Newsletter. n° 8, October 2003.
Date: 2003-10-29
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: common foreign and security policy, international relations, international security, political culture, serial publication

Newsletter
n°8

October 2003

Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies

43 avenue du Président Wilson - 75775 Paris cedex 16 - France

phone: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30  (cid:127)  fax: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: institute@iss-eu.org

http:www.iss-eu.org

institute

European Union

for security
studies

institut

d’ études
de  sécurité

Union Européenne

editorial

Three pillars for CFSP

T hree paradoxes characterise the Union’s attitude to the

realities: with very few exceptions,  it is now much eas-

rest of the world. The first is typical of post-Cold War

ier for the Europeans to agree a view on external crises than on

éditoNicole Gnesotto 

Director

European autonomy on defence matters, are the most cari-

catural illustration of this latent division among Europeans on

the Union’s role as international actor.

(cid:81) The last paradox is possibly a permanent one: agreed, Amer-

American policy. Terrorism provides a classic example of this. After

ican policy is divisive, but each time there is a risk of a crisis or

11 September the Fifteen had to adapt simultaneously and as rap-

even divorce from America, the Europeans manage to recon-

idly as possible to the new terrorist threat and the new America that

cile differences on new bases. Before Iraq, raising the question

was recovering from the shock of the attacks. The threat of terror-

of a European strategic concept amounted to either heresy or

ism produced a leap forward in European integration in a num-

utopianism: among the Fifteen a combination of indifference,

ber of fields, including the introduction of a common arrest war-

deference towards the United States and national preference

rant, financial and police cooperation, the Commission’s early

jeopardised the very idea of the EU having its own security con-

warning system, and extending to consensus within the European

cept. Since Iraq, all members of the enlarged Union of 25 are

Convention on inclusion in the future treaty of a clause on mutual

enthusiastically involved in drawing up a common vision of the

assistance in the event of terrorist attack against any member state.

world and also a shared strategy on the Union’s actions in it. To

Conversely, once the initial reflex of solidarity with the victims of

bring about this spectacular slide from an inexistent Union to

the 11 September attacks had passed, the requirement to adapt to

one with a strategic vision it needed the shock and anguish

the new US strategic priorities – the axis of evil, pre-emption and

caused by the possibility of a radical split between Europe and

US exceptionalism – greatly perturbed, and in the end divided, the

America, and among the Europeans themselves. The Iraq cri-

Europeans, culminating in the Iraq crisis and the division of Euro-

sis showed that it could have taken very little for this scenario to

peans into two camps quickly labelled ‘war’ or ‘peace’.

become the only possible outcome.

(cid:81) The second paradox is more traditional: while the Europeans

(cid:81) These paradoxes indicate quite clearly the conditions gov-

find it fairly easy to agree on a more or less common view of the

erning the creation of an EU foreign policy, which can only exist

world, they are divided on the Union’s role in managing the world’s

on the basis of consensus in three areas: states must agree on a

crises. Since that role is broadly a function of the type of relation-

crisis, US policy towards that crisis and action to be taken by

ship that each member country wants to build with America, bilat-

Europe itself. Not that agreement on those three elements would

eral or within NATO, the Europeans have never managed to agree

be impossible. Kosovo, for example, produced consensus in

on the actual purpose of their diplomatic and military cooperation.

Europe:  on  the  unacceptability  of  genocide,  the  need  for 

The recurring debates on the virtues or vices of multipolarity or

American intervention, the Union’s obligation to support

unipolarity,  like  the  discussions  on  the  possible  degree  of 

Washington and above all the necessity to correct Europe’s lack

... continued on back page

Institute Activities

Annual conference

(cid:81) The Institute’s second Annual Con-
ference, held in Paris on 30 June, was the
occasion for Javier Solana, High Repre-
sentative for CFSP and Secretary-Gen-
eral of the EU Council, to deliver his
annual speech on CFSP and the state of
the Union. The debate centred on his
paper on EU security strategy.

