EU and Ukraine : a turning point in 2004?
Date: 2003-11-30
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European Union, Ukraine, enlargement of the Union, geopolitics

Occasional Papers

November 2003

n°47

Taras Kuzio

EU and Ukraine:
a turning point in 2004?

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Occasional Papers

November 2003

n°47

by Taras Kuzio

EU and Ukraine:
a turning point in 2004?

Dr Kuzio is a Resident Fellow at the Centre for Russian & East European Studies and Adjunct
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. In summer 2003, he wrote this
paper while studying as a Visiting Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies,
Paris. Taras Kuzio was also head of the NATO Information and documentation Office in Kyiv.
He has been an adviser with the Council on Foreign Advisers to the Ukrainian parliament.
Recent publications include Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy. Theoretical and
Comparative Perspectives (Praeger, 2002) and Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building
in Ukraine (Praeger, 2002).

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Contents

Summary  

Introduction

Ukraine’s ‘multi-vector’ transition
2.1 ‘European Choice’ deficit
2.2 Foreign policy
2.3 Conclusion

Outside actors in Ukraine

3.1 Russia
3.2 NATO and the USA
3.3 The European Union
3.4 The ‘Wider Europe’ Communication
3.5 Poland

Policy proposals

4.1 Strategic recommendations
4.2 Tactical recommendations

Conclusions

Annexes

a1 Abbreviations
a2 Bibliography

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Summary

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

EU enlargement raises important questions: How much further can the EU enlarge?
Should the EU encompass geographic ‘Europe’ or stop at the western border of the CIS?
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) clearly allows any geographically
based European state to apply for membership. Is Ukraine then eligible? On 15 March
2001, the European Parliament supported Ukraine’s future membership; in contrast, the
EU continues to fudge any answer to this question.

The difficulty in answering these questions lies with the criteria that should be used to
formulate a response. Whatever the answer, with enlargement it has become a matter of
urgency for the EU to engage strategically with its new neighbours in Eastern Europe. In
particular, the EU must develop a realistic strategy for Ukraine, its largest new neighbour
within Europe. Of these neighbours only two – Ukraine and Moldova – seek EU member-
ship. One reason why Ukraine needs greater attention on the part of the EU is geopolitical.
European Commission President Romano Prodi and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Pers-
son wrote: ‘Any political instability, regressive economic development or fragmentary
reform in these countries would threaten to create a new discontinuity in Europe – a politi-
cal, economic and social divide – in the wake of EU enlargement.’1

Ukraine borders three, and soon to be four, new EU members. All four of these are or

will soon be NATO members. With enlargement, Ukraine’s geostrategic importance
becomes an issue that the EU must address. 

This Occasional Paper discusses critical issues in the EU-Ukrainian relationship and
provides a number of policy recommendations that could contribute towards fashioning
an EU strategy towards Ukraine. At the heart of the current stalemate in relations are vir-
tual policies adopted by the EU and Ukraine towards each other.2 The EU has never
adopted a clear strategy towards Ukraine and other western CIS states that seek EU mem-
bership, and in general has paid far too little attention to the region. Ukraine straddles the
Central and East European-Eurasian divide. This makes it all the more imperative that the
EU devise a strategy that would support a potential shift within Ukraine towards a more
Central and East European identity. This potential is more present in Ukraine than in
other CIS states. The most effective manner to support Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ may

1 Reuters, 22 May 2001.
2 Tarasiuk describes it as ‘dishonesty’ on the part of both the EU and Ukraine to the other side; Borys Tarasiuk, head of
parliamentary committee on European integration, Kyiv, 24 June 2003. Neither Ukraine nor the EU has a strategy on the
other and the EU’s policy towards Ukraine is ‘ambivalent’; conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, Kyiv,
26-28 June 2003.

...

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EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

be by offering it an ‘open-door’ policy. The 2004 elections will have a decisive impact upon
Ukraine’s ‘European choice’. If the front-runner in polls since 2000, Viktor Yushchenko,
won the elections, the EU would be forced to change its ‘closed-door’ approach. Yushchenko
would no longer continue a virtual ‘European choice’ strategy and the EU would be forced
to drop its own virtual policy towards Ukraine. The policy proposals developed in this
Occasional Paper outline a possible EU strategy towards Ukraine.

4

Introduction 

This paper aims to contribute to the develop-

ment  of  a  comprehensive  strategy  by  the
European Union (EU) towards Ukraine. It has,
therefore, placed the issue of EU-Ukrainian rela-
tions  within  a  broader  context,  taking  into
account domestic developments inside Ukraine,
the country’s foreign policy and the attitudes of
external  actors,  other  than  the  EU,  towards
Ukraine.  The  enlargement  of  the  EU  to
Ukraine’s western border makes it imperative
for the EU to develop a coherent and all-embrac-
ing strategic policy towards Ukraine. Maintain-
ing Ukraine in its current grey zone, together
with Belarus and Moldova, is not in the interests
of the EU and its new Central and East European
members. Ukraine stands at the crossroads of
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and
combines elements of both due to its history
and  geography.  The  EU  can  play  an  essential
strategic  role  in  tipping  the  balance  inside
Ukraine  in  favour  of  its  often  declared,  but
‘European
sometimes  not 
choice’.

implemented, 

Ukraine, together with eleven other former
Soviet republics, has since the Soviet collapse
been seen as a Soviet successor state. This has
meant  that  Ukraine  has  never  been  seriously
considered  for  EU  membership  in  any  of  the
documents it has signed with the EU. Although
the  EU  has  recognised  Ukraine’s  ‘European
choice’  and  European  geography,  it  has  not
moved  to  the  next  stage  of  accepting  that
Ukraine and other countries of the western CIS
are  eligible  under  Article  49  of  the  Treaty  on
European Union (TEU) to join the EU.

The  EU-Ukraine  relationship  has  been
plagued by problems under both terms of office
of President Kuchma. Both sides have adopted
virtual policies  to  one  another.  Ukraine  has
espoused  ‘European  choice’  rhetoric  and  the

1

5

aim of integration into the EU while adopting
domestic policies that undermine these goals.
The EU has placed the onus of moving closer to
its ‘common values’ on Ukraine without mak-
ing any offer of future membership. Ukraine has
responded by demanding a ‘signal’ from the EU
and the creation of a strategy towards Ukraine
that gives it either a positive or negative answer
to the crucial question of whether it can be seen
as a future member.

Since  the  late  1990s,  the  middle  group  of
twenty-seven post-communist states has split.
Its Central and East European members, such as
Slovakia  and  Bulgaria,  have  dramatically
improved  their  domestic  indicators  in  areas
such as democratisation and economic reform.
The  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States
(CIS) members in this middle group, such as
Ukraine and Russia, have regressed. The CIS and
Central and Eastern Europe have increasingly
drifted  apart.  The  majority  perception  of
Ukraine in the EU is that it has not advanced in
any respect and is little different to other CIS
states. This paper argues that the reality is more
complex. Ukraine’s record remains one of the
best in the CIS and it is not that different from
the  laggard  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,
Romania.  Ukraine’s  record  is  certainly  better
than that of the Western Balkans. 

The EU has no coherent medium- to long-
term strategy towards Ukraine. EU officials have
issued  contradictory,  and  at  times  insulting,
statements about Ukraine. Including geograph-
ically  European  states  in  the  western  CIS
together with the southern Mediterranean and
the  Middle  East  sends  the  wrong  signal  to
Ukraine. It serves to reinforce the perception in
Kyiv that the EU does not see Ukraine as part of
‘Europe’ or even as a potential future member.

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

The EU does not in practice treat Ukraine
and  Russia  equally.  Ukraine’s  foreign  policy
aims are assumed to be the same as Russia’s.
Russia does not seek EU membership and is con-
tent with the ‘integration not accession’ offered
by the Commission’s 2003 ‘Wider Europe’ Com-
munication.3

This ‘Russian policy’ is exported by the EU to
the three other western CIS states. NATO has
adopted  a  genuine  policy  of  differentiating
between  Russia  and  Ukraine  and  of  treating
them equally. NATO deals with Russia, which
does not seek membership, through the NATO-
Russia Council. With Ukraine, NATO accepts
that it is seeking membership. The EU rules out
membership for Ukraine because this may be
seen to require giving the same option to Russia
(and because Ukraine has regressed on its ‘Euro-
pean  choice’  domestically).  The  Council  of
Europe  also  linked  Ukrainian  and  Russian
membership in the mid-1990s.

The ‘Russia factor’ plays an important role in
making the EU cautious in its approach towards
Ukraine.  Russia  is  strategically  important  to
leading EU members who desire to deepen the
EU and give greater substance to its Common
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP).  To  some
West  European  EU  members,  Ukraine  is  still
seen as ‘semi-Russian’, a factor that reinforces
the tendency to place the fate of all three eastern
Slavs together.

Offering an ‘open-door’ policy to the West-
ern  Balkans  but  not  another  European  geo-
graphic  region  (western  CIS)  is  perceived  as
applying double standards. EU officials do not
doubt  that  the  Western  Balkans  is  part  of
Europe.  Yet,  the  same  officials  never  use  the
same  language  when  talking  about  Ukraine,

despite EU documents that define Ukraine as a
‘European’ country. The perception of Ukraine
as being geographically European but culturally
not is deep-rooted in Western Europe. Ukraine
and the CIS are understood to have formulated
their political culture outside ‘Europe’ (the only
exception to this is western Ukraine).

The enlargement of the EU will focus greater
attention by the Union’s new Central and East
European  members  on  Ukraine.  Poland  has
acted, and will continue to act, as a key lobbyist
for Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ within the EU
and  NATO.  The  three  Baltic  states  and,  to  a
lesser extent, Hungary and Slovakia, will follow
Poland.  Ukraine  is  their  immediate  eastern
neighbour, to which they are tied by historical
and cultural links. Ukraine is also seen by them
as having a certain geopolitical importance, and
not only because of the fate of its minorities.

Three scenarios are discussed for the 2004
presidential elections in the last section of this
paper. The most favourable would be a victory
by the reformist and pro-EU former Prime Min-
ister Viktor Yushchenko. A Yushchenko victory
would radically change Ukraine’s international
image and move the country from virtual to real
implementation of its ‘European choice’. It is
likely that Ukraine will be invited to join NATO
in  the  coming  decade.  A  Yushchenko  victory
could lead to a strong show of support from the
United States and might lead to an invitation to
join  NATO  at  the  next  summit,  in  2007.
Ukraine’s membership of NATO could be a pre-
cursor to the longer path towards EU member-
ship (or not, as in the case of Turkey). It would
certainly encourage the de-coupling of Ukraine
from Russia, a position advocated strongly in
this paper.

3 Tarasiuk describes the Communication as ‘restricting’, not ‘widening’ Europe. Borys Tarasiuk, Kyiv, 24 June 2003.

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Ukraine’s ‘multi-vector’ transition

2.1 ‘European choice’ deficit

Although Ukraine is the only CIS state with a
large pro-Western reform movement, the coun-
try has a pro-European domestic deficit in rela-
tion  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  This  is
made worse by a naivety within Ukraine’s élites
with regard to the EU accession process.

From  the  point  of  view  of  support  for
reformist policies and ‘community of values,’
the  EU  has  little  to  currently  work  with  in
Ukraine except on the centre-right. Of Ukraine’s
four opposition groups only Yushchenko’s Our
Ukraine bloc is ideologically committed to poli-
cies that the EU would understand as being a
part  of  a  shared  ‘community  of  values’.  This
could  change  in  the  post-Kuchma  era  when
some oligarch centrists evolve into legitimate
businessmen.

During the 1998 elections, the centre-right
was the strongest supporter of EU membership.
Centrist parties framed their programmes more
cautiously  with,  ‘formation  of  conditions  for
integration  into  the  European  structures’.4
When political blocs and parties were asked if
Ukraine should join the EU, positive responses
were given by the centre-right as well as by the
centre and left. (The only exception was the pro-
presidential Social Democratic Party (United),
which  gave  no  response.)  With  regard  to  the
timeframes on offer, Our Ukraine was the only
movement that suggested Ukraine should strive
to join the EU within five years. The other polit-
ical  blocs  and  parties  were  divided  equally
between two responses: membership over the
next ten, or twenty, years.5

4 National Security and Defence, no.2, 2002, p. 21.
5 National Security and Defence, no.2, 2002, p. 28.

For national democrats in Ukraine, as in the
three Baltic states, ‘returning to Europe’ implies
a  rejection  of  communism,  Eurasia  and  the
USSR. This is perceived in Russia as being also a
rejection of ‘Russia’. The EU should not restrict
itself  to  cooperating  only  with  Yushchenko.
Deepening  democratisation  and  civil  society,
moving from virtual to real policies to combat
corruption and strengthening the rule of law –
these are all areas backed by other opposition
groups, such as the Socialists and the populist
Tymoshenko bloc. 

2.2 Foreign Policy

Ukraine’s foreign policy is officially defined as
‘multi-vector,’ the beauty of which lies in its flex-
ibility. Two reasons have been outlined as to why
Ukraine pursues such a foreign policy. The first
concerns  the  impact  of  domestic  factors.
Ukraine’s regional diversity, its large number of
Russians and Russian speakers, competing for-
eign  orientations  and  economic  and  energy
dependency are put forward as explanations for
the need for a multi-vector foreign policy. The
second explanation is the usefulness of ‘multi-
vectorism’ for Ukraine’s ruling élites at specific
periods of time.

The first explanation implicitly assumes that
Ukraine is a consolidated democracy, where the
élites  interact  with,  and  take  note  of,  public
opinion. This is far from being the case. Opinion
polls in 2002 carried out by the Ukrainian Cen-
tre for Economic and Political Studies found
that over 80 per cent of Ukrainians felt they had

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EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

no  influence  on  central  or  local  government.
Opinion polls regularly show a low level of polit-
ical awareness among Ukrainians. In addition,
even in Western consolidated democracies most
citizens do not take an active interest in foreign
policy issues, let alone in democratising states
such as Ukraine. This is not to rule out domestic
factors  as  having  no  influence  on  Ukraine’s
security policy. As described earlier, Ukraine is
not homogeneous in its orientations or political
preferences. Neither is it homogeneous in the
different regional levels of civil society activity. 
Ukrainian security policy is crafted by a small
number of people who consist of the executive,
its political allies at any given time, and mem-
bers of government and parliament. The execu-
tive’s  influence  is  paramount,  a  factor  which
gains dramatically in importance during times
of political crisis, when foreign policy formula-
tion is closely tied to the fate of the president.

Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine has been
passive since opposition movements first began
to appear in the late Soviet era. The exceptions
have been Donbass miners, whose strikes have
occasionally  led  to  political  demands  (as  in
1993).  The  only  opposition  party  popular  in
eastern Ukraine is the Communist Party (KPU).
Pro-presidential  parties  are  well  entrenched,
especially in Prime Minister Yanukevych’s Don-
bass, but these are top-down parties made up of
forcibly conscripted members, who are only able
to bring people on the streets through bribery or
pressure  (e.g.  on  state  employees).  Eastern
Ukraine’s  civic  passivism  has  therefore  not
translated  into  widespread  civic  activity  in
favour  of  reunion  with  Russia  or  hostility  to
close cooperation with NATO, two views that
are usually found in opinion polls among east-
ern Ukrainians. Opinion polls also show that
foreign policy issues are less of a priority for east-
ern Ukrainians than for western Ukrainians.

