European Parliament resolution on Eurostat
Date: 2004-04-22
Institutions: European Parliament
Subjects: European Anti-fraud Office, European Commission, Eurostat, administrative check, financial control, fraud against the EU, interinstitutional relations (EU), management audit

30.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104 E/1021

Thursday 22 April 2004

9.
Repeats the need to bring the EIB under prudential supervision, be it by the European Central Bank
or by any other structure dealing with banking supervision at European level; recognises once again that
this needs to be arranged in the Treaty; Calls therefore upon the Commission and Member States to come
with an initiative and asks the EIB actively to consider possibilities and report back to the Parliament;

10. Welcomes the fact that the EIB has adopted the Commission’s definition of SMEs and supports its
attempts to put it into practice;

Strongly calls again upon the EIB, the Court of Auditors and the Commission to amend the tripar-
11.
tite agreement following its expiry on 19 March 2003 to authorise the Court of Auditors to audit both the
guarantee and the underlying transaction, in cases where the EIB provides loans; considers that further
consideration should be given to improving the supervision of the EIB and is of the opinion that the
European Parliament needs to be involved in this; calls on the parties to further amend the tripartite
agreement so that the Court of Auditors has at least the same audit rights with respect to the EIB as it
has with respect to the ECB, namely the operational efficiency of the management of the EIB;

12.
Suggests that the EIB regularly publish an evaluation report on its financial activities, dealing separ-
ately with its direct activities, those undertaken by third parties (loans, risk capital, funds, etc.) and its
derivative transactions;

13.
Asks the EIB to inform the Parliament about compliance with the recommendations in the Annual
report of the Audit Committee and the recommendations made by the operations evaluation department
in its sectoral reports;

Recommends that the EIB also publish information concerning failed projects, if any, in order to

14.
learn from such failures;

15.
Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to give full access to information necessary for the audit by
the Court of Auditors (if necessary including commercially confidential or market-sensitive information)
and for scrutiny by OLAF and the Court of Justice;

16.
Regrets that the information presented by the EIB on its website appears in only three community
languages; encourages the EIB to make the information presented on the website available in more Com-
munity languages;

Urges the new European Parliament to organise a hearing of experts on the EIB annual report 2003

17.
and 2004 and to formulate conclusions for the Lisbon process concerning the policies of the EIB;

18.
Asks the EIB to annually provide the European Parliament and the public, together with the pre-
sentation of the EIB’s Annual Report, with a written summary of the action undertaken in response to the
issues raised in the previous annual report of the Parliament;

19.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the EIB.

P5_TA(2004)0372

Eurostat

The European Parliament,

European Parliament resolution on Eurostat

(cid:1) having regard to its resolution of 4 December 2003 on the evaluation of the activities of the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1) of 4 December 2003, its resolution of 29 January 2004 on the action
taken by the Commission on the observations contained in the resolution accompanying the decision

(1) P5_TA(2003)0551.

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30.4.2004

Thursday 22 April 2004

giving discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the
2001 financial year (1) and its resolution (2) of 21 April 2004 on granting discharge to the Commis-
sion in respect of 2002,

(cid:1) having regard to the Commission’s report to the European Parliament and the Council on the follow-

up to 2001 discharges (COM(2003) 651 (cid:1) C5-0536/2003),

(cid:1) having regard to Article 276 of the EC Treaty,

(cid:1) having regard to Article 147 of the Financial Regulation,

(cid:1) having regard to Rule 37(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas it highlighted a number of concerns regarding financial management at Eurostat in its dis-

charge resolution of 8 April 2003 (3) on the financial year 2001,

B. whereas, as a result of Parliament’s insistence and several press reports in the spring of 2003, the
Commission launched an internal investigation into Eurostat, the results of which were communicated
to Parliament on 8 July 2003 together with a number of emergency measures, including the suspen-
sion of contracts and senior management pending further examination,

C. whereas three parallel investigations were launched by an internal Commission task force, the Internal

Audit Service and OLAF, whose findings were submitted to Parliament at the end of October 2003,

D. whereas Mr Prodi announced an action plan to Parliament in December 2003 in the context of the
annual debate on the Commission’s legislative programme, which was further detailed by Commis-
sioner Solbes in February 2004,

