Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue.
Date: 2004-05-30
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: Arab world, European security, Union for the Mediterranean, common security and defence policy, democracy

Occasional Papers

May 2004

n°52

Rosa Balfour

Rethinking the Euro-
Mediterranean political 
and security dialogue

published by 

the European Union 

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Occasional Papers

May 2004

n°52

by Rosa Balfour

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean
political and security dialogue 

The author is a Research Fellow at CeSPI (Centre for Studies in International Politics),
Rome.  She  would  like  to  thank  the  EU  Institute  for  Security  Studies  for  providing  the
grant that enabled the writing of this paper, as well as its team of researchers, in particu-
lar Antonio Missiroli and Martin Ortega, for their valuable and insightful comments. She
is also particularly grateful to the officials of the European Commission, the Council of the
European  Union  and  the  Italian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  who  devoted  time  to  dis-
cussing the issues dealt with in this paper. Needless to say, the views expressed here are the
responsibility of the author.

1

Contents

Summary

1

2

3

Introduction: European security and the Barcelona process

Virtues (and vices) of the EU's Mediterranean policies

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'
3.1 A brief history of the first chapter of the EMP 
3.2 The security dimension
3.3 The democratic dimension: EU assistance

and political dialogue for human rights and democracy

4

Policy recommendations

4.1 Enhanced political dialogue
4.2 Institutions
4.3 Security
4.4 Human rights and democracy
4.5 Differentiation and political conditionality

5

a

Conclusions

Annexes

a1 Abbreviations
a2 Bibliography
a3 Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

(Naples, 2-3 December 2003), Presidency Conclusions 

a4 Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 

(Dublin, 5-6 May 2004), Presidency Conclusions 

3

5

7

13

13

14

18

27

27

27

28

28

29

31

33

33

34

37

42

2

Summary

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Since the summer 2000, the emergence of the new intifada and the deterioration of Arab-
Israeli relations, the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the military intervention in Iraq
have all played their part in undermining the security environment in and around the
Mediterranean, with negative repercussions on EU policies towards the region, while at the
same time highlighting the vital importance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).
The 2003 Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood initiative and the European Security Strategy
that confirmed the EU’s ambition to become a fully fledged regional power and to strength-
en its global role could together give fresh momentum to the EU’s Mediterranean policies.
But was the EMP on its deathbed? Should these new strategies signal a change of direc-
tion in the EU’s Mediterranean policies? This paper argues that, while welcoming the new
proposals, the Barcelona process still remains an appropriate framework for deepening rela-
tions between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Its strengths lie in its ‘global approach’
that binds together economic reform with development, cultural exchange with political dia-
logue, human rights with security, and in the conceptualisation of ‘comprehensive’ security
that underpins the EMP. It also provides the only forum in which Israel and the Arab coun-
tries can sit around the same table. 

The core focus of this paper is the first basket of the Barcelona process, which deals with a

‘political and security partnership’ - perhaps one of the most neglected aspects of the EMP
given its uneven and limited record of success, where the ambitions of 1995 were gradually
wounded as tension in the Middle East became increasingly explosive. More specifically, the
security predicament in the region must be understood in conjunction with the absence of a
process of democratisation, which, de facto, has hitherto been tacitly supported by the EU
member states for fear of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. But the endurance of more or
less authoritarian regimes has created a vicious circle whereby the democratic deficit breeds
fundamentalism and fundamentalism provides the justification for authoritarianism. 

Only recently has the European Commission started to acknowledge the degree to which
the creation of a secure environment also depends on the individual human dimension, and
the new European Security Strategy, too, posits a strong relationship between security and
good governance, human rights and the rule of law. This paper explores the relationship
between these two dimensions, traces the developments in these fields from 1995 until the
most recent achievements during the Italian EU Presidency of the second half of 2003 and
suggests some policy recommendations.

...

3

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Rather than seek radical change to revamp the EU’s Mediterranean policies, a modus
vivendi between the achievements of the EMP’s ‘global approach’ with the new concepts of
‘differentiation’ and ‘benchmarking’ introduced by the Wider Europe strategy should be
found, allowing individual countries to make progress without jeopardising the entire
regional approach. The EU should also try to strike a balance between the conception of
‘soft’ security inherent to the EMP and addressed following a comprehensive methodology,
and the new developments in the fields of the European Security and Defence Policy and the
new European Security Strategy.

4

Introduction: European security 
and the Barcelona process 

Following the watersheds of 11 September and

the military intervention in Iraq, in 2003 two
documents approved by the European Union set
the stage for a possible renewal of the EU’s role
in international affairs. The Wider Europe stra-
tegy  published  by  the  Commission  in  March
and the new European Security Strategy prepa-
red by the High Representative for CFSP and
adopted in December, propose major concep-
tual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of
the world which, if implemented, could trans-
form the EU’s still hesitant status as an interna-
tional actor. 

At the same time, tackling the political and
security challenges posed by relations with the
countries on the southern shore of the Mediter-
ranean has rarely seemed so imperative. The ter-
rorist attacks of 11 September and the military
intervention in Iraq have renewed the focus on
paradigms such as ‘the clash of civilisations’ and
‘democracy  through  bombs’,  making  highly
debatable  analytical  categories  part  of  an
increasingly polarised popular debate between
the so-called ‘West’ and the ‘Arab world’, as well
as part of the ‘philosophy’ behind new policy
guidelines.

The EU, by nature and because of its history,
is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the
clash of civilisations. Limited by its capabilities
as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop rela-
tions based on dialogue, on economic integra-
tion as a means of building secure and stable
environments,  and  on  diffusing  its  norms
through persuasion rather than coercion. In the

Mediterranean  region,  the  EU  has  promoted
dialogue through the Barcelona process and has
also been seeking a more prominent role in the
settlement of conflict between Israel and Pales-
tine, given the strategic, economic, political and
human  importance  of  the  entire  Southern
Mediterranean and Middle East to Europe as a
whole. 

At the same time, the EU has just embarked
on its largest and most challenging enlargement
ever.  Its  members  now  number  25  and  the
Union’s borders now extend eastwards towards
the forests of Ukraine and Belarus, but it has
only modestly consolidated its Mediterranean
presence. Of the 10 new entrants, only the small
states of Malta and divided Cyprus are dotted in
this historic sea, while Slovenia looks onto the
Mediterranean through a mere sliver of coast-
line.  The  balance  within  the  EU  of  countries
concerned with the Mediterranean (tradition-
ally France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain)
and those which tend to look towards the East is
likely to shift in favour of the latter, especially as
the Union has moved closer to Russia. Even if
the balance shifts towards the East, the risks and
challenges emanating from the Mediterranean
will not go away: thinking strategically about
the Union’s South remains a necessary priority.
The Mediterranean could also constitute a
testing ground for the EU to develop general
policies  that  could  serve  as  a  ‘laboratory’  in
developing its foreign policy capabilities else-
where.  Integrating  an  Islamic,  democratic
Turkey would represent an example that could

1

5

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

have  positive  repercussions  in  the  Mediter-
ranean. Thinking imaginatively, the EU could
also  learn  lessons  from  the  Mediterranean  in
dealing,  for  example,  with  so-called  ‘rogue
states’ or with issues relating to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Before examining the possible impact on the
Mediterranean  of  recent  developments  repre-
sented in the Wider Europe document and the
European Security Strategy, it is worth offering a
bird’s eye assessment of the problems the EU has
encountered in its policies towards the Southern
Mediterranean,  which  have  developed  within
the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership (EMP), in order to assess possible future
developments. This will be necessary to address a
number of questions that have emerged since
the publication of these two key documents: is
the Wider Europe communication complemen-
tary or a substitute for a ‘failed’ Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership? Can the ‘global approach’
inherent in the Barcelona process be reconciled
with the greater flexibility and differentiation
advocated by Wider Europe? Is the concept of
security that underpins relations between the
two  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  compatible
with the new security strategy? 

This  paper  is  structured  in  three  sections.
The first aims to assess the ‘vices and virtues’ of
the EMP vis-à-vis the most recent proposals of
2003. The following section focuses on the first
chapter of the Barcelona process, which is dedi-
cated to building a political and security part-

nership, from its inception in 1995 to the most
recent events under the Italian EU Presidency
during the second half of 2003. In particular it
examines progress in the security field (mostly
related to the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), but also some issues related to
the emerging policy against the proliferation of
WMD and the fight against terrorism), and the
political  dimension  of  human  rights  and
democracy, arguing that this field is inextricably
bound  up  with  security  concerns.  Finally,  an
attempt is made to identify some medium- as
well as short-term policy recommendations that
take into account the general ‘philosophy’ of the
EMP  and  the  recent  proposals  contained  in
Wider Europe and in the new European Security
Strategy.

The  breadth  of  this  paper  is  limited  and
broad at the same time: limited because the first
chapter  is  the  area  of  the  EMP  where  less
progress  has  been  made;  broad  because  the
scope of the issues that the first ‘basket’ of the
EMP  includes  (political  and  diplomatic  rela-
tions, arms control and non-proliferation, polit-
ical  reform  in  the  Southern  Mediterranean,
regional conflict, the rise of Islamic fundamen-
talism, and so on) is vast. For this reason, rather
than  produce  an  empirically  based  research
paper, the objective has been to identify some
concepts relevant to the understanding of the
security environment of the Mediterranean and
to translate such concepts into potential politi-
cal practice and policy recommendations.

6

Virtues (and vices) of the EU’s Mediterranean policies

Since the launch in Barcelona of the Euro-

Mediterranean  Partnership  in  1995,  rela-
tions between the EU and the countries on the
southern shore of the Mediterranean have been
progressively institutionalised, in the search of
means to address ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’ security
challenges, such as legal and illegal migration
and the fight against terrorism, to enhance eco-
nomic  development  and  market  integration,
and  to  encourage  political  and  cultural  dia-
logue. Indeed, the EMP is structured in three
broad ‘baskets’ or chapters: a political and secu-
rity partnership, based inter alia on the princi-
ples of human rights and democracy, and of dia-
logue and cross-cultural respect; an economic
and financial partnership with the ambitious
aim of creating a free trade area across the two
shores by 2010; and a social and cultural dia-
logue to nourish cross-societal exchanges. This
approach was complemented by the EU’s Com-
mon Strategy on the Mediterranean approved in
June 2000, which essentially confirms the objec-
tives of the Barcelona process. 

Yet,  despite  the  crucial  importance  of  the
region,  the  EU  institutions  have  repeatedly
recognised that the Barcelona process has not
made sufficient progress. In 2000 they seemed
to have decided to revamp the process, with the
member states agreeing to a Common Strategy

and the Commission publishing a Communica-
tion  which  identified  the  weaknesses  of  the
process and outlining some recommendations
to ‘reinvigorate’ it.1 These intentions came up
against the stark realities of the deterioration of
the Middle East Peace Process, with the rise of
the new intifada in September 2000. Until the
Valencia Action Plan approved in 2002 during
the Spanish Presidency (discussed in the next
section), the Barcelona process seemed on the
brink of stagnation.

The first set of reasons for the problems of
the EMP are central to the nature of the EU as an
external  policy  actor,  with  its  ‘dual  decision-
making  processes’2 (intergovernmental  and
supranational) and competences, and its lim-
ited capability to act in a unitary manner. Even
at  the  start  of  the  Barcelona  process,  the  EU
position on the Mediterranean was the result of
a  delicate  compromise  between  the  member
states  in  an  attempt  to  counterbalance  the
Union’s Northern and Eastern dimensions of
enlargement,3 but did not necessarily reflect a
common view of the strategies and priorities to
be adopted towards the region.4 The Common
Strategy on the Mediterranean, which was con-
ceived  to  improve  coordination  between  the
member states, seems to have brought about lit-
tle change.5

1 European  Commission,  ‘Reinvigorating  the  Barcelona  Process’,  COM(2000),  497  final,  Brussels,  6  September  2000;  and  European
Parliament, ‘Report on the Commission Communication on relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region: reinvigorating the
Barcelona Process’, Brussels, 22 January 2001.
2 Jörg Monar, ‘Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn
1998, pp. 39-60.
3 Esther Barbé, ‘Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions’, in Jan Zielonka, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1998), pp. 117-29; Ricardo Gomez, ‘The EU’s Mediterranean policy. Common foreign policy by the back door?’, in Helen
Sjursen and John Peterson (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 133-51.
4 Jörg Monar, op. cit. in note 2.
5 Claire Spencer, ‘The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 6 (2001),
pp. 31-51.

2

7

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Weaknesses in the policy can be found in its
tilt towards the economic domain, based on the
so-called ‘Washington consensus’, whereby eco-
nomic liberalisation would automatically spill
over into other fields of reform and lead towards
political liberalisation and good governance.6
There is little evidence to support a causality
between economic liberalisation and political
reform;  if  anything,  there  seems  to  be  more
empirical proof of the opposite.7 In the South-
ern Mediterranean, Tunisia is a case in which
economic  reform  has  not  led  to  any  greater
degree  of  political  liberalisation;  in  fact,  the
regime has tightened its grip over opposition
through repression over the past few years. In
policy terms, this means that the priority so far
accorded to the second basket of the Barcelona
process might not be sufficient to satisfy its ulti-
mate aim of creating a free trade area by 2010, as
its progress could be stalled by unresolved issues
in the first basket. Also, and importantly, the
incentive for the Southern Mediterranean states
of establishing a free trade area is in blatant con-
tradiction with the EU’s continued protection-
ism towards certain goods which happen to be
of great importance to the Barcelona partners,
namely  agricultural  produce  and  textiles,8 a
contradiction that can be found in all of the EU’s
relations  with  third  countries  and  is  not
addressed in the Wider Europe strategy.

The emphasis on the economic basket has on
the  one  hand  tended  to  obscure  the  links
between economics, politics and security inher-
ent in the setting-up of the framework, while on
the  other  hand  allowing  those  political  and
security problems which the process is supposed
to  address  to  slow  down  economic  progress.

Also, relations between Israel and the Arab states
can  have  huge  consequences  that  go  beyond
issues directly related to regional security or the
Middle East Peace Process and can well block
progress in other baskets. And here lies the final
set  of  problems,  which  stem  from  the  region
itself. The longstanding, unresolved conflicts in
the Middle East (despite the EU’s emphasis on
keeping the Middle East Peace Process separate
but  complementary  to  the  EMP)  and  in  the
Maghreb over the Western Sahara, have so far
posed  insurmountable  obstacles  to  regional
security building.