Indeed, foreign policy is a priority for western
and  central  Ukrainians.  In  addition,  civic
activism is greater, and anti-oligarch views are
widespread (the Kyiv clans’ SDPU is the only oli-
garch party which is unpopular in its home base)
in these two regions. Three of Ukraine’s four
opposition parties (Socialists, Our Ukraine, and
the Tymoshenko bloc) have their strongholds in

western, central and northern Ukraine. 

Regional factors influence Ukrainian foreign
policy in two ways. Between elections, the execu-
tive can pursue, if it so desires, a security policy
that is at odds with preferences and orientations
in  eastern  Ukraine.  This  has  translated  into
close cooperation with NATO and support for
Euro-Atlantic  integration.  During  elections,
however, the executive has to take into account
the  more  populous  eastern  Ukrainian  voters.
Pro-Russian and pro-CIS integration rhetoric is
often used to win votes (as it was in the 1999 elec-
tions, and it may be used again in the 2004 elec-
tions). This rhetoric is then abandoned after the
elections  when  eastern  Ukrainians  return  to
their traditional passivity.

Ukraine’s multi-vector security policy can be
divided  into  two  main  periods,  following
Kuchma’s first and second terms in office. In the
first period, between 1994 and 1999, Ukraine’s
multi-vector  foreign  policy  was  pro-Western.
Nevertheless, Kuchma came to power on a pro-
Russian platform of adopting a higher profile in
the CIS (unlike Kravchuk’s view of the CIS as
merely  a  forum  for  a  ‘civilised  divorce’).  This
never amounted to support for the ‘Belarussian
path’, which has only ever existed on the extreme
left in Ukraine. Kuchma’s pro-Russian election
platform  rapidly  changed  after  he  came  to
power. Ukraine needed assistance from interna-
tional financial organisations when it launched
economic reforms in October 1994. This assis-
tance was forthcoming after Ukraine signed the
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty or START I
Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Two other factors forced a shift in Ukraine’s
multi-vector security policy from pro-Russian
to  pro-Western.  Despite  the  election  of  ‘pro-
Russian’ Kuchma, Russia remained unwilling to
accept  Ukraine’s  independence  or  its  sover-
eignty over Crimea and Sevastopol. Ukraine ori-
ented  itself  towards  the  United  States  and
NATO  to  counterbalance  Russia.  Only  after
nine postponed visits did Yeltsin travel to Kyiv in
May 1997 to sign a treaty with Ukraine. In the
period 1995-97, Ukraine successfully used the
‘NATO  card’  to  press  Russia  into  becoming
more amenable (Yeltsin’s visit was – not coinci-
dentally – only two months prior to the NATO

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Ukraine’s ‘multi-vector’ transition

Madrid  summit  where  Ukraine  signed  the
NATO-Ukraine  Charter).  Ukraine  had  also
meanwhile become more willing to compromise
on leasing berths in Sevastopol to the Russian
Black Sea Fleet.

Until  the  end  of  Kuchma’s  first  term  in
office, Ukraine engaged only in the economic
dimension  of  CIS  activities  while  routinely
denouncing the CIS as an ineffective organisa-
tion. Ukraine became the third largest recipient
of US aid, after Israel and Egypt, and officially
aspired to join the EU and NATO. A Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU
was signed in 1994 and came into effect in 1998.
Moreover, a NATO-Ukraine Charter was signed
in 1997.

A second reason for the shift to a pro-West-
ern  foreign  policy  in  Kuchma’s  first  term  is
related  to  the  executive’s  political  allies.  In
Kuchma’s  first  term  (1994-99),  the  ‘party  of
power’ had not yet consolidated into political
parties, a step that only took place after the 1998
elections.  Ukraine’s  late  start  in  economic
reforms and its smaller resources of raw materi-
als placed its ‘party of power’ at a disadvantage
in relation to Russia for example, where reforms
began earlier and the ‘party of power’ was able to
become  far  wealthier.  ‘Parties  of  power’  first
appeared  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  at  different
times – Our Home is Russia in 1995 and the
NDP in Ukraine in 1998 – both of which turned
out to be failures. In his first term, Kuchma was
obliged to rely more heavily on national democ-
rats for support in the face of an unstructured
‘party of power’, a hostile left in control of Par-
liament,  and  Russian  external  pressure.  The
reliance on national democrats inevitably influ-
enced  Ukraine’s  foreign  policy  orientation.
Ukraine’s emerging oligarchic class also saw the
national  democrats  as  allies  against  the  KPU
and  external  Russian  threats.  They  only  felt
strong enough to abandon  reliance on national
democratic support, as well as their fear of Russ-
ian oligarchs, after they had established them-
selves as an economic-political force in the 1998-
2002 parliament. 

During  Kuchma’s  second  term  in  office
(1999-2004),  Ukraine’s  multi-vector  security
policy turned eastwards and returned to many

of the planks of Kuchma’s original 1994 election
programme.  The  election  of  Putin  in  March
2000 facilitated this reorientation because he,
unlike  his  predecessor  Yeltsin,  never  denied
Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state
within its borders. A Ukrainian-Russian ‘strate-
gic partnership’, which was devoid of content in
the Yeltsin era and Kuchma’s first term in office,
became  possible  under  Putin  and  during
Kuchma’s  second  term.  For  Ukraine,  such  a
partnership  rests  on  mutual  respect  for  one
another’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and
equality and takes into account each’s national
interests. While accepting Ukrainian independ-
ence, Putin has sought to draw Ukraine into a
closer  relationship.  This  approach  has  been
acceptable to eastern Ukrainian oligarchs, who
do not harbour anti-Russian feelings and see it
as  perfectly  natural  to  cooperate  closely  with
Russia  on  foreign  policy  issues.  In  the  1998-
2002 parliament, this translated into the cre-
ation  of  an  inter-faction  group  entitled  ‘To
Europe with Russia’.

Ukraine has also stepped up its participation
in the CIS since 2000, a move facilitated by West-
ern  isolation  of  Kuchma  after  serious  allega-
tions of misconduct began to surface after the
so-called ‘Kuchma-gate’ crisis broke in Novem-
ber 2000. A month earlier pro-Western Foreign
Minister  Borys  Tarasiuk  had  been  dismissed.
Ukraine joined the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre,
its defence minister began to attend CIS military
meetings regularly as an observer, and Foreign
Minister Anatoly Zlenko was elected head of the
CIS Council of Foreign Ministers. From 2001
Putin became Kuchma’s main external ally in
the face of his isolation in the West. Kuchma’s
only domestic allies – the centrist oligarchs – no
longer felt threatened by their Russian counter-
parts and, in the absence of Western investment,
welcomed  Russian  economic  activity  in  the
Ukrainian economy.

In January-February 2003, this was taken one
step  further.  Kuchma  became  the  first  non-
Russian to be elected to the largely ceremonial
position of head of the CIS Council of Heads of
State. In addition, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan agreed to establish a CIS Free Trade
Zone (‘Joint Economic Space’). On 22 May 2003,

9

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

the  left  and  pro-presidential  centre  in  the
Ukrainian  parliament  voted  (by  266  deputies
out of 450) to back its creation.

This was a rather curious step considering
that Kuchma had always ridiculed the effective-
ness (and therefore usefulness) of the CIS. More
importantly, Ukraine is not a de jure member of
the CIS, as it had never ratified the 1993 CIS
Charter  and  hence  is  only  a  ‘participant’.
(Ukraine  had  regularly  defined  its  status  –
wrongly – as an ‘associate member’ of the CIS.
No such status exists.) How can the leader of a
non-member  head  the  CIS?  This  would  be
unthinkable in the EU or NATO, but is perfectly
in line with the legal nihilism and disregard for
formal rules prevalent in the CIS.

Since the Kuchma-gate crisis and subsequent
political  stagnation,  the  West  has  become
increasingly  disillusioned  with  President
Kuchma, a disillusionment that has led to rise of
‘Ukraine fatigue’.6 There are many reasons for
this: the inability to solve the murder of opposi-
tion journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in Autumn
2000,  arms  sales  to  so-called  ‘rogue  states’
(including possibly Iraq), the worsening state of
media  freedom,  publicity  surrounding  high-
level corruption (e.g. the Lazarenko affair), a vir-
tual struggle against corruption and unwilling-
ness to accept the outcome of the 2002 elections
(which pro-presidential forces lost).

‘Ukraine  fatigue’  has  also  arisen  over  two
other  fundamental  issues.  First  is  the  gap
between domestic realities and foreign policy
rhetoric, which has its origins in a neo-Soviet
political culture still prevalent among Kuchma
and some of his oligarch allies. The second lies
with the confusion surrounding both EU poli-
cies towards Ukraine and Ukraine’s foreign pol-
icy orientation. The EU has adopted an incoher-
ent policy on Ukraine that has been made even
more confusing by Ukraine itself. The EU has

always resisted being seen to be asking Ukraine
to choose between ‘Eurasia’ (i.e. the CIS) and
‘Europe’  (i.e.  EU).  (Russia  does  not  have  to
choose, as it does not seek EU membership and
geographically it lies within both ‘Europe’ and
Asia.)  While  not  asking  Ukraine  to  choose
between ‘Europe’ and Eurasia, the EU and West
European governments do not treat Ukraine’s
constantly shifting multi-vector foreign policy
seriously.  The  reasons  the  EU  has  not  asked
Ukraine to choose are twofold: first, so as not to
harm relations with Russia, as choosing implies,
from the Russian view, the breaking of relations
with  Moscow;  and  second,  because  asking
Ukraine to choose would indicate that the EU
no longer placed Ukraine within an undefined
‘grey  zone’  lying  on  the  edge  of  ‘Europe’.
Kuchma himself believes that integration into
the EU and NATO does not mean severing ties
with Russia: ‘Separating Ukraine from Russia is
as  impossible  as  separating  Russia  from
Europe’.7 If this is understood in the sense of a
radical break and Yalta-style dividing line, he
may be correct. However, Kuchma is quite disin-
genuous also, as a Ukraine inside NATO and the
EU would differentiate it from a Russia that was
still outside those two organisations.

European  Commission  President  Romano
Prodi  was  at  least  honest  when  he  said: 
‘The Balkan countries will join as they belong.
Turkey is officially a candidate that is clear. But
Morocco,  or  Ukraine,  or  Moldova?  I  see  no 
reason  for  that.’8 Ukraine  keeps  asking  for  a 
signal from the EU,9 to which the EU responds
by  saying  Ukraine  has  to  prove  itself  first.  In 
reality, both sides are happy at the current status
quo. In some ways, EU de facto ties Ukraine’s
fate to Russia’s when it holds the same position
as that of Kuchma and centrist oligarchs that
Ukraine  will 
‘[advance]  to  Europe  with 
Russia’. 

6 This has been recognised inside Ukraine as well. The gap between realities and rhetoric in foreign policy at a time of a lack of clarity in
domestic affairs inside Ukraine has led to ‘Ukraine fatigue’; Zerkalo Nedeli, 23-30 November 2002. In an open letter to Kuchma, Prime Minister
Yanukevych and parliamentary chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn, Yushchenko warned that domestic infringements of human rights could not be
hidden from the West; http: maidan.org.ua, 27 February 2003.
7 ITAR-TASS, 22 May 2003.
8 Interview in the Dutch newspaper Die Volkskrant cited by Reuters, 27 November 2003.
9 Deputy Foreign Minister Yevhen Bersheda, cited by ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1999.

10

Ukraine’s ‘multi-vector’ transition

A joint German-French report drawn up by
their  respective  foreign  ministries  in  2000
clearly  stressed  that  Ukraine  could  not  be
allowed to become a member of the EU: ‘The
admission of Ukraine would imply the isolation
of Russia. It is sufficient to content oneself with
close cooperation with Kiev. The Union should
not be enlarged to the East any further than by
the ten countries of Central Europe, with which
it is currently negotiating. The EU has hitherto
been ready to admit new countries, but its mis-
sion is not to unite the entire continent.’10 This
attitude  towards  Ukraine  by  two  European
states, written a year before 11 September and
three years before the transatlantic rift over Iraq,
has only deepened. 

Even before the ‘Wider Europe’ Communica-
tion, therefore, EU policy was already following
the line of seeking ‘integration not accession’,
whereby Ukraine is included together with Rus-
sia and other ‘neighbours’ as a country that is
not likely to join the EU. Instead of dealing with
the root causes of the domestic political crisis
and thereby loosening Ukraine’s growing for-
eign policy dependency on Russia, Ukraine’s rul-
ing élites have diverted responsibility onto the
shoulders of others. As Ukraine approached the
end of the Kuchma era, its ruling élites became
progressively out of touch with reality, a situa-
tion not dissimilar to that in Russia in the late
Yeltsin era. For example, when asked about cor-
ruption, Kuchma replied that he was not in a
position to improve the country’s legislation.
Ukraine has an abundance of legislation and the
problem is its lack of implementation and selec-
tive implementation.11 Incredibly, Kuchma pre-
dicted that Ukraine would be offered associate
membership of the EU at the October 2003 EU-
Ukraine summit.

Deputy Prime Minister Tabachnyk claimed
that Ukraine’s drive toward Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration ‘is central to the dynamics of decision-

making  at  all  levels’  and  that  this  was,  ‘more
clearly articulated at the domestic level than it is
abroad’. This is certainly not how it has seemed
looking at Ukraine from the West, from where it
looks as if the policies of Ukraine’s ruling élites
are undermining – not supporting – its integra-
tion into Euro-Atlantic structures. 

Ukraine’s  multi-vector  security  policy  in
Kuchma’s  first  and  second  terms  show  that
‘multi-vectorism’ is easily adaptable to the exec-
utive’s  current  geopolitical  predicaments.
Although Euro-Atlantic integration was always
considered a component of ‘multi-vectorism’,
its achievement was undermined by the lack of
ideological commitment (in contrast to com-
mitment only at the level of rhetoric) to ‘Europe’
within the executive and its centrist allies. The
EU High Representative for the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana,
warned Ukraine’s leaders at an October 2002
Warsaw conference that ‘Ukraine is not playing
by the rules but playing with the rules’. Solana
added, ‘We would like one day to embrace your
country,  but  we  have  to  know  what  kind  of
country you are.’12

The gulf in Ukraine between domestic non-
European  policies  and  its  declared  strategic
goals of integration into the EU and NATO will
continue  until  the  end  of  Kuchma’s  term  in
office. President Kuchma’s three-year interna-
tional isolation came to an end in 2003; never-
theless, the United States still refuses to hold a
presidential summit with him (annual presiden-
tial summits had been held under President Bill
Clinton). The restoration of full trust in Ukraine
will have to wait until Kuchma’s successor takes
office in November 2004. 