E. whereas OLAF has so far concluded a number of investigations into specific aspects of the Eurostat
case and forwarded some files to public prosecutors in Luxembourg and France, whilst several matters
still remain under examination,

1.
Recalls the conclusions and recommendations contained in the resolution of 29 January 2004 deal-
ing principally with the follow-up to the Eurostat affair, and in particular with the positive role of whist-
leblowers in raising concerns, the existence of internal audit reports detailing irregular financial practices
and the poor communication and treatment of such information within and across Commission depart-
ments resulting in the problem’s remaining unaddressed for several years;

2.
Regrets the inadequate response so far received to the oral question (O-0067/03) submitted last
October and to the resolution of 29 January 2004; demands that the Commission make a full and com-
plete written evaluation by 31 July 2004 of the circumstances of the Eurostat scandal including all OLAF
reports, covering in particular the slow response of Commissioners to the warning signals and the poor
flow of information within the Commission;

Recognises the quality and thoroughness of the work of the Commission’s Internal Audit Service as
3.
well as Eurostat’s IAC; finds, however, the extremely long delays and the resistance and hesitation of the
Commission in forwarding these vital reports to Parliament unacceptable; calls on the Commission to
consider the full publication of these documents, or at least versions which have been rendered anony-
mous;

4.
Notes that the Financial Regulation was infringed at Eurostat between 1999 and 2003 and that the
management of Eurostat neither responded to the reports of the internal audit units by taking decisive
action nor informed those in positions of responsibility within Eurostat unambiguously about abuses
which had occurred; stresses that although some rule changes may be desirable, the problem was not the
lack of good rules but the poor application of existing rules;

(1) P5_TA(2004)0049.
(2) P5_TA(2004)0337.
(3) OJ L 148, 16.6.2003, p. 21.

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Official Journal of the European Union

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5. Welcomes in principle the Eurostat action plan for 2004 and the Commission proposal for a new
OLAF Regulation (10 January 2004);

Thursday 22 April 2004

Stresses that the case has highlighted serious problems in the working methods of both the Commis-
6.
sion and OLAF; considers that the Eurostat affair has highlighted serious shortcomings in the Commis-
sion’s internal control management system and that the Commission’s failure to come up with a convinc-
ing response undermines the credibility of the system as a whole;

Commission

7.
Considers that the Commission has failed to draw the appropriate conclusions from the Eurostat
affair and that, contrary to the undertaking it made at the start of its term of office, it has failed to accept
its political responsibility for the matter, either collectively or individually;

8.

Notes that the reports so far received about the Eurostat affair have revealed that:

(cid:1) there was no effective political response to public announcements by OLAF about investigations into
Eurostat (July 2002) by either the Commissioner responsible for Eurostat or the Commissioner respon-
sible for budgetary control issues;

(cid:1) no-one monitored all the pieces of evidence as they slowly came to light;

(cid:1) the Secretary-General did not pass on any of the information, which was, albeit, very vague, from

OLAF to anyone with political responsibility;

(cid:1) Commissioners’ Private Offices ignored or dismissed the information that did reach them;

Recognises that the problems originated prior to 1999, but maintains that action to identify and

9.
remedy the situation was not taken swiftly enough by the present Commission;

10.
Considers that, despite the Commission’s efforts to improve relations between Commissioners and
departments, the Eurostat affair has made it clear that there was inadequate transparency and communi-
cation between Eurostat’s management and the Commission’s cross-sector departments and between Euros-
tat and the Commissioner responsible;

11.
Believes that these facts demonstrate that insufficient consideration seems to have been given to the
systems and methods by which the Commissioners themselves would be able to assume their political
responsibilities in the fight against fraud and mismanagement;

12.
Reminds the Commissioners that they are responsible for the wrongdoings of officials in their
departments (‘Committee of Independent Experts’, 1999 and the Code of Conduct for Commissioners,
1999); considers that Commissioners cannot be relieved of their responsibility because they did not receive
enough information;

13.
Regrets the absence of proposals for structural change in the relations between Commissioners and
Directors-General, and considers it vital to clarify the leading role of Commissioners as well as their pol-
itical responsibility; notes that the proposals of the Commission progress report on the actions adopted
under the March 2000 White Paper on administrative reform do not go far enough in this regard;

