Communication from the Commission to the Council AND to the European Parliament on Commission Decisions of 7 July 2004 concerning national allocation plans for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances of Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC
Date: 2004-07-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, greenhouse gas, reduction of gas emissions, tradeable emission permit

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 7.7.2004 
COM(2004) 500 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION  
TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on Commission Decisions of 7 July 2004 concerning national allocation plans  
for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances of Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom  
in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Combating  climate  change  is  an  important  objective  of  the  European  Union.  The  EU  has 
decided  to  do  this  by  implementing  its  obligations  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  a  multilateral 
agreement  to  tackle  this  global  problem  through  multilateral  co-operation.  Working  closely 
with  Member  States,  industry,  civil  society  and  academia  a  European  Climate  Change 
Programme (ECCP) has been developed to help the EU find cost-effective ways of meeting 
its Kyoto Protocol commitments. A key proposal from the ECCP was the creation of an EU-
wide  emission  trading  scheme  to  help  the  EU  to  reduce  its  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases 
cost-effectively.  In  2003,  the  Council  and  Parliament  adopted  Directive  2003/87/EEC 
providing for EU-wide emissions trading from January 2005.  

The first phase of EU emissions trading covers CO2 emissions from over 12,000 installations. 
Each  Member  State  has  to  draw  up  a  national  allocation  plan  for  allocating  tradable 
allowances and notify it to the Commission for assessment. The Directive lays down criteria 
for the Commission to assess and mandates it to reject a national allocation plan, in whole or 
in  part.  In  order  to  help  the  Member  States  prepare  their  plans,  the  Commission  adopted 
guidance1 on the implementation of the criteria set out in the Directive. 

This Communication sets out the Commission’s assessment of 8 plans and is accompanied by 
decisions  addressed  to  each  Member  State.  One  of  the  reasons  why  the  Commission  was 
given responsibility under the Directive to assess the national allocation plans is to ensure that 
the Directive’s criteria have been correctly applied in the distribution of tradable allowances 
before trading starts. In a single EU internal market and a single EU emissions trading scheme 
it is important to guard against distortion of competition through an incorrect application of 
the  Directive  or  Treaty  provisions.  This  is  the  first  time  that  the  EU  engages  in  EU  wide 
emissions  trading  and  the  first  trading  period,  from  2005-2007,  has  been  designed  as  a 
“learning phase”. However, if more allowances were issued by Member States than the likely 
quantity of actual emissions from the installations covered, little or no environmental benefit 
would be provided by the Directive. The development of clean and new technologies would 
be hampered, and the development of a dynamic and liquid market would be undermined.  

2. 

NUMBER OF NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS SUBMITTED 

By  25  June  2004,  16  Member  States  have  notified  a  national  allocation  plan  to  the 
Commission.  Of  these,  8  (see  table  1  below)  are  sufficiently  complete  to  allow  the 
Commission  to  take  a  decision  on  their  compatibility  with  the  Directive.  These  plans 
represent  close  to  half  of  the  estimated  overall  quantity  of  allowances  for  the  first  trading 
period. 

1 

Communication  on  guidance  to  assist  Member  States  in  the  implementation  of  the  criteria  listed  in 
Annex  III  to  Directive  2003/87/EC  establishing  a  scheme  for  greenhouse  gas  emission  allowance 
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, COM(2003) 830 final of 7 
January 2004. Paragraphs 48 to 64. 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Table 1 

Member State 

Total intended 
quantity for the 
period (in tonnes) 

Austria 

Denmark 

Germany 

Ireland 

The Netherlands 

Slovenia 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

98.242.719

100.500.000

1.499.000.000

66.960.000

285.900.000

26.329.969

68.700.000

736.000.000

Total 

2.881.632.688

3. 

