WRITTEN QUESTION P-0149/04 by Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Revenue from denationalisation used to cover current expenditure.
Date: 2004-01-20
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European accounting system, Greece, budget policy, privatisation, public debt, public expenditure, public finance

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84 E/319

(2004/C 84 E/0366)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0149/04

by Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(20 January 2004)

Subject: Revenue from denationalisation used to cover current expenditure

The Greek Government holds account number 234 339/0 with the Bank of Greece, into which is paid the
revenue obtained from the denationalisation of public enterprises. Finance Ministry documents put before
the Hellenic Parliament have revealed that between 2001 and 20 September 2003, EUR 3,9 billion was
drawn from that account to cover current government expenditure.

The Finance Ministry documents refer to specific funds for the Olympic Games, the staff insurance fund of
the Greek Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), the Skaramanga shipyards, the Thessaloniki Water
Company, the ‘Bambakos’ organisation, hospitals, and meeting the needs of the Public Company for
Transferable Securities (DEKA), etc.

Under the terms of the relevant regulations, can the revenue from denationalisation be used to cover
current budget expenditure or only to reduce the public debt? What measures does the Commission
propose to take in this matter?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(13 February 2004)

In the context of the Community budgetary surveillance procedures, government accounts (cid:1) notably the
government deficit/surplus (cid:1) should be compiled according to the rules laid down in the European System
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA95) (1).

According to the ESA95 accounting rules, privatisation proceeds (cid:1) including proceeds from indirect
privatisations (cid:1) are financial receipts (see ESA95 paragraphs 4.165(g) and 5.86). Therefore, such receipts
are not taken into account in the calculation of the general government deficit/surplus. This means that if
an EU government decides to increase expenditure, and finances such spending through a privatisation, its
deficit will increase.

Since the government debt that is relevant for budgetary surveillance procedure is defined in gross terms (2)
(cid:1) that is, without netting government assets such as shares in public enterprises (cid:1) privatisation lead to a
reduction in the government debt level insofar as they reduce the government debt issuance or allow the
government to buy back debt.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the European system of national and regional accounts in

the Community, OJ L 310, 30.11.1996.

(2) The general government debt is defined in Article 1(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November
1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the
European Community, OJ L 332, 31.12.1993.

(2004/C 84 E/0367)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0153/04

by Olivier Dupuis (NI) to the Commission

(27 January 2004)

Subject: Use of the term ‘Chechen network’ without any proven involvement of Chechens

In an increasingly conspicuous manner, judges from EU Member States are using terms which appear to
back up the idea that Chechens are involved in terrorist networks active in the European Union.
In particular, Judge Bruguière has created the term ‘Chechen networks’, which he uses to define any cases
terrorist networks, although such use is
which may have a remote connection with international