As discussed in the last section of this paper,
the EU can still play an important role in the
transition to the post-Kuchma era by declaring
its interest, alongside the OSCE and Council of
Europe, in the holding of free and fair elections

10 ‘New Neighbourhood-New Association Ukraine and the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century’, Policy Papers 6 (Warsaw:
Stefan Batory Foundation, March 2002), p.11.
11 Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 May 2003. See also T.Kuzio, ‘Ukraine’s Virtual Struggle Against Corruption and Organised Crime’, RFERL Organized
Crime and Terrorism Watch, 6 September 2002.
12 Solana also expressed his concern that Ukraine was becoming increasingly isolated from Europe, rather than integrating into it; Interfax,
16 October 2002.

11

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

in 2004. The statement should support a free
election campaign devoid of harassment of the
opposition, selective use of legislation to remove
candidates and equal access to the media. The
holding of free elections next year will influence
whether the West continues to have ‘Ukraine
fatigue’ and whether Ukraine actually translates
its  ‘European  choice’  rhetoric  into  policy.  A
statement by the EU in support of free elections
would place the onus squarely upon the Ukrain-
ian leadership to resolve the current domestic
political  crisis  but  not  at  the  expense  of
Ukraine’s integration into Europe.

2.3 Conclusion

Ukraine’s record on transition lies between Rus-
sia’s and Romania’s. In relation to the remainder
of the CIS, it has one of the best records. Yet,
Ukraine  –  together  with  the  entire  CIS  –  has
regressed since the late 1990s. This has occurred
at  the  same  time  as  progress  has  taken  place
within  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  thereby
leading to a growing gulf between it and the CIS.
Despite the mixed picture, Ukraine’s transition
still presents many opportunities that the EU
can seize. 

Within Ukraine, an expanding economy has
coexisted  alongside  a  stagnating  political
regime in crisis. The political stalemate will only
be  broken  by  the  2004  presidential  elections.
Both the pro-presidential élites and the opposi-
tion are fragmented, while Ukraine’s oligarchs
have an uneasy relationship with the executive.
Kuchma has acted as ‘umpire’, standing above
competing oligarch clans, so much so that, with-
out Kuchma, each clan fears that influence over
a new executive by another clan will negatively
affect  its  interests.  The  opposition  is  divided
between moderates, such as Our Ukraine who
are willing to compromise with the authorities
under  certain  conditions,13 and  radicals.
National democrats (Our Ukraine) and the KPU

dislike each other more than either dislikes the
oligarchs.  Our  Ukraine  has  never  provided
wholehearted support to the three radical par-
ties (SPU, KPU and Tymoshenko) in their anti-
presidential street protests since 2001. Divisions
within the pro-presidential élites and the oppo-
sition have meant that neither side can succeed
in the pursuit of either an authoritarian regime
or Kuchma’s resignation and early presidential
elections. Stalemate has therefore ensued.

Speaking on ‘Europe Day’ in May 2003, Pres-
ident Kuchma referred to the past to highlight
Ukraine’s  ancient  links  to  European  history
stretching  back  to  the  medieval  state  of  Kyiv
Rus. Yet recourse to history is insufficient. While
criticising others for not adopting ‘European’
policies inside Ukraine (respect for the rule of
law, tolerance, human rights, rejection of the
authoritarian  past,  multi-party  politics,  etc.),
the executive must take responsibility for under-
mining Ukraine’s ‘European Choice’. The com-
bination of an ambivalent or hostile left and an
ideologically amorphous pro-presidential cen-
tre that routinely succumbs to deception nar-
rows the ideologically committed supporters of
Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ to the centre-right.
If  integration  into  Europe  is  to  be  based  on
‘common values’ (Ukraine, unlike Russia, can-
not hope to be a strategic partner of the EU) only
the  centre-left  SPU  and  centre-right  Our
Ukraine adhere to some, or all, of these.

Free and fair elections in 2004 leading to a
presidential  victory  for  Yushchenko  would
relieve  the  West’s  ‘Ukraine  fatigue’.  The  EU
would also have little choice but to change its
approach towards Ukraine, as those who gen-
uinely  proclaim  Ukraine’s  ‘European  choice’
would  then  be  in  power.  Yushchenko  has
stressed his aim, if elected in 2004, of focusing
on  rapidly  improving  ties  with  the  EU.14 A
Yushchenko victory would transform Ukraine’s
‘European choice’ from a virtual declaration to
real policy, a step for which the EU should be
prepared. 

13 Like Aslund, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine divide Ukraine’s oligarchs into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Compromises can be made with ‘good’
oligarchs. Medvedchuk and the SDPU fall into the ‘bad’ category, in Yushchenko’s eyes. ‘Bad’ oligarchs are defined as those unwilling to
legitimise themselves by evolving from crooked oligarchs into honest businessmen.
14 A Yushchenko victory ‘would unleash a tide of democracy’, a Kyiv think tank has claimed. See Askold Krushelnycky, ‘Ukraine: Yushchenko
Seeks ‘Open, Honest’ Dialogue with Moscow, Better Ties with EU’, RFERL Magazine, 10 June 2003.

12

Outside actors in Ukraine

3.1 Russia

Ukraine’s  relationship  with  Russia  has  never
been an easy one. During the term of Leonid
Kravchuk  (1991-94)  and  the  first  Leonid
Kuchma tenure (1994-99), the main issue that
dominated relations was that of Russia coming
to terms with both Ukrainian independence and
Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea and the
city  of  Sevastopol.  During  Kuchma’s  second
term  (1999-2004),  under  President  Vladimir
Putin Russia has accepted Ukraine’s statehood.
While  not  seeking  to  undermine  Ukrainian
independence,  Russia  still  aims  to  maintain
Ukraine within a Russian sphere of influence.
This has allowed Kuchma to return to his 1994
election programme of closer ties with Russia,
combining a virtual ‘European choice’ with an
eastern Slavic orientation. Coincidentally, the
Kuchma-gate  crisis  in  November  2000  made
this realignment with Russia all the more likely
because Putin became Kuchma’s only ally in the
face of international isolation.

Russia’s  interests  in  Ukraine  are  a  deeper
aspect of its policies towards the CIS as a whole.
A way of overcoming the lack of historical legiti-
macy of the borders of the Russian Federation is
by maintaining ‘internal’ CIS borders as fuzzy,
in the same manner as internal Soviet frontiers.
Russia  has  opposed  the  demarcation  of  CIS
‘internal’  borders  with  Ukraine  and  Russia’s
other CIS neighbours. From the viewpoint of
soft security threats to the EU, this will be an
urgent issue once the EU enlarges to the western
borders of Ukraine and Belarus.

Putin, in contrast to Yeltsin, understands the
different  national  identities  of  Ukraine  and
Belarus. Only the extreme left in Ukraine sup-
port  Ukraine’s  membership  of  the  Russian-
Belarussian union. In the CIS, the Russian gov-
ernment  is  willing  to  work  either  with  Sovi-

etophile/communist 
(Belarus/Moldova)  or
authoritarian  oligarchic  regimes  (Ukraine,
Kazakhstan). Kuchma and his pro-presidential
centrist allies represent Russia’s typical partner
in the CIS, because they are a mirror image of the
type  of  post-Soviet  regime  that  has  emerged
inside  the  Russian  Federation  itself.  On  the
other  hand,  the  Russian  government  is  less
favourable  to  national  democrats  in  Ukraine
and the CIS. National democrats in Moldova,
Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia are perceived in
Moscow as being ‘anti-Russian’. In Ukraine this
has translated into a distrust of Yushchenko in
Moscow. 

This creates a two-fold dilemma for EU pol-
icy  towards  Ukraine.  First,  the  main  political
force that provides grounds for optimism in the
declared ‘European choice’ – Our Ukraine – is
also the main political force perceived in a nega-
tive manner by Russia. Consequently, if the suc-
cess of Ukraine’s commitment to ‘common val-
ues’  rests  on  the  coming  to  power  of
Yushchenko,  the  EU  and  Russia  may  have
incompatible objectives in Ukraine. Success in
revitalising  Ukraine’s  commitment  to  reform
rests  on  pro-presidential  centrists  being
replaced by centre-right reformers, élites who
actually  mean  what  they  say  about  Ukraine’s
‘European choice’. Ironically, therefore, the pro-
motion of a greater commitment to reforms by
the EU, NATO and Western governments on the
part of Ukraine’s leaders is not problematical to
Russia as long as Kuchma and his centrist allies
remain in power, because they are only virtually
committed to ‘common values’.

As  with  Russia’s  relations  with  the  West,
Russian policies towards Ukraine and the CIS
are  grounded  in  geopolitical  terms  and  not
adherence  to  shared  ‘common  values’.  The
incompatibility  of  EU  and  Russian  strategies
towards Ukraine and the CIS will impact upon

3

13

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

EU policies towards its eastern neighbours and
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Rus-
sia is perceived by some EU states as essential to
CFSP, because it is an ally in the pursuit of a
‘multipolar’ world and a counterweight to US
‘unilateralism’.15 Such EU member states may
not wish to harm relations with Russia by fully
‘European  choice’.
supporting  Ukraine’s 
Ukrainian officials have been advised by some
EU officials that membership would only occur
together with Russia.16 Linking the destinies of
Ukraine and Russia places them both beyond
‘Europe’ (understood as the same as the EU in
Kyiv). In this view, Ukraine should, like Russia,
move as close as possible to the EU without join-
ing  it.  This  suits  Russia,  which  is  seeking  to
develop a ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU but
not membership. It does not suit a Ukraine that
seeks membership. In other words, Russia can
only be a great power while remaining outside
the EU, while Ukraine can only accomplish its
‘European choice’ by being inside the Union.17

3.2 NATO and the USA

Since  joining  NATO’s  Partnership  for  Peace
(PfP)  in  February  1994,  Ukraine  has  been  its
most active CIS state. Ukraine has participated
in 200 exercises and hosts the NATO PfP train-
ing centre at the former Yavoriv military base in
western Ukraine. Ukraine has never seen NATO
enlargement as a threat to its security. Quite the
contrary,  it  has  been  understood  as  bringing
security to Ukraine’s western borders. By con-
trast,  the  Russian  perception  of  the  NATO
threat  changed  only  in  2002  under  Putin.
Whereas  the  Russian  military  remains  anti-
Western,  the  Ukrainian  military  has  a  better
understanding of the link between a domestic
adherence to ‘common values’ and successful
integration 
into  Euro-Atlantic  structures.
Moreover, NATO is willing to invite Ukraine to

become a member without making this condi-
tional on Russian membership. 

During  Kuchma’s  first  term,  Ukraine  suc-
cessfully used the ‘NATO card’ to obtain West-
ern backing for Ukraine’s independence and ter-
ritorial integrity in the face of what Kyiv believed
to be a hostile Russia. During the second half of
the  1990s,  Ukraine  became  the  third  largest
recipient of US aid and the largest country with
whom the United Kingdom had a bilateral mili-
tary  relationship.  A  strong  bilateral  military
relationship  also  developed  with  the  United
States  ‘in  the  spirit  of  PfP’.  Ukraine  talked
vaguely of ‘Euro-Atlantic’ integration under two
pro-Western  Foreign  Ministers,  Hennadiy
Udovenko  and  Borys  Tarasiuk,  from  1994  to
2000. However, it was not until May 2001 that
Ukraine  formally  announced  its  intention  of
seeking NATO membership. In 1998 and 2001,
Ukraine developed the most extensive govern-
ment programmes of cooperation with NATO
of any post-communist state.

The benefits of the NATO-Ukraine relation-
ship can already be found in the transformation
of Ukraine’s military officer corps into a pro-
NATO  institution.  The  NATO-Ukraine  Joint
Working Group on Defence Reform has assisted
in  improving  transparency  in  the  military
budget and other reforms among the military
and border troops. NATO assistance has helped
in the radical reduction of the size of Ukraine’s
armed forces from 780,000, inherited from the
former USSR, to 295,000 in 2003, a figure which
is to be halved to 150,000 by 2010. Defence Min-
ister General Volodymyr Shkidchenko was the
last military officer to occupy this position and
he was replaced by the secretary of the National
Security  and  Defence  Council,  Yevhen
Marchuk,  in  June  2003.  The  appointment  is
linked  to  Ukraine’s  fulfilment  of  the  2002
Action Plan with NATO that called for the cre-
ation  of  a  civilian  minister  of  defence  and
greater civilian control over the security forces.

15 As Dov Lynch states, ‘. . . Moscow values relations with Paris for the similarity in Russian and French views on international relations’.
‘Russia faces Europe’, Chaillot Paper 60 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2003), p. 50. 
16 Interview with Ambassador Borys Tarasiuk, Brussels, 15 February 1998.
17 The European Council of the EU in its June conclusions on the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication places Ukraine together with Belarus
and  Moldova  while  keeping  Russia  separate  as  part  of  the  ‘EU-Russian  strategic  partnership’.  See  http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/
makeFrame.asp?MAX=1&BID=71&DID=76201&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/gena/76201.pdf&Picture=0.

14

Outside actors in Ukraine

operations 

NATO’s new responsibilities beyond the geo-
graphic area of NATO members are limited by
its  lack  of  heavy-lift,  especially  long-haul  air-
craft. In June 2003, a NATO-Ukraine Memoran-
dum  on  Cooperation  in  Airlift  was  signed.
Eleven  NATO  member  states  have  agreed  to
charter  six  Ukrainian  heavy-lift  aircraft  for
in
NATO-led  peacekeeping 
Afghanistan.  The  Ministry  of  Defence,  there-
fore, actually acts to push Ukraine’s ‘European
choice’ beyond mere rhetoric. The driving force
behind Ukraine’s open declaration of seeking
NATO membership was the National Security
and Defence Council (NSDC), which also cam-
paigned successfully for Ukraine to send peace-
keeping troops to Iraq. Passivity and empty rhet-
oric come from the presidential administration.
The Ukrainian contribution of two thousand
troops is the fourth largest in Iraq, and they are
based in the Polish sector where they can build
upon many years of cooperation in the Ukrain-
ian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT), itself pro-
moted by NATO and the United States. UKR-
POLBAT has been based in Kosovo since July
2000 as part of KFOR.18

Discussions  of  Ukraine’s  membership  of
NATO will remain academic until after Kuchma
leaves  office.  Certainly,  it  seems  clear  that  a
Yushchenko victory in 2004 is likely to lead to a
NATO invitation in 2007 (non-free, unfair elec-
tions would postpone this to 2012). The serious-
ness with which NATO treats Ukraine’s mem-
bership aspirations was evident in the high-level
conference held at the Center for Strategic and
International  Studies  in  Washington  in  May
2003.19 Longstanding  NATO  members  from
Germany,  Italy,  Turkey,  Norway,  the  United
States and Portugal, and new and future NATO
members, such as Hungary, Romania, Slovenia,

Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  sent  their
defence ministers, while the United States and
Ukraine  were  represented  at  the  presidential
level. The next high-level meeting on Ukraine
will take place in Poland in 2004, confirming
that Poland is likely to lobby Ukraine’s interests
inside both NATO and the EU.

3.3 The European Union

Relations between Ukraine and the EU have not
developed as quickly as those between Ukraine
and NATO.20 Two major obstacles hinder rela-
tions. First, there is a lower level of interest on
the part of the EU towards Ukraine as compared
with  that  shown  by  NATO  (and  the  United
States). It took four years for EU member states
to  ratify  the  Partnership  and  Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) signed by President Leonid
Kravchuk in June 1994, a factor that reflected
the low priority placed on Ukraine (and other
CIS states, apart from Russia).

