Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament -  Preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism
Date: 2004-10-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: civil defence, database, exchange of information, health control, terrorism

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 20.10.2004 
COM(2004) 701 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION  
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

3.5. 

3.6. 

3.7. 

3.8. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 3 

THE CIVIL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK ............................................................. 3 

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism ............................................................. 3 

Enhancing preparedness through training and simulation exercises............................ 4 

Identifying and assessing capabilities .......................................................................... 5 

HEALTH PROTECTION............................................................................................ 6 

The challenge ............................................................................................................... 6 

Cooperation in the field of health security................................................................... 6 

Threat awareness, command and control arrangements: Mechanism for information 
exchange, consultation and co-ordination.................................................................... 6 

Surveillance and detection: Capability for inventorying, detection and identification 7 

Response and recovery: Medicines’ stocks and health services database  
and arrangements for provision of medicines, specialists, other medical goods  
and infrastructure ......................................................................................................... 7 

Prevention and Protection: Interdiction of agent movement and biosafety ................. 8 

Enhancing preparedness and response ......................................................................... 9 

International cooperation ............................................................................................. 9 

THE COMMUNITY SPHERE RAPID ALERT SYSTEM NETWORKS ............... 10 

Existing Commission emergency rapid alert systems................................................ 10 

Consolidating the emergency systems managed by the Commission........................ 10 

A European Union law enforcement network............................................................ 11 

A European Union Critical infrastructure Warning Information Network................ 11 

TECHNICAL ANNEXES........................................................................................................ 12 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The European Council of June 2004 asked the Commission and the Council to assess Member 
States  capacities  to  prevent  and  cope  with  terrorist  attacks  and  to  enhance  the  existing 
cooperation on civil protection. The present Communication gives an overview of the actions 
that  the  Commission  is  currently  taking  and  proposes  additional  measures  to  strengthen  the 
existing instruments and to meet the mandates given by the European Council.  

2. 

THE CIVIL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 

2.1. 

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism 

Mutual  assistance  and  collective  action  are  both  a  political  imperative  and  a  practical 
necessity  in  the  event  of  a  terrorist  attack.  Terrorist  attacks  may  require  the  involvement  of 
many different response teams, ranging from traditional civil protection capabilities to more 
sophisticated  technical  and  scientific  resources.  The  capabilities  required  to  handle  the 
consequences of terrorist attacks can easily exceed the capacities of the country affected. Only 
collective  action,  based  on  solidarity,  can  ensure  a  timely  and  adequate  response  to  all 
terrorist scenarios.  

For its part, the Commission is ready to assist Member States in the implementation of their 
solidarity  commitment  through  the  Community  Civil  Protection  Mechanism.  Established  in 
October 2001, the Community Mechanism has quickly developed into the key instrument for 
European  cooperation  in  the  field  of  civil  protection.  Participation  in  the  Mechanism  has 
grown  to  a  total  of  30  countries  (EU-25,  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Iceland,  Liechtenstein  and 
Norway),  with  others  showing  interest  in  joining  the  Mechanism.  The  Commission  has 
worked closely with Member States to develop a series of actions and instruments aimed at 
enhancing  preparedness  and  facilitating  mutual  assistance  in  the  event  of  a  major  disaster. 
Most importantly, the Mechanism – which can be called upon by any country that is struck by 
a major disaster – has now provided real-time support in various emergencies, allowing it to 
gain experience and to build upon lessons learned.  

When  stricken  by  a  disaster,  the  national  authorities  of  the  affected  country  can  submit  a 
request  for  assistance  to  the  Monitoring  and  Information  Centre  (MIC),  which  immediately 
forwards the request to its network of national contact points. It is then up to the individual 
countries to determine whether they are in a position to offer assistance. The MIC collects the 
responses  and  the  requesting  country  can  choose  the  capabilities  it  needs  to  supplement  its 
own  assets.  In  addition,  the  MIC  can  also  offer  technical  support  and  dispatch  small  expert 
teams  to  coordinate  assistance  or  to  liaise  with  the  national  authorities  or  international 
organisations.  

The MIC also collects validated information throughout the emergency and provides regular 
updates  to  all  participating  countries.  A  dedicated  communication  and  information  system 
(CECIS)  is  being  implemented  in  2004  to  ensure  even  more  efficient  information  flows 
during emergencies. 

To date, the MIC has coordinated European civil protection assistance in a variety of natural 
and  man-made  disasters.  In  the  past  two  years,  more  than  10  different  countries  have 
benefited  from  European  civil  protection  assistance  arranged  through  the  Mechanism.  The 

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types  of  assistance  provided  through  the  MIC  cover  the  whole  range  of  traditional  civil 
protection activities - including fire-fighting, medical assistance, search and rescue – as well 
as more specialised equipment or expertise. Similar assistance can be provided, upon request, 
in  case  of  a  terrorist  attack.  The  added  value  of  EU  wide  cooperation  can  be  realised 
whenever the scale of a disaster is such that it exceeds the national capacities, regardless of 
whether it is a natural disaster, a technological accident or a terrorist threat.  

On  the  same  day  that  the  European  Council  adopted  the  Solidarity  Declaration,  25  March 
2004,  the  Commission  expressed  its  intention  and  commitment  to  further  strengthen  the 
Community  Civil  Protection  Mechanism.  The  Communication  on  Reinforcing  the  Civil 
Protection Capacity of the EU identified the following areas of improvement: 

•  stronger coordination and communication; 

•  the inter-operability of technical equipment, including civilian-military inter-operability; 

•  common  insignia  for  the  intervention  teams  to  enhance  the  visibility  of  European 

solidarity; 

•  finding  the  means  to  finance  transportation  of  equipment  and  teams  in  the  event  of  a 

disaster. 

