WRITTEN QUESTION E-3096/03 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Protection of monopolies and high fares by means of aviation agreements with third countries and attempts by potential competitors to break such monopolies.
Date: 2003-10-20
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: air freight rate, air transport, airline, bilateral agreement, competition law, monopoly, third country

C 78 E/222

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

27.3.2004

In the context of the Communication ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy on soil protection’, the Commission
has announced a series of initiatives, including the development of a proposal for the management of
biowaste. Such a Communication did not require any specific response from Member States. The Council
has adopted conclusions on integrated soil protection on 25 June 2002. In it, Council stressed that
ongoing environmental
inter alia, compost would make an important
contribution to soil protection and requested the Commission to present the appropriate proposals as
soon as possible.

legislation initiatives on,

(1) OJ L 230, 19.8.1991.
(2) OJ L 55, 29.2.2000.
(3) OJ L 291, 28.10.2002.
(4) OJ L 123, 24.4.1998.
(5) OJ L 228, 8.9.2000.
(6) OJ L 312, 15.12.1993.
(7) OJ L 137, 25.5.2002.

(2004/C 78 E/0226)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3096/03

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(20 October 2003)

Subject: Protection of monopolies and high fares by means of aviation agreements with third countries and

attempts by potential competitors to break such monopolies

1.
Is the Commission aware that, on the basis of a 1996 agreement, the airlines KLM and SLM enjoy a
monopoly in the form of a joint venture on the busy scheduled route between Schiphol in the Netherlands
and Zanderij in the former Netherlands colony of Suriname?

2. What view does the Commission take of the fact that much higher fares are charged on this route
than on internal French flights to the overseas department of Cayenne (French Guyana), given that this
French route can offer no serious competition to KLM and SLM whilst there is no good road link between
Cayenne and Suriname?

3.
Is it normal and permissible for an EU Member State to conclude an aviation agreement with a third
country in order to reserve routes for two of its ‘own’ airlines, with abnormally high fares as the result? Is
the Commission aware of any other examples of this practice? Do those cases also involve routes to
former colonies which are vital to the countries in question in that they provide their inhabitants with a
link to their families, universities and the outside world in general?

4.
Is the Commission aware that, as from 1 November 2003, the Netherlands airline Air Holland
intends to offer a competing seat-only service between the Netherlands and Suriname, with fares roughly
half those charged under the current monopoly, and that, should the Netherlands once again refuse Air
Holland a licence, flights would be operated from Belgium, which has a separate aviation agreement with
Suriname?

5. What steps can the Commission take in order to ensure that, in the light of the much lower fares,
more passengers can use the services operated via Cayenne, the Caribbean island of Curaçao or Brussels?

Source: the 7 October 2003 edition of the Netherlands daily newspaper de Volkskrant.

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(22 December 2003)

The Commission is aware that air traffic between the Member States and third countries is regulated by
bilateral air service agreements concluded between the countries where the airports are located. The
Commission is also aware that some of these agreements impose restrictions on the number of air carriers

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designated to operate the route, on frequencies and also on tariffs. Furthermore, these agreements limit the
operation of the concerned routes to air carriers owned or controlled by nationals of the Member State
party to the agreement. This ‘nationality clause’ impedes other Community carriers from operating on
third country routes from Union airports other than the ones located in the Member State of
its
‘nationality’.

On 5 November 2002, the Court of Justice recognised the Commission’s competence to negotiate certain
aspects covered by these bilateral agreements. It has, among others, declared the ‘nationality clauses’
incompatible with the EC Treaty. Consequently, the Commission has proposed to the Council the adoption
framework for the negotiation and
of certain measures with a view to providing a sound legal
implementation of air services agreements and an appropriate division of responsibilities between the
Community and its Member States. These measures were adopted by the Council on 5 June 2003. The
Commission has immediately started negotiations aiming at (a) concluding a comprehensive Union air
service agreement with the United States; (b) renegotiating the matters covered by the bilateral agreements
for which the Community has exclusive competence and (c) securing non-discriminatory market access in
international agreements for all Community carriers as required by the EC Treaty. The Commission cannot,
however, renegotiate all existing bilateral agreements at once. In its Communication of 19 November
2002 (1)
in response to the Court’s judgements, the Commission identified a number of key trading
partners with which it believes Community negotiations should be opened in the future.

Apart from the above-mentioned aspects covered by bilateral air services agreements for which the
Community competence has been recognised by the Court of Justice, according to Community law as it
stands today, other aspects of such agreements remain the competence of the Member States themselves.
These other aspects include, among other things, the allocation of traffic rights under a bilateral agreement.
Any problem arising from this allocation and related authorisations remain the responsibility of the
national authorities.

With regard to the application of competition rules, attention must be drawn to the fact that under
Article 10 of the EC Treaty read in combination with Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Member States
are under an obligation not to require nor encourage the violation of competition rules.

However, it must be noted that the existence of a duopoly in certain routes does not, in itself, amount to a
breach of the competition rules. It is mentioned in the question that the fares charged on the Amsterdam-
Zanderij routes are much higher than the tariffs applied on similar routes between France and Cayenne.
This fact on its own does not mean that there is an abuse of dominant position on the route in question.
Indeed, fares tend to be lower on markets open to competition than on restricted markets [markets
reserved for one or a few operators].

Finally, it must be noted that under the current regulatory situation, the Commission only enjoys limited
powers to enforce the competition rules on air traffic between the Community and third countries. Indeed,
the current procedural Regulation excludes from its scope air transport between the Community and third
countries. The new procedural Regulation (cid:1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 (cid:1) will not change this situation.
Consequently, the Commission adopted a proposal
last February 2003 to change this handicap. The
proposal has been submitted to the Council and discussions are ongoing.

(1) COM(2002) 649 final.

(2004/C 78 E/0227)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3113/03

by Maurizio Turco (NI) to the Commission

(22 October 2003)

Subject: Classification of the codes for the units of measurement of quantities exported shown on the

Commission’s database CATS (Clearance Audit Trail System)

The additional answer to Written Question P-3202/02 (1) incorporated extracts from the Commission’s
database CATS (Clearance Audit Trail System) containing data from Member States concerning export
refunds for Community agricultural products to third countries.