On the other hand, the policy framework set
up by the EU provides scope for its strengthen-
ing and improvement.9 Among its strengths is
its  ‘global  approach’,  which  embraces  a  vast
number of issues – from development and eco-
nomic reform to security and human rights –
and for this reason has been praised by most
observers. Thanks to this global approach, the
EMP  has  provided  the  only  forum  in  which
Israel and Arab states sit around the same table –
an achievement per se. It also reflects what the
EU has developed since the second half of the
1990s in terms of exercising its influence abroad
through the use of a wide range of civilian tools,
which have been gradually refined in the con-
texts of development policy, enlargement and
the stabilisation policies, for example, towards
the Western Balkans. 

The problem with a global approach such as
this has been in finding a balance between long-
,  medium-  and  short-term  priorities.10 There
have been numerous instances, especially in the
political and security fields, where stalemate in
one  area  of  activity  has  led  to  the  stalling  of

6 Diane Hunt, ‘Development Economics, the Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’, in George Joffé

(ed.), ‘Perspectives on Development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Special Issue of the Journal of North African Studies, vol. 3, no. 2,

1998, pp. 16-38.

7 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

8 Diane Hunt; Isabel Romeo, ‘The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean “Safe” for Europe’, Mediterranean Politics,

vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 21-38; George Joffé, Europe and the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process Five Years On (London: The Royal

Institute of International Affairs 2000).

9 Dorothée Schmid, ‘Optimiser le processus de Barcelone’, Occasional Paper 36 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2002).

10 Richard Youngs, ‘The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for Prioritization’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring

1999.

8

Virtues (and vices) of the EU's Mediterranean policies

progress in other fields. In the absence of clear
priorities, the daily agenda of getting the EMP to
work, from identifying realistically achievable
confidence- and partnership-building measures
to creating an ‘area of peace and security’, has
been hard to maintain. Attempts at promoting
subregional cooperation involving a few coun-
tries have so far met with little success.11 The
Wider Europe strategy could try to address the
relationship  between  maintaining  a  global
approach with all partners on an equal footing
while introducing the concepts of ‘differentia-
tion’ and ‘benchmarking’.12

Wider Europe is conceived as a post-enlarge-
ment strategy to deal with the EU’s neighbours
from 2004 onwards, with the aim of fostering a
‘friendly neighbourhood’.13 In other words, it is
suggesting an alternative to the possibility of
extending the Union beyond the current candi-
date countries. To those countries left out of the
enlargement process, the EU offers as its great-
est and ultimate incentive – the ‘carrot’ – a stake
in its internal market and further integration
and liberalisation to promote the four freedoms
of  movement  (of  persons,  goods,  capital  and
services). In return it expects these countries to
make  progress  in  economic  and  political
reform. The method to ensure that this carrot
and stick exercise does not remain merely a good
intention is through the introduction of ‘bench-
marks’ that progressively set out clear and realis-
tic objectives through Action Plans prepared on
a country-by-country as well as a regional basis.
While  benchmarks  would  support  the  EU’s
approach of exercising conditionality towards
its partners by making it more transparent and
consistent, differentiation would allow the EU
to reward those partners who are making more
progress.  In  the  Mediterranean  context,  this
would help release the Barcelona process from

the stalemate in which it has often found itself,
allowing some countries to progress more rap-
idly than others. 

The  combination  of  these  two  principles
makes Wider Europe an innovative as much as a
necessary strategy: the new neighbourhood ini-
tiative ought to prepare the Union to manage
the many new challenges that will appear on its
doorstep  from  May  2004  onwards  and  con-
tribute to it playing a proactive role in the poli-
tics and security of Europe writ large. On the
other hand, the compatibility, complementarity
and potential synergy (or tension) of the neigh-
bourhood 
initiative  with  current  policies
remain to be seen. Despite being a regional strat-
egy, Wider Europe clearly privileges the bilateral
over  the  multilateral  framework,  whereas  the
global approach has produced some important
achievements in the dimension of developing
consensual politics, which can be considered a
partnership- and confidence-building measure.
Secondly, for the North African states to better
accept  the  proposal,  the  ultimate  ‘carrot’  of
offering  a  stake  in  the  EU’s  internal  market
would have to be backed by credible measures in
the field of the four freedoms – put simply, the
EU would have to adopt far more liberal meas-
ures with regard to migration, agriculture and
textiles, to name a few sensitive issues. Finally,
there is some doubt on the political feasibility
and  opportuneness  of  linking  the  Mediter-
ranean, which has already been drawn together
into a regional framework, to Ukraine, Moldova
and Belarus, the other three countries included
in the new neighbourhood initiative. It will be
essential to ensure that Wider Europe injects a
new lease of life into the EMP rather than substi-
tute for it.14

In terms of the instruments to implement
Wider Europe, until the next financial frame-

11 For instance, the Arab Maghreb Union exists only on paper. One recent possible exception in the economic field regards the signing of
the Agadir Agreement, which provides for free trade by 2006, between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
12 As we shall see, similar approaches can be found in security cooperation in the field of ESDP and in political relations with the May
Communication on promoting human rights and democracy in the region.
13 European Commission, ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’,
Commission Communication COM(2003), 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.
14 Martin  Ortega  argues  that  the  new  Wider  Europe  policies  should  not  impinge  upon  the  more  traditional  EU  policies  towards  the
Mediterranean. See Ortega’s contribution to Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Partners
and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe’, Chaillot Paper 64 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2003).

9

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

work in 2006 the Commission is essentially pro-
posing  to  tailor  existing  tools  (including  the
projects  carried  out  under  the  MEDA  and
INTERREG programmes) to the objectives set
out in its new neighbourhood strategy. There-
after,  a  new 
‘Neighbourhood  Instrument’
should  be  created  with  a  single  regulating
framework to couple the EU’s external policy
objectives with economic and social cohesion.15
So far, within the EMP institutional frame-
work the main tools are, in the first instance, the
Association  Agreements  signed  bilaterally
between the EC and the individual countries of
the  Mediterranean.  Political  dialogue  at  the
highest level occurs at the Euro-Mediterranean
ministerial conferences where the foreign minis-
ters  meet,  plus  plenty  of  sectoral  meetings
between desk officers. Senior officials meet reg-
ularly in the Euro-Mediterranean Committee.
The Association Councils monitor and discuss
the implementation of the agreements.16

CFSP  tools  would  be  available  should  the
member states choose to resort to them. How-
ever, with the exception of the Middle East Peace
Process, the only CFSP measure that has been
adopted towards the region has been the Com-
mon Strategy which, as we have seen, has had lit-
tle or no impact on the region as such. Finally,
MEDA  assistance  is  designed  to  support  the
objectives  of  development,  cooperation,  eco-
nomic reform and democratisation, with com-
mitments in the region of  5.35 billion for 2000-
06.  Compared  with  previous  assistance,  the
Barcelona process has enabled the EU to more or
less triple its commitments towards the region,
though the Mediterranean still fares badly in
both absolute and relative terms compared with
the EU’s Eastern and South-East European part-
ners.

The toolbox is therefore in place; it is a ques-
tion of making it more operational. Alongside

the incentives contained in the Partnership, the
EU can resort to a set of measures that cut across
its CFSP and EC pillars to exercise political con-
ditionality on the recipient countries. Political
dialogue and diplomatic tools (such as deliver-
ing demarches and statements or suspending
meetings at the various levels of the dialogue)
can be accompanied by changing the content of
cooperation programmes or withdrawing aid,
up to imposing trade sanctions and suspending
military  cooperation,  or  cooperation  alto-
gether.17

The concept of security that emerges from
the Barcelona framework focuses on its ‘softer’
rather than on the ‘harder’ aspects, better cap-
turing  the  nature  of  economic,  cultural  and
human  interdependence  that  exists  between
policy spheres and between the northern and
southern shores of the Mediterranean. Also, the
types of ‘risks’ that can stem from the region,
rather than constituting a traditional security
threat, tend to be diffuse in nature, such as the
consequences  of  economic  instability,  social
unrest, international crime, and so on. This con-
ception of ‘soft security’ has been articulated in
a comprehensive way, including notions of part-
nership-building, multilateral cooperation and
the institutionalisation of relations, and involv-
ing a broad range of actors that should ensure an
inclusive and constructive rather than exclusive
approach to building sustainable security in the
broad region. The framework aims to link eco-
nomics and politics to security, and to mobilise
a variety of tools to tackle the root causes of con-
flict. In principle, it is a ‘comprehensive security’
framework or, to use Javier Solana’s terminol-
ogy, a ‘holistic’18 vision of security. In practice,
of course, the politics have often contradicted
this concept. 

To an extent, the recent European Security
Strategy elaborated by the High Representative

15 European Commission, ‘Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’, COM(2003), 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003.
16 Extensive information on the EMP can be found at www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations /euromed.
17 Karen E. Smith, ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?’, European Foreign Affairs
Review, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 253-74.
18 Javier Solana, Speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1 July 2002. Javier Solana calls
this  a  ‘specific  culture  of  security’,  which  is  ‘based  on  conflict  prevention,  political  management  of  crises  and  taking  account  of  the
economic and social roots causes of violent action of all kinds’. Javier Solana defines this view as ‘holistic security’.

10

Virtues (and vices) of the EU's Mediterranean policies

for CFSP, discussed at the Thessaloniki Euro-
pean Council in June and approved in its final
version at the Brussels European Council held at
the end of 2003,19 confirms the conceptualisa-
tion of security that the EU developed during
the 1990s of the Union as a ‘civilian power’. It,
too, considers development, the rule of law and
human rights as key to building a secure envi-
ronment. In terms of the ‘methods’ of foreign
policy-making,  it  confirms  that  upholding
international law, working through multilateral
institutions, building and supporting regional
cooperation  and  institutions,  constructing
friendly  multilateral  relations  and  fostering
political  and  economic  reform  are  the  best
means to contribute to international peace. The
European Security Strategy, however, departs
from traditional EU policies where ‘hard’ secu-
rity issues are addressed, such as in the spread of
WMD and terrorism. 

On the whole, the EMP itself has the poten-
tial to provide a framework which runs counter
and proposes alternative views and strategies to
the ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm which, hav-
ing been a debatable analytical category in the
immediate aftermath of the collapse of the East-
West divide, has increasingly entered the politi-
cal discourse in the post-11 September world, in
the  West  as  well  as  in  the  Arab  world,  where

Huntington’s  book  was  a  bestseller.20 The
recent document prepared jointly by the Coun-
cil  Secretariat  and  the  Commission  on  the
future development of relations with the Arab
world also goes in the same direction. It pro-
poses to build upon existing (EMP) and nascent
(the  Wider  Europe  communication  and  the
European Security Strategy) policy frameworks
to  develop  relations  with  the  broader  Arab
world. It also insists on the need to find a solu-
tion to the Arab-Israeli conflict, upon which a
policy that aims to ‘advance political pluralism
and democracy, and to stimulate social and eco-
nomic development’, could be developed based
on the ‘mutual interests of Arab countries and
the EU’.21

The recent developments in the conceptual
and practical building of the EU’s capability to
act  in  international  affairs  should  take  into
account  the  strengths  and  potential  that  the
EMP has shown so far. In the future these new
policies could well supersede the structures set
up over the past decade; but in the medium term
the  EU  should  ensure  that  they  complement
each other: the priority should be to make exist-
ing policies work better rather than supplant
them with new strategies which, however inno-
vative, still need to be tested.

19 Javier Solana, ‘A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy’, document adopted at the European Council, Brussels,
12 December 2003.
20 Gilles Kepel, L’autunno della Guerra Santa. Viaggio nel mondo islamico dopo l’11 settembre (Roma: Carocci, 2002).
21 Council Secretariat and European Commission, ‘Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World’, D(2003), 10318, Brussels,
4 December 2003.

11

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

12

A critical assessment of the
‘political and security partnership’

3.1 A brief history of the first
chapter of the EMP 
The  general  aim  of  the  first  basket  of  the
Barcelona Declaration was to establish a ‘com-
mon area of peace and security’ through a num-
ber of principles and objectives:
(cid:90) develop the rule of law, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms while
recognising  cultural  diversity  and  refraining
from intervention in the internal affairs of a state;
(cid:90) settle disputes through peaceful means;
(cid:90) cooperate in preventing and combating ter-
rorism;
(cid:90) cooperate  in  the  fight  against  organised
crime and drug trafficking;
(cid:90) promote  regional  security  and  conditions
likely to create good-neighbourly relations and
subregional cooperation;
(cid:90) promote  the  non-proliferation  of  nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons;
(cid:90) consider further steps to combat prolifera-
tion  and  the  accumulation  of  conventional
arms;
(cid:90) endeavour to create a Middle East zone free
from weapons of mass destruction;
(cid:90) promote the long-term view of creating an
area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean
and  possibly  establish  a  Euro-Mediterranean
pact to that end.22

Since Barcelona, however, the content of the
first basket has actually been shrinking, initially
due to the need to identify priorities and meas-
ures that could be agreed upon by consensus,
but  subsequently,  as  tensions  over  the  Arab-

Israeli  conflict  grew,  agendas  were  gradually
scaled down in order to avoid tackling the most
controversial issues. The Action Plan approved
at the first meeting of the partners in May 1996
listed  six  areas  of  dialogue:  strengthening
democracy, preventive diplomacy, confidence-
and security-building measures (CSBM), disar-
mament, the fight against terrorism and organ-
ised crime and drug trafficking. Amongst these,
preventive diplomacy, CSBM and the partners’
participation  in  international  human  rights
conventions were to be the priorities.23 The sec-
ond meeting, in Malta on 15-16 April 1997, was
preceded by threats of Arab sanctions against
Israel  over  the  latter’s  settlements  expansion
into East Jerusalem. Much diplomatic effort was
spent on getting representatives from all coun-
tries to sit around the same table. The end result,
however, was a scaling down of the Conference’s
agenda so as to avoid tackling the most sensitive
issues. What was approved was for the senior
officials  to  continue  their  work  towards  the
drafting of a Charter for Peace and Stability in
the Euro-Mediterranean region, to be approved
‘when political circumstances allow’.24

This project received even greater attention
at the Third Euro-Med conference in Stuttgart
two years later: ‘stability in the Mediterranean
Region requires a comprehensive and balanced
approach in order to address common security
concerns,  strengthen  cooperation  and  adopt
measures conducive to stability’ and the Charter
was felt to be the best framework providing ‘an
enhanced political dialogue as well as the evolu-
tionary and progressive development of part-
nership building measures, good-neighbourly

22 Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona Declaration, 27-28 November 1995.
23 Rosemary Hollis, ‘Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?’, in Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt
(eds.), Bound to Cooperate - Europe and the Middle East (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000), pp. 107-30.
24 Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Conclusions, Malta, 15-16 April 1997.

