Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on:the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhancing maritime transport security, andthe Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing ship and port facility security(COM(2003) 229 final — 2003/0089 (COD))
Date: 2003-10-29
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: ESC opinion, common transport policy, harbour installation, maritime transport, transport safety

5.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/21

microenterprises, the Committee recommends that in the
future policies of the Community and the Member States the
establishment of such microenterprises be facilitated (e.g. by
simplifying and reducing the preconditions) and, in general,
that still more account be taken of the specific operating
conditions of such enterprises.

3. Conclusion

The Committee recommends that the Commission draft be
approved subject to the comments set out in points 2.2 and
2.2.1 and that particular account be taken of the comment set
out in point 2.3 when adopting future measures.

Brussels, 29 October 2003.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on:

— the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhancing
maritime transport security’, and

— the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing

ship and port facility security’

(COM(2003) 229 final — 2003/0089 (COD))

(2004/C 32/04)

On 2 May 2003 the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social
Committee under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-
mentioned communication.

On 26 May 2003 the Council decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee under
Article 80 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 10 October 2003. The rapporteur
was Dr Bredima-Savopoulou.

At its 403rd plenary session of 29 and 30 October 2003 (meeting of 29 October) the European Economic
and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 122 votes for and one against.

1.

Introduction

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
1.1.
world safety and security have assumed a higher profile than
ever before and have been placed at the top of policy-makers’
priority lists. Subsequent events and action proved that the
war on terrorism is bound to last a long time.

proved by the Transport White Paper (1) which already referred
to the need to enhance the security of cruise ship passengers
in Europe.

1.3.
On 23 April 2002, in a letter from Ms Loyola de
Palacio, the Commission asked the European Economic and
Social Committee to draw up an exploratory opinion on the
the Treaty
Security of Transports, under Article 262 of
establishing the European Community.

1.2. Maritime security has been a matter of concern for the
European Community well before 11 September 2001, as

(1) COM(2001) 370 final, 12.9.2001.

C 32/22

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

5.2.2004

At its plenary session of 24 October 2002 the EESC
1.4.
adopted its exploratory opinion (1) supporting the Com-
mission’s analysis with regard to both the nature of the subject
and the solutions to it. The EESC proposed a number of
yardsticks to be followed in future EU action regarding security
of transport.

The Communication refers to a number of areas on
2.3.
which action is in progress, such as on security of Community
ports, enhancing the security of the logistics chain as a whole,
monitoring and administration of maritime security, maritime
transport risk insurance and international mutual recognition.
More specifically, the Commission underlines that:

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) began
1.5.
work on maritime security in February 2002. The Commission
considered it preferable to await the outcome of the discussions
within the IMO rather than develop regional unilateral initiat-
ives. On 12 December 2002, following a Diplomatic Confer-
ence, IMO adopted amendments to the International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea (Solas), and in particular a
new chapter entitled ‘Special measures to enhance maritime
security’, and an International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code. The amendments of the Solas Convention and
Part A of
the ISPS Code consist entirely of mandatory
provisions; Part B of the ISPS Code is made up of recommen-
dations which contracting governments are requested to
implement.

1.6.
The effective implementation of maritime security
measures requires intense preparations and timely action on
the part of parties involved. The implementation of the IMO
measures will be a huge challenge, particularly in smaller ports
and developing countries. Governments will need to put in
place a large number of measures by June 2004. Likewise,
ships and shipping companies must comply with the new IMO
security provisions.

2. Communication on enhancing maritime security

2.1.
The Commission considers that since the security of a
transport chain depends upon its weakest link, an approach
addressing the multimodal dimension in parallel will make it
possible to improve the security of transport as a whole.
Initially, this Communication addresses the purely maritime
dimension of this chain.

The EU’s maritime logistics system,

2.2.
including sea-
borne freight transport, ports and port handling services,
accounts for over two-thirds of the total trade between the
Community and the rest of the world. It is therefore important
that maritime transport security should be enhanced, and its
competitiveness maintained, while facilitating trade.

(1) OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.