The  Commission  is  committed  to  further  improving  the  system  of  mutual  assistance  along 
these lines. To be effective, however, each of these proposals requires the full support of the 
Member States.  

2.2. 

Enhancing preparedness through training and simulation exercises 

Training  is  a  cornerstone  of  emergency  preparedness  and  response.  At  European  level,  the 
Community  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  has  invested  significant  efforts  in  the  design  and 
implementation  of  a  training  programme  for  national  experts  and  team  leaders.  This 
programme  currently  consists  of  three  components:  courses,  simulation  exercises  and  an 
exchange of experts system.  

The  targeted  audience  of  the  training  courses are  national  team  leaders,  liaison  officers  and 
technical,  assessment  and  coordination  experts  who  are  eligible  to  participate  in  European 
assistance interventions outside their own country. The training curriculum has been carefully 
developed  to  cover  all  knowledge  and  skills  required  to  contribute  effectively  to  such 
interventions.  The  courses,  which  last  one  week,  also  encourage  interaction  between  the 
participants  to  promote  exchanges  of  information  and  knowledge  of  other  countries’ 
approaches to civil protection.  

The first cycle of training courses has been successfully completed. More than 200 national 
experts  and  team  leaders  have  received  training.  The  Commission  will  continue  and,  where 
possible, intensify its efforts in this field. A second training cycle started in September 2004.  

In addition, the Commission intends to organise specific training courses on selected topics. 
These  are  likely  to  include  training  on  topics  relevant  to  terrorist  attacks,  such  as 
psychological  or  psycho-social  aftercare  for  victims  and  responders,  operating  in  a 
contaminated environment, etc. Simulation exercises are important to establish and maintain 
an effective and efficient response system capable of handling threats to public safety. They 
enable  first  responders  to  apply  their  skills  in  a  realistic  scenario  and  produce  learning 

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situations  at  a  level  of  complexity  that  cannot  be  achieved  in  training  courses.  For  those  in 
charge  of  the  system,  they  present  a  unique  opportunity  to  test  and  evaluate  procedures, 
identify problems and build on past experience.  

At  European  level,  the  Commission  has  financed  since  2002  the  organisation  of  8  major 
simulation  exercises,  involving  teams  and  experts  from  several  Member  States.  These 
exercises are carried out within the framework of the Community Mechanism.  

Three exercises were specifically modelled to reflect terrorist scenarios: the Euratox exercise 
(France) in October 2002, the Common Cause exercise (Denmark) in October 2002 and the 
EU Response exercise (Belgium) in January 2003. 

Under the exchange of experts system, national experts can work for a limited period of time 
in  other  Member  States.  The  system  is  designed  to  share  knowledge  and  expertise  and  to 
ensure that all Member States can build upon this collective knowledge base. 

2.3. 

Identifying and assessing capabilities  

Terrorists  will  continue  to  expose  and  exploit  our  vulnerabilities.  When  prevention  and 
deterrence  fail  and  attacks  occur,  only  a  well-organised  and  effective  response  system  can 
guarantee  an  expeditious  return  to  normality.  This  requires  an  increased  emphasis  on 
preparedness for terrorist events at all levels. In response to this, the European Commission 
has developed a number of activities and instruments aimed at identifying and assessing the 
civil protection capabilities available for assistance at European level. 

One  way  of  enhancing  preparedness  is  information  gathering.  Reliable  and  detailed  data  on 
the  assets  and  capabilities  available  for  assistance  at  European  level  will  facilitate  planning 
and  can,  in  the  long  run,  ensure  a  more  rational  use  of  limited  resources.  The  Council 
Decision  establishing  the  Community  Mechanism  recognised  this  need  and  requested 
Member  States  to  make  information  on  civil  protection  teams  and  experts  available  to  the 
Community Mechanism. The information received from Member States has been entered into 
the  civil  protection  database  maintained  by  the  Commission.  The  above  mentioned 
Commission  Communication  on  Reinforcing  the  Civil  Protection  Capacity  of  the  EU 
identified a number of information gaps and called upon the Member States to provide more 
detailed data in order to allow better planning and preparedness.  

In 2003, the EU Military Committee was mandated to establish a database of military assets 
and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations against the effects of terrorist 
attacks, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. In 2004, the 
content of the military database was made available to the Community Mechanism in order to 
enhance its overall response capacity. 

In  response  to  the  mandates  given  by  the  June  European  Council,  the  Commission  has 
initiated a new process designed to assess the civil protection capabilities that are available at 
European  level  to  assist  countries  affected  by  a  major  terrorist  attack.  This  exercise  is  not 
intended to provide a realistic picture of all national civil protection resources available within 
the participating countries, but focuses specifically on the assets and capabilities that could be 
made available to assist other countries in the event of a major terrorist attack.  

The Commission has taken a scenario-based approach to identify both the needs for assistance 
at  EU  level  and  the  resources  available  for  such  assistance  interventions.  With  the  help  of 
national experts, the Commission designed a limited number of scenarios for the response to 

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terrorist attacks. Based on the scenarios, the Commission has developed a consolidated list of 
the  civil  protection  assets  and  capabilities  required  to  handle  the  consequences  of  major 
terrorist  attacks  in  Europe.  It  devised  a  comprehensive  questionnaire  focusing  both  on 
quantitative and qualitative information, and on 17 August 2004, requested the 30 countries 
participating  in  the  Community  Mechanism  to  provide  information  on  the  civil  protection 
assistance they could offer in each of these scenarios. In the meantime, the EU Military Staff 
has  started  upgrading  the  military  database  on  the  basis  of  the  consolidated  list  and 
questionnaire developed by the Commission.  