A round-table discussion in the after-
noon chaired by Quentin Peel (Financial
Times) featured contributions by several
European personalities on the future of
CFSP after Iraq, enlargement and the
Convention.

The  hundred-plus  participants  at
this annual event included directors of
security institutes in the wider Europe
and representatives of the Council, the
Commission and member states. The
press was also well represented.

Institute publications

Chaillot Papers
(cid:81) No.64: Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a
wider Europe, by Judy Batt, Dov Lynch,
Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (September).
(cid:81)No. 63: The European Union and armaments:
getting a bigger bang for the euro, by Burkard
Schmitt (August).
(cid:81)No. 62: The European Union and the crisis in
the Middle East, by Muriel Asseburg,
Dominique Moïsi, Gerd Nonneman and
Stefano Silvestri; edited by Martin Ortega
(July).

Occasional Papers
(cid:81) No. 46: EU-Russian security dimensions
operations, by Hiski Haukkala, Thomas
Gomart and Anaïs Marin; edited by Dov
Lynch (July).

Forthcoming
(cid:81) Chaillot Paper: Security and insecurity in the
South Caucasus, by Dov Lynch;
(cid:81) Chaillot Paper: Facing the challenge of prolifer-
ation, edited by Gustav Lindström and
Burkard Schmitt. 
(cid:81) Occasional Paper: Shaping an intelligence
community within the EU, by Björn Müller-
Wille (former Visiting Fellow).
(cid:81) Occasional Paper: EU and Ukraine: a turning
point in 2004?, by Taras Kuzio (former
visiting fellow).
(cid:81) Occasional Paper: The EU in the UN: cohesion
in the General Assembly, by Paul Luif (former
senior visiting fellow).

External publications

Judy Batt
— ‘“Fuzzy Statehood” versus Hard Borders:
the impact of EU enlargement on Romania
and Yugoslavia’, in Michael Keating and
James Hughes (eds.), The regional challenge in
Central and Eastern Europe: territorial restruc-
turing and European integration (Brussels:
P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 161-81.
— ‘The impact of the EU’s new eastern
border on processes of convergence and
divergence in Europe: policy implications’,
in Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell and Peter
Mooslechner (eds.), Economic Convergence
and Divergence in Europe: Growth and Regional
Development in an Enlarged European Union
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), pp. 425-
35.

Jean-Yves Haine
— ‘The Imperial Moment: A European
View’, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, Fall 2003, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 483-509. 
— ‘L’Alliance superflue?’, Esprit, August-
September 2003, pp. 5-21. 
— ‘Iraq: A Catalyst for a New Alliance?’, in
Lawrence S. Graham and Ryszard
Stemplowski (eds.), The EU-US Cooperation
(Warsaw: The Polish Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, 2003), pp. 41-58.

Dov Lynch
— ‘Russia faces Europe’, Russia and Eurasia
Review (Washington, DC: The Jamestown
Foundation, 2003), vol. 2, issue 14.

Antonio Missiroli
— ‘ESDP — Post-Iraq. Building a European
Security and Defence Policy: what are the
priorities?’, in the Cicero Foundation’s Great
Debates series of on-line lectures, Paris, June
2003.
— ‘Turkish Delights? A Response to Bilgin’,
Security Dialogue, 3/2003.
— ‘Quasi gol? Convenzione e politica estera’,
Italianieuropei, 4/2003.

Martin Ortega
— ‘Europa despierta’, in Politica Exterior,
July/August 2003.

