WRITTEN QUESTION E-0487/04 by Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE-DE) to the Commission. EU dairy sector: Argentina and the WTO peace clause.
Date: 2004-02-23
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Argentina, Dispute Settlement Body, New Zealand, agricultural trade, aid to agriculture, common commercial policy, milk, trade dispute, trade relations

C 84 E/800

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

3.4.2004

It should be noted that achievement of these indicative targets is and will depend on the budgetary
authority confirming that the additional resources required to meet the measured needs arising from
enlargement of the Union by 10 Member States will be granted. If the establishment plan is not increased
year on year according to the forecasts of needs, the share of posts for nationals of new Member States’
would obviously have to be decreased accordingly with consequent implications for overall performance of
the Commission.

The results of successful candidatures in open competitions by nationality for 2001, 2002 and 2003 are
given in the annexe which is sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament’s Secretariat.

(1) Decision 22/03/1995 Kotzonis/CES (T-586/93, Rec. p. II-665, RecFP p. II-203).
(2) Communication of 19 February 2003, C (2003) 436.

(2004/C 84 E/0895)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0481/04

by Christopher Heaton-Harris (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(23 February 2004)

Subject: Blue Dragon

Could the Commission confirm if any of the OLAF investigators involved in the Blue Dragon investigation
were amongst the 12 former UCLAF staff moved from OLAF to the Commission in 2001?

Answer given by Ms Schreyer on behalf of the Commission

(5 April 2004)

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has informed the Commission that three OLAF staff members
concerned initially with questions relating to the ‘Blue Dragon’ case had earlier been staff members of the
Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (UCLAF) and subsequently left OLAF for posts in the
Commission in 2001.

(2004/C 84 E/0896)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0487/04

by Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE-DE) to the Commission

Subject: EU dairy sector: Argentina and the WTO ‘peace clause’

(23 February 2004)

Following the expiry of the WTO ‘peace clause’ on 31 December 2003, Argentina has already threatened
to bring proceedings against the EU before the WTO’s dispute settlement body in relation to Community
subsidies to the dairy sector.

Does the Commission believe that the threats from Argentina might at some stage jeopardise the recently
reformed Community system?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(21 April 2004)

With regard to the expiry of the Peace Clause, the Commission maintains the following position: World
Trade Organisation (WTO) Members’ use of litigation in an attempt to challenge subsidies, granted in
conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture,
risks undermining comprehensive negotiations on
agriculture aimed at concluding an agreement acceptable to all Members.

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84 E/801

The Commission too has concerns about certain export practices such as State Trading Enterprises (STEs)
operating in the milk sector. The Dairy Industry Restructuring Bill 2001 may have replaced the New
Zealand Dairy Board by a company which controls 98 % of that country’s milk and assumed the Board’s
role and sole exporter status but, because of the statutory privileges conferred on it by the Bill it remains,
de jure and de facto, a State Trading Enterprise. The Bill maintains the company’s right to licences to
export to designated markets like the USA, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Japan and the EU, until the
beginning of 2011 in some cases. In addition to the right to all export licences to some of these designated
markets, the company has the sole right to export to such markets under the tariff rate quotas opened by
those countries.

Article XVII of the GATT and the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII obliges Members to
notify annually non-governmental enterprises,
including marketing boards, which have been granted
exclusive or special rights or privileges including statutory powers, in the exercise of which they influence
through their sales the level or direction of exports. Members should ensure the maximum transparency
possible in their notification so as to permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the
enterprises notified and the effects of their operations on international trade. The last notification from
New Zealand was on 20 July 2001 which indicated that ‘The NZDB may continue to be notified as a STE
but further analysis on this question is needed’. Since then the company which replaced the NZDB has
expanded its share of the world market for dairy products dramatically. The details will be sent directly to
the Honourable Member.

The Commission’s concerns are due to the statutory monopoly of a single company on a significant part
of preferential world trade in the dairy sector, the consequent potential of cross subsidisation under such
an arrangement,
the effect of a single desk seller on world market price formation under these
circumstances and the absence of the transparency required by Article XVII of the WTO rules.

However a strategic choice has to be made by Members, and in particular the export-oriented ones,
between two alternative routes which are largely mutually exclusive: either they believe that multilateral
negotiations are the way forward to a fair and market-oriented trading system, or they believe WTO
litigation is the way forward.

The Commission is convinced that the consistency between the EU commitments under WTO and its
domestic support policy will be strengthened even further in the perspective of continued common
agricultural policy (CAP) reform.

(2004/C 84 E/0897)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0498/04

by Salvador Garriga Polledo (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(23 February 2004)

Subject: Community warning on Spanish productivity

The Commission claims that Spanish labour productivity is poor, ‘inter alia’ thanks to the low levels of
the population and the slowness with which Spain is making the move to a
education amongst
knowledge-based economy.

This assessment has caused some surprise, and Spaniards would like to know more about the specific
factors which led the Commission to reach it.

What parameters were used to arrive at these conclusions, and in what sense does the Commission think
that dialogue on the issue would help narrow the gap between conceptual positions on the issue of
productivity in Spain?