Newsletter. n° 9, January 2004.
Date: 2004-01-29
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: common foreign and security policy, international relations, international security, political culture, serial publication

Newsletter
n°9

January 2004

Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies

43 avenue du Président Wilson - 75775 Paris cedex 16 - France

phone: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30  (cid:127)  fax: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: institute@iss-eu.org

http:www.iss-eu.org

institute

European Union

for security
studies

institut

d’ études
de  sécurité

Union Européenne

editorial

European strategy as a model

éditoNicole Gnesotto 

Director

I n these days of troubled transatlantic relations and a failed

IGC, the adoption by European heads of state and govern-
ment of a common security strategy deserves praise. Under
the aegis of Javier Solana, the recent infighting among the twenty-
five over America’s strategy of pre-emptive action, the legality of
the use of force and military intervention in Iraq has been trans-
formed, in the space of a few months and a few pages of text, into
a truly common European vision of the world and the Union’s role
in it. If one has to find something positive that has emerged from the
Iraq crisis, it is that it at least permitted the Union to lay aside one
of its old taboos and work out its own concept of international secu-
rity in a collective, consensual and autonomous, in short European,
way. Four conclusions can be drawn from this.
(cid:81) The idea of Europe as a purely civil power is behind us. The great
debate of the 1980s over Europe as a civil power or a military
power definitely seems to be a thing of the past: nobody any longer
challenges the Union’s need to be able to act externally in all fields
as a global player that can call upon a complete range of resources,
including military.
(cid:81) However, what the Union intends to become is a sui generis
power. There is a clear European consensus that military power is
to be seen as one means among others to be used on the interna-
tional scene, neither the only one nor the first: ‘none of the new
threats is purely military; nor can [they] be tackled by purely mil-
itary means’. That is why this European strategy cannot be seen
as a doctrine of military intervention. The Union is neither a civil
power nor a militaristic one, and it is somewhere between the
extremes of Venus and Mars that it is developing its own strategy
for dealing with international threats and crises.
(cid:81) Globalisation calls for a global approach to security. According
to the European vision, the socio-economic root causes of threats are

inseparable from their direct violent or military manifesta-
tions, and what holds good for an analysis of the threat also does
so for the necessary response: the political resolution of regional
conflicts – in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – devel-
opment aid and support for democratic forces in all crises form
part of the wide range of instruments available, along with
means for applying coercion by force.
(cid:81) Preventive engagement and effective multilateralism are
thus the two pillars on which the European security strategy
rests. Acting before crises erupt, acknowledging the primary
responsibility of the UN Security Council in the maintenance
of peace and security, and defending and developing interna-
tional law – principles that have from the outset underpinned
the Union’s external actions – now formally benefit from the
greatest possible degree of consensus.
(cid:81) Does this mean that European and American strategies are
poles apart? Things are not quite so simple: it is evident that the
Europeans do not share America’s ideology of ‘rogue states’
and the ‘axis of evil’, nor its obsession with military technol-
ogy as a response to the new threats, nor, quite obviously, its
mistrust of multilateral institutions, beginning with the UN.
On the other hand, when it comes to identifying the strategic
agenda for the coming decades the two have broadly similar pri-
orities:  international  terrorism  and  the  proliferation  of
weapons of mass destruction are at the forefront of Europe’s
concerns. Similarly, the Europeans are aware that multilateral
professions of faith are not sufficient when dealing with states
that threaten world peace: to be effective, the multilateral sys-
tem’s means for applying sanctions and coercion need to be
strengthened. European conservatism regarding principles –
especially the principle that international security presupposes

... continued on back page

Institute Activities

The Institute and the Union

(cid:81) EU security strategy. Having been
tasked by the High Representative to
coordinate  three  workshops  on  the
draft  EU  security  strategy  paper  ‘A
Secure Europe in a Better World’, on 6-
7 October the Institute (Martin Ortega)
held a second workshop, in Paris, enti-
tled ‘The EU’s strategic objectives: effec-
tive multilateralism and extended secu-
rity’.  The  seminar  was  attended  by
experts and officials from over thirty
countries including the United States,
as well as NATO representatives.
(cid:81) This  followed  a  first  seminar,  on
threats, held in Rome (Aspen Institute
Italia) on 19 September. The third in the
series, ‘The EU Security Strategy: Coher-
ence  and  Capabilities’,  was  held  in
Stockholm at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs on 20 October.
(cid:81) Reports  of  these  three  workshops
have been widely distributed within EU
member states. They can be accessed
directly at the Institute’s website.
(cid:81) The final version of Javier Solana’s
document was officially adopted by the
25 heads of state and government at the
European Council of 12/13 December
2003 with the title ‘A Secure Europe in
a Better World: European Security Strat-
egy’. As one of the Institute’s missions is
to enrich the strategic debate and pro-
mote a common European security cul-
ture,  we  have  decided  to  distribute
copies of the document together with
this issue of the Newsletter.
(cid:81) Armaments. Following its Commu-
nication on a European defence equip-
ment policy (March 2003), the Euro-
pean Commission established a ‘Group
of Personalities’ to develop a long-term
vision for an EU security research pro-
gramme. The Group consists of repre-
sentatives from industry, the Commis-
sion,  the  European  Parliament,  the
Council, intergovernmental bodies and
research centres. Burkard Schmitt of the
Institute is acting as rapporteur for the
Group,  whose  findings  will  be  pub-
lished in spring 2004.

