  exclusively  by  the  Member  States,  the  national  laws  implementing  the  data 
protection requirements of Directive 95/46 will apply, as it is currently the case for 
the consultation between central national authorities. 

As  outlined  in  the  study  Member  States  shall  provide  inter  alia  that  personal  data 
must be processed fairly and lawfully, that they are collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes.  Furthermore  the  processing  of  personal  data  must  be  adequate,  relevant 
and  not  excessive  in  relation  to  the  purposes  for  which  they  are  collected  and 
processed,  it  must  be  accurate  and,  where  necessary,  be  kept  up  to  date.  Every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete 
are erased or rectified. 

To  balance  the  negative  effects  of  the  abovementioned  drawbacks  the  following 
flanking measures should be considered: 

6.1. 

Proportionality of the data stored 

A basic requirement for proportionality and data protection is that the personal data 
collected  are  adequate,  relevant  and  not  excessive  in  relation  to  the  purposes  for 
which  they  are  necessary  collected.  Since  the  VIS  itself  shall  primarily  support  the 
implementation of the common visa policy only these data shall be stored in the VIS 
which are gained upon the visa application and the decisions taken thereto and which 
are  needed  for  the  exchange  of  visa  data  between  the  Member  States  to  meet  the 
objectives of the VIS. 

The source for the alphanumeric personal data should be the visa application form. 
As  not  all  data  are  needed  after  a  decision  has  been  taken,  the  storage  of  all  these 
data in each case would be disproportional. To balance this effect, one should foresee 
two sets of data, one for each application and one added in case that further data are 
needed for the purpose of the consultation between central authorities, because only 
for about 20% of the visa applications such consultation between central authorities 
is  needed.  For  this  purpose  the  integration  of  the  technical  functionalities  of  the 
VISION network for this consultation, would not only avoid redundancy of the data 
flow  but  improve  the  current  consultation  and  the  related  background  checks  in 
national databases according to the national law.  

6.2. 

Disproportionality of the storage of scanned documents 

The Council Conclusions foresee the storage of scanned documents in the VIS, as a 
possible  further  step  in  addition  to  the  inclusion  of  alphanumeric  data,  the 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
photograph  and  biometrics.  However,  the  study  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
storage of scanned documents could not be considered as proportional.  

A  major  obstacle  for  effective  return  is  uncertainty  concerning  the  identity  of  the 
person concerned and/or his or her lack of necessary travel documents. Countries of 
origin often delay or deny the issuing of return travel documents because of missing 
information  on  nationality  or  identity.  In  order  to  avoid  removal,  illegal  residents 
may  therefore  hide  or  destroy  their  travel  documents  and  frequently  claim  a 
completely  false  identity  and/or  nationality.  As  a  consequence,  lengthy  and 
expensive procedures have often been conducted, which include presentation of the 
returnee at several embassies of third countries or conducting a language or dialect 
analysis.  

However, if all travel documents are scanned in the Consular posts and stored in the 
VIS, this would mean that for all visa applicants, estimated at 20 million per year, an 
extra  operation  at  the  Consular  Posts  would  be  needed.  Eurostat  figures  show  that 
annually  only  around  350,000  persons  who  are  illegally  present  in  the  EU  territory 
are apprehended; meaning that at least 98% of the scanned documents never will be 
used  for  identification  of  illegal  immigrants.  On  the  other  hand,  the  alphanumeric 
data on the travel document should be in any case introduced in the VIS as well as 
the visa issuing authority  

Furthermore,  the  travel  documents  are  currently  photocopied  and  stored  in  the 
consular post. If a Member State requires copies of these documents for returning an 
illegal  immigrant,  the  competent  authority  can  use  the  VIS  to  localise  the  consular 
post  that  stores  the  documents,  and  may  even  use  the  VIS  infrastructure  to  ask  for 
these documents. The travel documents can subsequently be faxed or sent by normal 
mail to the competent authority that needs them, in case that the alphanumeric data 
on the travel document which are stored in the VIS are not sufficient for the specific 
purpose. 

6.3. 