Once the information is received, the Commission will consolidate the information and start 
to  draft  an  EU  Restricted  report  assessing  the  capabilities  available  at  European  level  for 
assistance to countries affected by a major terrorist attack. This report will be presented to the 
December  European  Council.  The  report  could  be  a  unique  policy  tool  for  the  European 
Union  and  the  Member  States,  allowing  them  to  further  strengthen  the  civil  protection 
framework in Europe and to consolidate the solidarity commitments they have undertaken.  

So  far,  only  some  of  the  Member  States  have  responded  with  appropriate  information.  All 
Member  States  need  to  participate  fully  if  the  Union  is  to  have  an  accurate  picture  of  its 
response capability and to take forward its ability to deliver on its solidarity commitment.  

3. 

HEALTH PROTECTION 

3.1. 

The challenge 

Incidents and terrorist attacks involving explosives, chemical, biological and chemical agents 
can  be  hugely  disruptive  and  costly  even  if  they  do  not  kill  or  maim  or  involve  “unlimited 
catastrophe” agents, such as smallpox, which will continue to spread unless effective counter-
measures are applied. The action in the health field is intended to cover the whole spectrum of 
activities  from  risk  assessment  via  the  detection  or  exclusion  of  presence  of  biological, 
chemical or radioactive agents in packages, environmental compartments or humans, animals 
or plants, through to risk communication between health authorities, health professionals and 
the public, to risk management involving the introduction or application of counter-measures 
including  travel  advisories,  screenings  and  contact  tracing,  vaccination,  administration  of 
therapeutics  and  treatments,  decontamination,  mass  casualty  triage,  isolation,  quarantine, 
interdiction of premises and movement, and waste disposal.  

3.2. 

Cooperation in the field of health security 

The Member States and the Commission are working together to ensure that there is adequate 
capacity  and  capabilities  and  to  enhance  preparedness  and  response  in  the  health  sector  for 
any  incident,  no  matter  its  origin.  They  have  agreed  in  November  2001  a  programme  on 
health security, which has been the object of Commission communication COM(2003) 320 of 
2 June 2003. 

3.3. 

Threat  awareness,  command  and  control  arrangements:  Mechanism  for 
information exchange, consultation and co-ordination 

The platform of health security coordination in the EU is the Health Security Committee, set 
up  in  November  2001  by  the  Health  Ministers  and  the  Commissioner  for  Health  and 
Consumer  Protection.  It  exchanges  information  on  health-related  threats,  coordinates  health 
preparedness and emergency response plans and crisis management strategies, raises the alert 

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and communicates rapidly in case of health-related  incidents  of  EU  concern,  advises on the 
management of risk and facilitates and supports training and dissemination of good practice 
and experience. 

A secure 24 hour/7 day-a-week rapid alert system (RAS-BICHAT) links the Commission and 
the  members  of  the  Health  Security  Committee  with  back-up  contact  points  in  appropriate 
government offices. It complements the early warning and response system (EWRS) system 
established  by  Commission  Decision  2000/57/EC  of  22 December  1999  for  the  formal 
notification  of  outbreaks  and  consultation  and  coordination  of  counter-measures  under  the 
terms  of  Decision  No  2119/98/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council.  Both 
systems are linked under appropriate operating procedures with all the EU health-related alert 
systems and with systems that scan and summarise information made available through news 
agencies,  other  news  media  and  specialised  sources  onto  the  World  Wide  Web  in  order  to 
provide advance warning on adverse events.  

Alert systems and coordination of measures ensured by this platform of cooperation on health 
protection  apply  over  the  full  range  of  incidents  from  simple  incidents  and  threats  such  as 
notification of unsafe food consignments and mailing of suspect letters, to mass casualties and 
interdiction  of  movement  which  might  require  deployment  of  significant  law  enforcement, 
security, and even military assets. 

3.4. 

Surveillance  and  detection:  Capability  for 
identification  

inventorying,  detection  and 

Biological agents have been prioritised on the basis of certain criteria, such as infectiousness, 
virulence,  persistence  in  the  environment,  ease  of  manipulation  and  dissemination  and 
existence of defences to counter their propagation and effects.  

There are seven laboratory facilities in five Member States of the EU that are suitable for the 
handling  and  confirmation  in  samples  and  specimens  of  high-risk  agents  such  as  viral 
haemorrhagic  fever  or  smallpox  viruses  (P4  laboratories).  A  network  has  been  formed 
between these laboratories to provide quality-assured diagnostic services to all Member States 
and  on-call  availability  24h/7d  to  communicate  rapidly  with  national  authorities  and  the 
Commission, and organise tests and exercises, training and skill development.  

To  boost  biosecurity  defences,  the  Commission  has  put  since  June  2003  under  mandatory 
surveillance Bacillus anthracis (for anthrax), Franciscella tularensis (for tularemia), Coxiella 
burnetii  (for  Q-fever),  and  Variola  major  (for  smallpox)  by  their  addition  to  the  EU  list  of 
special agents and by laying down case definitions for these agents in Commission Decision 
2003/534/EC  of  17  July  2003.  Moreover,  in  order  to  identify  in  a  single  tool  and  prioritise 
health  security  actions,  a  matrix  has  been  developed  together  with  a  decision-making 
algorithm for use by the EU competent national authorities.  

