WRITTEN QUESTION E-3387/03 by Armando Cossutta (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Increases in the cost of motor insurance — data sources.
Date: 2003-11-17
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU statistics, Italy, insurance premium, motor vehicle insurance, price increase, statistical method, statistics

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The common fisheries policy includes a number of initiatives designed to reduce by-catches by its own
fishing fleet.

These include:

(cid:1) the Action Plan on discards (2). This Action Plan deals with the problem of discarding of fish by the
Community’s fishing fleets in all its areas of operation. Its purpose is to provide a general overview of
the magnitude of discarding, to indicate the biological and economic consequences of discarding as
well as the possibilities for reducing quantities discarded by reducing fishing effort and developing
more selective fishing gears;

(cid:1) the promotion of selective fishing techniques, through financial incentives for the use of selective
fishing gear offered by Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the
detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector (3)
and the funding of studies on by-catch and possible mitigation measures.

As an example of the latter, a specific three-year research project, starting in 2003, is being finalised under
the sixth Framework Programme to develop low-impact, species-selective fishing gears, and to formulate
alternative fishing tactics in order to reduce impact on non-target species. The potential Community
contribution is between EUR 3 and EUR 4 million.

the introduction of fishing effort control measures in order to reduce by-catches of severely depleted

1.
fish stocks in mixed fisheries (such as, for instance, cod in the North Sea and West of Scotland).

In connection with long distance fleets in third-country waters, in some cases the Fisheries Agreements
contain measures to reduce discards, for example the setting of by-catch quotas.

2.
As far as monitoring is concerned, in the Data Collection Regulation (4) there is an obligation to
monitor discards for specific stocks; other stocks of secondary importance are to be covered by pilot
surveys. There are also monitoring obligations for the bycatch of some protected species in the Habitats
Directive (5).

As for the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) suggestion to call for a United Nations’ Food and
3.
Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
‘International Plan of Action on Bycatch Reduction’, the Commission
thinks it is a very valuable idea and is ready to support it. However, given the large workload associated
with the preparation of the Commission’s own Action Plan on Discards referred to in point 1, on which a
number of specific initiatives will be taken next year, the Commission is not in a position to allocate
resources to take the lead in preparing other initiatives at the international level.

(1) OJ L 358, 31.12.2002.
(2) COM(2002) 656 final.
(3) OJ L 337, 30.12.1999.
(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 1543/2000 of 29 June 2000 establishing a Community framework for the collection

and management of the data needed to conduct the common fisheries policy, OJ L 176, 15.7.2000.

(5) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 43/92 of 9 January 1992 establishing a deadline for the presentation by the

Member States of regionalization plans, OJ L 5, 10.1.1992.

(2004/C 84 E/0067)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3387/03

by Armando Cossutta (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

Subject: Increases in the cost of motor insurance (cid:1) data sources

(17 November 2003)

With reference to my written question to the Commission (E-1522/03 (1)) tabled on 23 April 2003, and to
the answer by Commissioner Bolkestein received on 15 July 2003, I would like to reassert the reliability of
the data I provided on the increases in the cost of motor insurance cover in Italy.

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In the answer on behalf of the Commission, Commissioner Bolkestein contests the data I presented, which
among other things indicate the disproportionate increase in the cost of motor insurance cover over the
last 12 months, and in doing so refers to different figures. In the same answer, the Commission cites the
source of its reference data as the European Insurance Association (CEA). This is in fact the body which
‘represents the interests of private European insurers’ (as it officially describes itself), and is therefore a
completely partisan organisation. I would also point out that the data I cited came directly from the Italian
competition ombudsman’s office, which is an impartial organisation.

How does the Commission justify using data from partisan organisations to confute other data that

1.
are clearly uninfluenced by vested interests?

2. Would it not perhaps consider it better professional conduct to use its own data?

In the light of the above, will the Commission reread and give a fresh answer to my written question

3.
E-1522/03 on unjustified increases in the cost of third-party motor insurance?

(1) OJ C 33 E, 6.2.2004, p. 128.

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(29 January 2004)

The Commission is aware of the concerns regarding the situation existing in Italy where motor insurance
tariffs have increased very much in recent times.

The Honourable Member is right in pointing out that the data provided by the Italian Competition
Authority (Autorità Garante della concorrenza e del mercato), which coincide with those elaborated by
Eurostat, show a larger increase in the premiums for Italy than the data issued by the European Insurance
Association (CEA). The data from Eurostat show an overall increase in motor insurance premiums by
135,3 % from January 1995 to October 2003 in Italy (cid:1) compared to an Union average of 29,3 %.
However, it must be noted that other Member States also experienced large increases during the same
period, notably Ireland (increase by 59,3 %) and the United Kingdom (84,5 % since January 1996).

