WRITTEN QUESTION E-0297/04 by Theodorus Bouwman (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Compliance with EU law of Spanish mining company Uminsa and possible frauds.
Date: 2004-02-06
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU financing arrangements, Spain, State aid, application of EU law, coal industry, collective agreement, control of State aid, fraud against the EU, labour law, unfair dismissal, union representative, workers' representation

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84 E/569

(2004/C 84 E/0646)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0297/04

by Theodorus Bouwman (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(6 February 2004)

Subject: Compliance with EU law of Spanish mining company Uminsa and possible frauds

In the last few weeks the mining company Uminsa has dismissed 16 miners, eight of whom are shop
stewards for the Spanish trade unions ‘Comisiones Obreras’ and ‘Unión General de Trabajadores’. The
company has justified the dismissals with allegations such as having illegally called for a strike, and a belief
that these employees may have been working whilst on sick leave. Uminsa is a major beneficiary of state
aid, from both the Spanish State and the European Union, despite not respecting the current Coal Plan
(Plan del Carbón)’s labour agreement, which provides that the company would create four new job places
for 11 retirements, and forcing the miners to carry out unpaid overtime.

All evidence suggests that these are the first dismissals from a longer list with the objective of restructuring
the company’s workforce; all of it done in an irregular fashion, especially if we take into account the fact
that they are dismissing workers with less than three months left before they become eligible for early
retirement.

Uminsa’s mine where the 16 dismissed employees worked is located in Velilla del Rio Carrión, in the
Province of Palencia, Castilla-León, Spain.

We believe that Uminsa’s behaviour is unacceptable and that the European institutions must exercise their
stewardship of jobs, especially in a deprived area receiving Objective 1 funding, by not granting or
authorising public money to companies such as Uminsa that do not carry out their labour or social duties.
Uminsa has in fact received since 1998 substantial public subventions through the ECSC Treaty (see
answer to question E-0342/02 (1), 27 March 2002).

Can the European Commission assess whether Uminsa’s actions comply with European labour law?

Furthermore, can the Commission investigate whether this might be a case of fraud on public funds, as the
company is not fulfilling the objectives agreed to in the concession of such EU funds?

Can the Commission investigate whether the public money which has been allocated so far to Uminsa has
been properly used? Can it make sure that Uminsa has not used the same aid for the same objective twice?

(1) OJ C 205 E, 29.8.2002, p. 122.

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(16 March 2004)

Coal subsidies are assessed on the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002 of 23 July 2002 on
State aid to the coal industry (1), which entered into force after the expiry of the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty. This Regulation lays down rules for the granting of State aid to the coal industry with
the aim of contributing to the restructuring of the coal industry. The rules take account of the social and
regional aspects of the sector’s restructuring and the need for maintaining, as a precautionary measure,
a minimum quantity of indigenous coal production to guarantee access to reserves. The restructuring
process of the coal industry has to be continued, given that, in the future, most Community coal is likely
to remain uncompetitive in relation to imported coal. The restructuring of the coal industry has major
social and regional effects. Therefore mines can benefit, temporarily, from aid to alleviate the social and
regional consequences of the restructuring. This enables Member States to implement adequate measures
for the social and economic development of the areas affected by the restructuring.

C 84 E/570

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

3.4.2004

In this respect the task of the Commission is to ensure that normal conditions of competition are
established, maintained and complied with. The evidence provided by the Honourable Member, is not
however sufficient at this stage to conclude the illegal use of EU or national funds.

The Commission is currently examining the compatibility of aid in favour of coal industry in the region
where Uminsa is located (2), as well as the compatibility of a long-term restructuring plan for the period
2003 to 2006 of the Spanish coal industry. The examination of all relevant state aid aspects will be carried
out in light of Council Regulation 1407/2002.

(1) OJ L 205, 2.8.2002.
(2) OJ C 105, 1.5.2003.

(2004/C 84 E/0647)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0301/04

by Olle Schmidt (ELDR) to the Commission

(6 February 2004)

Subject: Swedish nuclear power and the internal market

Since 1984 there has been a special production levy on nuclear power in Sweden which has been
subsequently increased and, since 2000, has been converted into a fixed tax on the thermal effect of
nuclear reactors. Sweden is the only Member State to impose this tax, which distorts competition on the
internal market and gives electricity generated abroad competitive advantages on the deregulated electricity
market. The tax has a powerful effect on the competitiveness of nuclear power producing companies and,
therefore, on trade between Member States. In the draft budget for 2004, the Swedish Government states
that the ‘effect tax’ may be compared to an extra income tax imposed on certain companies and is
therefore to be regarded as a penalty. In other words,
it discriminates solely against Swedish nuclear
power.

The EU’s directive on deregulation of the electricity and gas markets is being put into effect with the aim
of creating more equal conditions. Some of the larger power companies in Sweden now have owners in
other Member States, such as Finland and Germany. For such foreign owners, the impact of the Swedish
tax on nuclear power is clearly detrimental since almost half of the electricity generated in Sweden is
produced by nuclear power plants.

In recent years, the Commission has indicated in various ways that nuclear power is an important source
of energy with beneficial environmental effects, not only in Europe but also worldwide, and that it is an
targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions. The
effective means of achieving the Kyoto Protocol
Commission should, therefore, take a particularly serious view of the fact that Swedish nuclear power is
taxed in such a way as to reduce the scope for investment. It is extremely unfortunate to restrict the
production of nuclear power in smoothly operating nuclear power plants in this way, bearing in mind the
work currently in progress to draft a directive on measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and
infrastructure investment.

In the light of the foregoing, what measures will the Commission take in response to the Swedish ‘effect
tax’ on nuclear power, which is adversely affecting and distorting competition in power production on the
internal market, impeding the process of deregulating the electricity market in the EU and reducing cross-
border trade in electricity for the internationally owned and internationally operating energy companies
concerned?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(23 March 2004)

Community law does not forbid reverse discrimination and does not affect Member States’ energy policy
with reference to their choice of energy sources. Specifically, Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October
2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (1) only