The Institute and the Union
continued

(cid:81) The Balkans. On 19 October Lord
Ashdown, the EU’s Special Represen-
tative  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,
briefed a small group of selected spe-
cialists on current developments in and
prospects for Bosnia-Herzegovina, at
the Institute.

Seminars
(cid:81) Transatlantic.  On  17  November  a
transatlantic conference ‘Transatlantic
security  cooperation:  facing  the  new
challenges’  organised  by  the  Istituto
Affari  Internazionali  and  the  EUISS
(Gustav Lindstrom), was held in Rome.
Attended  by  some  sixty  diplomats,
researchers, academics and officials, it
focused on EU and US strategic con-
cepts,  EU-NATO  cooperation,  arma-
ments cooperation and future trends in
the transatlantic link.
(cid:81) Proliferation. The Institute (Dov
Lynch) participated in the organisation
of a major inter-parliamentary confer-
ence, led and financed by the European
Commission and held at the European
Parliament, Strasbourg, on 20 and 21
November. The conference was organ-
ised in the spirit of the G-8’s Global
Partnership  against  the  Spread  of
Weapons  and  Materials  of  Mass
Destruction, and under its French pres-
idency.

Institute publications
Transatlantic Book 2003
(cid:81) As part of its work on transatlantic relations,
the Institute published, in English only, Shift or
Rift: Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq, by
Nicole Gnesotto, Stanley Hoffmann, Antonio
Missiroli, David Gompert, Jean-Yves Haine, Ivo
Daalder, James Lindsay, Martin Ortega, Patrick
Clawson, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Daniel
Serwer, Gustav Lindstrom and Brian Jenkins;
edited by Gustav Lindstrom (November).

Chaillot Papers
(cid:81) No.65: The South Caucasus: a challenge for the
EU, by  Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E.
Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman
Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla
Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer and Arif Yunusov;
edited by Dov Lynch (December).

Institute publications
continued

Occasional Papers
(cid:81) No. 49:  EU cohesion in the UN General
Assembly, by Paul Luif (December).
(cid:81) No. 48: Space and security policy in Europe:
Executive summary, by Stefano Silvestri,
Rapporteur (December), a study funded by
the European Space Agency.
(cid:81) No. 47: EU and Ukraine: a turning point in
2004?, by Taras Kuzio (November).

Forthcoming
(cid:81) Chaillot Paper: Fighting proliferation -
European perspectives, edited by Gustav
Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt. 
(cid:81) Chaillot Paper: From Copenhagen to Brussels.
European defence: core documents, Vol. IV,
compiled by Antonio Missiroli.
(cid:81) Occasional Paper: Shaping an intelligence
community within the EU, by Björn Müller-
Wille.
(cid:81) Occasional Paper: Initiatives for crisis
management in sub-Saharan Africa, by
Fernanda Faria.

External publications

Judy Batt
— ‘The EU’s new borderlands’,  CER Working Paper,
October 2003.

Nicole Gnesotto
— ‘Différences de perception de la dangerosité du
monde’, in Arthur Paecht (ed.), Enjeux stratégiques,
Les relations transatlantiques - de la tourmente à
l’apaisement? (Paris:  IRIS, PUF, 2003).
— ‘L’Europe et les Etats-Unis : raisons et leçons
d’une crise’, in Michel Dumoulin & Geneviève
Duchenne (eds.), The European Union and the United
States, Proceedings of the 8th Glaverbel Chair in
European Studies 2002-2003 (Brussels: P.I.E.-
Peter Lang, 2003).

Jean-Yves Haine
— ‘The EU’s Soft Power. Not Hard Enough?’,
Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs, Winter/Spring 2004, pp. 1-9.

Antonio Missiroli
— ‘The EU - just a regional peace-keeper?’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 4, 2003.
— ‘The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood:
Stabilisation, Integration and Partnership’, in
Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign
and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy
(London: Routledge, 2003).

Martin Ortega
— ‘Some comments on the EU’s Mediterranean
policy’, Perceptions, June 2003.