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS 

Each national allocation plan received has been analysed in detail. The Directive requires the 
Commission  to  assess  them  according  to  the  same  criteria  set  out  in  Annex  III  of  the 
Directive,  and  in  analysing  them,  the  Commission  has  identified  several  issues  that  were 
assessed in detail for compatibility with these criteria under the following main headings: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

consistency with each Member State’s Kyoto Protocol commitments (“path to 
Kyoto”), 

ex-post adjustments,  

transfer rules, 

design and management of new entrant reserves, 

other  issues  specific  to  individual  plans  (including  consistency  with  other 
Community legislation). 

Each of these issues is explained in greater detail in the following sections. 

3.1. 

Consistency with a path to Kyoto 

The  Directive  was  adopted  to  contribute  to  cost-effective  compliance  with  commitments  of 
Member States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, criteria 1 and 2 in Annex III are 
central pillars for the design of a national allocation plan.  

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
In the period 2005-2007 criterion 1 provides that each Member State must submit a plan with 
a  total  quantity  of  allowances  “consistent  with  a  path  towards  achieving  or  over-achieving 
each Member State’s target under Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol”.  

Criteria  1  to  5  need  to  be  observed  when  determining  the  total  quantity  of  allowances.  The 
total  quantity  shall  not  be  more  than  is  likely  to  be  needed  for  the  strict  application  of  the 
criteria  of  Annex  III,  and  a  Member  State  should  not  allocate  more  than  is  needed,  or 
warranted,  by  the  most  constraining  of  the  criteria.  Any  application  of  optional  criteria  or 
elements may not lead to an increase in the total quantity. 

Where use of Kyoto mechanisms is integrated in the determination of the path to Kyoto, the 
Guidance Document states: “a Member State must substantiate any such intentions to use the 
Kyoto  mechanisms.  The  Commission  will  base  its  assessment  notably  on  the  state  of 
advancement of relevant legislation and implementing provisions at the national level”. 

In assessing consistency with a path, the Commission has taken into account: 

– 

– 

– 

The actual and projected progress of the Member State; 

The reliance and  state  of preparation and  implementation  of  measures  for  the 
government-funded purchases of Kyoto units; 

The reliance and state of preparation and implementation of measures in non-
trading sectors, incl. transport. 

Four  of  the  assessed  plans  intended  government-funded  purchase  of  Kyoto  units.  Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands intend to purchase up to 172 million Kyoto units2. 

In  accordance  with  the  Guidance  Document  the  Commission  has  assessed  whether  the 
intended use of the Kyoto mechanisms is substantiated, basing its assessment notably on the 
state of advancement of relevant legislation and implementing provisions at the national level. 
The Commission has evaluated the state of advancement against the following aspects: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

Does the plan indicate how many Kyoto units the Member State intends to purchase 
for the period 2008-2012? 

Does  the  plan  indicate  which  Kyoto  units  (JI,  CDM,  and  International  Emission 
Trading) will be used to what extent? 

Does  the  plan  present  information  on  the  state  of  advancement  of  relevant 
legislation? 

Has  the  Member  State  established  and  notified  to  the  UN  a  designated  national 
authority? 

Does  the  plan  show  that  implementing  provisions  (operational  programmes, 
institutional decisions) are in place at the national level? 

2 

Austria – 35 million; Denmark – 18.5 million; Ireland – 18.5 million; the Netherlands – 100 million. 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(f) 

(g) 

Have any credit purchase contracts been signed or any credit purchase tenders been 
initiated? 

Has the Member State set up or made any financial contributions to carbon purchase 
funds? 

(h) 

Does the plan specify how much money has been committed at this stage? 

The results are summarised in table 2 below.  

Table 2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Total 
quantity 
(Mt) 

Split 
indicated 

Law in 
place  

National 
Authority 
designated 

Operational 
programme 

Contracts 

Contribution
s to JI/CDM 
funds 

Austria 

35 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Denmark 

18.5 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Budget 
committed 
(& implied 
price per 
tonne) 

€ 288 Mn 
(€ 8.20) 

€ 126 Mn 
(€ 6.70) 

Ireland 

18.5 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Netherlands 

100 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

€ 736 Mn 
(€ 7.30) 

The  Commission  finds  that  the  intended  use  of  the  Kyoto  mechanisms  is  not  substantiated 
where a Member State has not signed any contracts or initiated any carbon purchase tenders, 
has not designated a national authority, has no operational programme in place, and has not 
committed any or sufficient budgetary resources.  