Points in particular to the issues of political responsibility that this raises in matters of financial and
14.
managerial governance and the weaknesses of the control environment in some departments; calls on the
Commission to make proposals for amending the Code of Conduct of Commissioners and structural
changes in their relations with Directorates-General so as to make the political responsibility of Commis-
sioners for their departments a meaningful concept; considers it essential that the President of the Com-
mission has the measures at his/her disposal to ensure that the discipline of the Code can be applied;

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30.4.2004

Thursday 22 April 2004

Calls for one member of the College to take responsibility, as in the past, for coordinating the fight

15.
against fraud and mismanagement, with specific responsibility inter alia for:

(cid:1) liaising with the Internal Audit Service;

(cid:1) the scrutiny, review and oversight of the follow-up of all internal audit reports prepared by the audit
capabilities of the directorates-general, and for evaluation reports on the management of programmes;

(cid:1) the Audit Progress Committee;

(cid:1) relations with OLAF;

(cid:1) relations with the European Court of Auditors;

(cid:1) liaison with other Commissioners in their work on budgetary control issues;

16.
Believes that each individual Commissioner is accountable for the services under his responsibility
and must ensure that their objectives have been achieved on a basis of full respect of the principles of
sound financial management; insists that all Commissioners prioritise the fight against fraud and misman-
agement within the Directorates-General for which they have responsibility; intends to take into consider-
ation the commitment of candidate Commissioners to this fight during the hearings on the new Commis-
sioners;

17.
Calls therefore for one adviser in all Commissioners’ Private Offices to be given specific responsibil-
ity, in addition to other tasks, for advising his/her Commissioner on issues relating to budgetary control
within the DGs for which that Commissioner has responsibility and liaising with the office of the member
of the College responsible for budgetary control matters;

18.
Reiterates its belief that Commissioners must have a more direct and proactive role in overseeing
the work of their departments and taking responsibility for the failings as much as for the successes;
intends therefore to hold the future Commission to account for its omissions as well as its actions;

Internal procedures

19.
Recalls that the administrative reform has been one of the main objectives of the present Commis-
sion, that the White Paper ‘Reforming the Commission’ (COM(2000) 200)was adopted on 1 March 2000,
and that the Commission has committed itself to an ambitious programme for strengthening indepen-
dence, accountability, efficiency, transparency and the highest standards of responsibility; notes that:

(cid:1) many very necessary and important steps in the right direction have been taken; and

(cid:1) there are still potential barriers to reform which have to be addressed;

20.
Recalls that the reform places a strong emphasis on decentralisation of financial controls; believes
that this in turn highlights the urgent need to develop more suitable and accountable forms of central
management supervision of the control systems operating in individual departments;

21.
Takes the view that the Eurostat case has highlighted the need to review the relations between these
different actors and between the individual Commissioners and the College of Commissioners, as well as
the functioning of the chain of accountability, in order to ensure progress not only in the area of financial
management but also in the governance structure of the Commission;

22.
Calls for the annual activity reports drawn up by the Directors-General to reflect their responsibil-
ities as authorising officers, as provided for by the Financial Regulation; calls for the summary report to
include all the key aspects of the various annual activity reports/statements of assurance;

23. Maintains, with reference to the channels used for disseminating requests from Commissioners and
the replies issued by departments, that such replies (when relating to topics deemed sensitive) should
always be forwarded by the Director-General to the relevant Commissioner himself and not just to his
head of office;

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C 104 E/1025

24.
Deplores the former practice of Eurostat and OPOCE of creating ‘financial envelopes’; calls on the
Commission to act swiftly and investigate the possibility of other Commission departments’ having been
engaged in similar practices and to take appropriate action to uncover the truth about the real extent of
the system and the final use of the funds in these ‘financial envelopes’;

Thursday 22 April 2004

Progress at Eurostat

Takes note of the actions taken so far to remedy the situation in this Commission department;

25.
welcomes in particular:

(cid:1) the thorough revision of all existing contracts with and subsidies to outside bodies and the cancel-

lation of all automatic contract renewals;

(cid:1) the complete revision of existing relations between Eurostat and national statistical offices, including

grants that were not properly analysed over several years;

(cid:1) the drastic reduction in the number of publications;