3.5. 

Response  and  recovery:  Medicines’  stocks  and  health  services  database  and 
arrangements  for  provision  of  medicines,  specialists,  other  medical  goods  and 
infrastructure  

There  are  no  authorised  vaccines  in  the  EU  against  pathogens  such  as  smallpox  or  plague. 
Authorised  anthrax  vaccines  are  not  widely  available.  Advantage  has  been  taken  of  the 
opportunity presented by the current review of the EU pharmaceutical legislation to introduce 

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legal  amendments  in  order  to  allow  distribution  and  prescription  of  non-  market  authorised 
medicines under appropriate liability conditions.  

The  analysis  of  the  antibiotics  capacity  of  industry  showed  that  there  is  very  likely  to  be 
sufficient supply to meet demand in all foreseeable situations. Information has been obtained 
and  shared,  on  a  restricted  basis,  on  stocks  of  bioagent  vaccines,  antibiotics,  antidotes  and 
anti-virals in Member States and consensus has been obtained on the general information that 
needs  to  be  collected  on  medical  resources  for  mutual  assistance  in  disastrous  medical 
situations.  Most  Member  States  have  existing  or  are  acquiring  stockpiles  of  smallpox 
vaccines. There is an insufficient supply of immunoglobulins used for the treatment of serious 
adverse reactions to vaccines. A study by the Commission on the dilution of existing smallpox 
vaccines  showed  that  it  would  be  problematic  under  emergency  conditions.  Action  is  now 
directed  towards  the  development  of  safer  vaccines  and  the  formulation  of  vaccination 
strategies, including for pandemic influenza. On request of the Commission, guidelines have 
been issued by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, on the use of medicines against 
potential pathogens and the development of vaccinia virus- based vaccines against smallpox. 

Clinical  guidelines  for  the  recognition  and  case  management  of  diseases  related  to  the 
pathogens that may be used in deliberate releases have been developed and issued on the basis 
of a consensus and peer review process on anthrax, smallpox, botulism, plague, tularaemia, 
haemorrhagic fever viruses, brucella, Q fever, encephalitis viruses, glanders and melioidosis. 

On chemical agent terrorism, a series of lists of chemical agents has been compiled to arrive 
at groups of substances requiring the same public health and medical approaches. The clinical 
and  toxicological  aspects  have  been  reviewed  and  data  from  a  survey  of  poison  centres 
conducted  by  the  Commission  have  been  used  to  compile  an  inventory  of  clinical  and 
laboratory-related expertise in the EU. A network of chemical agent response centres will be 
set up to report incidents of EU concern and advice on counter-measures. Finally, guidance on 
the  use  of  antidotes  and  pharmaceuticals  for  chemical  agents  has  been  obtained  from  the 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency and published.  

Knowledge  about 
their  clinical  and 
terror  agents  and  corresponding  diseases  and 
epidemiological management and associated laboratory analysis is limited, hence the drive to 
identify relevant experts in the EU and their listing in a directory shared by the authorities of 
the Member States. Experts are designated by the Health Security Committee in accordance 
with criteria on qualifications, experience and deployment readiness.  

3.6. 

Prevention and Protection: Interdiction of agent movement and biosafety 

The  EU  has  a  stringent  regulatory  regime  for  recording  CBRN  agents  and  materials.  The 
directives on biological and chemical agents for the purpose of health and safety at work have 
introduced, since 1990, obligations in respect of the possession, storage, handling and use of 
these  agents  in  all  workplaces,  including  laboratories,  research  and  academic  institutions, 
hospitals etc. They also require appropriate qualifications and registering of those involved in 
all  of  the  above  operations.  Strict  conditions  exist  for  the  registering  and  manipulation  of 
radioactive  substances  in  a  series  of  directives  regarding  the  radiological  protection  of  the 
public and of workers against ionising radiation. Strict conditions and safeguards apply also in 
the  food  safety  and  veterinary  and  plant  health  sectors.  A  compulsory  regime  exists  for  the 
control  of  exports  of  dual-use  items  and  technology  which  contains  lists  of  radiological, 
nuclear, biological and chemical agents for which strict provisions linked to international non-
proliferation regimes and export control arrangements apply.  

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3.7. 

Enhancing preparedness and response 

Preparedness and response planning is a key priority in the EU. Making counter-measures by 
the  Member  States  compatible  and  inter-operable  is  the  key  objective.  To  this  end,  a 
compilation  of  national  health  emergency  plans  has  been  made.  EU-  wide  evaluation 
exercises  on  smallpox  and  pandemic  influenza  will  be  carried  out  in  2005  to  evaluate 
communications  and  compatibility  of  national  plans.  The  Commission  has  published  a 
working paper setting out its blueprint for Community Preparedness and Response Planning 
on  pandemic  influenza  in  March  2004.  It  is  now  working  on  preparing  a  general  health 
emergency plan for the EU.  

Member States and the Commission are developing prediction models about the progress of 
disease  and  dispersal  of  agents  under  different  scenarios  and  variable  quantitative  and 
qualitative information on movements of people, social habits, various geographical, weather 
and  transport  and  utility  conditions  and  to  gauge  the  impact  of  particular  health  protection 
counter-measures,  such  as  quarantine  and  mass  vaccinations.  These  activities  are  supported 
with co-funding by the Community provided under the public health programme 2003-2008. 

