Case C-3/04: Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Rechtbank Utrecht, Sector kanton, Locatie Utrecht, by order of that Court of 10 December 2003 in the case of POSEIDON CHARTERING B.V. against 1. V.O.F. Marianne Zeeschip, 2. ALBERT MOOĲ, 3. SJOERDTJE SĲSWERDA, 4. GERRIT DANIEL SCHRAM
Date: 2004-03-06
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: approximation of laws, contract, freedom to provide services, interpretation of the law, remuneration of work, sales occupation

6.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 59/15

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present appeal is based on the following two grounds of
law:

(i) Manifest error in that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance states that the Appellant’s principal objection
relates to the validity of the Commission’s finding that
the Compensatory levy is compatible with the common
market organisation for cotton and therefore the original
Application of the Appellant is inadmissible — should
this finding be upheld it would inevitably result in an
infringement of the rights to access to justice of the
Appellant.

This is because the Appellant did not have any other
option but to challenge the deficient finding of the
operative part of Article 1 of the contested Decision,
which implicitly refers to the last paragraph of Section IV
of the contested Decision which states that the Com-
pensatory levy of Article 30(1) of Law 2040/92 is
‘consonant with the market organisation’. The contested
Decision is deficient in that the Commission failed to
fulfil its duty to analyse the activities of the Greek Cotton
Board financed by the compensatory levy of Article 30(1)
of Law 2040/92 under the EC State aid rules; and

(ii) The judgment of the Court of First Instance is erroneous
in law and contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities.

The Appellant submits that the judgment of the Court of
First Instance is contrary to the case-law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities in that the judgment
states that (i) ‘it is obvious’ that the Compensatory levy of
Article 30(1) of Law 2040/92 neither constitutes State
aid nor contains a State aid component — the reason
being that in the Court of First Instance’s opinion the
Compensatory levy of Article 30(1) of Law 2040/92 is
‘merely one of two State aid financing methods granted
by the Greek Cotton Board’; and (ii) that it is erroneous
to equate the Compensatory levy of Article 30(1) of Law
2040/92 ‘with State aid’. This is because the Compensa-
tory levy of Article 30(1) of Law 2040/92 constitutes
State aid within the meaning of the Enirisorse and Van
Calster case-law.

(1) OJ C 259, 09.09.2000, p. 24.
(2) OJ 2000, L 63, p. 27.

Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Rechtbank
Utrecht, Sector kanton, Locatie Utrecht, by order of that
Court of 10 December 2003 in the case of POSEIDON
CHARTERING B.V. against 1. V.O.F. Marianne Zeeschip,
2. ALBERT MOOIJ, 3. SJOERDTJE SIJSWERDA, 4. GER-
RIT DANIEL SCHRAM

(Case C-3/04)

(2004/C 59/25)

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities by order of the Rechtbank Utrecht,
Sector kanton, Locatie Utrecht, of 10 December 2003, received
at the Court Registry on 5 January 2004, for a preliminary
ruling in the case of POSEIDON CHARTERING B.V. against 1.
V.O.F. Marianne Zeeschip, 2. ALBERT MOOIJ, 3. SJOERDTJE
SIJSWERDA, 4. GERRIT DANIEL SCHRAM on the following
questions:

1.

Is a self-employed intermediary, who has arranged (not
several but) one contract (a charter for a ship) which is
renewed every year and pursuant to which, in respect of
the renewal of the charter, the annual freight negotiations
(except, during the period from 1994 to 2000, in 1999)
are conducted between the owner of the ship and a third
party and the outcome of those negotiations is recorded
by the intermediary in an addendum, to be regarded as a
commercial agent within the meaning of Council Direc-
tive 86/653/EEC (1) of 18 December 1986 on the coordi-
nation of the laws of the Member States relating to self-
employed commercial agents?

2. Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1
that the intermediary works for two principals because
the intermediary already knew the third party between
1987 and 1994 and transacted business in respect of the
abovementioned charter for the same ship? If an agency
contract must be held to exist, does it make any
difference to the answer to Question 1 that an indemnity
(commission) of 2,5 % of the charter has been paid over
many years and/or that Article 7(1) of the Directive
refers to ‘commercial transactions concluded’ and to the
existence of an entitlement to (the) commission ‘where
the transaction is concluded with a third party whom he
has previously acquired as a customer for transactions of
the same kind’?

3. Does is make any difference to the answer to Question 1
that Article 17 of the Directive refers to ‘customers’
instead of customer?

(1) OJ L 382 of 31.12.1986, p. 17.