Amended proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Community
Date: 2003-12-15
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: anti-dumping duty, dumping, export subsidy, import policy, import restriction, third country

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 15.12.2003
COM(2003) 799 final

2003/0141 (ACC)

Amended proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

amending Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports
from countries not members of the European Community and Council Regulation (EC)
No 2026/97 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the
European Community

(presented by the Commission)

EN

  EN

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

There is a clear need to clarify the way decisions are reached between Member States when it
comes  to  the  imposition  of  definitive  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy  (countervailing)
measures in the area of trade defence instruments (TDI).

The current situation allows rejecting the Commission proposal in the Council without clearly
taking  a  position,  i.e.  not  having  to  vote  "no"  if  a  Member  State  decides  not  to  follow  the
Commission  proposal.  This  potentially  undermines  the  effectiveness  of  the  TDI  instrument
and should therefore be addressed in a modification of the decision-making system.

In  order  to  address  this  problem,  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  and  Anti-subsidy  Regulations
(Council Regulations (EC) No 384/96 and 2026/97) will have to be amended by requiring a
simple  majority  of  Member  States  in  the  Council  for  rejecting  a  Commission  proposal  for
imposing  definitive  measures.  The  respective  proposal  for  such  an  amendment  has  been
the  Member  States  (original  proposal
modified 
COM(2003)380).

light  of  discussions  with 

the 

in 

Under this procedure, Member States would still be consulted in the Advisory Committee on
a  proposal  regarding  the  imposition  of  definitive  measures.  The  proposal  would  then  be
forwarded  to  the  Council  and  adopted  unless  the  Council  decides  by  a  simple  majority  to
reject the proposal, within a period of one month after its submission by the Commission.

This new approach does not upset the balance of responsibilities under the current system, it
tackles  surgically  the  problem  at  hand  while  respecting  the  simple  majority  principle  :  it
ensures that an affirmative position is required by Member States to overturn a Commission
proposal, not more, not less.

Since  the  decision-making  process  should  be  applied  in  a  consistent  fashion  throughout  the
various steps involved in the application of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy instrument, this
change should also be applied concerning decisions which follow the same procedure as the
imposition  of  definitive  measures,  i.e.  to  review  or  suspend  measures  and  to  deal  with
absorption and circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing measures.

Furthermore, there is a clear need to ensure and even increase transparency and effectiveness
of trade defence instruments. The amendments explained below complement the amendments
concerning the way decisions are being made in this area.

1. Introduction of mandatory time limits for the completion of review investigations.

Under  the  present  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation,  new  investigations  are  subject  to  a
mandatory  time  limit  of  15  months  (13  months  for  the  Basic  Anti-subsidy  Regulation).  By
contrast, the current 12 month deadline for review investigations is not mandatory but merely
indicative. Experience gained since the entry into force of the Basic Regulations show that, in
the absence of mandatory deadlines and the necessary human resources, it is very difficult to
respect the above mentioned normal deadline of 12 months. In particular, the absence of strict
deadlines makes it difficult to oblige interested parties to respect procedural requirements. As
a result, reviews have often lasted longer than the normal timeframe.

3

 
Pending the conclusion of expiry review investigations, the measures under review continue
to  remain  in  force.  Consequently,  unusually  lengthy  review  investigations  may  undermine
legal certainty and cause adverse effects to interested parties.

The only solution to this problem is to introduce mandatory time limits for the completion of
the  review  investigations.  It  is  therefore  proposed  to  introduce  a  mandatory  deadline  of  15
months  for  completion  of  interim  and  expiry  review  investigations,  while  maintaining  the
existing  indicative  timetable  of  12  months.  For  newcomer  reviews  and  anti-absorption
reinvestigations,  a  mandatory  time  limit  of  9  months  is  proposed.  These  deadlines  are
considered  to  be  the  adequate  amount  of  time  necessary  to  complete  the  various  review
investigations, giving due account to the relative complexity of each different type of review
investigation.

It  is  also  proposed  to  specify  the  consequences  of  non-compliance  with  these  mandatory
deadlines.

This proposed amendment  is clearly an  important  step  towards  better  administration.  It  will
also further improve transparency of the review investigations as it will significantly enhance
the foreseeability of their conclusion. It will, however, require the provision of the respective
human resources to the Commission Services to deal with the resulting additional workload.
Therefore,  the  provisions  on  deadlines  will  be  phased  in,  starting  with  deadlines  on  expiry
reviews, and after 2 years, deadlines for other reviews.

2. Minimum period for sending relevant information to the Advisory Committee

The  Advisory  Committee  is  the  main  interface  between  the  Commission  and  the  Member
States in the context of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations. Due to the nature of the
subject,  the  relevant  information  provided  to  Member  States  is  often  of  a  highly  technical
nature and consists of an elaborate economic and legal analysis. In order to allow for a proper
consideration of this information by Member States, it is considered necessary to provide for
a minimum period of 10 days before a meeting of the  Advisory Committee for  transmitting
information to Member States.

3. Withdrawal of undertakings

Furthermore,  in  the  light  of  the  experiences  gained  up  to  now,  the  current  practice  of
withdrawal  of  acceptance  of  undertakings  is  unnecessarily  time-consuming.  Indeed,  the
current  system  requires  the  approval  of  a  Commission  Decision  withdrawing  acceptance  of
the undertaking and a Council Regulation imposing duties.

Given that  the  provisions  of  Article  8(9)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  and  Article
13(9) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation do not leave any discretion to the Council as to
the duty level to be imposed following the breach or withdrawal of an undertaking, there is no
need for the Council to re-introduce the original duty level, as the same effect can be obtained
by simply lifting the exemption of the payment of the duty by a Commission Decision.

4

 
The  amendment  therefore  provides  for  a  streamlined  legal  procedure.  It  clarifies  that  the
Commission  is  the  Institution  responsible  for  accepting  and  withdrawing  undertakings.  It
clarifies  further  that  the  duty  rates  imposed  by  the  Council  Regulation  applies  to  all
companies not mentioned in the Commission Decision accepting undertakings.

In  order  to  implement  the  new  system,  the  operative  part  of  future  Council  Regulations
imposing measures has to be modified so that, instead of listing companies benefiting from an
undertaking, it makes reference to the parallel Commission Decision accepting undertakings
and any subsequent amendment of such decision.

4. Absorption

indicates 

the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation 

that  anti-absorption
Article  12(1)  of 
investigations  are  initiated  on  the  basis  of  evidence  submitted  by  the  Community  industry.
There could be cases, however, where the Community industry has no compelling reasons to
request the initiation of the above-mentioned investigations, or simply has not yet detected the
actual  nature/dimension  of  the  problem,  whilst  other  interested  parties  may  be  affected
notably by the lack of efficiency of the measures. It is therefore felt necessary to amend the
text of Article 12(1) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation in order to explicitly mention that
the Commission, the Member States and all other interested parties may request the initiation
of an anti-absorption investigation.

According to the current text of Article 12 of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation, absorption
exists when it is shown that “..measures have led to no movement or insufficient movement in
resale prices or subsequent selling prices in the Community”. It could therefore be argued that
where  it  is  not  possible  to  show  evidence  of  this  lack  in  movement,  the  existence  of
absorption  cannot  be  proved,  either  at  initiation  stage  or  determination  stage.  Recent  cases
have  shown  however  that  resale  prices  or  subsequent  selling  prices  may  not  be  available,
obviously  when  the  importers  of  the  product  concerned  are  also  final  users,  or  because  of
insufficient cooperation from importers. In this context, it is proposed to modify the wording
of Article 12 of the  Basic Anti-dumping  Regulation in order to also include  the decrease in
export  prices  into  the  notion  of  movement  in  prices,  in  order  to  assess  whether  absorption
exists or not.

The above considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the relevant provisions of the Basic Anti-
subsidy Regulation.

It  seems  also  desirable  to  clarify  that  any  increase  of  the  anti-dumping  duty  pursuant  to
Article  12(2)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  cannot  exceed  the  amount  of  the  duty
absorbed.

5. Circumvention

The problem of circumvention of anti-dumping duties formed part of the negotiations which
preceded the adoption of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, but Members were divided on
the  issue  and  no  provision  was  eventually  included  in  that  Agreement.  Instead,  in  a
Ministerial Decision on Anti-Circumvention attached to the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement,
WTO Members noted the problem, recorded the desirability of uniform rules in this area as
soon as possible, and referred this matter to the WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices
for resolution.

5

 
The Community included anti-circumvention provisions in its 1994 Regulation providing for
the extension of anti-dumping duties to imports from third countries of like products, or parts
thereof,  when  circumvention  is  taking  place.  Circumvention  is  defined  as  a  change  in  the
pattern  of  trade  between  third  countries  and  the  Community  which  stems  from  a  practice,
process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than
the  imposition  of  the  duty,  and  may  include  an  assembly  operation  in  the  Community  or  a
third country.

