Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Operation of Euratom Safeguards in 2002
Date: 2003-12-10
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, report, supervisory body

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 10.12.2003
COM(2003) 764 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Operation of Euratom Safeguards in 2002

EN

  EN

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Operation of Euratom Safeguards in 2002

1. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2002 was a pivotal year for Euratom Safeguards. During 2001 the Commission had
appointed  a  High  Level  Experts  Group  (HLEG)  to  examine  the  mission  and  the
means of the former Euratom Safeguards Office. On the basis of their final report the
Commission adopted a new Mission Statement for the former Office and instructed
that it be  fully  integrated  within DG TREN.  To this  end  on  26  June 2002  two  new
Directorates  were  created:  Directorate H  Nuclear  Safety  and  Safeguards,  and
Directorate I Nuclear Inspection.

The  adoption  of  the  new  Mission  Statement  will  entail  significant  changes  in  the
approaches  employed  for  the  execution  of  Euratom  Safeguards  controls.  Therefore
structures  were  created  to  provide  new  concepts  and  guidance  in  order  to  progress
the  introduction  of  new  approaches.  Internally,  working  groups  of  experienced
personnel from H and I were set up. Externally, an advisory group of senior experts
from the Safeguards community, SAGES, was established.

In  March  2002,  the  proposed  new  Regulation  on  the  application  of  Euratom
Safeguards  was  adopted  by  the  Commission  and  submitted  to  the  Council  for
approval. The new Regulation is intended to update the currently in force Regulation
3227/76  in  line  with  legal  and  technical  developments,  in  particular  the  Additional
Protocol  to  the  Agreements  between  the  Member  States,  the  Community  and  the
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  modern  data  transmission  techniques  and  a
consistent Safeguards policy on waste. Discussions with the Council have progressed
reasonably well and it is hoped  that the new Regulation  will enter into force at the
end of 2003.

The  Additional  Protocols  to  the  Safeguards  Agreements  between  the  Community,
Member States and the IAEA had been ratified by 11 of the 15 Member States by the
end of 2002. In  the  meantime exercises were  arranged together with the  IAEA  and
some  Member  States  to  investigate  the  practicalities  of  implementation  and  to
develop  the  necessary  implementation  procedures.  A  dedicated  database  is  being
developed for follow up of the Additional Protocols when they are in force.

In  order  to  increase  transparency,  a  Stakeholders’  seminar  attended  by  110
representatives  of  Member  States  and  nuclear  installations  was  held  to  brief
participants  on  the  implementation  of  the  new  Regulation  and  the  Additional
Protocols as well as upon the new missions of Euratom Safeguards. In a similar spirit
of  greater  transparency,  all  the  major  nuclear  installations  of  the  European  Union
were invited to complete a questionnaire on their perception of the image and quality
of Euratom Safeguards. The generally positive replies are considered as encouraging.

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It  is  expected  that  enlargement  will  not  pose  any  major  practical  difficulties.  The
project to prepare software and hardware tools for nuclear material reporting for the
enlargement states had entered its final phase by the end of 2002.

At the end of 2002 the total amount of Plutonium under Euratom Safeguards was 569
tonnes,  an  11 tonne  increase  compared  with  the  end  of  2001.  Similarly  the  total
amount of Uranium under Euratom Safeguards increased to 318 710 tonnes. Despite
the  increase  in  the  amounts  of  material  under  control,  careful  streamlining  and
prioritisation  of  inspection  activities  allowed  a  5%  reduction  in  inspection-days
compared to 2001.

Reports  made  by  the  operators  of  installations  on  flows  and  inventories  of  nuclear
materials  in  accordance  with  Regulation  3227/76  were  processed  and  checked.  In
total more than 1 million lines of data were received, mostly in electronic format. All
errors  and  inconsistencies  detected  were  satisfactorily  corrected  by  the  operators
concerned.  In  turn  Euratom  Safeguards  furnished  the  IAEA  with  the  accountancy
reports  which  the  Community  supplies  in  fulfilment  of  its  obligations  under  the
Safeguards  Agreements  with  the  IAEA.  All  reports  were  supplied  on  time  and
correctly formatted.

A number of discrepancies and inconsistencies were detected by inspection activities
during  2002.  However,  subsequent  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  no
diversion of nuclear material had taken place. Similarly, data  analysis  performed at
Headquarters  revealed  no  evidence  for  the  diversion  of  nuclear  materials.  The
Safeguards  Implementation  Report  of  the  IAEA  for  2002  concluded  that  there  was
no  evidence  of  diversion  of  nuclear  material  or  misuse  of  facilities  or  equipment
under IAEA Safeguards.

2. 

LEGAL BASIS OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

The task of Euratom Safeguards is to ensure that within the European Union nuclear
material  is  not  diverted  from  its  intended  use  and  that  safeguarding  obligations
assumed by the Community under an agreement with a third state or an international
organisation are complied with. Chapter VII of the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic  Energy  Community,  commonly  called  the  Euratom  Treaty,  and  the
implementing  Euratom  Regulation  No.  3227/76,  as  amended,  constitute  the  legal
basis of Euratom Safeguards1

.

3. 

MISSION AND FUNCTIONING OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

3.1. 

High Level Experts Group Report and level of implementation

In  order  to  review  the  operations  of  the  now  former  Euratom  Safeguards  Office
(ESO),  the  Commission  (in  June  2001)  mandated  a  High  Level  Expert  Group
(HLEG)2 to prepare a report on the matter. The report was finalized at the beginning

1

2

For further details, see chapters 2 and 3, of the 1999-2000 Annual Report (COM(2001) 436 final).
The group was composed of Messrs. Christopherson, Eliat and Pellaud.

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of  2002  and  submitted  to  the  Commissioner  responsible  for  energy  and  transport
matters,  Vice-President  Mme  de  Palacio  in  February  2002.  The  findings  of  the
HLEG  and  the  recommendations  made  were  guiding  elements  for  the  Commission
decision  of  26  June  20023  whereby  the  nuclear  services  of  DG  TREN  were  re-
organized and a new mission statement for Euratom Safeguards was adopted.

In  its  decision  of  26  June  2002,  the  Commission  took  note  of  the  findings  of  the
HLEG report, adopted the mission statement as contained in the report, and approved
the  creation  of  a  Scientific  Advisory  Group  on  Euratom  Safeguards  (SAGES4)  to
advise the Commission on implementing the new mission statement, in particular re-
defining the generic Safeguards approaches.

The  first  steps  concerning  the  evaluation  and  implementation  of  the  HLEG
recommendations had already been pursued by the Commission decision of 26 June
2002,  namely  the  re-integration  of  ESO  into  DG  TREN,  the  adoption  of  the  new
mission  statement  and  the  creation  of  the  SAGES.  With  regard  to  the  other
recommendations  made,  it  is  clear  that  more  time  will  be  needed  to  assess  and,  as
appropriate, implement them to the extent necessary.

A detailed analysis of the requirements and general characteristics of new safeguards
approaches  for  all  types  of  nuclear  installations  has  been  initiated  in  the  form  of
several  internal  working  groups  dedicated  to  the  subject.  A  re-examination  of  the
Commission’s  co-operation  modalities  with  nuclear  operators,  and  with  the  IAEA,
can  only  be  started  once  a  general  outline  of  a  new  concept  has  been  prepared
internally.

3.2. 

Reorganisation and new Mission Statement

3.2.1.  Reorganisation

In the light of the fragmented nature of the services dealing with nuclear matters, the
Commission,  in  1999,  started  an  exercise  to  group  together  and  streamline  its
activities  in  the  nuclear  field.  With  this  objective  in  mind,  the  re-organization
decided on 26 June 2002 resulted in the creation of two new directorates within DG
TREN,  one  dealing  with  nuclear  safety  and  safeguards  (Directorate  H)5,  the  other
one with nuclear inspections (Directorate I).

3.2.2.  New Mission Statement

The  new  mission  statement,  which  was  also  adopted  by  the  same  Commission
decision  of  26  June  2002,  sets  out  the  basic  orientations  for  the  Commission’s
activities in the nuclear inspection  field.  It emphasizes  the  need  to  redirect  existing
practice, which is based on carrying out almost exclusively independent verification
activities,  to  a  situation  where  the  quality  and  performance  of  nuclear  operators’
measurement  and  control  systems  will  be  taken  into  account  when  making  a

3

4

5

Minutes of the 1773rd meeting of the Commission, PV(2002) 1573 final
The SAGES group is composed of Messrs. Pellaud, Loos, Schenkel
As a further step, a unit dealing with radio-protection matters was integrated into Directorate H as of 16
February 2003.