(cid:1) the internalisation policy, meaning that statistical work will again be executed in-house, as recom-
mended by the IAC-Eurostat reports and demanded in Parliament’s above-mentioned 2001 discharge
resolution;

(cid:1) the free publication of statistics via its internet site;

(cid:1) improved training in financial management;

26.
Takes the view that an independent administrative and management audit of the new Eurostat
structure should be carried out once OLAF’s investigations are complete, and specifically a follow-up
report should be drawn up during the present Commission’s term of office, analysing whether previous
IAS and IAC-Eurostat recommendations were complied with;

27.
Considers that, in the case of Eurostat, there was an excessive dependency on external agencies;
welcomes, in this regard, the commitment to carry out internally the bulk of Eurostat’s tasks and to review
the nature of all contracts with external consultants linked to Eurostat;

Urges the Commission, in addition, to address the situation of the small sub-contracting firms

28.
unintentionally caught up in the affair;

Financial Regulation

Calls on the Commission to address, either by a revision of the implementing provisions or by
29.
specific legislative/procedural measures, any weaknesses identified in the new Financial Regulation which
may expose the Community budget to the risk of fraud; recommends that any such measure be considered
in conjunction with the anticipated revision of the OLAF Regulation;

OLAF

Underlines the importance of a fully-functioning and independent anti-fraud body for handling
30.
complex and sensitive investigations; reiterates its position that OLAF must have institutional indepen-
dence from the Commission and be accompanied by a body providing proper legal oversight of its oper-
ations and ensuring confidentiality and protection of those under investigation;

31.
Stresses that the Commission Secretary-General should be required directly to inform the Commis-
sioner responsible for the DG concerned of any internal investigations of which he may be aware through
OLAF, even if the information provided is concise; the Commissioner must undertake not to disclose
outside the College of Commissioners any confidential information which might be entrusted to him or
her;

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Official Journal of the European Union

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30.4.2004

Thursday 22 April 2004

Interinstitutional bodies

32.
Considers, as the case of OPOCE proves, that it is particularly difficult to identify clear political
responsibility in interinstitutional bodies; calls therefore on the Institutions to re-examine the legal provi-
sions governing existing interinstitutional bodies, without, however, calling into question the principle of
interinstitutional cooperation;

Future action

33.
Admits that the Eurostat affair represents a serious set-back for public appreciation of the Commis-
sion’s administrative reform process; recognises, nevertheless, that almost all of the specific actions from
the abovementioned White Paper have been approved; urges the Commission to ensure full and thorough
implementation throughout its services, agencies and satellite bodies so that similar circumstances to those
at Eurostat can never be repeated;

34.
Intends to assess thoroughly all the reports on the Eurostat investigation, promised by OLAF and
requested repeatedly by Parliament, most recently in its resolution of 17 December 2003 (1) when it called
for OLAF ‘to submit its final reports to Parliament as soon as possible, and by 15 January at the latest’;
underlines that so far these have not been received; reaffirms its intention to continue to monitor and
scrutinise future developments in the ongoing Eurostat investigations and potential legal actions, with a
view to proposing further reforms as required;

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Court of

35.
Auditors.

*

*

*

(1) P5_TA(2003)0585.

P5_TA(2004)0373

Freedom of expression and information

European Parliament resolution on the risks of violation, in the EU and especially in Italy, of
freedom of expression and information (Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights)
(2003/2237(INI))

The European Parliament,

(cid:1) having regard to the motion for a resolution by: Sylviane H. Ainardi and 37 others on the risk of a
serious breach of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and of information in Italy
(B5-0363/2003),

(cid:1) having regard to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 11 of the

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

(cid:1) having regard to Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 22, 43, 49, 83, 87, 95

and 151 of the EC Treaty,

(cid:1) having regard to its resolutions of 20 November 2002 on media concentration (1), of 13 November
2001 on the Commission communication Services of General Interest in Europe (2), of 4 October
2001 on the third report of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Econ-
omic and Social Committee on the application of Directive 89/552/EEC (3) and of 4 September 2003
on the situation situation as regards fundamental rights in the European Union (2002) (4),

(1) OJ C 25 E, 29.1.2004, p. 205.
(2) OJ C 140 E, 13.6.2002, p. 153.
(3) OJ C 87 E, 11.4.2002, p. 221.
(4) P5_TA(2003)0376.