These provisions have so far been used by the Community in one case concerning products
from  Brazil  shipped  via  Argentina  (in  which  the  circumvention  measures  were  at  the  same
time  suspended,  remedial  action  having  been  taken); in  one  case  against  products  from  the
People's Republic of China shipped via Malaysia ; and in four cases against products from the
People's Republic of China, including products shipped via Hong Kong, Taiwan and Vietnam.
There  are  also  three  pending  cases  against  products  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,
Ukraine and Russia, shipped via Moldavia.

To-date, WTO case law has developed but the matter has not yet been resolved by the WTO
Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, nor has it been adressed under the Dispute Settlement
Body system.

It  is  now  proposed  to  render  the  provisions  of  Article  13  more  operational,  clarifying  them
and  ensuring  more  legal  certainty  with  the  identification  of  practices  like,  notably,
transhipment,  slightly  modified  products,  and  re-channelling  of  sales  via  the  producers  or
exporters  with  the  lowest  duties.  These  issues  were  not  dealt  with  in  the  negotiating  text
proposed in December 1991 by the then GATT Director General (the “Dunkel draft”). In all
the  circumstances,  whatever  the  litigation  risk  might  be,  if  any,  such  provisions  have  been
operational,  and  would,  if  necessary,  be  defended  by  the  Community  with  the  same  vigour
and conviction it has demonstrated in the past.

Although Article 13(3) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation does not expressly mention the
parties who have the right to request the initiation of an anti-circumvention investigation, such
requests have so far only been submitted by the Community industry. As mentioned above for
absorption, there could be cases, however, where the Community industry has no compelling
reasons to request the initiation of the above-mentioned investigations, or simply has not yet
detected the actual nature/dimension of the problem, whilst other parties may have an interest
in an effective enforcement of the measures. It seems therefore preferable to clarify the text of
Article  13(3)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  in  order  to  explicitly  mention  the
Commission, the Member States and all other interested parties as parties which may request
the initiation of an anti-circumvention investigation.

The  question  has  recently  arisen  whether  anti-circumvention  investigations  can  address
situations  whereby  a  product  normally  subject  to  anti-dumping  duties  is  slightly  modified
(normally  by  adding  other  substances)  in  order  to  declare  it  “legally”  under  customs  codes
which do not justify the application of anti-dumping measures. This illegal practice is already
implicitly  covered  by  the  current  text  of  Article  13  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation.
However, for the sake of clarity, it is considered preferable to clarify the text of Article 13 of
the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation,  so  as  to  explicitly  mention  the  practice  of  slightly
modifying products as a circumvention practice.

6

 
There have been cases whereby exporters subject to higher individual duties or to the country
residual duty export their goods through companies benefiting from lower individual duties.
Such  “company”  circumvention  practices  are  not  explicitly  addressed  by  Article  13  of  the
Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation.  However,  it  is  clear  that  these  practices  undermine  the
remedial  effects  of  the  measures,  and  it  should  therefore  be  made  possible  to  sanction  this
behaviour. It is therefore proposed to lift the individual duties of those companies which are
found to follow these practices, and apply to them the country residual duty rate.

Article 13(4) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation provides for the exemption of the duties
(extended)  on  importation  of  goods  that  are  not  subject  to  circumvention.  It  also  states  that
requests should be accompanied by a customs certificate, issued to importers, declaring that
the importation of the goods does not constitute circumvention. However, in cases in which
circumvention  takes  place  outside  the  Community  (i.e.  the  circumvention  practices  put  in
place by exporting producers in third countries) any exemption from the duties would make
sense  only  if  it  is  granted  to  exporting  producers  in  the  countries  concerned  that  do  not
circumvent the measures.  According  to  the most  recent  practice,  exemptions  are  granted  by
means  of  a  Council  Regulation  to  exporting  producers  in  third  countries.  It  is  proposed  to
modify  Article  13(4)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  so  as  to  make  it  clear  the
difference  in  exemption  when  circumvention  practices  take  place  inside  or  outside  the
Community,  and  when  requests  for  exemption  are  submitted  during  or  after  the  anti-
circumvention investigation.

The above considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the relevant provisions of the Basic Anti-
subsidy Regulation.

6. Other issues relating to enforcement

Article 19(6) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation – “information received pursuant to this
Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested” – is unclear as to
whether the information gathered in the context of one investigation can be used, for example,
for the purposes of initiating another investigation concerning the same like product. It seems
therefore useful to clarify that this is possible within the same proceeding.

Articles  6(3)  and  6(4)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  give  the  Commission  the
possibility  to  request  Member  States  to  supply  information,  when  so  needed.  However,  it
would be extremely useful if the provisions contained in  these articles, which only apply to
the anti-dumping investigations when they are on-going, could be extended to also cover the
period  after  the  imposition  of  measures,  so  as  to  be  used  for  monitoring  undertakings  and
verifying the level of effectiveness of the measures. Of course, any such data provided would
be subject to the provisions of confidentiality contained in the  Regulation.  It  is  proposed  to
insert  a  new  paragraph  for  this  purpose  under  Article  14  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping
Regulation.

The above considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the relevant provisions of the Basic Anti-
subsidy Regulation.

It is therefore proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a Council Regulation
which should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

7

 
2003/0141 (ACC)

Amended proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

amending Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports
from countries not members of the European Community and Council Regulation (EC)
No 2026/97 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the
European Community

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular
Article 133 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission1,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1

2

3

By Regulation (EC) No 384/962 (the 'Basic Anti-dumping Regulation') and Regulation
(EC) No 2026/973 (the 'Basic Anti-subsidy Regulation') the Council adopted common
rules  for  protection  against  dumped,  and,  respectively,  subsidised  imports  from
countries  which  are  not  members  of  the  European  Communities  (the  Basic  Anti-
Dumping  Regulation  and  the  Basic  Anti-Subsidy  Regulation  are  hereinafter  jointly
referred to as the 'Basic Regulations').

The  Basic  Regulations  foresee,  for  the  imposition  of  definitive  anti-dumping  and
countervailing  measures,  a  procedure  under  which  the  Council,  acting  by  simple
majority on a proposal by the Commission, imposes definitive measures.

In  the  light  of  recent  experience  of  the  application  of  the  Basic  Regulations  and  in
order to preserve the transparency and efficiency of the trade defence instruments, it is
considered  necessary to revisit the way  Community  institutions  work  together  in  the
process of the imposition of definitive anti-dumping and countervailing measures.

Under the current approach, a Commission proposal will only be adopted if a simple
majority of Member States votes in favour of such a proposal. This has the effect that
abstentions count effectively against the Commission proposal. This in turn can result
in a situation where a Commission proposal will not be adopted by the Council due to
the number of abstentions.

OJ C …, …, p. …
OJ  L 56,  6.3.1996,  p.  1.  Regulation  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  (OJ  L  305,
7.11.2002, p. 1).
OJ  L  288,  21.10.1997,  p.  1.  Regulation  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1973/2002  (OJ  L  305,
7.11.2002, p. 4).

8

 
                                                
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

In order to address this problem effectively, the Basic Regulations have to be amended
by  requiring  a  simple  majority  of  Member  States  in  the  Council  to  reject  a
Commission  proposal  for  imposing  definitive  measures.  Under  this  procedure,
measures  shall  be  deemed  to  be  adopted  unless  the  Council  decides  by  a  simple
majority to reject the proposal, within a period of one month after submission of the
proposal by the Commission.

It  is  expedient  to  apply  such  a  procedure  in  order  to  streamline  the  Community's
decision-making process without changing the respective roles of the Commission and
the Council in the application of the Basic Regulations.

For reasons  of  consistent  application  of  decision-making  procedures  under  the  Basic
Regulations,  the  procedures  for  other  decisions  by  Council  under  the  Basic
Regulations  which  foresee  essentially  the  same  procedure  as  for  the  imposition  of
definitive  measures  should  be  aligned  as  well.  Accordingly,  the  above  approach
should  be  adopted  also  for  the  procedures  regarding  reviews,  reinvestigation,
circumvention and suspension of measures.

The  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  establishes  mandatory  time  limits  for  the
completion of investigation procedures initiated pursuant to Article 5(9) of the  Basic
Anti-dumping  Regulation  while  review  investigations  initiated  pursuant  to  Articles
11(2),  (3)  and  (4)  and  reinvestigations  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  the  Basic  Anti-
dumping Regulation, are subject to an indicative time limit only.