Research awards

Visiting fellows
During the period July to September the following studied
-Mustafa Aydin (Turkish), whose research topic 
-Peter Hauge Berg (Danish), ‘Civil-military coop
-Markus Mervola (Finnish), ‘Migration: security

The Institute and the Union

(cid:81) EU security strategy. The Institute is
contributing  to  development  of  the
EU’s security strategy. As a result of rec-
ommendations made by Javier Solana
at the Thessaloniki summit in June , the
High  Representative  for  CFSP  was
tasked with instigating a public debate
on foreign and security policy and pre-
senting a new document at the Rome
European Council in December. In that
context the Institute is coordinating a
series of three workshops; the first of
these, on threats in a new security envi-
ronment, was organised by the Aspen
Institute Italia in Rome on 19 Septem-
ber. The second workshop will look at
the  Union’s  strategic  objectives  (6-
7 October, Paris) and the third, on EU
coherence and capabilities,  is to be held
at  the  Swedish  Institute  of  Interna-
tional Affairs on 20 October.
(cid:81) At the request of the Italian EU pres-
idency, a seminar dealing with ESDP
and the Mediterranean was organised
by the Institute (Martin Ortega) for the
Political and Security Committee, in
Brussels, on 18 September.
(cid:81) A  meeting  on  ‘The  EU  and  crisis
management’ was held at the Institute
on 8 July for officials of the ten new EU
member countries.

Task forces

(cid:81) A meeting of the Institute’s Euro-
pean Defence Book Task Force (Jean-
Yves Haine) was held on 5 September.

Institute staff

(cid:81) Dimitrios Triantaphyllou left the Insti-
tute at the end of August on termination
of his contract for an appointment at the
London School of Economics.

Analysis

No dancing in the streets for the EU

The idea of ‘returning to Europe’ was
the  leitmotif  of  the  revolutions  of
1989.    Now  that  eight  of  the  ten 
Central and East European candidates
are about to realise this ambition, the
question becomes what sort of Europe it
will  be.  Completing  the  accession
negotiations was a remarkable feat,
but  popular  involvement  has  been
minimal, leaving European citizens
feeling ill-informed and, as a result,
apprehensive  about  what  is  being
done  in  their  name.  Hence  the  low
turnout in the accession referendums,
which was at least as striking as the
decisive majorities obtained in favour
of accession.
Opinion polls suggested that absten-
tion was to be explained by a fatalistic
sense of ‘no alternatives’. Around 70
per cent of respondents on average feel
poorly informed about their country’s
accession to the EU, as a Eurobaro-
meter poll found in November 2002.
Expectations  of  the  impact  of  EU
membership  seem  to  be  sober:  a
majority expect no improvement in
their personal socio-economic situa-
tion for at least 10 years. They voted
for accession as a long-term invest-
ment that will benefit their children
rather than themselves. The smaller
countries, in particular, fear for their
national identity and domination by a
‘faceless bureaucracy’ in Brussels. New
states  having  only  recently  escaped
from communist federations are wary
about the Union’s federal aspects.
All the accession countries are acutely
aware  of  their  weaknesses  —  even
Poland, a relatively large and nation-
ally self-confident state. The sense of
geopolitical insecurity that underlay
the Central and East Europeans’ deter-
mination  to  ‘return  to  Europe’  has

been largely allayed by their recent or
imminent accession to NATO, which
is prized for its US guarantees. The
development of European foreign and
security policy is greeted with scepti-
cism, and will be strongly resisted by
all  the  accession  countries  if  it
detaches  Europe  from  the  United
States. Yet citizens in all the new mem-
ber states want a ‘strong Europe’ to
anchor their political and economic
transformations. Trust in their own
political institutions and élites is at a
low ebb, so people in the new member
states look to the EU to act as a con-
straint  on  misbehaviour  by  their
national élites and to drive forward
modernisation  of  their  national 
institutions.
Ignorance and indifference about EU
enlargement pervade public opinion in
the existing member states, as a Euro-
barometer poll confirmed in March
2003. And those people who feel most
informed about the process are also the
most  sceptical,  worried  about  jobs,
wages and investment in competition
with the newcomers. Nearly 70 per cent
across  the  present  15  members  feel
that enlargement will be very costly for
their country. They also wonder how
the  enlarged  EU  will  function,  and
whether  it  will  become  even  more
remote and baffling. Those people who
welcome  EU  enlargement  are  often
unable to name more than one of the
countries  involved.  But,  strikingly,
substantial majorities still agree that
‘we  have  a  moral  duty  to  re-unite
Europe after the divisions of the Cold
War’ (72 per cent) and that enlarge-
ment is historically and geographically
natural  and  justified.  There  is  clear
support for the EU to become a more
effective  international  actor,  and 