A  training  programme  has  been  developed  along  two  strands:  First,  training  in  the  field  of 
the 
communicable  disease  outbreak 
Commission  and  the  Member  States  and  provides  a  facility  for  flexible  deployment  of 
expertise inside and outside the EU. Second, a training course and production of materials on 
forensic  epidemiology  that  have  been  prepared  together  with  Europol  for  jointly  training 
Member States’ trainers from law enforcement and field epidemiologist services.  

investigation  (EPIET),  which 

is  co-funded  by 

The  future  European  Union  Centre  for  Disease  Prevention  and  Control  (agreed  on  21  April 
2004 by the European Parliament and Council following a proposal by the Commission) will 
be a key player in providing advice to the Member States and the EU institutions, as well as in 
implementing surveillance and response actions in the area of health security.  

3.8. 

International cooperation 

The  Global  Health  Security  Action  Initiative  was  agreed  by  the  G7  and  Mexican  Health 
Ministers and Commissioner Byrne in Ottawa on 7 November 2001 and has similar goals to 
those  of  the  EU  cooperation  An  incident  scale  for  risk  communication  and  algorithms  for 
response  in  various  scenarios  have  been  developed  between  the  parties  to  the  initiative, 
smallpox measures and patient isolation training has been held, inter-laboratory tests are being 
carried  out  within  a  laboratory  collaboration  platform  and  risk  communication  and  co-
ordination via a dedicated network have been established. Cooperation on field investigation 
techniques,  chemical  agent  events  and  influenza  planning  is  on-going,  and  a  smallpox  plan 
evaluation  exercise  (Global  Mercury)  was  conducted  in  September  2003.  The  Commission 
leads  on  the  cooperation  platform  on  biosafety  and  biosecurity  research.  Ministers  and  the 
Commissioner meet regularly to review progress.  

The Commission is cooperating with the WHO in activities concerning bioterrorism, first in 
the context of the Ottawa initiative and, second, in the context of on-going initiatives by the 
WHO to improve its Global Outbreak and Response Network activities. 

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4. 

THE COMMUNITY SPHERE RAPID ALERT SYSTEM NETWORKS 

4.1. 

Existing Commission emergency rapid alert systems 

The  Commission  has  developed  the  operational  capacity  to  assist  in  the  response  to  a  wide 
range  of  emergencies.  This  has  resulted  in  the  creation  of  several  rapid  response  systems 
(RAS), such as the MIC (Monitoring and Information Centre, to facilitate and support mutual 
assistance  between  the  participating  countries),  the  ECURIE  system  (in  the  event  of  a 
radiological emergency), BICHAT (for biological and chemical attacks and threats), RAPEX 
(consumer health and safety - non-food aspects), RASFF (consumer health in relation to food 
and 
(phytosanitary  network: 
interception of organisms harmful to plants), SHIFT (health controls on imports of veterinary 
concern) and ADNS (animal health).  

(communicable  diseases),  EUROPHYT 

feed),  EWRS 

The individual networks usually consist of an information exchange network on a “round the 
clock communication basis” receiving and triggering an alert and forwarding information to 
and  from  Member  States  and  associated  countries  or  IAEA  Emergency  Response  Centre. 
While  the  precise  scope,  procedures  and  purposes  of  each  of  these  systems  differ,  they  all 
share the aim to respond quickly and efficiently to emergencies. Existing networks and alert 
systems have an excellent track record and they have proven their worth in handling alerts and 
information  flows  timely  and  efficiently.  Above  all  they  have  created  trust  and  mutual 
confidence and reliance among the specialised authorities. 

4.2. 

Consolidating the emergency systems managed by the Commission 

Information  about  an  imminent  or  evolving  threat  or  attack/disaster  may  reach  the 
Commission through any of its RAS. Since alerts are often submitted through multiple entry 
points, the Commission needs to ensure that relevant information is shared forthwith with all 
its services and national authorities concerned. Certain emergency situations may be of such 
gravity and the risk of their degenerating into a serious crisis so great that overall coordination 
across  virtually  all  EU  policies  is  necessary.  Cooperation  and  coordination  between  all 
relevant  rapid  alert  systems  (including  a  law  enforcement  network  and  a  critical 
infrastructures network) is essential in the event of a major terrorist attack or disaster.  

To strengthen the Commission’s contribution to the fight against terrorism, the Commission 
will  create  a  secure  general  rapid  alert  system  (ARGUS)  to  link  all  specialised  systems  for 
emergencies that require action at European level. A new central entry point will be created 
and built upon the existing structures available within the Commission. The new system will 
respect the specific characteristics, competence and expertise of the individual and specialised 
systems which will continue to carry out their current functions. Since it is often unclear in the 
initial phase of an incident (e.g. an explosion) whether it is an accident or terrorist incident, 
the scope of this system will not be limited strictly to terrorist attacks, but should include all 
crisis centres and rapid reaction mechanisms aimed at ensuring safety and security.  

Further  to  the  creation  of  ARGUS,  a  central  Crisis  Centre  should  be  established  in  the 
Commission, which would bring together representatives of all relevant Commission services 
during  an  emergency.  This  crisis  centre  would  coordinate  efforts  so  as  to  evaluate  the  best 
practicable  options  for  action  and  to  decide  on  the  appropriate  response  measures.  A 
comprehensive  emergency  system  in  place  at  EU  level  requires  that  associated  with  each 
degree  of  risk  there  be  a  uniform  approach  to  risk  analysis  (assessments,  security  levels, 
response actions etc). Therefore a security risk analysis system should be developed, whereby 

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additional  security  measures  may  be  triggered  in  general  and,  where  appropriate,  the  use  of 
specialised  measures  in  particular.  Member  States  not  wishing  to  deploy  a  certain  measure 
would be able to address a specific threat by alternative security measures. 