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judgement  on  the  safeguards  effort  that  should  be  spent  in  a  nuclear  facility.
Furthermore,  the  mission  statement  asks  for  a  re-definition  of  the  co-operation
modalities  with  the  IAEA  in  order  to  avoid  duplication  of  effort  and  to  achieve
efficiency gains.

3.3. 

Preparation of new Regulation

3.3.1.  State of Play – Discussion in the Council

As  stated  in  last  year's  report,  the  draft  new  Regulation  on  the  Application  of
Euratom Safeguards was approved by the Commission on 22 March 2002 under the
number  COM(2002)99.  On  the  same  date  it  was  forwarded  to  the  Council  for
approval.  In  a  number  of  discussions  in  the  Council  the  following  issues  were
identified and compromise solutions were sought:

(cid:1)  The  security  and  confidentiality  of  data  provided  by  the  operator  to  the

Commission.

(cid:1)  The extent of information on Nuclear Material in records kept by the operators.

(cid:1)  The extent and detail of reporting of nuclear material in waste.

(cid:1)  The  length  of  the  transitional  period  granted  to  the  operators  for  them  to  adapt

their accountancy systems to the new reporting format.

(cid:1)  The  mechanism  of  exemptions  for  non-nuclear  users  of  Nuclear  Material  in  its

end-use form.

The  state  of  progress  in  the  discussions  at  the  Council  allows  optimism  as  to  the
approval  of  the  new  Regulation  by  the  Council  in  good  time  before  the  entry  into
force of the Additional Protocols and before the EU enlargement.

3.3.2.  Seminar for Stakeholders

At  the  request  of  the  Danish  Presidency,  the  Commission  held  an  information
seminar centred around two subjects:

(cid:1)  Technical  issues  and  the  timetable  for  the  implementation  of  the  new  Euratom
Regulation  COM(2002)99,  and  the  preparation  of  the  Commission  for  the
implementation of the Additional Protocols.

(cid:1)  The  new  missions  of  Euratom  Safeguards  following  the  HLEG  report  and  the

development of new Safeguards approaches.

The  seminar  was  held  in  Luxembourg  on  the  12  and  13  December  2002.  It  was
attended  by  110  representatives  of  nuclear  installations  and  national  authorities
across the EU Member States.

An  important  part  of  the  seminar  was  the  provision  of  hands-on-sessions,  during
the
which  the  participants  could  run  the  software  under  development  by 
Commission,  allowing  reporting  under  the  new  Regulation  of  Accountancy  and
Additional Protocol data.

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At the concluding session of the seminar it was mentioned that the Commission will
afford operators as much assistance as possible to facilitate the implementation of the
new  Regulation.  It  was  also  indicated  that  the  operators'  perceptions  of  Euratom
activities  will  be  taken  into  account  when  considering  the  re-orientation  of
safeguards  methods  and  approaches  in  nuclear  installations.  During  the  concluding
session  it  was  also  stated  that  quality  assurance  approaches  comprising  auditing  of
the  accountancy  system  of  the  operator  as  well  as  a  risk  analysis  to  avoid
unnecessary inspections would be further considered.

4. 

EURATOM VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

4.1. 

Nuclear Material Accountancy

The  European  Union  area  contains  the  full  range  of  nuclear  fuel  cycle  activities,
although  they  are  not  evenly  dispersed  throughout  the  Member  States.  The  nuclear
material inventories in the installations under safeguards are constantly growing. For
example, plutonium stocks during the last decade increased from 203 tonnes in 1990
to about 569 tonnes at the end of 2002. Plutonium stocks hold a special interest for
safeguards  because  of  their  sensitive  nature.  During  the  same  period,  the  total
Uranium  inventory  in  the  European  Union  increased  from  200 400  tonnes  to  about
319 000 tonnes at the end of 2002 (table no. 1).

The  operators  of  nuclear  installations  report  all  nuclear  material  inventories  and
flows  to  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office.  These  reports  amounted  to  more  than  1
million accountancy lines for the year, the large majority of which was received by
electronic means. All these data were checked for internal and external consistency
and  for  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Euratom  Agreements  with  third
countries.

All clerical mistakes and inconsistencies revealed  during  2002  were  corrected  after
consultation with the operators involved.

Accountancy  reports  were  sent  to  the  IAEA  in  fulfilment  of  the  obligations
undertaken by the European Union in the  framework of  its  Safeguards Agreements
with  the  IAEA.  During  the  period  covered  by  this  report,  the  quality  and  the
timeliness of the reports met with the satisfaction of the IAEA.

4.2. 

Inspection effort and results

In 2002 inspection activities conducted by Euratom Safeguards inspectors amounted
to 7 288 person-days: a reduction of about 5% in comparison with 2001.

This  evolution  results  mainly  from  streamlining  and  prioritisation  of  inspection
activities  as  outlined  below.  These  savings  set  free  inspection  resources  for  new
facilities becoming operational in the reporting period.

An approximate distribution of the inspection effort, according to the major types of
installations, shows that about 30% of the effort was spent in reprocessing facilities
(see 4.2.1 below) and associated stores, 45% in enrichment and fabrication facilities
(see 4.2.2 to 4.2.4) and another 25% in power reactors, research reactors (see 4.2.5)
and other nuclear facilities (see 4.2.6).

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The main concerns and/or results achieved in the course of the inspection activities
for each type of installations under control are summarised below.

4.2.1.  Reprocessing facilities6

Modern  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  installations,  THORP  at  Sellafield,  UK,  and
UP2/UP3  at  La  Hague,  France  are  characterised  by  a  high  throughput7  and  highly
automated and contained processes. The current safeguards approaches foresee high
frequency  inspections  and  automated  unattended  safeguards  systems  to  verify  the
nuclear material flows, a significant part of which is fresh Plutonium. At the site of
each of these two large reprocessing plants a Euratom on-site laboratory performing
verification measurements is being operated by analysts of DG JRC-ITU.

With  the  exception  of  a  planned  shutdown  period  from  mid-March  2002  until  the
beginning  of  June  2002,  THORP  was  in  normal  production.  In  June  2001  an
apparent  bias  of  the  operator's  input  sample  results  was  detected.  Knowing  the
principal  causes  and  aware  of  the  circumstances  of  the  issue,  the  operator  was
allowed to continue production until the planned inventory in the chemical separation
plant  in  April  2002.  Extensive  test  work  done  by  the  operator  and  investigations
substantially supported by the Euratom  On-Site  Laboratory (OSL), showed  that  the
data, which indicated an apparent material loss were biased and had to be corrected.
The  revised values  are  in  agreement  with  internationally  recognised  standards.  The
annual  Physical  Inventory  and  the  Material  Balance  presented  by  BNFL  were
accepted.  Proper  action  was  taken  by  the  operator  to  avoid  recurrence  of  this
problem.  Since  then,  the  installed  safeguards  system  has  not  revealed  any  further
problem of this kind.

The  results  of  the  inspection  activities  in  the  Magnox  reprocessing  facilities  and
related  facilities  at  Sellafield  were  satisfactory.  The  annual  Physical  Inventory
Verification showed that the Material Unaccounted For (MUF) values for all nuclear
materials to lie within internationally accepted limits. In particular the results for the
Fuel  Handling  Plant-Decanners  were  an  improvement  when  compared  to  those  of
previous years. At the end of the year the Special Nuclear Material Store 9 Extension
was  actively  commissioned  and  put  into  operation.  The  introduction  of  the  first
Plutonium Oxide cans took place in November.

At La Hague, the UP2/800 reprocessing plant was in  operation from April  2002 to
the end of the year following the commissioning of the new plutonium finishing line
(R4). The UP3 reprocessing plant was in operation from January to December 2002
and  the  COGEMA  operator  trained  Japanese  trainees  in  reprocessing  techniques
throughout  the  year.  Mini-campaigns  of  shearing  and  reprocessing  with  'debriefing
periods' alternated with commercial reprocessing campaigns.

6

7

At reprocessing facilities, spent fuel assemblies received from power reactors are processed chemically
to separate uranium and plutonium from the highly radioactive fission products. The separated nuclear
materials can be re-introduced in the fuel cycle.
The total annual throughput of these three facilities adds up to over 3000 tonnes of fuel containing more
than 20 tonnes of plutonium.