d at the Institute as visiting fellows:
was ‘The contribution of the Black Sea region to the European security architecture’;

peration (CIMIC) — Driven forward by necessity: a look at developments within EU and NATO’;
y challenges for the EU’.

people  expect  enlargement  to  con-
tribute to that.
So,  for  the  acceding  countries,  EU
enlargement has been a sobering, if not
bruising process. For existing member
states, it has coincided with increasing
exposure over the past decade to global
economic pressures and the retrench-
ment of welfare states. Europe is being
reunited, but there is no dancing the
streets. Instead, the prevailing climate
is one of apprehension, disillusion, a
certain amount of existential fear and
mutual mistrust. Elites took charge of
the  process,  but  failed  to  provide
visionary leadership that could capture
the popular imagination and mobilise
the energies that will be needed in the
next difficult phase of absorbing and
fully  integrating  the  new  member
states.
Given all this, it is surprising how ‘EU-
Europe’ 
a 
powerful attraction for the countries
left  outside.  While  some  of  the  new
member  states,  notably  Poland,
strongly  support  keeping  the  door
open  to  further  enlargements,  and
potential  candidates  in  the  Western
Balkans are anxious to firm up a clearer
timetable for accession, ‘enlargement
fatigue’ is evident in existing member
states. At the same time, in most of the
would-be  candidates  for  accession,
‘transition fatigue’ is setting in. If the
EU  is  to  act  as  an  effective  external
motor  of  reforms  in  its  neighbour-
hood, it has first to define that clear
vision of itself that is so far lacking, in
order to provide a convincing rationale
for its further enlargement (or not),
and  to  offer  credible  and  attractive
alternatives  to  membership  for  its
neighbours.(cid:93)

continues 

exert 

to 

Judy Batt

On-line/http

All of the Institute’s publications and
reports on seminars can be accessed on
the Institute’s website:
www.iss-eu.org

Armaments: new opportunities, new challenges

The debate on how to reform Europe’s
armaments sector has a long history. How-
ever, since the work of the Convention on
the Future of Europe, discussions have
entered into a new phase. Firstly, (most)
member states have given up their princi-
ple hostility vis-à-vis EU involvement in
armaments.  The  draft  Constitutional
Treaty  (stipulating  the  creation  of  an
Armaments, Research and Capabilities
Agency), the Commission’s Communica-
tion  on  a  Defence  Equipment  Policy
(announcing new initiatives on market
and research issues) and the Thessaloniki
Presidency  Conclusions  (deciding  to
establish an Agency as early as 2004) illus-
trate that there is now for the first time a
fair chance of bringing armaments into
the framework of the EU.
Secondly, the debate has gained a remark-
able dynamic. Immediately after its Com-
munication,  the  Commission  started
work on a preparatory action in the field
of security-related research. At the same
time, it has begun to prepare a Green Book
on  defence  procurement  law  and  to
explore options for a defence industry
monitoring service. In parallel, COREPER
has established an ad hoc Preparation
Group to develop, by the end of the Italian
presidency, a basic concept for the Arma-
ments, Research and Capabilities Agency. 
These are positive developments, because
they indicate a growing awareness of two
things. First, member states cannot avoid
going  beyond  traditional  armaments
cooperation schemes if they want to main-
tain a viable defence industrial base and
equip their armed forces adequately. Sec-
ond, the EU offers a broad range of policies
and instruments for action in those areas
where reforms are needed: procurement,
research and market. 