Where  a  Member  State  does  not  substantiate  the  intended  use  of  the  mechanisms  this 
contravenes  criterion  1  for  the  element  of  the  intended  total  quantity  of  allowances  that  is 
built into the path and allocated as a result of the intended use. To determine this element, the 
proportion of overall emissions that the trading scheme represents is relevant in comparison 
with emissions from sources not covered by the Directive.  

The  Commission  finds  that  Austria,  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  have  substantiated  the 
intended use of the mechanisms.  

Ireland,  while  stating  its  intention  to  purchase  18.5  million  Kyoto  units,  has  not  indicated 
which  mechanism(s)  will  be  used  to  what  extent,  has  no  legal  base  in  place,  has  not 
designated  a  national  authority,  has  no  operational  programme  in  place,  has  not  signed  any 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
  
  
contracts or initiated any carbon purchase tenders, has not made any contributions to carbon 
purchase  funds,  and  has  committed  no  budgetary  resources  yet.  The  Irish  authorities  have 
notified to the Commission on 6 July the commitments to establish an operational programme 
by  30  November  2004,  to  establish  and  notify  to  the  UN  Climate  Secretariat  a  designated 
national authority by 30 November 2004, and to commit financial resources in the budget for 
2005.  Taking  into  account  the  above  described  changes  and  the  reduced  total  quantity  of 
allowances, the Commission finds the Irish plan to be in line with criterion 1. 

According to Council Decision 2002/358/EC, Denmark is legally obliged to reduce emissions 
by 21% during 2008-2012 in relation its 1990 emissions. The Danish plan states that on the 
basis  of  current  knowledge,  this  corresponds  to  average  annual  emissions  of  54.9  million 
tonnes CO2 equivalent in 2008-2012. However, Denmark has expressed assumptions to which 
a joint statement by the Council and the Commission to Decision 2002/358/EC refers, on the 
basis  of  which  an  alternative  target  amounting  to  an  annual  average  of  59.7  million  tonnes 
CO2 equivalent is calculated3. In case Denmark’s assumption with respect to the target is not 
realised,  Denmark  has  undertaken  to  accomplish  the  further  reductions  needed  through 
domestic measures or the use of flexible mechanisms. 

Where  a  Member  State  has  based  its  national  allocation  plan  on  projected  emissions 
development in the 2005-2007 period for activities covered by the scheme, the Commission 
has carefully assessed these projected developments, including major assumptions made.  

The  Commission  has  made  a  comparison  of  production  and  emissions  growth  rates  for  the 
trading sector with overall economic growth rates as indicated in the plan or available from 
reliable independent sources. Where a growth rate for the trading sector was in excess of the 
overall  economic  growth  rate,  the  Commission  has  assessed  the  justification  for  assuming 
faster growth in the trading sector compared to the overall economy, in view of the ongoing 
structural shift in many Member States from the secondary to the tertiary sector. 

The  Commission  has  made  great  effort  to  compare  data  in  an  equitable  manner  across  the 
Member States, in spite of the differences in the data quality between different plans.  

Where  projected  developments  show  an  increase  in  output  and  emissions  from  activities  in 
the scheme, the Commission has assessed how many allowances are intended to be allocated 
to  existing  installations  in  relation  to  recent  actual  emissions,  how  many  allowances  are 
intended  to  be  allocated  to  known  new  entrants  in  accordance  with  paragraph  54  of  the 
Guidance Document, and how many allowances are foreseen to be allocated to a new entrant 
reserve. 

Where  such  an  assessment  has  shown  that  the  Member  State  intends  to  allocate  more 
allowances to existing installations than emissions were in the base period, the Commission 
has assessed in how far the projected growth in output and emissions in existing installations 
is  realistic  and  substantiated  in  view  of  the  actual  and  implied  average  degree  of  capacity 
utilisation at activity level to realise the expected growth. 