4.3. 

A European Union law enforcement network 

The  only  missing  link  of  the  present  RAS  systems  managed  at  EU  level  is  an  alert  system 
concerning  public  order  and  security  as  regards  either  preparation  for  or  response  to  crises 
involving law enforcement. Terrorist attack responses require the participation of traditional 
law  enforcement  besides  the  present  systems.  A  European  law  enforcement  network  (LEN) 
will be established and it should be managed by EUROPOL. It should be in place by 2005. It 
will  consist  of  a  dedicated  24h/7  days-a-week  multi-layered  access  network,  to  serve  in 
particular  the  EU  law  enforcement  community,  using  the  current  secure  communication 
channels of the Europol network. ARGUS must be notified when LEN would be triggered by 
the national law enforcement agencies to Europol and vice versa. Europol would dedicate an 
Operational Centre –that will act as a communications centre with a Europol Officer on call 
24  h/7  days  a  week.  The  Europol  Officer  on  call  could  interact  with  the  Europol  Liaison 
Officers of the National Bureaux at Europol. LEN would require the adoption of operational 
guidelines for handling the Europol law enforcement network alerts and agreeing notification 
criteria  parameters  and  classification  of  events.  Member  States  would  need  to  identify  a 
responsible  national  contact  point  authorised  to  issue/receive  alerts  and  take  further  action 
where necessary.  

4.4. 

A European Union Critical infrastructure Warning Information Network 

As  referred  to  in  the  communication  “Critical  Infrastructure  Protection  in  the  fight  against 
terrorism”,  the  Commission  will  lay  down  at  the  latest  by  the  end  of  2005  a  European 
programme  for  Critical  Infrastructure  Protection.  The  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  a 
Critical  Infrastructure  Warning  Information  Network  (CIWIN)  needs  to  be  established. 
ARGUS should interact with CIWIN in the same way it interacts with other RAS. 

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TECHNICAL ANNEXES 

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ANNEX 1 

1. 

MULTI-SECTOR RESPONSE FOR HEALTH PROTECTION 

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism has direct consequences not only for 
people, but also for the environment, the food chain and for property. Preventing terrorist acts 
and  mitigating  their  consequences  requires  a  mobilisation  of  actors  and  resources  in  many 
sectors other than health. Of major importance to health security are the measures and actions 
in food, animal, plant and water safety.  

1.1. 

Food safety 

The  EU  has  a  broad  body  of  legislation  which  covers  primary  production  of  agricultural 
products and industrial production of processed food. This legislative body provides different 
means  to  respond  to  situations  in  specific  sectors.  The  measures  that  would  be  taken  in 
response  to  a  terrorist  act  in  the  food  sector  are  not  fundamentally  different  from  those 
adopted by the EU in response to accidents in the recent past. The aspect of the fight against 
bio terrorism that needs developing is the organisation of upstream information, investigation 
and  information-gathering  within  the  territory  of  the  EU  and  third  countries  as  well  as  an 
improved  cooperation  between  authorities  and  those  working  in  the  food  chain  and  their 
education.  

1.2. 

Animal safety 

Many  EU  regulations  exist  in  the  area  of  animal  safety.  In  response  to  animal  health 
emergencies,  the  Commission  will  adopt  urgent  safeguard  measures  to  supplement  existing 
regulations. The Commission manages a bank of about 40 million doses of various antigens of 
the  foot-and-mouth  disease  virus  for  the  rapid  formulation  of  vaccines.  There  is  on-going 
reinforcement  of  banks  of  vaccines  against  foot-and-mouth,  classical  swine  fever,  avian 
influenza and bluetongue. Imports are subject to strict controls at the EU borders. 

1.3. 

Plant safety 

Structures  specifically  intended  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  plant  protection  products,  which 
sample, analyse and inspect randomly and at regular intervals, are already in place in the EU. 
Phytosanitary  laboratories  exist  in  all  Member  States.  Strict  notification  requirements  are 
enforced and inspections are carried out in third countries for plants intended for planting and 
for specified plant products. A system is also in place for temporary safeguard measures in the 
case of an imminent danger of introduction or spread of harmful organisms. 

1.4.  Water safety 

As  regards  water  safety,  EU  laws  on  the  quality  of  drinking  water  and  on  the  quality  of 
surface waters used for drinking water abstraction are been reviewed to check whether they 
sufficiently  cover  the  requirements  for  constant  monitoring  of  drinking  water  and  other 
appropriate  monitoring  and  early  warning  systems.  Multi-barrier  systems,  the  use  of 
appropriate  markers  at  key  points  and  the  introduction  of  and  adherence  to  the  HACCP 
system by suppliers are being promoted in the context of the programme on health security to 
enhance safety and confidence in early detection of infective agents and toxicants.  

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ANNEX 2 

1. 

ACTIONS IN OTHER FIELDS 

1.1. 

Enhancing the protection of the external border with regard to the movement of 
goods 

As the EU is a Customs Union, the protection of the Internal Market relies exclusively on the 
mechanisms in place at the external border and their efficient application.  

The fight against terrorism or any other external threat relies on the capacity of the national 
customs authorities to block entry at the border of all goods that could present a danger to the 
EU  while  not  hampering  legitimate  trade.  With  this  in  mind  the  Commission  presented  a 
Communication  to  the  Council  on  the  role  of  customs  in  the  integrated  management  of  the 
external border (COM(2003) 452). 