However, all this is by no means a guar-
antee for success. Reforms in a field as
complex as armaments are always slow
and cumbersome. Moreover, member
states still diverge on key issues like pro-
curement philosophy, industrial policy
and arms exports. These divergences will
be particularly difficult to overcome in
an intergovernmental decision-making
process  with  25  governments  and
numerous services and administrations
involved. If one adds to this the usual
bureaucratic inertia and the traditional
reluctance of national defence establish-
ments to surrender prerogatives to Euro-
pean bodies, one gets an idea of the dif-
ficulties in reaching efficient, effective
solutions.
The first test case will be the creation of
the Armaments, Research and Capabili-
ties  Agency.  The  Ad  hoc  Preparation
Group has made a promising start, but
the more detailed discussions become,
the more difficult it will be to maintain
the current consensus. Moreover, the
Agency set up in 2004 will probably be
only  a  light  structure  with  a  limited
mandate (coordination of existing ele-
ments like OCCAR, ECAP and WEAO).
This makes sense if – but only if – it is the
first step towards a more ambitious proj-
ect. 
It will be essential, therefore, to ensure
that the statutes of the new Agency con-
tain provisions for a progressive build-up
in the future. If the Agency is to make its
weight felt, it must cover the whole pro-
curement cycle, contain innovative ele-
ments (like permanent working groups
and an autonomous budget) and pro-
vide  in  particular  an  effective  link
between military research and the har-
monisation of capability needs. 

Moreover, one should not forget that even
a ‘strong’ Agency will not be able to solve
by itself all the European armaments sec-
tor’s problems. Serious reform should
therefore include: (a) the establishment of
a European defence equipment market,
based on legally binding commitments
and a single set of rules; (b) the develop-
ment of a comprehensive research strat-
egy that allows for full exploitation of syn-
ergies between civil, security and military
research.
These  objectives  can  only  be  achieved
through the combined use of Commu-
nity and CFSP instruments, i.e. in close
cooperation between member states and
the Commission. This means that both
sides must overcome their mutual mis-
trust and engage in a common learning
process. 
This is easier said than done, since impor-
tant mental barriers persist that are deeply
rooted in different philosophies, cultures
and institutional instincts. However, if
common sense is to prevail, there is sim-
ply no alternative. Within the Commis-
sion, all relevant directorates must fully
recognise the specificity of defence and
develop a greater readiness to adopt their
practices and instruments accordingly.
Member states, in turn, should finally
accept the Commission as a partner com-
mitted to a strong European industry and
overcome their defensive attitude vis-à-vis
the use of Community instruments in
armaments.
Granted, politics and common sense do
not  necessarily  coincide.  However,  in
armaments, the discrepancy between the
two must not become too wide. Other-
wise,  the  price  for  Europe’s  industry,
armed forces and, last but not least, tax-
payers will become too high.(cid:93)

Burkard Schmitt

editorial ... continued from front page

...
of military capability. After Iraq, the pessimists will conclude that

questions, they depend on each other to a considerable degree: a

Kosovo was a happy exception. The realists, on the other hand,

constitutional treaty cannot of itself produce policy, and even less

will stress the coincidence of three issues within the EU, the com-

a common foreign policy; a security concept cannot be imple-

pletion of which is essential if the Union is to enhance its capa-

mented without effective institutions; and a transatlantic part-

bility to engage in common external actions. 

nership presupposes a European partner whose functioning and

(cid:81) The security concept, the transatlantic relationship and the

strategic vision are serious and dependable. The sooner the Union

IGC are three issues that concern the various levels at which con-

manages to consolidate these three vital pillars of external action

sensus is necessary for the implementation of a European foreign

– an effective treaty, a common strategic concept and a shared

policy:  the  world,  America  and  the  Union’s  institutions.

view  of  America  –  the  sooner  its  role  in  the  world  will  be 

Although there is no formal relationship between these three 

established.

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