The  PCAs  upgraded  the  April  1990  agree-
ment between the EU and the USSR, and they
were reached with most CIS member states. The
EU always treated Central and Eastern Europe
and the USSR differently, with the three Baltic
states joining the former group after 1992 and
the former USSR becoming the CIS. The lack of
membership potential for the CIS was always
therefore built into this differentiation. Ukraine
has not consistently implemented the PCA, all
the while insisting that relations be upgraded to
the level of Association Agreement. Problems in
relations with Ukraine range from protection-
ism, an unwillingness to go beyond signing the
agreement  to  its  implementation  and  lack  of
respect for contractual obligations, and agree-

18 Ukraine has a mechanised infantry company and one helicopter squadron in SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in Bosnia and an infantry
company and helicopter squadron in KFOR in Kosovo.
19 ‘Ukraine and NATO. Tasks and Achievements for Cooperation and Integration’, press conference, Washington, DC, 5 May 2003; available
at  http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ukraineandnato.pdf.  See  also  ‘Ukraine  in  Europe’,  CSIS  Occasional  Paper,  September  1999;  available  at
http://www.csis.org/europe/pubs/UkraineInEurope.pdf.
20 This has not been helped by Ukraine not sending an Ambassador to France, arguably one of the key members of the EU where Ukraine
should be lobbying diplomatically, for nearly three years, from September 2000 to April 2003. Anatoly Zlenko was recalled from France to
become Foreign Minister and reportedly left the position open in case he was fired from his new position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France,
15 May 2003).

15

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

ment violations (especially clauses 35-45). The
EU has often complained that Ukrainian minis-
ters were not fully conversant with the PCA.21

Moreover, the implementation of the PCA
after March 1998 has run concurrently with the
declaration by Ukraine of its intention to seek
EU membership. Ukraine developed two exten-
sive  government  programmes  to  achieve  this
goal in 199822 and 2000 which, like the PCA,
remained unfulfilled. Also, Leonid Kuchma was
re-elected  in  November  1999  on  a  pro-‘Euro-
pean choice’ platform. Yet, at that time democ-
ratisation  and  reform  were  stagnating  in
Ukraine (and throughout the CIS). This para-
dox of Ukraine officially seeking EU member-
ship while undermining its chances by its own
domestic  policies  contributed  to  the  rise  of
‘Ukraine fatigue’ in the late Kuchma era. The
Gongadze investigation is a case in point. Speak-
ing at the European Parliament in April 2001,
Foreign  Minister  Anatoly  Zlenko  promised  a
‘transparent  and  open  investigation’  into  the
murder of opposition journalist Gongadze the
previous year. Despite such reassurances and a
change of Prosecutor-General in July 2002, who
claimed he would resolve the Gongadze affair by
the  end  of  2002,  there  has  been  no  visible
progress.

PCAs were signed with eleven CIS states, and
they did not envisage future EU membership.
The aims of the PCA signed with Ukraine were
fourfold:
(cid:90) to  provide  a  framework  for  political  dia-

logue;

PCA be reviewed over the five-year period since
1998. The review report, issued in March 2003,
concluded that:
(cid:90) political dialogue had been largely achieved,
with  the  agenda  becoming  ‘progressively
more  substantial  and  operational’.  The
future  of  EU-Ukraine  relations  should  be
intensified within the ‘Wider Europe’ Com-
munication;

(cid:90) implementation of the promotion of trade
and investment and harmonious economic
relations is mixed;

(cid:90) there had been progress in financial, science
and technology cooperation but social and
cultural cooperation had ‘scope to be devel-
oped further’;

(cid:90) support for the consolidation of democracy
had been undertaken through the political
dialogue, although the report stated that ‘the
achievement of this goal is the responsibility
of  Ukraine’.  Ukraine  had  ‘progressively
developed democratic principles and human
rights and the rule of law’ since 1992 and the
entering into force of the PCA. However, the
EU  had  concerns  in  ‘judicial  reform  and
implementation  of  legislation’  and  with
regard to the ‘rights and freedom of journal-
ists’;

(cid:90) negotiations on accession to the WTO had
supported transition to a market economy;
(cid:90) dialogue on Ukraine’s participation in crisis
management,  such  as  in  Moldova,  should
continue;

(cid:90) there should be an intensification of legisla-

(cid:90) to promote trade, investment and economic

tive approximation;

relations;

(cid:90) to support the consolidation of democracy

and transition to a market economy;

(cid:90) to enhance cultural, economic, social, finan-
cial, civil, scientific, technological co-opera-
tion.

(cid:90) in  the  realm  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,
cooperation should be intensified under the
Action Plan;

(cid:90) cooperation in the transit of energy, energy
sector reform and efficiency should be devel-
oped.

The EU-Ukraine summit in Copenhagen in
July 2002 recommended that progress on the

Following  1998,  when  the  PCA  came  into
force, Ukraine pushed energetically for the EU

21 Interview with Klaus Schneider, deputy head Ukraine/Moldova/Belarus Policy unit, European Commission, Brussels, 10 August 1999.
22 Uriadovyi Kurier, 18 June 1998. See also the Ukrainian ‘Parliamentary hearings on Ukraine’s relations and cooperation with the EU’, Holos
Ukrayiny, 24 December 2002.

16

Outside actors in Ukraine

to develop a ‘strategic vision’ towards it. When
first  articulated  by  Foreign  Minister  Borys 
Tarasiuk, a ‘strategic vision’ was understood as a
differentiation of Ukraine from other CIS states
and  recognition  of  its  membership  aspira-
tions.23 Five years later neither of these two goals
articulated for the EU by Tarasiuk have been
met. The Common Strategy adopted by the EU
at its December 1999 Helsinki summit did not
go as far as Tarasiuk and President Kuchma had
hoped. The only visible progress, in Ukrainian
eyes,  was  the  EU’s  acknowledgement  of  ‘  .  .  .
Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcomes
Ukraine’s pro-European choice’. The definition
of Ukraine as a ‘European’ country in the EU’s
Common Strategy had been obtained earlier in
the  July  1997  NATO-Ukraine  Charter.  The
Common Strategy outlined a ‘strategic partner-
ship’  between  the  EU  and  Ukraine  ‘based  on
shared values and common interests’. The EU’s
‘strategic goals’ in Ukraine were to support the
creation of a ‘stable, pluralistic democracy’, ‘sta-
bility and security’ in Europe, and promotion of
‘economic, political and cultural cooperation’.

In  addition,  the  Commission  adopted  a
Ukraine Country Strategy Paper two years later
in December 2001, which set out the ‘strategic
framework’ for EU assistance to Ukraine during
the period 2002-06. The Paper highlighted the
priorities of strengthening democratic and civil
society  and  media  institutions,  judiciary  and
public administration, structural reforms to the
economy,  improving  the  investment  climate,
WTO membership and restructuring the bank-
ing  and  social  security  systems.  The  first
National  Indicative  Programme  for  2002-03,
included in the Strategy Paper, was divided into
three sections, all of which were heavily oriented
towards economics and trade:
(cid:90) Institutional,  Legal  and  Administrative

Reform;

(cid:90) Support to the private Sector and Assistance

for Economic Development;

(cid:90) Addressing the Social Consequences of Tran-

sition.

Each  of  the  three  areas  was  divided  into
‘Specific  Objectives’,
‘Main  Objectives’, 
‘Expected  Results’, 
‘Description  of  Pro-
grammes’,  ‘Conditionality’  and  ‘Indicators’.
These resemble the proposed Action Plans that
will  be  central  to  the  implementation  of  the
same ideas in the ‘Wider Europe’ Communica-
tion. 

The EU drew up Common Strategies with
Ukraine  and  Russia  in  order  to  demonstrate
that its policies to both countries were equal.
The content of both documents was largely the
same, reflecting the still commonly held view
that both countries should be encouraged to
integrate as closely as possible to the EU without
being offered membership. In this sense, the EU
appears to apply Russia’s aim of non-member-
ship  to  Ukraine.  By  contrast,  NATO  policies
towards Ukraine and Russia have differentiated
between Ukraine’s interest in membership and
Russia’s non-interest.

Two factors undermined even this limited
progress. While lobbying Western governments
and  international  organisations  to  define
Ukraine  as  ‘European’,  Ukraine  in  Kuchma’s
second term (1999-2004) reinforced its presence
in the CIS, thereby undermining its own ‘Euro-
pean’  identity.  Ukraine’s  already  weak  ‘Euro-
pean image’ in Western Europe was undermined
further by domestic policies. The economy did
begin to grow during the Viktor Yushchenko
government 
(1999-2001),  but  politically
Ukraine  fell  into  deep  crisis.  In  stressing  the
need for the EU to send a ‘signal’, the Kuchma
leadership reverted to a neo-Soviet political cul-
ture. Blame for Ukraine’s regression in democra-
tisation  was  thus  not  the  fault  of  Ukraine’s
elected leaders but that of an outside body. The
tradition of blaming foreign entities is deeply
ingrained at the level of élites. There is no indica-
tion that Kuchma and the Ukrainian authorities
are ideologically committed to ‘common values’
in and of themselves. A number of key questions
arose  for  the  EU.  Why  should  a  ‘signal’  be
required  from  the  EU  to  introduce  policies

23 Tarasiuk cited by ITAR-TASS, 27 April 1998 and Holos Ukrayiny, 26 March 1999.

17

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

which  the  Ukrainian  authorities  had  been
elected to uphold and which are enshrined in
the  1996  constitution?  Was  democratisation,
the rule of law and market economic reform not
important in and of itself to Ukraine? It seemed
not, as there has been a distinct lack of ideologi-
cal support for Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ and
‘common  values’  during  both  of  Kuchma’s
terms.

A second difficulty is misunderstanding of
the EU. The threats by Deputy Prime Minister
Tabachnyk outlined earlier to reorientate away
from ‘Europe’ to Russia have been continually
raised since the second half of the 1990s. Tara-
siuk also warned in 1998 that without a ‘signal’
from the EU Ukraine could be pushed closer to
‘somebody’s sphere of influence’.24 Such threats
from national democrats, such as Tarasiuk, or
centrists, like Tabachnyk, belied a lack of under-
standing on their part of the core differences
between the EU and NATO. Despite the adop-
tion of a ‘Common Strategy’, Ukraine has not
become a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU. The term
itself had become so misused during Kuchma’s
second  term  that  some  twenty  countries  had
become Ukraine’s ‘strategic partners’. After the
Kolchuga scandal of Autumn 2002, the notion
of a strategic partnership simply imploded.25

The head of the parliamentary committee on
European  integration,  Tarasiuk,  complained
that the EU dealt with Ukraine only at the level
of  ‘nice  declarations’,  while  it  was  ‘politically
indecisive and contradictory’. Worse still: ‘Until
now I have not heard a comprehensive explana-
tion from the EU as to what criteria it applies to
the countries that aspire to become its members:
geographic, economic or political . . . It is only
when things really hurt that the Europeans are
ready to make political decisions that should
have been made many years ago. As long as noth-
ing dangerous happens in Ukraine, nobody pays
attention to it.’26

In June 1998, Ukraine adopted a first decree
outlining its strategy of integration into the EU.
The  decree  reflected  the  Ministry  of  Foreign
Affairs ideology at the time of ‘Integration into
Europe – Cooperation in the CIS’. By December
of that year, the Ukrainian government was to
have  prepared  a  ‘National  Programme’.  This,
and a subsequent programme unveiled in 2000,
were reminiscent of Soviet five-year plans. All
CIS states – Ukraine included – have a penchant
for  drafting  long  documents  that  are  then
ignored  or  only  partially  fulfilled.  These  are
more akin to letters of intent than contractual
obligations. The programme’s plan will not be
fulfilled. In the first stage (2000-01), Ukraine
was to have joined the WTO and in the second
(2002-03) Ukraine was to become an associate
member  after  signing  a  free  trade  agreement
with the EU. Between 2004 and 2007, Ukraine
was then to hold negotiations on full EU mem-
bership. Kuchma undoubtedly wished to claim
credit for obtaining EU associate member status
in  his  second  term,  an  objective  he  himself
undermined.

Ukraine’s  trade  with  the  EU  has  grown
throughout  the  1990s  and  comparatively
declined with Russia. Between 1994 and 2002,
trade with Russia declined from 50 to 17.1 per
cent  of  Ukrainian  exports.  During  the  same
period, trade with the EU increased from 10.3 to
18.9 per cent, which rises to 40.8 if we include
new  EU  members  in  Central  and  Eastern
Europe.27 Both the United States and EU prom-
ised support for Ukraine’s membership of the
WTO after Ukraine fulfilled its obligations to
the Financial Action Task Force on money laun-
dering. Nevertheless, this still requires recogni-
tion of Ukraine as a market economy.  Despite
Russia’s progress in market economic reform,
according to the Heritage Foundation’s annual
index, being no better than Uk raine’s, only Rus-
sia has been granted market economic status by

24 Financial Times, 13 May 1998.
25 President  Bill  Clinton  made  a  major  visit  to  Kyiv  in  May  2000  to  celebrate  the  ‘strategic  partnership’.  Two  months  later  Kuchma
authorised the sale of Kolochuga radars to Iraq.
26 Holos Ukrayiny, 23 November 1999.
27 Zerkalo Nedeli, 24-30 May 2003.

18

Outside actors in Ukraine

the EU. Another factor is ‘Ukraine fatigue’ (or
‘Kuchma  fatigue’).  Although  not  stated  pub-
licly, there is little wish to be seen as ‘rewarding’
Kuchma  while  he  is  still  in  office.  No  break-
through  with  Ukraine,  regardless  of  who  is
elected  in  2004,  will  take  place  until  after
Kuchma retires.28 From the EU perspective, rela-
tions  will  therefore  merely  ‘tick  over’  until
Kuchma leaves office.29

A number of formal steps have been made by
Ukraine. A National Agency for Development
and European Integration was created in 1997
within the government to coordinate EU inte-
gration, but this has not proved successful. The
title  Minister  of  Economics  was  changed  to
Minister of Economics and European Integra-
tion in July 2001. In January 2003, a State Coun-
cil on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration
was created headed by Volodymyr Horbulin, sec-
retary  of  the  National  Security  and  Defence
Council from 1995 to 1999.30 These largely cos-
metic steps reflected the tendency to create new
institutions as a way of providing ‘jobs for the
boys’. Little actualisation of the pro-European
rhetoric has taken place. Kuchma and his cen-
trist allies have failed to develop a wide social,
educational and political programme to create
support in Ukraine for the declared ‘European
choice’.

