WRITTEN QUESTION E-0418/04 by Gerhard Schmid (PSE) to the Commission. Security of EC cards.
Date: 2004-02-17
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Germany, data protection, electronic banking, electronic money, fraud, industrial counterfeiting, product safety

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84 E/789

last occasion during a round of formal discussions held in December 2003 in Pyongyang. The Commission
has consistently expressed to the North Korean authorities its concern about the treatment of these people
once returned by China to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). It has urged the DPRK to
respect the fundamental rights of these citizens.

Furthermore, the EU tabled a resolution on the human rights situation in the DPRK at the 2003 United
Nations (UN) Commission of Human Rights which was adopted on 16 April 2003. The EU is prepared to
table another resolution in 2004 underlining its continuing concern.

The EU is conducting a bilateral dialogue on human rights with China and the issue of the North Korean
refugees in China has also been systematically raised in that context. The EU’s constant position has been
to call on the Chinese authorities to handle the issue in a moderate and constructive manner and to apply,
therefore, the non-repatriation principle in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and
to allow the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to have access to the North Korea-China
border area. Most recently, the EU recalled this position to the Chinese authorities during the last round of
the dialogue on human rights held in Dublin on 26/27 February 2004. Moreover, on 18 February 2004,
the EU Troika carried out a démarche to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the arrest and
detention in China of the DPRK citizens who had left their country and urged China not to forcibly
repatriate them to the DPRK.

(2004/C 84 E/0886)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0418/04

by Gerhard Schmid (PSE) to the Commission

(17 February 2004)

Subject: Security of EC cards

Fraud involving cash dispensers in the EU is on the increase. There have been a number of cases recently
where data from EC cards has been transmitted from a cash dispenser set up specially for this purpose and
copied onto new cards. Only German EC cards contain extra built-in security features preventing this kind
of abuse. The replacement of magnetic strip cards with chip cards will take some time to complete.

Is the Commission planning to draw up measures to introduce such security features throughout the
internal market?

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(5 April 2004)

The Commission is aware of the various techniques used by criminals to collect card data from automated
teller machines (ATMs) in the EU. These techniques include the setting up of fake ATMs or alterations to
genuine ATMs with the specific purpose of copying data from the magnetic stripe of Community cards.
After copying the magnetic stripe and capturing the PIN code, criminals generally transfer the data
obtained onto blank cards (‘white plastic’), which are fraudulently used mostly in unattended ATMs or
terminals.

According to the information received by the Commission,
the security features described by the
Honourable Member can prevent this kind of abuse and have been in place already for many years in
Germany. They consist of a modification in the magnetic stripe of the card and an additional device to be
installed in the ATM. To the Commission’s knowledge, such a solution is, for the time being, used only on
cards issued by German banks and only in order to perform cash withdrawals at ATMs located in
Germany. Such security features cannot be detected by terminals (POS) located in German shops or other
merchant terminals (e.g. petrol stations or vending machines).

C 84 E/790

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

3.4.2004

is
The EU banking industry has analysed this technology in detail. Their conclusion was that
technologically less advanced than the chip, and therefore was not retained as their preferred solution.
Instead, the EU payment card schemes and banks committed to introducing chip cards in all Member
States by 2005 in order to prevent fraud with counterfeit cards. When new POS terminals and ATMs
capable of reading chip cards will be installed in all Member States, the criminal modus operandi described
above will no longer be possible.

it

It is possible that in some countries the migration to chip cards will take more time to complete, given the
current level of progress, the number of cards to be re-issued and the ATMs and POS terminals to be
replaced or modified. However, even in this case, banks are reluctant to introduce throughout the Internal
Market the security features existing on German cards and ATMs as an interim solution. In fact, such
features would require yet another adaptation of ATMs and replacement of cards, which would add further
costs to the migration to the chip and is likely to slow it down further.

For these reasons the Commission is not planning measures to introduce the security features used in
Germany. Instead, the Commission’s objective is to ensure that the deployment of chip cards and terminals
in the EU takes place as soon as possible. In 2004 the Commission intends to issue a Report to the
Parliament and the Council on the EU Fraud Prevention Action Plan 2001-2003. The Commission also
supports projects on solutions using chip cards for authentication purposes under the Information Society
Technologies (IST) Research Programme.

Rather than mandating detailed security features, the role of the Commission is to create strong incentives
for payment providers to implement such features, if necessary by setting liability rules. Currently there is
an increasing number of cases where cards are counterfeited and the PIN code is captured using electronic
devices. The Commission will examine these issues in the context of its forthcoming proposal on a New
Legal Framework for Payments in the Internal Market.

(2004/C 84 E/0887)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0447/04

by Michl Ebner (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(23 February 2004)

Subject: Exports of peat to Italy

Peat is one of the most common bulk materials used in horticulture. Countries rich in peat, such as
Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, export a large amount of this material to
countries such as Italy, which have little peat of their own. For many years now, a large number of Italian
companies have been importing peat from those countries by sea. However, there are problems which
hamper the import of this material by sea. Because of difficulties in Italian ports (e.g. labour problems,
high costs and charges), such materials are now transported across Europe by road. Statistics show that
76 % of Italian peat imports from Germany, 79 % of peat imports from the Netherlands and an astounding
100 % of peat imports from France are transported by road, although transport by sea would be perfectly
feasible, cheaper and less harmful to the environment.

What are the Commission’s views on this situation?

Does the Commission actively encourage sea transport?

Is the Commission giving consideration to the drafting of a proposal for a Community Directive whereby
sea transport would be given preference over cross-Europe road transport, which is expensive and harmful
and pollutes the environment?