— priority should be given to passenger transport, where
the consequences of a terrorist act would be the heaviest
with regard to the human lives at stake;

— the scope of the work concerning maritime security at
the IMO is limited to ships and to port facilities where
the ship/port interface takes place;

— maritime safety depends to a large extent on the security
of other feeder modes of transport. It is therefore very
important that it should be possible to identify both the
transported goods and those involved in handling them
(suppliers and carriers) and their respective responsi-
bilities;

— without calling into question the different administrative
and economic systems for maritime and port matters,
there is a need for clear and comprehensible procedures
to be established at both national and Community level
with regard to maritime security;

— it intends to analyse in 2003 the potential consequences
in terms of insurance of enhancing maritime security in
order to encourage better coverage of risk for maritime
transport operators and customers.

2.4.
The Commission will encourage the establishment of
partnership based on mutual and reciprocal recognition of
security and control measures with all its international part-
ners, including the USA, so as to promote the harmonious and
secure flow of world maritime trade. The envisaged agreement
is intended to replace the bilateral arrangements that have
been concluded between certain Member States and the US
Customs Service and it will be based on the principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination which apply to all trade
between the Community and the US.

2.5.
On a legislative level, the Commission will, as necess-
ary, launch an initiative concerning the enhancement of the
security of seafarers’ identification and reserves the right to
present in the course of 2003 a proposal for a Directive
defining additional security measures to be implemented in
Community ports. Moreover, it intends to draw up emergency
plans and take actions that would guarantee effective response
in case of need.

5.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/23

3. Proposal for a Regulation on enhancing ship and port

facility security

3.1.
The main objective of this Regulation is to introduce
and implement Community measures aimed at enhancing the
security of ships used in international trade and domestic
shipping and associated port facilities in the face of threats of
intentional unlawful acts. The Regulation is also intended
to provide a basis for the harmonised interpretation and
implementation and Community monitoring of the special
measures to enhance maritime security adopted by IMO. In
order to achieve the above objective the Regulation:

goes beyond the measures adopted by IMO in that it
makes mandatory certain provisions of Part B of the ISPS
Code, which have the status of recommendations, e.g. it
extends the measures to passenger ships on national
routes; it extends to other ships sailing nationally the
requirements relating to undertaking security evaluations;

calls upon Member States to conclude agreements on
security arrangements for scheduled maritime traffic
within the Community on fixed routes using dedicated
port facilities;

exemption from the obligation of security checks prior to
entry into a port for ships engaged on a scheduled service
within a Member State or between two or more Member
States.

3.3.
Each Member State will be required to adopt a national
plan for the implementation of the Regulation, starting with
the appointment of a single national authority by 1 January
2004 and completing with the issuing of the international ship
security certificates by 1 June 2004.

The Regulation gives Member States the possibility
3.4.
of concluding amongst themselves bilateral or multilateral
agreements for the provision of alternative security arrange-
ments and,
those necessary for promoting
scheduled short-sea shipping within the Community on fixed
routes between port facilities located within their territories.

in particular,

3.5.
The Commission proposes that six months after the
date of application of the Regulation, in cooperation with the
national authorities and assisted by the European Maritime
Safety Agency it shall initiate a series of inspections to verify
the means of monitoring implementation of the national plans
adopted pursuant to this Regulation. Member States concerned
will be informed in good time before inspections. However,
departments responsible for monitoring port facilities, com-
panies and ships may be inspected without advance notice.

details the arrangements to be made by Member States
for ports only occasionally serving international traffic;

4. General comments

establishes the system of security checks prior to the
entry of ships of whatever origin into a Community port,
as well as that of security checks in the port;

4.1. Comments on the Communication

calls for a single national authority responsible for the
security of ships and port facilities, and a timetable for
early implementation of some of the measures it contains;

provides for a process of
inspections to check the
arrangements for monitoring the implementation of
national plans adopted pursuant to it;

entrusts to the European Maritime Safety Agency the role
of assisting the Commission in the performance of its
tasks.

4.1.1. Maritime transport by its very nature is open to
attack. The sector is characterised by an extremely diverse
international labour force, transporting a vast range of goods
whose provenance, description and ownership are often left
vague. As most characteristically said ‘The very things that
have allowed maritime transport to contribute to economic
prosperity also render it uniquely vulnerable to exploitation
by terrorist groups (1)’.