Anti-dumping measures remain in force pending the outcome of a review pursuant to
Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation. Consequently, unusually lengthy
review  investigations  pursuant  to  such  Article  may  undermine  legal  certainty  and
cause  adverse  effects  for  interested  parties.  Similar  non  desirable  effects  may  result
from overly lengthy investigations in the context of reviews pursuant to Articles 11(3)
and  (4)  and  reinvestigations  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping
Regulation.

It is therefore appropriate to introduce mandatory time limits also for the completion
of  review  investigations  pursuant  to  Articles  11(2),  (3)  and  (4)  and  reinvestigations
pursuant to Article 12 of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation.

The various types of review investigations have different potential scopes and degrees
of  complexity.  Due  account  should  be  given  to  these  differences  when  setting  the
appropriate time limits for completion.

First, reviews pursuant to Articles 11(2) and (3) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation
may,  in  certain  circumstances,  present  the  same  complexity  as  new  proceedings
pursuant to Article 5(9), for instance in terms of the scope of the investigation or the
number  of 
review
interested  parties  concerned.  Consequently,  while 
investigations should normally be completed within the existing indicative time limit
of 12 months, the mandatory time limit for completion should be equal, but not longer,
than that of the 15 month period set for the completion of new proceedings.

these 

9

 
(13)

(14)

Second, reviews pursuant to Article 11(4) and reinvestigations pursuant to Article 12
of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  present  a  lesser  degree  of  complexity  than
reviews  pursuant  to  Articles  11(2)  and  (3)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation.
Accordingly, the time limit for the completion of such reviews should be shorter. For
review investigations pursuant to Article 11(4), it is considered that the time limit for
completion should be set to 9 months. This limit is in line with the maximum period
allowed  for  registration  of  imports  under  Article  14(5)  of  the  Basic  Anti-dumping
Regulation. As imports are registered pending the completion of a review pursuant to
Article 11(4), the time limit for the completion of such a review should not be longer
than the time frame during which the imports concerned by the review may be subject
to registration.

Third,  while  reinvestigations  pursuant  to  Article  12  should  normally  be  completed
within the existing indicative time limit of 6 months, it is considered appropriate to set
the mandatory time limit at 9 months, as a longer period may be necessary to complete
the investigation if revised normal values have to be considered. In addition, imports
subject  to  reinvestigation  pursuant  to  Article  12  may,  like  imports  subject  to  11(4)
reviews,  also  be  subject  to  registration  pursuant  to  Article  14(5).  Consequently,  the
same  maximum  time  limit  of  nine  months  as  for  registration  should  apply  to
reinvestigations pursuant to Article 12.

(15) Recitals 8 through 14 above apply, mutatis mutandis, to reviews under Articles 18, 19

and 20 of the Basic Anti-subsidy Regulation.

(16)

(17)

It is considered prudent to provide for a phase-in of deadlines in reviews, in view of
the resulting demands for the meeting of such deadlines on human resources. Such a
phase-in period will facilitate the appropriate allocation of resources over time.

Information  provided  to  Member  States  in  the  Advisory  Committee  is  often  of  a
highly technical nature and involves an elaborate economic and legal analysis. In order
to provide Member States with sufficient time to consider this information, it should
be sent at the latest 10 days before the date of a meeting set by the Chairman of the
Advisory Committee.

(18) Article 8(9) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation stipulates, inter alia, that in case of
withdrawal  of  undertakings  by  any  party,  a  definitive  duty  shall  be  imposed  in
accordance with Article 9, on  the basis  of  the facts established within  the  context of
the  investigation  which  led  to  the  undertakings.  This  provision  has  led  to  a  time-
consuming double proceeding consisting of both a Commission Decision withdrawing
the  acceptance  of  the  undertaking  and  a  Council  Regulation  re-imposing  the  duty.
Taking into account that this provision does not leave any discretion to the Council as
to the introduction of a duty to be imposed following the breach or withdrawal of an
undertaking or as to its level, it is considered appropriate to modify the provisions in
Articles  8(1),  (5)  and  (9)  in  order  to  clarify  the  Commission’s  responsibility  and  to
allow withdrawal of an undertaking and application of the duty by one single legal act.
It is also necessary to ensure that the withdrawal procedure is terminated within a time
limit of normally six months and in no case more than nine months in order to ensure a
proper enforcement of the measure in force.

10

 
(19) Recital  18  above  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  undertakings  under  Article  13  of  the

Basic Anti-subsidy Regulation.

(20) Article  12(1)  of  the  Basic  Anti-Dumping  Regulation  indicates  that  reinvestigations
pursuant  to  this  article  are  initiated  on  the  basis  of  evidence  submitted  by  the
Community  industry.  Other  interested  parties  may  equally  have  an  interest  in  such
reinvestigations which are aiming at correcting the effects of the absorption of the duty
by the  exporter.  It is therefore necessary to  amend  this  article  in  order  to  extend  the
possibility  of  requesting  the  initiation  of  anti-absorption  investigations  to  any  other
interested  party.  It  is  also  necessary,  in  order  to  assess  whether  absorption  exists  or
not,  to  include  into  the  notion  of  movement  of  prices  the  decrease  of  export  prices
since this is one of the possible situations in which, by lowering the price level on the
Community market, the remedial effect of the measure may be undermined.

(21) Recital 20 above applies, mutatis mutandis, to Article 19(3) of the Basic Anti-subsidy

Regulation.

(22) Moreover,  it  has  to  be  clarified  that  the  increase  in  the  amount  of  the  anti-dumping
duty imposed following a reinvestigation pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Basic Anti-
dumping  Regulation  has  to  be  limited  to  the  maximum  amount  that  could  have
possibly  been  absorbed,  which  is  the  amount  of  the  duty  in  force  prior  to  that
reinvestigation.

(23) Given  that  Article  13(3)  of  the  Basic  Anti-Dumping  regulation  does  not  expressly
mention the parties who have the right to request the initiation of anti-circumvention
investigations, it is desirable to clarify which parties have this right.

(24)

Past experience has shown that it is also desirable to clarify which practices constitute
circumvention of the measures in place. Circumvention practices may take place either
inside  or  outside  the  Community.  It  is  consequently  necessary  to  provide  that
exemptions from the extended duties which may already be granted to importers under
the  current  Basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  may  also  be  granted  to  exporters  when
duties  are  being  extended  to  address  circumvention  taking  place  outside  the
Community.

(25)

In order to ensure proper enforcement of measures, it is advisable to amend the terms
of  Article  19(6)  of  the  Basic  Anti-Dumping  Regulation  as  regards  the  use  of
information gathered in the  context of an investigation,  for the purposes of  initiating
another investigation within the same proceeding.

(26) Recitals 23 through 25 above apply, mutatis mutandis, to Articles 23 and 29(6) of the

Basic Anti-subsidy Regulation.

(27)

In  order  to  ensure  a  better  enforcement  of  measures,  it  is  necessary  to  provide,  in  a
new paragraph of Article 14 of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation, for the possibility
for  the  Commission  to  request  Member  States  to  supply,  subject  to  the  respect  of
confidentiality  rules  contained  in  the  Basic  Regulations,  information  to  be  used  for
monitoring price undertakings and verifying the level of effectiveness of the measures
in force. Similar provisions need also be introduced by a new paragraph within Article
24 of the Basic Anti-subsidy Regulation,

11

 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 384/96 is hereby amended as follows:

1.

Article 8(1) shall be replaced by the following:

“1.  Upon  condition  that  a  provisional  affirmative  determination  of  dumping  and
injury  has  been  made,  the  Commission  may  accept  satisfactory  voluntary
undertaking offers submitted by any exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports
at dumped prices, if, after consultation, it is satisfied that the injurious effect of the
dumping is thereby eliminated. In such a case and as long as such undertakings are in
force, the provisional duties imposed by the Commission in accordance with Article
7(1) or the definitive duties imposed by the Council in accordance with Article 9(4)
as the case may be shall not apply to the relevant imports of the product concerned
manufactured  by  the  companies  referred  to  in  the  Commission  decision  accepting
undertakings,  as  subsequently  amended.  Price  increases  under  such  undertakings
shall  not  be  higher  than  necessary  to  eliminate  the  margin  of  dumping  and  they
should  be  less  than  the  margin  of  dumping  if  such  increases  would  be  adequate  to
remove the injury to the Community industry.”

2.

Article 8(9) shall be replaced by the following:

“9. In case of breach or withdrawal of undertakings by any party to the undertaking,
or  in  case  of  withdrawal  of  acceptance  of  the  undertaking  by  the  Commission,  the
acceptance of the undertaking shall, after consultation, be withdrawn by Commission
Decision or Commission Regulation, as appropriate, and the provisional duty which
has been imposed by the Commission in accordance with Article 7 or the definitive
duty which has been  imposed  by  the  Council  in  accordance  with  Article  9(4)  shall
automatically  apply,  provided  that  the  exporter  concerned  has,  except  where  he
himself has withdrawn the undertaking, been given an opportunity to comment.

