WRITTEN QUESTION P-2992/03 by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Drugs production in Afghanistan.
Date: 2003-10-06
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Afghanistan, EU financing, aid evaluation, aid policy, alternative agricultural production, drug traffic, narcotic

8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88 E/631

Supplementary answer
given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2003)

The Commission wishes to reassure the Honourable Member that all food additives including sweeteners
were examined for their safety by the Scientific Committee on Food prior to their authorisation. This task
is now carried out by the European Food Safety Authority.

Indeed, two new sweeteners are proposed for authorisation in the current amendment of Directive 94/35/
EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1994 on sweeteners for use in foodstuffs (1): sucralose
and the salt of aspartame and acesulfame. Both substances were examined for their safety by the Scientific
Committee on Food before they were proposed for authorisation by the Commission.

The opinion on sucralose was adopted by the Scientific Committee on Food in September 2000. The
Committee concluded that sucralose is acceptable as a sweetener for general food use and established an
Acceptable Daily Intake of 0-15 milligramme per kilogramme (mg/kg) bodyweight.

The salt of aspartame and acesulfame was examined by the Scientific Committee on Food in March 2000.
The Committee concluded that the salt does not raise additional safety considerations since it only
represents an alternative source of aspartame and acesulfame. Aspartame and acesulfame are both already
authorised as sweeteners under Directive 94/35/EC.

At the request of the Commission, aspartame has been re-evaluated by the Scientific Committee on Food
in collaboration with the British and French Food Safety Agencies. To this end, the scientists have reviewed
all the scientific literature published since the last opinion on aspartame amounting to around 150 articles.
The resulting opinion, adopted in December 2002, fully reconfirmed the safety of aspartame and that the
intake of this sweetener, also in consumers with a high intake, including adults, children and diabetics of
all ages, remains well below the Acceptable Daily Intake. The data on headaches examined by the
Committee varied in quality, but the one well controlled double-blind, cross-over trial showed that
aspartame was no more likely than placebo to be associated with headaches.

Moreover, during the 2nd reading of
the Commission has
committed to present within two years of entry into force of this amendment a progress report about the
re-evaluation of food additives, in particular concerning the two newly authorised sweeteners.

the amendment of Directive 94/35/EC,

For the reasons outlined above, the Commission does not consider it necessary to proceed with further re-
evaluations of these sweeteners.

(1) OJ L 237, 10.9.1994, p. 3.

(2004/C 88 E/0649)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2992/03

by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(6 October 2003)

Subject: Drugs production in Afghanistan

The UN committee responsible has officially reported record drugs production figures in Afghanistan over
the past year, double the production figures under the Taliban regime, since the new administration has
been unable to secure favourable conditions for wheat and maize growers or guarantee a market for their
produce.

In answer to my previous question on the same subject (E-3357/01 (1)), Commissioner Nielson indicated
that under Article B7-302 (2) the Commission was giving priority to financing alternative crops and sources
of income in the provinces most affected by the ban on opium production, the amount earmarked for this
purpose being around EUR 90 million.

C 88 E/632

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

8.4.2004

Has the Commission kept a record of funding provided to date (period 2001-2004) and what the effect
has been for farmers? To what does it attribute their lack of success? Will it continue to provide funding
and, if so, what basic guidelines will apply? What additional measures will it take to remedy the disastrous
situation caused by drugs production and marketing?

(1) OJ C 277 E, 14.11.2002, p. 2.
(2) B7-302: ‘Aid to uprooted peoples in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America’. Around EUR 90 million

earmarked for activities in Afghanistan over the period 2001-2004.

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(4 November 2003)

Context

In 1999, Afghanistan was the largest producer of opium poppy in the world, with an estimated
production of 4 600 tons of opium accounting for 70 % of the world total. Following the Taliban imposed
poppy ban (main objective of this ban was to keep prices high rather than to limit the opium production),
production fell dramatically in 2001. However, in 2002 production again reached the high levels seen in
1999.

A bumper harvest is expected for 2003 coinciding with very high farm gate prices for raw opium
(according to informal sources from USD 100 to 300 a kilogramme (kg) for an average harvest of about
35 to 40 kg of raw opium per hectare). This makes opium-poppy production extremely profitable to
farmers and farm workers (non-governmental organisations (NGOs) report that up to USD 9 are paid per
day to farm workers in poppy production where as USD 1 to 2 are normal farm labour wages). The very
high prices together with the expected bumper harvest indicate increasing demand for opium outside
Afghanistan.

Under these circumstances it is almost impossible to identify crops or to develop off-farm activities which
could be competitive to opium-poppy production in the short run. The fact that the Afghan Transitional
Authority (ATA) has only limited control over the country hampers effective law enforcement, which
constitutes another reason why no progress in the fight against opium poppy cultivation was achieved so
far.