3

13

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

relations, regional cooperation and preventive
diplomacy.’25 The  change  in  language  from
‘confidence building’ to ‘partnership building’
also  signals  the  cooperative  nature  of  the
process,26 despite the fact that it was heading
towards stalemate.

The  next  conference,  held  in  Marseilles  in
November 2000, however, witnessed the Charter
being  deleted  from  the  agenda  until  further
notice in an effort to get all partners to meet at a
time of spiralling violence in the Middle East.
The absence of the Syrian and Lebanese delega-
tions was noticeable, but within the EU too there
were  divergent  views  over  the  contents  of  the
Charter and whether it should include all secu-
rity issues. Since then, any security and political
dialogue seems to be inextricably tied to devel-
opments in the Middle East, despite the Com-
mission’s insistence that the Barcelona frame-
work should be ‘complementary’ to the Peace
Process and cannot be considered as a tool to
solve the long-standing conflict. Although the
idea of a Charter has not been altogether aban-
doned, any talks on the subject matter have been
put on hold pending an improvement in rela-
tions between Israel and the Palestinian Author-
ity. Given the Commission’s insistence on sepa-
rating  Arab-Israeli  relations  from  the  EMP,
political dialogue has been overwhelmingly con-
ditioned  by  their  deterioration,  and  all  Euro-
Mediterranean  conferences  have  dedicated  a
large part of their discussions to the situation.27
By 2002, the end result of the story of the first
chapter of the Barcelona process was that at the
moment the only projects which have taken off
are the setting up of a network of foreign policy
research institutes and think tanks, known as
EuroMeSCo,  diplomatic  seminars  held  twice
yearly  in  Malta  bringing  together  junior  and
senior national officials from both shores of the
Mediterranean, and a pilot project on coopera-
tion among civil protection services in disaster

relief, which was launched in June 1998 and is
currently awaiting its first evaluation report. 

The Spanish Presidency of the EU during the
first half of 2002 presented some more concrete
proposals in the security field, largely in tradi-
tional ‘hard security’ issues such as defence. The
most significant initiatives in the Action Plan are
the creation of a dialogue on ESDP matters and a
regional cooperation programme in the field of
justice.  These  issues  will  be  further  analysed
below. Other themes concern a dialogue on the
root causes of instability, involving presentations
by  the  Commission  and  the  member  states,
exploring the possibility of developing coopera-
tion in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis
management,  and  non-proliferation  and  the
adherence to multilateral instruments on arms
control. Developments in 2003, too, will be dis-
cussed in the sections below. Suffice to mention,
at this stage, that the three objectives set out by
the Commission in October,28 one for each bas-
ket, were achieved during the Italian Presidency:
the agreement to create a Euro-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Assembly with consultative func-
tions,  the  constitution  of  a  subsidiary  of  the
European Investment Bank, the Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean  Investment  and  Partnership
(FEMIP),  and  the  creation  of  a  Euro-Mediter-
ranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures.

3.2 The security dimension

With the failure of the Charter for Peace and
Stability,  put  on  stand-by  until  the  circum-
stances in the Middle East permit its resuscita-
tion, the security dimension of the Barcelona
process became somewhat bereft of substance.
The Valencia meeting attempted to address this
vacuum by producing the Action Plan and sug-
gesting  cooperation  in  the  nascent  European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since 2002

25 Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Chairman’s formal conclusions, Stuttgart, 15-16 April 1999.
26 Rosemary Hollis, op. cit. in note 23.
27 On the relationship between the Barcelona process and the peace process in the Middle East see Martin Ortega, ‘A new EU policy on
the Mediterranean’?, op. cit. in note 14, pp. 86-101.
28 European Commission, ‘Communication to prepare the VI Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs’, COM(2003),
610 final, Brussels, 15 October 2003.

14

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

ESDP seems to have become one of the main
cards the EU is betting on to relaunch the politi-
cal and security dialogue, especially given that
the confidence- and security-building measures,
and  ensuing  partnership-building  measures,
foreseen at Palermo, have been put on hold.

ESDP  cooperation  represents  a  shift  away
from the ‘soft security’ focus that has so far char-
acterised the first basket of the EMP. It essen-
tially  consists  of  bridging  the  gap  in  trans-
parency and information in ESDP developments
by including it in the Euro-Mediterranean dia-
logue at the level of both the Senior Officials and
the  Political  and  Security  Committee  (PSC).
With a view to preparing the ground for future
partnership building measures, ESDP coopera-
tion entails information on:
(cid:90) ESDP objectives in general;
(cid:90) ESDP structures and procedures;
(cid:90) information on civilian and military capabil-
ities;
(cid:90) specific information on civil protection;
(cid:90) modalities for the involvement of third coun-
tries in civilian and military EU-led operations;
(cid:90) current and future operations, such as the
EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
launched  in  January  2003  and  the  EU  peace-
keeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia (FYROM);
(cid:90) ESDP’s role in the fight against terrorism.

Also,  the  Mediterranean  partners  can
appoint special envoys to act as points of contact
at the Secretariat General of the Council and at
the EU Military Staff. Following a first meeting
at the level of the EU’s PSC during the Greek
Presidency, in July the Italian Presidency gave a
presentation covering all aspects of ESDP, and a
number of seminars involving senior and other
officials have taken place.

A significant aspect of this initiative is that,
from its inception, ESDP cooperation has fore-

seen the possibility of it developing following
‘variable geometry’ patterns. In other words, it
can be pursued with those countries that are
willing to increase the level of their cooperation
with the EU. It also tries to respond to a percep-
tion of suspicion in the South towards ESDP
due  to  the  lack  of  information,  transparency
and openness on its development, although atti-
tudes  towards  the  EU  developing  a  military
capability  vary.29 Previous  experience  in  the
1990s suggests that transparency and informa-
tion in military matters do need to be addressed.
In  the  previous  case  of  the  EUROFOR  and
EUROMARFOR initiatives led by France, Spain,
Italy and Portugal, the Maghreb countries had
repeatedly accused the Northern partners of cre-
ating military units to interfere in the internal
affairs  of  the  Southern  Mediterranean.30
Despite reassurances that the units were being
deployed with the objective of increasing coop-
eration  between  forces  and  were  not  directed
against the Southern partners, in practice, apart
from  the  presence  of  Southern  observers  in
EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR manoeuvres,
no  other  forms  of  cooperation  seem  to  have
taken place during the 1990s.31

The first basket dialogue between the two
shores  therefore  could  indeed  benefit  from
greater military cooperation and in traditional
security issues: ‘the most profound objective of
the EMP is to dispel the historical inertia of mis-
understanding  and  fragmentation’.32 In  this
sense the partners could also look elsewhere to
find  further  ways  of  cooperating.  NATO,  the
Western  European  Union  (WEU)  and  the
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in
Europe (OCSE) all have or have had institution-
alised frameworks involving Southern Mediter-
ranean countries. NATO’s Mediterranean Dia-
logue, established in 1994 with Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, 
Jordan,  Mauritania,  Morocco  and
Tunisia, is the one forum where a division of

29 EuroMeSCO, ‘European Defence. Perceptions vs. Realities’, Working Group III, First Year Report, Paper 16, June 2002; available at
www.euromesco.net/eurmesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=78884. 
30 Esther Barbé, op. cit. in note 3.
31 Sven Biscop, ‘Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western Security Dialogues with the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean
Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 92-112.
32 Martin Ortega, ‘Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence’, The International Spectator, vol. XXXV,
no. 1, January-March 2000, pp. 115-25, quote on p. 118.

15

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

labour between the EU and NATO should be
found, in parallel with the developing relation-
ship between ESDP and NATO.

The EU could also ‘pick and choose’ from the
defunct  WEU  Mediterranean  dialogue  which
involved, from 1992 onwards, the same coun-
tries participating in the NATO dialogue, as well
as from the OSCE initiative.33 Already in 2000,
shortly before the ending of the WEU dialogue,
some policy recommendations had been made
to upgrade cooperation North and South of the
Mediterranean from the exchanges realised in
the form of the previously mentioned networks
of research institutes and diplomatic seminars.
These include:
(cid:90) ‘planning and holding of joint military exer-
cises;
(cid:90) sporadic  cooperation  of  Euro-Mediter-
ranean armed forces for specific peacekeeping
operations;
(cid:90) maritime cooperation between northern and
southern  Mediterranean  states  for  tackling
refugee and migrant issues at sea;
(cid:90) Euro-Mediterranean cooperation for land-
demining.’34

EU experiences with other neighbouring or
nearby countries could also be looked at to iden-
tify measures and methods that can be adapted
to  the  Mediterranean  context.  Peacekeeping
operations  in  the  Balkans,  for  example,  have
involved non-EU member states, from the candi-
date  countries  in  Eastern  Europe  to  Cyprus
(before accession), as well as Turkey and Russia.
The EU Police Mission in Bosnia also involves
non-EU member states such as Turkey, Cyprus
(before accession), Russia and Ukraine. As the EU
develops its capabilities in peacekeeping abroad,
it could evaluate the possibility, in the long term,
of encouraging participation of a greater number
of countries, including EMP members.

Despite being a recent initiative, ESDP coop-
eration does seem to be bearing some fruit. In
December  2003,  at  the  Naples  Euro-Mediter-
ranean Conference, ministers identified some
further  partnership  building  measures  that
could be carried out under the ESDP hat, such as
civilian crisis management training and cooper-
ation  between  civil  protection  authorities,  a
theme that was dear to the Italian Presidency. In
this  latter  field,  the  pilot  project  on  disaster
management, an evaluation report on which is
to be completed in 2004, could well constitute a
positive experience to be drawn upon for future
activities. This field is also set to become a grow-
ing area of EU activity as the draft Constitution
prepared by the Convention on the Future of
Europe expands the definition of the Petersberg
missions by establishing that the Union can use
civilian and military means for ‘joint disarma-
ment  operations,  humanitarian  and  rescue
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, con-
flict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks
of combat forces in crisis management, includ-
ing  peacemaking  and  post-conflict  stabilisa-
tion’.  Furthermore,  ‘all  these  tasks  may  con-
tribute to the fight against terrorism, including
by supporting third countries in combating ter-
rorism  in  their  territories’.35 The  European
Security  Strategy  of  December  2003  is  also
important in this regard.

One  final  aspect  regarding  ‘hard’  security
issues deserves a brief mention. The three objec-
tives of the first chapter of the Barcelona process
relating to combating the proliferation of con-
ventional  and  non-conventional  arms  and
WMD have remained a good intention, given
the  profound  disagreements  on  virtually  all
issues involved. It is beyond the scope of this
paper  to  address  this  aspect  of  regional
security,36 but some new prospects could come
about thanks to a recent decision by the Council

33 On the various military cooperation initiatives, see Martin Ortega, op. cit. in note 32.
34  See  Martin  Ortega  (ed.),  ‘The  Future  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Security  Dialogue/L’Avenir  du  Dialogue  Euro-Méditerranéen  en
Matière de Sécurité’, Occasional Paper 14 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. 4.
35 The European Convention, ‘Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003, Article III-210.
36 See Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, ‘Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective’, and Mark
A.  Heller,  ‘Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  and  Euro-Mediterranean  Policies  of  Arms  Control:  An  Israeli  Perspective’,  both  in  Álvaro
Vasconcelos  and  George  Joffé  (eds.),  ‘The  Barcelona  Process.  Building  a  Euro-Mediterranean  Regional  Community’,  Special  Issue  of
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 133-57 and 158-88.

16

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

of the EU to develop a policy on WMD. 

In the wake of the deep divisions caused by
the military intervention in Iraq, the member
states have decided to assess the possibility of
developing a ‘policy . . . to contain proliferation
while  dealing  with  the  underlying  causes’.37
While the institutional framework for manag-
ing WMD threats would remain the UN, includ-
ing its inspection agencies and coercive capabil-
ities,  the  EU  proposes  developing  regional
security arrangements and regional arms con-
trol and disarmament processes. It could make
the Mediterranean one area of special focus, by
carrying out a WMD threat assessment, includ-
ing specific non-proliferation issues in the EMP
dialogues and promoting a broader adherence
to international treaties (see the table on p. 19
for the international conventions and treaties to
which  the  EMP  members  are  party).38 Libya,
having recently announced its intention to give
up its WMD and open up its sites for inspection,
could  provide  the  opportunity  to  tie  the
Mediterranean to a regional non-proliferation
programme.  However,  despite  the  progress
made in the Thessaloniki declaration in elabo-
rating an EU strategy against the proliferation
of WMD, the implications of this strategy for
the Barcelona process were not discussed with
the  EU’s  Mediterranean  partners  during  the
Italian Presidency.

Since an EU policy on WMD is still embry-
onic and ESDP is in its infancy, they can only be
considered long- and medium-term objectives.
This calls for the identification of policies that
can have a more direct impact on building trust,
the keyword in building a regional security envi-
ronment. ‘The basic problem of that Partner-
ship in matters of politics and security is the
negative perception of the so-called complex of
security. In other words, the mistrust between
the shores [. . . which] stems as much from the

traditional dimensions of security (military) as
from economic and societal dimensions.’39 This
also means that ESDP cooperation should not
act as a substitute for an enhanced political dia-
logue and soft security policies. 