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Routine  verifications  made  on  all  Plutonium  input  and  output  flows  allowed  the
confirmation of COGEMA declarations. However, as in previous years, considerable
delays by the operator in making declarations of some analysis results were noted.

The Physical Inventory in the UP3 chemical process revealed a rather high “Material
Unaccounted For (MUF) of U and U235. A MUF of similar magnitude but opposite
sign was observed at the UP2-800 plant, what could link its origin to the systematic
transfers  of  Uranyl  Nitrate  liquid  from  UP2-800  to  UP3.  The  investigation  by
COGEMA into the potential causes is still ongoing. All activities were performed in
a  spirit  of  good  co-operation  with  the  operator  and  with  the  support  of  the  analyst
inspectors from the LSS run by DG JRC-ITU.

Efforts were undertaken to further rationalise inspection activities via concentration
on strategically important materials, namely Plutonium input and output streams. As
in 2001, uranium outputs were not routinely checked and other controls on Uranium
with a lower priority were not performed.

The decommissioning plan for the Dounreay (UK) reprocessing facility aims, in the
long run, at the complete removal of nuclear material from a number of areas on the
site. This plan requires inter alia the re-starting of some existing facilities as well as
the  construction  of  new  ones  e.g.  for  waste  handling.  As  long  as  fissile  material  is
present in these facilities nuclear safeguards have to be applied. During the last year
weekly  routine  inspections  were  performed  by  our  inspectors  and  two  Physical
Inventory Verifications (PIV) were carried out.  All these  activities  were  conclusive
in  the  sense  that  they  led  to  a  confirmation  of  the  declarations  made  by  the  plant
operators.

4.2.2. 

Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX) 8

At the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP), Plutonium commissioning was started in April
after receipt of Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) consent and a successful “pre-
Plutonium”  Physical  Inventory  Verification.  Since  then  the  production  of  MOX
pellets has continued and the first MOX rods have been produced.

The  commissioning  of  the  Safeguards  instrumentation  is  almost  completed.  To
coincide with the start of MOX production, a continuous weekly inspection scheme
was started. The inspections consist of verifying operational data, which are received
daily  via  a  link  on  the  operators  site  network,  against  signals  from  the  installed
Safeguards  instrumentation.  At  the  moment  these  checks  are  performed  by  manual
signal review, however,  software tools  are  under development which  will  automate
these  activities.  Discussions  on  data  transfer  between  the  site  and  Euratom
Headquarters  at  Luxembourg,  which  could  further  rationalise  the  inspection  effort,
have been continued.

For  the  MOX  Demonstration  Facility  (MDF)  at  Sellafield,  the  operator  received
the  license  to  operate  the  plant  as  a  support  facility  and  as  a  testing  laboratory  for
SMP purposes. Some material processing re-started in the summer.

8

In MOX Fuel Fabrication Plans, the plutonium oxide produced in reprocessing installations is used in a
mixture with uranium oxide to fabricate MOX fuel elements for subsequent use in nuclear power plants.

8

 
                                                
All routine interim verifications, the routine monthly Interim Inventory Verifications
and the Physical Inventory Verification in February were successfully completed.

The  methods  and  technical  means  applied  at  the  MELOX  plant  in  Marcoule
continued  to  be  highly  satisfactory.  In  close  co-operation  with  the  operator,
inspectors  determined  the  implementation  of  additional  surveillance  measures  to
cover  a  new  storage  facility  recently  set  up  inside  the  plant.  The  annual  Physical
Inventory  Verification  (PIV)  of  the  plant  was  conducted  in  July  with  satisfactory
results.

The  annual  Verification  of  the  Physical  Inventory  of  the  COGEMA-Cadarache
plant in France found an unacceptable amount of Material Unaccounted For (MUF)
on the plutonium materials.

The  operator  has  identified  the  possible  causes  of  the  MUF  and  he  is  presently
revising  his  internal  procedures  for  the  accounting  and  follow-up  of  the  stored
material, re-measuring the batches of materials that are involved in the MUF and re-
evaluating the accuracy of his measuring system.

The involved materials will remain in the installation allowing a re-establishment of
the attributed quantities.

The  Commission  received  a  preliminary  report  on  the  subject  and  inspectors  are
closely monitoring the progress made by the operator.

The  Belgonucléaire  MOX  fuel  plant  at  Dessel,  in  Belgium,  is  safeguarded  by
Euratom  and  the  IAEA  according  to  the  New  Partnership  Approach  (NPA).  The
inspections during the year 2002 have confirmed the operator’s declarations and the
year  ended  with  a  successful  Physical  Inventory  Verification.  The  unattended
measurement  system  for  received  material  has  been  modernised  and  on-site
unattended equipment has been linked to the inspector offices. Due to the failure of
the Belgium authorities to grant export licenses for the transfer of Plutonium samples
to  DG  JRC-ITU,  Euratom  Safeguards  has  been  unable  to  perform  destructive
analysis since March 2001.

The  FBFC  MOX  fuel  assembly  plant  at  Dessel,  in  Belgium,  continues  to  supply
principally German and Swiss reactors. To cover the borrowing scenario the annual
Physical  Inventory  Verification  (PIV)  took  place  at  the  same  time  as  the  PIV  at
Belgonucléaire.

The  Safeguards  objectives  for  the  installations  in  the  Hanau  area  in  Germany  have
been achieved. The Safeguards approach for the decommissioning of Siemens MOX
facility  was  agreed  upon  and  is  being  implemented  successfully.  The  nuclear
material  at  BfS  Hanau  has  all  been  moved  to  the  new  purpose  built  storage.  The
Safeguards  measures  to  firstly  verify  these  movements  and  then  to  maintain
continuity of knowledge worked satisfactorily.

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4.2.3.  Enrichment Facilities9

All three Urenco centrifuge enrichment plants at Almelo, the Netherlands, Gronau
in  Germany  and  Capenhurst  in  UK,  are  safeguarded  by  Euratom  working  together
with the IAEA. Capenhurst is on a list of installations drawn up by the UK as part of
the voluntary offer, and designated by the IAEA for the application of Safeguards.

Throughout  2002  the  rapid  build-up  of  enrichment  capacity  set  in  motion  in  recent
years has continued unabated. The total installed capacity to date at all three plants is
estimated at more than 6000 tonnes separative work per year.

For  reasons  of  commercial  sensitivity  as  well  as  proliferation  risk,  access  to
centrifuge  cascade  areas  is  highly  restricted.  A  combination  of  High  Performance
Trace Analysis/Environmental Sampling (HPTA/ES), permanently installed cascade-
pipe monitors, portable NDA requirement, Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and
Limited  Frequency  Unannounced  Access  (LFUA)  are  used  to  confirm  that  high
enriched  uranium  is  not  being  produced.  During  2002,  sample  collection  for
HPTA/ES has become a feature of inspections.

There  is  one  Physical  Inventory  Verification,  as  well  as  11  intermittent  routine
inspections per year and a number of additional routine inspections to verify feed or
product.  The  conclusion  of  these  activities  is  that  operator  declarations  in  2002  of
nuclear material flow and inventory at all plants were acceptable.

inspections 

throughout  2002.  The  yearly 

EURODIF  at  Pierrelatte,  France,  a  gas-diffusion  enrichment  plant,  was  subject  to
weekly  high  frequency 
inventory
verification was successfully carried out in the first week of March. Up to mid-June
2002, all the low-enriched uranium output declared to be subject to safeguards was
verified  during  the  weekly  inspections;  the  input  of  natural  uranium  and  the  tails
were verified on a random basis. From mid-June on, due to a reduction in inspection
effort, the verification of enriched Uranium also fell below 100%. As a consequence,
not all enriched material exported from EURODIF outside the European Union was
verified and sealed.

The  conclusion  reached  as  a  result  of  these  inspection  activities  was  that  in  2002,
there was no evidence that nuclear material declared to be subject to safeguards was
diverted  from  its  intended  use.  However,  the  “particular  status”10of  the  installation
continues to limit the safeguards assurance and needs to be addressed.

9

10

Modern Light Water  Reactors  need  fuel  with  about  3  to  5  percent  of  the  fissionable  uranium  isotope
U235. As natural uranium contains only 0.7 percent of this nuclide, an enrichment process is needed to
achieve  the  desired  concentration.  In  the  European  Union,  two  companies  offer  this  service  for  civil
customers: URENCO and EURODIF.
Due to the presence of nuclear material not subject to safeguards at EURODIF.