Any interested party or Member State may submit information, showing prima facie
evidence of a breach of an undertaking. The subsequent monitoring of whether or not
a  breach  of  an  undertaking  has  occurred  shall  normally  be  concluded  within  six
months, but in no case later than nine months following a duly substantiated request.
The  Commission  may  request  the  assistance  of  the  competent  authorities  of  the
Member States in the monitoring of undertakings.”

3.

Article 9(4) shall be replaced by the following:

"4.  Where  the  facts  as  finally  established  show  that  there  is  dumping  and  injury
caused thereby, and the Community interest calls for intervention in accordance with
Article 21, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall be imposed by the Council, acting on
a  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consultation  of  the  Advisory
Committee.  The  proposal  shall  be  adopted  by  the  Council  unless  it  decides  by  a
simple  majority  to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its
submission by the Commission. Where provisional duties are in force, a proposal for
definitive  action  shall  be  submitted  not  later  than  one  month  before  the  expiry  of
such  duties.  The  amount  of  the  anti-dumping  duty  shall  not  exceed  the  margin  of

12

 
dumping established but it should be less than the margin if such lesser duty would
be adequate to remove the injury to the Community industry."

4.

Article 12(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"1. Where the Community industry or any other interested party submit, within two
years from the entry into force of the measures, sufficient information showing that,
after the imposition of measures, export prices have decreased or that there has been
no  movement,  or  insufficient  movement  in  the  resale  prices  or  subsequent  selling
prices  of  the  imported  product  in  the  Community,  the  investigation  may,  after
consultation,  be  reopened  to  examine  whether  the  measure  has  had  effects  on  the
above mentioned prices.

The  investigation  may  also  be  reopened,  under  the  conditions  set  out  above,  at  the
initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State."

5.

Article 12(2), last sentence, shall be replaced by the following:

"Where it is considered that the conditions of Article 12(1) are met due to a  fall in
export prices  which has  occurred  prior  to  or  following  the  imposition  of  measures,
dumping margins may be recalculated to take account of such lower export prices.

6.

Article 12(3) shall be replaced by the following:

"3.  Where  a  reinvestigation  pursuant  to  this  Article  shows  increased  dumping,  the
measures  in  force  may,  after  consultation,  be  amended  by  the  Council,  acting  on  a
proposal from the Commission in accordance with the new findings on export prices.
The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a simple majority
to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its  submission  by  the
Commission. The amount of the anti-dumping duty imposed pursuant to this Article
shall not exceed twice the amount of the duty imposed initially by the Council."

7.

Article 13(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"1.  Anti-dumping  duties  imposed  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  may  be  extended  to
imports from third countries, of the like product, whether slightly modified or not; or
to imports of the slightly modified like product from the country subject to measures;
or parts thereof, when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place. Anti-
dumping duties not exceeding the residual anti-dumping duty imposed in accordance
with  Article  9(5)  of  this  Regulation  may  be  extended  to  imports  from  companies
benefiting  from  individual  duties  in  the  countries  subject  to  measures  when
circumvention  of  the  measures  in  force  is  taking  place.  Circumvention  shall  be
defined  as  a  change  in  the  pattern  of  trade  between  third  countries  and  the
Community or between individual companies in the country subject to measures and
the  Community,  which  stems  from  a  practice,  process  or  work  for  which  there  is
insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty,
and  where  there  is  evidence  of  injury  or  that  the  remedial  effects  of  the  duty  are
being  undermined  in  terms  of  the  prices  and/or  quantities  of  the  like  product,  and
where  there  is  evidence  of  dumping  in  relation  to  the  normal  values  previously
established  for  the  like  product,  if  necessary  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of
Article 2.

13

 
The  practice,  process  or  work  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  includes,  inter  alia,  the
slight  modification  of  the  product  concerned  to  make  it  fall  under  customs  codes
which are normally not subject to the measures, provided that the modification does
not  alter  its  essential  characteristics;  the  consignment  of  the  product  subject  to
measures  via  third  countries;  the  reorganisation  by  exporters  or  producers  of  their
patterns  and  channels  of  sales  in  the  country  subject  to  measures  in  order  to
eventually  have  their  products  exported  to  the  Community  through  producers
benefiting from an individual duty rate lower than that applicable to the products of
the manufacturers; and, in the circumstances indicated below under article 13(2), the
assembly of parts by an assembly operation in the Community or a third country."

8.

Article 13(3) shall be replaced by the following:

"3.  Investigations  shall  be  initiated  pursuant  to  this  Article  on  the  initiative  of  the
Commission or at the request of a Member State or any interested party on the basis
of sufficient evidence regarding the factors set out in paragraph 1. Initiations shall be
made,  after  consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee,  by  Commission  Regulation
which  may  also  instruct  the  customs  authorities  to  make  imports  subject  to
registration in accordance with Article 14(5) or to request guarantees. Investigations
shall  be  carried  out  by  the  Commission,  which  may  be  assisted  by  customs
authorities  and  shall  be  concluded  within  nine  months.  When  the  facts  as  finally
ascertained  justify  the  extension  of  measures,  this  shall  be  done  by  the  Council,
acting  on  a  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission,  after  consultation  of  the
Advisory Committee. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides
by  a  simple  majority  to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its
submission  by  the  Commission.  The  extension  shall  take  effect  from  the  date  on
which  registration  was  imposed  pursuant  to  Article  14(5)  or  on  which  guarantees
were requested. The relevant procedural provisions of this Regulation with regard to
initiations and the conduct of investigations shall apply pursuant to this Article."

9.

Article 13(4) shall be replaced by the following:

"4. Imports shall not be subject to registration pursuant to Article 14(5) or measures
where  they  are  traded  by  companies  which  benefit  from  exemptions.  Requests  for
exemptions  duly  supported  by  evidence  shall  be  submitted  within  the  time  limits
established  in  the  Commission  Regulation  initiating  the  investigation.  Where  the
circumventing  practice,  process  or  work  takes  place  outside  the  Community,
exemptions may be granted to producers of the product concerned that can show that
they are not related to any producer subject to the measures and that are found not to
be engaged in circumvention practices as defined in Article 13(1) and 13(2). Where
the  circumventing  practice,  process  or  work  takes  place  inside  the  Community,
exemptions  may  be  granted  to  importers  that  can  show  that  they  are  not  related  to
producers subject to the measures.

These  exemptions  are  granted  by  decision  of  the  Commission  after  consultation  of
the  Advisory  Committee  and  shall  remain  valid  for  the  period  and  under  the
conditions set down therein.

14

 
Provided  that  the  conditions  set  in  Article  11(4)  are  met,  exemptions  may  also  be
granted  after  the  conclusion  of  the  investigation  leading  to  the  extension  of  the
measures.

Provided that at least one year has lapsed from the extension of the measures, and in
case  the  number  of  parties  requesting  or  potentially  requesting  an  exemption  is
significant, the Commission may decide  to  initiate a  review  of  the  extension  of the
measures. Any such review shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
Article 11(5) as applicable to reviews pursuant to Article 11(3)."

10.

Article 14(4) shall be replaced by the following:

"4.  In the  Community  interest,  measures  imposed  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  may,
after  consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee,  be  suspended  by  a  decision  of  the
Commission  for  a  period  of  nine  months.  The  suspension  may  be  extended  for  a
further period, not exceeding one year, if the Council so decides, acting on a proposal
from the Commission. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides
by  a  simple  majority  to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its
submission  by  the  Commission.  Measures  may  only  be  suspended  where  market
conditions  have  temporarily  changed  to  an  extent  that  injury  would  be  unlikely  to
resume as a result of the suspension, and provided that the Community industry has
been  given  an  opportunity  to  comment  and  these  comments  have  been  taken  into
account. Measures may, at any time and after consultation, be reinstated if the reason
for suspension is no longer applicable."

11.

A new Article 14(7) shall be inserted:

"7. Without prejudice to paragraph 6, the Commission may request Member States to
supply  information  necessary  to  monitor  efficiently  the  application  of  measures.  In
this respect, the provisions of Articles 6(3) and 6(4) shall apply. Any data submitted
by  Member  States  pursuant  to  this  Article  shall  be  covered  by  the  provisions  of
Article 19(6)."

12.

Article 15(2) shall be replaced by the following:

"2. The Committee shall meet when convened by its chairman. He shall provide the
Member States, as promptly as possible, but no later than 10 working days before the
meeting, with all relevant information."

13.

Article 19(6) shall be replaced by the following:

"6.  Information  received  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  shall  be  used  only  for  the
purpose  for  which  it  was  requested.  This  provision  shall  not  preclude  the  use  of
information received in the context of one investigation for the purpose of initiating
other investigations within the same proceeding concerning the same like product."