Regarding  regional  conflicts,  it  has  been
advocated that it is perhaps time to end the arti-
ficial separation between the Middle East Peace
Process  and  the  EMP,  and  use  the  Barcelona
framework  to  discuss  the  ‘road  map’  and
regional  peace  building.40 Secondly,  rather
than constituting a traditional security threat,
the nature of the risks present in the Mediter-
ranean basin highlights on the one hand the
degree to which politics, security and econom-
ics are intertwined, and on the other the extent
to which these issues are linked to the EU mem-
ber  states’  security.  Economic  underdevelop-
ment,  poverty  and  high  birth-rates,  illiteracy
and  low  levels  of  mass  education,  are  not
divorced from the problems of modernisation
in North Africa, which in turn includes political
issues  relating  to  authoritarianism,  the  pro-
gressive erosion of the legitimacy of the govern-
ing élites and the rise of Islamic fundamental-
ism.  Instability  in  the  South  has  direct
consequences in the North, of which migration
pressures are one of the tangible effects.

Some soft security issues have been moved to
the  third  basket  of  the  EMP.  The  ‘Regional
cooperation programme in the field of justice,
in combating drugs, organised crime and terror-
ism, as well as cooperation in the treatment of
issues  relating  to  the  social  integration  of
migrants,  migration  and  movements  of  peo-
ple’41 represents a new type of initiative that cuts
across the EU pillar structure, in the sense that
Community as well as intergovernmental tools
can be used, as well as the basket structure of the
Barcelona  process.  The  objectives  of  the  pro-
gramme cover a very broad terrain, from cooper-

37 Council  Secretariat  and  European  Commission,  ‘Basic  principles  for  a  EU  strategy  against  Proliferation  of  Weapons  of  Mass
Destruction’, Doc. 10352/03, PESC 315, Brussels, 2003.
38 Council Secretariat and European Commission, ‘Action Plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Doc. 10354/03, PESC 316, Brussels, 2003.
39 Esther Barbé, op. cit. in note 3, p. 127.
40 Martin Ortega, op. cit. in note 14.
41 The programme is published in Euromed Report 44, 29 April 2002.

17

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

ation in the field of justice to combating drugs
and organised crime to exchanging information
on international terrorist organisations. In the
field  of  migration,  the  intentions  of  the  pro-
gramme seem to respond to the long-standing
demand of the Southern partners that the rights
of migrants in the EU be included on the agenda
of migration issues. 

It is premature to assess the progress made
in  that  initiative,  formally  launched  in  June
2003. The €6 million earmarked for the pro-
gramme are still insufficient to tackle justice,
migration  and  police  cooperation,  but  the
method adopted could be promising, as it could
have recourse to consensual politics and treat
the fight against illegal immigration into the
EU  together  with  co-development  in  North
Africa and the integration of migrants in the
EU. It appears that drawing up this framework
within the context of the third basket, which
deals with socio-cultural affairs, rather than in
the first, has helped depoliticise highly sensitive
issues, reach an agreement between North and
South  on  the  aims  of  such  cooperation  and
include the dossier on terrorism. There is a risk,
however,  that  transferring  issues  so  closely
related to security concerns could jeopardise
the approach that distinctly characterised the
third basket, in other words involving civil soci-
ety organisations in the socio-cultural dialogue
between the two shores, and thus the strongest
bottom-up dimension of the EMP as a whole.42
Secondly, it is necessary to ensure consistency
between the regional programme and the coop-
erative initiatives that are taking place bilater-
ally  at  the  levels  of  the  interior  ministries  of
EMP partners.

Terrorism remains one of the most contro-
versial issues among the Mediterranean part-
ners, given the lack of any basic understanding
of its definition. Progress in this field can only
be seen at the declaratory level, but should not
be  underestimated.  Following  the  terrorist
attack that hit Morocco on 16 May 2003, the

informal mid-term Euro-Mediterranean meet-
ing held in Crete in May 2003 concluded that
discussing the fight against terrorism should
become a regular subject of political dialogue
and that the Senior Officials should continue
their dialogue through ad hoc meetings. Signif-
icantly, it was also agreed that the fact that the
EMP partners have widely different interpreta-
tions of the definition of terrorism ‘should not
prevent partners from identifying areas where
they can cooperate’.43 The Naples Conference
went further in declaring the countries’ com-
mitment  to  fight  against  terrorism  ‘in  all  its
forms  and  manifestation  wherever  and  by
whomsoever committed’ without meeting any
opposition from Syria. The dialogue on terror-
ism will be continued at the level of Senior Offi-
cials and cooperation will be pursued at both
the bilateral and multilateral levels by preparing
programmes  on  training  and  technical  assis-
tance, ‘without prejudice to respect for human
rights and democracy’.44

3.3 The democratic dimension:
EU assistance and political
dialogue for human rights and
democracy

Both  the  EU  and  the  EMP  have  stressed  the
importance  of  democratic  practices  in  the
region. However, ‘the security environment in
the southern Mediterranean cannot be under-
stood without bearing in mind the surprisingly
consistent pattern of non-democratic regimes
in the region’.45 Indeed, North Africa and the
Middle East are in a difficult predicament: the
fear that greater political liberalisation could
lead to a power transfer into the hands of non-
democratic groups is not just a mere justifica-
tion for the current ruling élites to stay in power,
often through permanent states of emergency;
it is also a cause of concern for European govern-

42I am grateful to Annette Jünemman for this observation.
43 Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Presidency Conclusions, Crete, 26-27 May 2003.
44 Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Presidency Conclusions, Naples, 2-3 December 2003.
45 Brynjar Lia, ‘Security Challenges in Europe’s Mediterranean Periphery – Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas’, European Security, vol. 8, no. 4,
Winter 1999, pp. 27-56, quote on p. 47.

18

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

International arms conventions to which the EMP countries are party

NPT  GP  CTBT  ENMOD SBT 

BWC 

CWC 

CCWC  APM 

Algeria 

Austria 

Belgium 

Cyprus 

Denmark 

Egypt 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Ireland 

Israel 

Italy 

Jordan 

Lebanon 

Libya 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Morocco 

Netherlands 

Portugal 

Spain 

Sweden 

Syria 

Tunisia 

Turkey 

* 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

** 

United Kingdom  ** 

* 

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** 

** 

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** 

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* 

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** 

*   Signed
** Ratified

NPT
GP

CTBT
ENMOD

SBT

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmen
tal Modification Techniques
Sea-Bed Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

19

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

BWC

CWC

CCWC 

APM

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

ments. On the other hand, the vicious circle that
is perpetuating itself is that authoritarianism is
a cause as well as a consequence of the demo-
cratic deficit. Some of the fears of EU govern-
ments (the rise of fundamentalism, the percep-
tion of its links to Islamic terrorism), need to be
understood in the light of the lack of democracy
and of failing post-colonial state-building proj-
ects. It is for these reasons that human rights
and democracy need to underpin any concep-
tion of security in the Mediterranean, both at
the level of developing ‘comprehensive security’
and in the human dimension. 

The countries in the region have had very dif-
ferent experiences with fundamentalism, and
each of these experiences seems to confirm that
there  is  no  consistent  pattern  of  relations
between the state and political Islam in the Arab
world. The heterogeneity is such that it ‘shows
the  obvious  limitations  of  viewing  political
Islam  as  a  security  issue  by  considering  the
movement solely as a powerfully uniform and
transnational threat’.46 There is no recipe for
dealing  with  fundamentalism.  The  govern-
ments of the region have themselves tried vari-
ous strategies to deal with political Islam, from
integration, such as in Lebanon and Jordan, to
repression,  with  more  or  less  violent  out-
comes.47 There is plenty of evidence, however, to
suggest that one common thread in all countries

of  the  Mediterranean  basin  is  that  the  chan-
nelling  of  opposition  into  fundamentalist
groups or parties stems from disaffection with
governing élites, their propensity for self-per-
petuation, the growing gap between them and
the lower strata of society, and the lack of politi-
cal  integration  and  participation  in  a  demo-
cratic  framework.48 In  other  words,  contain-
ment, or turning a blind eye to human rights
violations whilst hiding behind the justification
that these are necessary to fight terrorism, con-
stitutes a short-sighted policy that does not pro-
duce long-term stability or security. 

Until  very  recently,  human  rights  and
democratisation  were  among  the  most  neg-
lected aspects of the political and security dia-
logue in the EMP, despite the fact that the EU
does have a range of tools at its disposal to exer-
cise pressure for respect for human rights and
democracy in the Mediterranean.49 All Associa-
tion  Agreements  signed  bilaterally  with  the
individual  countries  contain  an  essential
clause  based  on  such  principles.  In  cases  of
breaches of such clauses, the EU can adopt a
number of measures that cut across its foreign
policy capabilities, from the deferment or sus-
pension of aid or of the agreement itself to neg-
ative measures under the CFSP umbrella, from
the issuing of warnings up to sanctions. What
is  more,  the  Wider  Europe  communication

46 May Chartouni-Dubarry, ‘Political Transition in the Middle East’, in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), op. cit. in note 36,
pp. 53-76, quote on p. 66.
47 May Chartouni-Dubarry, ibid.
48 See for instance George Joffé, ‘The Islamist Threat to Egypt’, The Middle East and North Africa (London: Europa Publications, 1996), pp.
3-10; Michael Patrick Tkacik, ‘Democratization and Islam: Towards the Creation of a User-Friendly Environment’, Mediterranean Quarterly,
vol.  10,  no.  2,  Spring  1999,  pp.  136-62;  May  Chartouni-Dubarry;  Gema  Martin-Muñoz,  ‘Political  Reform  and  Social  Change  in  the
Maghreb’, in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé, op. cit. in note 36, pp. 96-130.
49 See Rosa Balfour, ‘Promoting Principles of Democracy and Human Rights. A Review of the European Union’s Strategies towards its
Neighbours, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy (London: Routledge: forthcoming (manuscript
under revision) 2004).

20

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

proposes  a  more  consequential  use  of  those
instruments.

The  Barcelona  process  uses  bottom-up  as
well as top-down approaches. On the one hand,
assistance promotes human rights and democ-
racy in Mediterranean partner countries, chan-
nelled  through  the  MEDA  Democracy  pro-
gramme (now subsumed in the general budget
line  that  funds  the  European  Initiative  for
Democracy and Human Rights). The Commis-
sion prefers to target civil society organisations,
with  96  per  cent  of  projects  implemented  by
non-governmental  organisations 
(NGOs),
while only 4 per cent are contracted to public
bodies such as government ministries or inter-
national organisations.50 If this approach seeks
to  promote  democratisation  from  below
through the empowerment of citizens, its weak-
ness  is  that  it  avoids  tackling  controversial
issues with the recipient governments, which are
often extremely hostile to substantial assistance
aiming  at  political  institutions,  like  those  of
Syria and Egypt.51

The  top-down  approach  would  see  these
issues being discussed at the level of political
dialogue,  which  has  so  far  produced  rather
unsatisfactory results. The EU member states
have been extremely reluctant to engage with
their partner governments in any dialogue that
gives real substance to the principles subscribed
to by all in the Barcelona Declaration, let alone
exercise much pressure in an effort to convince
the Southern Mediterranean states to respect
some basic civil liberties. There have been only a
few instances in which the EU and its member
states, through their delegations or embassies,
have voiced some concern.

Indeed, the EU’s exercise of pressure aimed at

respect for the principles of the Barcelona Decla-
ration  –  political  conditionality  –  has  been
defined as ‘the dog that didn’t bark’.52 With the
exception of the European Parliament, officially
documented episodes of expression of concern
have been few and far between. No negative CFSP
provisions have been adopted (Libya excepted),
economic and technical assistance has not been
suspended or officially threatened to be made
conditional, and the ‘essential element’ of the
Association Agreements has never been invoked,
even  with  regard  to  countries  with  whom  an
agreement has been in force for some years.

By and large, the EU member states have been
receptive to the arguments put forward by their
Southern partners, both sides fearing that polit-
ical liberalisation could lead to Islamic funda-
mentalist  organisations  -  which  make  up  the
bulk of opposition across North African Arab
states - winning power through open electoral
competition.  The  fight  against  terrorism  has
further  accentuated  this  perceived  dilemma
between democratisation and the rise of funda-
mentalism:  ‘by  focusing  on  the  "terrorist
threats”, southern regimes have been very suc-
cessful in branding all manifestations of opposi-
tion - violent and non-violent – as a threat to the
stability of the region’.53 In this sense, the EU
priorities in the Mediterranean of developing
security and stability54 have so far translated
largely  into  maintenance  of  the  status  quo,
rather than questioning the origins of the problé-
matique of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
and the legitimacy of the partner governments.
The tightening grip on opposition seems to have
become more stringent in the post-11 Septem-
ber environment,55 partly due to pressure from
Western governments. 

50 Nadim Karkutli and Dirk Bützler, ‘Evaluation of the MEDA Democracy Programme 1996-1998. Final Report’, Brussels, April 1999.
51 Richard  Youngs,  ‘Democracy  Promotion:  The  Case  of  European  Union  Strategy’,  Working  Document no.  167  (Brussels:  Centre  for
European Policy Studies, October 2001).
52 Ibid.
53 Brynjar Lia, op. cit. in note 45, pp. 49-50.
54 Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of “Europe”: Limits to International Idealism’, Democratization,
vol.  7,  no.  2,  2000,  pp.  142-67;  Richard  Youngs,  ‘The  European  Union  and  Democracy  Promotion  in  the  Mediterranean:  A  New  or
Disingenuous Strategy?’ in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, ‘European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa’.
Special Issue of Democratization, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, pp. 40-62.
55 Annette Jünemman (ed.), ‘Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11. Regional and Domestic Dynamics’, Special Issue of
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 8, no. 2-3, 2003.

21

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

That tendency was confirmed during 2002.
The only proposal made in the Valencia Action
Plan was to continue national presentations on
internal human rights practices and tools for
the protection of those rights. Despite the mod-
est  proposal  made  at  Valencia  –  it  is  widely
admitted, at least at the EU level – this exercise
has produced very little improvement in terms
of mutual understanding on the substance of
the principles enshrined in the Barcelona Decla-
ration and on the ways of enhancing them. Later
on, the Commission stated that these general
presentations  ‘can  serve  as  a  pretext  to  avoid
serious discussion’.56

The Barcelona Declaration itself leaves space
for ambiguity in understanding the relationship
between the universalism of human rights and
the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states. On the one hand the Dec-
laration is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and on international law, and
aims to develop the rule of law and democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental prin-
ciples, and for diversity, pluralism and tolerance.
On the other, the EU conceded to the requests of
the Southern partners to include some elements
of cultural relativism – a concession that was not
offered to the partners involved in other regional
strategies such as enlargement and the Stabilisa-
tion and Association process in the Balkans. The
point, however, is not so much trying to solve
this ambiguity, which in any case generally exists
between the universalism of rights affirmed in
the UN Declaration and the principle of non-
interference enshrined in the UN Charter, but
lies in using these interpretations as a spring-
board  for  a  serious  debate  between  Northern
and  Southern  partners,  rather  than  hiding
behind the excuse that different culturally deter-
mined interpretations of rights make it impossi-
ble to address the plight of citizens whose basic
rights are often denied.