The  same  problems  that  began  to  bedevil
Ukraine-EU relations in 1997-99 are still rele-
vant  at  the  end  of  Kuchma’s  second  term:
namely, the perceptions that Ukraine is histori-
cally,  culturally  and  geographically  part  of
‘Europe,’ and therefore has a ‘right’ to member-
ship; the view that Ukraine needs a ‘signal’ of
future membership prospects and the pretence

that the country has started undertaking all of
the  tasks  set  for  it  and  that  the  EU’s  lack  of
response  is  the  real  problem.  The  perception
remains that the EU has no long-term strategy
towards  Ukraine  and  that  it  should  support
Ukraine’s ‘European idea’ and ‘European con-
cept’. Moreover, the sources of ‘Ukraine fatigue’
remain  misunderstood  in  Ukraine  itself,  and
exacerbated by the fact that the economic and
political situation in Ukraine is not too dissimi-
lar to that in the ‘laggard’ countries on the path
to  EU  membership  (Romania  and  Bulgaria).
Many remain convinced that enlargement will
create a new ‘Yalta’, with strict dividing lines in
Europe between those inside the EU – and thus,
Europe – and those outside. Ukraine will be thus
be pushed into a new ‘grey zone’. The focus on
nuclear safety is seen as being disingenuous, as
Ukraine abided by its commitment to close the
Chernobyl nuclear plant but it still awaits funds
promised by the G-8. Finally, many hold the view
that the EU in fact supports Ukraine’s economic
integration in the CIS precisely so that the EU
can forget about it.

In addition, until EU enlargement, Ukraine
lacked  supporters  among  West  European  EU
members for offering Ukraine the prospect of
future  membership.  Austria,  Germany,  the
United Kingdom and some Scandinavian states
have  been  the  only  EU  members  that  have
offered  diplomatic  support.31 Chancellor
Schröder  indeed  has  stated  that  ‘We  want
Ukraine to join the EU as an associate member
and enter the WTO as soon as possible’.32 This
position was contradicted, however, by Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer, who ruled out mem-
bership  in  the  ‘foreseeable  future’.33 Such 

28 US State Department official, Washington, DC, 31 March 2003.
29 Interview at the Council of the EU, General Secretariat, 13 May 2003. 
30 Presidential decrees on the Council are published in Uriadovyi Kurier, 4 and 25 February 2003. Details of the first meeting of the Council
are published in Uriadovyi Kurier, 7 February 2003.
31 Interview with Klaus Schneider, deputy head Ukraine/Moldova/Belarus Policy Unit, European Commission, Brussels, 10 August 1999.
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder quoted in The Ukrainian Weekly, 18 July 1999, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook cited in Interfax, 12 April
2000 and Austrian President Tomas Klestil in UNIAN, 6 November 2002. See the comments by Kuchma after his visit to Austria in Uriadovyi
Kurier,  20  October  1998.  On  Scandinavian  and  British  support  to  Ukraine  see  Ahto  Lobjakas,  ‘EU:  ‘Neighbors’  Debate  Focus’,  RFERL
Magazine, 14 April 2003.
32 Interfax, 9 April 2003.

33 http://europa.eu.int/comm.external_relations/we/inro/ip03_358.htm.

19

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

contradictory  statements  are  common  both
within the EU and between EU member states.
In  the  cases  of  Italy  and  Greece,  support  for
Ukrainian  membership  has  sometimes  been
coupled  with  that  of  Russian  membership,  a
linkage that again ties the fates of two states
with different strategic agendas. More clearly,
the  former  Belgian  Prime  Minister  Jean-Luc
Dehaene, in his position as vice-chairman of the
European  Convention,  ruled  out  Ukraine’s
future membership, because the eastern borders
of the EU after enlargement should remain fixed
(but not those in the Western Balkans and with
Turkey). These views are similar to those of the
French  and  German  foreign  ministries  dis-
cussed  above.  34 The  French  government  ini-
tially preferred not to discuss the membership
option for Ukraine, instead looking to ‘integra-
tion not accession’ as the answer for Ukraine
and other CIS states, such as Moldova. Then, at
the  April  2003  Athens  conference,  President
Jacques  Chirac  said  France  would  support
upgrading Ukraine’s status to associate mem-
ber. It is not clear if this will be translated into
real support inside the EU.

3.4 The ‘Wider Europe’
Communication
The ‘Wider Europe’ Communication, presented
in March 2003, is a comparatively late attempt
to grapple with the problem of new neighbours
before the EU enlarges in 2004.35 The PCAs have
long been criticised as being too static, having
no potential to evolve and for transferring prob-
lems of transition entirely to the states them-
selves.36 The notion of ‘integration not acces-
sion’ reduces all four western CIS states to the
level of Russia’s objective of non-membership.

Of the three countries, one is disinterested in the
EU  (Belarus)  and  two  seek  membership
(Ukraine and Moldova). ‘Integration not acces-
sion’ lies at the heart of the ‘Wider Europe’ Com-
munication, offering all the benefits of ‘mem-
bership’ except voting rights and full participa-
tion in EU institutions.

In  return  for  showing  a  commitment  to
‘common values’ and continued implementa-
tion of reforms, the new neighbours are offered
a ‘stake in the EU’s internal market’ and the pro-
motion of the four freedoms of movement (per-
sons, goods, services and capital). Further meas-
ures  to  enhance  integration  proposed  in  the
Communication include extension of the inter-
nal market, preferential trading relations and
the opening up of the EU market, lawful migra-
tion,  cooperation  in  combating  soft  security
threats and involvement in crisis management,
cultural  cooperation,  promotion  of  human
rights, support for WTO membership, and inte-
gration into transport, energy and communica-
tions networks.

From a Ukrainian perspective, the Commu-
nication  is  an  improvement  on  the  PCA  and
amorphous  Common  Strategy.  Nevertheless,
there remain three flaws. First, the lack of mem-
bership prospects reduces the incentive to work
towards  EU  ‘common  values’.  The  ‘waiting
room’ formula ‘has had a distinct lack of suc-
cess’. The only game in town for most countries,
apart from Russia, is full membership.37 The
‘Wider Europe’ Communication was bound up
almost  immediately  with  the  question  of
whether  further  EU  enlargement  would  only
include the Western Balkans and Turkey and
not the western CIS. EU Enlargement Commis-
sioner Günter Verheugen’s views have evolved
towards a more ‘open-door’ view: ‘it is true that
the  door  cannot  remain  closed  in  the  long

34 Offering an ‘open door’ to the Western Balkans but not Ukraine is a sign of the EU’s ‘double standards. Yevhen Perelygyn, head of the
department of Euro-Atlantic Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking at the conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New
Relations’, Kyiv, 26 June 2003.
35 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/inro/ip03_358.htm.
36 Dov Lynch, ‘The New Eastern Dimension of the Enlarged EU’, paper given at the conference ‘The enlarged EU and its new neighbours:
new security challenges’, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 5-6 June 2003.  The ‘Wider Europe’ Communication claimed the PCAs were
‘evolutionary’ but admitted they did not, ‘establish further trade concessions beyond those the EU accords to its WTO partners’.
37 Fraser Cameron, The Europe We Need, (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 10 June 2003); available at www.theepc.net.

20

Outside actors in Ukraine

term’.38 This is preferable to the ‘closed-door’
policy of the European Commission President
Romano Prodi. 

Nevertheless, the EU continues to fudge the
question of an ‘open-door’ policy for Ukraine
and Moldova, unlike the clear signal it is sending
to the Western Balkans (although they have a
long path to membership ahead). It is not clear
why the benefits of cooperating with the EU,
which are undoubtedly great, lead to member-
ship only in the case of the Western Balkans but
not the western CIS, especially as both regions
geographically belong to ‘Europe’.

Not surprisingly, Ukrainian reactions have
been negative. Speaking at the European Con-
ference in Athens, President Kuchma described
membership of the WTO as Ukraine’s priority.
‘At the same time, we would like to obtain assur-
ances of the fact that no discussion on the ques-
tion of membership today does not mean that it
is  forever  removed  from  agenda’,  Kuchma
added.39 In other words, Ukraine needs to hear
that the door is open, at least in principle. Parlia-
mentary chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn described
the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication as ‘degrad-
ing,’ while the Foreign Ministry called it disap-
pointing, as it ‘does not meet Ukraine’s aspira-
tions’.40 Ultimately, the suspicion in Ukraine
and  Moldova  is  that  the  EU  shares  Samuel
Huntington’s view of a ‘clash of civilisations’.
Western CIS states may be simply, ‘too poor, too
undemocratic, or simply too different’.41

Second, the Communication puts the west-
ern CIS in the same category as the southern
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The mixing
of targets ‘has become the document’s key prob-
lem’ because it, ‘is a gross political and psycho-

logical blunder made by the authors of the doc-
ument’.42 Such blunders are not new. The EU
signed  the  PCAs  in  the  1990s  with  most  CIS
states even though the majority of them are nei-
ther part of ‘Europe’ (like the southern Mediter-
ranean) or will ever seek EU membership.

A third issue in the ‘Wider Europe’ Commu-
nication will continue to be the perceived dou-
ble standard of only agreeing to an ‘open-door’
policy for the Western Balkans. When talking
about the Western Balkans, a spokesman for the
Greek presidency of the EU was adamant that:
‘We should not forget that these are European
countries and that Europe will never be com-
plete without their accession’.43 Is it not possi-
ble to take the fact that so few EU members use
the same language about the western CIS as a
sign  that  they  psychologically  do  not  perceive
these  countries  as  European?  Greece,  like
Poland, uses a similar language. However, few
other  EU  members  rise  to  the  defence  of  the
western CIS. There is no logical explanation why
an ‘open-door’ policy should be adopted for one
region of geographic Europe (Western Balkans)
while  denying  it  to  another  (western  CIS).44
According  to  Dennis  MacShane,  Britain’s
Europe Minister, Europe stretches geographi-
cally from the Atlantic to the Urals. To this geo-
graphic component should be added a belief in
shared  ‘common  values’.  Both  the  Western
Balkans and western CIS belong geographically
to ‘Europe,’ and the former has not proven its
higher  commitment  to  ‘common  values’.45
Quite the contrary.

It would seem that Ukraine is in effect being
punished  for  pursuing  positive  and  peaceful
interethnic relations. One has the impression

38 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘EU: ‘Neighbors’ Debate Focus’, RFERL Magazine, 14 April 2003. On another occasion Verheugen did not, ‘rule out any
of the statuses about which are being talked about today’; Ukrayinska Pravda, 8 April 2003.
39 www.president.gov.ua/activity/151715220.html.
40 Ukrainian State Television Channel 1, 27 March; and ITAR-TASS, 12 March 2003. Pessimism about Ukraine’s EU prospects remains high
and 49.3 per cent believe that relations are in limbo; Ukrayinska Pravda, 5 May 2003.
41 Ian Black, ‘Expanding EU Woos Russia and Ukraine’, The Guardian, 18 April 2003.
42 Oleksandr Sushko, Headlines and Comments, no.11, (Kyiv: Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 2003).
43 Breffni O’Rourke, ‘EU: Can Brussels Stay Focused On the Balkans?’, RFERL Magazine, 11 June 2003.
44 Members of the Polish government Centre for Eastern Studies in a round-table at the EUISS, 3 June 2003.
45 The Guardian, 18 April 2003.

21

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

that Ukraine has been forgotten in relation to
the Western Balkans precisely because it is not
racked  by  ethnic  conflict.46 Warsaw’s  Stefan
Batory  Foundation  has  criticised  this  double
standard as follows: ‘But, Ukraine has not expe-
rienced the type of conflicts or crises character-
ising the experience of several countries in the
Western Balkans, something which, ironically,
would most likely have pushed Ukraine up the
EU’s agenda.’47

Moreover, the game has moved on since the
publication of the Communication in March.
For example, the Council’s conclusions on the
‘Wider Europe’ Communication no longer men-
tion the possibility of the extension of the four
freedoms.48 In Ukraine’s view, it is losing from
being considered together with Africa and the
Middle East in the same document. The fear of
an influx of labour and migrants from these two
regions led some EU members to insist on drop-
ping the four freedoms.49

3.5 Poland

In recent years, Poland has added its strong sup-
port, and its lobbying for Ukraine inside the EU
(and NATO) will grow. The three Baltic states
are likely to follow suit, but not all Central and
East European states think in this way. Czech
President Vaclav Havel backed Turkey’s mem-
bership but expressed pessimism that the west-
ern CIS would ever join the EU, a view that was
subsequently retracted.

In early 2003 the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs  produced  a  ‘Non-Paper’  and  Paper  in
support of an ‘Eastern Dimension’ for the EU.
Both were meant to contribute to discussion of

the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication. A major
factor raised in both papers was the need to dif-
ferentiate  EU  policy  towards  its  eastern  and
southern neighbours. This has been accepted in
the  European  Council’s  conclusions  on  the
Wider  Europe  Communication  published  in
June 2003. 

Where the Polish papers differ is in the degree
to which they are willing to lobby for the EU to
take  this  differentiation  one  step  further  by
treating  countries  in  accordance  with  ‘the
degree of convergence of their values and for-
eign policy with those of the EU’.50 In addition,
Poland has explicitly called for the creation of a
new ‘Eastern Dimension’ in the EU that would
complement the existing Northern Dimension
and  represent  a  ‘parallel  enhancement  of  the
Barcelona process’: ‘Poland favours establishing
the EU Eastern Dimension as a regional frame-
work  which  could  serve  as  a  co-ordination
mechanism for actions, toolbox of instruments
and a platform for the EU-regional co-operation
in some areas . . . ’51

Poland  believes  that  the  ‘Wider  Europe’
Communication does not go far enough and
that it should leave the door open for Ukraine
and Moldova, the only two of the four new EU
neighbours that seek membership. These two
states  should  be  allowed  the  possibility  of
upgrading their relationship with the EU over
the  long  term  to  that  of  Association  Agree-
ments, which would recognise in practice, if not
in  theory  (as  in  the  Common  Strategy),
Ukraine’s ‘European Choice’.52 The May 2003
Paper calls for the Actions Plans that are devel-
oped for Ukraine and Moldova to become ‘Part-
nerships for Association’. This would prepare
both  states  ‘to  enter  into  an  association  or

46 Interview with Klaus Schneider, deputy head, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus policy unit, European Commission, Brussels, 10 August 1999.
47 More than a Neighbour – Proposals for the EU’s future policy towards Ukraine (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003).
48 http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=1&BID=71&DID=76201&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/gena/76201.pdf&Picture=0.
49 Yevhen Perelygyn, head of the department of Euro-Atlantic Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking at the conference
‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, Kyiv, 26 June 2003.
50 Non-Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland, February 2003. 
51 ‘The New Neighbours – a framework for relations. Proposals from Poland’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2003.
52 This view of Polish policy was reinforced by members of the government Centre for Eastern Studies in a round-table at the EUISS, 3 June
2003. See also More than a Neighbour – Proposals for the EU’s future policy towards Ukraine (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003), which argues
that the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication in the western CIS should be only the EU’s first – not last – step.

22

Outside actors in Ukraine

neighbourhood agreement by the time the PCAs
expire [in 2008]’.53 As discussed above, the EU
speaks  with  different  voices  on  this  sensitive
issue. The Poles are calling upon the EU to agree
to  an  ‘open-door’  policy,  a  policy  that  has
worked  effectively  for  NATO.  An  ‘open-door’
policy, as in the Western Balkans, would pro-
vide, ‘a strong incentive to undertake efforts in
furthering domestic and economic reforms’.