Questions such as a common approach to risks or guaranteeing an appropriate level of human 
resources and equipment are examined in this Communication and further action in this area 
both by the Commission and the Member States is under consideration. 

At the same time, agreement between the Community and the United States in the framework 
of  their  "Container  Security  Initiative"  has  been  achieved.  Bilateral  negotiations  on  its 
implementation are continuing. 

1.2. 

Export control lists 

The EU has a compulsory regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology 
which  contains  lists  of  radiological,  nuclear,  biological  and  chemical  agents  etc.  for  which 
strict  provisions  linked  to  international  non-proliferation  regimes  and  export  control 
arrangements apply. In the area of exports of dual use technologies (civil technologies which 
can be used for military purposes in particular for production or delivery of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction),  "the  responsibilities  of  exporters  of  dual  use  items  as  defined  in  Regulation 
1334/2000 (legal and natural persons) in ensuring that exports of dual use technologies does 
not contribute to the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorists are extremely 
important. It is increasingly recognised that regular dialogue between exporters and national 
authorities  and  regular  information  and  awareness  raising  by  national  authorities  vis-à-vis 
their  dual  use  suppliers  are  a  prerequisite  for  the  efficient  implementation  of  Regulation 
1334/2000.  

At EU level, a working group established by the article 18 of the Regulation 1334/2000 has 
met  regularly  and  facilitated  interaction  between  EU  Member  States'  authorities  responsible 
for  issuing  export  licenses  of  dual  use  items  and  exporters.  However,  the  Commission  is 
conscious  that  this  dialogue  can  be  improved  and  has  started  to  consider  options  for  such 
improvement which have been shared with UNICE at the highest levels as a follow up to the 
Thessaloniki  Action  plan  against  the  proliferation  of  WMD  (which  includes  a  number  of 
actions aiming at strengthening the community export control regime and at making the EU a 
leading player in the international export control regimes). 

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Concerns over the adverse impact of controls on public health activities, such as barriers for 
and  delays  in  the  transport  of  agents,  samples,  reagents  and  specimens  for  tests  and 
comparisons,  persist  among  national  public  health  agencies  and  laboratories.  Commission 
services have raised the attention of the EU Member States in 2002 on the risks that delays 
arising from the implementation of national- (EC) export control legislations in a number of 
important  suppliers  of  relevant  dual-use  biological  technologies  (EU  and  non  EU  such  as 
USA, Japan, Australia, Canada) might create in case of a public health crisis whose solution 
would  imply  quick  international  cooperation  and  move  of  sensitive  dual  use  items  across 
international borders. 

The Commission has made a number of proposals for follow up regarding the strengthening 
of the community export control regime in the enlarged EU. In particular the Commission has 
drawn the attention of the EU Member States and of key third countries to the risks that non 
membership of new EU Member States in export control regimes such as Missile Technology 
Control  Regime  and  Wassenaar  Arrangement  present  in  terms  of  weakening  of  the 
international  export  control  regimes  and  for  the  very  functioning  of  the  Community  export 
control regime due to the single market for dual-use items. The Commission has coordinated 
the  Task  Force  in  charge  of  the  Peer  Reveiws  of  Member  States'  application  of  Regulation 
1334/2000  in  conformity  with  the  Thessaloniki  Action  Plan.  Drawing  on  the  peer  review 
visits which are now finished, the Task Force will present a report to the WP Dual Use with 
suggestions for follow-up which should be of interest not only to the export control licensing 
officers of the EU but also to all the EU actors involved in the fight against terrorists getting 
access to dual use technologies in the EU. 

Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council which calls for all States to adopt measures to 
ensure  that  terrorists  do  not  access  relevant  dual  use  technologies  contains  important 
provisions regarding controls of exports of dual use items. The Commission is contributing to 
the work carried out in the UN Committee 1540 established to monitor the implementation of 
this  Resolution.  The  Commission  has  prepared  its  contribution  on  the  aspects  of  the 
implementation of the Resolution which is of EC competence and it has been agreed that all 
Member  States  will  mention  it  in  their  national  report  to  the  UN  committee  in  charge  of 
Resolution 1540. 

1.3. 

The EU Solidarity Fund 

Bearing in mind the significant costs involved after a major terrorist attack or natural disaster 
there  exist  a  need  to  alleviate  the  financial  consequences  for  those  affected  by  it.  The 
Commission  is  currently  reviewing  the  possibility  of  a  common  approach  to  emergency 
situations  through  a  revised  EU  solidarity  fund  (in  addition  to  national  compensation 
schemes) with the objective to provide financial aid to cope with emergency situations in the 
aftermath  of  an  unforeseen  crisis  (COM(2004)  487).  Such  an  instrument  would  provide 
funding  to  give  support  to  victims  of  terrorism  as  well  as  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  other 
natural and/or man-made disasters or public health crises. 

Support  to  the  victims  and  their  families  as  well  as  contributions  to  rehabilitations  efforts 
must be an integral part of the response to terrorist attacks in a society bound by solidarity. 
The Commission is currently working on different aspects of this response and implementing 
a pilot project agreed upon by the Parliament to support the financing of projects intended to 
help the victims to recover and to raise awareness of the public against terrorist threat. 

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1.4. 

Research and technology development  

Following  the  different  requests  from  the  Parliament  and  the  Council,  the  Commission  has 
started a Preparatory Action entitled "Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the 
field of Security research 2004-2006", with a view to contributing to the improvement of the 
European citizens’ security and to reinforce European technological and industrial potential in 
this area. This Preparatory Action covers the period 2004-2006 and addresses five main areas, 
including the protection against terrorism. 