In 2003 seeds of change seemed to take root
in the stated intentions of the EU institutions.

At the start of the year the first signs came from
the  Commission  in  particular.  At  the  end  of
March,  Romano  Prodi  visited  Algeria  and
Tunisia,  his  third  visit  to  the  region  since
becoming President of the Commission. It was
the  first  time  that  human  rights  issues  were
mentioned  so  explicitly,  the  audience  being
reminded of the ‘essential element’ clauses of
the Association Agreements that commit the
two countries to respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. He recognised recent
progress but emphasised that more needed to
be done: ‘I am not here to sermon and judge. I
am here to underline that we are attentive . . .
towards  these  fundamental  principles  of
human  rights.’57 While  expressing  sympathy
for the difficulties the Southern Mediterranean
states face in the fight against terrorism, he also
emphasised  the  fact  that  those  difficulties
could not be used as a ‘pretext for reduce public
freedoms,  nor  to  give  up  of  improving  the
human rights situation’.58

Two  months  later  the  Commission  pub-
lished  a  report  on  how  to  improve  the  EU’s
human  rights  and  democratisation  strategy
towards  the  region.  Three  factors  stimulated
this shift in policy. Firstly, it was implicitly based
on recognition that the EU record in this field
had been flawed and inconsequential, while the
human rights situation in the region had, if any-
thing, deteriorated over the previous few years.
Secondly,  the  report  seems  to  represent  an
attempt by the Commission to counter both the
‘clash  of  civilisations’  and  the  ‘democracy
through  bombs’  discourses  that  littered  the
Western and Arab press in the run-up to and dur-
ing  the  intervention  in  Iraq.  Conversely,  the
Commission seems keen to establish a dialogue
on matters that go to the heart of any renewed
relations, with the Arab world in particular. On
the other hand, it should be remembered that
Israel,  too,  is  addressed  in  the  Commission’s
report, especially with regard to the violation of
human rights in the Occupied Territories and

56 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and
democratisation with Mediterranean partners. Strategic guidelines’, COM(2003), 294 final, Brussels, 21 May 2003.
57 Romano Prodi, ‘Devant le membres du Conseil de la Nation Algérien’, SPEECH/03/162, Algiers, 30 March 2003.
58 Romano Prodi, ‘Discours à la Université de Tunis le 31 mars 2003’, in EuroMed Report 56 (Brussels: 1 April 2003).

22

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

the rights of non-Jewish minorities within Israel. 
Last but not least, the publication in Novem-
ber 2002 by the United Nations Development
Programme of the seminal Arab Human Devel-
opment Report was very influential in the Com-
mission, providing a valuable contribution to
the debate on the importance of human rights
and democracy in the region and their relation-
ship  to  economic  development.  Indeed,  as  we
have seen, the Barcelona process seemed to rest
on  an  unproven  assumption  that  economic
reform  would  lead  to  political  liberalisation.
Conversely,  the  Arab  Human  Development
Report emphasises the need for a tighter rela-
tionship  between  human  rights  and  develop-
ment.  The  ‘freedom  deficit’  shared  in  varying
degrees by all the citizens of the Arab world was,
according  to  the  Report,  hindering  economic
development,  and  this  provided  the  Commis-
sion with a significant warning over the salience
of  pursuing  a  human  rights  policy:  ‘equity,
knowledge and the freedom and human rights
integral to good governance matter for their own
sake as well as for their critical role as enablers of
development. They are both means and ends’.59
On the basis of the analysis of the ‘freedom
deficit’ situation in the region contained in the
Arab  Human  Development  Report  (see  the
tables overleaf for some indicators on degrees of
freedom in the region), the Commission made
ten policy recommendations for improving the
EU’s strategy towards the Mediterranean that
are worth summarising. At the level of the EU, it
recommends  that  political  dialogue  should
include a ‘systematic’ dialogue on human rights
issues, and that a specific technical subgroup
could be established. In order to enhance EU
knowledge  on  the  human  rights  situation
within the partner countries, sources of infor-
mation  (from  delegations,  member  states’
embassies and the EU country reports) should
be streamlined, which would enhance coordina-
tion between the Commission and the member
states. In order to better identify priorities, the

EU should promote workshops with ‘civil soci-
ety’, even at a regional level, integrate those pri-
orities in the National Action Plans agreed with
the partner governments, which should indicate
the  objectives  and  how  to  achieve  them.
National Action Plans should also serve to intro-
duce  the  promotion  of  human  rights  and
democracy  objectives  into  MEDA  assistance
programmes, along with the European Initia-
tive for Democracy and Human Rights funding
programme.60

So far, it seems that the Commission’s inten-
tions have not fallen on deaf ears. There does
appear to be a greater awareness among the EU
member  states  that  political  reform  needs  to
address human rights if it is to help to create a
more  secure  environment.  Whereas  in  Crete
ministers ‘took note’ of the Commission’s Com-
munication, the Naples conclusions chose to
recognise  that  ‘promoting  human  rights  and
democracy is crucial to the success of the Part-
nership’61 and accepted the use of the differenti-
ation method, based on Action Plans for each
country,  advocated  by  the  Wider  Europe  and
human rights communications. The preferred
way forward on this theme appears to be to make
progress  on  the  less  controversial  matters  in
order to avoid alienating partners. Alongside the
subcommittees on human rights and democ-
racy that exist within the framework of the Asso-
ciation Agreements, in the second half of 2003
the Italian Presidency initiated the debate by cre-
ating two working groups within the Partner-
ship’s regional framework on the rights of chil-
dren,  proposed  by  the  countries  on  the
Northern shore, and on racism and xenophobia,
following  the  preferences  of  the  Southern
Mediterranean states.

Further confirmation that human rights and
democracy deserve a more important position
in North-South relations, and in European for-
eign policy in general, can be found in the Euro-
pean  Security  Strategy  adopted  in  December
2003, as well as in the joint Commission-Coun-

59 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (New
York: United Nations Publications, 2002).
60 European Commission, op. cit. in note 56.
61 Op. cit. in note 44.

23

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Some indicators of degrees of freedom in the southern Mediterranean states

Freedom House Country 

Number of authorised 

Ratings,  

1995-2002* 

parties** 

Algeria 

Egypt 

Israel 

Jordan 

6.6 Not Free (1995-98)  

6.5 Not Free (1999-2002) 

6.6 Not Free 

1.3 Free 

4.4 Partly Free (1995-2001)  

5.5 Partly Free (2001-02) 

Lebanon 

6.5 Not Free 

7.7 Not Free 

5.5 Partly Free 

7.7 Not Free 

6.5 Not Free 

37 

16 

36 

18 

0 

22 

6 

7 

Libya 

Morocco 

Syria 

Tunisia 

Algeria 

Egypt 

Jordan 

Lebanon 

Libya 

Morocco 

Syria 

Tunisia 

Number of parties  

Number of banned parties 

in government, 2000** 

** 

6 

1 

Non-partisans 

0 

0 

7 

1 

1 

4 

10 

0 

0 

10 Exiled groups 

1 

6 

9 

Sources: 
* Freedom House, downloadable from www.freedomhouse.org (the lower the score, the freer the
country)
** Source: Arab Human Development Report 2002

24

 
 
 
 
 
A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

cil Secretariat paper on strengthening relations
with the Arab world dated 4 December 2003.
While  the  former  considers  ‘spreading  good
governance,  supporting  social  and  political
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of
power, establishing the rule of law and protect-
ing  human  rights’  as  ‘the  best  means  of
strengthening  the  international  order’,62 the

latter  suggests  that  the  combination  of  top-
down and bottom-up approaches needs to be
strengthened through a ‘firm and frank’ politi-
cal dialogue and by identifying partners at dif-
ferent levels to build a dialogue with civil soci-
ety.63 Even if it is too early to see the impact of
such a shift, the signs that the EU institutions
produced in 2003 are certainly encouraging.

62 Op. cit. in note 19.
63 Council Secretariat and European Commission, ‘Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World’, D(2003), 10318, Brussels,
4 December 2003.

25

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

26

Policy recommendations

The EU’s ‘comprehensive’ approach to secu-

rity contained in the EMP, the Wider Europe
communication and the new European Security
Strategy  does  provide  an  appropriate  frame-
work for dealing with the political problems and
potential synergies that affect both sides of the
Mediterranean. This approach reflects the EU’s
capabilities in external relations as well as the
‘style’ it developed throughout the 1990s as a
‘civilian power’. In addition, the evolution of the
ESDP and the ‘hard’ security proposals put for-
ward in the European Security Strategy intro-
duce a new dimension into the EMP. This ‘com-
prehensive’  approach  holds  notwithstanding
the value of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue
and its possible expansion both substantially
and geographically.64

‘Comprehensive’ security also better captures
the  complex  nature  of  the  risks  that  emanate
from North Africa, where economic underdevel-
opment and poverty, demographic growth, infor-
mal economic practices, low levels of education
and the marginalisation of women are deeply tied
to political systems based largely on authoritari-
anism. The problem is that authoritarianism is
the cause as well as the consequence of perceived
security threats emanating from fundamental-
ism. In reinvigorating the Barcelona process, the
challenge for the EMP is to confront together
root causes of instability in the Mediterranean
basin as well as short-term priorities. 

4.1 Enhanced political dialogue

Alongside the specific issues relating to the Part-

nership, the EU could initiate a dialogue on matters
of global interest, such as the future of multilateral-
ism, non-proliferation or the internationalisa-
tion of terrorism. The aim would be to involve
partners on an equal footing, as these issues are
of common interest. It is important to ensure the
participation of EU partner countries in multi-
lateral processes as well as to enhance the sociali-
sation and mutual understanding between lead-
ers North and South of the Mediterranean.

Reciprocity requires that the EU and its mem-
ber states address some issues of concern to its
Southern  partners.  The  rights  of  North  African
migrants in the EU, especially in the context of the
fight against terrorism, is one area (included in
the regional programme for cooperation in jus-
tice)  in  which  the  EU  member  states  should
practice what they preach.65

Key issues, such as respect for human rights
and  good  governance,  should  also  be  main-
streamed  into  political  dialogue  at  all  levels,
from ministerial meetings to the technical com-
mittees and subgroups.

4.2 Institutions

The issues at stake are so important and wide-
ranging that the Partnership merits a perma-
nent  secretariat.  The  role  of  the  secretariat
should be to draw together the threads of all the
activities carried out under the auspices of the
Barcelona process as well as of the other EU poli-
cies that have an impact on the region, such as
the new Wider Europe initiative. Similarly, the
secretariat  could  provide  information  and,

64 On NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue, see Roberto Aliboni, ‘Strengthening NATO-Mediterranean Relations: A transition to partnership’,
Report to Italian Parliament-NATO seminar (2002); and Thanos Dokos, NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue: prospects and policy recommendations
(Athens: ELIAMEP, 2003).
65 Britain’s 2001 anti-terrorist act combined with its immigration rules is providing one example of different treatment of British and foreign
suspects of terrorism. For a critique, see ‘Coming quietly’, The Economist, 1 March 2003, pp. 33-4.

4

27

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

when necessary, coordination between the EMP
and other Mediterranean initiatives such as the
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the ‘5 plus 5’66
group, or other subregional arrangements, as
well as the sectoral cooperation that is occurring
between national ministries other than foreign
affairs, such as the cooperation between interior
ministries on matters regarding migration and
the  fight  against  terrorism,  or  defence  min-
istries in the field of ESDP. With the forthcom-
ing possible creation of a Euro-Mediterranean
Assembly,  a  secretariat  could  also  serve  as  its
administrative  and  information  unit  and
involve  officials  from  both  shores  of  the
Mediterranean who could report to the parlia-
mentary  representatives, 
thus  promoting
greater involvement of the latter.

4.3 Security

Dialogue on ESDP issues is no doubt an activity
that might lead to greater mutual trust. Most of
the  Southern  Mediterranean  states  are  eager  for
greater Euro-Mediterranean transparency and coop-
eration on military and traditional security matters,
which they otherwise view with a degree of dis-
trust.67 Transparency on ESDP can thus provide
incentives to the Southern states to build part-
nerships. However, Mediterranean partners are
not for their part so eager to reciprocate with the
same transparency and to apply good ‘security
governance’ practices.68

Given  that  ESDP  is  still  in  the  process  of
being developed, increasing transparency and
information  is  only  a  modest  step  and  a
medium-term objective that should be accom-
panied by other measures in the future. These
could include involving the Mediterranean partners

in  EU-led  peacekeeping  operations,  following  the
experiences with the EU’s Eastern partners, mar-
itime cooperation in the Mediterranean and joint mil-
itary exercises.69 Cooperation should also possi-
bly be linked to military training, especially in the
field  of  international  law  practices  that  fully
respect civil and political rights. 

Similar exercises could be envisaged in the
civilian domain, such as involving the EMP part-
ners in any future EU police missions following the
example  of  the  one  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina
launched in January 2003.

4.4 Human rights and 
democracy
It would be naive, unrealistic and damaging to
suggest that the EU should take on the objective of
‘exporting’ democracy to the South. Yet political
instability and many of the security risks emanat-
ing from the region are linked to the endurance of
regimes which fall far short of observing the most
basic democratic standards. The policy recom-
mendation in the recent Commission communi-
cation  on  reinforcing  its  policy  on  promoting
human rights in the region are a good starting
point; to be credible they clearly require a positive
endorsement by the EU member states. 