Proportionality of the use of data 

In accordance with data protection legislation, the access should be given to the data 
stored in the VIS only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. This means that 
the  authorities  which  should  have  access  to  the  VIS  have  to  be  defined  by  the 
specific  purpose.  Therefore  the  access  for  consulting  the  data  should  be  reserved 
exclusively  to  duly  authorised  staff  of  the  authorities  of  each  Member  State  which 
are competent for the specific purposes of the VIS and limited to the extent the data 
are  required  for  the  performance  of  the  tasks  in  accordance  with  these  purposes. 
Access to enter and up-date the data should only be given to duly authorised staff of 
the  consular  post  or  another  visa  authority  competent  for  examining  the  visa 
application. Therefore it is essential for the legal instrument, to define the purposes 
for which the data stored in the VIS may be used, the data which could be used for 
the specific purposes and the search criteria, which would allow access to these data 
in case of a “hit”, indicating that the data are stored in the VIS. 

For the purposes of examining the application all information stored in the VIS may 
be relevant. Therefore the competent visa authority may have access to the complete 
application  file  and  the  linked  application  files  of  previous  applications  of  the 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
applicant and of group members. To prevent threats to internal security, in particular 
fingerprint data may be used for background checks in national databases.  

For checks on visas to verify the identity of the person who presents the visa with the 
applicant and/or to verify the visa presented or claimed to be issued, the competent 
authorities for carrying out checks at external borders and within the territory of the 
Member  State,  could  have  access  to  the  data  taken  from  the  application  form,  the 
photographs and the data on the decisions of the visa authorities.  

For  the  purposes  of  identification  and  return  of  illegal  immigrants  the  competent 
immigration  authority  could  have  access  to  the  complete  application  file  and  the 
linked  application  files  of  previous  applications  of  the  applicant  and  of  group 
members.  

For  the  purposes  to  facilitate  the  application  of  the  Dublin  II  Regulation  the 
competent  authorities  should  have  access  to  consult  the  relevant  data  of  the  visas 
issued  or extended. Furthermore  the Dublin Regulation provides that  each  Member 
State  shall  communicate  to  any  Member  State  on  request  such  data.  These  data  on 
visas concerning the asylum seeker may be used for examining asylum applications 
as  is  appropriate,  relevant  and  non-excessive.  For  these  purposes  the  competent 
asylum  authorities should have access to all alphanumeric and photo data stored in 
the VIS.  

For  the  purposes  of  reporting  and  statistics,  the  competent  visa  authorities  should 
have  access  only  to  the  VIS  for  data  which  do  not  allow  identifying  individual 
applicants.  This  makes  reporting  and  statistics  possible  for  the  Member  States  but 
does not give any possibility to conclude on the individual person behind these data.  

6.4. 

Data protection safeguards 

The  very  principles  for  a  legal  framework of  data  protection  are  already  laid  down 
and recognised at European level, in particular in Article 8 of the European Charter 
of  Fundamental  Rights,  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  as 
well  as  in  the  Data  Protection  Directive  95/46/EC  and  the  Council  of  Europe 
Convention  of  1981  for  the  Protection  on  Individuals  with  Regard  to  Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data. The above-mentioned principles must be read alongside 
Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union which declares that respect for human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  is  one  of  the  principles  on  which  the  Union  is 
founded. 

For the determination of the retention period it has to be taken into account that for 
reasons of data protection, personal data should be kept no longer than it is necessary 
for the purposes of the VIS. If personal data should be retained only for the period of 
the  visa's  validity,  the  contribution  to  these  purposes  would  be  very  limited.  This 
retention  period  would  not  allow  any  speeding  up  of  subsequent  applications  for 
regular travellers, as their record would only be stored for the time period the visa is 
valid. In addition, it would be unlikely that such a period of validity would assist in 
the  documentation  of  illegal  migrants,  who,  at  some  stage  had  applied  for  a  visa. 
However,  for  the  start  of  the  retention  period  it  should  be  distinguished  whether  a 
visa has been issued, a visa has been annulled, revoked or extended or if no decision 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
has  been  taken  on  the  application.  It  should  be  ensured  that  the  data  on  the 
application should be automatically erased after the retention period has expired.  

Furthermore  in  case  that  a  third  country  national  has  required  the  nationality  of  a 
Member State, all data on this applicant shall be erased immediately as soon as the 
Member State responsible becomes aware of that fact. 

Applicants,  but  also  persons  issuing  invitations  shall  be  informed  according  to 
Article 10 of Directive 95/46/EC by the Member State which enters the data in the 
VIS. In relation with the applicant the information that the data from the application 
form, the photograph and the fingerprints should be processed in the VIS and about 
his/her  rights  should  be  provided  on  the  visa  application  form.  Persons  issuing 
invitations  should  be  informed  about  the  processing  of  their  data  by  the  related 
forms.  