The Commission finds that all assessed plans, including the plan of the Netherlands with the 
changes notified to the Commission on 23 June, are based on sufficiently justified projections. 

3 

See Table 0.1 in the Danish NAP.  

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  Commission  has  assessed  whether  the  plans  unduly  favour  certain  undertakings  or 
activities contrary to the requirements of the Treaty. On the basis of the information provided 
by  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  measures  confer  a  selective 
advantage  to  certain  undertakings  which  has  the  potential  to  distort  competition  and  affect 
intra Community trade. The measures also appear to be imputable to the Member States and 
to entail the use of State resources to the extent that more than 95% of allowances are given 
for  free.  While  the  Commission  cannot  therefore  exclude  that  the  plan  implies  State  aid 
pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Treaty, any potential aid granted under the plans (other than a 
plan  which  is  rejected  as  contravening  criterion  1)  is  consistent  with  and  seems  to  be 
necessary to achieve the overall environmental objective of the Directive expressed in criteria 
1  and  2.  Beneficiaries  will  still  have  an  incentive  to  improve  their  environmental 
performance.  Any  potential  unequal  treatment  was  justified  by  the  Member  States  on 
objective and transparent grounds. 

3.2. 

Ex-post adjustments 

The Directive foresees in Annex III, criterion 10, and Article 11 that a Member State has to 
decide  up-front  (before  the  trading  period  starts)  about  the  absolute  quantity  of  allowances 
allocated in total and to each installation’s operator. This decision may not be re-visited and 
no  allowances  may  be  re-allocated  by  means  of  adding  to  or  subtracting  from  the  quantity 
determined for each operator on the basis of a government decision or a pre-determined rule. 
The Directive expressly allows for ex-post adjustments in case of force majeure subject to the 
procedure laid down in Article 29. In addition:  

-  these  Decisions  allow  corrections  to  be  made  to  intended  allocations  in  respect  of  data 
quality at any time before the decision on allocation under Article 11(1) is taken; 

-  the  Directive  does  not  exclude,  where  an  installation  is  closed  during  the  period,  that 
Member  States  determine  that  there  is  no  longer  an  operator  to  whom  allowances  will  be 
issued; and 

- where allocation takes place to new entrants from a reserve, the exact allocation to each new 
entrant will be decided upon after the decision on allocation under Article 11(1) is taken.  

Criterion 10 requires the quantity of allowances to be allocated to existing installations to be 
stated in the plan prior to the commencement of the trading period. The admissibility of ex-
post  adjustments  has  been  assessed  by  the  Commission  irrespective  of  whether  an  intended 
adjustment, or the magnitude of it, may be attributed to or be independent of the behaviour of 
the operator that it is proposed to change the allocation for during the period. 

On  the  basis  of  Annex  III,  criterion  5,  the  same  principle  applies  to  new  entrants.  Once  a 
Member  State  has  decided  in  the  course  of  the  trading  period  the  absolute  number  of 
allowances to be granted to a new entrant out of a new entrant reserve, it may not re-visit this 
decision. Otherwise some companies may be unduly favoured or discriminated against by the 
application of a principle that is not acceptable for existing installations.  

Ex-post adjustments would create uncertainty for operators, and be detrimental to investment 
decisions  and  the  trading  market.  Ex-post  adjustments  substitute  more  efficient  solutions 
found  in  the  market-place  by  administrative  processes  that  would  be  cumbersome  to 
implement.  Also  downward  ex-post  revisions,  that  might  be  argued  have  a  beneficial 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
environmental  effect,  are  detrimental  to  the  certainty  that  businesses  need  in  order  to  make 
investments that lead to reductions of emissions. 

The  Commission  finds  that  the  intended  ex-post  adjustments  in  the  plans  of  Germany  and 
Austria contravene criteria 5 and/or 10. 