Understandably, Poland is concerned to but-
tress the ‘pro-European forces in Ukraine’. The
last  thing  Warsaw  wishes  to  see  is  a  second
Belarus  on  its  eastern  border  that  would  be
within Russia’s sphere of influence. The EU can-
not ignore the geopolitical dimension of its rela-
tions with its neighbours. Towards securing its
Ukrainian neighbour, the Polish papers provide
concrete – but moderate – recommendations:
(cid:90) upgrade EU-Ukrainian relations to those of
EU-Russia. This recommendation indicates
that Poland does not see the EU as treating
Russia and Ukraine equally (unlike NATO).
The implicit message is that the EU is giving
preference to Russia, again for geopolitical
reasons;

(cid:90) provide market economic status to Ukraine
(a status granted to Russia in mid 2002) that
would open the door to WTO membership;
(cid:90) provide targeted assistance through a ‘Euro-
pean  Democracy  Fund  (EDF)’  (February
Paper)  or  ‘European  Civil  Society  Neigh-
bourhood Fund (ECSNF)’ (May 2003 Paper)
to what are, in effect, pro-European forces
(NGOs, small and medium businesses, civil
society, etc.,). This would increase support
for political-economic reforms, the rule of
law, democratic control of the armed forces,
and fighting corruption.54 The EDF/ECSNF
would be more flexible and country-specific
than the TACIS;5555 ‘The New Neighbours –

a  framework  for  relations.  Proposals  from
Poland’  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  May
2003) calls for work to begin as soon as possi-
ble  on  the  ‘neighbourhood  instrument’
which  should  be,  ‘flexible  and  allow  for  a
wider scale of assistance measures than the
present TACIS assistance’.

(cid:90) enhanced  political  and  security  dialogue
(through a Justice and Home Affairs Action
Plan and the CSFP) as part of the elaboration
of  a  common  European  political  and  eco-
nomic space. Coupled with an ‘open-door’
policy, this would decouple the notions of
the EU and ‘Europe,’ by including countries,
such as Ukraine, as potential future members
because  they  would  be  then  considered
‘European;’

(cid:90) following on from the previous point, ensur-
ing flexibility between tight border controls
needed to combat soft security threats and
less  restrictive  border  controls  that  would
not  halt  cross-border  trade  and  academic,
cultural and official cooperation. Poland has
taken the lead in providing visa-free travel
and postponing its introduction from July
until October 2003;

(cid:90) expanded military cooperation, as agreed at
the  June  2002  Seville  European  Council.
Ukraine has assigned a military liaison offi-
cer to the EU Military Staff. Two areas that
are  of  interest  in  this  field  are  the  use  of
Ukrainian transport aircraft by the EU for
peacekeeping operations, a step in parallel
with that of NATO. In addition, there is the
possible use of Ukrainian troops in the broad
array  of  potential  crisis  management 
operations undertaken by the EU. A possible
early example could be in an EU-led opera-
tion in the Moldovan conflict.56 Other areas
of  on-going  military  cooperation  are  the

53 ‘The New Neighbours – a framework for relations. Proposals from Poland’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2003.
54 More than a Neighbour – Proposals for the EU’s future policy towards Ukraine (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003), calls for a change in
emphasis away from ‘threats and fears associated with new neighbours’ to a ‘positive, constructive approach’ (p.10). Heather Grabbe, Centre
for European Reform, has complained, ‘It’s all about protecting ourselves from these countries, rather than engaging with them’ (Breffni
O’Rourke, ‘Ring of Friends’, Closer Ties with Neighbours’, RFERL Magazine, 31 January 2003).
55 ‘The New Neighbours – a framework for relations. Proposals from Poland’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2003) calls for work to begin
as soon as possible on the ‘neighbourhood instrument’ which should be, ‘flexible and allow for a wider scale of assistance measures than
the present TACIS assistance’.
56 Interview at the European Union Military Staff, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 June 2003.

23

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

destruction  of  ‘Ukrainian  ‘frog’  (liquid)
mines and ensuring compliance by Ukraine
with EU rules governing arms exports;

(cid:90) joint infrastructure projects in energy, trans-
portation  and  communications.  In  May
2003, the EU, Poland and Ukraine signed an
agreement  to  extend  the  Odessa-Brody
pipeline to Gdansk. The project was backed
by a business plan outlined by former British
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, a con-
sultant  with  PricewaterhouseCoopers,
which stressed its advantages;

(cid:90) information campaign about the EU and its
policies  through  ‘European  Information

Centres’. NATO initiated such a policy with
the opening of an Information and Docu-
mentation office in 1997 in Kyiv, with diplo-
matic  accreditation,  to  combat  Cold  War
stereotypes. Information on the EU is impor-
tant to overcome the low level of knowledge
at the élite and public levels. Ninety-three per
cent of Ukrainians assume that joining the
EU will be a positive step but only half are
able  to  explain  why.  Too  few  Ukrainians
understand the political dimension of the
EU. Only three per cent of those who have
put  queries  on  the  EU  to  a  ministry  have
received a response.

24

Policy proposals

During both Kuchma terms of office (1994-99

and 1999-2004), Ukraine outlined its strate-
gic goal of becoming a member of both the EU
and NATO. Of the two, Ukraine’s relations with
the EU have been the most problematical. This
could of course change under the impact of the
new Ukrainian president who may be elected in
2004 and an enlarged EU taking a greater inter-
est in its immediate neighbourhood. Neverthe-
less, Ukraine has a real possibility of becoming
the EU’s second ‘Turkey’, in the sense of being a
NATO  member  but  only  an  EU  aspirant.
Ukraine and Turkey are similarly perceived, and
both are sometimes seen as being too large to be
integrated into the EU. 

In  addition,  although  this  is  not  stated
openly,  some  leading  EU  states  are  not  con-
vinced that the western CIS is part of ‘Europe’. In
this sense, they conflate the notions of EU and
‘Europe’ into one: ‘Since the 1950s, there has
been a closer and closer entanglement of Europe
with the European Union. To most of the out-
side world Europe means the EU. Significantly,
the  EU  has  never  attempted  to  define
“Europe”.’57 When  Morocco  applied  for  EU
membership in the 1980s, it was politely told
that it was not ‘European’. In contrast, the West-
ern Balkans are deemed eligible for membership
via the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agree-
ments.  What  about  Ukraine  and  the  western
CIS? Here, the EU seems muddled, and unwill-
ing to admit it does not see Ukraine as a future
member.

The main ‘grey area’ is therefore the western
CIS because the EU is unsure whether ‘Europe’

stretches from the Atlantic to its border with the
CIS (whereby the EU and ‘Europe’ are the same)
or further east to the Urals. Article 49 of the TEU
explicitly states that any European state can join
if it meets certain criteria on adhering to the
‘common values’ outlined in Article 6. Neverthe-
less, Ukraine is expected to try even harder than
Spain did in the 1980s or Poland in the 1990s to
prove it is part of ‘Europe’. Within Ukraine, the
EU is not perceived in a hostile manner, unlike
NATO in eastern Ukraine and within the left
wing of the political spectrum. 

Nevertheless, the process of EU accession is
little  understood  at  the  élite  or  public  level.
Opinion  polls  in  support  of  EU  membership
therefore tell us little, as most people equate the
EU with a higher standard of living and the rule
of law. Opinion polls in February and June 2000
indicated that between 57 and 67 per cent were
in  favour  of  EU  membership  for  Ukraine.58
When asked what the attraction of EU member-
ship was, 77 per cent said ‘higher living stan-
dards’ (the most frequently cited reason).59 A
similar level of support was found by another
Kyiv  think  tank,  with  the  highest  support  in
western Ukraine (74.1) and the lowest in south-
ern Ukraine (46.7 per cent).60

Of  the  three  main  political  groups  in
Ukraine, pro-presidential centrists and national
democrats both seek EU membership. Only the
latter, however, are willing to commit to domes-
tic  policies  beyond  mere  rhetoric  that  would
show Ukraine’s commitment to ‘common val-
ues’  and  its  ‘European  choice’.  This  could
change in the post-Kuchma era with centrists

57 Op. cit. in note 37.
58 A third June 2003 poll by the Ukrainian Centre Economic and Political Studies found that 64.8 per cent supported membership of the
EU. 15.7 opposed this step and the remainder were undecided; Ukrayinska Pravda, 2 July 2003.
59 ‘Public Opinion Poll in Ukraine: February 2000’ and ‘Public Opinion Poll in Ukraine: June 2000’, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign
Policy Ukraine, Kyiv.
60 National Security and Defence (Ukrainian Centre Economic and Political Studies), no. 2, 2002, p. 36.

4

25

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

moving closer to the national democratic pro-
reform position. During the Kuchma era, pro-
presidential centrists have therefore backed only
a  virtual  ‘European  choice’.  Neither  centrists
nor national democrats will accept the path of
‘integration not accession’ offered by the EU in
its ‘Wider Europe’ Communication. Although a
national  democratic  president  might  be
tempted to follow such a course in the hope that
the  EU  would  gradually  change  its  attitudes,
this is not true for centrists. Thus far, centrists
under Kravchuk and Kuchma have placed the
ball in the EU’s court by claiming there is little
point in supporting ‘common values’ in practice
when no future membership is on offer. Once
the  EU  gives  a  ‘signal’,  centrists  claim,  they
would allegedly begin to energetically pursue
‘common values’. 

The debate is misleading. In 1989-93, only
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the three
Baltic states embarked on radical changes that
proved  their  wholehearted  commitment  to
‘common values’. Radical changes in the other
Central and East European states followed suit
only later in the decade. Nevertheless, Associa-
tion Agreements were signed with both the radi-
cal reformers and the laggards at the same time.
The  approach  of  offering  future  member-
ship  if  certain  conditions  are  met  is  used  by
NATO vis-à-vis Ukraine but not by the EU. Here
lies  the  major  difference  between  the  Action
Plans  offered  by  NATO  (open-door  offer  of
membership)  and  the  EU  (closed-door  non-
offer of membership). It is not difficult to imag-
ine to which Action Plan Ukraine’s élites will
direct most of their efforts.

This stalemate in Ukraine-EU relations will
need to be resolved in the post-Kuchma era. As
the date rapidly approaches, it is important that
the EU begins the process of discussing, for the
first  time,  a  comprehensive  strategy  towards
Ukraine. The EU should place the responsibility
for  Ukraine’s  domestic  policies  upon  its  own
leaders, and not accept that the lack of the ‘sig-
nal’ is the cause of Ukraine’s difficulties. Such an
approach can only be made by allowing the same

degree  of  ‘open-door’  medium-  to  long-term
prospect of membership as offered to the West-
ern Balkans. With this kind of ‘signal’, the EU
would  clearly  shift  to  Ukraine’s  government
responsibility to convert its rhetoric into policy.
Both  Ukraine  and  the  EU  could  then  move
beyond the virtual policies that each adopted
towards the other during the Kuchma eras.

Developing a new strategy towards Ukraine
and this region will take place against the back-
ground  of  a  number  of  important  factors,
including the process of enlargement until 2007
and the integration of twelve new members, the
Intergovernmental Conference and discussions
in 2004-06 over the new six-year EU budget from
2007.  In  the  ‘Wider  Europe’  Communication
the European Commission proposes to work in
the ‘initial phase’ until 2006 ‘within the existing
legal framework’. From 2007, ‘New Neighbour-
hood Instruments’ will be introduced ‘following
an assessment of the relevant legal and budget-
ary  issues’.61 Additional  conditioning  factors
are the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004
ending the Leonid Kuchma era and the possibil-
ity  of  a  victory  for  front-runner  Viktor
Yushchenko, the presidential elections in Russia
and  likely  re-election  of  Vladimir  Putin,  the
planned monetary union between Belarus and
Russia in 2005, the discussions of EU peace con-
solidation in Moldova and new elections there
in 2004-05. The NATO summit in 2007 is also
important for Ukraine, as invitations to become
members  are  likely  to  be  offered  to  Albania,
Croatia and Macedonia. 

The 2004 elections in Ukraine could lead to
three scenarios. The three front running candi-
dates  are  Yushchenko,  who  is  guaranteed  to
enter  the  second  round,  communist  leader
Symonenko, who is certain to lose if he enters
the second round, and a pro-presidential candi-
date (possibly Prime Minister Yanukevych). In
the second round of the elections, Yushchenko
will  therefore  face  either  Symonenko  or
Yanukevych (or another pro-presidential cen-
trist). A scenario whereby Symonenko wins the
elections is ruled out.

61 ‘Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’, Commission Communication, COM(2003), 393 final Brussels, 1 July 2003.

26

Policy proposals

SCENARIO 1: 

A  victory  by  Yushchenko  would  lead  to  an
evolution from a virtual domestic commit-
ment to reform and an external policy of see-
king  EU  membership  into  an  ideological
commitment  in  support  of  EU  ‘common
values’. Ukraine’s international image would
radically change. The changes in policies and
attitudes could be as profound as those that
took place in the second half of the 1990s in
Slovakia  in  the  post-Meciar  era.  A  Yush-
chenko victory would virtually guarantee an
invitation to Ukraine to join NATO at its next
summit and force the EU to take a more posi-
tive  and  serious  approach  by  dropping  its
own virtual policy towards Ukraine. After the
revolution  of  1989  in  Central  and  Eastern
Europe,  it  took  the  EU  until  1993  to  sign
Association  Agreements  regardless  of  the
state of the commitment to ‘common values’.
Some Central and East European states (i.e.
the Visegrad group) had proved their com-
mitment to ‘common values’ in the interve-
ning four years, but Slovakia, Bulgaria and, to
some extent, Romania, only began catching
up in the late 1990s. Yushchenko would also
show such a commitment and the EU should
respond in the same manner to Ukraine as it
did to Central and Eastern Europe.

SCENARIO 2: 

A  victory  by  a  pro-presidential  candidate
would  be  an  improvement  on  the  Kuchma
era, although not to the same extent as in the
previous scenario. Some of Kuchma’s virtual
policies would continue, both domestically
and  towards  the  EU.  An  invitation  to  join
NATO would most likely be put off until the
2012 summit. Nevertheless, not all centrist
oligarchs are stuck in time (see the discussion
above).  Prime  Minister  Yanukevych  and
National Bank chairman Serhiy Tyhipko may
be in favour of moving away from the ‘robber
baron’ capitalism of the 1990s to the legitimi-
sation  of  themselves  and  their  positions
within Ukraine’s unconsolidated democracy
and semi-market economy. If this group of

centrist oligarchs were to become business-
men and accept the ‘rules of the game’ they
would  move  closer  to  Yushchenko  and  his
allies in Our Ukraine, which already includes
high-profile  businessmen,  such  as  Petro
Poroshenko.

SCENARIO 3: 

Political reform proposals elaborated by Pre-
sident Kuchma in March 2003 and discussed
throughout the remainder of the year have as
a central aim to hold all elections (presiden-
tial, parliamentary, local) in the same year.
Kuchma has reiterated that he continues to
plan  to  hold  the  presidential  elections  in
2004. The opposition fear, with some justifi-
cation, that Kuchma seeks to extend his term
in office by two years until 2006, when the
next  parliamentary  elections  are  due.
Attempts to extend Kuchma’s term in office
are due to the unavailability of a candidate
acceptable to all oligarchic groups and Kuch-
ma’s low popularity – and by default his poli-
tical allies – who were defeated in the propor-
tional half of the 2002 elections.