15

 
Article 2

Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 is hereby amended as follows:

1.

Article 13(1) shall be replaced by the following:

“1. Upon condition that a provisional affirmative determination of subsidization and
injury  has  been  made,  the  Commission  may  accept  satisfactory  voluntary
undertakings offers under which

(a) the country of origin and/or export agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take
other measures concerning its effects; or

(b)  any  exporter  undertakes  to  revise  its  prices  or  to  cease  exports  to  the  area  in
question as long as  such exports benefit from  countervailable subsidies,  so  that  the
Commission, after consultation, is satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidies is
thereby eliminated.

In such a case and as long as such undertakings are in force, the  provisional  duties
imposed  by  the  Commission  in  accordance  with  Article  12(3)  and  the  definitive
duties imposed by the Council in accordance with Article 15(1) shall not apply to the
relevant imports of the product concerned manufactured by the companies referred to
in  the  Commission  decision  accepting  undertakings  and  in  any  subsequent
amendment of such decision.

Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than is necessary to offset
the  amount  of  countervailable  subsidies,  and  should  be  less  than  the  amount  of
countervailable subsidies if such increases would be adequate to remove the injury to
the Community industry.”

2.

Article 13(9) shall be replaced by the following:

“9. In case of breach or withdrawal of undertakings by any party to the undertaking,
or  in  case  of  withdrawal  of  acceptance  of  the  undertaking  by  the  Commission,  the
acceptance  of 
the  undertaking  shall,  after  Consultation,  be  withdrawn  by
Commission Decision or Commission Regulation, as appropriate, and the provisional
duty which has been imposed by the  Commission in accordance with Article  12 or
the  definitive  duty  which  has  been  imposed  by  the  Council  in  accordance  with
Article  15(1),  shall  apply,  provided  that  the  exporter  concerned,  or  the  country  of
origin and/or export has, except in the case of withdrawal of the undertaking by the
exporter or such country, been given an opportunity to comment.

Any interested party or Member State may submit information, showing prima facie
evidence of a breach of an undertaking. The subsequent monitoring of whether or not
a  breach  of  an  undertaking  has  occurred  shall  normally  be  concluded  within  six
months, but in no case later than nine months following a duly substantiated request.
The  Commission  may  request  the  assistance  of  the  competent  authorities  of  the
Member States in the monitoring of undertakings.”

16

 
3.

Article 15(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"1. Where  the  facts  as  finally  established  show  the  existence  of  countervailable
subsidies  and  injury  caused  thereby,  and  the  Community  interest  calls  for
intervention in accordance with Article 31, a definitive countervailing duty shall be
imposed  by  the  Council,  acting  on  a  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after
consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee.  The  proposal  shall  be  adopted  by  the
Council unless it decides by a simple majority to reject the proposal, within a period
of one month after its submission by the Commission. Where provisional duties are
in force, a proposal regarding definitive action shall be submitted not later than one
month before the expiry of such duties. No measures shall be imposed if the subsidy
or subsidies are withdrawn or it has been demonstrated that the subsidies no longer
confer any benefit on the exporters involved. The amount of the countervailing duty
shall not exceed the amount of countervailable subsidies established but it should be
less than the total amount of countervailable subsidies if such lesser duty  would  be
adequate to remove the injury to the Community industry."

4.

Article 19(3) shall be replaced by the following :

"3.  Where  the  countervailing  duties  imposed  are  less  than  the  amount  of
countervailable  subsidies  found,  an  interim  review  may  be  initiated  if  the
Community  producers  or  any  other  interested  party  submit,  within  two  years  from
the entry into force of the measures, sufficient evidence that, after the imposition of
measures,  export  prices  have  decreased  or  that  there  has  been  no  movement,  or
insufficient movement of resale prices of the imported product in the Community. If
the  investigation  proves  the  allegations  to  be  correct,  countervailing  duties  may  be
increased  to  achieve  the  price  increase  required  to  remove  injury;  however,  the
increased duty level shall not exceed the amount of the countervailable subsidies.

The interim review may also be initiated, under the conditions set out above, at the
initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State."

5.

Article 23(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"1.  Countervailing  duties  imposed  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  may  be  extended  to
imports from third countries, of the like product, whether slightly modified or not; or
to imports of the slightly modified like product from the country subject to measures;
or  parts  thereof,  when  circumvention  of  the  measures  in  force  is  taking  place.
Countervailing  duties  not  exceeding  the  residual  countervailing  duty  imposed  in
accordance  with  Article  15(2)  of  this  Regulation  may  be  extended  to  imports  from
companies  benefiting  from  individual  duties  in  the  countries  subject  to  measures
when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place. Circumvention shall be
defined  as  a  change  in  the  pattern  of  trade  between  third  countries  and  the
Community or between individual companies in the country subject to measures and
the  Community,  which  stems  from  a  practice,  process  or  work  for  which  there  is
insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty,
and  where  there  is  evidence  of  injury  or  that  the  remedial  effects  of  the  duty  are
being undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like product and that
the imported like product and/or parts thereof still benefit from the subsidy.

17

 
The  practice,  process  or  work  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  includes,  inter  alia,  the
slight  modification  of  the  product  concerned  to  make  it  fall  under  customs  codes
which are normally not subject to the measures, provided that the modification does
not  alter  its  essential  characteristics;  the  consignment  of  the  product  subject  to
measures  via  third  countries;  and  the  reorganisation  by  exporters  or  producers  of
their  patterns  and  channels  of  sales  in  the  country  subject  to  measures  in  order  to
eventually  have  their  products  exported  to  the  Community  through  producers
benefiting from an individual duty rate lower than that applicable to the products of
the manufacturers."

6.

Article 23(2) shall be replaced by the following:

"2.  Investigations  shall  be  initiated  pursuant  to  this  Article  on  the  initiative  of  the
Commission  or  at  the  request  of  a  Member  State  or  of  any  interested  party  on  the
basis  of  sufficient  evidence  regarding  the  factors  set  out  in  paragraph  1.  Initiations
shall  be  made,  after  consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee,  by  Commission
Regulation which may also instruct the customs authorities to make imports subject
to  registration  in  accordance  with  Article  24(5)  or  to  request  guarantees.
Investigations  shall  be  carried  out  by  the  Commission,  which  may  be  assisted  by
customs  authorities  and  shall  be  concluded  within  nine  months.  When  the  facts  as
finally  ascertained  justify  the  extension  of  measures,  this  shall  be  done  by  the
Council, acting on a proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation of the
Advisory Committee. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides
by  a  simple  majority  to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its
submission  by  the  Commission.  The  extension  shall  take  effect  from  the  date  on
which  registration  was  imposed  pursuant  to  Article  24(5)  or  on  which  guarantees
were requested. The relevant procedural provisions of this Regulation with regard to
initiations and the conduct of investigations shall apply pursuant to this Article.

Imports  shall  not  be  subject  to  registration  pursuant  to  Article  24(5)  or  measures
where  they  are  traded  by  companies  which  benefit  from  exemptions.  Requests  for
exemptions  duly  supported  by  evidence  shall  be  submitted  within  the  time  limits
established  in  the  Commission  Regulation  initiating  the  investigation.  Where  the
circumventing  practice,  process  or  work  takes  place  outside  the  Community,
exemptions may be granted to producers of the product concerned that can show that
they are not related to any producer subject to the measures and that are found not to
be  engaged  in  circumvention  practices  as  defined  in  Article  23(1).  Where  the
circumventing  practice,  process  or  work  takes  place  inside  the  Community,
exemptions  may  be  granted  to  importers  that  can  show  that  they  are  not  related  to
producers subject to the measures.

These  exemptions  are  granted  by  decision  of  the  Commission  after  consultation  of
the  Advisory  Committee  and  shall  remain  valid  for  the  period  and  under  the
conditions set down therein.

Provided  that  the  conditions  set  in  Article  20  are  met,  exemptions  may  also  be
granted  after  the  conclusion  of  the  investigation  leading  to  the  extension  of  the
measures.

18

 
Provided that at least one year has lapsed from the extension of the measures, and in
case  the  number  of  parties  requesting  or  potentially  requesting  an  exemption  is
significant, the Commission may decide  to  initiate a  review  of  the  extension  of the
measures. Any such review shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
Article 22(1) as applicable to reviews under Article 19."

7.

Article 24(4) shall be replaced by the following:

"4.  In the  Community  interest,  measures  imposed  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  may,
after  consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee,  be  suspended  by  a  decision  of  the
Commission  for  a  period  of  nine  months.  The  suspension  may  be  extended  for  a
further period, not exceeding one year, if the Council so decides, acting on a proposal
from the Commission. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides
by  a  simple  majority  to  reject  the  proposal,  within  a  period  of  one  month  after  its
submission  by  the  Commission.  Measures  may  only  be  suspended  where  market
conditions  have  temporarily  changed  to  an  extent  that  injury  would  be  unlikely  to
resume as a result of the suspension, and provided that the Community industry has
been  given  an  opportunity  to  comment  and  these  comments  have  been  taken  into
account. Measures may, at any time and after consultation, be reinstated if the reason
for suspension is no longer applicable."