The  Commission  finds  that  the  German  plan  contravenes  criterion  10  because  Germany 
intends to adjust or potentially adjust the allocated amount per installation during the period 
2005  to  2007  in  case  (i)  existing  installations  starting  operation  as  of  1  January  2003 
experience  lower  capacity  utilisation;  (ii)  existing  installations  have  annual  emissions  lower 
than 40 % of base period emissions; (iii) existing installations receive additional allowances 
due to a transfer of allowances foreseen for a closed installation; (iv) existing installations or 
new entrants benefiting from the CHP bonus allocation demonstrate a lower amount of CHP-
mode  power  production  than  in  the  base  period.  The  intention  of  Germany  to  potentially 
adjust  the  allocation  of  allowances  to  new  entrants  contravenes  criterion  5  which  requires 
non-discrimination  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty,  because  the  application  of  such  ex-post 
adjustments would discriminate new entrants compared to the operators of other installations 
in respect of which no ex-post adjustments to their allocation are permitted by the Directive. 

The Commission finds that the Austrian plan contravenes criterion 10 because Austria’s rules 
concerning the transfer of the eligibility to be allocated a certain amount of allowances from 
existing  installations  that  close  down  imply  an  adjustment  of  the  allocated  amount  to  an 
existing installation during the period 2005-2007.  

3.3. 

Transfer rules 

Given differing expectations of the time it will take to establish a large and liquid market, the 
Directive allows Member States a certain discretion to decide how new entrants will be able 
to begin participating in the trading scheme. Furthermore, Member States have discretion on 
the treatment of closed installations. 

If a Member State does not withhold the issuance of allowances to a closed installation for the 
remainder of a trading period, the transfer of allowances from a closed installation to a new 
installation, under the control of the same operator, is in place. 

Where a Member State has chosen to withhold the issuance of further allowances to a closed 
installation for the remainder of a trading period and has established a new entrant reserve, it 
is  necessary  to  examine  the  conditions  under  which  this  part  of  the  scheme  will  operate  in 
order to ensure that installations benefiting from a transfer rule are not unduly favoured vis-à-
vis those who do not. The application of a transfer rule may be limited in the sense that an 
operator is only eligible to benefit from it in case both the closed and the new installation are 
located on the territory of the Member State.  

The Commission furthermore notes that retaining allowances following closures is expected 
to  create  incentives  for  investment  in  clean  and  efficient  installations.  The  environmental 
impact  of  a  transfer  rule,  however,  is  neutral,  unless  a  Member  States  would  cancel  any 
allowances not issued following closure. Any surplus allowances are likely to be surrendered 
by another installation, in the same Member State or elsewhere, to cover emissions. 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
3.4. 

New entrant reserves 

As explained above, the Directive allows Member States some discretion to decide whether to 
set  aside  a  share  of  the  total  quantity  of  allowances  in  a  new  entrant  reserve  so  to  allocate 
allowances free of charge to new entrants starting to operate new installations over the course 
of the trading period, as specified in paragraphs 48-64 of the Guidance Document. 

In  accordance  with  the  Guidance  Document  the  Commission  has  covered  the  following 
aspects in its assessment of new entrant reserves:  

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

justification for its size; 

description of the methodology by which allowances would be granted to new 
entrants; 

existence of any dedication for specific activities, technologies or purposes; 

use made of any allowances remaining at the end of the period; 

provision upon exhaustion of the reserve during the period. 

The  8  plans  assessed  foresee  the  establishment  of  new  entrant  reserves  amounting  of  80.8 
million allowances in total.4 

The Commission finds that all assessed plans foresee a reserve of a sufficiently justified size. 
It has assessed, in particular, to what extent any growth is expected to take place in existing 
installations (except for capacity extensions that fall under new entrant treatment) as opposed 
to new installations, taking into account any allocation for known new entrants in accordance 
with paragraph 54 of the Guidance Document.  