The PCA with Ukraine was conceived in a dif-
ferent era. In the early 1990s, the PCA reflected
the mood of the disintegration of the USSR and
the unwillingness of the EU to see the CIS states
as future members. By the time the PCA came
into effect in Ukraine in 1998, it was even more
out of date. During the same year, Ukraine drew
up its first programme of cooperation with the
EU that had membership as its end goal. The
current wave of EU enlargement makes the PCA
ever  more  obsolete  as  the  document  framing
relations between the Union and Ukraine.

Will the path of ‘integration not accession’
offered by the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication
be more effective than the PCA in stimulating
the  internal  impulse  in  countries,  such  as
Ukraine, to embark on wide-scale reform pro-
grammes? This is unlikely: ‘Recent history, how-
ever, demonstrates that the “waiting-room” for-
mula has had a distinct lack of success. For most
countries, there is only one game in town – the

27

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

EU – and that implies full membership.’62 The
possibilities envisaged within the Communica-
tion  have  greater  potential  than  the  PCA,  an
agreement  that  was  largely  restricted  to  eco-
nomics and trade. Joint Action Plans could be a
way to inject momentum into relations. Never-
theless, as long as the Action Plans are not cou-
pled  with  an  ‘open-door’  policy,  in  the  same
manner as NATO’s, it is doubtful that they will
be received and implemented enthusiastically
by Ukraine’s élites.63

The proposals put forward in the two Polish
Non-Papers  and  by  Warsaw  think  tanks  have
suggested ways forward, including on the role of
Action Plans in promoting domestic reform in
Ukraine. The proposed ‘New Neighbourhood
Instruments’ from 2007 could include promot-
ing ‘sustainable economic and social develop-
ment’, cooperation against soft security threats,
‘ensuring efficient and secure borders’ and pro-
moting human and cultural contacts.64

More detailed areas that could be considered
in the Joint Action Plans (‘New Neighbourhood
Instruments’) may include:
(cid:90) Democracy Fund: an EU version of the US
National  Endowment  for  Democracy,  the
British Westminster Foundation for Democ-
racy and other similar foundations. Target-
ing support to youth NGOs, election moni-
toring, independent media and trade unions;
(cid:90) international  support: granting  Ukraine
market economic status as a stepping-stone
to membership of the WTO;

(cid:90) support to the market economy: structural,
legislative and business advice to the small
and medium business sector. Recognition of
Ukraine as a market economy;

(cid:90) Justice and Home Affairs: institutional sup-
port for the rule of law, reforming the judici-
ary and ensuring its independence from pol-

itics. Advice and assistance in combating cor-
ruption and organised crime;

(cid:90) academic and student contact: visiting fel-
joint  research  projects,  academic
lows, 
exchanges, joint working parties. The Paris-
based EU Institute for Security Studies could
be a good partner for such activities;

(cid:90) security  cooperation:

cooperation 

to
counter soft security threats in areas such as
enhanced border controls to thwart illegal
migrants, terrorism, sex slaves, narcotics and
weapons;

(cid:90) ESDP: use of Ukrainian peacekeeping forces
in EU-run operations, such as potentially in
Moldova;

(cid:90) civil  control: expanding  programmes  on
democratic control of the armed forces to
other branches of the security forces (i.e. the
Security Service, Ministry of the Interior);

The EU should develop a strategic vision for
Ukraine  by  taking  into  consideration  five
strategic and seven tactical recommendations.

4.1 Strategic recommendations

EU  officials  to  talk  with  a  single  voice  on
Ukraine 

At an October 2002 conference in Warsaw, the
EU  High  Representative  for  the  CFSP  and
Swedish  Prime  Minister  Goran  Person  sup-
ported  maintaining  an  ‘open-door’  policy  as
long  as  countries  respect  ‘common  values’.
Interviewed at the same time, Commission Pres-
ident Romano Prodi ruled out Ukraine being
part  of  the  EU:  ‘The  fact  that  Ukrainians  or
Armenians  feel  European  means  nothing  to
me’.65 Three years earlier, Prodi had not ruled

62 Op.cit. in note 37.

63 Interview with Borys Tarasiuk, head of parliamentary committee on European integration, Kyiv, 24 June 2003. Yevhen Perelygyn, head
of department on Euro-Atlantic Integration, Foreign Ministry, Kyiv, speaking at conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, 26 June
2003.
64 Op. cit. in note 61.
65 Quoted from an interview in the Dutch newspaper Die Volkskrant as cited by Reuters, 27 November 2003. Prodi’s views in Die Volkskrant
came after similar remarks made to La Stampa.

28

Policy proposals

after 

out EU membership for Ukraine. He returned to
this  position 
criticism  of  his
Ukraine/Armenia comparison by stating that
Ukraine could become a member of the EU ‘in
principle’.66 Such wavering and constant chang-
ing of views reflects a lack of any real EU strategy
towards Ukraine. 
(cid:92) Recommendation: the EU urgently needs to
develop  an  all-embracing  strategic  policy
towards  Ukraine  that  all  EU  officials  will
then uphold. 

Decouple the ‘western CIS’ from the southern
Mediterranean and the Middle East

Although EU officials insist that there will be
differentiation  within  and  between  both
regions,  European  Commission  President
Prodi’s  remarks  ruling  out  membership  for
Ukraine, Moldova and Morocco would indicate
otherwise. It is illogical and counter-productive
to place European states in the western CIS with
non-European states in the southern Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East.67 Such an approach
sends a ‘signal’ to the western CIS that they have
no opportunity of ever joining the EU. 
(cid:92) Recommendation: decouple  the  Western
CIS from the southern Mediterranean and
the Middle East by treating the former in a
similar  manner  to  the  Western  Balkans  as
part of ‘Europe’. Adopt a policy of differenti-
ation  between  the  southern  Mediter-
ranean/Middle East and the western CIS and
within the western CIS. There should be no
‘one size fits all’ approach.68

Provide an ‘open-door’ policy to all geographi-
cally European states69

The EU needs to be consistent with Article 49 of
the TEU that allows every geographically Euro-
pean state to apply for membership. To date,
this  has  not  been  the  case  with  EU  policy

towards the western CIS ‘grey zone’. Romano
Prodi has declared: ‘The Balkans, whatever the
timetable is, are destined to become part of the
European family. They are a region we have to
look after.’70 Such language has never been used
by  Prodi  or  other  EU  officials  regarding
Ukraine. This de facto punishes countries, such
as Ukraine, for successfully avoiding interethnic
conflict while rewarding others, such as Croatia
and Serbia, which have not. 
(cid:92) Recommendation: Ukraine is defined as a
European state in various EU declarations
and the Common Strategy. It is time the EU
takes these pronouncements seriously and
talks about Ukraine as part of ‘Europe’ in the
same manner as EU officials talk of the West-
ern Balkans. NATO’s ‘open-door’ policy in
the 1990s successfully blurred the distinc-
tion  between  being  ‘in’  and  ‘out’.  Such  an
approach could be adopted throughout geo-
graphic ‘Europe’ by the EU, thereby encour-
aging states outside the EU – but geographi-
cally within ‘Europe’ – to not feel excluded.
This would place the onus upon states in the
Western Balkans and western CIS to pursue
deep reforms with the EU only providing a
medium-  to  long-term  commitment  to
maintaining an open door. 

Support Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ 

Ukraine’s  transition  record  has  been  the
strongest in the CIS and is not very far behind
that  of  Romania.  Nevertheless,  since  the  late
1990s, there has been a growing gap between
progress  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and
regression in the CIS. Domestic political sup-
port for Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ is narrower
than that found in other Central and East Euro-
pean states but wider than anywhere in the CIS.
Ukraine’s  path  to  the  EU  will  therefore  be
longer.  The  EU  should  consequently  adopt

66 Interfax, 18 March 2003.
67 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Stefan Batory Foundation, at the Conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, Kyiv, 26-28 June 2003.

68 Op. cit. in note 37.
69 Oleksandr Sushko, Ukrainian Center Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine,  called for an open-door policy that he defined
as ‘Copenhagen Light’. Conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, Kyiv, 26-28 June 2003.
70 Prodi interviewed in La Stampa and cited in Breffni O’Rourke, ‘EU: Can Brussels Stay Focused On the Balkans?’, RFERL Magazine, 11 June
2003.

29

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

medium- to long-term policies towards Ukraine
that provide greater support for its ‘European
choice’. A particular area to focus upon is the
centrist  political  spectrum,  where  during  the
Kuchma era there has been greatest lack of sub-
stance in the ‘European choice’ rhetoric. 
(cid:92) Recommendation: provide  assistance  to
Ukraine through different Action Plans, as
discussed above, which will lead the EU to
become  a  strategic  external  supporter  of
Ukraine’s ‘European choice’.

Decouple Russia and Ukraine 

Russia  and  Ukraine  have  different  strategic
agendas. Russia has never sought EU and NATO
membership, whereas Ukraine has. NATO has
respected these different agendas and has not
ruled out Ukrainian membership. In contrast,
the EU has approached Russia and Ukraine in a
similar manner with the offer of ‘integration not
accession’. Russia has been less interested in the
EU’s promotion of ‘common values’, adopting a
similar policy as it has to NATO of focusing pri-
marily upon a strategic partnership as a ‘great
power’. Ukraine has supported ‘common values’
in rhetoric but failed to apply them in domestic
politics. Moreover, Estonian and Latvian mem-
bership brings Russian minorities into the EU
that are proportionately larger than the Russian
minority in Ukraine. A major strategic decision
the EU has to face is whether it can agree in prin-
ciple to Ukraine being inside the EU while Rus-
sia remains outside. For some West European
states,  decoupling  the  fates  of  Russia  and
Ukraine in such a manner will be difficult. 
(cid:92) Recommendation: treat Ukraine and Russia
differently  by  decoupling  their  strategic
agendas. Russia does not seek EU member-
ship, Ukraine does. Russia wishes to be recog-
nised as a great power, Ukraine does not.

4.2 Tactical recommendations

Political declaration in support of free and fair
presidential elections in 200471

The EU should issue a statement in support of
free and fair elections in Ukraine in 2004.72 The
statement  should  place  the  onus  upon
Ukraine’s leaders to decide if they wish to hold
free  elections  to  prove  their  commitment  to
‘common values’ and integration into the EU.
The EU could offer to reinvigorate its relation-
ship with Ukraine by emphasising that it may
adopt an ‘open-door’ policy if Ukraine holds free
and fair elections.73

Condemn attempts to extend Kuchma’s term
in office 

Any attempt to extend President Kuchma’s term
in office by two years from 2004 to 2006 should
be condemned by the EU as worsening bilateral
relations  and  as  further  damaging  Ukraine’s
international image. No possibility of develop-
ing or upgrading relations with the EU will be
possible if President Kuchma extends his period
in office.

Support for ‘common values’ 

Of  the  three  western  CIS  states  and  Russia,
democratisation  in  Ukraine  has  since  1992
proved  to  have  the  greatest  potential.  Such
potential will grow if the 2004 elections are held
according to the democratic standards set out
by the EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Support  by  the  EU  for  democratisation  in
Ukraine could tip the balance in favour of polit-
ical  and  societal  groups  who  back  Ukraine’s
‘European choice’, and in the process make it
more Central and East European than Eurasian in
its political culture. The EU can play a vital role
as an external actor supporting the more limited 

71 Oleksandr Sushko, Ukrainian Center Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, also proposed this as a way for the EUfinally to
make a strategic decision on Ukraine. Conference ‘Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations’, Kyiv, 26-28 June 2003.
72 The new US Ambassador to Ukraine, John Herbsta, said that holding elections in 2004 according to OSCE standards whose outcome
reflects electors preferences is, ‘vital for the success of Ukraine in joining NATO and moving closer to the European Union’ (Ukrayinska Pravda,
21 June 2003).
73 Op. cit. in note 47.

30

Policy proposals

internal  drive  behind  Ukraine’s  ‘European
choice’.

Poland in the role of an intermediary 

Poland is ideally suited to act as an intermediary
for  Ukraine,  as  both  countries  are  Slavic  and
have close languages. Polish-Ukrainian recon-
ciliation in the 1990s was as momentous as that
pursued  by  France  and  Germany  after  1945.
Poland has held an interest in Ukraine since the
Solidarity movement of the 1980s and the elec-
tion of the Polish Pope John Paul II, who made a
highly  successful  visit  to  Ukraine  in  2001.
Poland also has a strategic interest in ensuring
democratic and friendly neighbours on its east-
ern border.

Recognise that the EU and Russia have differ-
ent agendas in Ukraine 

EU support for reform and ‘common values’ in
Ukraine will inevitably look towards political
groups that most strongly back the country’s
‘European choice’, such as Yushchenko’s Our
Ukraine.  Russia  has  less  interest  in  pursuing
‘common values’ in Ukraine, or other CIS states,
and  its  policies  are  driven  geopolitically  and
strategically (as seen most starkly in Belarus).
Russian leadership of the CIS is understood as a
way  of  reconfirming  Russia’s  ‘great  power’ 
status. Russia’s preference in the CIS is for two
political forces – communist/Sovietophiles or
centrist post-communists – and not reformist
national  democrats. 
In  the  event  of  a
Yushchenko  victory  in  the  2004  elections 
leading to a stronger Ukrainian commitment to
democratisation  policies,  the  EU  and  Russia 
are likely to have different agendas in Ukraine.

Recognise the difference between integration
in the Visegrad Triangle and the CIS

Regional cooperation to deal with soft security
threats  and  to  allow  cross-border  trade  and
human  contacts  should  be  welcomed.  At  the

same time, integration within the CIS as a whole
should not. The EU backed regional integration
among the Visegrad states as a stepping-stone to
EU membership. In a similar way, integration is
backed  in  the  Western  Balkans.  In  these  two
areas, one can readily appreciate the benefits of
regional cooperation and integration prior to
EU accession. Integration in the CIS is of a fun-
damentally  different  type  where  the  largest
state, Russia, sees the remainder of the CIS as a
‘near abroad’, a notion that implies the limited
sovereignty of these states as opposed to those in
the ‘far abroad.’ Fuzzy internal CIS borders are
supported by Russia because they blur the dis-
tinction  between  ‘Russia’  and  the  geographic
space of the ‘CIS’ (the same was true of ‘Russia’
and the USSR). In addition, the type of integra-
tion that has taken place in the CIS during the
last decade will not promote the ‘common val-
ues’  that  the  EU  would  like  the  western  CIS
states to uphold. Russia sees the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) as a CIS alternative to
the EU that would be more than just an eco-
nomic free trade zone. Despite strong Russian
pressure, Ukraine has always been unwilling to
join the EEC.

Demarcation of CIS ‘internal’ borders

Russia  opposes  the  demarcation  of  what  it
defines as CIS ‘internal’ borders, even though
Ukraine supports the demarcation of these bor-
ders as a way to counter soft security threats. The
EU  should  support  Ukraine’s  attempts  to
demarcate its border with Russia. This would
greatly reduce soft security threats to the new
EU-Ukrainian border. A first step in this direc-
tion by the EU was the promise in 2001 to pro-
vide Ukraine with assistance to create a modern
border infrastructure on its eastern border that
was to include the training of border troops and
customs officers. EU-Ukrainian cooperation in
this field is already being implemented.