The EESC reiterates (2) that security is an issue where,
4.1.2.
par excellence, all
links in the transport chain should be
involved in order to achieve tangible results. In the short term
a security culture should be developed by all participants in
the transport chain. Measures aimed at fighting terrorism
should be coupled with measures aimed at fighting traditional
security problems (organised crime, piracy, fraud, smuggling
and illegal immigration). The EESC invites the Commission as

For the purpose of reaching the overall objective of
3.2.
maritime security the Commission proposes the extension of
all the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Solas Convention and
of Part A of the ISPS Code to include passenger ships engaged
on domestic voyages. Moreover, it provides for a possible

(1) OECD: Security in Maritime Transport-Risk Factors and Economic

Impact (July 2003).

(2) OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

g)

C 32/24

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

5.2.2004

a matter of urgency to tackle traditional security problems,
and in particular piracy and armed robbery,
in its future
policymaking, if it is not feasible to cover them under the
present Regulation. The EESC notes that the Council has asked
the Commission to carry out a feasibility study concerning
controls at maritime borders aimed at the improvement of
checks and surveillance at maritime borders. It also notes that
maritime transport security will be one of the five vital sectors
where the future fight against terrorism by the recently created
action group of the G8 will focus.

the EU enlargement,

4.1.2.1. With the advent of
the
Mediterranean Sea acquires an enhanced role. Its vicinity to
areas from where potential security problems might arise
emphasises the need for a Mediterranean dimension to mari-
time transport security policy. The Motorways of the Sea
Agreement between five Mediterranean EU Member States (5-
6.7.2003) stressed the importance of developing short sea
shipping services in the Mediterranean along with the security
services.

4.1.2.2.
In light of the above considerations, the EESC
welcomes the Commission Communication on the develop-
ment of a Euro-Mediterranean Transport Network (1) and the
incorporation of security of shipping in its common transport
policy objectives. It agrees that it is essential that the Mediter-
ranean Partners strengthen international security by incorpor-
ating equivalent rules into their national laws and introducing
efficient means of enforcement. The setting-up of a Euro-
Mediterranean institute for Safety and Security is considered as
a first step towards this goal.

4.1.3.
Τhe ΕΕSC considers that trade is a major factor for
world prosperity and underlines that its disruption will have
serious consequences for national economies and consumer
prices. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to the medium-
term consequences of terrorism. Measures to reduce risks and
the economic consequences of further attacks should be both
security-effective and growth friendly. The recent OECD
Study (2)
indicates that the cost of implementing security-
related measures will be high, but the financial cost of not
taking every opportunity to reduce the risk and the incidence
of terrorist attacks may be considerably higher. It is hoped
that the implementation of the measures (as suggested in
paragraph 4.1.1) and the expected beneficial effect of the
enhanced surveillance and controls in port areas in reducing
or eliminating traditional criminal activities and security
largely off-set the costs of
problems,
implementing security measures.
Indeed, the same OECD
study points to potential savings, such as ‘reduced delays,
faster processing times, better asset control, fewer losses due
to theft or fraud’.

in the long run will

(1) COM(2003) 376 final.
(2) OECD: Security in Maritime Transport-Risk Factors and Economic

Impact (July 2003).

In this regard,

The EESC supports the determination of the Com-
4.1.4.
mission to resist any unilateral measure which might not only
affect international trade but also be incomplete or run counter
to the objectives with regard to security, which necessitate
the EESC welcomes the
global solutions.
authorisation of the Commission by the Council to negotiate
on matters within the Community’s sphere of competence in
order to reach an agreement between the Community and the
US customs authorities concerning the development of an
export control system, which takes account of the need for
security in international container-based trade.
further
welcomes the decision to invite the relevant stakeholders to
preparatory meetings of the Joint EU/US working party on
transport security.

It

4.1.5.
The EESC welcomes the intention of the Commission
to fill the security gap by presenting in the course of 2003 a
proposal for a Directive defining additional security measures
to be implemented in Community ports and its intention to
draw up emergency plans.

4.2. Comments on the Regulation

In its exploratory opinion the EESC urged the EU to
4.2.1.
initiate a dialogue with the US and other countries with a view
to establishing a global system in the interest of all. Assuming
such a leading role over security issues would offer the EU the
opportunity to show a higher profile internationally. It is
therefore gratifying to see a year later that indeed the EU has
followed the above suggested course of action.