Burkard Schmitt
— ‘Towards a European Defence Equipment
Market?’, in The European Files, no. 3.

Analysis

New formulas for the Middle East

It is very difficult to tell a friend that
he or she is wrong. And yet, pointing
out our friends’ mistakes is the best way
to help them – even though this sincer-
ity may not always be well received. In
the  Middle  East,  we  the  Europeans
should  tell  our  transatlantic  friends
that American policies are not working
satisfactorily. The capture of Saddam
Hussein or other positive developments
on the ground will not offset the over-
all unstable situation in Iraq. Transi-
tion to democracy and independence
are stuck in cumbersome negotiations
between  the  Iraqi  communities,  and
nobody can anticipate whether those
negotiations will guarantee both the
end  of  terrorism  and  territorial
integrity. In the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict,  American  mediation  since  the
Aqaba summit last June has not led to
practical measures for the application
of the Quartet’s ‘road map’. Private ini-
tiatives, such as the unofficial Geneva
peace accord, have been more instru-
mental  in  exposing  the  Israeli  and
Palestinian governments’ short-sight-
edness than external pressure on the
parties. Finally, President George W.
Bush’s policy of confrontation vis-à-vis
Iran was not the best way of engaging
Iran in the peaceful track. The trilateral
British-French-German  initiative  of
October 2003 has eased tensions and
allowed for serious international action
to curb possible Iranian nuclear prolif-
eration ambitions. 
Faced with American Middle East poli-
cies that are not attaining the desired
results, the Europeans are too shy. True,

some of them are more vocal than oth-
ers when they publicly criticise US poli-
cies. The trouble is that all of them are
too timid when it comes to putting for-
ward  alternative  policies.  The  Euro-
peans should develop new proposals
for  the  Middle  East,  elaborating  on
common  grounds  that  already  exist
between them. They should ask them-
selves: what Middle East region do we
want to have in 10-20 years’ time?
The most difficult issue, of course, is
Iraq, on which Europeans are divided.
However, there is potential consensus
on  the  crucial  role  that  the  United
Nations  must  play  in  the  transition
towards democracy and independence.
If transition is to be supervised in a neu-
tral  fashion,  an  increased  UN  role
seems indispensable. Also, taking into
account past colonial experience, the
Europeans know very well that foreign
military control of natural resources
cannot  be  sustained  forever.  On  the
other hand, serious degradation of the
security  situation  in  Iraq  would  run
counter to European interests. There-
fore, it seems paramount to develop a
new, more ambitious transition plan,
whereby the international community
would be directly involved in the polit-
ical and economic reconstruction of
Iraq  and  the  Europeans  should  pro-
mote such a plan.
The Europeans basically agree on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on how
to deal with Iran. There is no credible
alternative to a negotiated two-state
solution to the former, along the lines
of  the  Clinton  parameters  and  Taba

negotiations. While the current Israeli
and Palestinian governments do not
seem  ready  to  follow  that  path,  the
external  actors,  notably  the  United
States and the EU, should insist on a
peaceful resolution of the conflict that
allows the two peoples to live side by
side in peace. On Iran, the Europeans
share the view that nuclear proliferation
is unacceptable. However, constructive
relations are possible if Iran respects
human rights and international law.
In sum, the EU and its member states
should define new formulas to stabilise
the Middle East once and for all. The
objective would be to offer peoples of
the region the opportunity to organise
their lives in peace both internally and
internationally. To do that, the fatal cir-
cle of periodic outbursts of violence in
the region must be broken. 
An  alternative  European  long-term
project for the region would ultimately
also benefit the United States. Indeed,
both American and European interests
in the Middle East would be best served
if the region were stable and at peace.
Hence the utility of the European input.
In the Middle East, the Americans need
the Europeans because the latter have
innovative ideas (which the Americans
do not acknowledge willingly). Recip-
rocally, the Europeans need the Ameri-
cans because their ideas cannot be put
to work without American muscle. Any
convincing global political formula for
the Middle East requires the appropri-
ate combination of European expertise
and American energy.(cid:93)

Martin Ortega

On-line/http

Institute staff

Briefings

ESDP webpage: the Institute has added a special webpage
on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to its
website. It gives a detailed overview of ESDP and its rami-
fications, including the main elements of the policy, and
provides definitions, facts and figures, some tentative
assessments and references to official documents.  All of
the Institute’s publications and reports on seminars can be
accessed on the Institute’s website: http://www.iss-eu.org.

Giuseppe Vitiello, Head of Docu-
mentation, resigned from the
Institute at the end of December
to take up an appointment in
Rome as director of publishing at
the Istituto Superiore di Sanità.