It is obvious, however, that European-styled
democracy cannot blossom overnight in Medit-
erranean states that have little in the way of dem-
ocratic  tradition.  The  EU  should  instead  pro-
mote  more  flexible  concepts,  such  as  ‘good
governance’, best practices, the rule of law and
fundamental rights and freedoms, on which a
frank dialogue between partners should be pur-
sued.70

While  maintaining  its  overall  objective  of

66 The ‘5 plus 5’ group involves five countries from the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and France, Italy, Malta,
Portugal and Spain. At the latest meeting held in Tunis after the December 2003 Euro-Mediterranean conference, both Romano Prodi and
Javier Solana participated in the discussions that revolved around many of the dossiers debated in Naples.
67 Dimitris K. Xenakis, ‘Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System’, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 75-
90.
68 On security governance in the Mediterranean, see Fred Tanner, ‘Security governance. The difficult task of security democratisation in the
Mediterranean’, Euromesco Brief, 2003.
69 See  for  instance  Carlos  Echeverria,  ‘Cooperation  in  peacekeeping  among  the  Euro-Mediterranean  forces’,  Chaillot  Paper 35  (Paris:
Institute  for  Security  Studies  of  WEU,  February  1999),  and  Michael  Pugh,  ‘Europe’s  boat  people:  maritime  cooperation  in  the
Mediterranean’, Chaillot Paper 41 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, July 2000).
70 On good governance, see Richard Youngs, op. cit. in note 54. 

28

Policy recommendations

promoting ‘universal’ human rights and free-
doms, which are based on UN law and accepted
by all parties to the EMP, the EU should focus on
just a few issues, such as freedom of the press, free-
dom of association and the rights of women. The link
between human rights and development, most
recently reiterated by the UN Human Develop-
ment Report, should also be a cornerstone of the
EU’s strategy, inter alia because it makes the dia-
logue on human rights more acceptable to its
partners.

In addition, the EU should use the tools it has at
its disposal for exercising pressure on governments to
comply with the commonly agreed principles,
from  the  ‘essential’  clause  of  the  Association
Agreements to aid (the tools of positive and neg-
ative  conditionality  will  be  discussed  below).
The bottom-up and top-down approaches need to be
reinforced  and  complement  rather  than  contradict
each other.

4.5 Differentiation and political
conditionality
The EMP is the only forum in which Israel and
the Arab states of North African and the Middle
East meet. This is one of its strengths. On the
other hand, it has been hard to make progress
with all countries at once. Thus, some degree of
flexibility should be introduced, as advocated by
the  Wider  Europe  document,  in  order  to  allow
those partners that are most willing to deepen relations
with the EU, in the hope that this will also serve as
an example to the less willing countries.

Differentiation requires the use of incentives
to encourage the most willing states to further
cooperation. It should be remembered that the
main interests of the Southern partners lie not
so much in the political and security field as in
the economic and trading opportunities that
the Barcelona process offers. This requires far
greater consistency between the economic and the polit-
ical and security objectives of the EMP. Linking the

two chapters together in a clear, transparent and
agreed regime of political conditionality might pro-
vide one route to greater cooperation in the first
basket.

Positive conditionality should therefore rest
on offering trade incentives, compensation mechanisms
to ameliorate the negative effects of harmonising
internal  legislation  to  speed  up  the  free  trade
agreements, and measures of asymmetrical liberali-
sation to favour South Mediterranean products,
such as agricultural. If the EU persists in main-
taining trade restrictions on the key products of
the  Southern  shore,  the  ultimate  objective  of
trade  liberalisation  will  not  be  credible.  Thus,
some positive steps need to be taken in the sec-
ond basket and tied to progress in the first.

The  EU  could  offer  other  incentives  and
cooperation, including in the fight against ter-
rorism  (exchange  of  information  and  intelli-
gence), cooperation in fighting illegal migration
and  trafficking  in  human  beings  (including
transit migration from sub-Saharan Africa), the
rights of migrants in the EU, and cooperation in
the field of legal migration to the EU.

The  EU  and  its  Mediterranean  partners
should  set  clear  benchmarks on  the  progress
expected through the use of incentives. These
should concern commonly agreed objectives for
the short, medium and long term. The EU has
developed experience in benchmarking through
the enlargement process: regular reports from
the Commission monitoring the progress of the
candidate countries towards the acquis commu-
nautaire have included an evaluation of priori-
ties to be achieved. ‘Micro-conditionality’ has been
introduced 
in  the  assistance  programme
devoted to the Western Balkans, clarifying what
was expected from each of the projects the EU
supported through aid. Similar measures could
be introduced for the Mediterranean partners. 
A regime based on political conditionality
would  also  have  to  include  the  possibility  of
resorting to negative measures should condi-
tions not be met. At the risk of stating the obvi-

29

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

ous, negative conditionality should be governed by
an incremental use of tools, clarity over the con-
ditions expected and equality of treatment of
partners so as to avoid accusations of double
standards.

Critics of political conditionality argue that
without offering the real ‘carrot’ (i.e. accession
to the Union), the ‘sticks’ do not work. Enlarge-
ment beyond the current candidate countries
and the Western Balkans is currently not on the
cards, nor is it likely in the future. The ‘Wider
Europe’ document suggests that a ‘stake’ in the
single market would be a substantial ‘carrot’,
alongside  privileged  and  enhanced  relations
with the EU’s neighbours. 

This said, the regional approach should not
be abandoned. The EU should ensure that the
positive effects of greater cooperation serve as
an example, making differentiation a tool with
which to draw the less willing countries into its
fold. Matching this ambition, however, is not
without  costs:  the EU should back its words with
money. Following the MEDA allocation of funds
for 2000-2006, the EU and its member states will
have to decide on a new economic package for
the  region.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  neither
enlargement nor renewed interest in the Eastern
neighbourhood would not impinge upon the
urgent needs for development in the Southern
and Eastern Mediterranean. 

30

Conclusions

Nearly ten years ago the Egyptian sociologist

and civil rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim
captured well the nature of the security dilemma
in the Mediterranean region as well as the way
forward for Western policy: ‘the Establishments
of both sides of the Mediterranean are clearly
keen on avoiding a Huntington “Clash of Civi-
lizations” and have been cooperating on narrow
security issues to contain and/or pre-empt vio-
lence and terrorism. These, however, are sheer
sedatives. What is truly needed are drastic socio-
political-economic reforms. Because the Estab-
lishment on the southern side is not democrati-
cally elected, it will not engage in such serious
reform.  Even  if  it  did,  credibility  may  still  be
lacking. Hence the imperative of a carrot-and-
stick  strategy  with  the  southern  Establish-
ments.’71

So far, policies towards the Mediterranean
have been caught in something of a paradox. On
the one hand, the prime motivation for the EU’s
involvement  in  the  region  was  to  avoid  the
spillover  effects  of  instability  and  insecurity
from the South. The hitherto bleak prospects of
peace in the Middle East, but also in the Western
Sahara, a potentially explosive cocktail of high
demographic growth coupled with rising unem-
ployment and economic stagnation, the prolif-
eration of arms including nuclear and possibly
biological  and  chemical  weapons,  and  the
revival of international terrorism, all place the
region in a complex security predicament.

On the other, the EU has been de facto sup-
porting  precisely  the  status  quo  regimes  that
play a part in putting the region at risk by under-
mining civil and political rights, and human and
social  development.  The  risk  (which  has  also
served as an alibi) of Islamic fundamentalism has

emptied much of the laudable exercise of engag-
ing in political dialogue with the governments of
North Africa of its reforming zeal. This paradox
runs through the policy framework set up by the
EU  and  its  partners  in  the  Barcelona  process,
which  has  struggled  to  reconcile  the  ‘global
approach’ that characterises it with the short-
term security concerns of the EU member states.
The challenges therefore can be seen as artic-
ulated in two stages. In the first, they concern
the ways in which the security environment is
understood and defined, which should include
the human dimension as well as the more tradi-
tional security threats. On the basis of this con-
ceptualisation of security, the next set of chal-
lenges has to do with: the identification of those
policy options and methods that are most likely
to reflect the EU’s actual capabilities and thus be
credible and effective; meeting the expectations
of its partners to the South and thus supporting
the deepening of political dialogue; and achiev-
ing the objectives of reform, democratisation,
and security-building through a method based
on partnership rather than by imposing a model
from the outside.

The good news is that increasing recognition
of the need to tackle the democratic and security
deficits differently is surfacing. Wider Europe
overall  confirms  the  ‘philosophy’  behind  the
EMP, but introduces the new methodological
principles of ‘benchmarking’ and ‘differentia-
tion’ that could help carry the process forward.
The  new  European  Security  Strategy  aims  to
reinforce the EU’s foreign policy capabilities in
many of the ‘hard’ security areas in which it has
so far failed to pull its weight. 

Even  beyond  EU  initiatives,  some  greater
awareness of the importance of these issues is

71 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘From the Battle of Tours to the Battle of Algiers’, Civil Society, August 1995; quoted in Hollis, op. cit. in note 23,
p. 129.

5

31

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

beginning to appear even in the United States,
after 11 September, Afghanistan and Iraq. The
Bush administration intends to present a pro-
posal on a Greater Middle East Initiative at the
June Group of Eight meeting. According to ini-
tial information, it seems that the United States
is planning a major change in its Middle East pol-
icy and is preparing to call upon the Arab govern-
ments to adopt political and economic reforms
and be held accountable on human rights.72

It is of course too early to give even a tentative
evaluation  of  the  American  proposals.  While
some convergence may be emerging between the
EU and the United States on the need to give
democracy  and  human  rights  a  role  together
with  security  and  stabilisation  in  the  wider
Mediterranean region, the first responses to the
US  proposal  reveal  that  the  issue  of  how to
encourage reform in the Mediterranean is likely
to  become  a  matter  of  debate.  Germany
endorsed  the  plan  but  then,  together  with
France, produced a joint proposal which under-
lines that voices from the region, governments
and civil society alike, need to be listened to and
need to play their part in defining future West-
ern policies towards the Mediterranean.73 In the
region, where US credibility is at a low, scepti-
cism or ‘near-universal scorn’ have greeted the

Bush  administration’s  plan.74 Many  Arab
observers view the plan as placing all the onus on
democratising Arab countries instead of resolv-
ing the question of Palestine, which is seen as the
source of the region’s democratic deficit, and
reform-minded opposition leaders argue that
change has to come from the countries in ques-
tion rather than from abroad.75

None the less, the US plan should comple-
ment  well  the  framework  and  policies  of  the
Barcelona process. American traditional lever-
age in the Middle East, accompanied by the EU’s
relations with the countries in the region, which
have suffered less from the ‘war against terror’,
could  together  provide  a  strong  stimulus  for
change. The question of method, though, is not
secondary. Finding a balance between engaging
the  governments  of  the  Southern  Mediter-
ranean, supporting those pushing for democra-
tisation from within, exercising adequate pres-
sure to reform without causing internal strife,
acknowledging cultural diversity while support-
ing respect for civil and political rights, at the
same time pursuing the fight against terrorism
and the creation of a secure environment, will be
no easy task. The ‘carrot and stick’ exercise in the
Mediterranean will require careful fine-tuning
and a concerted effort by all actors involved.

72 ‘Bush Aims For “Greater Mideast” Plan’, The Washington Post, 9 February 2004.
73 ‘Paris et Berlin se mettent d’accord sur une réponse au plan américain de “Grand Moyen-Orient”’, Le Monde, 4 mars 2004.
74 ‘They grumble, but they move’, The Economist, 6-12 March 2004.
75 ‘Reform and reformulating’, Al-Ahram, Issue no. 678, 19, 24 February 2004.

32

Annexes 

Abbreviations

CFSP

CSBM

EC

EIB

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

European Community

European Investment Bank

ELIAMEP

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

EMP

ESDP

EU

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

European Security and Defence Policy

European Union

EUROFOR

European (Rapid Deployment) Force

EUROMARFOR

European Maritime Force

EuroMeSCo

Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, a network of foreign policy

FEMIP

FYROM

institutes in the 27 countries involved in the Barcelona process

Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

INTERREG

a Community initiative that aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the EU

MEDA

NATO

NGO

OSCE

PSC

UK

UN 

UNSC

UNSCR

UNSG

US

WEU

WMD

Mediterranean European Development Agreement

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Non-Governmental Organisation

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Political and Security Committee

United Kingdom

United Nations

UN Security Council

UN Security Council Resolution

UN Secretary-General

United States

Western European Union

Weapons of Mass Destruction

a1

33

a2

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(cid:92) Youngs, Richard (2002), ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous
Strategy?’ in Gillespie and Youngs, pp. 40-62
(cid:92) Zielonka, Jan (1998) (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law International

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EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Naples, 2-3 December 2003)
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The VIth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers held in Naples on December 2nd and 3rd took place in a posi-

tive, constructive atmosphere against an international background casting shadows of tension, instability and insecurity in the

region. In this framework, the Ministers reaffirmed their shared willingness to strengthening their partnership, thereby renewing

their common adherence to the values and the objectives set out in the Barcelona Declaration. While stressing the emphasis on

the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as the key element for their respective relationship, they underlined the need for enhanced

efforts at increasing its effectiveness. In this context, the Ministers also expressed awareness for the necessity to deepen the

Process so as to provide it with further visibility and transparency in a bid to bringing it closer to the civil societies of the region.

2. The Ministers sent a message of common interests, shared values and solidarity among Euro-Mediterranean Partners; they

reaffirmed their joint interest in reinforcing security and stability in the region, in promoting political and economic reform and

in ensuring that extremism and terrorism are not allowed to get in the way of progress. They also agreed that furthering the

process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mutual understanding is essential to the vision of the Barcelona

Process, reiterating that the partnership stands as the best way of meeting the challenges and opportunities represented by secu-

rity and stability, globalisation, economic reform and social development. 

3. The Ministers agreed that such a vision, which has always been at the heart of the Barcelona Process, is even more relevant in

the present circumstances. They also agreed that the process of enlargement of the EU on one side and the current situation in

the Middle-East on the other, have given rise to a greater demand for Europe on the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediter-

ranean. These challenges call for a reinvigorated and renewed partnership, based on a stronger commitment both of the Euro-

pean Union and the Mediterranean countries to common values and objectives.

4. Recalling that the Valencia Action Plan, agreed by Foreign Ministers at their meeting in April 2002, is the most recent com-

prehensive set of commitments for developing the Partnership and making reference to the review of its outcome at the mid-term

Ministerial meeting in Crete, the Ministers took stock of progress made and provided orientations for future work. Furthermore,

they supported the idea of engaging in a thorough, open and sincere discussion within the existing bodies of the Euro-Mediter-

ranean Partnership on how best carry into effect the acquis of the Barcelona Process, aiming also at improving the contribution

by the Mediterranean partners to the outline of policies and their relevant implementation.

