WRITTEN QUESTION E-3099/03 by Jonas Sjöstedt (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Aid for the farming of mussels.
Date: 2003-10-20
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Structural Funds, eutrophication, fishing industry, shellfish farming, water protection

C 78 E/464

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

27.3.2004

Accordingly, when exercising its powers to scrutinise mergers, the Commission must consider whether the
transactions notified to it create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it. When
carrying out this analysis, the Commission is required under Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation to
take account of technical and economic progress, i.e. efficiency gains which are the direct result of the
merger, provided that they are to the consumers’ advantage and do not form an obstacle to competition.
In practice, taking these efficiency gains into account may produce similar results to applying a ‘net benefit’
criterion, albeit on the understanding that the existence and scope of those efficiency gains are assessed by
the Commission as part of a competition analysis and can therefore be taken into account only in so far as
they ultimately have a beneficial effect on competition.

It is true that the Merger Regulation is designed to prohibit the creation or strengthening of dominant
positions as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market,
and this as opposed to Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which refers only to abuse by companies already in a
dominant position. This reflects the different, complementary natures of these two legal
instruments:
whereas the former introduces a priori checks which are preventive in nature, the latter consists of ex-post
checks which are punitive in nature. The attraction of a priori merger supervision lies in the fact that it is
more efficient to maintain a situation of effective competitive situation on the markets concerned than to
take steps subsequently against anti-competitive abuse by companies which have acquired or strengthened
a dominant position as the result of a merger.

transactions only 18 of which were prohibited. Many of

In thirteen years of implementing the Merger Regulation, the Commission has examined more than 2 300
the mergers authorised by the
merger
Commission have allowed powerful European groups to emerge which are themselves world leaders or
able to challenge world leaders on their respective markets. Examples include the groups which resulted
from the decisions concerning Carrefour/Promodes, TotalFina/Elf, Volvo/Renault, Framatome/Siemens,
Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia (merged as Arcelor) and Aérospatiale/DaimlerChrysler Aerospace/Centre for
Advanced Spatial Analysis (CASA) (merged as the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company
(EADS)). The Air Liquide/Brin’s Oxygen Company (BOC) merger would be another example if that
particular transaction had not been abandoned after the US authorities had indicated that it would very
probably be banned. Prohibited mergers (or mergers abandoned in the course of in-depth investigations by
the Commission) include those designed to establish both European (e.g. Volvo/Scania) and non-European
(e.g. General Electric (GE)/Honeywell) groups.

It is thus clear that the Commission exercises its merger supervision powers in a perfectly neutral fashion
as regards the identity and nationality of the companies involved or their shareholders and that this is not
incompatible with the objectives of making European industry and the European economy in general more
competitive, maintaining high employment and guaranteeing solid, lasting growth in the European Union.

(1) OJ L 395, 30.12.1989; corrected version: OJ L 257, 21.9.1990.

(2004/C 78 E/0489)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3099/03

by Jonas Sjöstedt (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(20 October 2003)

Subject: Aid for the farming of mussels

The eutrophication of our coastal seas continues to be a major environmental problem even though
certain measures have been taken on land to reduce the leakage of nutrients into the sea. Eco-systems
adjust to some extent to the growing quantity of vegetable plankton caused by eutrophication through a
sharp increase in the number of mussels and other organisms that act as filters. These filters are of crucial
importance in reducing plankton biomass in coastal seas. The risk of harmful plankton efflorescence is
reduced in areas with many filters. In some areas there are good opportunities for biological manipulation
of fjord systems as it were by increasing the number of filters with the aid of mussel farming.

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 78 E/465

Today mussels are already being farmed in coastal areas including Bohuslän in Sweden, but attempts to
expand such farming have entailed major problems. Mussel farming is hampered by long periods when
harvesting has to stop because of toxic algae that make mussels poisonous.

How does the Commission assess the strategic role of mussel farming as a way of reducing the incidence
of eutrophication and what measures are being taken to ensure that
this industry can survive
commercially?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(16 December 2003)

The Commission is certainly aware of the problems caused by eutrophication to the marine ecosystem.

The causes of this problem are diverse and their interrelation complex. However, a high level of nutrients
in the water appears to be a condition sine qua non for the development of eutrophication episodes.

For that reason, Community action in this field mainly aims at reducing the input of nutrients to the
marine waters, independently of their origin.

Aquaculture activities, both in freshwater and in the marine, are in some cases at the origin of effluents
rich in nutrients to the sea. For that reason, the use of farmed mussels as natural fighters against
eutrophication should be carefully assessed before its possible implementation. Moreover, as toxin-
producing algae are often carried from offshore to inshore waters by currents, they can be harmful
irrespective of the level of filter feeders near the coast.

Farming of mussels and other bivalves may enjoy, as many other forms of aquaculture, the measures
foreseen in Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements
regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector (1).

(1) OJ L 337, 30.12.1999.

(2004/C 78 E/0490)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3106/03

by María Bergaz Conesa (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

Subject: The Júcar-Vinalopó water diversion project

(22 October 2003)

The Júcar-Vinalopó water diversion project is a massive scheme (total cost over EUR 50 million) which
forms part of the Spanish National Hydrological Plan, and was submitted for Community funding in
October 2002. The technical features of the scheme mean that the diverting of water from the Júcar to the
Vinalopó is intrinsically linked up with diverting water from the Ebro, a project not yet forwarded to the
Commission. The National Hydrological Plan confirms this, by providing for the delivery of 63 hectolitres3
in the vicinity of the Tous dam so as to make the diversion from the Júcar to the Vinalopó possible
(see Analysis of the Precedents and Water Transfers Raised by the National Hydrological Plan p. 170).

The scheme is being subjected to detailed analysis by the Commission (DG Environment)
from an
environmental impact point of view, and the European Investment Bank is carrying out a feasibility study
whose results have not been made public.

Independent experts claim that the scheme is neither economically nor environmentally viable, and suffers
from major shortcomings from a technical standpoint, such as the absence of a precise, updated and
complete environmental impact assessment. The project’s shortcomings have been communicated to both
Commission and Parliament in the shape of various complaints from citizens, petitions and parliamentary
questions.