8.

A new Article 24(7) shall be inserted:

"7. Without prejudice to paragraph 6, the Commission may request Member States to
supply  information  necessary  to  monitor  efficiently  the  application  of  measures.  In
this  respect,  the  provisions  of  Articles  11(3)and  11(4)  shall  apply.  Any  data
submitted  by  Member  States  pursuant  to  this  Article  shall  be  covered  by  the
provisions of Article 29(6)."

9.

Article 25(2) shall be replaced by the following:

"2. The Committee shall meet when convened by its chairman. He shall provide the
Member States, as promptly as possible, but no later than 10 working days before the
meeting, with all relevant information."

10.

Article 29(6) shall be replaced by the following:

"6.  Information  received  pursuant  to  this  Regulation  shall  be  used  only  for  the
purpose  for  which  it  was  requested.  This  provision  shall  not  preclude  the  use  of
information received in the context of one investigation for the purpose of initiating
other investigations within the same proceeding concerning the same like product."

19

 
Article 3

Regulation (EC) No 384/96 is hereby amended as follows:

1.

Article 11(5) shall be replaced by the following:

"5.
The  relevant  provisions  of  this  Regulation  with  regard  to  procedures  and  the
conduct of investigations, excluding those relating to time limits, shall apply to any
review carried out pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. Reviews carried
out  pursuant  to  paragraphs  2  and  3  shall  be  carried  out  expeditiously  and  shall
normally  be  concluded  within  12  months  of  the  date  of  initiation  of  the  review.  In
any  event,  reviews  pursuant  to  paragraphs  2  and  3  shall  in  all  cases  be  concluded
within 15 months of initiation. Reviews pursuant to paragraph 4 shall in all cases be
concluded within 9 months of the date of initiation. If a review carried out pursuant
to paragraph 2 is initiated while a review under paragraph 3 is ongoing in the same
proceeding, the review pursuant to paragraph 3 shall be concluded at the same time
as foreseen above for the review pursuant to paragraph 2.

The Commission shall submit a proposal for action to the Council not later than one
month before the expiry of the above deadlines.

If the investigation is not completed within the above deadlines, the measures shall
expire in investigations pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article or remain unchanged
in investigations pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article. A notice announcing
the  actual  expiry  or  maintenance  of  the  measures  pursuant  to  this  paragraph  shall
then be published in the Official Journal of the European Union."

2.

Article 12(4) shall be replaced by the following:

The  relevant  provisions  of  Article  5  and  6  shall  apply  to  any  reinvestigation
"4.
carried out pursuant to this Article, except that such reinvestigation shall be carried
out expeditiously and shall normally be  concluded within six months of the date of
initiation of the reinvestigation. In any event, such reinvestigations shall in all cases
be concluded within 9 months of initiation of the reinvestigation.

The Commission shall submit a proposal for action to the Council not later than one
month before the expiry of the above deadline.

If  the  reinvestigation  is  not  completed  within  the  above  deadlines,  measures  shall
remain unchanged. A notice announcing the maintenance of the measures pursuant to
this paragraph shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union."

20

 
Article 4

Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 is hereby amended as follows:

Article 22(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"1.
The  relevant  provisions  of  this  Regulation  with  regard  to  procedures  and  the
conduct of investigations, excluding those relating to time limits, shall apply to any
review carried out pursuant to Article 18, 19 and 20. Reviews carried out pursuant to
Articles 18 and 19 shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be concluded
within  12  months  of  the  date  of  initiation  of  the  review.  In  any  event,  reviews
pursuant  to  Article  18  and  19  shall  in  all  cases  be  concluded  within  15  months  of
initiation.  Reviews  pursuant  to  Article  20  shall  in  all  cases  be  concluded  within  9
months  of  the  date  of  initiation.  If  a  review  carried  out  pursuant  to  Article  18  is
initiated  while  a  review  under  Article  19  is  ongoing  in  the  same  proceeding,  the
review pursuant to Article 19 shall be concluded at the same time as foreseen above
for the review pursuant to Article 18.

The Commission shall submit a proposal for action to the Council not later than one
month before the expiry of the above deadlines.

If the investigation is not completed within the above deadlines, the measures shall
expire in investigations pursuant to Article 18 or remain unchanged in investigations
pursuant to Articles 19 and 20. A notice announcing the actual expiry or maintenance
of the measures pursuant to this paragraph shall be published in the Official Journal
of the European Union."

Article 5

This  Regulation  shall  apply  to  all  investigations  initiated  pursuant  to  Regulation  (EC)  No
384/96 and Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 after the entry into force of this Regulation with the
exception of

– 

And

– 

Articles 1(3), (6), (8),  (10), (12) and 2(3), (6), (7) and (9) of this Regulation which
shall apply also to pending investigations

Articles 3 and 4 of this Regulation which shall only apply two years after the entry
into  force  of  this  Regulation  to  investigations  initiated  pursuant  to  Articles  11(3),
11(4)  and  12  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  and  Articles  19  and  20  of  Regulation
(EC) No 2026/97.

21

 
Article 6

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  7th  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the
Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the Council
The President

22

 
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Policy  area(s):  External  trade  relations,  including  access  to  markets  of  non-Community
countries

Activit(y/ies): anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations

TITLE OF ACTION: AMENDMENT TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 384/96 ON PROTECTION
AGAINST  DUMPED  IMPORTS  FROM  COUNTRIES  NOT  MEMBERS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 2026/97 ON PROTECTION AGAINST
IMPORTS  FROM  COUNTRIES  NOT  MEMBERS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN
SUBSIDIZED 
COMMUNITY

1.

BUDGET LINE(S) + HEADING(S)

20.01.01.01 Expenditure related to staff in active employment of Policy area Trade

20.01.02.11 Other management expenditure of DG Trade

2.

OVERALL FIGURES

2.1.

Total allocation for action (Part B): € million for commitment

Not applicable

2.2.

Period of application:

The proposed expenditure is foreseen to be of unlimited duration.

2.3.

Overall multiannual estimate of expenditure:

(a)

Schedule  of  commitment  appropriations/payment  appropriations 
intervention) (see point 6.1.1)

(financial

Not applicable

Commitments

Payments

€ million (to three decimal places)

[n+1]

[n+2]

[n+3]

[n+4]

Year
[n]

Total

[n+5
and
subs.
Years
]

23

 
(b)

Technical and administrative assistance and support expenditure(see point 6.1.2

Not applicable

Commitments

Payments

Not applicable

Subtotal a+b

Commitments

Payments

(c)

Overall  financial  impact  of  human  resources  and  other  administrative  expenditure
(see points 7.2 and 7.3)

€ million (to three decimal places)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Commitments/
payments

TOTAL a+b+c

Commitments

Payments

0

0

0

0,575

1,150

1.725

1,725

0,575

1,150

1,725

1,725

0,575

1,150

1,725

1,725

Total

2009
and
subs.
Years
1,725/
year

1,725/
year

1,725/
year

2.4.

Compatibility with financial programming and financial perspective

[X] Proposal is compatible with existing financial programming.

[]

Proposal  will  entail  reprogramming  of  the  relevant  heading  in  the  financial
perspective.

Proposal  may  require  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Interinstitutional
Agreement.

24

 
2.5.

Financial impact on revenue:4

[X] Proposal  has  no  financial  implications  (involves  technical  aspects  regarding

implementation of a measure).

The financial revenue depends on the level of AD or AS measures which in turn is
governed by the substantive law contained in the two above-mentioned Regulations.
The  proposal  does  not  affect  the  substantive  provisions  but  only  changes  the
procedural provisions.

OR

Proposal has financial impact – the effect on revenue is as follows:

(NB All details and observations relating to the method of calculating the effect on
revenue should be shown in a separate annex.)

Budget line

Revenue

(€ million to one decimal place)

Prior to
action
[Year
n-1]

[Yea
r n]

Situation following action

[n+1] [n+2] [n+3

[n+4] [n+5]

]

a) Revenue in absolute terms

b) Change in revenue

 (cid:1)

(Please specify each budget line involved, adding the appropriate number of rows
to the table if there is an effect on more than one budget line.)

3.

BUDGET CHARACTERISTICS

Type of expenditure

New

EFTA
contribution

Contributions
form applicant
countries

Heading in
financial
perspective

Non-comp

Non Diff

NO

NO

NO

No 5

4.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 133 of the Treaty

Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96

Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97

Proposal  for  an  amendment  to  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection  against
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  and  Council

4

For further information, see separate explanatory note.