On 22 October research fellows
briefed a group of officials from
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs at the Institute.

www.iss-eu.org

Comment

Half empty
A few  months  and  a  couple  of

Newsletters ago, we described the
outcome of the European Con-
vention as ‘half full’. After the failure
of the Intergovernmental Conference
to finalise a constitutional treaty for
the  EU,  the  contrary  seems  almost
inevitable: never before, in fact, has an
IGC ended in failure. What is more,
the political and personal relations
between the heads of state and gov-
ernment of the 25 look seriously dam-
aged - which does not bode well for the
coming months. Still, the future may
turn out to be not so bleak, the glass
not so empty.
(cid:81) Firstly, with the obvious exception
of the modalities and scope for quali-
fied majority voting, the IGC reached
a tentative consensus on most of the
80-odd  controversial  points  ear-
marked at the outset. Admittedly, they
were (and still are) part of a package
deal  that  was  not  finalised,  so  they
cannot be considered an acquis of the
IGC, a point from which to start again
once  the  dust  has  settled.  Yet  the
forthcoming Irish and Dutch presi-
dencies would not have to start from
scratch if and when they resume talks
or negotiations on a constitutional
treaty. If the prospect of a new Treaty
of Rome has waned, why not dream of
a new Treaty of . . . Utrecht, maybe?
(cid:81) Secondly, the IGC glass was almost
full notably in the domain of security
and defence. After a difficult start -

when the reverberations of European
divisions over Iraq still influenced the
attitude of most negotiating partners
- sensible solutions were put on the
table  and  basically  accepted.  This
applies both to the mutual assistance
clause  (Art.  III-214),  whose  latest
wording seemed to meet all demands,
and especially to the article on ‘struc-
tured cooperation’ on defence (Art. III-
213). The ultimately converging for-
mulations  proposed  by  the  Italian
presidency and, jointly, by France, Ger-
many  and  the  United  Kingdom,
helped to clarify all the fuzzy elements
in the original draft article released by
the Convention (including the ‘admis-
sion criteria’ to be included in the rel-
evant protocol) and dispel the fears
expressed by some present and future
EU members. In other words, the func-
tional requisites and procedures for a
better performing ESDP were essen-
tially laid down, if not formally agreed.
(cid:81) Thirdly, ESDP has further proved to
be fertile ground for viable and effec-
tive compromises, in that crucial deals
have been struck in those policy areas
that did not necessarily fall within the
IGC domain. This applies to the ‘per-
manent  financial  mechanism’  for
funding common military operations
to be finalised by next March; to the
Agency in the field of defence capabil-
ities development, research, acquisi-
tion and armaments, to be set up dur-
ing  2004;  and  also  to  the  military

planning  headquarters  for  EU  mis-
sions - an extremely sensitive issue on
which (unlike the majority voting sys-
tem) a willingness to find a balanced,
workable  and  universally  accepted
solution eventually prevailed.
(cid:81)  Finally,  the  glass  is  not  entirely
empty also because - as the case of the
Agency  shows  -  some,  or  perhaps
many, of the new provisions regarding
ESDP  (and  possibly  CFSP)  almost
agreed upon by the IGC could well be
put in place before, and arguably with-
out, a brand new constitutional treaty.
In fact, the enlarged Union may decide
to  implement  whatever  the  Nice
Treaty does not explicitly forbid - and
arguably even more, especially if oper-
ational realities and imperatives call
for quick and effective action.

This could apply even to ‘structured
cooperation’, although Nice formally
rules  out  enhanced  cooperation  on
defence and military matters. In fact,
if everybody was ready to subscribe to
the  revised  Article  III-213  (and
attached protocol), why not include
the key elements of that in the new
headline goal for 2010 and make them
a  common  policy  target  for  all EU
members?  By  doing  so,  the  Union
could also overcome the risks of pre-
ventive exclusion and discrimination
that  made  it  so  difficult  to  achieve
consensus in the IGC.(cid:93)

Antonio Missiroli

editorial ... continued from front page

...

an order based on rules drawn up by all and for all – therefore does
not rule out pragmatism on the need for international law to evolve
to meet the new threats. However, the Europeans never overstep the
red line beyond which observance of the rule might become excep-
tional and exceptions the foundation of  international practice.
(cid:81) Allied but different is therefore how the Europeans see themselves,
and that is how they behave: in the Iranian crisis, starting from a
common aim of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear state,
Europe’s approach, which has so far been quite successful, has been

radically different from America’s. Will the United States take
umbrage or will it draw the relevant lessons? At a time when US
strategy is coming up against the tragic reality of the complex situ-
ation in Iraq, will Americans be sensitive to the normative value
of the approach taken by the Europeans? The answer will depend
less on the Americans’ capacity for introspection and self-criticism
than on the Europeans’ collective determination to defend, and
prove in practice, the relevance and effectiveness of their own 
concept of international security.(cid:93) 

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