An  effective  data  protection  regime  needs  an  independent  data  supervisory  regime. 
Since the user of the VIS will be the Member States and their competent authorities, 
it seems appropriate that the personal data will be processed in the VIS on behalf of 
the  Member  States.  This  implies  that  the  data  controllers  are  within  the  Member 
States.  Therefore  the  national  supervisory  authorities  should  be  responsible  for  the 
monitoring  of  the  lawfulness  of  the  processing  of  data  in  accordance  with  national 
data  protection  legislation  by  the  Member  States.  This  monitoring  includes  in 
particular  the  transmission  to  and  from  the  VIS  and  the  use  of  the  data.  For  the 
reasons  given  in  the  study,  it  is  appropriate  that  the  European  Data  Protection 
Supervisor  as  established  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  45/2001  should  monitor  the 
activities  of  the  Commission  or  another  operational  EC  body  in  relation  to  the 
protection of personal data. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The  effective  monitoring  of  the  VIS  requires  evaluation  in  regular  intervals.  For 
these purposes it is necessary that systems are in place to monitor the functioning of 
the  VIS  against  objectives,  in  terms  of  outputs,  cost-effectiveness  and  quality  of 
service.  The  study  recommends  that  every  two  years  a  report  on  the  technical 
functioning  of  the  VIS  should  be  submitted  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council.  This  report  should  include  information  on  the  performance  of  the  VIS 
against  quantitative  indicators  predefined  by  the  Commission.  Moreover,  in  further 
regular intervals like four years an overall evaluation of the VIS should be produced, 
including examining results achieved against objectives and assessing the continuing 
validity of the underlying rationale and any implications of future options.  

On  the  basis  of  these  observations,  the  following  indicators  could  be  applied  to 
measure  performance  of  a  visa  information  system.  Detailed  indicators  and  targets 
would need to be developed, in order to gauge the success of a VIS, with or without 
biometrics. 

Monitoring and evaluation indicators could be in particular: 

–  System availability rate 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
–  Number of entries on the system 

–  Numbers of visas refused, annulled, revoked indicating the standard grounds 

–  Number of repeat applications in the 12 month period after a visa refused. 

Other indicators could be based on national statistics such as: 

–  Average time taken to process an application 

–  Processing times at border checkpoints 

–  Average application processing time 

–  Number of illegal immigrants identified 

–  Number of visa hits for the Dublin Regulation 

8. 

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

The  Extended  Impact  Assessment  had  to  ensure  that  the  relevant  stakeholders,  in 
particular  the  Member  States  but  also  data  protection  authorities  and  the  interested 
public  have  been  involved  and  consulted  as  regards  the  different  competences 
touched  upon  by  the  proposal  in  compliance  with  the  Commission´s  standards  on 
consultation. 

Stakeholders’  consultations  were  held  between  April  and  July  2004.  In  several 
workshops  experts  from  the  Member  States  contributed  with  their  input  to  the 
Extended Impact Assessment. Furthermore the public had the possibility to comment 
on the possible impacts of the establishment of the VIS. Moreover an interview with 
the  European  Travel  Commission  (ETC),  a  representative  body  of  33  national 
tourism organisations has been conducted. 

8.1.  Member States 

The study has reviewed replies received from 12 Member States to the questionnaire 
distributed by Commission Services. 

•  The majority of Member States remarked that there are substantial problems with 
the consular co-operation as exchange is based on meetings, phone calls or paper 
documents.  Visa  shopping  occurs  because  repeat  applicants  present  new  or 
recently issued passports or rejection stamps are skilfully removed. Border checks 
are  limited  to  the  visual  inspection  of  applicants  and  travel  documents.  Most 
Member  States  have  the  problem  of  illegal  migrants  apprehended  without 
documents.  

•  Member States did not see any alternative to the VIS as a common system for the 
exchange of visa data to ensure the same effectiveness and quality of exchange of 
information.  

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
•  The main impacts expected are in the process of visa issuing (easier assessment of 
application), prevention of visa shopping, and reduction in document fraud. With 
biometric data changing identities or manipulating documents will become more 
difficult. VIS with biometrics would also aid the identification of undocumented 
illegal migrants and speed up the return procedures.  