25

 
                                                
Regulation  (EC)  No  2026/97  on  protection  against  subsidized  imports  from  countries  not
members of the European Community

5.

5.1.

DESCRIPTION AND GROUNDS

Need for Community intervention 5

5.1.1. Objectives pursued

Introduction of mandatory time limits for the completion of review investigations.

The  introduction  of  mandatory  time  limits  in  reviews  is  an  essential  part  of  the  set  of
amendments  which  complements  the  amendments  contained  in  the  original  Commission
proposal  concerning  the  way  decisions  are  made  by  Member  States  in  the  area  of  anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy. Indeed, this has been a long-standing request by a large number of
Member  States.  The  introduction  of  deadlines  would  therefore  be  considered  as  an  integral
part of the overall "package" which ensures a balance between the different aspects covered
by the various amendments.

Under  the  present  Basic  anti-dumping  Regulation,  new  investigations  are  subject  to  a
mandatory  time  limit  of  15  months  (13  months  for  the  Anti-subsidy  Basic  Regulation).  By
contrast, the current 12 month deadline for review investigations is not mandatory but merely
indicative. Experience gained since the entry into force of the Basic Regulations show that, in
the absence of mandatory deadlines and the necessary human resources, it is very difficult to
respect the above mentioned normal deadline of 12 months. In particular, the absence of strict
deadlines makes it difficult to oblige interested parties to respect procedural requirements. As
a result, reviews have often lasted longer than the normal timeframe.

Pending the conclusion of expiry review investigations, the measures under review continue
to  remain  in  force.  Consequently,  unusually  lengthy  review  investigations  may  undermine
legal certainty and cause adverse effects to interested parties.

The only solution to this problem is to introduce mandatory time limits for the completion of
the  review  investigations.  It  is  therefore  proposed  to  introduce  a  mandatory  deadline  of  15
months  for  completion  of  interim  and  expiry  review  investigations,  while  maintaining  the
existing  indicative  timetable  of  12  months.  For  newcomer  and  anti-absorption  review
investigations,  a  mandatory  time  limit  of  9  months  is  proposed.  These  deadlines  are
considered  to  be  the  adequate  amount  of  time  necessary  to  complete  the  various  review
investigations, giving due account to the relative complexity of each different type of review
investigation.

5.1.2. Measures taken in connection with ex ante evaluation

(This involves:

5

For further information, see separate explanatory note.

26

 
                                                
(a)

explaining how and when the ex ante evaluation was conducted (author, timing and
where  the  report(s)  is/are  available)  or  how  the  corresponding  information  was
gathered;6

(b)

describing briefly the findings and lessons learnt from the ex ante evaluation.)

Following the presentation of the "19th Annual Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities", the European Parliament, on its own
initiative,  adopted  in  October  2002  a  report  prepared  by  MEP  Michel  Hansenne  (Ref.  A5-
0323/2002,  PE  316-244).  In  this  report,  the  EP  suggested  a  number  of  improvements  to
current practices, such as, inter alia, the introduction of deadlines in reviews. In this respect,
the  EP  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  means  should  be  granted  to  the  Commission  in  order  to
commensurate to the needs deriving from this (anticipated increase of workload).

Furthermore,  the  Member  States  -  through  the  Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidy  Advisory
Committee and the Council Commercial Questions Group - have insisted at several occasions
on the shortening of the investigation periods in reviews.

The  Commission  has  studied  this  proposal  and  now  submits  a  proposal  for  a  Council
Regulation which deals with this question. Moreover, it continued to stress the need to assess
the effect on its resources.

5.1.3. Measures taken following ex post evaluation

(Where a programme is being renewed the lessons to be learned from an interim or ex post
evaluation should also be described briefly.)

Not applicable

5.2.

Action envisaged and budget intervention arrangements

(This point should describe the logic behind the proposal. It should specify the main actions
to  achieve  the  general  objective.  Each  action  should  have  one  or  more  specific  objectives.
These should indicate the progress expected over the proposed period. They should also look
beyond immediate outputs but be sufficiently precise to allow concrete results to be identified.
Specify for each main action:

– 

the target population(s) (specify number of beneficiaries if possible);

The Community producers, importers, users and traders, as well as the third country
producers  and  exporters,  will  benefit  from  the  consequences  of  setting  mandatory
deadlines in reviews. All these parties have voiced concern in the past related to the
time  it  takes  to  conclude  investigations  and  have  highlighted  that  the  uncertainty
related to it is detrimental to their activities.

– 

the specific objectives set for the programming period (in measurable terms);

Based  on  the  objectives  set  out  under  point  5.1.1.,  the  introduction  of  mandatory
deadlines in reviews has the following specific objectives :

6

For minimum information requirements relating to new initiatives, see SEC 2000 (1051)

27

 
                                                
- increase transparency of trade defence instruments

- increase effectiveness of the instrument

- avoid to cause adverse economic effects to interested parties

– 

the concrete measures to be taken to implement the action ;

In  order  to  deal  with  the  resulting  additional  workload  following  the  setting  of
deadlines in reviews, it is required that additional human resources be foreseen. The
number  of  additional  casehandlers  needed  to  cope  with  the  additional  workload
involved in setting out a 15-month deadline for interim and expiry reviews is 14 (7 A
and 7 B), in additional to a C post for secretarial support tasks.

This  figure  has  been  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  number  and  type  of  currently
ongoing new cases and reviews, the number of currently available case-handlers and
the average length of reviews in recent years.

In measurable terms  : interim and  expiry  review  investigations  account  for  69%  of
the total investigation months, resulting in 53 casehandlers dealing exclusively with
those  reviews.  In  view  of  coping  with  the  shorter  deadlines  proposed  (from  an
average  of  19  months  to  the  proposed  15  months),  an  additional  14  casehandlers
should be added to the existing 53. Note that this calculation reflects the situation on
31 October 2003. The result was cross-checked by making the same calculation for
the  situation  on  31  December  1998,  1999,  2000,  2001  and  2002.  All  these
calculations have indeed fully backed up the number of necessary additional staff as
the relative importance of these types of investigations in DG Trade's workload has
also been confirmed.

The  application  of  deadlines  for  reviews  will  be  phased  in  by  a  2-step  approach.
Together  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the  amendments,  all  new  expiry  review
investigations  will  be  subject  to  mandatory  deadlines.  2  years  after  the  entry  into
force of the amendments, also interim reviews  will become subject to  deadlines.  In
other words, the additional workload resulting from the introduction of deadlines will
be gradually building up. Hence also the proposal to receive the additional staff in 3
"instalments"  of  an  additional  5  posts  per  year  for  3  years.  As  far  as  2004  is
concerned, it will be possible to cope with existing staff. This reflects the fact that the
additional workload foreseen for 2004 is limited, given that a considerable part of the
reviews which will be processed in that year will have had an initiation date prior to
the  entry  into  force  of  the  amendments.  Note  that  an  expiry  review  initiated  for
instance  in  October  2003  will  normally  have  been  concluded  in  April  2005.
Obviously, as time goes on, more and more expiry reviews and from 2006 onwards
also interim reviews will be subject to  strict  deadlines  and  therefore,  the  additional
staff resources are needed gradually over the aforementioned 3 year period.

Number of
additional staff

2004

0

2005

5

2006

5

2007

5

28

 
For information, the number of cases for which an expiry review under articles 11(2)
or 18 might be requested is 23 in 2004 and 64 for 2005.

Furthermore, a complementary budget will be needed to cope with the extra missions
during a certain timeframe (until now, missions could be re-scheduled to fall under
the budget of the following year as there were no deadlines to deal with).

DG  Trade  has  opted  both  for  the  2  step  approach  (i.e.  gradual  phasing  in  of
mandatory  deadlines)  as  well  as  for  the  request  of  additional  staff  in  order  to
absolutely  ensure  that  mandatory  deadlines  are  respected  once  they  are  in  place.
Indeed,  the  non-respect  by  the  Commission  of  these  deadlines  would  have  serious
consequences,  both  for  economic operators and  for the Commission.  In the  case  of
expiry  reviews,  existing  AD/AS  measures  would  automatically  expire.  Thus,  the
Community  industry  would  no  longer  be  protected  by  AS/AD  duties  although  it
would be entitled to such measures. This in turn would make the Commission legally
liable  (payment  of  damages,  claims  of  maladministration).  In  the  case  of  interim
reviews,  the  measures  would  remain  unchanged  if  the  deadline  is  not  met.  This  in
turn could have e.g. as a consequence that exporters and importers are still subject to
AD/AS  duties  although  such  duties  should  have  been  lowered  or  repealed  on  the
basis of the information submitted in the interim review. Again, the adverse financial
consequences for exporters and importers of such a failure are quite obvious, as is the
Commission's liability resulting therefrom.