5. The Ministers reviewed progress in particular in implementing the Partnership on three specific issues:
(cid:90) The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly;
(cid:90) The future course of FEMIP;
(cid:90) The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures.

6. They agreed that achievements on these three issues will foster greater political co-operation, more focussed support for eco-

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nomic reform and private sector development and moves to promote inter-cultural dialogue and understanding. All three will

move the focus of the partnership further into the domain of civil society, thus producing results that are relevant to ordinary man

and woman. 

Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood Initiative

7. The Ministers took note of the EU Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood Policy and discussed as far as the Southern neighbours

are concerned, how this policy could strengthen cooperation by building on the existing Barcelona Process acquis. They noted

that the policy aims to support reforms as well as regulatory and legislative approximation, particularly as regards the internal

market, between the EU and Mediterranean partners, as they are ready to engage in such intensified cooperation. To develop its

full potential to promote political and economic reform based on the shared values reflected in the Barcelona Declaration, the

initiative will need to include credible incentives. In this regard, they acknowledged that one of the aspects of these new policies

is to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters as well as the joint ownership of this process with a view to

fostering stability, development and democracy in the countries to the South, in the common interest of the E.U. and Mediter-

ranean partners.

Iraq

8. A discussion on the unfolding events in Iraq and the prospects for post conflict arrangements took place. Ministers welcomed

the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1511. They recalled the Union’s commitment to play a significant role in the polit-

ical and economic reconstruction of Iraq, within the framework of the relevant UNSC Resolutions with the following as essential

elements for success:
(cid:90) an adequate security environment;
(cid:90) a strong and vital UN role, which could also benefit from an early appointment of a new Special Representative to the UNSG;
(cid:90) a realistic schedule for the handing over of political responsibility to the Iraqi people; 
(cid:90) the setting-up of a transparent multilateral donor fund to channel support from the international community which the EU

also regards as an essential element for the success of the reconstruction.

The Ministers welcomed the recent agreement establishing the timeline and a programme for a rapid transfer of sovereignty to

a transitional Iraqi Government and urged all parties concerned to agree on the necessary constitutional as well as the electoral

arrangements. In this context, they recalled UNSC Resolution 1511 and praised its unanimous approval underlining the need of

its full implementation.

9. Ministers urged all countries in the region to contribute actively to the stability of Iraq and to support its political and economic

reconstruction process. Following the meeting on 2 November in Damascus among neighbouring countries of Iraq, Ministers

welcomed the holding of such meetings, in consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi institutions, to help support

the political and economic reconstruction transition process under way in Iraq, and emphasised their usefulness. Ministers also

welcomed the UNSG’s initiative to hold meetings between Iraq’s neighbours and Security Council members. A prosperous, sta-

ble and sovereign Iraq, whose territorial integrity is preserved, will be essential for the stability in the region and beyond.

10. In this context, Ministers underlined the need to establish a platform for regular and substantial consultations among those

members of the International Community which are engaged in Iraq and all neighbouring countries.

Middle East Peace Process

11. Ministers discussed recent developments concerning the Middle East. The were deeply concerned by the situation in the

region and noted that, despite support given by the international community to the quest for a comprehensive, just and lasting

solution, insufficient progress has been made by the concerned parties. They should seize the opportunity for peace set out in

the Quartet Road Map.

12. Ministers recognised that there is no alternative to a swift and full implementation, in good faith by the two sides, of the Road

Map. UNSCR 1515 was seen as an encouraging support by the International Community to the endeavours by the Quartet.

13. Ministers underlined the need for both Parties to work together constructively on solutions to the conflict. They expressed their

commitment to the clear objective of two States, Israel and a viable and democratic Palestinian State, living side by side in peace

and security, in the framework of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, as laid out in the Road Map. Ministers recalled the

importance of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summits of 28 March 2002. They called on both par-

ties – Israel and the Palestinian Authority – to live up to the commitments they undertook at the Aqaba summit on 4 June 2003.

14. They recalled that a comprehensive peace in the Middle East must also include Syria and Lebanon in the framework of the

Madrid Principles.

15. Ministers reiterated that the fight against terrorism in all its forms remains one of the priorities of the entire International

Community and that it is the duty of all countries, in particular of those in the region, to actively co-operate in the fight against

terrorism and to abstain from all support, direct or indirect, to terrorist organisations.

16. It was emphasised by Ministers that the new Palestinian Government under Prime Minister Qorei must concretely demon-

strate its determination in the fight against extremist violence. Decisive steps to consolidate all Palestinian security services must

be taken by the new Palestinian Government, which deserves to be supported by all. Efforts to implement a lasting cease-fire

were welcomed.

17. Ministers also urged the Government of Israel, in exercising its right to protect its citizens, to exert maximum effort to avoid

civilian casualties and take all necessary action to ease the humanitarian and economic plight of the Palestinian people and facil-

itate the relief work of international donors. Israel should refrain from any action that violates international law.

18. Ministers were of the view that decisive steps must be taken to reverse the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in the

West Bank and Gaza. It is making life increasingly intolerable for ordinary Palestinians and fuelling extremism.

19. Ministers welcomed the upcoming donor’s meeting (Ad Hoc Liaison Committee) that will take place on 10 December 2003

in Rome, as a good opportunity to discuss necessary measures and efforts by the parties and the International Community to

improve the economic and humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people.

20. Strong concerns were expressed regarding the route marked out by Israel for the fence in the Occupied West Bank and East

Jerusalem. The envisaged departure of the route from the “green line” prejudges future negotiations and makes the two-State

solution physically impossible to implement. Continued expansion of Israeli settlements and related construction is counter-

productive.

21. Ministers highlighted the importance of promoting tolerance in all countries of the Partnership, and stressed in particular the

need to stand up against both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, as well as xenophobia.

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22. Ministers also reiterated that the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process are complementary, and expressed

their readiness to use fully the potential of the Barcelona Process to make a positive contribution to the stabilisation of the

Mediterranean region. Ministers recalled the importance of a reinvigorated cooperation within the wider region and with

Mediterranean partners.

23. Initiatives from civil society on both sides were welcomed as contributions to the effort to promote rapprochement, confi-

dence building and the search for a lasting peace.

Association Agreement

24. The Valencia Action Plan, agreed unanimously by the participants at the Valencia meeting, contains a series of activities to

reinforce all areas of the Partnership. Good progress has been made on many of them. Association Agreements are now in force

with Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, and Jordan and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon.

25. The Association process remains at the core of the Partnership. The Ministers confirmed commitment to encourage speed-

ing up the ratification process of Agreements not yet in force and to ensure where necessary the early implementation of relevant

provisions through interim agreements or other appropriate arrangements. The Ministers welcomed progress made in many

areas on the implementation of the Agreements in force notably the regular holding of Association Councils and Committees as

well as the setting up of sub-Committees such as under the Agreements with Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia. They reaffirmed the

importance of completing the grid of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements by concluding the negotiation with Syria.

II. POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Political and security dialogue

26. Ministers reiterated that a concerted effort should be made to give greater substance to political and security co-operation.

This requires an overall strategy to the stability/security issue in the region, while paying more attention – with an even-handed

and balanced approach – to new security challenges particularly great in the Mediterranean basin. In order to deal more effec-

tively with these challenges, the Ministers considered the option of preparing their discussions also through open ended ad hoc

informal groups reporting to the Partners through existing Euromed institutional channels.

27. The Ministers, while reaffirming the complementarity between the Middle East Peace Process and the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership, in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration, recognised that, any direct linkage between the two should continue

to be avoided. It is undoubtedly true that when there have, from time to time, been positive developments in the former, they have

contributed in large measure to creating a more positive atmosphere for progress in the latter. The converse is equally the case,

and applies particularly to political and security co-operation. The Ministers therefore recognised their interest in implementing

the Road Map and returning to negotiations.

Human Rights and Democracy

28. Cooperation in promoting human rights and democracy is crucial to the success of the Partnership. The Ministers welcomed

the approach set out in the recent EU initiative, based on dialogue with the Partners aiming to reach a consensus on extending

cooperation in this area progressively and on an individual basis, in particular by developing joint action plans which would set

out the means to implement effectively through national regulation and legislation the commitments which the partners have

agreed to. Such cooperation would be eligible for enhanced EU financial support and the EU will take it into consideration when

allocating MEDA funds. The Ministers also emphasized the support provided for direct actions in the field of human rights and

for capacity-building of civil society players in a regional or sub-regional framework.

Partnership building measures

29. The Ministers acknowledged that existing political and security dialogue among Senior Officials should be pursued and

should aim to agree on further partnership building measures in the field of security; they mandated the Senior Officials to study

further and to identify partnership building measures to be implemented among partners such as maritime safety, civil protec-

tion and environment. If necessary such measures could be on the basis of participation by a limited number of partners, open

to others to join later.

Fight against terrorism

30. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations wherever and by whomso-

ever committed. They stressed their engagement in the full implementation inter alia of UNSCR 1373. They also mandated Senior

Officials to further the dialogue on terrorism, including ad hoc meetings, with a view to increasing cooperation in this field.

According to that vision, the Ministers reiterated that co-operation on terrorism will be pursued under existing and future

regional and bilateral programmes for training and technical assistance to improve the capability to fight terrorism as well as

other forms of organised crime without prejudice to respect for human rights and democracy.

ESDP

31. The Ministers welcomed the launching of dialogue and co-operation on ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), con-

firming that the dialogue with the EU Political and Security Committee, and at expert level, can usefully add to the range of instru-

ments available under the Barcelona Process. They also stressed that this dialogue should help to familiarise the Mediterranean

partners with ESDP aims and instruments, with a view to their eventual, possible cooperation in ESDP activities on a regional,

sub-regional or country basis. They recalled that some of the Mediterranean partners already work with the EU in peacekeeping

activities (Balkans, Africa) under the UN aegis. The Ministers expressed their belief that further complementary measures, such

as civilian crisis management training; co-operation among civil protection authorities, particularly continuing cooperation on

a project on disaster management, drawing on the experience of the on-going pilot project, subject to satisfactory evaluation of

its results, would constitute a significant addition to partnership building.

Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly

32. The Ministers welcomed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and agreed to include this new body,

in a consultative capacity, in the framework of the Barcelona Process. They expressed their conviction that this step will provide

the Process with further visibility and transparency, thereby bringing the Partnership itself closer to the interests and expecta-

tions of public opinions in the region. In this context, the Ministers stressed that the Assembly will add to the depth of the

Barcelona Process, ensuring complementarity with the existing institutions of the Partnership. The text of the Recommendation

from the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Forum to the Ministerial Conference is attached.

...

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EURO-MEDITERRANEAN MID-TERM MEETING
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Dublin, 5-6 May 2004)
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

I.INTRODUCTION

1.The Dublin Mid-Term meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers took place as a reaffirmation of the Partners’ contin-

uing commitment to the Barcelona process.  It confirmed the importance of partnership and co-ownership as essential elements

of the process.

2.The meeting took place against the background of a number of initiatives concerning the countries of the Mediterranean region

and beyond. The Union has proposed to include Mediterranean partners in the Neighbourhood policy. In addition, on the basis

of mandates from the December 2003 European Council, an Interim Report on “An EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediter-

ranean and the Middle East” was welcomed by the European Council in March 2004. On the basis of this Interim Report, work

is now in progress to develop for the European Council in June an agreed view on relations with the area which extends from Mau-

ritania to Iran – the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 

3.Ministers unreservedly condemned terrorist attacks including those at Casablanca, Istanbul and Riyadh, as well as the

appalling terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March, and expressed solidarity with the victims.  These events reinforced the relevance

of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as the framework for solidarity and co-operation between the EU and its Mediterranean

partners in tackling common security threats. It should stimulate the partners to reinforce all their joint activities, in particular

in the fight against terrorism in all its forms, co-operation on justice and home affairs, and the inter-cultural dialogue.

4.Ministers therefore confirmed their attachment and commitment to the Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coher-

ent set of privileged relations within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood. They acknowledged the solid and substantial

range of co-operation activities which has been established in a spirit of partnership on issues ranging from political and security

questions, including human rights, political reform and good governance, through trade liberalisation, economic reform and

infrastructure networks to culture, education and the movement of people. They therefore firmly committed themselves to

implementing the Naples agenda in order to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-

ownership of the process.

5.The meeting also recognised the potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy to build on the Barcelona Process and to fur-

ther it on the basis of jointly agreed Action Plans, as well as the opportunities and benefits offered to the Mediterranean partner

countries through this policy. Within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a more intensive political dialogue and greater

access to EU programmes and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market,

as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs. Such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better

mutual understanding of security concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principles,

such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The level of EU

support to the implementation of reforms should be related on a mutually agreed basis in a spirit of co-ownership, to the inten-

sity of the efforts of the partners assessed under the framework of agreed evaluation instruments. Articulation of MEDA and EIB

credits should be further reinforced, as well as co-ordination within the EU and with other donors.

6.Against this background, Ministers took stock of progress in implementing the Valencia Action Plan and the conclusions of the

Ministerial meeting in Naples.  In the perspective of the Euro-MediterraneanForeign Ministers meetings to be held under the

Dutch and Luxemburg Presidencies as well as the 10th anniversary next year of the launching of the Barcelona Process. Ministers

requested the Euro-MediterraneanCommittee to draw up firm proposals and guidelines for moving forward. They acknowl-

edged that progress on the implementation of the Valencia Action Plan had been insufficient and needed to be speeded up. There

should be more focus on deliverable achievements rather than on process. Final decisions were taken on the Euro-Mediterranean

Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures which will ensure its establishment in line with the agreed timetable.

7.At Naples, Foreign Ministers mandated senior officials to examine the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s working methods.

The Presidency has carried this work forward and, following an extensive consultation process with Partners, published its Work-

ing Paper on the Improvement of the Working Methods of the Partnership. This has met with the approval of the Senior Officials

of the 35 partner countries. Ministers welcomed agreement on improving the working methods of the partnership, which

includes the setting up of ad-hoc groups to prepare discussion, proposals to increase the sense of co-ownership by giving a

greater role to the Mediterranean partners, and certain technical improvements. In addition, arising from this paper, two ad-hoc

thematic groups have been set up and had their initial meetings on 5th and 7th April respectively, with a view to preparing work-

plans on Partnership-Building Measures and the European Neighbourhood Policy. These draft work-plans were welcomed by

the Ministerial Meeting.