Regulatory interference like price subsidies or purchasing programmes of
the Afghan Transitional
Authority (ATA) to secure markets for grain farmers would not be an alternative. First of all, poppy is
grown mostly on very small plots whereas the grain, which faces marketing problems is produced mainly
on large-scale farms. Second, regulatory interference would contradict the declared objective of the ATA to
ensure a private and liberal economy. Besides this, regulatory interference requires important infrastructure
and purchasing capacity, which are currently not available with the ATA.

Actions of the Commission and other donors

The Commission, the entire donor community and the ATA consider the increase in opium poppy
cultivation as a major risk to the socio-economic and political reconstruction process of Afghanistan since
it constitutes a major source of income to forces not supporting the ATA (local commanders and Al Qaida
mainly). Meanwhile it became obvious that alternative livelihoods (very difficult to introduce under the
current situation) constitute only one element in the fight of
illegal opium-poppy production. Law
enforcement but also education of the population to make them aware that opium-poppy production is
illegal and that opium consumption has very negative health and social consequences are of equal
importance.

In response to the complex nature of the fight against illegal opium poppy production the ATA elaborated
the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (developed with technical support provided by the United
Kingdom (cid:1) lead donor in the drug control sector (cid:1) and the Commission). Within the frame of this
strategy, which is based on the elements mentioned above, the Commission is providing support to the
reconstruction of rural production systems, which have been destroyed by the civil war and the recent
drought. For this purpose about EUR 140 million will be provided in 2002/2003. Details of actions are
provided in the table which is sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament’s Secretariat.

8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88 E/633

But this support would be pointless if the Law enforcement side of the strategy would not be addressed
too. Therefore the Commission has decided to contribute more than EUR 70 million (funded by the budget
line B7-300 and B7-305 in 2002 and 2003) to the re-enforcement of law and order ensuring payment of
salaries, equipment and training to the national police. This complements directly the involvement of
Germany which is the lead donor for re-establishing the national police force.

Impact so far and future action of the Commission

Eradication of opium-poppy production requires a fairly long period of time (in Pakistan and Thailand for
example it took 15 year to achieve satisfactory results). The prevailing insecurity and the fact that the ATA
has only limited control over the country set up a conducive environment for illegal crop cultivation. In
addition, the growing demand for opium in neighbouring countries which do have weak governments,
makes eradication in Afghanistan even more difficult. These, together with the tremendous rural poverty
the population regarding the illegal production and danger of
and the widespread unawareness of
consumption are the main reasons that
the programme supported by the Commission and the
international community has had little impact so far. However, the Community and other partners
(especially the United Kingdom and Germany) will continue their support to government in this area, as it
is only through a sustained commitment that the Afghan Government will be able to realize the goals set
out
in the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy which will remain the basic guidelines for all
interventions.

the
Since more understanding of
Commission is currently preparing a project to assess these issues and to incorporate the findings into
projects.

the socio-economic determinants of drug production is required,

Further to this, the Commission intends to continue its commitment to fight against rural poverty, which
is considered as a main reason for opium-poppy cultivation. Rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and
support to horticulture production (Afghanistan was a very important exporter of fruits and nuts before
the civil war) are key elements to re-establish efficiency of other farming systems providing more attractive
alternatives to farmers. The Community is identified as lead agency for this aspect of alternative livelihoods
with the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The Commission together with other donors (World
Bank and the United States)
is supporting delivery of health services to the rural population as a
complementary action.

A further key condition for the anti-drugs strategy is that the ATA gains more control over the country
and that security is re-established quickly to end the anarchy prevailing in some regions. In this regard,
support is provided by Germany (training and re-establishing the national police) and the Community via
the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) ensuring payment of salaries and equipment to
the police and on helping to strengthen border police capacity to tackle drug smuggling. The extension of
ISAF to the provinces and the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams recently decided by the United
Nations Security Council together with the rebuilding of the National Army supported by France and the
United States may also improve the security situation in future.

A copy of the table providing overview of Commission programmes to Afghanistan is being forwarded
direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament’s Secretariat.

(2004/C 88 E/0650)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3021/03

by Anna Karamanou (PSE) to the Commission

(14 October 2003)

Subject: Child trafficking in Afghanistan

On the basis of Unicef reports, much publicity was recently given to the problem of child trafficking in
Afghanistan, which is taking on ever greater dimensions. The Afghan police intercepted a group of around
50 children, some of them only four years old, who had come from the north-eastern province of
Badakhshan and were being taken by road to an unknown destination through the neighbouring province
of Takhar. The authorities suspect that the boys were destined either to attend religious schools in Pakistan