4.2.2.
The EESC notes with satisfaction the EU coordinated
position in the decision-making international fora and at the
EU level in order to avoid possible inconsistencies between
international and prospective Community rules. It also wel-
comes the comprehensive analysis by the Commission and the
proposed action for the timely and harmonised implemen-
tation of the IMO international measures.

4.2.3.
The effect of tightening of security on the cost of
trading internationally is likely to be asymmetrical. Shipping
must continue to serve the flow of international trade effec-
tively and efficiently and, to ensure this, ships, port facilities
and their respective personnel must be prepared adequately
for the possibility of encountering terrorist attacks or other
forms of criminal intentions. If security procedures become
too stringent the efficiency of the business of transporting
goods could be severely hampered, which would give terrorists
the success they were seeking. Therefore, it is encouraging to
note that the Commission has launched a study to assess the
consequences of enhancing maritime security.

5.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/25

The scope and level of measures should take into
4.2.4.
account any adverse implications on the performance of the
human element (fatigue, stress). European philosophy and
culture sustains a strong respect for the human rights and any
reaction to threats of terrorism should not disregard these long
cherished principles. The scope of any security screening of
personnel should be relevant to its potential
involvement
in terrorist activities and should not lead to unwarranted
employment exclusions. Furthermore, there is an increasing
danger of imposing upon ship’s crews and on port authorities,
directly or indirectly, policing responsibilities that normally
fall upon governments. Unless a security culture is instilled
across the board, it would be unrealistic to expect ship’s crews
to protect their ships against sophisticated terrorist threats.
Finally, the safety and working conditions of crews should not
be put at risk when dealing with their additional security
duties.

The EESC reiterates that

4.2.5.
the implementation of
security measures should be of such a nature as to avoid
deflection of traffic in favour of some ports to the detriment
of other ports,
‘imposing disproportionate bureaucracy or
costs and charging to the industry costs that fall properly to
governments’ (1). In perspective, the EESC has good reasons to
be concerned that governments may be reluctant to assume
the corresponding responsibilities for their Agencies and ports.
On the other hand, there are legitimate concerns that security
considerations will override safety considerations and needs to
facilitate trade.

4.2.5.1.
The cost of compliance with the measures adopted
by IMO and proposed by the Commission will be significant
for most ports and huge for the big ones (2). Unavoidably, the
enhancement of security will involve costly arrangements in
terms of hardware (infrastructure and equipment) and software
(manpower and training). Some of the anticipated costs can be
calculated fairly reliably – others, notably those associated with
shore side security — less so. It is estimated that security costs
will increase the overall annual operational costs of shipping
companies by 10 % (3). In accordance with a recent OECD
Study (4)‘the initial burden on ship operators is estimated to be
at least USD 1,279 million (EUR 1,460 million) and USD 730
million (EUR 833 million) annually thereafter. Estimates on
port-related security costs are extremely difficult to derive as it

(1) OECD: The Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 17.2.02 Econ-
omic Department Paper No 34: OECD Transport Security and
Terrorism Council of Ministers, 2.5.2002.

(2) A container scanner in the port of Rotterdam costs EUR 14m.
(3) Drewry Report, 2003.
(4) OECD: Security in Maritime Transport-Risk Factors and Economic

Impact (July 2003).

is yet uncertain what the impact of IMO measures will be on
hiring of new security personnel and if so, what will be the
applicable rates’. By way of comparison, maritime security
costs in the EU are expected to be higher than in the US for
geographical reasons due to the larger number of EU ports.
Moreover, the non-federal structure of the EU and the fragmen-
tation of authorities involved will exacerbate the problems of
implementation of the security measures in the EU.