A  Group  of  Personalities  (GoP)  was  established  in  2003  and  tasked  to  propose  key 
orientations,  principles  and  priorities  for  a  future  European  Security  Research  Programme 
(ESRP).  The  GoP  report  describes  the  essential  elements  of  a  “European  Security  Research 
Programme” (ESRP) and its contribution to address the new security challenges of a changing 
world. Its main recommendations include: 

•  The establishment of an ESRP, from 2007 onwards, with funding of at least 1 billion Euros 

per year, additional to currently existing resources, 

•  The creation of a “European Security Research Advisory Board” to define strategic lines 
of  action,  user  involvement,  implementation  mechanisms  and  a  strategic  agenda  for  the 
ESRP, 

As  a  follow-up,  the  Commission  adopted  on  7  September  2004  a  Communication  entitled 
“Security Research: The Next Steps” (COM(2004) 353) to initiate a debate with the Council 
and  the  Parliament.  It  subscribes  to  the  main  thrust  of  the  report  and  indicates  steps  to  be 
taken to progress the activity: 

•  Consultation  and  cooperation  with  stakeholders,  especially  via  the  “European  Security 

Research Advisory Board” to be established in 2004. 

•  Development  of  an  ESRP,  to  become,  from  2007,  a  specific  programme  within  the  7th 

Framework Programme of Community Research. 

•  Ensuring  an  effective  institutional  setting,  taking  into  account  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy and other relevant Community 
policies  (e.g.  fight  against  terrorism  including  bio-terrorism,  cross  border  control, 
transport,  environment,…),  and  developing  cooperation  and  synergies  with  the  European 
Defence Agency. 

•  Establishing  a  governance  structure  responding  to  the  needs  of  security  research  work  in 

terms of contract, participation and funding. 

In  fields  directly  related  to  biological  and  chemical  terrorism,  the  6th  Framework 
Programme’s  Scientific  Support  to  Policies  activities  covers  “Civil  protection  (including 
biosecurity and protection against risks arising from terrorist attack) and crisis management”. 
Research  is  currently  ongoing  on  biological  agents,  risk  assessment,  crop  bioterrorism  and 
modelling  the  propagation  of  bioterrorist  agents.  The  Commission  can  also  call  upon  the 
advice  of  the  EU  Research  Group  on  Countering  the  Effects  of  Biological  and  Chemical 
Terrorism, encompassing experts from the Member States was established as a follow up to 
the Research Council of 31 October 2001. 

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The  Commission  has  developed  real  time  systems  for  emergency  management  (e.g.  to  help 
emergency response in transport accidents involving dangerous substances). Similar systems 
could  be  developed  as  early  warning  to  address  deliberate  attacks  in  the  areas  of  civil 
protection and health security. The Commission will further work on the establishment of a 
European level threat assessment methodology. 

Improved surveillance on disease monitoring could be supported by the Commission’s Joint 
Research  Centre  through  the  development  of  real-time  monitoring  networks,  integrating 
normalised  instrumentation  (e.g.  on  capture  systems  for  biological  vectors)  and  sensors, 
remote sensing data, and meteorological data, which then feed into models that can provide 
alerts  in  the  case  of  an  outbreak,  predict  the  spreading  of  diseases  and  be  used  to  take 
preventive  actions.  In  addition  to  disease  monitoring,  other  vulnerabilities  in  the  food  chain 
can be reduced by improved traceability systems (e.g. in the cold chain, in feedstock and in 
food  products),  where  the  Commission  can  use  its  expertise  developed  in  animal  and  meat 
traceability. 

In  addition,  the  Commission’s  services  has  substantial  experience  in  the  analysis  of  lessons 
learned concerning the management of past industrial and natural disasters, it can expand on 
this experience to collate and analyse data concerned with deliberate attacks on installations. 
The information could be conveyed to national civil protection agencies thereby contributing 
to the development of appropriate prevention, preparedness and response measures to address 
deliberate terrorist threats.  

Further  improvement  and  validation  of  Commission  and  external  dispersion  models  of 
radioactive substances for the consequence modelling of various types of scenarios including 
‘dirty bomb explosions’ will be supported by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre. Other 
improvements include extending the geographic coverage of existing dispersion models to the 
entire  EU  territory,  and  integration  of  existing  dispersions  models  within  Commission 
interactive impact analysis map-based tools to provide the dispersion models with additional 
functionality  in  order  to  improve  their  scenario  and  impact  analysis  functionalities  (such  as 
estimating affected population and critical infra-structures within the vicinity of the incident). 
Development  of  statistical  techniques  will  improve  the  Commission’s  early  warning  rapid 
alert  system  on  outbreaks  of  communicable  diseases  by  further  studying  bio-terror  related 
incidents and outbreaks at large.  

1.5. 

The Commission’s internal rules of procedure for crises 

On  5  March  2003  the  Commission  adopted  a  Decision1  amending  its  internal  Rules  of 
Procedure  for  crises  which  directly  affect  the  safety,  operation  and  integrity  pf  the 
Commission in terms of persons, buildings and information. In this regard on 26 March the 
Commission  adopted  a  second  Decision2  on  security  in  crisis  situations  which  institute 
operational procedures for a new crisis management structure. 

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2 

Minutes  of  the  1603rd  meeting  of  the  Commission  of  5  March  2003,  point  No  9:  doc.  No  C(2003) 
744/2. 
Written procedure No E/479/2003: document No C(2003)972 of 21 March 2003. 

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