The Commission finds that all assessed plans contain some information on the methodology 
by which allowances are to be granted out of the reserve to new entrants. However, plans do 
still lack operational  detail. The Commission  cannot exclude that more detailed rules, when 
developed, may contravene other criteria or the Treaty unless it has all necessary information. 
It  finds  that  criterion  6  is  not  fulfilled  when  information  presented  on  the  manner  in  which 
new entrants will be able to begin participating in the trading scheme is insufficient. This is 
the case for the United Kingdom.  

The  Commission  notes  that  Austria,  Ireland,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  chosen 
some  dedication  rules  for  the  new  entrant  reserve  by  means  of  priority  access  for  specific 
technologies (Sweden) or partitioning the reserve into sub-segments (Austria, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom). The Commission has assessed whether these dedication rules are excessive 
insofar as they may contravene the freedom of establishment as guaranteed under the Treaty, 
and finds that no plan contains excessive dedication rules. 

4 

Austria  –  1.0  million;  Denmark  –  3.0  million;  Germany  –  9.0  million;  Ireland  –  1.0  million;  the 
Netherlands – 7.5 million; Slovenia – 0.2 million; Sweden – 2.4 million, UK – 56.8 million. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
                                                 
In assessing what use will be made of any allowances remaining in the reserve at the end of 
the period, Denmark and Germany intend to cancel any remaining allowances at the end of 
the period. Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom5 intend to sell any remaining 
allowances. Sweden and the Netherlands have not decided yet whether remaining allowances 
will  be  cancelled  or  sold,  but  have  committed  not  to  transfer  to  existing  installations.  The 
transfer  of  remaining  allowances  for  free  to existing  installations  contravenes  criterion  10  – 
cf. ex-post adjustments. The cancellation or sale of the remaining allowances are admissible, 
to  the  extent  that,  in  accordance  with  Article  10,  not  more  than  5%  of  the  total  quantity 
allocated for the period 2005-2007 may be sold. The Commission recalls that any sale of any 
remaining allowances should, as explained in the Guidance Document, take place at the end 
of the trading period when it is assured that no further new entrants may arise to be eligible 
for an allocation out of the new entrant reserve. 

In assessing what happens if the reserve is exhausted during the period, the Commission notes 
that Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
intend to have further new entrants purchase allowances on the market. 

3.5. 

Consistency with other legislation 

The Directive states in Annex III, criterion 4, that national allocation plans must be consistent 
with other Community legislative and policy instruments.  

Directive  2001/77/EC  on  the  promotion  of  electricity  produced  from  renewable  energy 
sources in the internal market6 requires Member States to set national indicative targets for the 
share of renewable energy in 2010 and to take measures to fulfil these targets. This will lead 
to  reductions  in  covered  emissions  independently  of  the  effect  of  the  emissions  trading 
scheme. The Directive is therefore a Community instrument that should be taken into account 
in the preparation of national allocation plans. It should be taken into account in the form of a 
number  of  allowances  provided  for  the  activity  of  electricity  generation  that  is  lower  than 
would otherwise have been the case. 

In its assessment of the plans concerned, the Commission has found them all to be consistent 
with the Directive 2001/77/EC. 

3.6. 

Issues specific to individual plans 

The United Kingdom’s plan does include a list of installations to be covered, but the list does 
not include installations in Gibraltar. The list required by criterion 10 is therefore incomplete.  

Table 3 below summarises the assessment of the Commission, indicating where criteria have 
been contravened. 

5 

6 

EN 

The UK has committed not to sell more than 5 % of the total quantity of allowances issued by the UK 
for the period 2005-2007, so as to respect Article 10 of the Directive. 
OJ L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 33. 

10 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Table 3 

(1) Kyoto 

(2) Emissions development 

(3) Potential 

(4) Other legislation 

(5) Non-discrimination 

(6) New entrants 

(7) Early action 

(8) Clean technologies 

(9) Public consultation 

(10)  List  of 
with quantity for each one 

installations 

(11) Outside competition 

Article 10 

EN 

Austria 

Denmark 

Germany 

Netherlands 

Ireland 

Slovenia 

Sweden 

UK 

REJECT 

REJECT 

REJECT 

REJECT 

REJECT 

11 
EN