8.Good progress has been made within the association process which lies at the core of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Association Agreements are now in force with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Jordan and on an interim basis with the Palestinian

Authority. There are interim agreements in place with Egypt and Lebanon as well. The ratification of the agreement concluded

with Egypt is now finalised and the first meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council is scheduled for June 2004. The ratification

processes of the agreements with Lebanon and Algeria are also well underway. All partners were again encouraged to expedite

the ratification process of those Association Agreements not yet in force. The EU is also encouraged by the progress made

towards concluding an Association Agreement with Syria, and is hopeful that the few outstanding points will be resolved soon,

allowing Syria to join the group of Euro-Mediterranean countries which have signed Association or Interim Agreements with the

Union, thus completing the network of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. These are important developments for the

fulfilment of the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and for the reinforcement of South-South cooperation. 

9.Ministers drew attention to the priority they attach to the promotion of gender equality and the promotion of the role of

women in society, in the framework of pursuing the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Ministers acknowledged

the important contribution of women in all sectors, including: education, the public service, the administration of justice, busi-

ness, agriculture and rural development.  They adopted the promotion of the role of women in society, north and south of the

Mediterranean, as one of the major ambitions in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

II.EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY 

10.The setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in Athens on 22-23 March was welcomed as a means to

improve co-operation on democratisation and to provide an input into all areas of the Partnership. The President of the Assem-

bly addressed the meeting of Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that the views of the Assembly on the major issues of the partner-

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ship would be welcome. Ministers agreed that the appropriate articulation between the institutions should be established with-

out setting up an over-burdensome formal consultation procedure. 

III.EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE
EAST

11.The EU presented an overview of its internal discussions on its proposed Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the

Middle East and encouraged partners to make comments and suggestions on the Strategic Partnership and follow up actions

relating to it.  The EU stressed that the most recent European Council underlined the importance of intensive consultation with

the countries involved. Ministers welcomed the opportunity provided by the Dublin Mid-Term Ministerial meeting to discuss

with Partners the proposed EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension and also to underline its com-

mitment to the Barcelona Process and its wish to develop this further including through the European Neighbourhood Policy.

12.In this respect the European Union and Mediterranean partners discussed issues relating to reform and democratisation in

the region. Existing instruments such as the Association Agreements and the national action plans under the European Neigh-

bourhood Policy should be fully used to support reforms and modernisation.

13.The EU indicated that it will continue to pursue its specific EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle

East, based on the existing frameworks and in particular the Barcelona Process as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, and

aiming for the appropriate articulation between the different frameworks. The EU also stated its readiness to cooperate with

other actors, with a view to achieving complementarity with other initiatives, notably with the US and in the framework of the G8

and NATO Summits in June.  The EU expressed its willingness to cooperate closely with initiatives coming from the region, includ-

ing taking account of the outcome of the Arab League Summit. 

14.Ministers agreed that the clear commitment to pursuing the Middle East Peace Process through the implementation of the

Road Map was central to the success of such a policy. Progress on the resolution of the Middle East conflict cannot be a pre-con-

dition for confronting the urgent reform challenges facing the countries of the region, nor vice versa. But it is clear that it will not

be possible to build a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress unless a just and lasting settlement of the conflict is in place.

IV.MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

15.Ministers reviewed developments since their last meeting in Naples and view with great concern the situation in the Middle

East. The Presidency informed partners about the meeting of the International Quartet in New York on 4 May. They noted with

appreciation the statement issued by the Quartet after the meeting and welcomed the programme of action outlined therein. The

Quartet should play an active role in pursuing the goal of a comprehensive regional peace and encourage the parties to move

ahead vigorously on the basis of the principles outlined in their New York statement.

16.Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to a negotiated two-State solution agreed between the parties which would result in

a viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent Palestinian State existing side by side in peace with an Israel living within recog-

nised and secure borders. They reaffirmed their belief that the Roadmap represents the only route to achieving such an outcome.

They called on both sides to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap. They stated that any change to the pre-1967 borders can

only be arrived at by agreement between the parties. Ministers noted that the refugee question and the manner in which the right

of return may be realised is also a Final Status issue and that the Roadmap states that a final and comprehensive permanent sta-

tus agreement that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to this question.

Ministers emphasised the principle that Final Status issues are a matter for negotiation and agreement between the parties them-

selves and must not be prejudged. Issues such as borders and refugees must be mutually agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians

based on Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, the terms of reference of the Madrid peace process, the principle

of land for peace, previous agreements and the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summit; and be consis-

tent with the Roadmap.

17.Ministers took note of the announced intention of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to withdraw from all Gaza settlements and

parts of the West Bank. They agreed that such a withdrawal must bring about a full Israeli withdrawal and complete end of occu-

pation in Gaza, and can be a step towards achieving the two-state vision; it could represent a significant step towards the imple-

mentation of the Roadmap provided that it is carried out in accordance with certain conditions, as set out in the conclusions of

the March 2004 European Council. They consider that such a step should provide a rare moment of opportunity in the search

for peace in the Middle East. Such an initiative should be properly orchestrated with the international community so as to ensure

that an orderly situation in Gaza results which will permit the maintenance of security as well as rehabilitation and reconstruc-

tion. Ministers urged all parties to undertake urgently preparations towards this end. Ministers stressed the need to avoid a polit-

ical vacuum, and the dangers which that would involve, in the interim period between now and the beginning of any withdrawal.

They recalled that there are a number of measures which need to be adopted in the period immediately ahead in the political,

security and humanitarian spheres in order to prevent further deterioration and to resume progress. Ministers urged an end to

violence and terrorism as well as the resumption of a ceasefire embracing all parties and groups. They called on both sides to

resume negotiations on the peace process without further delay. 

18.Ministers stressed the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summit of 28 March 2002

to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East which must include Syria and Lebanon.

19.Ministers recalled that a just, lasting and comprehensive peace must meet the legitimate aspirations of both the Israeli and

Palestinian people. Ministers called on all States in the region to exert every effort to promote peace. They also urged all states

to act to combat terrorism.

V. IRAQ

20.The EuroMediterranean partners stated their determination to assist the Iraqi people as they enter a new era in the history of

their country.

21.Calling on all parties in Iraq to work together to establish a sovereign, independent, democratic and peaceful Iraq whose ter-

ritorial integrity is preserved and which lives in peace with its neighbours, the EuroMediterranean partners committed them-

selves to continue to help the Iraqi people rebuild their country and regain its proper place in the regional as well as the interna-

tional family. 

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22.They welcomed the consensus reached by the various parties in Iraq in signing the new Transitional Administrative Law on 8

March and expressed the hope that this encouraging development would permit the transition process to move ahead expedi-

tiously.

23.They noted that the security situation in Iraq remained a major impediment to successful political and reconstruction

processes. 

24.They condemned all violence and terrorist attacks, including the kidnappings and brutal murder of hostages.  They deplored

the taking of hostages in all circumstances and called on those responsible to release immediately and unharmed all remaining

hostages and to desist from any further such activity. 

25.The partners condemned any incidents of abuse of prisoners in Iraq by occupying forces which have taken place as contrary

to international humanitarian law. They noted the prompt response by the UK and US authorities in instigating investigations

into reports of such abuse and their commitment to rectify any failure to adhere to international humanitarian law.

26.Convinced that a strong UN role in this political transition process is an essential element for its success, the EuroMediter-

ranean partners welcomed the decision of the Iraqi Governing Council to invite the UN to help with the transfer of sovereignty at

the end of June 2004 and future national elections and the acceptance of this invitation by the United Nations Secretary General,

Kofi Annan. They looked forward to the UN playing a vital and growing role endorsed by the UN Security Council in the run-up

to transition and beyond and expressed their support to UN Special Advisor Mr Lakhdar Brahimi in his endeavours.

VI.POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Political and security dialogue

27.Ministers expressed their determination to give greater substance to the political and security dialogue despite the obstacles

posed notably by the absence of progress in the Middle East Peace Process.  The noted the work programmes presented by the

ad hoc working groups and looked forward to progress being made on the areas covered by the groups. 

EuroMeSCo

28.Ministers noted the upcoming EuroMeSCo/EuroMed Senior Officials seminar to be held in Dublin on 1 June. They acknowl-

edged that EuroMeSCo continues to make an important contribution to the promotion of ongoing dialogue in the Political and

Security chapter of the Barcelona Process which is recognised by the Euro Mediterranean Partnership’s adoption of EuroMeSCo

as an official confidence building measure.

Diplomatic Seminars

29.Ministers noted with appreciation the 16th Seminar that was recently held in Malta. Ministers agreed that these Seminars are

an important contribution to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and expressed their support for this ongoing activity.

Human rights and democratisation

30.Ministers underlined the importance of taking forward the recommendations in the Commission Communication on rein-

vigorating EU actions on human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners. They reaffirmed that the Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership is based on respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy and that these form an

essential element both of the bilateral Association Agreements and of the multilateral framework governing relations between

the EU and Mediterranean partners. They also acknowledged the need for further progress in the region with regard to respect

for human rights and democracy. This could focus on extending and strengthening political pluralism, regulatory reform for the

implementation of international commitments, improving the judicial and penal systems, greater transparency, education and

awareness raising, as well as full acceptance of and improving conditions for activity by civil society. They confirmed the need for

full adherence to international law by all parties. 

31.Ministers noted that contacts have taken place with a number of partners to draw up joint action plans in line with the Com-

mission’s Communication on the subject and an allocation is envisaged for the countries that adopt action plans. An EU-

Morocco Association sub-committee on human rights, democratisation and good governance is being established; other part-

ners were encouraged to do the same to allow for structured discussion and follow-up; the EU indicated that human rights will

be an important component of the political chapter of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, and two regional

workshops will be held this year on the rights of the child (including matters relating to family law and parental responsibilities)

and on racism and xenophobia. Ministers noted that activity under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights

has also been stepped up with a focus on strengthening civil society and improving governance and the fight against corruption.

32.Ministers expressed the conviction that addressing these issues is essential to achieving lasting economic, social and human

development and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s goal of a region of peace, stability and prosperity.

Fight against terrorism 

33.Ministers deplored the recent terrorist attacks which have demonstrated that the fight against terrorism must be a priority

objective. Ministers therefore took this opportunity to stress that progress in cooperation on the fight against terrorism should

be stepped up. The need to move to the stage of concrete operational joint activities has been heightened by these attacks.

34.The EU, in the European Security Strategy adopted at the European Council in December 2003, identified terrorism as one of

the key threats to EU interests. The European Council on 25/26 March 2004 adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism.

The European Council urged full implementation of measures to combat terrorism as a matter of urgency and called for the

development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the factors contributing to terrorism. It also agreed updated Strategic

Objectives to enhance the EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism which was adopted in the wake of the 11 September 2001

attacks and subsequently supplemented by many important initiatives.

35.Cooperation should be intensified both at regional level and bilaterally. In the latter context, Ministers mandated the Justice

and Security sub-committees existing or currently being established under the Association Agreements to take forward such joint

activities at expert level with the aim of improving and assisting the development of counter-terrorism standards and capabili-

ties. The fight against terrorism should also be pursued in the framework of the Action Plans to be agreed under the ENP.

36.Ministers also noted that the informal Ad Hoc Senior Officials and experts’ meeting on Terrorism on 21 April concentrated

on an exchange of views on the possibility of engaging in operational joint activities.

Non-proliferation

37.Ministers instructed Senior Officials to explore possibilities for enhancing dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation

issues, in particular in order to promote universal adherence and effective compliance with all relevant multilateral agreements,

and the implementation of effective export/end use control policies. The development of a cooperative mechanism should be

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examined, as well as the designation of points of contact between Euro-Mediterranean partners. On the EU side, the Personal

Representative of HR Solana could assist in this process. The final objective should remain a mutually and effectively verifiable

Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their means of delivery, as set out

in the Barcelona declaration. 

EESSDDPP

38.Ministers noted the report on dialogue and cooperation on ESDP between the EU and Mediterranean partners prepared by

the relevant EU body and undertook to discuss the issue further at official level.  

39.Ministers noted ongoing efforts to deepen this dialogue in the framework of the Barcelona Process, as agreed at Valencia.

These efforts should focus on means to raise the visibility of this dialogue, establishing contact points on a voluntary basis and

exploring the possibility for cooperation with Mediterranean partners in concrete activities on conflict prevention and crisis

management. This could be done through possible cooperation in the Senior Officials’ meetings and in other appropriate for-

mats, including on a subregional or country basis; this would be fully coordinated with the activities of the Euro-Mediterranean

Process. These general efforts would be made with a view to encouraging participation of Mediterranean partners, on a case by

case basis, in crisis management operations. 

...

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Occasional Papers

All Occasional Papers
can be accessed via the institute’s website:
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n° 34

Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role 
of the European Union
Fernanda Faria

For our eyes only? 
Shaping an intelligence community within the EU 
Dov Lynch

EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly
Paul Luif

Space and security policy in Europe: Executive summary
Stefano Silvestri, Rapporteur

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?
Taras Kuzio

EU-Russian security dimensions
Edited by Dov Lynch

€uros for ESDP: financing EU operations
Antonio Missiroli

The Galileo satellite system and its security implications  
Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini

La question du Cachemire. Après le 11 septembre et la nouvelle 
donne au Jammu et Cachemire 
Christophe Jaffrelot et Jasmine Zérinini-Brotel

L’Union en action : la mission de police en Bosnie 
Agnieszka Nowak

La Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte de stabilité
Ralitza Dimtcheva

Iraq: a European point of view 
Martin Ortega

Iraq: the transatlantic debate 
Philip H. Gordon

Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP 
Katia Vlachos-Dengler

From candidate to member state: Poland and the future of the EU
Rafal Trzaskowski

Optimiser le processus de Barcelone 
Dorothée Schmid

L’ONU au Kosovo : leçons de la première MINUK
Eric Chevalier

Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?  The view from Central Europe
Edited by  Antonio Missiroli

April 2004

January 2004

December 2003

December 2003

November 2003

July 2003

June 2003

April 2003

Mars 2003

Janvier 2003

Janvier 2002

December 2002

December 2002

November 2000

September 2002

Juillet 2002

Mai 2002

April 2002