– 

the immediate outputs of each action; and

Reviews  under  articles  11(2)  and  18  of  the  Basic  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy
regulations  will  immediately  fall  under  the  provisions  of  the  proposal,  including
pending  investigations.  In  measurable  terms,  this  means  that  for  2004,  23  AD/AS
cases could be subject to a request for such review.

– 

the  contribution  of  these  outputs  to  the  expected  outcomes  in  terms  of  satisfying
needs or solving problems

The  output  described  above  will  directly  satisfy  the  objective  of  the  amendment  to
the Basic Regulations.

Information should also be given on the budget intervention arrangements (rate and form of
the required financial assistance).)

5.3.

Methods of implementation

(Specify the methods to be used to implement the planned actions: direct management by the
Commission using either regular or outside staff or by externalisation. In the latter case, give
details  of  the  arrangements  envisaged  for  this  externalisation  (TAO,  Agencies,  Offices,
decentralised  executive  units,  management  shared  with  Member  States  -  national,  regional
and local authorities.)

Indicate  the  effect  of  the  externalisation  model  chosen  on  the  financial  intervention,
management and support resources and on human resources (seconded officials, etc.).)

Under  Article  133  of  the  Treaty,  the  Community  has  exclusive  competence  for  commercial
policy, and in  particular  for the trade defence instruments. The Community  Institutions will
be responsible for the implementation and management of the proposed regulation.

29

 
As the investigations carried out by the Commission are "confidential" and of a quasi-judicial
nature, the work must be carried out by regular staff (officials, END, ..).

As far as confidentiality is concerned, 2 aspects have to be underlined. First of all, AD and AS
decisions are market sensitive in that any leaks about their precise date of adoption would in
particular give to exporters in 3rd countries and importers in the Community the opportunity to
engage  in  adverse  short-term  operations  undermining  the  efficiency  of  such  measures.
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, in all AD/AS investigations, information of a
highly sensitive nature is routinely collected. This information covers the  core business data
of  the  economic  operators  affected  (comprehensive  transaction-by  transaction  sales  listings,
cost of production broken down to individual product types, sales channels, sourcing patterns,
etc.).  Unauthorized  release  of  this  type  of  information  would  directly  engage  the  financial
liability of the Commission.

As far  as the quasi-judicial nature is concerned, it should be noted that the investigations in
questions  affect  normally  a  fairly  high  number  of  parties  with  adverse  interests.  All  these
parties enjoy a number of procedural rights which are not only imposed on the Institution by
reason of the Treaty, but also by WTO obligations. Many of these procedural rights govern in
detail  the  complex  information  collection  process.  Thus,  not  only  the  final  conclusions
reached  in  such  investigations,  but  also  the  numerous  preceding  steps  are  ruled  by  various
legal rules.

6.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

6.1.

Total financial impact on Part B - (over the entire programming period)

(The method of calculating the total amounts set out in the table below must be explained by
the breakdown in Table 6.2. )

6.1.1.

Financial intervention

Not applicable

Commitments (in € million to three decimal places)

Breakdown

[Year
n]

[n+1]

[n+2]

[n+3]

[n+4]

Total

[n+5
and
subs.
Years]

Action 1

Action 2

etc.

TOTAL

30

 
6.1.2.

Technical  and  administrative  assistance,  support  expenditure  and  IT  expenditure
(commitment appropriations)

[Year
n]

[n+1]

[n+2]

[n+3]

[n+4]

Total

[n+5
and
subs.
years]

Not applicable

1) 
administrative assistance

Technical 

and

Technical 

a) 
offices

assistance

b)  Other 
administrative assistance:

technical 

and

- intra muros:

- extra muros:

of  which  for  construction
and 
of
maintenance 
computerised  management
systems

Subtotal 1

2) Support expenditure

a) Studies

b) Meetings of experts

c) Information and
publications

Subtotal 2

TOTAL

31

 
6.2.

Calculation  of  costs  by  measure  envisaged  in  Part  B  (over  the  entire
programming period)7

Not applicable

(Where  there  is  more  than  one  action,  give  sufficient  detail  of  the  specific  measures  to  be
taken for each one to allow the volume and costs of the outputs to be estimated.)

Breakdown

Commitments (in € million to three decimal places)

Type
of outputs
(projects, files )

Number of
outputs

Average unit
cost

(total for years
1…n)

Total cost

(total for years
1…n)

1

2

3

4=(2X3)

Action 1

- Measure 1

- Measure 2

Action 2

- Measure 1

- Measure 2

- Measure 3

etc.

TOTAL COST

If necessary explain the method of calculation

7

For further information, see separate explanatory note.

32

 
                                                
7.

IMPACT ON STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE

7.1.

Impact on human resources

Types of post

Staff to be assigned to management of the
action using existing and/or additional
resources

Number of
permanent posts

Number of
temporary posts

Officials 
temporary staff

or

A

B

C

7

7

1

Other human resources

Total

Description of tasks deriving from the
action

Casehandlers to carry out AD and AS
investigations (A and B) + secretarial
support (C).

Total

7

7

1

The  needs  for  human  and  administrative  resources  shall  be  covered  within  the  allocation
granted to the managing DG in the framework of the annual allocation procedure.

7.2.

Overall financial impact of human resources

Type of human resources

Amount (€)

Method of calculation *

Officials

Temporary staff

Other human resources

540.000 in 2005
1.080.000 in 2006
1.620.000 from
2007 onwards

15 staff at an average of € 108.000 per
staff member per year

(specify budget line)

Total

The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.

33

 
7.3.

Other administrative expenditure deriving from the action

Amount €

Method of calculation

± 7.000/person/year
(= 2005 : 35.000;
2006 : 70.000;
2007 : 105.000)

Budget 2003 of the investigating teams
divided by no of A/B officials in place,
times 5 for 2005.

Budget line

(number and heading)

Overall allocation (Title A7)

A0701 – Missions

A07030 – Meetings
A07031 – Compulsory committees 1
A07032 – Non-compulsory committees 1

A07040 – Conferences

A0705 – Studies and consultations

Other expenditure (specify)

Information systems (A-5001/A-4300)

Other expenditure - Part A (specify)

Total

The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.

1 Specify the type of committee and the group to which it belongs.

I.

Annual total (7.2 + 7.3)

II.

III.

Duration of action

Total cost of action (I x II)

€ 1.725.000
from 2007
onwards
(575.000 and
1.150.000 in
2005 and 2006
respectively)

unlimited

Not applicable

(In the estimate of human and administrative resources required for the action, DGs/Services
must take into account the decisions taken by the Commission  in its orientation/APS debate
and when adopting the preliminary draft budget (PDB). This means that DGs must show that
human  resources  can  be  covered  by  the  indicative  pre-allocation  made  when  the  PDB  was
adopted.

Exceptional cases (i.e. those where the action concerned could not be foreseen when the PDB
was  being  prepared)  will  have  to  be  referred  to  the  Commission  for  a  decision  on  whether
and how (by means of an amendment of the indicative pre-allocation, an ad hoc redeployment
exercise,  a  supplementary/amending  budget  or  a  letter  of  amendment  to  the  draft  budget)
implementation of the proposed action can be accommodated.)

34

 
The  requirement  for  additional  staff  could  not  be  foreseen.  Indeed,  at  the  origin  of  the
proposals to change the above-mentioned Regulation was the need, as evidenced by a number
of events in March 2003, to improve the decision making process within the Council and thus
safeguard  the  effectiveness,  credibility  and  transparency  of  this  important  Community
activity.  However,  Member  States  took  this  opportunity  to  insist  also  on  a  number  of  other
changes which would enhance would effectiveness, credibility and transparency. By doing so,
they addressed concerns which had already before been voiced by economic operators and by
the European Parliament.

8.

FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION

8.1.

Follow-up arrangements

(Adequate  follow-up  information  must  be  collected,  from  the  start  of  each  action,  on  the
inputs,  outputs  and  results  of  the  intervention.  In  practice  this  means  (i)  identifying  the
indicators for inputs, outputs and results and (ii) putting in place methods for the collection of
data).

Not applicable

8.2.

Arrangements and schedule for the planned evaluation

(Describe the planned schedule and arrangements for interim and ex post evaluations to be
carried out in order to assess whether the intervention has achieved the objectives set. In the
case  of  multiannual  programmes,  at  least  one  thorough  evaluation  in  the  life  cycle  of  the
programme is needed. For other activities ex post or mid-term evaluations should be carried
out at intervals not exceeding six years.)

Not applicable

9.

ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES

(Article 3(4) of the Financial Regulation: "In order to  prevent  risk  of  fraud  or  irregularity,
the  Commission  shall  record  in  the  financial  statement  any  information  regarding  existing
and planned fraud prevention and protection measures.")

Not applicable

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