10

 
                                                
4.2.4.  LEU and HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion Facilities11

At  the  FBFC  LEU  fabrication  plant  at  Dessel,  Belgium  co-operation  with  the
IAEA under the NPA agreement continues. A successful annual Physical  Inventory
Verification was carried out in July with in-field measurement support by DG JRC-
ITU.

At BNFL Springfields, a large uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plant in the
UK, a weekly inspection regime was maintained because of the size and diversity of
the  plant  and  the  continuous  nature  and  high  frequency  of  imports  and  exports.
Additionally, all exports from the EU are sealed.

A  survey  of  the  Springfields  site  was  carried  out  by  experts  from  the  European
Commission’s Radiological Health and Safety service in order to assess the risks of
radiation  and  contamination  to  which  inspectors  are  exposed.  This  was  a  useful
exercise  to  raise  inspector  awareness  of  the  relative  risks  over  the  large  variety  of
conditions  and  types  of  material  that  exist  here.  It  was  recommended  that  such  an
exercise be performed at every major installation where inspectors are present.

The specifications of the project to install an NDA station in the inaccessible drum
store  at  the  Oxide  Fuel  Complex  were  concluded.  Once  the  financial  terms  are
proposed  by  the  operator,  a  decision  on  implementation  will  be  taken.  Discussions
took place with the operator on possible alternatives to the current inspection regime.

At  the  LEU  fabrication  plant  of  FBFC  in  Romans-sur-Isère  (France)  the  annual
physical inventory was carried out in August with in-field measurement  support by
DG  JRC-ITU.  There  was  no  evidence  of  diversion,  however  a  number  of
shortcomings  were  detected  and  had  to  be  corrected  by  the  operator.  The
shortcomings  consisted  of  items  declared  in  the  List  of  Inventory  Items  by  the
operator but not found by our inspectors at the Verification of the Inventory and also
of  other  items  that  were  not  declared  by  operator  but  found  during  the  verification
activities.

An unattended measuring station (UMS) was installed in July and training on its use
has  been  provided  both  to  the  operator  and  the  Euratom  inspectors.  The  UMS  has
been developed by JRC-Ispra and it is intended to measure on-line the outgoing flow
of finished fuel assemblies.

The annual physical inventory verification at the CERCA HEU Fabrication plant
in  Romans-sur-Isère  (France)  was  carried  out  in  November  and  was  globally
satisfactory. It was possible to perform it for the first time on the basis of a List of
Inventory  Items  provided  in  a  computer  readable  form,  allowing  the  inspectors  to
validate  satisfactorily  the  declared  data.  A  new  and  re-engineered  version  of  a
gamma-scanner  has  been  installed  by  the  JRC-Ispra  in  the  plant.  The  measuring
device  is  used  for  non-destructive  assays  of  fuel  elements  fabricated  for  research
reactors.

11

At  LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants,  fuel  assemblies  are  produced  from  low  enriched  uranium  (LEU)  for
subsequent  use  in  nuclear  power  plants.  In  HEU  Fuel  Fabrication  Plants,  fuel  elements  for  research
reactors using high-enriched uranium (HEU) are manufactured.

11

 
                                                
All  verifications  at  ENUSA  at  Juzbado,  in  Spain,  Westinghouse  Atom  AB  at
Västerås, in Sweden and ANF-Lingen in Germany, were performed with satisfactory
results with measurement support by DG JRC-ITU. Due to their level of achievement
in material accountancy, these installations are often used as benchmarks. In Juzbado
and  Västerås,  Euratom  inspectors  successfully  use  advanced  tools  for  on-site
verification and evaluation.

4.2.5.  Nuclear Power and Research Reactors12

A  successful  Physical  Inventory  Verification  was  performed  at  the  Dodewaard
Reactor (NL) that was shut down in 1997. Shipments of spent fuel will continue into
2003.

During  the  annual  Physical  Inventory  Verification  of  the  Magnox  power  reactor  at
Wylfa (UK) the absence of an irradiated fuel element became evident. The report of
a  technical  investigation  panel  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  element  must  have
been  inadvertently  dispatched  to  Sellafield.  The  report  also  makes  a  number  of
recommendations aimed at preventing the recurrence of such events. The operator’s
attention has however been drawn to the fact, that there is no definitive corroboration
of  their  conclusion  until  Sellafield  is  in  a  position  to  confirm  the  receipt  of  the
missing element.

In  April  the  operator  at  Bradwell  (UK)  informed  Euratom  of  an  apparent  fuel
element  accountancy  discrepancy  involving  elements  being  shipped  to  Sellafield.
Another incident of this kind involving the discovery of an unirradiated element was
reported  again  in  December  from  the  same  power  station.  Following  a  full
investigation, Euratom has satisfied itself that the necessary corrective  actions  have
been taken.

A shortfall in accounting procedures was also noted at Sizewell in UK in November.
At  the  instigation  of  Euratom,  the  operator  has  introduced  steps  to  prevent  a
recurrence.

Routine  inspections  at  nuclear  power  reactors  in  Finland  and  Sweden  were
completed  without  major  safeguards  relevant  incidents.  Euratom  Safeguards,  as  far
as  possible,  tries  to  avoid  performing  core  control  inspections  because  of  the  high
level  of  inspection  effort  that  they  require.  Nonetheless  they  were  not  always
avoidable and the usual planning problems were experienced due to changes to dates
made at short notice. Changes in the IAEA responsibility for Finnish reactors led to a
change in the IAEA’s approach and considerable confusion for the operator. Euratom
Safeguards will propose the drafting of facility specific NPA papers for these cases.

12

Most of the nuclear power reactors operated in the European Union are of the Light Water Reactor type
(LWR),  i.e.  the  reactors  are  cooled  and  moderated  with  normal  water.  In  addition,  the  UK  operates
MAGNOX and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) which are moderated with graphite and cooled
with CO2 gas. The operation of LWRs using LEU is characterised by long periods (12-18 months) of
continuous  operation.  These  periods,  when  the  in-core  fuel  is  inaccessible,  are  followed  by  outages
typically lasting 2-4 weeks when about one third of the (used) core fuel is exchanged for fresh fuel from
Fuel Fabrication Plants. LWRs are inspected during this outage period when all the fuel is accessible for
verification.

12

 
                                                
Though the  reactor  Barsebäck 1  (Sweden) is free of  nuclear  material,  the  operator
wants to maintain it in an operational status as an experimental site for new handling
procedures  in  Barsebäck  2  which  is  of  identical  design.  Therefore  we  kept  the
surveillance system installed and running.

French reactors were  regularly  inspected whenever  refuelling  outages  took  place  at
one of the units at a reactor site. These inspections did not give rise to any remarks.

The work environment in some reactors in Spain led to technical reliability problems
with permanently installed surveillance systems so that during the refuelling  period
additional  temporary  surveillance  systems  had  to  be  installed.  Intrusive  measures
(ion  fork)  had  to  be  applied  in  Vandellos  after  a  communications  breakdown
between  Euratom  Safeguards  and  the  operator  led  to  a  loss  of  continuity  of
knowledge of the core material.

The loading of spent fuel casks (CASTOR) continued in a number of German and
Belgian power plants and started at Trillo, Spain. In view of the envisaged medium
to  long  term  storage  of  these  containers  at  the  reactor  sites  their  contents  were
measured  by  Euratom  before  loading  and  subsequently  brought  under  multiple
containment  and  surveillance  systems.  Due  to  recurring  technical  problems  during
the loading, drying, and closing process, the CASTOR related inspections turned out
to  be  resource  consuming  and  difficult  to  plan.  Moreover,  it  appears  that  the
licensing  policy  of  some  German  Länder  authorities  does  not  aid  inspection
planning.  A  gradual  improvement  of  the  situation  is  expected  as  unattended
measurement stations are installed in all concerned reactors.

Another  type  of  inspection  requiring  considerable  human  resources  is  that  of
reactors using MOX fuel in the Non Nuclear Weapon States. The installation of a
special  core  camera  system  at  the  reactors  of  Gundremmingen,  Germany  helped  to
alleviate the burden at this site.