•  Most  Member  States  view  biometric  functionalities  as  essential  for  the 

effectiveness and value added of the VIS.  

•  Border  checks  might  be  slower,  but  some  Member  States  expect  quicker 

processing procedures for frequent travellers, VIPs, and low risk groups.  

•  Opinions are divided over the usefulness of integrating scanned documents. Some 
Member  States  are  sceptic  about  the  use  of  scanned  documents  and  fear  large 
costs, other Member States are in favour of integrating scanned documents.  

•  In terms of processes and organisational issues, most Member States will have to 
adapt their national systems to the VIS, and consular posts will be most affected 
by  such  change.  Changes  in  national  legislation  are  also  anticipated  by  some 
Member States. 

8.2. 

Public consultations 

The contributions submitted in the process of public online consultation on the VIS 
have  been  examined 
those  from  Immigration  Law  Practitioners’ 
Association  (ILPA),  Standing  Committee  of  experts  on  international  immigration, 
refugee and criminal law, Data Protection Authorities and Contributions from private 
persons.  

including 

The following observations could be made from the analysis of these responses: 

•  Most  consultees  expressed  a  view  that  VIS  is  a  disproportionate  response  to  the 
perceived  threats  posed  by  third  country  nationals  travelling  to  the  EU.  Most 
travellers  are  lawful  travellers  since  visas  issued  significantly  outnumber  visas 
refused and since most of them comply with immigration requirements. The SIS, 
if  consulted  in  a  systematic  way,  should  be  sufficient  to  counteract  the  threats 
posed since it records information on persons who should be refused entry to the 
Schengen area.  

•  There is a concern that a system like VIS is contemplated before any attempts are 
made to reform and improve the current system for issuing Schengen visas. In this 
context, a recommendation was made to amend the ambiguous rules of Common 
Consular  Instructions  which  provide  for  a  large  degree  of  discretion  in  making 
visa issuing decisions.  

•  VIS  proposals  so  far  have  been  presented  in  the  repressive  terms,  i.e.  to  catch 
criminals and abusers of the visa system. There has been no examination to what 
extent VIS would have positive effects for regular travellers to the EU.  

•  Data  protection  and  privacy  concerns  have  loomed  large  in  the  public 
consultation.  In  particular,  concerns  over  the  inappropriate  use  of  data  and 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
unauthorised  access  have  surfaced.  There  is  also  a  fear  that  the  rejection  of  a 
previous  visa  application  would  automatically  result  in  a  future  rejection.  In 
addition, a recommendation was made that VIS includes only ‘hard’ data and not 
improvable  facts or  suspicions by authorities.  Security of processing  of personal 
data must also be ensured to prevent any possibility of identity fraud, hacking or 
abuse from the unauthorised access.  

•  Legal  safeguards  and  rights  of  third  country  nationals  should  be  included  in  the 

VIS and third country nationals must be made aware of these rights.  

•  There  is  also  concern  over  the  storage  of  personal  data  of  EU  citizens  issuing 
invitations  to  third  country  nationals  as  it  would  constitute  an  invasion  of  their 
privacy. 

•  The main benefit from the establishment of VIS would be, according to the tourist 
industry, for repeat visitors in terms of simplification of repeat visa applications, 
which  is  a  welcome  development.  VIS  will  have  no  benefits  for  the  first  time 
traveller.  From  this  point  of  view,  collection  and  sharing  of  visa  data  should  be 
welcomed  as  facilitation  of  visa  application,  as  long  as  data  protection  is  fully 
enforced. 

•  Any form of VIS should bring more transparency to the visa application process 
and  make  it  more  accessible  and  easier  for  visa  travellers.  Europe  must  be 
perceived  as  a  place  of  welcome,  and  VIS  should  not  be  about  policing  the 
issuance  of  visas,  but  facilitating  the  application  process  and  providing  ease  of 
access for business and leisure travellers. It would be even better if VIS could lead 
to  reduced  queues  and  improve  some  of  the  treatment  of  visa  travellers.  If 
consular  authorities  have  access  to  the  right  information  about  the  person, 
especially in the repeat application, that could make the service more professional, 
more successful and speedier. People should be treated in a civilised way, and not 
like second class citizens. 

•  The idea of electronic visa application should be looked into. Australia has this, 
and travellers can apply electronically, or via a travel agency. If biometric data is 
introduced, there could be places like travel agencies, or passport issuing offices, 
where travellers could provide their biometric data (it was not clear whether this 
would be possible in the VIS). 