4.2.5.2.
Although part of the increased security costs will
be passed on to customers, governments are also expected to
bear some of the costs to counter terrorism, since terrorism is
a reaction to policies of governments (5). The US government
has already earmarked security grants to private companies
and ports amounting to USD 105m (EUR 120m) after
disbursing USD 93m (EUR 106m) in similar grants last year.
Unless similar action is taken by EU governments, European
ports and companies will be disadvantaged, and more
importantly, ports may fail to meet the security criteria and
qualify as compliant ports, with far reaching repercussions in
terms of competitiveness. Consequently, the EESC invites the
Commission, recognising the origins of the problem and
the real targets of terrorism, to devise an EU scheme for
commensurate financing of
the
measures incumbent upon ships, crews and ports.

the implementation of

4.2.5.3.
In the aftermath of 11 September, insurance impli-
cations in maritime transport were tremendous. Terrorism
insurance became either unavailable or unattainable. For
instance, following the attack on the tanker ‘Limburg’ (October
2002) underwriters tripled insurance premia for vessels calling
on Yemeni ports,
reaching as much as USD 300 000
(EUR 342 390) per vessel and USD 250 (EUR 285) per
container. Insurance cover for inevitable delays resulting from
the intense security measures as well as for the highly
sophisticated high tech scanning equipment has to be con-
sidered. According to estimates (6) hull and machinery
insurance for ships (tankers/bulk carriers) is expected to rise
by 9 % and P&I insurance to rise by 10 %.

(5) EESC Opinion — OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.
(6) Drewry, Annual Review of Ship Operating Costs, 18.6.2003.

C 32/26

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

5.2.2004

5. Specific comments

5.1. Comments on the Regulation

Commission to take proper action for the timely implemen-
tation by the Member States of the new Seafarers Identification
Documents Convention, and to dispense with any unwarranted
visa requirements or arrangements that would result
in
charging seafarers with visa fees. Moreover, the compatibility
of the new Convention with the obligations from the Schengen
Agreement should be examined.

5.1.1.
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) required
to be fitted on ships has a security benefit only if signals can
be received ashore, analysed and acted upon. Member States
should be required to comply with Article 9 of the Directive
2002/59/EC of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel
traffic monitoring and information system by 1-7-2004.
Furthermore, the EESC welcomes the intention of the Com-
mission to support technological research and the promotion
of satellite radio navigation applications (Galileo and GPS)
which will make it possible not only to enhance security but
also safety, navigation and management in this area. The early
implementation of the Galileo system was suggested in the
exploratory opinion of the EESC as a means of facilitating the
enhancement of increased security.

5.1.2. A r t i c l e 3 ( J o i n t m e a s u r e s a n d s c o p e )

5.1.2.1.
The EESC agrees that the radical measure of fully
applying the voluntary Part B of the ISPS Code would be
unnecessary and supports in general the proposal to make
mandatory certain of its provisions. The extension of the scope
of the IMO measures to domestic shipping needs to be
clarified. There is no indication of the size of Class A ships or
indeed of sizes of other classes of passenger ships referred to
in the second paragraph of paragraph 2 (presumably it may
cover any ship engaged in any voyages, even short ferry
crossings).

Effective access control would require a photo ID
5.1.2.2.
for all persons boarding a ship in a port. The EESC welcomes
the inclusion of paragraph 4.18 of Part B of the ISPS Code in
the list of the mandatory provisions. However, and in order
not to compromise ship security, the requirement to issue
appropriate identification documents should be extended to
cover not only government officials but also other persons
involved with the operation of the ships in ports.

5.1.2.3.
The EESC notes with satisfaction that the proposal
does not infringe on the terms of ILO 108 Convention 1958.
Hence, seafarers can continue to be exempt from normal visa
requirements for the purpose of shore leave or for transit to
and from their ships. In this connection it welcomes the
successful outcome of the work of the International Labour
Organisation (3-19.6.2003) concerning the enhancement of
the security of seafarer’s identification and the EESC invites the

5.1.3. A r t i c l e 5 ( I n t r a - C o m m u n i t y a n d d o m -

e s t i c s h i p p i n g )

5.1.3.1.
The EESC fully endorses the Commission proposal
that Member States may conclude among themselves, each
acting on its own behalf, the bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments envisaged under the IMO measures, and in particular
such agreements as are necessary to promote intra-Community
short sea shipping. The EESC agrees that Member States
concerned should notify the draft agreements to the Com-
mission and urges the Commission to review the proposed
procedure so that approvals for the implementation of the
agreements are given without undue delay.

5.1.4. A r t i c l e 7 ( S e c u r i t y c h e c k s p r i o r
e n t r y i n t o a C o m m u n i t y p o r t )

t o

5.1.4.1. Member States should be encouraged to promote
the concept of a single point of entry, thereby, making it
possible for the ship’s master or agent to provide the required
information using this concept.