Inspections  at  research  reactors  do  in  general  not  give  rise  to  any  Safeguards
relevant  remarks  in  the  framework  of  this  annual  summary.  The  tendency  is  for  a
decrease  due  to  the  denuclearisation  policy  in  many  member  states.  The  only  new
project in this area is the FR2 reactor in Germany.

After an unscheduled and temporary shutdown the High Flux Reactor at Petten, in
the Netherlands obtained a license to restart again in March. Audits on safety culture
and  safety  management  concluded  that  the  safe  operation  of  the  reactor  was  not  at
risk. Provisional planning in order to safeguard an increased inventory of fresh fuel,
did not have to be activated.

4.2.6.  Other installations and facilities

The storage ponds for LWR irradiated fuel assemblies at La Hague, in France are
inspected jointly with the IAEA. Verification activities performed in this area did not
reveal  any  discrepancies.  However,  a  loss  of  continuity  of  knowledge,  which
occurred  late  2001,  was  recovered  at  the  beginning  of  2002  but  not  in  a  timely
manner.

13

 
With  a  view  to  reducing  their  presence  in  France  (a  Nuclear  Weapons  State),  the
IAEA has started to consider a possible revision of their safeguards implementation
procedure in these LWR ponds but no concrete output has been seen so far.

During 2002, two new intermediate storage facilities were put into operation in the
European Union. The move towards storage of irradiated fuel close to the reactor is
particularly  favoured  in  Germany,  as  well  as  in  some  other  countries  too.  As  a
consequence, Safeguards activities at intermediate storage facilities will be expanded
in  2003,  and  new  Safeguards  approaches  for  this  type  of  installation  are  under
discussion.

At  Cadarache  (F),  the  operator  (CEA)  intends  to  build  a  new  store,  to  replace  an
existing  one.  It  will  include  reconditioning  of  significant  quantities  of  nuclear
material. Euratom expressed its wish to be involved during the design phase in order
to  develop  and  install  the  appropriate  equipment  and  to  minimise  the  manpower
needs  and  dose  uptake.  Euratom  has  asked  to  the  operator  to  separate  the  flows  of
civil and defence materials as much as possible.

During  the  last  decade,  a  large  number  of  installations  at  the  Research  Centre  of
Karlsruhe  in  Germany,  have  ceased  nuclear  activities.  Euratom  performed
inspections to verify the Basic Technical Characteristics and the status (closed down
or decommissioned facility) of 17 Material Balance Areas during the last quarter of
2002. These inspections were made in close collaboration with the IAEA in order to
establish  that  the  nuclear  material  had  been  shipped  and  that  structures  and
equipment  had  been  dismantled  and/or  removed.  The  results  obtained  were
satisfactory,  and  confirm  that  most  of  these  installations  need  not  be  inspected
anymore.

The unloading activities of irradiated fuel assemblies from the reactor core of the fast
flux reactor Superphenix at Creys-Malville, France, to the spent fuel pond continued
through 2002. It is expected that these activities will be finalised in June 2003, such
that the reactor core will then be empty. The fresh fuel assemblies are still stored in a
dry store on-site and are subject to regular Safeguards inspections. Safeguards were
implemented and follow-up was appropriate.

During  the  annual  physical  inventory  in  December  2002  at  the  Joint  Research
Centre  Ispra  in  Italy,  a  new  software  package  (IP3)  was  used  for  stratification,
selection of items to be measured, and other inspection verification work.  From the
final results, it can be concluded that the tool was successfully implemented during
this PIV. The IAEA participated at this exercise.

At the Interim Storage Lingen-Emsland (Germany) the first Castor container with
irradiated  fuel  assemblies  was  transferred  from  the  Emsland  reactor  to  the
intermediate  on-site  store  in  December  2002.  This  is  in  line  with  the  German
approach to store irradiated assemblies at on-site stores.

The  Interim  Storage  facilities  from  GNS  (Ahaus  and  Gorleben)  in  Germany,  are
not expecting to receive any irradiated fuel assemblies from German reactors in the
coming years.

14

 
In 2002, 6 containers with spent fuel assemblies from the BR3 research reactor were
transferred to the new SCK-Belgoprocess intermediate store at Dessel, in Belgium.
The BR3-MBA has been completely emptied.

At the Interim Storage Greifswald in Germany, CASTOR loading proceeded  at a
reduced  rate  throughout  the  year,  due  to  several  technical  problems  due  mainly  to
concerns  over  the  primary  lid  sealing  arrangement.  A  total  of  six  CASTORs  were
loaded  in  Block  2  and  shipped  to  the  interim  storage.  The  remaining  material  in
Block 1 was verified by Ion Fork and loaded to a KRB MOX flask in preparation for
being shipped to the interim storage.

Safeguards arrangements in the wet store at Greifswald continue to provide cause for
concern with the current approach resulting in an almost permanent loss of continuity
of  knowledge  due  to  the  movement  of  partially  filled  flasks.  An  IAEA  proposal  to
consider a zone approach has yet to be realised.

At  the  closed  down  Rheinsberg  reactor  in  Germany,  only  one  inspection  was
performed during the year and this was in order to provide baseline sampling for the
hot cells. The installation has zero inventory.

4.2.7.  Global evaluation of the safeguards activities

During  the  reporting  period  of  2002,  the  global  evaluation  of  safeguards  activities
focussed  mainly  on  the  evaluation  of  Material  Unaccounted  For  (MUF),  the
cumulative  MUF,  which  is  the  algebraic  sum  of  the  MUF  for  a  Material  Balance
Area  over  time,  and  Shipper-Receiver  Differences13.  MUF  can  be  described  as  the
difference  between  the  physical  inventory  and  the  book  inventory.  The  evaluation
was  only  carried  out  for  bulk-handling  facilities  (Reprocessing  Plants,  Fuel
Fabrication  Plants,  and  Gas  Centrifuge  Enrichment  Plants),  where  the  MUF  is
expected to be different from zero due to measurement uncertainties and the nature
of processing the nuclear material.

The  entire  evaluation  was  performed  on  data  from  the  Euratom  Safeguards
accountancy database. That means the French bulk-handling Material Balance Areas
(MBAs)  from  which  we  do  not  have  declarations  were  excluded  from  evaluation.
Small  bulk-handling  MBAs  with  a  physical  inventory  or  throughput  less  than  two
significant  quantities14  were  also  excluded  from  evaluation  as  were  bulk-handling
MBAs which were being decommissioned during the reporting period of 2002.

Based on the evaluation there is no evidence that in bulk-handling MBAs of the EU,
source materials and special fissile materials were diverted from their intended uses
as  declared  by  the  operators  into  MUF  or  into  Shipper-Receiver  Differences.  The
measurement  systems  of  all  the  bulk-handling  MBAs  in  the  EU  comply  with  the
most recent international standards. There was still evidence that there are biases in

13

14

‘Shipper-receiver difference’ means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch
as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.
Significant quantities are used in establishing the quantity component of the Safeguards inspection goal,
e.g. 8 kg Pu, 25 kg High Enriched Uranium and 75 kg Low Enriched Uranium.

15

 
                                                
the cumulative MUF for some bulk-handling MBAs. Therefore, investigation of the
biases must be carried out and corrective actions must be undertaken.

5. 

SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES UNDER THE NPA

5.1. 

The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report

The  Safeguards  Implementation  Report  (SIR)  of  the  IAEA  covering  the  joint
activities on the territory of the EU in 2001 was made available to ESO in May 2002.

A meeting at the IAEA headquarters took place in the first half of June to review the
findings and discuss details relating to nuclear installations in the EU.

All in all, the SIR 2001 concluded that there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear
material  or  misuse  of  equipment  or  facilities  placed  under  Safeguards  in  the
European Union.

The SIR 2001 acknowledged that collaboration with ESO and Member State support
programmes made it possible to reach significant advances in Safeguards technology
and verification procedures. Trials were carried out in various EU installations in the
areas  of  surveillance  systems,  short  notice  random  inspections  and  remote
monitoring. As part of the New Partnership Approach arrangements and in order to
save resources, the IAEA and ESO continued to share the purchase and operational
and maintenance cost of the equipment installed in facilities under IAEA safeguards.

As in the SIR 2000, the IAEA stressed the importance of working closely with State
and  regional  systems  of  accounting  and  control  of  nuclear  materials  to  increase
verification  effectiveness  and  cost  efficiency.  In  this  context,  an  Agency/Euratom
working  group  has  been  established  for  the  Additional  Protocol  implementation
preparations  in  the  EU.  A  new  seminar  on  the  New  Partnership  Approach,  jointly
developed by the Agency and Euratom, was held for the first time in 2001. Many of
the routine training courses were attended by inspectors of the ESO and conversely,
IAEA  inspectors  attended  courses  given  by  the  ESO,  thus  maintaining  the  co-
operation on training between both organisations.