However, one needs to underline that such a cross-country data comparison is not easy or straightforward.
In particular, as also explained in the survey conducted by the Italian Competition Authority, reliable
comparative results across Member States are very difficult to obtain since the features of the data
considered differ from one Member State to the other due to local characteristics (such as different types of
cars, different coverage provided by the insurance policies, etc.). Furthermore, the surveys conducted by the
Italian Competition Authority (as well as by other public or private institutions, such as the European
Insurance Association, CEA, that represents the European insurance industry) are based on samples that
may differ with regard to the age of the drivers or the sex of the insured persons (for example the statistics
of the Italian Competition Authority take only account of males). In addition, other cost factors, such as
differing costs to repair vehicles and varying compensation schemes across countries, may affect the
comparability of the statistics.

Finally, in order to assess the increase in premiums in Italy, it must also be taken into account that motor
insurance tariffs were fixed by the Italian Government before the liberalisation introduced by the European
the tariff
directives in 1994. According to information available to the Commission, even after
liberalisation, claims costs plus expenses have exceeded premium income for many years in the accounts
of
insurance undertakings in Italy. This is also confirmed in the analysis conducted by the Italian
Competition Authority, which points out that only in the year 2000 did the premiums arising from motor
insurance exceed the cost of claims. In 2000 and 2001 the motor insurance income still appears to be
negative for insurance undertakings due notably to high management expenses.

However, the Italian Competition Authority’s analysis also highlights conditions of low competition in the
Italian market due to the existence of agreements between insurers as well as between insurance
undertakings and loss adjusters for the claim compensation. In this specific regard, the Commission would

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like to specify that, on its part, it does not dispose of indications concerning possible anticompetitive
agreements or collusion between insurers in the Italian market that would be contrary to European
competition law (Article 81 of the EC Treaty).

to the insurance undertaking
The Authority’s analysis in addition shows that other factors external
contributed to thetariff increases and their high level, such as the high costs of the compensation granted
for personal damages and the uncertainty of the criteria determining such compensation in Italy.

Only in 2002 did most insurance companies reach a situation where motor insurance premiums income
exceeded cost of claims plus expenses. In 2003 tariffs have apparently started to decrease for some
categories of drivers, as confirmed by the data from the Italian Authority for the Supervision of the
insurance sector (ISVAP).

In the conclusions of the ISVAP report in 2002 it is stated, with regard to the survey of the Italian
Competition Authority, that the Italian system is not entirely comparable with the one existing in countries
like France or the United Kingdom. These Member States have had freedom of tariffs for many years and,
unlike in Italy, there was no obligation for insurance undertakings to provide coverage to all policyholders.

In addition to the above considerations, the Honourable Member is invited to consider also the relatively
high cost and frequency of accidents in Italy as pointed out by the Commission in its reply to the question
E-1522/03.

According to the European insurance legislation the tariffs of motor insurance should be determined by
market forces. The Commission believes that, in the future, a more competitive and efficient European
insurance market will lead to more competitive tariffs for the benefit of consumers in the Union.

(2004/C 84 E/0068)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3448/03

by Mihail Papayannakis (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(20 November 2003)

Subject: Operation of quarries in a protected area

The Strofylia-Kotychi cluster of habitats in the western Peloponnese (Achaia and Ileia prefectures)
is
protected by the Ramsar Convention and by Directive 79/409 (1) and has been included in the Natura
2000 network (serial number 128, code GR 2320001). At its north-eastern edge, in the Mavra Vouna
(‘Black Mountains’) area (which supplies the habitat with fresh water and where,
‘inter alia’, at least
100 species of birds find shelter, of which 27 are protected by Community directives) aggregates quarries
have been operating since 1964, and in recent years they have intensified their activities, causing serious
damage to the Black Mountains and Kalogria lagoon. In addition, they give rise to unbearable living
conditions in neighbouring Araxos (through which many hundreds of lorries pass each day, starting at
4 a.m., accompanied by clouds of dust (cid:1) as the lorries are very often uncovered (cid:1) deafening noise, and
damage to the foundations of buildings). All the above facts constitute multiple violations of both
Community law and many national provisions.

Is the Commission aware of the above-mentioned facts, complained of by the residents, environmental
non-governmental organisations and local government bodies? Does the Commission intend to check to
what extent the above-mentioned directives are being complied with, and whether the quarries in question
have permits and approvals relating to environmental conditions and whether they are complying with
them? What measures will be taken to ensure compliance with the law for the period up to 2005, when it
is believed that the quarries will close definitively?

(1) OJ L 103, 25.4.1979, p. 1.