31

5

Conclusions

Ukraine’s  post-Soviet  transition  has  pro-

duced better indicators than those in Russia
and the CIS. Although the entire CIS region has
regressed since the late 1990s in terms of democ-
ratisation, this has been worse in some countries
than  in  others.  This  regression  should  be  set
against a growing and vibrant civil society inside
Ukraine,  the  only  CIS  state  with  a  large  pro-
reform  and  pro-Western  movement  that  won
the 2002 elections. The laggards in Central and
Eastern  Europe  progressed  in  their  levels  of
democratisation during the same period, lead-
ing to a growing divergence between Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states on the one
hand and the CIS on the other. Nevertheless,
Ukraine’s transition record is still comparable in
many respects to that of Romania. One of the
main  differences  is  that  nobody  in  Western
Europe doubts Romania is part of ‘Europe’. The
same cannot be said of Ukraine.

Ukraine faces two major difficulties in fulfill-
ing its declared ‘European choice’. First, there
are virtual policies of Ukraine towards the EU
and the equally virtual policy of the EU towards
Ukraine. Virtuality on both sides has produced
confusion, conflicting signals, empty rhetoric
and duplicity. In the 1999 Common Strategy
with  Ukraine,  the  EU  recognised  Ukraine’s
‘European choice’. One year later, in a classified
document,  Germany  and  France  ruled  out
Ukraine’s membership of the EU. The priority
given by the EU to its strategic partnership with
Russia has meant that Article 49 of the TEU,
granting  the  right  to  any  European  state  to
apply for membership, de facto does not apply
to the western CIS. The EU’s position on this

region is identical to Russia’s: integration but
not accession. 

Such an alignment of what the EU offers to
Ukraine and Moldova with that of Russia is only
possible as long there is a virtual pro-‘European
choice’ undertaken by Ukraine under President
Kuchma.  If  Ukraine’s  declared 
‘European
choice’ were to change from virtual to real after
the 2004 presidential elections, and if Ukraine
began to seriously internalise ‘common values’,
the EU would be in a quandary. A new Ukrainian
president might rapidly move in the direction of
promoting the internalisation of ‘common val-
ues’ because much of the legislation is already
largely in place (under Kuchma the problem has
often been its poor implementation or the exec-
utive  ignoring  it).  Kuchma’s  presidency  has
therefore been convenient for the EU, because it
has permitted the EU to put off any decision on
Ukraine and thereby not formulate any coher-
ent strategy towards it.74 The lack of a strategy
has led to contradictory statements by the EU
on Ukraine.

On the eve of the EU’s Thessaloniki summit
in 
June  2003,  French  Foreign  Minister
Dominique  de  Villepin  said  that  ‘The  EU  is
determined  to  support  those  countries  that
choose Europe’ through stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreements.75 In saying this, he was only
referring  to  the  Western  Balkans  but  not  the
western CIS: ‘It is absolutely clear that Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Macedonia  and
Serbia-Montenegro are destined to join Europe 
. . .’ The condition for this is ‘support for Euro-
pean values: democracy, tolerance, respect for
others and the absolute repudiation of ethnic

74 Borys Tarasiuk, head of the parliamentary committee on European integration and a parliamentary deputy from Our Ukraine, Kyiv,
24 June 2003.
75 EU High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana also said that Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Croatia and Bosnia had been sent a ‘very
clear signal’ that they have a ‘road open’ to EU membership. Cited in ‘EU: Leaders Tell Balkan Countries Future is EU Membership’, RFERL
Magazine, 21 June 2003.

32

Conclusions

and religious hatred and any recourse to vio-
lence.’

Like the Western Balkans, the western CIS is
also geographically part of Europe, a fact recog-
nised by the EU in its 1999 Common Strategy
with Ukraine. The Western Balkans is not fur-
ther advanced than the western CIS in terms of
reaching the ‘common European values’ that
the  EU  espouses.  On  the  issue  of  interethnic
relations, Ukraine is far more advanced than any
country in the Western Balkans and its positive
record in the treatment of national minorities
has  been  long  recognised  by  the  OSCE  and
Council of Europe.

Will  the  ‘Wider  Europe’  Communication
improve  the  EU’s  relations  with  Ukraine  and
remove virtuality on both sides? This is doubt-
ful. The Communication will require a larger
input of time, energy, and resources by the EU
than have hitherto been allocated to Ukraine.
This is positive. At the same time, the Commu-
nication’s  failure  to  mention  membership
prospects  will  hamper  its  full  acceptance  by
Ukraine.  When  Action  Plans  are  drawn  up
between the EU and Ukraine, the problem will
remain  that  their  fulfilment  will  not  lead  to
eventual membership (unlike the steps required
to be taken by the Western Balkans). Indeed, the
Action  Plans  to  be  developed  at  the  October
2003 EU-Ukraine summit will not include any
offer  of  future  membership.76 This  stands  in
contrast with the Action Plan drawn up with
NATO at the November 2002 summit, which, if
fulfilled, will lead to membership later in the
decade. 

The issue of adherence to ‘common values’ is
a  recently  introduced  misnomer.  There  is  no
question  that  EU  aspirant  members  should
move towards adoption of these values. In all
three regions the adherence of these countries to
the EU’s ‘common values’ was low at the start of
the  accession  process.  It  was  the  accession
process itself, coupled with the offer of future
membership, which had (and may continue to
have in the case of the Western Balkans) a posi-

tive impact upon these countries internalising
the  ‘common  values’.  Ukraine  is  tasked  with
first internalising EU ‘common values’ before
the  EU  adopts  a  decision  on  what  to  offer
Ukraine. The incentive of future membership
that was, and is, present for the countries in the
Iberian peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe
and Western Balkans is absent from the EU’s
approach  to  the  western  CIS.  Two  factors
explain this different approach by the EU and
NATO. Firstly, the Russia factor, an issue which
is absent from the Western Balkans. Secondly,
the interrelated psychological problem of recog-
nising western CIS states, such as Ukraine, as
‘European’. 

Ukraine is a difficult case for the EU because
it  is  the  only  European  country  (other  than
Moldova) that seeks membership but is not con-
sidered a potential future member. The door is
open  to  the  Western  Balkans  provided  they
prove their commitment to the ‘common val-
ues’, even if this is only likely to mean member-
ship  in  the  medium-  to  long-term.  Such  an
approach implicitly recognises Western Balkan
states as ‘European’. In the case of Ukraine, the
door  remains  closed  to  future  membership.
There  is  no  guarantee  that  even  if  Ukraine
proves its commitment to the ‘common values’
the EU will open the door to future member-
ship.  Ukraine  is,  after  all,  in  a  better  starting
position than many west Balkan states, espe-
cially in the sphere of interethnic relations.

Under  both  of  Kuchma’s  terms  in  office,
Ukraine’s commitment to the EU’s ‘common
values’ remained at the level of rhetoric. This has
led to what I have described in this paper as a ‘vir-
tual’ policy towards the EU. If the 2004 elections
are free and fair and a candidate is elected who is
genuinely committed to the EU’s ‘common val-
ues’,  the  EU  should  reconsider  its  strategy
towards Ukraine along the lines of that outlined
in  the  Western  Balkans.  Such  an  approach
would be the best neighbourhood policy for the
EU in Central and Eastern Europe, as it would
provide  external  support  for  Ukraine’s  pro-

76 Interview with Gerhard Logan from the European Commission by the BBC Ukrainian service (Ukrayinska Pravda), 28 June 2002.

33

EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

European  lobby,  which  is  smaller  than  that
found in some other states invited to join the
EU.

5.1 Postscript

The EU and Ukraine held their seventh annual
summit in October 2003 in Yalta. The summit
issued a 26-point joint statement that covered a
very wide range of issues. The issues that were
discussed included next year’s EU enlargement,
EU assistance to Ukraine, implementation of
the  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement
and regional conflicts in Bosnia, Moldova, Iraq,
and Israel-Palestine. The statement also focused
on  concrete  policies  upon  which  Ukraine
should be working, such as reform of the judici-
ary,  ‘strengthening  and  ensuring  stability  of
democratic  institutions,  the  rule  of  law  and
respect for human rights’. These political areas
are precisely where Ukraine has regressed during
Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office since
1999. In contrast to these political areas where
Ukraine has fared badly, the statement recog-
nised ‘progress’ in the implementation of eco-
nomic reform and Ukraine’s stable economic
growth. Nevertheless, the statement continued
to point to the need for further tax and banking
reform, and the strengthening of the independ-
ence  of  the  National  Bank.  Ukraine’s  ruling
elites  have  fewer  problems  in  pursuing  eco-
nomic reforms, as they are the winners in the
transition  from  communism.  As  for  the
National Bank, its independence is in jeopardy
under its new chairman, Serhiy Tyhipko, who is
also head of one of the three main oligarch par-
ties, Labour Ukraine. 

The  statement  pointed  to  the  need  for
reform of the energy sector. This was most vigor-
ously pursued under the Yushchenko govern-
ment in 1999-2001, a factor which led to grow-
ing criticism by oligarchs and the government’s
dismissal  in  April  2001.  Former  head  of
Naftogaz  Ukrayiny  Ihor  Bakay  has  admitted
that most Ukrainian oligarchs made their capi-
tal  in  the  1990s  from  the  re-sale  of  Russian

77 Financial Times, 10 October 2003.

energy. Energy reform is not likely to be seri-
ously pursued while the head of the presidential
administration is Viktor Medvedchuk. Medved-
chuk’s Social Democratic United (SDPU) party
is believed to gain financially the most from cor-
rupt  energy  deals.  The  EU-Ukraine  summit
statement raised the importance of the further
development of the Eurasian oil transportation
corridor that would bring Azeri oil to Poland
and Western Europe. Ukraine has completed the
construction of the Odessa to Brody pipeline,
linking  the  Black  Sea  to  the  former  Druzhba
pipeline.  However,  Russia  is  lobbying  for  the
new pipeline to work in reverse, bringing Russ-
ian oil from Brody to Odessa, a step the EU (and
the United States) have warned against.

The summit statement also raised the ques-
tion of the EU’s deeper involvement in support-
ing  Ukrainian  reforms  through  the  ‘Wider
Europe’ project. Progress in Justice and Home
Affairs is already evident in areas such as control
of illegal migration, strengthening border con-
trols, struggle against organised crime and cor-
ruption. Greater cooperation in jointly drafting
Action Plans, as part of the ‘Wider Europe’ ini-
tiative, is favoured by both sides. EU enlarge-
ment commissioner Günter Verheugen warned
none the less that, ‘Wider Europe is not about
putting EU membership on the agenda for these
countries’.77 Poland and Hungary introduced
cost-free visas to Ukraine in October 2003. This
is an important step in not making the eastern
border  of  the  EU  a  ‘second  Yalta’,  to  quote
Kuchma. Cross-border trade and other contacts
need  to  be  maintained.  However,  President
Kuchma’s exasperation with the EU not offering
Ukraine the prospect of future membership was
one factor in his promotion of the CIS Joint Eco-
nomic  Space  (JES)  between  Ukraine,  Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan just prior to the sum-
mit. As Kuchma bemoaned, ‘How much longer
can  we  be  kept  on  the  doorstep  [of  the  EU]?
None of the [EU] officials have said Ukraine is
wanted in the EU.’ The JES was mentioned in
one sentence of point 12 of the statement, which
stated that a strictly free-trade zone, within the
JES,  was  not  seen  as  incompatible  with

34

Ukraine’s  integration  into  the  EU.  The  other
three members of the JES, it should be noted,
seek  to  create  a  customs  union  and  a  rouble
zone.

For the first time, the summit also discussed
possible  Ukrainian  membership  of  the  Euro-
pean Economic Area, which brings together the
EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Such a
step would increase positive leverage by the EU
over Ukraine while offering Kyiv the possibility
of integration into a large market. In May 2003,
Kuchma had predicted that Ukraine would be
offered EU associate membership at the sum-
mit, presumably because he would have liked to
claim credit for obtaining associate member sta-
tus during his second term in office. On the eve
of the summit, Deputy Foreign Minister Olek-
sandr Chalyi even affirmed that associate mem-
bership was being discussed with the EU. In real-
ity, this is not the case. President of the Euro-
pean Commission Romano Prodi and current

EU President and Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi  expressed  the  hope  that  Ukraine
could become a member in the future, without
giving any date. Prodi said: ‘We want to have very
strong ties [with Ukraine] even up to full mem-
bership.’ This was the first official suggestion of
potential  EU  membership  for  Ukraine.  The
statement raised the prospect of Ukraine having
an  equivalent  open-door  status  to  the  west
Balkan states. 

In  mid-2003  the  well-known  economist,
Anders  Aslund,  at  the  Washington-based
Carnegie Endowment think tank, asked when
the EU would become serious about Ukraine.78
The October 2003 summit, which took place
within months of the EU’s major enlargement
into post-communist central Europe, may mark
a shift in the right direction. The ball is now
firmly in Ukraine’s court: it must fulfil its mutu-
ally agreed Action Plans and hold free and fair
elections in 2004.

78 Anders Aslund, ‘Left Behind. Ukraine’s Uncertain Tansformation’, The National Interest, no. 73, Fall 2003, p. 114.

Conclusions

35

a1

Abbreviations

CFSP 
CIS 
ECSNF 
EDF 
EEC 
EU 
EUISS  
ITAR-TASS 
JES 
KFOR 
KPU 
Kyiv is used rather than Kiev 
NATO 
NDP 
NGO 
NPT 
NRBO 
NSDC 
OSCE 
PCA 
PfP 
RFE/RL 
SDPU 
SFOR 
SPU 
TACIS 

Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
European Civil Society Neighbourhood Fund 
European Democracy Fund 
Eurasian Economic Community 
European Union 
European Union Institute for Security Studies 
Russian news agency 
Joint Economic Space 
Kosovo Force 
Communist Party Ukraine 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
People’s Democratic Party 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
National Security and Defence Council 
National Security and Defence Council 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Partnership Cooperation Agreement 
Partnership for Peace 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Social Democratic Party (United) of Ukraine 
Stabilisation Force 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 
EU programme of Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia 
Treaty on European Union 
Ukrainian-Polish Battalion 
Ukrainian Independent Information Agency 
United States 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
World Trade Organisation 

TEU 
UKRPOLBAT 
UNIAN 
US 
USSR 
WTO 

36

 
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(cid:93) Hoffmann, Lutz and Felicitas Mollers, Felicitas ed., Ukraine on the Road to Europe, (Heidelberg: Physica, 2001).
(cid:93) Kuzio, Taras, ‘The EU and Ukraine: Neighbor, Partner, Member?’, Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review, vol.2,
no.16 (5 August 2003), http://russia.jamestown.org.
(cid:93) Kuzio, T., ‘Ukraine, Poland, and the EU’s Wider Europe Initiative’, RFERL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, 1 July 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/pbureport/. 
(cid:93) Kuzio, T.,  ‘Ukraine-EU: A Troubled Relationship’, Russia and Eurasia Review, vol.1, no. 3 (2 July 2002).
(cid:93) Kuzio, T., ‘The EU and Ukraine: A Troubled Relationship’ in John Redmond and Jackie Gower ( eds.), Enlarging the EU: The
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