9. 

COMMISSION DRAFT PROPOSAL AND JUSTIFICATION 

9.1. 

Proportionality and European added value of the options 

Based  on  the  assessment  of  the  four  options  in  chapter  5,  proportionality  and  the 
European added value of the options can be summarized as follows: 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
Proportionality 

European added value 

No VIS 

Does not address all of the political objectives set and only some 
improvements in the problems in the current situation could be 
anticipated  

None  

Entry-exit 
system 

Substantial improvement,  however huge organisation step from 
the current situation, risky and extremely costly to implement 

As  VIS  with  biometrics  but  also  enables  comprehensive 
immigration controls  

VIS without 
biometrics 

Improvement of the current situation but would meet only some 
of the political objectives  

Facilitates  exchange  of  information  on  visas  on  a  regular  and 
comprehensive  basis  to  enable  implementation  of  common  visa 
policy  

VIS with 
biometrics 

Despite  of  extensive  impacts  on  fundamental  rights  and  high 
costs  this  option  would  tackle  many  of  the  problems  identified 
and  meet  political  objectives  set  out.  By  introducing  the 
abovementioned flanking measures the extensive impact will be 
counterbalanced 

Facilitates  exchange  of  information  on  visas  on  a  regular  and 
comprehensive  basis  to  enable  implementation  of  common  visa 
policy 

Identification of visa applicants with the use of biometrics enables 
reliable and immediate exchange of information 

Contributes to an effective return policy  

EN 

31 
EN 

 
 
 
 
9.2. 

Final Policy choice 

The assessment of the different parameters shows that option 4, the establishment of 
a  Visa  Information  System  integrating  biometric  identifiers  is  the  option  which 
closely meets the objectives and purposes outlined in the Council Conclusions of 19 
February  2004.  In  a  large  database  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  persons  with 
alphanumeric data alone. Even for bona-fide travellers the spelling of the same name 
can be different from one country to another, many instances of the same name exist 
and  in  some  countries  dates  of  births  are  not  completely  known.  Identifying 
undocumented persons or persons is virtually impossible without biometrics.  

Inclusion  of  biometric  data  in  the  VIS  would  not  only  significantly  support  the 
assessment of applicants in view of preventing ‘visa shopping’, fraud and threats to 
internal  security,  but  have  positive  consequences  for  bona  fide  travellers.  Matches 
against biometric data would help to verify their identity in case of a new application 
or at checks, but also in case of lost or stolen travel documents as bona fide travellers 
could quickly prove their identity to get new travel documents and visas. Moreover, 
the inclusion of biometric data would also significantly support the identification of 
undocumented  illegal  immigrants  and  the  return  procedures,  if  these  illegal 
immigrants have once applied for a visa.  

An EU entry-exit system, incorporating biometrics for visa applicants would provide 
a continuum of measures to control the movements of third country nationally, from 
a visa application stage through arrival at external border to leaving the territory of 
the Schengen states. Such a system would enable much more efficient and effective 
border  controls  to  be  operated.  There  also  would  be  improvement  to  immigration 
control arrangements, overall, due to the existence of more comprehensive records. 
However it would be extremely costly to implement. It therefore appears to be less 
advantageous  than  VIS  with  biometrics.  A  VIS  without  biometrics  would  ensure 
improvement of consular cooperation but would have little impact as a contribution 
towards internal security and fight against terrorism and on the fight against illegal 
immigration. Furthermore bona fide travellers would profit to a small extend from a 
VIS  without  biometrics  as  there  were  just  some  improvements  in  the  visa  issuing 
process but no improvement in case of lost or stolen travel documents as they could 
not  proof  their  identity  quickly.  Option  1  (No  VIS  option)  would  not  create 
improvements  in  exchanges  of  visa  application  information  between  consular 
authorities  of  Member  States.  The  absence  of  a  visa  information  exchange  system 
would not address some of the most pressing issues, such as visa shopping and visa 
fraud  and  therefore  this  option  would  not  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Council 
Conclusions of 19 February 2004. 

For the preparation of the proposal the flanking measures outlined in section 6 of this 
document  should  be  born  in  mind  in  order  to  minimize  and  balance  the  negative 
drawbacks of the chosen option. 

EN 

32 

   EN