The IAEA also reported on the substantial progress made in Integrated Safeguards as
the  conceptual  framework  was  completed.  It  comprises  the  Safeguards  concepts,
approaches,  guidelines  and  criteria  that  govern  the  design,  implementation  and
evaluation of Integrated Safeguards.

In  addition  to  its  global  conclusions,  the  SIR  2001  made  recommendations  for
improvement  in  specific  areas.  These  recommendations  may  be  summarised  as
follows:

(cid:1)  Whenever  possible  shipment  of  partially  filled  or  empty  transport  containers
should not take place during the open core period in LWRs. Outside this period an
advanced notification for movement of empty or partially filled containers should
be  requested  by  ESO  and  information  transmitted  to  the  IAEA  in  good  time  to
facilitate inspection activities.

(cid:1)  Problems  occur  due  to  the  IAEA  mechanistic  system  when  nuclear  material
remains in closed shipping containers over long periods or when nuclear materials

16

 
at reactors are present in the form of rods in closed containers, rendering them not
easily  accessible.  In  the  European  Union,  this  has  been  the  case  due  to  the
restriction of movements because of licensing problems and because of a ban on
transports due to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. The IAEA also intends
to investigate the possibility to either extend the area under surveillance or to seal
these flasks before their removal.

(cid:1)  The  generic  problem  associated  with  plutonium  production  in  large  research
reactors will be eliminated after the installation of power monitors at the facilities
concerned,  subject  to  a  satisfactory  outcome  of  the  vulnerability  test  of  the
equipment.

(cid:1)  Corrective  actions  need  to  be  taken  during  or  soon  after  a  Containment  and
Surveillance failure is detected. The IAEA considers it important to further install
protective covers on seals and back-up open core surveillance systems. The IAEA
should fully bear the cost of this redundant equipment not needed by ESO.

It is foreseen that improvements in the way in which the NPA will be implemented in
the  future  shall  contribute  further  to  a  more  even  cost  sharing  between  the  two
inspectorates and better consistency between conclusions drawn in the SIR and those
resulting from safeguards activities conducted by the ESO.

5.2. 

Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards

The aim of the Additional Protocols is to increase the IAEA’s capabilities to detect
undeclared  nuclear  material  and  activities  that  are  in  violation  of  the  NPT  (Non
Proliferation Treaty) provisions.15

Euratom  plays  a  key  role  in  the  implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol  in  the
European  Union.  As  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  in  Europe  shows  a  number  of  specific
European issues due to the phasing out of nuclear activities over the years Euratom
has developed a generic approach for the areas of major concern:

(cid:1)  Former nuclear research centres today may have a diverse range of activities. The
buildings  in  these  centres  no  longer  necessarily  house  nuclear  fuel  cycle  related
activities.

(cid:1)  There  are  hundreds  of  locations  in  the  EU  that  once  contained  nuclear  material,
which was declared to the IAEA, and which  have completely  different  activities
today or which are in the process of being completely dismantled. Safeguards will
have  come  to  an  end  when  the  nuclear  material  was  removed  and  consequently
the Commission and the IAEA need to clarify the current status of these locations.

(cid:1)  In  addition  there  are  many  places  where  nuclear  material  is  only  used  for  non-
nuclear  fuel  cycle  related  purposes,  which  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  the
Additional  Protocol  should  not  be  subject  to  a  declaration  under  the  Additional
Protocol.

15

The areas covered by the Additional Protocol and the responsibility of the Community are described in
the Annual report 2001 “Operation of the Euratom Safeguards office in 2001”

17

 
                                                
Euratom undertook therefore to negotiate with the IAEA a harmonised approach for
all these cases, which on one hand is in line with the spirit of the Additional Protocol
and on the other hand does not impose an unnecessary burden on operators that have
never had or no longer have a functional relationship with the nuclear fuel cycle.

The corresponding procedures developed jointly with the IAEA have been tested and
will  now  be  systematically  implemented  in  the  EU.  Furthermore,  a  number  of
dedicated site visits have been executed to assist operators in the NNWS in the site
definition  of  complicated  sites,  where  the  activity  program  have  changed  over  the
years.

With these measures, Euratom used the time until all Member States have ratified the
Additional Protocol, which is a pre-condition16 for its entry into force, to prepare for
a  smooth  implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol  in  the  EU.  For  the  same
purpose, two field trials (JRC at Petten and VTT in Helsinki) have been carried out
in  order  to  test  the  modalities  for  the  information  flow  required  by  the  IAEA,  the
delimitation of nuclear sites and the arrangements for complementary access.

By the end of 2002, 11 of the 15 Member States had ratified the Additional Protocol,
the remaining four are expected to do so during 2003.

the  Additional  Protocol 

Euratom has prepared two papers for every Member State: the “Arrangements for the
implementation  of 
the
corresponding  “Information  Flow  under  the  Additional  Protocol  in  …(Member
State)”, subject to discussion during the bilateral meetings with the Member States.
Furthermore,  the  Commission  developed  reporting  software  for  the  future  users,
which has been subject to discussions and testing in dedicated user group meetings,
and  made  preparations  for  the  development  of  a  dedicated  Additional  Protocol
database.

in…(Member  State)”  and 

The  preparations of  both  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  are  such  that  the
entry into force of the Additional Protocol in 2004 seems now realistic. To this end
the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  will,  under  the  terms  of  the  Additional
Protocol,  provide  the  IAEA  with  written  notification  that  their  respective  (internal)
requirements for the entry into force have been met. Date of entry into force will then
be the date such notification is received by the IAEA.

6. 

TOWARDS AN IMPROVED AND REVISED EURATOM SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

6.1. 

Steering Groups for new safeguards approaches

A number of steering groups were established to redefine inspection objectives and
to  make  proposals  on  new  safeguards  approaches  following  the  recommendations

16

Article 102 of the Euratom TREATY asks for: “Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State,
an international organisation or a national or a third State to which, in addition to the Community, one
or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into force until the Commission has been notified by
all Member States concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance
with the provisions of their respective laws.”

18

 
                                                
made in the HLEG report. The steering groups were established and co-ordinated by
the sector for methodology of the unit Safeguards & Non-Proliferation but included
members both from other sectors of this unit as well as from the units responsible for
logistics and inspections of Directorate I.

The  first  step  was  to  perform  an  “inventory”  of  current  practices.  The  groups
exchanged  information  and  experiences  from  in-field  operations  and  reviewed  the
current  requirements  of  the  EIGs  (Euratom  Inspections  Guidelines)  and  the  NPA
(New Partnership Approach) papers.

The  planning  of  the  next  steps  was  started.  The  aims  being  both  to  provide
suggestions for possible short term changes to cope with the challenges of the near
future, e.g. EU enlargement without additional resources, and to propose innovative
approaches  which 
the
effectiveness of the system. The first results, of a very general nature, were presented
at the beginning of  December to  the SAGES, who agreed to the  proposed  working
method  but  suggested  that  for  the  next  consultation  concrete  proposals  should  be
presented. The current thinking was also presented in the “Seminar for Stakeholders”
in December 2002.

the  overall  efficiency  without 

jeopardising 

improve 

6.2. 

Survey of operators

The  Quality  Survey  on  Euratom  Safeguards  activities  is  one  of  the  first  measures
adopted  by  the  Commission  in  order  to  put  into  practice  two  of  the  main  HLEG17
recommendations,  which  were,  that  the  European  Commission  should  introduce  a
much  higher  transparency  in  its  Safeguards  activities  and  modify  its  relations  with
nuclear operators. In practice, this means that the Commission should consequently
define ways to strengthen collaboration and the exchange of views with the facility
operators,  who  are  considered  as  partners  and  not  only  as  inspectees.  The  overall
purpose  of  the  survey  was  to  evaluate  the  image  and  the  performance  of  Euratom
safeguards activities as seen by the operators of the nuclear installations.

In total 72 questionnaires were sent in July 2002 to all major nuclear installations and
to  a  representative  sample  of  all  the  other  nuclear  installations  of  the  EU.  The
evaluation of the findings of the survey is the subject of a classified Technical Report
(“Evaluation of results of quality survey on Euratom Safeguards activities in nuclear
installations”, March 2003) and will be summarized in the next annual activity report
for 2003.

6.3. 

Progress in Safeguards technology

In  2002,  work  continued  on  the  development  of  a  new  safeguards  seal  based  upon
transponder  technology.  This  will  facilitate  in-field  verification  and  eventually
replace the existing copper brass device for most applications within the next 2 to 3
years.

17

HLEG (HIGH LEVEL EXPERTS GROUP)

19

 
                                                
The  first  new  digital  surveillance  systems  of  the  latest  technology  that  incorporate
video  motion  detection  and  image  data  treatment  on  the  fly  were  successfully
installed in nine installations and have been operating reliably.

New  software  was  developed  and  implemented  for  the  on-site  collection  and
evaluation of operators’ data provided in computer-readable form.

7. 

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

7.1. 

European Parliament (EP)

On 2 July 2002, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Report from
the Commission to the Parliament and to the Council on the operation of the Euratom
Safeguards Office during 1999-200018. The rapporteur being Mr. Rübig.

In  its  resolution,  the  European  Parliament  values  the  quality  and  the  results  of  the
activities of the Euratom Safeguards Office for the period 1999-2000 and considers it
positive  that  no  diversion  of  nuclear  materials  within  the  European  Union  was
detected in the period 1999-2000.

The  EP  made  also  recommendations  concerning  nuclear  safety  and  physical
protection, which will be considered for implementation.

7.2. 

Enlargement

The project set up to facilitate the implementation of the Euratom Nuclear Material
Accountancy  System  in  the  Accession  States,  via  software  tools  and  the  required
hardware  entered  in  its  final  phase.  Representatives  of  the  applicant  countries
actively contributed to the project through their participation in a steering committee,
which also ensures that the tool is tailor-made to their needs.

The  steering  committee  meetings  were  also  used  as  an  opportunity  to  discuss  with
some candidate countries their questions concerning the implementation of Euratom
Safeguards after accession.

7.3.  Member States

Contacts with the Member States addressed mainly the Additional Protocol (AP) and
the  New  Euratom  Safeguards  Regulation  (implementation  of  Article  79  Euratom).
Several meetings took place to prepare  for the implementation of  the AP. The new
regulation  was  subject  to  lengthy  discussions  with  the  Member  States  and  their
experts in the Atomic Questions Group of the Council.

7.4. 

Euratom Agreements

During  2002  the  three  Community  nuclear  co-operation  agreements  currently  in
force,  with  the  United  States  of  America,  Canada  and  Australia  respectively,  were

18

sur 
Rapport 
COM(2001) - 436 – final

le 

fonctionnement  de 

l’Office  du  Contrôle  de  Sécurité  d’Euratom 

-

20

 
                                                
implemented  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  Parties  involved.  In  a  bilateral  technical
working  Group meeting between Euratom and Canada that took place in Ottawa in
November  2002,  the  good  relations  between  the  parties  were  acknowledged,  and
technical proposals towards the solution of the long standing problem of shipment of
Canadian  obligated  tails  to  Russia  were  discussed.  A  positive  solution  is  expected
next year.

Stagnation was observed in the negotiation of the agreements with Japan and China.
The  first  could  not  be  concluded  because  of  difficulties  raised  during  the  draft
approval  procedure  in  Japan,  while  for  the  second  the  negotiation  mandate  to  the
Commission by the Council is still pending19.

8. 

EURATOM SAFEGUARDS RESOURCES

8.1. 

Budget appropriations

Article  174  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  specifically  mentions  the  necessity  to  include
appropriations in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure related to the
activity of nuclear Safeguards.

Founded on this legal basis Safeguards activities are financed by two types of budget
appropriations:

(1) 

(2) 

A  general  “functioning”  appropriation  involving  the  costs  of  Euratom
Safeguards overheads such as general IT equipment, telecommunications, etc.
(Part  A  of  the  Budget,  chapters  A-70  and  A-24),  as  well  as  a  specific
appropriation  for  the  medical  survey  and  the  radiation  protection  of  the
inspectors (Part A of the Budget, line A-1420);

Specific  “operational”  appropriations  allocated  for  expenditure  which  is,
directly related to nuclear safeguards such as mission costs, rental of offices
on site (including on site laboratories), purchase of technical  equipment and
samples  taking  and  analysis,  contracts  for  services  (i.e.  maintenance  and
repairs), transportation of equipment and samples, training, etc., necessary for
Euratom Safeguards activities (Part B of the Budget, chapter B4-20).

For 2002, the specific operational appropriations in the EU Budget for the Euratom
Safeguards  represented  €  19.1  Mio.  From  that  amount  €  18.9  Mio  (99.1%)  were
actually committed. The distribution of the expenditure was as follows:

(cid:1)  Inspection mission costs (travel means, daily allowances):

€ 4.2 Mio (22%)

(cid:1)  Rental of offices for the inspectors on inspected sites (and related equipment

costs):

€ 0.6 Mio (3.2%)

19

In the meantime, the negotiation mandate has been obtained.

21

 
                                                
(cid:1)  Purchase, installation, maintenance and repairs of equipment on sites, including

informatic means, analysis of samples, related costs such as transport,
consumables, spare parts, etc.:

€ 5.7 Mio (29.9%)

(cid:1)  Investments made in large scale plutonium bulk handling plants and related

maintenance, operation and logistics:

€ 7.9 Mio (41.4%)

(cid:1)  Administrative and technical assistance, training for inspectors, and other

expenses (including special insurance coverage):

€ 0.5 Mio (2.6%)

The number  of inspections  on  site, after  a  stabilization  in the  last  3  to  4  years,  has
been reduced in 2002, in parallel with an increase of stand by equipment and remote
controlled systems in the installations.

Major  investments  related  to  large  Plutonium  bulk  handling  installations  have
already been completed. The costs of those plants still represent an important part of
the  expenditures.  Out  of  the  €  7.9  Mio  annual  costs,  more  than  50%  currently
represent maintenance and technical support on the existing equipment.

Budget  appropriations  allowing  the  implementation  of  Safeguards  activities  were
managed  by  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  from  January  1  to  July  31,  2002.  From
August  1,  2002,  further  to  the  reorganization  of  the  Directorate-General  of  Energy
and  Transports,  the  responsibility  of  Euratom  Safeguards  budgetary  management
was  shared  between  Directorate  A  (General  Affairs  and  Resources),  Directorate  H
(Nuclear Safety and Safeguards) and Directorate I (Nuclear Inspections).

8.2. 

Human and other Resources

8.2.1.  Staff Resources and Utilisation

The former ESO which, since 1.8.2002 is fully integrated into DG TREN, counted a
total of 265 officials of whom 195 were Nuclear Inspectors.

Two Directorates were created in the re-organisation of the former ESO: Directorate
H, Nuclear Safety and Safeguards, and Directorate I, Nuclear Inspection. At the 31st
of December 2002 there were a total of 275 officials in the two Directorates.

In total the two directorates contain 191 nuclear inspectors.

8.2.2.  Safeguards Equipment

The  safeguards  equipment  utilised  by  the  inspectors  falls  into  two  principal
categories,  that  for  Non  Destructive  Assay  (NDA)  measurements  and  that  for
Containment and Surveillance (C & S).

The NDA measurements, based upon neutron and gamma techniques, are used by the
inspectors to assure themselves that the physical quantities of nuclear material in the
facilities correspond to the notified accountancy values. These measurements can be
performed  either  manually  or  automatically  dependent  upon  the  facility  and
equipment configuration.

The  C  &  S  measures  are  in  the  form  of  video  surveillance  and  seals  to  ensure  the
continuity of knowledge on identified material.

22

 
During 2002 as part of the continuing process of rationalisation and standardisation
the work on upgrading the range of NDA instrumentation was completed and steps
were  taken  to  identify  the  next  generation  of  data  acquisition  PCs  for  the  portable
instruments. The software suite of programmes for data analysis of both neutron and
gamma measurements, in unattended mode applications, was extended.

8.2.3.  Support by the JRC

The Commission Joint Research Centre provides support to the Euratom inspectorate
for both routine activities and related development work for future improvements to
safeguards  activities 
the  Commission  Research  and  Development
programme.  In  the  Fifth  Framework  Programme  for  the  year  2002,  the  support
included provision for 58 person/years and a specific credit of € 1.72 Mio distributed
principally between ITU (Karlsruhe) and IPSC (Ispra).

through 

Co-operation between the former ESO and the JRC continued to be mainly focussed
on the following areas:

(cid:1)  ITU Karlsruhe: On-Site Laboratories, Sample Analysis, High Performance Trace

Analysis, and Nuclear Forensic Analysis;

(cid:1)  IPSC  Ispra  Institute:  General  Scientific  and  Technical  Support  in  the  areas  of
Health  Physics,  Equipment  and  instruments;  technical  training  and  calibration;
measurement and counting support, assistance in the development of new sealing
techniques.

(cid:1)  IRMM Geel: Analytical Activities in the domain of quality control and reference

materials (radioactive sources).

For  the  operation  of  the  On  Site  Laboratories  at  La  Hague  and  Sellafield,  an
administrative arrangement entered into force between the ESO and ITU, Karlsruhe,
to  provide  the  necessary  appropriately  trained  staff  (20  persons)  for  the  running  of
the  laboratories  throughout  the  year.  The  cost  of  this  arrangement  € 1.7 Mio
corresponds to a total of 340 mission weeks per annum.

9. 

OTHER ACTIVITIES WITH THE INVOLVEMENT OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

9.1. 

ESARDA conference

In  2002  the  ESARDA  meeting  held  in  Luxembourg  on  28-30  May  2002  took  the
form of a Workshop on ‘R & D responses to the New Safeguards Environment’. The
meeting  was  split  into  five  working  groups  covering  technologies,  data  treatment,
fuel cycle aspects, and socio-political aspects. All groups reported their conclusions
and recommendations in the final plenary session in order to orientate the needs for
R & D in the new safeguards environment.

9.2. 

Nuclear Safety, Physical Protection and illicit trafficking

In the light of recent developments, Euratom Safeguards has assessed the safety and
physical protection of its own radioactive materials and is in the process of bringing
technical means and procedures in line with the latest international standards.

23

 
In the  area  of  illicit  trafficking,  Euratom  Safeguards  continued  to  participate  in  the
work of the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) of
the  Non-Proliferation  Experts  Group  (NPEG)  of  the  G8.  In  particular  Euratom
Safeguards and the US Department of Energy jointly co-ordinated international inter-
laboratory  comparison  exercises  which  were  intended  to  build  knowledge  and
exchange  experience  in  the  analysis  of  seized  nuclear  materials.  During  a  seminar
held in  Luxembourg in June,  the  results  of the second  exercise were  presented  and
discussed.

Euratom Safeguards continues to maintain close co-operation with agencies such as
Europol and the IAEA and to keep track of incidents concerning illicit trafficking of
nuclear  materials  or  radioactive  materials  via  the  IAEA’s  database.  Eight  incidents
concerning radioactive materials were reported within the territory of the EU during
2002. However, none involved nuclear materials (Uranium, Plutonium, or Thorium).

Euratom Safeguards also participated and  actively contributed  to  the  success  of  the
International  Conference  on  Advances  in  Destructive  and  Non-destructive  analysis
which had been organised jointly by the Joint Research Centre (ITU) and the IAEA
in October in Karlsruhe.

10. 

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

10.1.  Global Evaluation of Verification Activities undertaken by Euratom Safeguards

during 2002

As  a  result  of  the  verification  activities  undertaken  by  Euratom  Safeguards  in  the
framework of Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty no evidence was found to suggest that
nuclear materials were diverted from their intended uses.

Nor was any  evidence  found  to suggest non-compliance with provisions  relating to
particular  safeguards  provisions  assumed  by  the  Community  under  agreements
concluded with third states.

10.2.  Concerning  the  treatment  and  evaluation  of  data  from  nuclear  material

accountancy

Over  1  million  lines  of  incoming  data  from  nuclear  installations  were  checked  for
internal and external consistency. All mistakes and inconsistencies detected by these
checks  were  corrected  after  consultation  with  the  concerned  operators.  In  turn,
Euratom Safeguards furnished all reports that it is obliged to transmit to the IAEA on
time and correctly formatted.

No  evidence  for  the  diversion  of  nuclear  materials  was  found  by  the  systematic
evaluations of the MUF reported by installations.

10.3.  Concerning inspection activities at specific installations

Discrepancies of some consequence came to light during 2002 (see section 4 of the
report).  In  all  cases  appropriate  follow-up  was  given  and  the  issues  were
satisfactorily resolved.

24

 
Table no. 1 - Quantities of nuclear material under Euratom Safeguards (t)

ANNEXES

End 1990

End 1995

End 20011)

End 20021)

Plutonium

Uranium

Total

HEU2)

LEU3)

NU4)

DU5)

203

406

548

569

200 400

269 100

314 610

318 710

13

32 000

44 000

11

46 700

51 400

10

57 000

52 700

10

58 500

47 700

124 400

171 000

204 900

212 500

Thorium

2 600

4 600

4 500

4 500

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

Quantities based on final reported data

High Enriched Uranium

Low Enriched Uranium

Natural Uranium

Depleted Uranium

25

 
Table no. 2 - Inspection activities of Euratom Safeguards

Person days of
inspection in:

Non Nuclear
Weapon States

France

UK

Total

1999

2412

3492

2871

8775

2000

2113

3426

2895

8434

2001

2328

2934

2399

7661

2002

2348

2539

2404

7291

Table no. 3 – Euratom Safeguards Budget 2002

Expenditures committed for the specific appropriations

Table no. 3 A

Line B4-2000: Safeguard inspections, training and retraining of inspectors

Topics

Expenditures (Thousand €)

a) Studies, convocation of experts, publications

b) Mission Costs

c) Transportation for staff and equipment

d) Rental of offices and special services on sites

e) Internships and Training

f) Special insurance

TOTAL

9

3,591

600

600

260

40

5,100 (out of 5,100)

26

 
Table no. 3 B

Line B4-2020: Sampling and analyses, equipment, specific work, provision of services
and transport

Topics

Expenditures (Thousand €)

a) Administrative and technical assistance

b) Purchase of surveillance equipment

c) Purchase of measurement equipment

d) Purchase of equipment for seals

e) Purchase  and  maintenance  of  computing
equipment directly linked to inspections

f) Costs for destructive analysis

g) Equipment  spares,  repairs,  accessories

and maintenance

h) Consumable items, purchase of sources,

transport of radioactive materials

i) Monitoring  (warning  system  based  in

Luxembourg)

j) Software (Accountancy program,
Management and IT Firewall)

203

981

485

712

128

-

413

188

76

2,731

TOTAL

5,917 (out of 6,100)

27

 
Table no. 3 C

Line B4-2021: Specific safeguards for large-scale plutonium processing plants

Topics

Expenditures (Thousand €)

a) Sellafield – BNFL (THORP, MOX)

b) La Hague – COGEMA (UP3, UP2)

c) Cadarache – COGEMA

d) Marcoule – MELOX

e) Dessel – BELGONUCLEAIRE

f) On site laboratories (initial investments

and operations)

g) Software (on sites)

h) Maintenance & repairs (Equipment,
hardware and software support)

i) Software development (new applications,

new equipment )

425

466

13

130

35

3,848

407

1,870

706

TOTAL

7,900 (out of 7,900)

Table no. 3 D

Line A0-1420: Health checks for staff exposed to radiation

Topics

Expenditures (Thousand €)

a) Gamma spectrometry and Toxicological

analysis (non standard)

b) Measurement equipment (dosimeters)

c) Maintenance and calibration

d) Material, services and other
contamination controls

e) Mission costs (for body-counter)

f) Other running expenses

5

80

6

40

30

20

TOTAL

181 (out of 230)

28

 
Table no. 4 – ESO’s Budget 1991-2002 (Mio €)

Evolution of expenditure for the specific budget appropriations

Budget Line

Safeguard inspections,
training and retraining
of inspectors

(B4-2000)

Sampling and analyses,
equipment, specific
work, provision of
services and transport

(B4-2020)

Specific safeguards for
large-scale plutonium
processing plants

(B4-2021)

Health checks for staff
exposed to radiation

(A0-1420)

TOTAL

1991

2.5

1995

4.2

2002

5.1

2.3

3.2

6.1

2.6

10

7.9

0.1

0.3

0.2

7.5

17.7*

19.3

*In addition, 1.8 Mio € were spent for the co-operation with Russia.

29