5.1.5. A r t i c l e 1 0 ( I m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d c o n -

f o r m i t y c h e c k i n g )

5.1.5.1.
The EESC believes that the IMO implementation
date of 1 July 2004 is already very tight and difficult to fully
meet, especially with respect to shore-side requirements. Given
the large number of ports and even greater number of ships to
be assessed and certificated by the above date and the need to
ensure complete preparations,
it may not be prudent to
advance the implementation of the appointment of ship, port,
company security officers (by 1 March 2004), the approval of
ship and port facility security plans (by 1 May 2004) and the
issuing of the international ship security certificates (by 1 June
2004). However,
the EESC strongly supports the timely
designation of a single national authority responsible for ship
and port facility security by 1 January 2004.

5.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/27

6. Conclusions

6.1.
The EESC welcomes the acknowledgment that compre-
hensive and coherent action is needed by the Community in
order to enhance maritime transport security. It supports the
intention to draw emergency plans and take actions that would
guarantee effective response in case of need.

6.2.
The EESC welcomes the determination of the Com-
mission to resist any unilateral measure which might affect
international trade and the pursuance of an EU agreement with
the US Customs Service that will be based on the principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination which will apply to all
trade between the Community and the US.

6.3.
The Commission’s intention to present in due course a
legislative proposal defining additional security measures to
be implemented in Community ports is fully supported.
Specifically the EESC highlights the need to give a Mediterrane-
an dimension to the maritime security policy which becomes
vital with the EU enlargement.

The EESC congratulates the Commission for the com-
6.4.
prehensive analysis and the proposed action for the timely
and harmonised implementation of the IMO international
measures. The effective implementation of the IMO measures
will be a huge challenge, particularly in smaller ports and
requires intense preparations and timely action on behalf of
parties involved. However, given the large number of ports
and ships to be assessed by 1 July 2004, it may not be prudent
to advance the implementation of the IMO date in the EU
framework.

6.5.
The EESC believes that attention needs to be paid to
the medium-term consequences of terrorism. Measures to
reduce risks and the economic consequences of further attacks
should be both security-effective and growth friendly. In line
with the yardsticks developed in its exploratory opinion
(2002), the EESC maintains that the implementation of the
envisaged measures must be clear, uniform, proportionate to
the threat and practical.

6.5.1.
The EESC is concerned about the economic impact
of the envisaged measures and the increase of the insurance

Brussels, 29 October 2003.

costs in periods of crises. It hopes that the desirable implemen-
tation of security and policing measures will ease the imbalance
of costs against the expected benefits in security and in
curtailing other illicit practices committed in ports.

6.5.2.
The EESC warns about the huge cost implications
from the implementation of the new IMO security measures.
Although part of these costs will be passed on to customers,
in the interest of fairness governments should also bear part of
some costs since terrorism is a reaction to policies of
governments. Hence, it urges the Commission to adopt an EU
financial instrument to cover some of these costs. To this effect
the EESC invites the Commission to draw up an overall
impact study about the financial implications of the increased
maritime security measures.

6.6.
The EESC supports in general the proposal to make
mandatory certain of the provisions of the voluntary Part B of
the IMO ISPS Code. However, the extension of the scope of
the measures to domestic shipping needs to be clarified as it
may cover any ship engaged in any voyages, even short ferry
crossings.

The scope and level of measures should take into
6.7.
account any adverse implications on the performance of the
human element (fatigue, stress). Ship crews and port workers
should not be unduly affected by the implementation of
security measures, such as any unwarranted employment
exclusion following security screening of personnel. Moreover,
seafarers should not be entrusted with the imposition of
policing responsibilities that normally fall upon governments.

The EESC invites the Commission to take proper action
6.8.
for the timely implementation of the successful work of the
International Labour Organisation concerning the enhance-
ment of the security of seafarers’ identification (ILO Conven-
tion 185, revising Convention 108).

6.9.
The EESC maintains that in the short term a security
culture should be developed by all participants in the transport
chain. In the medium and long term, however, the EESC firmly
believes that the EU should take the lead internationally in
developing a broader framework for security which will
address the causes of the terrorism and not only seek to
prevent it or eliminate its effects.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH