Partners and neighbours : a CFSP for a wider Europe.
Date: 2003-09-30
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: Central and Eastern Europe, European integration, European neighbourhood policy, Türkiye, Western Balkans, common foreign and security policy, enlargement of the Union

64-English-COVER.qxd  29/09/2003  16:27  Page 1

Chaillot Papers

n°64

September 2003

Partners and
neighbours: a CFSP 
for a wider Europe

Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

64-English-COVER.qxd  29/09/2003  16:27  Page 2

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) beca-
me an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European
Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July
2001,  it  is  now  an  integral  part  of  the  new  structures
that  will  support  the  further  development  of  the
CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide
analyses and recommendations that can be of use and
relevance to the formulation of the European security
and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also
acts  as  an  interface  between  European  experts  and 
decision-makers at all levels.

Chaillot  Papers are  monographs  on  topical  questions
written either by a member of the ISS research team or
by  outside  authors  chosen  and  commissioned  by  the
Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a semi-
nar or study group of experts convened by the Institute
and publication indicates that the paper is considered
by the ISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to
the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views
expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Chaillot
Papers are  also  accessible  via  the  Institute’s  Website:
www.iss-eu.org

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Chaillot Papers

n°64

September 2003

Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider
Europe

Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Institute for Security Studies
European Union 
Paris

64-English-Text.qxd  29/09/2003  16:25  Page 2

Institute for Security Studies
European Union 
Paris

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

© EU Institute for Security Studies 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU
Institute for Security Studies.
ISSN 1017-7566
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Alençon (France) by
l’Alençonnaise d’Impressions. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

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Contents

n°64 September 2003

Preface Nicole Gnesotto

Introduction

The EU and its changing neighbourhoods:
stabilisation, integration and partnership

1

Antonio Missiroli

• The stabilisation approach
(cid:127) The integration approach
(cid:127) Between integration and partnership
(cid:127) New (and old) neighbours
(cid:127) The EU and its proximities

2

3

4

The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU 

Dov Lynch

(cid:127) Dilemmas and problems
(cid:127) 1992-2003: the PCA method and its limits
(cid:127) Towards a ‘Wider Europe’
(cid:127) Faith and God

The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

(cid:127) The stakes
(cid:127) The contours of the political edifice
(cid:127) The socio-economic mire
(cid:127) The mid- to long-term challenges
(cid:127) The Stabilisation and Association Process
(cid:127) Regional cooperation
(cid:127) Whither the holistic approach?
(cid:127) A fog of uncertainty

The 13th candidate — Turkey: whither its march towards the EU?

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

(cid:127) The domestic scene 
(cid:127) The EU

5

7

9

10

17
20

26

30

34

38

42

47

57

60

63

63

66

68
69

70

71

74

77

80

81

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Contents

5

6

A new EU policy on the Mediterranean?

Martin Ortega

(cid:127) The three aspects and five objectives of the European Union’s
Mediterranean policy
(cid:127) The Barcelona process: mixed results
(cid:127) The peace porcess and the logic of war
(cid:127) Conclusions: the Union’s Mediterranean policy must be strengthened

The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

Judy Batt

(cid:127) Introduction
(cid:127) The opening curtain — hopes and fears
(cid:127) EU enlargement and Schengen
(cid:127) The impact on the ‘new neighbours’
(cid:127) Policy implications
(cid:127) Conclusions

Conclusions

(cid:127) The ‘pull’ of the EU
(cid:127) The ‘Wider Europe’ debate
(cid:127) Is ‘Wider Europe’ enough?
(cid:127) What is to be done?

Annexes

(cid:127) New neighbours initiative
(cid:127) Commission Communication on Wider Europe
(cid:127) Commission Communication on the Western Balkans
(cid:127) Commission Communication on reinvigorating EU actions

on human rights

(cid:127) Council conclusions - ‘Wider Europe’
(cid:127) EU security strategy
(cid:127) Treaty references to ‘European-ness’
(cid:127) About the authors
(cid:127) Abbreviations

86

87

89

94

99

102

102

103

105

110

114

118

119

119

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123

125

129

129

131
154

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160

164

166

168

169

64-English-Text.qxd  29/09/2003  16:25  Page 5

Preface

Nicole Gnesotto

‘
E xtending the zone of security around Europe’ is now one of the

Union’s strategic objectives – together with strengthening the inter-
national order and countering the new threats – listed in the security
concept presented by Javier Solana to the European Council at Thessaloniki
in June 2003: ‘Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the
East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’

Enlargement of the Union profoundly changes the number, identity and
nature of the new neighbours or partners who will now form the 25 coun-
tries’ external frontier. De facto, this new neighbourhood will also modify
the objectives and the sometimes conflictive dynamics of the Union’s foreign
policy.

A first tension can already be discerned between the Union’s global and
regional roles: enlargement widens the CFSP’s scope, indeed its geographi-
cal priorities, especially to the East, at a time when the global dimensions of
security  –  notably  terrorism  and  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass
destruction – have themselves become a priority. What is more, this tension
between the CFSP’s different objectives is bound to affect Euro-American
relations. The new agenda post-11 September is essential to the consolida-
tion of the partnership with the United States – the Bush administration hav-
ing made terrorism and proliferation its sole priorities – whereas a majority
of European countries, and in particular the Union’s 10 new members, will
also have security priorities centred much more on stabilisation of their
immediate neighbourhood.

A second tension will appear in the Union’s internal dynamics. There is
no doubt that, on the one hand, enlargement to 25 will de facto add to the
Union’s external responsibilities: finding itself increasingly closer to crisis
zones, inaction and passivity will become less possible as options for the
Union. However, the increase in the number of member states participating
in the CFSP will mean greater differentiation, even divergence, over indi-
vidual countries’ national priorities regarding neighbouring zones or CFSP
instruments to be used. Arriving at a permanent consensus among the 25 on
how to deal with the Union’s neighbours and partners will certainly be one
of the major institutional challenges that the enlarged Union will rapidly
have to resolve. Equally, apportioning financial resources and fixing prior-
ities for use of the Union’s military forces in support of the CFSP will become
more difficult: according to what security policy criteria will the Union in

5

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Preface

future decide the relative urgency of the situation in Africa, Moldova, the
Balkans or the Middle East?

These dilemmas, and many others besides, occupy a central place in the
Institute’s work. They also form the core of this first collective Chaillot
Paper to be published since the creation of the Institute on 1 January 2002.
The majority of the Institute’s researchers have been involved in its produc-
tion, but Antonio Missiroli, who is responsible for work on CFSP, put for-
ward the initial idea and has played a leading role.

More generally, all the levers that might be used in implementing the
Union’s stabilisation policy will have to be revisited in the light of enlarge-
ment. For many of the Union’s new neighbours, there is no prospect of mem-
bership, or only a very distant and vague one. Yet this perspective of full
membership of the Union was for over ten years the main instrument used
by the 12 and then the 15 to stabilise their external frontier. And in that
respect the current enlargement that will bring in ten new member coun-
tries is by all accounts the Union’s external stabilisation policy’s greatest
success. But as this lever cannot be extended infinitely, other instruments
will need to be created to help the 25 consolidate, on their periphery, an arc
of good governance, something that is essential to the security of all. Among
those various tools, it has to be recognised that there is a place for military
intervention, especially in crisis management and peacemaking policy. In
the Balkans, for instance, intervention and integration in the Union have
worked, and continue to work as an effective duo in stabilising former
Yugoslavia. That model is of course not directly applicable to all other zones,
but, among the Union’s policies for stabilising its periphery, the potential
role of the Union’s military instrument should not be overlooked. 

The most important thing, however, is undoubtedly that, after the single
currency, enlargement has been the Union’s greatest success story, and it has
above all to stay that way. The more the Union remains consistent, effective
and united within its frontiers, the more it will be effective and credible to its
new neighbours and partners, some of whom will perhaps be members one
day. The development, security and stability of the wider Europe’s partners
are indeed inseparable from the success of the institutional functioning of the
Union itself.

Paris, September 2003

6

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Introduction

Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

This  Chaillot  Paper is  the  product  of  collegial  reflection  by  the
EUISS research team. 

As the current enlargement process moves towards its culmi-
nation with the accession of ten new member states in May 2004,
its effects are already making themselves felt not only on the inter-
nal but also the external policies of the widening Union. New bor-
ders and neighbours bring new challenges while reconfiguring old
ones. This new reality requires more than just additions to already
existing policies. The entire neighbourhood, or proximity, policy
of the enlarged EU will have to be reassessed and reformulated.

First, enlargement itself – for long the most successful regional
policy of the EC/EU – may be reaching its geographical and func-
tional limits. For the Union, the main problem will become how to
exert influence on its neighbours comparable to that exerted in
the past decade on the Central and East Europeans without offer-
ing the prospect of membership linked to strict ‘conditionality’.
Belonging to ‘Europe’ and joining ‘EU-Europe’ are distinct condi-
tions and processes, which may overlap and coincide in terms of
both policies and ‘identity’ but which may have to remain separate
in the short term.

Second, those neighbours that are entirely excluded from the
enlargement  prospect  –  such  as  the  southern  Mediterranean
countries and, though less explicitly, Russia – demand no lesser
engagement on the part of the EU. For them, the Union has to
devise appropriate policies short of the kind of ‘conditionality’
that only accession requires, but policies still capable of offering
incentives and applying rewards and sanctions. Both the overall
amount and the actual use of the EU funds and programmes allo-
cated to them requires constant review in the light of the policy
goals the Union sets itself.

Third, all neighbourhood or proximity policies have to strike
an effective balance between regional and individual approaches –
that  is,  between  creating,  or  maintaining,  a  common  regional

7

64-English-Text.qxd  29/09/2003  16:25  Page 8

Introduction

framework for relations with the EU and more targeted and spe-
cially tailored programmes that take into account the peculiarities
of each neighbour. For instance, Ukraine and Moldova are differ-
ent both from each other and from Israel and Morocco, yet they
share land borders with both Russia and the enlarged EU. Simi-
larly, Turkey is a Muslim and a populous country, but a very dif-
ferent one from Egypt or Algeria as concerns its relations with the
Union. And even the western Balkan countries, though all ‘poten-
tial’ candidates to join the EU, often present very different policy
problems. The most effective approach would be a mixed one,
regional and individual at the same time, yet in diverse combina-
tions.

Finally, neighbourhood/proximity policies will require com-
mitment and coherence on the part of the EU: they will be effective
only if and when their recipients (the various neighbours) receive
clear messages and are presented with clear options by the Union
and by all the member states as well. Commitment and coherence
should be shown in trade, aid, assistance, and border policies, as
well as in the political will to act in accordance with values, norms
and principles set out in advance. This has not always been the case
so far – but should become common practice for the enlarged EU.1
Draft versions of the chapters of this Chaillot Paper were pre-
sented at a conference organised by the EUISS in early June 2003 in
Paris (a report of which can be found in www.iss-eu.org). The
authors are grateful to all the discussants and participants for
their feedback and criticism, which have helped them improve on
their  initial  texts.  Responsibility  for  the  arguments  presented
here, however, lies entirely and exclusively with us, individually
and collectively.

1. Shortly before this Chaillot Paper
went to print, the Notre Europe
association  published  an  ex-
tremely interesting paper on this
same bundle of issues: William
Wallace, ‘Looking after the Neigh-
bourhood:  Responsibilities  for
the EU-25’, in Policy Papers no. 4,
July  2003  (www.notre-europe.
asso.fr).

8

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The EU and its changing
neighbourhoods: stabilisation,
integration and partnership

Antonio Missiroli

Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

1

Over the past decades, the European Union has pursued at least
two  distinct  approaches  (and  policies)  towards  its  immediate
neighbourhoods:

(cid:90) an approach aimed, first and foremost, at stabilisation, mainly
based on fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships
(regionalism); and

(cid:90) an approach (in addition to, or instead of, the above), aimed at
integration proper, i.e. at bringing neighbouring countries directly
into the EU through a bilateral process based on strict ‘condi-
tionality’.

Arguably, both approaches are typical of the foreign and secu-
rity policy of any regional power, and they are also fully legitimate,
provided they are carried out with peaceful means. The European
Union, however, is nothing like a traditional ‘power’ – let alone a
‘superpower’ – and certainly not one with the attributes, goals and
instruments of a nation-state (however big). One can even ques-
tion the extent to which such terms as ‘foreign’ and/or ‘security’
policy proper may be used in conjunction with current EU poli-
cies. That said, it is conventionally assumed that the Union does
have a set of common external policies going well beyond its strict
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remit, and that most
of them notably address issues related to its immediate geograph-
ical neighbourhoods. This article aims at providing an overview of
these policies over time and space, and assessing their interplay,
sustainability and overall coherence in the light of the new context
created by the current enlargement of the Union.

9

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1

The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

The stabilisation approach

The first policy approach – stabilisation as a goal, regionalism as a
means  –  was  first  tentatively  adopted  vis-à-vis  the  crumbling
Yugoslav Federation in the early 1990s, but with very little success.1
It was then applied to the Central European countries and the
Baltic States – the Balladur Pact of 1993-95 (and first Stability Pact
proper) – and, in both cases, with a significant degree of success. In
South-Eastern Europe, however, the same approach bore little or
no fruit until it was blended with the second approach, which
envisages integration (however distant) as a goal and conditional-
ity (however strict) as a means.

East, south, and beyond
Moreover, between 1994 and 1995 the EU signed so-called Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus. With the exception of Belarus (due to objec-
tions on the EU side to President Lukashenko’s policies), the agree-
ments have been ratified by all the countries concerned and have
taken effect. They combine a Western interest in bilateral political
cooperation  and  dialogue  on  democratic  foundations  with  an
Eastern interest in economic cooperation, managed through the
Union’s TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Common-
wealth of Independent States). Strictly speaking, however, these
agreements cannot be considered as aimed at stabilising the coun-
tries concerned. The PCAs with Ukraine and Russia were subse-
quently supplemented by a ‘Common Strategy’ for each, approved
in  June  and  December  1999  respectively,  in  the  context  of  the
Union’s CFSP. Neither, however, adds much to the existing policies
or envisages eventual EU membership.2 More recently, Moldova
has been included in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
as a recipient country, although it does not entirely belong to the
region  geographically  or  politically.  In  fact,  the  dividing  line
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires ran though its current
territory – and still does, in a way, with Transnistria now cut off
from the rest of what could now qualify as a small (if peculiar)
‘Balkan’ country.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) process initiated
in  1995  –  now  more  commonly  referred  to  as  the  Barcelona
process  or  Euromed  –  can  be  considered  a  by-product  of  this

1. For a tentative overview, see Ge-
offrey  Edwards,  ‘The  Potential
and Limits of CFSP: The Yugoslav
Example’, in Elfriede Regelsberger
et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy of the Eu-
ropean Union: From EPC to CFSP and
Beyond (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Ri-
enner, 1997), pp. 173-95.

2. In December 2000 the Secre-
tary-General of the EU Council
and High Representative for the
CFSP, Javier Solana, released an
‘evaluation report’ on the three
‘Common  Strategies’  hitherto
adopted  by  the  Union  that
sounded  fairly  critical  of  the
method and the substance of the
exercise, which had been intro-
duced at the Treaty of Amster-
dam). See ‘Common Strategies
Report’, reproduced in Antonio
Missiroli (ed.), ‘Coherence for Eu-
ropean Security Policy: Debates –
Cases – Assessments’, Occasional
Paper 27 (Paris: Institute for Secu-
rity Studies of WEU, May 2001),
Annexe  E,  pp.  80-6.  Common
Strategies are expected to be in
force for five years. For specific
evaluations,  see  Gwendolyn
Sasse, ‘The EU Common Strategy
on  Ukraine:  A  Response  to
pro-European
Ukraine’s 
Choice?’, in Ann Lewis (ed.), The
EU & Ukraine: Neighbours, Friends,
Partners? (London: The Federal
Trust, 2002), pp. 213-20; Hiski
Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev
(eds.), The EU Common Strategy on
Russia:  Learning  the  Grammar  of
CFSP (Helsinki-Berlin: FIIA-IEP,
2001).

10

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Antonio Missiroli

1

approach in that it was not, and still is not, meant to lead to full
integration in the EU. Arguably, it was rather meant to prevent just
such an eventuality, at least for the foreseeable future (Morocco
had famously manifested an interest in applying for EU member-
ship), by setting up an alternative form of partnership based on
economic/trade cooperation and a rather unspecified political
‘basket’. Yet the lack of solid incentives – the ‘carrots’, as opposed
to the ‘sticks’ – on the Union’s side, coupled with the heterogene-
ity of the Mediterranean partners involved in the Euromed frame-
work (let alone the different priorities of the EU member states),
has made it less and less effective: the relevant ‘Common Strategy’
adopted in June 2000 said next to nothing as to the way ahead in
the process.3

Finally, over the years the EU has set up a wide array of multi-
lateral and bi-regional arrangements – the so-called ‘group-to-
group’ diplomacy – with areas far away from the European conti-
nent:  Central  and  Latin  America,  Asia  with  the  Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM) and Africa, not to mention the peculiar world of
the former European colonies that are tied to the EU through pref-
erential  trade  arrangements,  the  so-called  ACP  (African,
Caribbean and Pacific) countries.4 None of the latter properly fits
in the ‘neighbourhood’ policy of the Union, although they shape
(along with North America) a wider web of relations based on his-
torical and economic ties – what one might call a ‘non-geographi-
cal proximity’.

The ‘Balladur Pact’
The first Stability Pact was launched by then French Prime Minis-
ter Edouard Balladur in the spring of 1993 as an instrument of pre-
ventive diplomacy in post-Communist Europe. Its main objective
was to set out in detail and implement some basic principles with
regard to borders and minorities in the area and to organise and
coordinate the action of the institutions involved, especially the
EU, the Conference/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and the Council of Europe. It also built
upon the existing web of multilateral subregional relations estab-
lished  through  the  Central  European  Free  Trade  Agreement
(CEFTA), launched in late 1992 by the Visegrad group (the then
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) and later extended to fellow
applicants, and other partnerships in the area, all partly supported

3. See Marc Maresceau and Ed-
ward Lannon (eds.), The EU En-
largement and Mediterranean Strate-
gies:  A  Comparative  Analysis
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001);
Claire Spencer, ‘The EU and Com-
mon  Strategies:  The  Revealing
Case of the Mediterranean’, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 31-51. 

4. On the CFSP machinery, see
Jörg Monar, ‘Political Dialogue
with  Third  Countries  and  Re-
gional Political Groupings: The
Fifteen as an Attractive Interlocu-
tor’, in  Regelsberger, op. cit. in
note 1, pp. 263-74. See also Mar-
tin Holland, The European Union
and the Third World (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2002); and, more gener-
ally, Christopher Piening, Global
Europe: The European Union in World
Affairs (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Ri-
enner, 1997).

11

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1

The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

also by the EU’s Interreg programme. In December 1993, the EU
Council approved a CFSP ‘Joint Action’ to support this initiative,
and in May 1994 a conference was held in Paris with the participa-
tion  of  the  nine  European  countries  that  had  then  signed  the
Europe  Agreements  (Slovenia  was  to  follow  suit  in  1996/97).
Regional round tables were organised in the following months,
and a concluding conference took place in Paris, once again, in
March 1995. 

The resulting Stability Pact consisted of a political declaration
and about 100 bilateral agreements, the most tangible one being a
treaty  between  Slovakia  and  Hungary  regarding  the  Magyar
minority  in  Slovakia.  It  included  also  a  series  of  projects  on
regional  cross-border  economic,  cultural  and  environmental
cooperation to be funded by the PHARE programme (Action plan
for Coordinated Aid to Poland and Hungary; the abbreviation
comes from the French ). The Pact’s follow-up was handled by the
OSCE and has a mixed legacy: on the one hand, of the approxi-
mately  50  bilateral  agreements  or  arrangements  concluded
between the EU member states and the Central and East European
associates/candidates,  only  half  have  been  registered  with  the
OSCE. On the other hand, the OSCE – and notably its High Com-
missioner on National Minorities – played an important (if hardly
visible) role in advising the Baltic States on how to solve the thorny
issue of Russian-speaking minorities inside their borders.5

On the whole, however, it is fair to say that the relative effec-
tiveness of the first Pact on Stability in Europe was mainly due to
the ‘golden carrot’ of EU membership, that is, to its early overlap
with the second approach. In other words, full integration and
direct conditionality have largely superseded (for the better) the
initially more limited scope of the first approach – including that
of CEFTA, which had by 1997 more or less achieved its goal of cre-
ating a tariff-free area for trade in industrial goods and had con-
stituted a starting point for the countries’ accession to the Union’s
single market.

The special case of Turkey
Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the European Com-
munity as early as September 1963, i.e. long before Greece and the
Iberian countries, let alone the current candidates: Art. 28 of that

5. On this entire phase, see Karen
E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign
Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe
(New  York:  St.  Martin’s  Press,
1999); and Paul Luif, ‘The Euro-
pean Union’s Projection of Secu-
rity and Stability onto Central and
Eastern Europe’, in Paul Luif (ed.),
Security in Central and Eastern Europe:
Problems  –  Perceptions  –  Policies
(Wien:  Braumüller,  2001),
pp. 307-42.  For  a  broader  ap-
proach and a thorough analysis of
the various subregional groupings
and initiatives, see Andrew Cottey
(ed.), Sub-regional Cooperation in the
New Europe: Building Security, Pros-
perity and Solidarity from the Barents
to the Black Sea (New York: East-
West Institute, 1999).

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Antonio Missiroli

1

Agreement  explicitly  opened  up  the  prospect  of  Turkish  EC 
membership. At that point in time, the assumption (on both sides)
was that the road to full membership would be very long indeed
and in any case not to be taken for granted. The agreement was
based  on  genuine  common  economic  and  political  interests  –
Turkey’s strategic position on the Cold War chessboard being key –
and warmly blessed by Washington. However, Ankara never fully
implemented its side of the deal, especially regarding the lowering
of trade barriers, while Brussels responded in a similar fashion with
the financial protocol. The ambivalence and half-heartedness of
the  relationship  –  although  Turkey’s  ‘European  vocation’  was
never officially questioned – was further strengthened by domestic
turbulences, the division of Cyprus (1974), and Greece’s accession
to the EC in 1981. In April 1987, Turkey formally applied for mem-
bership, but two years later the European Commission published a
negative ‘opinion’ that put the candidacy on the back burner for a
while.6

Nevertheless, Ankara’s relevance to European security did not
decrease at all, quite the contrary: within both NATO and the
Western European Union (WEU) Turkey continued to play a role,
with the silent support of the United States, and often found or
put itself at critical junctures in transatlantic and intra-European
security debates. Such was the case, in particular, with the so-
called ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements, first between NATO and the
WEU, then – after the onset of the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) in 1999 – between the Alliance and the EU proper.
To a large extent, Turkey used its strategic position and member-
ship of NATO as an ‘asset’ in relations with the W/EU, trying to
exploit its leverage in the Alliance (and/or on divided Cyprus) to
extract better conditions from the Union in both ESDP and the
accession  process.  Such  an  approach,  complemented  with  an
uncompromising conduct and policy ‘style’, long represented a
point  of  convergence  between  the  traditional  ‘Kemalist’  élites
(especially  the  military)  and  the  modernising  urban  middle
classes.7 For both, albeit to different degrees, this was a way of car-
rying out the ‘Westernisation’ of Turkey (‘Europeanisation’ being
only an ingredient thereof) and being faithful to Kemal Atatürk’s
historical legacy without giving up on its peculiarities and ‘iden-
tity’. Similarly, at the EU end, Turkey’s diplomatic behaviour con-
stituted a welcome excuse to muddle through without making

6. For an overview, see John Red-
mond, The Next Mediterranean En-
largement of the European Commu-
nity:  Turkey,  Cyprus  and  Malta?
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993);
Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Na-
tion (eds.), Turkey Between East and
West: New Challenges for a Rising Re-
gional Power (Boulder: Westview
Press,  1996);  David  Barchard,
Turkey and the European Union (Lon-
don: CER, 1998); Robert Anciaux
(dir.), La République laïque turque
(Bruxelles:  Editions  Complexe,
2003). It is also worth recalling
that during this time Turkey un-
derwent two military coups, in
1971 and 1980.

7. On this bundle of issues see
Gareth Jenkins, ‘Context and Cir-
cumstance: The Turkish Military
and Politics’, Adelphi Paper 337,
2001; Gilles Dorronsoro, ‘The EU
and Turkey: Between Geopolitics
and Social Engineering’, Occasional
Papers 34 (Geneva: GCSP, 2002).
On ‘Berlin-plus’ in particular, see
Antonio Missiroli, ‘EU-NATO Co-
operation in Crisis Management:
No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Se-
curity Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 1,
2002, pp. 9-26.

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

any strategic choice on membership while keeping the prospect
formally  open,  thus  preserving  some  influence  over  certain
domestic decisions.

Such constructive ambiguity and half-heartedness on both
sides came to a head in the mid-1990s with the acceleration of the
EU enlargement process and the Balkan wars. At first, controversy
over the Customs Union enforced in January 1996 – lack of admin-
istrative compliance on Turkey’s side, following lack of financial
compliance on the EU side – seemed to replicate the traditional
pattern of relations. However, when the Luxembourg European
Council of December 1997 put Cyprus in the first row of EU can-
didates and plainly excluded Turkey, the stakes were crucially
raised on all fronts, from the stalemate on ‘Berlin-plus’ to domes-
tic politics: the forced resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakkan,  the  repressive  campaign  against  Kurdish  militant
groups, and the waves of illegal immigrants arriving on Italy’s
shores were all part of the picture. In the end, the Helsinki Euro-
pean Council of December 1999 decided to give Ankara candidate
‘status’, although without opening pre-accession negotiations as
long as Turkey did not meet the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’
and settle all its disputes with Greece, either bilaterally by 2004 or
through the International Court of Justice at The Hague. 

By  doing  so,  however,  the  Union  did  not  solve  the  issue  –
although things have tangibly improved on many fronts since –
but only raised the bar one notch higher. For its part, Turkey still
thought that its policy of taking political ‘hostages’ (‘Berlin-plus’,
Cyprus) and using them as bargaining chips would eventually pay
off – whereas these were liabilities rather than assets in dealing
with the EU.

Balkan evolutions
All these considerations may help explain why, as compared with
the  opening  of  the  accession  route,  the  so-called  ‘Royaumont
Process’ had such a modest impact on the EU’s immediate neigh-
bourhood. At the suggestion of Brussels and, again, based on a
French initiative, a ‘process of stability and good-neighbourly rela-
tions’ in South-Eastern Europe was inaugurated at the Royaumont
meeting, near Paris, in December 1995. It tried to take into account
the experience of the previous Stability Pact and the latest develop-
ments in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it lacked substance in that

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1

it failed to address the key issues (notably, borders and minorities)
and limited itself to promoting dialogue and better understanding
between governmental and non-governmental actors in the region.
On top of that – but understandably so, at that point in time – the
Process did not establish any link between policy change and future
association with the EU, thus offering no ‘carrots’ whatsoever to
the countries in question. Although the Union went as far as to
appoint a special coordinator in November 1997, the Royaumont
Process never got off the ground.

Only in the summer of 1999 – in the wake of the fourth consec-
utive war of Yugoslav succession, so to speak, namely that over
Kosovo – did the Union change its approach by offering a frame-
work for economic and political cooperation between the EU (plus
other international organisations) and the countries of SEE that
put some solid ‘carrots’ on the table. However, it stopped short of
creating direct ‘conditionality’, i.e. an explicit link between com-
pliance and good behaviour and the accession process. This is
probably why the jury is still out on whether the Stability Pact for
South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE) – in which the EU acts as a coordi-
nator and facilitator – has represented a fundamental policy shift
towards the Balkan countries, and whether it has acted as an effec-
tive means for either stabilisation or integration, or both at the
same time. In fact, the SPSEE encompasses successor states of for-
mer Yugoslavia but also countries – such as Bulgaria and Romania
– that have already signed Europe Agreements (EA) and started
accession negotiations, thus blurring the possible nature of the
Pact as a more or less explicit antechamber of the Union.8 And it
aims at regional stabilisation rather than pre-accession proper
(however gradual). 

Moreover, since late 2000 the Union has independently set in
motion a so-called Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
intended to foster peace, prosperity and democracy in the Western
Balkans. It sets out elements of a policy that – by resorting to a
‘contractual’ relationship between the EU and the five or six rele-
vant  states  or  entities  (Albania,  Croatia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia/FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, plus Kosovo) – tries
to bridge the gap between ‘simple’ stabilisation and ‘full’ integra-
tion,  and  supplements  this  with  an  ad  hoc  programme  called
CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Develop-
ment and Stabilisation), due to expire in 2006.9 To date, only two
countries  (Macedonia/FYROM  in  April  2001  and  Croatia  in

8. See Ralitza Dimtcheva, ‘La Bul-
garie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte
de Stabilité’, Occasional Paper 41
(Paris : EU Institute for Security
Studies, janvier 2001).

9. For an overall assessment, see
Martin Brusis and Nathan Galer,
‘South-Eastern Europe and the
EU: Problems, Actors, Policies’, in
Wim van Meurs (ed.), Beyond EU
Enlargement, vol.II, The Agenda of Sta-
bilisation for South-Eastern Europe
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Founda-
tion Publishers, 2001), pp. 45-71. 

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

October 2001) have signed so-called Stabilisation and Association
Agreements (SAA) with the EU. Their successful implementation
is a prerequisite for any further assessment of their respective
prospects for accession, although there is still no formal linkage
between them. In fact, the maximum status that the SAP can bring
is that of a ‘potential’ future member of the Union, as stated by the
Feira European Council in June 2000 and maintained the follow-
ing November at the regional EU summit in Zagreb. At any rate,
even the two SAAs have not entered into force yet but for the
interim agreements on trade-related measures, since unanimous
ratification by all EU member states is still lacking. Of the other
potential contractual partners, only Albania has started negotia-
tions (early this year). Finally, there is still no clear connection
between the SPSEE and SAP – which are expected to be comple-
mentary but without any agreed division of labour – or between
the SAP and pre-accession proper.

It is no accident, therefore, that Croatia filed a formal applica-
tion for membership in February 2003, while Macedonia/FYROM
plans to follow suit by the end of the year, thus de facto making a
unified strategic approach towards the Western Balkans more dif-
ficult. Meanwhile, the EU has decided temporarily to ‘freeze’ the
drafting of the fourth CFSP ‘Common Strategy’ envisaged after
Amsterdam, notably on the Balkans.

To a certain extent, such EU ambivalence over the final out-
come of the process is understandable, particularly in the light of
the past instability of the region: it would be the first time, in fact,
that  apparent  failure,  rather  than  prospective  success,  was
rewarded with EU membership. Such ambivalence is also partly
due to a fundamental uncertainty (and a certain number of inter-
nal divisions) over the future geographical and functional scope of
the European Union as such, for which the Balkans constitute an
important  test  case  and  a  precedent.  The  combined  effect  of
ambivalence and uncertainty on the EU side, however, risks creat-
ing a quintessentially ‘catch-22’ situation in the region: the com-
mitment eventually to grant full membership cannot be made
without substantial progress on rule of law and economic viabil-
ity, but these cannot be achieved without that commitment.

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The integration approach

By contrast, the second policy approach – based on integration as a
goal and conditionality as a means – has been much more success-
ful. Actually, enlarging the EC/EU has been, and still is, a very effec-
tive security policy. It is a security policy by other means, so to
speak,  and  a  security  policy  in  its  own  right.  By  other  means,
because extending the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities and
constraints to successive applicants has made instability and con-
flict on the Continent decreasingly likely. And it is a security policy
in its own right, too, because the entrants have brought in interests
and skills that have broadened the scope of common policies and
strengthened the EC/EU as an international actor. 

Enlargements
This was the case with the first enlargement of the European Com-
munity,  which  incorporated  the  British  (and  partially  Danish)
overseas connections and also gradually stimulated an Anglo-Irish
détente via Brussels. It was even more the case with the southern
enlargements of the 1980s, which paved the way for the successful
completion of post-authoritarian transition to democracy in the
countries concerned, provided a significant reinforcement of the
EC’s presence in the Mediterranean basin and added an equally sig-
nificant extension of European influence in the Americas. Finally,
the 1995 enlargement of the newly created EU brought more sta-
bility to the Baltic ‘rim’ and strengthened the Union’s drive to
cooperate with the UN and the OSCE.

The current enlargement, however, is nothing like the previous
ones. It is fundamentally different in size, scope, and character:
going from an EU of 15 to 25-plus member states – as decided at
the Copenhagen European Council of December 200210 – means
an increase of population of 20 per cent but an increase in GDP of
only a few percentage points (estimates range from 5 to 9), coupled
with an increase of ‘small’ members from the current 10 to 19. It is
therefore likely to change radically the institutions, the policies
and even the very nature of the Union.11

10. Accordingly, the Czech Re-
public, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia signed the
accession treaty in April 2003 and
will become full members from
April 2004. For a first evaluation,
see Heather Grabbe, ‘The Copen-
hagen  Deal  for  Enlargement’,
Briefing  Note
(London:  CER,
20 December  2002);  Antonio
Missiroli, ‘Two Enlargements and
a  Devolution’,  Newsletter no.  5
(Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, January 2003).

11. For a general overview, see
Graham  Avery  and  Fraser
Cameron, The Enlargement of the
European  Union
(Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).
See also the recent Report to the
European Commission coordi-
nated by the former Dutch PM
Wim Kok, ‘Enlarging the Euro-
pean Union: Achievements and
Challenges’ (Florence: EUI Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies,  Florence,  26  March
2003);  and  Marise  Cremona
(ed.), The Enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union (Oxford-New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2003).

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

It may also affect the way in which the EU projects itself exter-
nally: perhaps not so much in terms of its common foreign and
defence policy, to which the current applicants are expected to add
relatively little in terms of interests, inclinations and capabilities
(with the significant exception of a tangible pro-US orientation).
However, its impact will be much greater in terms of regional,
proximity and, to a certain extent, also security policy, ranging
from  border  issues  (permeability  vs.  control)  and  rights  of
transnational minorities, up to the ultimate finalité géographique of
the EU.12

It is worth noting that the process finalised at Copenhagen in
2002 started out relatively early: PHARE was created in December
1989 to support the economic reform process in Poland and Hun-
gary, and was subsequently extended and adjusted. The Europe
(Association) Agreements were signed in early 1992 by the Viseg-
rad  countries,  followed  shortly  by  Romania  and  Bulgaria,  the
Baltic States and, finally, Slovenia. However, only at the Copen-
hagen European Council of June 1993 was the direct link between
association  and  (future)  membership  made  clear  and  explicit,
thus giving the Agreements a wide-ranging and hitherto unique
scope. This included ‘conditionality’ as spelt out in the so-called
‘Copenhagen criteria’, which set a series of benchmarks from the
opening to the successful completion of entry negotiations. Such
benchmarks were later to be incorporated in Art. 49 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU).

At  that  point  in  time  it  was  widely  assumed  that  the  next
enlargement of the Union would be quite selective in the first
instance, and the criteria served the purpose of drawing a relatively
objective functional ‘road map’ for EU membership. Therefore, it
came as no particular surprise that the Luxembourg European
Council in December 1997 earmarked only six applicants for the
opening of accession negotiations: Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic  (the  three  countries  which  had  been  invited  to  join
NATO a few months earlier), Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus. It was
only two years later, under pressure from some member states,
that the Helsinki European Council extended the procedure to the
five remaining applicants plus Malta. As already mentioned, it
also awarded Turkey (the longest-waiting associate country) the
status of ‘candidate’, though one not yet ripe for opening acces-
sion negotiations.13

12. See Antonio Missiroli (ed.),
‘Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger
ESDP? The View from Central Eu-
rope’, Occasional Paper 34 (Paris:
EU Institute for Security Studies,
April 2002). For a post-Copen-
hagen  evaluation,  see  Antonio
Missiroli, ‘EU Enlargement and
CFSP/ESDP’, European Integration,
vol. 25, no. 1, 2003, pp. 1-16.

13. See Ulrich Sedelmeyer and He-
len  Wallace,  ‘Eastern  Enlarge-
ment’,  in  Helen  Wallace  and
William  Wallace  (eds.),  Policy-
Making in the European Union (Ox-
ford:  Oxford  University  Press,
2000), pp. 427-60.

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Challenges of success
In the end, therefore, the integration/conditionality approach has
fundamentally taken over as the dominant approach in most of
Central and Eastern Europe, not least because the tension and the
potential  contradiction  with  the  stabilisation/regionalism
approach was damaging the over-arching security goal (stability)
by triggering a ‘beauty contest’ among the applicants and fostering
a dangerous sense of exclusion among those who lagged behind,
thus also potentially undermining existing subregional coopera-
tion. Actually, such a risk cannot be ruled out once and for all even
now that the EU enlargement process has come full circle: ‘from
Copenhagen to Copenhagen’, so to speak. The 2002 controversy
over the Hungarian law on Magyars living abroad, especially the so-
called  ‘Benes  decrees’  in  postwar  Czechoslovakia,  showed  that
there remained a potential for subregional tension, if not open con-
flict (in particular over minority issues), which perhaps only the
EU’s norms and obligations can help overcome.14

In addition, the fact that Romania and Bulgaria have missed –
at least for the time being, given that in Copenhagen a target date
(2007) was set for their entry – the forthcoming wave of accessions
may create some problems, especially if their eventual integration
takes longer than foreseen due to the aftershock of the first wave
inside the Union and the possible attendant repercussions on the
two countries (who have now been joined by Croatia and, possibly,
Macedonia/FYROM). In this respect, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
inclusion in the other wave of enlargement, namely that of NATO
– as decided at the Prague North Atlantic Council of November
2002, a few weeks before Copenhagen15 – is expected to prevent
such an eventuality or, perhaps more importantly, prevent it from
having critically destabilising effects. More generally, such prob-
lems will not necessarily go away even once the current enlarge-
ment process has been completed and all the applicants have been
brought into the EU fold. New minority and border issues are
bound to emerge, especially with the new neighbourhoods of the
enlarged EU.16

By the same token, a possible third Eastern enlargement of
NATO from 2004-05 – namely, to such Balkan countries as Croa-
tia, Macedonia/FYROM and Albania – may help dispel their fears
of exclusion from the ‘West’ and further stabilise them domesti-
cally.  However,  it  may  also  strengthen  their  perception  of  the

14.  See  Heather  Grabbe,  ‘The
Benes Decrees: Implications for
EU  Enlargement’,  Briefing  Note
(London:  CER,  June  2002);  ‘A
Spectre over Central Europe’, The
Economist, 17 August 2002, pp. 23-
4. More generally, see Eiki Berg
and Wim van Meurs, ‘Legacies of
the Past, Ethnic and Territorial
Conflict Potentials’, in Iris Kempe
(ed.), Beyond EU Enlargement, vol. I,
The Agenda of Direct Neighbourhood
for Eastern Europe (Gütersloh: Ber-
telsmann Foundation Publishers,
2001), pp. 129-63.

15. In Prague, the Atlantic Alliance
decided to ‘invite’ Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania to join
the current 19 Allies by May 2004.
By then, therefore, NATO will have
26 members, 19 of which will be in
common with the EU.

16. For an initial appraisal see Jan
Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound:
Enlarging and Reshaping the Bound-
aries of the European Union  (Lon-
don-New York: Routledge, 2002).

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

Union as a less inclusive ‘club’ than the US-led Alliance. It is per-
haps also for this reason that the EU is trying to resuscitate and re-
launch the ‘European Conference’, initially invented in order to
suit  Turkey’s  peculiar  status  and  encompassing  all  candidate
countries no matter whether they have already met the Copen-
hagen criteria and started pre-accession negotiations. In fact, a
special meeting of the new Conference was held in the wake of the
official  signing  ceremony  for  the  ten  acceding  countries,  in
Athens, on 17 April 2003 – but the odds for success are still uncer-
tain.

Between integration and partnership

The two approaches described above have hardly corresponded to
policies that were fully and/or thoroughly conceived from the out-
set. On the contrary, they have been more reactive than proactive,
and a certain measure of ambiguity (however ‘constructive’) over
the final outcome has always existed, fostered also by differing
visions of enlargement among the current member states. Over
time, however, it has become increasingly evident that such ambi-
guity or fuzziness has limits and may even prove counter-produc-
tive. Unlike NATO and its Partnership for Peace programme –
which  has  managed,  quite  successfully,  to  blur  the  difference
between members and non-members and thus distribute security
benefits across the entire Continent without incurring significant
institutional costs – the Union has serious problems in doing that
effectively without clarifying (internally as well as externally) the
ultimate goal of its partnerships and regional policies. Further-
more, unlike the OSCE and/or the Council of Europe, the EU can-
not water down its nature and scope for the sake of extended mem-
bership: if it did, it would lose its main strength and, consequently,
its very appeal.17

Differentiation
To address all of this, the Union needs to assess how far it can
stretch its present structure and policies, both geographically and
functionally. This may lead to the explicit introduction of forms of
differentiation internally in order to accommodate potentially con-
flicting demands. The current institutional review process (the

17. For comparisons between the
different enlargements of Euro-
pean organisations over the past
years, see Stuart Croft et al., The
Enlargement of Europe (Manchester:
Manchester  University  Press,
1999); and Adrian Hyde-Price,
‘The Antinomies of European Se-
curity: Dual Enlargement and the
Reshaping of the European Or-
der’, Contemporary Security Policy,
vol. 21, no. 3, 2000, pp. 139-67.

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Convention on the Future of Europe and the ensuing Intergovern-
mental Conference) may well serve this purpose. In addition, a
debate on the ultimate conceivable border of the wider Union – the
limes, so to speak – may prove useful, if not conclusive. In fact, Arti-
cle 237 of the Treaty of Rome, later integrated into Art. O (Title VII)
of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  European  Union,  states  that  ‘any 
European state’ can apply to become a member of the EEC (see
Annexe 7 a). Since the 1993 Copenhagen summit and the Treaty of
Amsterdam (Article 49 TEU), such ‘European-ness’ has been com-
bined with conditionality (Annexe 7 b). The draft Constitutional
Treaty released in July 2003 by the European Convention follows
the same approach (Annexe 7. c). Accordingly, prospective candi-
dates must meet the following criteria for membership: democracy,
rule of law, enforcement of human rights, respect for minorities, a
functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competi-
tive pressures and the ability to take on EU obligations. Finally,
since the 1999 Kosovo war, the prospect of EU membership has
been floated in areas of the Continent that had been hitherto ruled
out, from the Balkans to Ukraine. Lately even Russia, in the after-
math  of  its  rapprochement  with  NATO,  has  been  quoted  as  a
potential future candidate, although it is much more likely to
remain an external (if possibly ever closer) partner. Meanwhile, the
period of application of the ‘Common Strategy’ on Russia has been
extended until June 2004. Perhaps it is time the Union addressed
these issues in a more stringent manner and devised more coherent
and articulated policies to resolve them.18

Moreover, the EU should consider forms of partnership and
cooperation (bi- and/or multilateral) that may stop short of full
eventual integration but, none the less, bring about a significant
degree of cooperation and stabilisation. The difficulty lies in the
fact that the most effective regional policy tool at the disposal of
the Union to this end has been conditionality, and conditionality
really works only when eventual membership is at stake. When it is
not, it proves a much weaker instrument, as the experience of the
past  decade  has  shown  and  the  general  difficulty  the  Union’s
CFSP has met in enforcing ‘negative’ diplomacy towards third
countries in order to force compliance with human and civil rights
further proves. Therefore, if membership is the ‘golden carrot’ but
is not on offer, what ‘silver’ and/or ‘bronze’ carrots can be devised
for the EU as a regional power to carry out effective policies in its
(old and new) neighbourhoods? 

18. For an interesting overview,
see Thomas Christiansen et al.,
‘Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Bor-
ders:  The  European  Union’s
“Near Abroad” ’, Cooperation and
Conflict,  vol.  35,  no.  4,  2000,
pp. 389-415. 

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

Probably,  a  certain  degree  of  external differentiation  with
respect to the various areas and countries involved has to be put in
place: not differentiation by accident and reactive improvisation,
as displayed by the current array of institutional and contractual
relations (from the PCAs to the SAP, from the EMP to other for-
mats), but one that adequately takes into account the peculiarities
of the actors and issues concerned. On the one hand, two basic
‘menus’ should be on offer, namely prospective membership (with
tentative ‘road maps’ and signposts) or just partnership (with
associated mutual obligations and benefits). On the other, not all
the items on either menu would be available to all potential recip-
ients and at the same time: implementation would be based on the
ability and willingness to deliver on the part of each individual
partner.

The Turkish conundrum
First of all, the Union will certainly have to sort out its collective
attitude vis-à-vis Turkey. The constructive ambiguity that domi-
nated talks and negotiations on both sides until recently may have
to be overcome sooner rather than later: either towards full mem-
bership, with a ‘road map’ for negotiations and a tentative dead-
line, or towards a structured bilateral partnership without full mem-
bership. The timetable for Cyprus’s entry in May 2004 may still
become an important catalyst for this. In Copenhagen, in fact,
Turkey obtained a ‘rendezvous for the rendezvous’ in December
2004, at which point in time, after the current enlargement has
been completed, Turkey’s credentials will be thoroughly assessed
in the light of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and a clear decision hope-
fully taken. It is worth recalling that, to date, all the countries that
have started negotiations with the EC/EU have also completed
them  and  –  with  the  exception  of  Norway,  but  due  to  its  own
autonomous national decision – have ended up as full members.
The endgame is approaching, therefore, and its outcome will have
repercussions on several counts. The ‘European Conference’ that
was invented in 1997 to accommodate Turkey’s peculiar status has
proved an empty shell in this respect, and the Customs Union with
Ankara  has  not  entirely  got  off  the  ground.  At  the  same  time,
Turkey is a crucial NATO ally, is engaged on the ground in the
Balkans and is an important partner in the Middle East, the Gulf,
and the Caucasus, although it is still difficult to predict how the

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events that preceded and accompanied the US-led war on Iraq in
the spring of 2003 will affect Ankara’s attitude.

At any rate, the structural imbalance between the country’s
important strategic position and its economic weakness has to be
addressed with instruments capable of meeting the specific (and
at times contradictory) demands that come from both Turkey
itself and the broader eastern Mediterranean region. Meanwhile,
the  new  Turkish  government  elected  in  November  2002  has
shown a readiness to change and compromise – from the status of
Cyprus (albeit not so much, unfortunately, in the run-up to and
aftermath of Copenhagen) to the so-called ‘Berlin-plus’ arrange-
ment between NATO and the EU – that bodes well for the crucial
decision to be taken in 2004, provided other subregional develop-
ments do not derail the whole process.19 Much remains to be
done, of course, but the new leadership seems to have understood
what specific requirements need to be met for the prospect of EU
membership to materialise. In a way, it has reversed the traditional
Turkish approach in that it is trying to extract better conditions
from the EU by showing a more accommodating attitude – rather
than an uncompromising one – on those issues that matter most
to the EU: ‘Berlin-plus’, human rights and, hopefully, Cyprus.

This said, and wishing every success to Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and his moderate Islamic Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP), the domestic situation is still far from settled.
Moreover, Turkey – unlike the ten currently acceding countries –
cannot rely on a strong constituency within the EU to support its
membership bid. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously declared his
opposition to that in November 2002, shortly after the electoral
tsunami that brought the AKP to power. In turn, Greece’s support
– at least since the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ of September 1999 – is
as much unexpected as it is qualified and conditional. To a certain
extent, Athens has managed to ‘Europeanise’ its relations with
Ankara, but remains vigilant on its core interests, from Cyprus to
airspace and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea.20

On the one hand, it is arguable that Turkey, whose religious
roots and ‘identity’ are coming to be considered an asset rather
than a liability in that the ‘West’, especially since 9/11, is desper-
ately  searching  for  a  democratic  success  story  in  the  Muslim
world. The AKP’s sweeping victory in the November 2002 elec-
tions is a clear sign of democratisation, and of a democratisation
that is increasingly being linked to the prospect of adhesion to the

19. An initial deal on ‘Berlin-plus’
was eventually struck in December
2002 in the wake of the Copen-
hagen summit: it foresees inter alia
that Malta and Cyprus will not
participate in any EU military op-
eration  conducted  with  NATO
planning and logistical support.
For  recent  reappraisals  see
Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip
L. Martin, ‘Is Turkey Ready for Eu-
rope?’,  Foreign  Affairs,  vol.  82,
no. 3, 2003, pp. 97-111; Gareth
Jenkins, ‘Muslim Democrats in
Turkey?’, Survival, vol. 45, no. 1,
2003, pp. 45-66; Philip Robins,
‘Confusion at Home, Confusion
Abroad: Turkey between Copen-
hagen and Iraq’, International Af-
fairs, vol. 79, no. 3, 2003, pp. 547-
66;  and  Antonio  Missiroli,
‘Turkish Delights? A Response to
Bilgin’, Security Dialogue, vol. 34,
no. 3, 2003, pp. 348-52.

20. See Giscard d’Estaing’s inter-
view  to  Le  Monde,  9  novembre
2002, and Yves Mény, ‘L’Europe,
Dieu et les Turcs . . . ’, Le Monde, 15
novembre 2002. See also Daniel
Vernet, ‘L’Europe médiatrice entre
Grecs et Turcs’, Le Monde, 23 juin
2003, and the discussion of the
pros and cons of Turkish EU mem-
bership, 
Internationale  Politik,
Transatlantic  Edition  2,  2003,
pp. 48-64.

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

EU. On the other hand, however, Turkey’s sheer size and economic
backwardness – in the light of current trends, by 2014 it could be
at the same time the poorest and the most populous EU member –
clearly act against its chances of admission.

For all these reasons, postponing the decision and muddling
through indefinitely may in the end have more negative than pos-
itive consequences, in domestic as well as strategic terms. Further-
more, if the December 2004 decision is a positive one and formal
accession negotiations get under way, the traditional policy ‘style’
of Turkish diplomatic and military élites may well be called cru-
cially into question. In fact, the country would then have to nego-
tiate with Brussels from a position of structural weakness, as was
(and still is) the case with the current wave of enlargement – a posi-
tion Turkey is not used to and may find difficult to deal with, with
consequences that are hard to foresee.

Outsiders as insiders
As regards Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, the decision between
structured partnership and full membership lies exclusively with
them. All three countries are already de facto members of the single
market through the European Economic Area. Norway and Ice-
land are also part of ‘Schengenland’ through the Nordic Passport
Union. Finally, acceptance of these countries among EU citizens is
very high, as the Eurobarometer polls consistently show, and they
would be most welcome also because they would immediately –
unlike almost all the currently acceding countries – become net
contributors to the EU budget. In these particular cases, in other
words, there is nothing new to be put on the table: all the elements
are  there  already.  Regarding  Norway,  interest  in  joining  the
enlarged Union seems to be on the rise after Copenhagen and could
well lead to a renewed bid, after the failures of 1972 and 1994, when
the accession deals were eventually rejected in popular referen-
dums.

Balkan dilemmas
As explained earlier, the jury is still out as far as the (remaining)
Balkan countries are concerned, especially Serbia and Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia/
FYROM. As already mentioned, some of these are also candidates

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1

for NATO membership, and the further expansion of the Alliance
may influence EU policy towards them. Unlike Croatia, however,
they are still objects and recipients – albeit at different levels of
intensity – of NATO-led and/or EU-led security policy operations.
In other words, they still fall short of providing a stable domestic
and regional picture and meeting the Copenhagen criteria in full.
And this is unlikely to change in the short term, with the possible
exception of Macedonia/FYROM. 

In  the  medium  to  long  term,  however,  the  crucial  issue  is
whether and under what conditions full EU membership would be
both conceivable and acceptable to the Union. If it is conceivable
(all the countries in question meet the geographic ‘European-ness’
criterion), it also has to be made acceptable, first through strin-
gent scrutiny of the implementation of the SAP and a better use of
the instruments provided especially by the SPSEE and CARDS
(with a view to reducing aid dependency and substituting external
assistance by indigenous growth), then through a closely moni-
tored ‘road map’ to eventual accession (see Annexe 3). Finally, the
highly sensitive issues of status – including borders and statehood
–  that  linger  over  most  of  the  region  have  also  to  be  tackled,
though  preferably  in  conjunction  with  standards  and  bench-
marks of good governance.21

To  these  ends,  the  Thessaloniki  European  Council  of  June
2003 reiterated its support for the ‘European perspective’ of the
western Balkan countries, due to ‘become an integral part of the
EU once they meet the established criteria’: their ‘privileged rela-
tions’ with the Union will be strengthened and the SAP ‘enriched’,
although the overall financial package is to rise only marginally
(see Annexe 2). This said, doubts remain as to whether the whole
process can overcome the low acceptance by EU citizens of most
Balkan countries, which may eventually play a decisive role. In fact,
integrating countries whose social and economic development is
lagging and marred by criminal networks, and whose democratic
credentials are unproven and administrative practices pre-mod-
ern, is a daunting challenge. To that, one should add the possible
emergence of both enlargement ‘fatigue’ after the 2007 wave (or
even earlier) and a specifically Balkan ‘fatigue’, given the consider-
able amount of financial and military resources deployed to the
region.

A possible fall-back position could be either (in the event of
accession)  an  ever-increasing  internal  differentiation  in  the

21. See Marie-Janine Calic, ‘The
EU and the Balkans: From Associ-
ation to Membership?’, SWP Com-
ments, 7 (Berlin: SWP, May 2003).

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

enlarged Union – something very close to a multi-tier EU – or else,
at least temporarily, a very solid ‘silver carrot’ encompassing for
example a brand new status of ‘associate member’. This would
provide both tangible benefits (customs union, economic and
administrative  assistance)  and  a  European  ‘identity’  (photo  de
famille, structured political partnership) without imposing the
risks, for both sides, of an undesired or unaffordable membership.
In a way, the choice is between further enlargement proper, with all
its foreseeable costs on both sides, and a sort of ‘enlargement by
other means’. At the same time, once again, it may be in the short-
term interest of the Union to postpone such a choice as long as
possible in order to exploit all the potential of the ‘golden carrot’,
especially in so far as postponement helps to conceal differences
within the EU over the ultimate objective of the process – which
could well remain open-ended until further notice.

New (and old) neighbours

Once  the  current  enlargement  process  has  been  completed,  in
2004, the wider EU (without Turkey) will automatically acquire
some new neighbours, starting with Ukraine and Belarus and end-
ing with Moldova. By contrast, Russia is already a neighbour of the
Union by virtue of its long border with Finland. Additional new
neighbours will be the western Balkan countries (all ‘potential’
future members), while the countries on the southern Mediter-
ranean ‘rim’  – Turkey apart – constitute a different kind of neigh-
bourhood, strategically as well as geographically.

The ‘Eastern dimension’
To a certain extent, some of the dilemmas illustrated above for the
Balkan countries may apply also to the three westernmost mem-
bers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Much as
they differ significantly one from another in terms of history, size
and potential problems, they are all ‘European’, at least geographi-
cally, but they are also all far behind on their path to ‘Europeanisa-
tion’. Moreover, Ukraine and (though less explicitly) Moldova – but
not Belarus – have expressed their interest in becoming, one day,
EU members, although none of them has ever received any encour-
agement from Brussels.

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In any event, the challenge for the Union will be to try and sep-
arate the two main virtues it has in the eyes of most of the neigh-
bouring countries, namely being both a vehicle for change and a
potential end-goal. This implies conceiving an approach that (a)
conveys a sense of inclusion in ‘Europe’ separate from the end-
state of full EU membership, while (b) working to foster the kind
of  change  that  may  make  it  conceivable  at  some  point  in  the
future, and given appropriate circumstances, to consider that very
membership. This in turn entails a reversal of emphasis, stressing
the process of adaptation to (rather than the end-goal of integra-
tion in) EU structures and policies. The countries concerned, in
other words, must be helped find their way into ‘Europe’ without
necessarily aiming directly at belonging to ‘EU-Europe’. 

What the Union can sensibly do is, first, increase the Eastern
neighbours’ awareness of the membership requirements and, sec-
ond, foster ever more decisively the process of democratisation,
state consolidation, administrative reform and economic liberali-
sation – which will both contribute to stabilising the Eastern ‘rim’
of the enlarged EU and facilitate its gradual entry into the Euro-
pean ‘mainstream’.

This said, the peculiarity of the three ‘new’ Eastern neighbours
– as distinct from all other potential members and partners – is
their relationship with, and dependence on, Russia. As such, this
may shape a sort of ‘Eastern dimension’ of the EU, namely one
based on a set of trilateral relations in which these countries also
represent, to varying degrees, an interface between Moscow and
the Union as an explicit element of their direct bilateral partner-
ship. In the case of Belarus, its likely eventual inclusion into the
Russian Federation would clearly simplify the current picture.22
Moldova’s  Russian  connection  is  mainly  (but  not  exclusively)
linked to the issue of secessionist Transnistria but is matched by
an equally delicate Romanian connection, which makes the coun-
try a particular test case for the enlarging EU.23 As for Ukraine, its
willingness to ‘go West’  is still not matched by consistent domes-
tic reforms, while its strategic position in the energy supply mar-
ket makes it a crucial partner for both Russia and the EU.24

In principle, therefore, the EU could envisage a neighbourhood
policy to the East that included either or both of two components:
the reinforcement of links with each of the three countries, with
due  regard  to  their  specificity,  and/or  the  development  of  a
regional approach – an Ostpolitik in its own right – that would

22. See Ann Lewis (ed.), The EU &
Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels
(London:  The  Federal  Trust,
2002); Leonid Zaiko, ‘Give a Dog
a Bad Name’, in Anatol Lieven and
Dimitri Trenin (eds.), Ambivalent
Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the
Price of Membership (Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace, 2003), pp. 90-
107.

23 Dov Lynch, ‘Crisis in Moldova’,
Newsletter no. 2 (Paris: EU Institute
for Security Studies, May 2002),
and his ‘Case Study of a Joint Ap-
proach  to  the  Moldovan  Con-
flict’, in Dov Lynch, ‘Russia Faces
Europe’, Chaillot Paper 60 (Paris:
EU Institute for Security Studies,
May 2003), pp. 96-103; see also
Michel Bran, ‘Les Moldaves et le
passeport roumain’, Le Monde,
29 novembre 2002, p. 17; and
Charles King, ‘The Europe Ques-
tion in Romania and Moldova’, in
Lieven and Trenin (eds.), op. cit. in
note 22, pp.245-68. 

24. For example, Taras Kuzio and
Jennifer D.P. Moroney, ‘Ukraine
and the West: Moving from Sta-
bility to Strategic Enlargement’,
European Security, vol. 10, no. 2,
2001,  pp.  111-26;  Oleksandr
Pavliuk, ‘An Unfulfilling Partner-
ship: Ukraine and the West 1991-
2001’, European Security, vol. 11,
no. 1, 2002, pp. 81-101; Lewis
(ed.),  op.  cit.  in  note  2;  and
Alexander J. Motil’s and James
Sherr’s  articles  in  Lieven  and
Trenin (eds.), op. cit. in note 22,
pp. 15 ff. and 108 ff. respectively.

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The EU and its changing neighbourhoods

encompass all three and place them in the context of EU-Russia
relations.25 As things stand now, however, the former is more
likely to be chosen, although cooperation with Moscow, possibly
in the framework of OSCE, may well turn out to be quite effective
in and with Moldova, after having failed in and with Belarus. In
either case, it is worth stressing that the countries in question tend
to reject the term ‘neighbourhood policy’, which they consider as
a polite form of exclusion, and they view with particular concern
the gradual establishment of a ‘Schengen curtain’ between them
and ‘EU-Europe’.

Finally, it is also predictable that the ‘acceding’ countries – as
the ten candidates accepted in Copenhagen are now called ahead
of their actual entry – will push for the reinforcement of such an
‘Eastern dimension’ of the Union’s policies, as much as Finland
(and to a lesser extent Sweden) did over the past years with the
‘Northern Dimension’ blueprint.26 It is no accident that in the
run-up  to  Copenhagen,  on  18  November  2002,  the  Council
decided to launch a ‘New Neighbours Initiative’ focused on ‘the
need for the EU to formulate an ambitious, long-term and inte-
grated approach towards each of these countries’ (see Annexe 1).
In  turn,  Poland  delivered  a  policy  non-paper  on  the  ‘Eastern
Dimension’ as concerning mostly Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.27
In a similar vein, on 11 March 2003 the European Commission
delivered a Communication on ‘Wider Europe’ that encompasses
future  relations  with  both Eastern  and Southern  neighbours
(Annexe 2) – a relatively unexpected association that is discussed
in more detail in the Conclusions of this publication.

Beyond Barcelona
Finally, the Barcelona process may have to be streamlined and rede-
fined, with a more realistic but also more tangible prospect of
structured  partnership  for  the  Mediterranean  countries.  This
could (and probably should) include a certain degree of differenti-
ation  among  them,  especially  since  the  demand  for  separate
‘Action Plans’ now comes notably from some Euromed partners.
Of the 12 included in the EMP, three (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey)
are already involved in the current enlargement, one (Morocco)
tried – not long ago but in vain – to be accepted as a potential can-
didate,  and  two  (Israel  and  the  Palestinian  Authority)  are  still

25. See Iris Kempe and Wim van
Meurs, ‘Strategic Challenges and
Risks of EU Eastern Enlargement’,
in Kempe (ed.), op. cit. in note 14,
pp. 11-43; Stephen White et al.,
‘Enlargement and the New Out-
siders’, Journal of Common Market
Studies,  vol.  40,  no.  1,  2002,
pp. 135-53; Catherine Guicherd,
‘The Enlarged EU’s Eastern Bor-
der: Integrating Ukraine, Belarus
and  Moldova  in  the  European
Project’, SWP-Studie 20 (Berlin:
SWP, June 2002); and William
Wallace, ‘Does the EU Have an
Ostpolitik?’, in Lieven and Trenin
(eds.), op. cit. in note 22 , pp. 44-
66.

26. For an overview see Hanna
Ojanen, ‘The EU and Its ‘Northern
Dimension’: An Actor in Search of
a Policy, or a Policy in Search of an
Actor?’, European Foreign Affairs Re-
view, vol. 5, no. 3, 2000, pp. 359-
76.  See  also  Chris  Patten  and
Anna  Lindh,  ‘Europe’s  Crucial
Northern Dimension’, Financial
Times, 20 December 2000.

27. See John Reed, ‘Poland Sug-
gests New Eastern Policy for EU’,
Financial Times, 28 January 2003,
and more generally Chris Patten
and Romano Prodi, ‘A coté de l’U-
nion européenne un cercle de pays
amis’, Le Monde, 19 mars 2003.

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caught up in a bilateral conflict while both being important EU
trade partners and recipients of aid. In other words, the Euromed
partners can hardly be considered a single and homogeneous unit.
The  eastern  Mediterranean  (now  part  of  the  EU  enlargement
process proper), Israel/Palestine, the Mashraq and the Maghreb
can be considered as distinct subregional units, each with its own
specific features.

With this in mind, much can still be improved in terms of exist-
ing  programmes  and  their  implementation,  starting  with  the
unrealistic (and perhaps also undesirable) goal of establishing a
free-trade zone by 2010, continuing with the way in which MEDA
funds are spent (or not) and concluding with the extremely deli-
cate security aspects. These have become ever more important
with the growing debate over how to address the proliferation and
spread  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD)  in  the  wider
region, which strikes extremely sensitive chords in the Mediter-
ranean  while  being  potentially  divisive  inside  the  European
Union.  Important  also  because,  from  2005  onwards,  the
Barcelona process may well end up encompassing only Israel and a
whole set of Arab countries (perhaps including also Libya), with all
the imaginable implications.

The same applies to the other highly sensitive issue in Euromed
relations, namely the link between economic cooperation (trade
and aid) and the incentives (negative and/or positive) to be set on
the extension of human rights and democracy, or simply good
governance (see Annexe 4). In this domain the EU has been at
times inconsistent with its own principles and declared objectives,
giving priority to static internal regime stability – which is not nec-
essarily the same thing as regional stability – over the defence and
promotion of democratic rights in partner countries over which it
has some leverage. Here too – after setting a shared and more cred-
ible policy framework – it may be both wiser and more effective to
envisage a set of targeted programmes based on a contractual rela-
tionship and aimed at addressing issues both common to the
region and country-specific.28 A recent case in point – and one that
is becoming ever more important politically, as the Presidency
Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003
show  –  is  the  control  over  illegal  immigration  flows  from  the
southern  Mediterranean  ‘rim’  into  EU  territory,  which  may
require both a general framework and more targeted instruments.

28. See Fred Tanner (ed.), The Eu-
ropean Union as a Security Actor in the
Mediterranean  (Zürich:  Zürcher
Beiträge  zur  Sicherheitspolitik
und Konfliktforschung, 2001);
Martin Ortega, ‘Military Dialogue
in the Euro-Mediterranean Char-
ter: An Unjustified Absence’, The
International  Spectator,  vol.  35,
no. 1, 2000, pp. 115-25; Sven Bis-
cop,  ‘The  ESDP  and  the  Euro-
Mediterranean Security’, Security
Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 2, June 2003,
pp. 183-98.  See also Dorothée
Schmid, ‘Optimiser le processus
de Barcelone’, Occasional Paper 36
(Paris : EU Institute for Security
Studies, juillet 2002), and George
A. Papandreou and Chris Patten,
‘Garantir la stabilité régionale’, Le
Figaro, 26 mai 2003.

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The EU and its proximities

As mentioned at the start, a policy towards the immediate geo-
graphical neighbourhood is an essential feature and requirement
of  any  regional  power,  and  the  EU  intends  to  be(come)  a  fully-
fledged one. It is therefore not only normal but consistent with the
Union’s nature and principles that it aims at building ‘a ring of
friends’ around its borders, as the Commission Communication of
March 2003 states. In turn, Article I-56 of the draft Constitutional
Treaty delivered by the European Convention reads: ‘The Union
shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring states, aim-
ing to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness,
founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and
peaceful relations based on cooperation’ (see Annexe 7. d).

At the same time, the Union also sees itself as an international
actor, at least on the economic and (to a lesser extent) diplomatic
front. That does not mean that it has the ambition to become a
global power in its own right, nor that it can/will operate worldwide
across the board, especially as regards military intervention and
such strategic issues as non-proliferation or energy supply. How-
ever, the nature of the challenges with which the EU countries are
increasingly confronted is making it both inevitable and desirable
for the Union to adopt a more systematic and comprehensive
approach to the wider world – as shown especially by the security
strategy paper delivered in June 2003 by the CFSP High Represen-
tative. On the one hand, in fact, the paper stresses the need ‘to pro-
mote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean, with whom we
can enjoy close and cooperative relations’ without creating ‘new
dividing lines in Europe’. On the other hand, it also emphasises
that ‘in a world of global threats, global markets and global media’
Europe’s security and prosperity ‘depend on an effective multilat-
eral system’ based on ‘pre-emptive engagement’ worldwide and
the readiness of EU countries ‘to share in responsibility for global
security’ (see Annexe 6).

That said, if one looks for instance at the aid flows emanating
from the EU, it becomes clear that the range of its interests and
partnerships is still rather selective and corresponds to that of a
regional power with some clearly identifiable overseas interests.

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Still in 2000 for instance, according to Commission estimates, out
of the €12 billion of the Union’s aid budget (EC plus European
Development Fund), roughly €2 billion went to the Central and
East European candidates, €1 billion to emergency, humanitarian
and food aid (mostly directed to Africa), €1 billion to the Mediter-
ranean, and €500 million each to the CIS, Latin America and Asia.
In so far as it is directed overseas, EU aid mostly ends up in ACP
countries, and the picture is more or less the same – with only
minor variations – if one looks at the bilateral aid given by individ-
ual EU member states. This further proves that the Union has a
geographical proximity (the immediate neighbourhood) as well as a
historical/economic proximity, which basically coincides with the
post-colonial links and the preferential partnerships of its mem-
ber states. 

As for security policy proper, the current planning assump-
tions for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) envis-
age a virtual geographical radius for EU military crisis manage-
ment  (up to approximately 4,000 km from Brussels) that roughly
covers the present immediate neighbourhood, starting with the
Balkans but touching only lightly the CIS proper and the south-
ern shore of the Mediterranean. It is also a fact that the first EU-led
crisis management operations are being carried out in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia/FYROM. Yet it is interesting to note
that talks are under way with a view to undertaking a joint EU-
Russia peacekeeping operation in Moldova with an OSCE man-
date. On top of this, the Union has recently taken on another sim-
ilarly limited military/humanitarian operation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, following a request by the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral as well as past discussions over possible deployments notably
in the African Great Lakes region or elsewhere in sub-Saharan
Africa. This is only to prove that the ‘outer’ proximity of the EU
now matters also in terms of direct military engagement, after the
interesting precedent of East Timor in 2000 (although EU coun-
tries were not engaged under a Union flag). Actually, once again,
the potential radius for purely humanitarian operations already
stretches as far as 10,000 km from Brussels.29

In other words, there seems to be a discernible pattern and a
substantial geographical overlap in the Union’s various external
policies:  trade,  aid,  diplomacy,  and  now  crisis  management

29. Such planning assumptions
were first formulated at the infor-
mal meeting of EU defence minis-
ters at Sintra, Portugal, on 28 Feb-
ruary 2000, in the margins of the
‘food-for-thought’ paper released
on the occasion. However, they do
not constitute an official EU ‘doc-
trine’, nor are they in any way bind-
ing politically. For the paper see
Maartje Rutten (comp.), ‘From
St.Malo to Nice – European De-
fence: Core Documents’, Chaillot
Paper 47 (Paris: WEU Institute for
Security Studies, 2001), pp. 94-
107. 

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proper. What is still lacking is a more streamlined and coherent
approach  especially  to  the  immediate  neighbourhood,  after  a
decade of mostly reactive decisions and constructive ambiguities.
To give just one practical example: will it make sense, once the cur-
rent enlargement process has been completed, to preserve the cur-
rent rigid separation (in both bureaucratic and procedural terms)
between  the  Interreg,  PHARE,  CARDS,  TACIS  and  other  pro-
grammes,  thus  perpetuating  the  tension  between  the  two
approaches analysed above? Fortunately, the Commission seems
to  be  reflecting  on  this.  More  generally,  the  most  effective
approach is likely to be one that can combine elements of both sta-
bilisation and integration, with regionally focused as well as coun-
try-tailored programmes, and an explicit political engagement on
the part of the EU.

Interestingly, this also appears to be the approach that the
Union as a whole intends to adopt if one looks at the General
Affairs and External Relations Council Report on ‘Wider Europe –
New Neighbourhood’ of 18 June 2003, which basically blends ele-
ments  of  both  the  Council’s  and  the  Commission’s  papers  of
recent months. In fact, the Report emphasises the need to set com-
mon policy goals for all (old and new) neighbours – to be ‘seen as
separate from the question of possible EU accession’ as regulated
by Art. 49 TEU – while increasingly resorting to ‘differentiation’ in
dealing with individual countries. In the medium term, it argues,
the Union’s relations with neighbouring countries are to be based
on ‘Action Plans’, i.e. ‘political documents, building on existing
agreements and setting out clearly the over-arching strategic pol-
icy targets, common objectives, political and economic bench-
marks used to evaluate progress in key areas, and a timetable for
their achievement which enable progress to be judged regularly.’
Besides,  such  Action  Plans  ‘should  be  concise,  complemented
where necessary by more detailed plans for sector-specific cooper-
ation, and should inform EC country assistance’: the latter, in par-
ticular, should encompass a thorough review of the ‘interoperabil-
ity’  of  the  various  instruments  of  regional  policy  as  well  as  a
potentially  new  ‘Neighbourhood  Instrument’  specifically  to
address cross-border issues (see Annexe 5).

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Antonio Missiroli

1

Hopefully the forthcoming enlargement, coupled with a grow-
ing demand for a more active foreign policy, will force an even
more systematic approach onto the relevant policy-makers. For
the time being, it seems to have markedly speeded up institutional
thinking and bureaucratic action. It is telling that, after a new ded-
icated Directorate-General Enlargement was set up in 1999 and
Commissioner  Günter  Verheugen  was  appointed  to  lead  the
whole process, in early July 2003 the Commission reorganised its
services to deal mainly with ‘Wider Europe’, creating an ad hoc
Task Force and partially merging staff from that DG and RELEX.
In terms of external policies, however, enlargement will add
very little to the ‘outer’ proximity of the Union: none of the appli-
cants – with the partial exception of the Central/Baltic European
expatriate communities in the United States and, perhaps, Turkey
(Middle East, Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia) – has an impe-
rial past or overseas linkages. However, it will certainly have an
impact on the new immediate neighbourhoods of the enlarged
EU, which these countries were part of in the past and will be in
close contact with in the future. Indeed, the most important con-
tribution (and priority) of the new member states to the Union’s
external  policies  is  expected  to  be  in  that  domain,  especially
regarding the ‘Eastern dimension’: an interesting test case in this
respect was the controversy over the transit to and from the Kalin-
ingrad enclave in the autumn of 2002, including the way in which
it was eventually settled.30

At the same time, however, the main geographical focus of
CFSP, and in particular ESDP, is likely to be elsewhere, from the
Balkans to the greater Middle East, from Europe’s ‘outer’ proxim-
ities  to  (maybe)  the  wider  world.  Striking  the  right  balance
between such diverse interests will be a major challenge for the
external policies of the enlarged EU.

30. While bordering Poland and
Lithuania, initially backed by the
Commission, pushed in this case
for  a  strict  application  of  the
Schengen  rules,  some  member
states lobbied for a more accom-
modating position vis-à-vis Russ-
ian demands. A compromise solu-
tion was eventually adopted in the
autumn of 2002. For some back-
ground see Sander Huisman, ‘A
New European Union Policy for
Kaliningrad’, Occasional Paper 33
(Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, March 2002); Alexander
in
Sergounin, 
Lieven and Trenin (eds.), op. cit. in
note 22, pp. 145-84.

‘Kaliningrad’, 

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Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

2

The new Eastern Dimension
of the enlarged EU
Dov Lynch1

The title of this chapter may lead to confusion. A number of caveats
must be noted at the outset. First, the discussion will not relate
specifically to the proposals put forward by successive Polish gov-
ernments on the need for an ‘Eastern Dimension’ of the European
Union  (EU).  Those  proposals  were  elaborated  in  response  to
Poland’s recognition of an urgent need for Brussels to start consid-
ering  the  particular  nature  of  the  states  that  will  adjoin  the
enlarged  EU;  that  is,  Ukraine,  Belarus,  Russia  and,  eventually,
Moldova. 

Second, the chapter will not discuss directly an area of EU pol-
icy that is evoked by the title, namely the Northern Dimension.
The Northern Dimension, launched in 1997 as a Finnish initia-
tive, will also be deeply affected by enlargement, acquiring a much
more pronounced Russian focus. The question of how the North-
ern Dimension will proceed after enlargement merits attention in
itself.2 However, the geographical focus of this chapter falls specif-
ically on the east, leaving aside the north-west. In particular, the
chapter examines the states that are referred to in the Commission
Communication of 11 March 2003 as the ‘Western Newly Inde-
pendent States’ (WNIS) — Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – as well
as the Russian Federation.3 The discussion does not address the
other newly independent states (NIS), which lie further east and
south, in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan)
and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan). 

Finally, one may query the notion that this neighbourhood is
‘new’. Certainly the geographical reality of an enlarged EU adds
new borders to the Union, which raises specific problems related
to the balance between openness and closure in EU border policy.4
Yet, the ‘Eastern question’ is not new for Brussels. The collapse of
the USSR forced the EU to consider the nature of its interests with
regard to the new states of the former Soviet Union. Albeit with lit-

1. Many thanks to Leszek Jesien,
Krakow European University, and
Hanna Ojanen, Finnish Institute
of International Affairs, for their
comments on the chapter, as well
as to all the participants at the
conference organised at the EUISS
on 5-6 June 2003, on ‘The En-
larged  EU  and  its  New  Neigh-
bours: New Security Challenges’.

2. On this question, the reader
may refer to Anaïs Marin, ‘La Di-
mension  Septentrionale :  une
autre forme de la PESC en Europe
du Nord,’ in Dov Lynch (ed.), ‘EU-
Russian Security Dimensions’, Oc-
casional Paper 46 (Paris : EU Insti-
tute  for  Security  Studies,  July
2003).

3. ‘Wider Europe – Neighbour-
hood: A New Framework for Rela-
tions with our Eastern and South-
ern  Neighbours’,  Commission
Communication  COM(2003),
104  final,  Brussels,  11  March
2003.

4. Enlargement will bring the EU
some 2,400 km of borders with
Ukraine and Belarus, to which Ro-
manian membership will add 450
km to its border with Moldova.

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2

tle energy and focus, the Union has been giving thought to the
questions raised by the East for over a decade.

This new neighbourhood differs from the others under discus-
sion in this Chaillot Paper in a number of fundamental respects.
First, the region experienced no major wars in the 1990s. Com-
pared with the Balkans and the Mediterranean, the European
states of the former Soviet Union have been a zone of stability.
Russia’s wars in Chechnya, in the North Caucasus, have impacted
only indirectly on EU-Russian relations. The conflict in Moldova,
between the central authorities in Chisinau and the separatist
region of Transnistria, lasted a few months in early 1992. A cease-
fire has held since then, and Russian peacekeeping forces have
been deployed in a security zone along the Dnestr River, separat-
ing the two parties. The relative stability of the region has meant
that the EU has not been forced to engage deeply in the region. 

Moreover, this region differs from the others under discussion
in the longevity and immediacy of its Soviet past. Relative to the
states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Soviet
experience was far more deeply imprinted in the social, political
and economic make-up of Russia, naturally, as the Soviet heart-
land, but also Belarus, Ukraine, and even Moldova (except for the
Bessarabian  region,  which  was  tagged  to  the  left  bank  of  the
Dnestr after the Second World War). In addition, more than the
Balkans and the states around the southern Mediterranean, these
states  experienced,  and  still  do  in  Ukraine  and  Moldova,  an
intense domestic debate over their identity and the priorities that
follow from choosing one direction over another. Certainly, all of
them perceive themselves as being European, even if not all do
with regard to Europe as defined by the EU (Russia and Belarus).
As Alexander Motyl has put it, the gap between these states and the
rest of Europe is identitaire and systemic,5 not because their identi-
ties are accepted as being non-European and, therefore different,
but precisely because they are ‘European-plus’ – plus Slavic, plus
Russian, plus unique.

For Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, Russia is a complicating
factor. The outcome of Russia’s identity debate, as the former
imperial centre and new post-imperial power, impacts on them
both positively and negatively. Moscow exerts a gravitational pull
on these states, in terms of economic trade and energy provision
and also as an orbit sought after by parts of their societies and seg-

5. Alex J. Motyl, ‘Ukraine, Europe
and Russia: Exclusion or Depen-
dence?’,  in  Anatol  Lieven  and
Dmitri Trenin (eds.), Ambivalent
Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the
Price of Membership (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution,
2003), pp. 15-45.

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

ments of their élites and rejected by others. The 1990s saw a Russia
confused about its relations with the new states on its borders and
coming to terms with the loss of empire and lands that had long
been cherished as part of the Russian heartland. Russia has also
been a complicating factor for the EU, in determining its relations
with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Russia’s clear power domi-
nance over the other states and its enduring geopolitical impor-
tance led to a marked Russia-centric approach initially. Even if this
changed in EU policy, certain member states maintain a focus on
Moscow to the near exclusion of the other capitals in the region. 
This region is also different in that it was never seen by the EU
as a ‘region’. While there was, and remains, a certain fuzziness
about the EU’s definition of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Balkans, Brussels never included Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and
Belarus together in a regional category by themselves. Instead, the
‘former Soviet Union’ became the regional category of reference.
The Commission’s Technical Assistance to the CIS (Common-
wealth of Independent States) programme — TACIS — reflects this
thinking. EU assistance objectives were determined for the whole
region  —  a  region,  it  is  worth  remembering,  which  comprises
twelve states with vastly different geographies and political cul-
tures, and, therefore, futures. As a result, the Eastern neighbours
became subsumed, not to say lost, within the ‘CIS’ and ‘the former
Soviet Union.’

Much of the analysis in this chapter relates to the Commis-
sion’s  Communication  (11  March  2003)  on  ‘Wider  Europe  –
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our East-
ern  and  Southern  Neighbours’.  This  communication  seeks  to
launch a debate within the EU on the possible shape of relations
with  the  Union’s  soon-to-be  new  —  and  old  —  neighbours,
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. The premise is that the
previous framework for relations with these states had, if not
failed, then certainly not fulfilled its potential. Put bluntly, the EU
needs a new policy. The question with regard to these states does
not hinge on offering or refusing them the prospect for member-
ship of the Union; not all of them are interested (Belarus) and none
of them is ready to undertake this process. The EU faces the task of
creating real proximity with these states, and of formulating a pol-
icy that can effectively support stability and development in them.
For the past decade, enlargement has been the central plank of the
EU  as  a  foreign  policy  actor.  Towards  Belarus,  Moldova  and

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2

Ukraine, the states discussed in this chapter, the EU must move
beyond the enlargement approach – without necessarily preclud-
ing the option in the long term – to reinvent itself as a foreign pol-
icy actor with other tools, means and objectives.

The Communication is less a fully-fledged policy than a ques-
tion. The question is one with which the EU has struggled so much
over the last decade that one wonders if it is not intrinsic to the EU
project  itself.  At  the  widest  level,  the  question  turns  on  the
dichotomy of exclusion/inclusion and, more specifically, how the
EU interacts with states on its borders that are not members of the
Union and have no immediate prospect of accession. Depending
on the border neighbourhood, the question is posed differently.
With regard to the WNIS and Russia, the question is: how can the
EU support the transformation of these states and this region into
a zone of stability and prosperity without offering them the incen-
tive of membership? How can the EU transform a region while
keeping it at arm’s length? Most fundamentally, can membership
of the Union be blurred?

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines the
range of general dilemmas and problems that the EU faces (and
has created) in interacting with states on its borders, and particu-
larly in the western part of the former Soviet Union. This will set
the scene for a discussion of how the EU approached these states
throughout the 1990s. The last section examines recent thinking
in the EU on these states, and, in particular, the ‘Wider Europe’
Communication. 

The focus throughout falls mainly on Ukraine, Moldova and
Belarus. Although lying in the same geographical region of the 
former Soviet Union, these states are very different from each
other. In fact, during the 1990s, these differences were so acute
that it may be difficult to consider them as part of the same region.
Under  President  Lukashenko,  Belarus  has  been  bent  on  re-
integration  with  the  Russian  Federation  and  has  fallen  into 
isolation, with very limited ties to European security organisa-
tions and the EU. Ukraine is the largest country of this area and
has declared its aspiration to accede to the EU in the long term, as
has Moldova. Chisinau, however, has sought to position Moldova
in a south-east European perspective rather than a former Soviet
one. Russia is treated only indirectly in the discussion, mainly in
terms of how it affects EU relations with the other three Eastern 
neighbours.

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

Dilemmas and problems

In addressing its Eastern neighbours the EU faces a number of
dilemmas which are different to those raised by Asian or Latin
American states. This stems from the paradox of this region’s prox-
imity to and distance from the Union. If these states were more ‘close’
or more ‘distant,’ the problem would not be posed. Indeed, these
states are ‘close’ enough to consider the possibility of eventual
membership but ‘distant’ enough that this option is complicated
and far from obvious. Departing from this basic paradox, the EU
faces a number of problems in interacting with these states.

First, the EU is both a vehicle for change in states on its borders
and an end goal in terms of their possible accession.6 The confu-
sion  between  the  two  roles  has  meant  that  they  have  become
tightly intertwined in the perception of the Eastern neighbours.
This has led to a fixation on ‘signals’ by political élites in the states
that have declared a desire to become members of the EU. At least
since 1998, the Ukrainian and Moldovan leaderships have insisted
the EU send a clear and unambiguous signal to them about the
possibility of their eventual accession. Such a signal is seen as a
vital impetus for them to undertake the transformation of their
political, economic, legal and social systems. The absence of a sig-
nal is seen itself as a signal – that membership is not on offer and,
therefore,  that  there  is  little  pressing  reason  to  undertake  the
painful process of transformation on the EU model.

Another problem stemming from the intertwining of the EU as
vehicle for change and end goal concerns the blurring of member-
ship. Although not always explicitly, the EU’s approach to these
states throughout the 1990s placed emphasis on their need to
adopt the acquis as a broad model for their reform. Promoting the
acquis as a transition model is fitting for states who have a realistic
chance of acceding to the EU  – to join, indeed, these states must
become like ‘us’. And adopting the acquis is appropriate for states
that seek to integrate – and, therefore, want to become like ‘us’.
However, one may question if it is the best policy for the EU to pur-
sue, and with such fixation, regarding states that have no immedi-
ate prospect of membership. In many ways, the range of possible
topics of cooperation between the EU and these states has been
eclipsed by a concentration on the need to adopt the acquis as a
model and inspiration.

6. Catherine Guicherd makes this
point in ‘The Enlarged EU’s East-
ern Border - Integrating Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova in the Euro-
pean  Project’,  SWP-Studie  20
(Berlin: SWP, June 2002).

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Dov Lynch

2

Of course, it is a good idea to promote the EU model on the bor-
ders of the Union, as a source of stability, prosperity and mutual
understanding. However, the insistence on the EU model in rela-
tions with these states has meant that the distinction between
membership  and  non-membership  is  definite  and  cannot  be
blurred. This has resulted in the EU losing strategic perspective on
these states and focusing too much on tactics. In strategic terms,
developing relations with the Eastern neighbours can be seen as a
vital EU interest, from which would flow a number of subsidiary
requirements that would give a strategic hue to the overall rela-
tionship. However, promoting the acquis as a model is all about
tactics (even if the long-term objective is strategic).

Moreover, the EU’s promotion of their harmonisation with the
EU model is completely misunderstood by the Eastern neighbour
states. In the view of many of their élites, accession to the Union is
a political decision and a political process – not a technocratic list
of laws and regulations to be harmonised. Otherwise, it is often
argued, why would some of the states in the Western Balkans be
offered the possibility of accession? As a result, Kyiv and Chisinau
read EU policy as disingenuous: the EU is insisting on their har-
monisation with the EU model in order to divert attention away
from the fundamental political question and create pretexts to
delay the moment of decision. 

This problem is linked with the psychological heart of neigh-
bouring states’ perceptions of accession. The inclusion/exclusion
barrier is deeply embedded in these capitals’ understanding of the
scope of possibilities in relations with Brussels: if a state is not ‘in’,
or on the way ‘in’, that state is ‘out’, irrevocably and completely.
The sharp line between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ is similar to the ‘sover-
eignty game’ in world affairs that emerged after decolonisation,
which diluted international society of all the gradations between
types of international entities that had existed previously. The
international game is now more zero-sum: there are states and
there is little else.7 Similarly, there is accession to the EU and there
is an oubliette. Exclusion is absolute.

This  psychological  fear  is  exacerbated  by  the  association
between the European Union and ‘Europe’. Since the end of the
Cold War in Europe, and with successive waves of EU enlargement,
the two have merged in the minds of many, and not only in the
Eastern neighbour states. Romano Prodi, in a speech given in

7. See discussions in Kemal S. She-
hadi, ‘Ethnic Self-determination
and the Break-Up of States’, Adel-
phi Paper 283, 1993; David E. Paul,
Sovereignty,  Survival  and  the
Westphalian Blind Alley in Inter-
national Relations,’ Review of Inter-
national Studies vol.  99,  no.  25,
pp. 217-31; Oyrind Osterud, ‘The
Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of
Sovereign States,’ Review of Interna-
tional  Studies,  vol.  97,  no.  23,
pp. 167-84; and James Mayall,
‘Nationalism and International
Society’, Cambridge Studies in Inter-
national  Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge  University  Press,
1990).

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

December 2002 on the EU’s proximity policy, called for a debate
on the limits of Europe as a measure to decide where the bound-
aries of EU enlargement would be set.8 The geographic scope of
the Union lends itself to a conceptual overlay between the two
notions. This conflation is sloppy work, and, if not dangerous, cer-
tainly counter-productive, as it deepens (and justifies) the iden-
tity/civilisational gap between those who are ‘in’ and those who
are not. 

The problem of the imperial past of the Eastern neighbours
merits more attention. Yeltsin’s dream of a new Russia in 1991 did
not include the former Soviet Republics in the South Caucasus or
Central Asia, which were seen by him as a burden on Russia’s revi-
talisation, but it did include Belarus and Ukraine (Moldova never
really figured as much on Russia’s identity radar). This original
vision lent a heavy dose of ambiguity to Moscow’s perception of
the viability and longevity of the latter states as fully independent
from the Russian Federation. For example, in the early months of
1992, Russian troops intervened coercively in the conflict between
Moldova  and  its  separatist  region  of  Transnistria.  Russian-
Ukrainian  bilateral  relations  were  not  formalised  until  1997,
because of differences over ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and a
host of other issues – all against a background of reluctance to
accept  the  existence  of  Ukraine.9 On  the  other  hand,  with
Lukashenko at the helm, Belarus has moved towards integration
with the Russian Federation in a series of treaties since 1996. 

Moreover, Russia retains extensive forward military deploy-
ment in these states, embodied in the 1997 agreement on the Black
Sea Fleet with Ukraine, the creation of joint military space with
Belarus and the Russian Operational Group deployed on the left
bank of the Dnestr in Moldova (to be withdrawn by the end of
2003, according to agreements within the OSCE). Russia also has
an extensive economic presence throughout these states, both in
the public sphere, in their energy dependence on Russia, and in the
private sphere, through wide-ranging Russian investment in a
number of key sectors of their economies. Finally, despite all the
clarion calls to the contrary, the CIS is not completely dead. The
original idea has been abandoned, but it lives on in certain sectors,
at least formally, as a forum for cooperation between its member
states. The announcement in 2003 of the plan to build a free-trade
area between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine is a case in
point. 

8. Romano Prodi, ‘A Wider Eu-
rope – A Proximity Policy as a way
to  Stability’,  SPEECH/02/619,
Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.

9. On this, see James Sherr, ‘Rus-
sia–Ukraine  Rapprochement?;
The Black Sea Fleet Accords’, Sur-
vival, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997.

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The geopolitical reality of this region as a grey zone between an
enlarging ‘empire’ – the EU – and a former empire – Russia – com-
plicates the EU’s ability to engage constructively and justly in the
region. If the analogy may be drawn, the EU is a reluctant ‘empire’,
unwilling and unable to challenge the predominance of the Russ-
ian power in these former Soviet Republics.10 Moreover, the EU is
made up of member states, many of which entertain desires for
close ties with Russia that overpass the region. Well aware of this,
Russia has often sought to use its bilateral relations with key EU
member states to protect its interests with regard to the EU. The
example of negotiations in 2002 over transit to the Kaliningrad
region is interesting in this respect. 

Russia’s presence in these EU neighbours, their dependence on
Russia  for  energy  and  trade,  and  their  internal  debates  about
national identity and orientation – all have weakened the EU’s will
to engage proactively. It is legitimate to query the need to discuss a
free-trade agreement with Ukraine when Kyiv has signed on to
such an agreement with members of the CIS. Why should the EU
waste its time?

The Russia factor has another effect on EU relations with these
states. With regard to Ukraine, the largest neighbour state, the EU
has been keen to retain equality between EU-Ukraine and EU-Rus-
sia relations. At the strategic level, almost every formal deepening
of the EU-Russian political relationship has been matched by sim-
ilar moves with Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine and Russia were the sub-
jects of two out of only three Common Strategies ever formulated
by the EU.11 Moreover, Ukraine was offered similar arrangements
to Russia, at the Seville Council in June 2002, for participation in
EU-led peace support operations.12 Russia and Ukraine were both
invited to send a military liaison officer to the EU Military Staff
(EUMS) in Brussels. Much of this has been inspired by member
states, keen on balancing European engagement with Russia and
Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities have also been active in seek-
ing to ensure such a matching. However much this serves a posi-
tive end, the strategic engagement of the EU with Ukraine has
remained largely formal. The link with Russia gives that relation-
ship an instrumental flavour. 

These circumstances have not been accommodating for the EU
when  considering  ways  to  stimulate  the  transformation  of  its
neighbour states without offering the single most powerful incen-

10. Heather Grabbe draws the
analogy in an excellent overview of
EU  enlargement  policies,  ‘The
Challenges of EU Enlargement,’ in
Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin
(eds.), op. cit. in note 5, pp. 67-89.

11. See the EU explanation of both
Common  Strategies:  http://
europa.eu.int/comm/external_
relations/ceeca/com_strat/in-
dex.htm.

12. Seville European Council, Pres-
idency Conclusions, ‘Presidency Re-
port  on  ESDP’,  Press  Release
10160/2/02, Brussels, 22 June
2002:  http://ue.eu.int/news-
room/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&B
ID=76&DID=71212&LANG=1&F
ile=/pressData/en/ec/71212.pdf
&Picture=0.

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tive it has – accession. EU relations with the Eastern neighbours
are a cocktail of paradoxes, misperceptions and harsh realities. 

1992-2003: the PCA method and its limits

Following the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, the EU con-
cluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Rus-
sia (agreed in 1994 and in force in 1997), Moldova (agreed 1994 and
in force in 1998), Ukraine (in force in 1998) and with Belarus (com-
pleted in 1995, but put on hold by the EU in September 1997).13
Similar to Association or Europe Agreements, the PCAs constitute
the basic framework that regulates relations between these states
and the EU, defining the objectives and the scope of relations, the
subjects  for  cooperation  and  the  institutional  mechanisms  of
interaction, as well as shaping expectations for the future develop-
ment of ties. In some respects, the PCA method, adopted by Brus-
sels for the states of the former Soviet Union, happened more by
default than design, lacking long-term perspective and coordina-
tion and reflecting a mixed bag of tools transplanted from other
EU policies.

The PCA method
The PCA with Ukraine reflects the general features of the EU’s
approach.14 Thirty-seven pages long, the Ukraine PCA comprises
one  hundred  and  nine  articles,  distributed  over  ten  chapters,
including five annexes. The chapter headings range from political
dialogue,  to  trade,  business  and  investment  issues,  economic
cooperation,  intellectual  property  questions  and  cultural  and
technological cooperation. Valid for a period of ten years, the doc-
ument sets four objectives for EU-Ukraine cooperation: to develop
closer political dialogue; to promote trade, investment and har-
monious economic relations; to provide the basis for mutually
beneficial cooperation across a range of fields (detailed in the
chapters); and to support Ukraine’s transition and its democratic
consolidation. The agreement creates three institutions: a Coop-
eration Council, which meets once a year at ministerial level, a
Cooperation Committee that meets more regularly at the level of
senior civil servants and has a number of specialised subcommit-
tees, and a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee with the Euro-

13. All of these documents may be
found on the EU website, ‘The
EU’s relationship with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia’: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/ceeca/
index.htm.

14. See Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities, L 49/3-49/39,
19 February 1998.

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2

pean Parliament that meets annually. In addition, Russia and
Ukraine  are  accorded  regular  summits  at  the  highest  level
(Ukraine yearly and Russia biannually).

Financially, the TACIS programe has been the main instru-
ment designed to support EU relations with these states and to
promote these objectives. According to the EU, TACIS ‘provides
grant-financed technical assistance to 13 countries of Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine  and  Uzbekistan),  and  mainly  aims  at
enhancing the transition process in these countries.’15 TACIS is
applied  through  national  country  programmes,  regional  pro-
grammes and small projects. For example, the TACIS programe in
Moldova provided around ECU/€70 million between 1991 and
1999.

The limits of the method
Several features of the PCA method must be noted. First, PCAs
reveal the heavily technocratic and non-political heart of the EU’s
approach to these states. These agreements are overwhelmingly
focused on trade and economic questions. In meetings of the insti-
tutions created by the PCA, this has translated in practice into an
emphasis by the EU on these states progressing in their transition
and aligning their legislation, norms and standards with those of
the EU. Harmonisation with the EU model is promoted as the most
effective way for these states to benefit from enlargement.16 In this
respect, the reports of the Cooperation Council meetings have
hardly changed since their inception, constantly featuring a stress
on the need to implement the PCA and for these states to har-
monise  their  legislation  with  that  of  the  EU.17 Many  of  these
reports are interchangeable between years. 

The frustration that is apparent in these reports may seem less
than well justified given another feature of the PCA method. The
PCAs are essentially static. Compared with other forms of agree-
ment the EU entertains with third parties, the PCA offers little
indication of progression in the relationship. Not only is the idea
of accession simply not part of their universe, the PCAs hold little
evolutionary potential at all. What is more, the agreements offer
little in terms of market access to these states, providing no prefer-
ential treatment in trade. The PCA method, therefore, places the

15.  See  http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/ceeca/
tacis/index.htm. 

16. See, for example, the ‘Joint
Statement’ from the EU-Ukraine
summit, Copenhagen, 10607/02,
presse  195,  4 
July  2002:
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/er
/71439.pdf. 

17. See, for example, ‘Bulletin EU
1/2 2000’, 1.6.100, EU-Moldova
Cooperation Council: ; and ‘Bul-
letin EU 5/2001’, 1/6/81, EU-
Moldova Cooperation Council:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/
off/bull/en/200105/p106081.
htm.

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

burden  for  the  ‘transition’  entirely  with  the  new  neighbours,
claiming no responsibility to underpin the transformation that
this  entails  and  opening  no  future  perspective  to  support  it.
Implicit in this approach lies the notion, prevalent in Western cir-
cles  in  the  early  1990s,  of  the  ‘inevitability’  of  the  transition
process in these states, a notion that followed the deterministic
development  theories  that  were  formulated  in  the  1950s.  The
position taken was: ‘Undertake this list of reforms, because you
have to and you will do them anyway, and then . . . well, nothing,
just undertake the reforms.’

In addition, the PCAs combined with the TACIS programme to
categorise the Eastern neighbours under a ‘CIS’ heading. Thus,
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are included with a great power
(Russia),  three  South  Caucasian  states  and  five  Central  Asian
states. The Eastern neighbours perceive this category as confining
them to a ‘black hole’ in terms of any possibility of eventual acces-
sion. It also links them with states of different political, social and
economic compositions and, thus, different prospects for devel-
opment and orientation. To Moldova and Ukraine, which have
declared accession objectives, this categorisation has exacerbated
fears of permanent exclusion. These states think the EU is making
a category error of fundamental importance. 

Finally, the emphasis on political dialogue in the PCA method
has failed to acquire depth. Security and wider political questions
have featured constantly on the agenda of the various mecha-
nisms for dialogue, but with little substance. At the widest level,
the EU’s overall political objective since 1992 has been to support
the independence of these states. For example, the EU Action Plan
for relations with Ukraine in 1996 noted the EU’s desire to see ‘the
development of Ukraine as a stable, independent, democratic,
market-oriented, non-nuclear state and of undisputed territorial
integrity’.18 Similarly, the EU has repeatedly stressed the impor-
tance  of  protecting  Moldova’s  territorial  integrity  and  sover-
eignty, a country divided by Transnistria. The EU has recognised
that Moldova’s ‘transition’ depends on the settlement of this con-
flict.19 To be charitable, CFSP was only nascent during this period,
so expectations should not be unrealistic. Yet, the EU never devel-
oped a political role in either of the states. Other international
organisations and states have assumed responsibility in the region
– in Ukraine, the United States and EU member states, such as
Britain; in Belarus and in Moldova, the OSCE. The EU had little

18. General Affairs Council, Brus-
sels, 6 December 1996, Press: 366
Nr 12440/96.

19.  See,  for  example,  Moldova:
Country Strategy Paper, 2002-2006:
National 
Indicative  Programme,
2002-2003, Brussels, 27 Decem-
ber, 2001: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/moldo
va/csp/02_06_en.pdf.

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2

political profile, apart from formal declarations that never quite
gained traction.

The PCA method does however have positive traits. For one, the
institutional  mechanisms  created  in  these  agreements  have
locked the EU and these states into a tight relationship. As a result,
the EU has become more deeply engaged in them, and Brussels has
been forced to develop positions on a range of questions, relating
to domestic developments in the Eastern neighbours, which it
otherwise might not have done. Certainly also, these ties have rep-
resented opportunities used by some élites in the Eastern neigh-
bours to affirm their state’s European aspiration. In this sense, the
PCA  institutions  have  acted  as  external  sources  of  support  to
European-orientated élites in Ukraine and Moldova.

Moreover, the framework for EU relations with these states was
not entirely static over the 1990s. In a number of respects, there
was evolution in the PCA method. Most notably, the Commission
conducted a major review of the TACIS programme in 1999, near
the expiry of the first regulation, and relaunched it in December
1999 under a new Council Regulation.20 In the words of the EU,
the new regulation ‘is based on an understanding that co-opera-
tion is a reciprocal process, encouraging a move from “demand-
driven” to “dialogue-driven” programming. More flexibility in the
way that TACIS is structured will allow potential technical assis-
tance to be mobilised and implemented according to the capacity
of each partner country.’21 The new regulation was designed in
response to problems that arose with regard to the procedures of
assistance, contracting and implementation. The basic objective is
to increase local ‘ownership’ of assistance programmes through
greater involvement.22

The emphasis on ‘ownership’ in the Eastern neighbours was
also  pursued  in  the  framework  of  the  PCAs.  For  example,  in
response to repeated calls from Ukraine for the development of a
free-trade area (FTA) with the EU, a joint EU-Ukraine study of the
conditions necessary for an FTA was conducted in 1999. The study
concluded  that  Ukraine  had  to  fulfil  a  number  of  conditions
before the FTA would be possible. The EU and Ukraine conducted
a joint review in 2002 on Ukraine’s implementation of the PCA.
Published in March 2003, the report highlights the lack of imple-
mentation and different interpretations by Brussels and Kyiv of
the nature of relations.23 The EU Action Plan in Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA), adopted in December 2001, was most innovative.

20. Council Regulation, no. 99/
2000, 29 December 1999, Official
Journal of the European Communities,
L12/1-L12/9.

21. http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/ceeca/tacis/
index.htm. 

22. See the TACIS publication, Co-
operation That Counts, 1999: A Focus
on the EU’s Tacis Programme, which
can  be 
found  at:  http://
www.eur.ru/eng/neweur/show_
file.php?ident=143. 

23. EU-Ukraine PCA Assessment Joint
Report:
http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/ukrain
e/intro/pcarep.pdf.

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

The Action Plan was elaborated with Ukrainian input and will be
implemented with clear benchmarks. A system of scoreboards has
been created to ensure continual review of the process and pres-
sure to push through reform. The first meeting of the JHA troika
with Ukraine was held in November 2002, and agreed to focus on
a limited number of areas (readmissions, border management,
money laundering, trafficking in humans and drugs, corruption
and child exploitation). While the success of the JHA Action Plan
remains to be seen, its methodology has been conducive to greater
engagement by Ukraine in the process – a necessary, if not suffi-
cient, condition for success. 

The EU Common Strategies on the Russian Federation (June
1999) and on Ukraine (December 1999) were other innovations in
the Union’s approach to the Eastern neighbours.24 Both docu-
ments sought to develop a specifically strategic approach to both
states, with an emphasis on greater political dialogue and cooper-
ation to respond jointly to security challenges arising across the
continent.25 Developing in parallel with the birth of ESDP, these
documents  laid  the  ground  for  discussions  with  Russia  and
Ukraine on their possible support to EU military capabilities and
participation in EU-led operations. Both states have been keen to
develop the security dialogue in the military-technical field, emer-
gency situation response and peace support operations.

Stalemate
On the whole, these shifts were innovations within the PCA frame-
work. The EU approach to the Eastern neighbours lacked the pos-
sibility of a fundamental evolution of the relationship. It also sub-
sumed  these  states  into  the  wider  category  of  the  ‘CIS’,  and
disclaimed any real responsibility for their transition processes. 

By 2002, the PCA method was nearing a dead-end. In all three
Eastern neighbours, the ‘transition’ process was under question.
EU relations with Belarus remained frozen, following the EU’s
September  1997  decision  to  impose  sanctions  because  of
Lukashenko’s authoritarian policies.26 With each new election in
Belarus, the EU declared its hope that Lukashenko would seize the
opportunity to liberalise Belarus’s political system. With each
election, this hope was dashed.27 The presidential elections in
Belarus in 2001, which returned Lukashenko to power with a sur-
prising degree of popular support, highlighted the failure of the

24. See ‘The Common Strategy of
the EU of 4 of June, 1999 on Rus-
sia’, 1999/414/CFSP, Official Jour-
nal  of  the  European  Communities,
24.6.1999,  L157/1-9,  and  ‘EU
Common Strategy of 11 Decem-
ber,  1999,  on  Ukraine’,  1999/
877/CFSP, Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 23.12.1999,
L331/1-9.

25. The Common Strategies have
been heavily criticised from their
inception from within Brussels (by
Solana in particular) and from
outside. See, for example, Council
Conclusions on Common Strategies,
General Affairs Council, Brussels,
26  February  2001,  Press:  61
Nr: 6506/01.

26. Council Conclusions on Belarus,
General Affairs Council, Brussels,
15 September 1997, Press: 269
Nr:10368/97.

27. On developments in Belarus
and with regard to the EU, see
Clelia  Rontoyanni,  ‘In  Europe
with Russia or In Europe without
Russia? Belarus and Ukraine face
Globalisation,’ paper presented
at the University of Kent, 8-10 Sep-
tember 2001, unpublished; and
also the chapters edited by Ann
Lewis (ed.), The EU and Belarus: Be-
tween Moscow and Brussels (London:
The Federal Trust, 2002). 

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EU’s approach. The suspension of contacts and assistance has not
been pressure enough for Lukashenko to change. 

Conversely,  the  EU’s  ‘positive’  assistance  to  Ukraine  and
Moldova has also had little impact on their domestic and external
trajectories. At the start of the twenty-first century, Moldova is one
of Europe’s poorest country.28 In 2001, the Communist Party of
Moldova — a pragmatic bunch, but with a distinctly eastward ori-
entation — assumed control of the parliament and the presidency.
In  Ukraine,  the  EU  has  become  increasingly  concerned  about
incipient (and not-so-incipient) authorities’ tendencies in Ukrain-
ian politics under Leonid Kuchma.29 Both Moldova and Ukraine
have suffered a decade of ‘transition’, which has resulted in the
deep  impoverishment  of  their  societies,  the  collapse  of  their
economies and the rise of oligarchic power structures overlapping
opaquely with the public sphere. The essential logic driving poli-
tics and economics in these states and societies is anathema to the
EU model.30 The EU is not to blame for these circumstances. How-
ever, Brussels has done little to prevent them from arising.

Towards a ‘Wider Europe’

Towards the Communication
As a result, a double stalemate has arisen. The EU’s approach has
failed to stimulate the transformation of the Eastern neighbours,
and the reform projects in these states have run into dead-ends.
Moreover, the ‘Russia factor’ in the region is no clearer in 2003 than
it was in 1992; it is just different in nature. And all of these trends
were concurrent with a revolution under way in the EU itself, with
enlargement pending and the launch of the Convention on the
Future of Europe. The integration of new members has also pre-
sented Brussels with new dynamics. The first is geographical – an
enlarged EU will border directly on the Eastern neighbours and
confront a range of problems and threats it has hitherto only con-
sidered indirectly. The ‘new’ neighbours can no longer be ignored. 
The second dynamic is that the states joining the EU are not
prepared to ignore the Eastern neighbours.31 In particular, Poland
has raised the need for an EU ‘Eastern Dimension’ since spring
1998. In 2001, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a
document on the contours of such a dimension. A number of 

28. See report by the European
Bank of Reconstruction and De-
velopment, where per capita GDP
for 2000 was noted as being $US
326 
http://
www.ebrd.com/country/coun-
try/moldova/index.htm. 

per  month: 

29.  On  various  aspects  of
Ukraine’s  internal  and  foreign
policies, see Ann Lewis (ed.), The
EU and Ukraine: Neighbours, Friends
or Partners? (London: The Federal
Trust, 2002).

30. See James Sherr, ‘Russia and
Ukraine: A Geopolitical Turn?’, in
Ann Lewis (ed.), ibid., pp. 171-79.

31. Not only the candidate coun-
tries have been interested in this
question; see, for example, Iris
Kempe and Wim van Meurs, ‘To-
ward  a  Multi-layered  Europe:
Prospects and Risks beyond EU
Enlargement’, CAP Working Paper
(Munich: Center for Applied Pol-
icy Research, Ludwig Maximilian
University, November 2002).

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

Polish research institutes have been particularly influential in for-
mulating Polish proposals, namely the Centre for Eastern Studies
and the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw.32 The Polish gov-
ernment  participated  in  the  elaboration  of  the  Commission’s
Communication on ‘Wider Europe’ through a non-paper distrib-
uted  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission  in  late  2002.  Other
future members (Czech Republic and Lithuania) and member
states (Sweden and Finland) also participated in this process.

Polish and Visegrad proposals have called on the EU to adopt a
strategy towards its new Eastern neighbours that opens up some
possibility of a future progression. Until 2001, Polish insistence
centred on the need for a clearer signal to Ukraine about eventual
association and possibly accession. The Polish government has
since steered away from this position. These proposals also called
on the EU to abandon its frozen approach to Belarus and seek to
engage with Belarussian civil society and youth, in order to sup-
port  sources  of  eventual  political  reform.  In  addition,  the  EU
might  consider  renewing  assistance  programmes  to  stimulate
small business activities in Belarus. With the accession of Roma-
nia and Bulgaria scheduled for 2007, Moldova received less atten-
tion in these proposals. Still, the need for the EU to assume a
greater  political  role  in  conflict  resolution  in  this  soon-to-be
neighbour was highlighted.

With enlargement looming, Brussels and EU member states
turned to consider a new EU strategy to the Eastern neighbours.
Romano Prodi had announced it as one of the priorities of his
leadership of the Commission. The process was kick-started by a
letter by Jack Straw, British Foreign Minister, to Brussels in March
2002, calling for a new approach to the Eastern neighbours.33 This
was followed by a decision in Luxembourg on 15 April to task
Javier Solana and Chris Patten with exploring further the notion
of a ‘Wider Europe’. During the summer of that year, the Danish
presidency  organised  meetings  on  the  question  at  the  level  of
Political Directors. In September, Solana and Patten made a joint
presentation to the Council in which they called for a new regional
and national framework for relations with Ukraine, Moldova and
Belarus (not Russia) in order to simulate PCA implementation.
This was also to include a new financial instrument and possibly
new  institutions.  The  General  Affairs  Council  agreed  on
18 November on the ‘need for the EU to formulate an ambitious,

32. See, for example, Katarzina
Pelczynka-Natecz,  Alexander
Dukba, Laszlo Poti and Vladimir
Vatapek, The Eastern Policy of the
EU: The Visegrad Countries’ Perspec-
tive (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern
Studies, February 2003); Grze-
gorz Gromadzki and Jakub Bora-
lynski, ‘The Half-Open Door: The
Eastern Border of the Enlarged
EU’, On the Future of Europe Policy
Paper 2 (Warsaw: March 2001);
Grzegorz Gromadzki et al., The En-
larged EU and Ukraine – New Rela-
tions  (Warsaw:  Stefan  Batory
Foundation with CEPS, 2003);
Anna Naumczuk et al., ‘The For-
gotten Neighbour – Belarus in the
context of EU Enlargement to the
East’, On the Future of Europe Policy
Paper 4  (Warsaw:  September
2001); and ‘New neighbourhood
– New Association: Ukraine and
the EU at the beginning of the 21st
Century’, On the Future of Europe
Policy Paper 6: (Warsaw: March
2002).

33. Interviews with officials in the
Commission and the Secretariat
of  the  Council,  Brussels,  April
2003.

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long term and integrated approach towards each of these coun-
tries.’34 A month later, at the European Council meeting in Copen-
hagen, what was now called the ‘Wider Europe – New Neighbour-
hood’ Initiative was expanded in scope to include the southern
Mediterranean countries.35 With this new mandate, the Commis-
sion then led the process, gathering input from future members,
before finally presenting the Communication on 11 March 2003. 
What started as an exercise to strengthen EU relations with its
new Eastern neighbours became a strategy paper on the enlarged
Union’s entire new and old neighbourhood.

A new method?
The  Communication  ‘Wider  Europe  –  Neighbourhood:  A  new
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours’ is intended to present a new approach. Twenty-seven pages
long, the Communication is divided into five parts and a number
of annexes. Its starting principles are seven-fold:

1. The Communication was intended to launch a debate in the
enlarged EU and with its neighbours about the requirements
of new circumstances and possible avenues for increased coop-
eration between them.36 The Communication does not repre-
sent a policy. It is neither set in stone nor acceptable to all mem-
ber states.

2. The Communication is not only designed for the new Eastern
neighbours of the enlarged EU – hence, the striking of the ‘new’
from the title – but also includes a number of old EU neigh-
bours in the southern Mediterranean.

3. The explicit premise driving the Communication is the recog-
nition by the EU of the interdependence of the Union, and its
member states, with the neighbouring states. This interde-
pendence is driven by geographical proximity and is translated
at the economic, social and security levels. This recognition is
seen to impose a ‘duty’ on the EU to promote political stability,
economic  development  and  the  reduction  of  poverty  in  a
‘shared environment’.

4. The new neighbourhood framework is targeted at states that
do not ‘currently’ have the perspective of EU membership. The
document is clear: ‘A response to the practical issues posed by
proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from

34.  General  Affairs  Council,
doc.
18 November 
14078/02.

2002, 

35. At Prodi’s insistence, it would
seem.

36. Interview with an official in the
Commission,  Brussels,  April
2003.

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

the question of EU accession.’ Although eventual membership
is not ruled out, the neighbourhood framework is not on the
same track as that of accession.

5. The timeframe referred to in the Communication is a decade. A
decade in EU terms is a long time, and for the Eastern neigh-
bours, it is as long a time as they have been independent. The
new framework, therefore, has a medium- to long-term per-
spective.

6. With regard to the Eastern neighbours, the Communication
creates a new conceptual category, referred to as the ‘Western
Newly Independent States’ (WNIS). ‘WNIS’ includes Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus (Russia is not included). The ‘CIS’ con-
ceptual framework has finally given way to a more rational, if
far from unproblematic, regional notion. The use of ‘WNIS’
runs parallel in the document with such terms as ‘proximity’
and ‘neighbours’ to create a new category of ‘neighbour states’
in EU parlance. 

7. The Communication is founded on the concepts of ‘differenti-
ation’ and ‘progressivity’. Differentiation will require different
levels of relations depending on the state in question and the
progress that this state makes in reaching agreed benchmarks
of reform.

As already noted, the Communication seeks to answer a ques-
tion: how can the EU promote stability, security and sustainable
development  on  its  borders  with  states  that  Brussels  sees  as
remaining outside these borders? As one official in the Commis-
sion has put it, the objective is to integrate these states into Europe
without necessarily offering them membership of the EU.37 This
is similar to the question that Romano Prodi posed in his speech
in December 2002.38 Prodi recognised that only the prospect of
membership sustained reforms in Central Europe: ‘The future
must be attractive to inspire hope.’ Still, Prodi argued that a ‘sub-
stantive and workable concept of proximity’ can have a similar
positive effect on the neighbours.

The new neighbourhood initiative proposes to enter into a bar-
gain with the Union’s neighbouring states. The offer is worth
reproducing in full:

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional
reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s

37. Discussions with an official in
the  Commission,  Paris,  May
2003.

38. Romano Prodi, ‘A Wider Eu-
rope – A Proximity Policy as a way
to  Stability’,  SPEECH/02/619,
Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.

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neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer eco-
nomic integration with the EU. Specifically, all the neighbouring
countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s
Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to pro-
mote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital
(four freedoms). If a country has reached this level, it has come as
close to the Union as it can be without being a member.

In order to reach this objective, the Communication proposes
that the EU offer eleven types of incentive to the neighbouring
states. These incentives range from extending internal market and
regulatory structures to preferential trading relations, opening
perspectives on lawful migration and the movement of peoples,
and integration into EU transportation, energy and telecommu-
nications  networks.  In  addition,  the  EU  could  become  more
deeply  engaged  at  the  political  level  in  the  neighbour  states,
including in terms of crisis management, even possible ‘internal
security arrangements’ (the Moldovan conflict is mentioned). The
Communication proposes the creation of a new financial instru-
ment – a Neighbourhood Instrument – that would draw on the
positive experiences of PHARE, TACIS and Interreg (interregional
cooperation). The Communication also calls for the EU to coordi-
nate its approach with International Financial Institutions (IFIs),
and to consider the extension of lending by the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB).

The method proposed in the Communication combines new
and  old  features.  On  the  one  hand,  the  new  neighbourhood
approach will not override the existing framework for relations:
‘Instead, it would supplement and build on existing policies and
arrangements.’ Thus, the focus remains on the neighbours imple-
menting the PCA. The EU model is still the standard by which
‘progress’ is to be judged, and harmonisation towards the EU
model remains the essential thrust of the reform in neighbouring
states. The Communication notes the possibility of moving to
new contractual arrangements with the EU, called Neighbour-
hood Agreements, but only once the PCAs have been fully imple-
mented and exploited.

By contrast, the Communication does offer a new approach to
the pursuit of these objectives. The ‘Wider Europe’ document is
inspired partly by the experience of the JHA Action Plan with
Ukraine, which featured joint work on the substance of the plan

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The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

and the determination of benchmarks of progress, and a score-
board  for  review  purposes.  Similarly  structured  regional  and
country Action Plans are proposed in the Communication which
would be jointly formulated by the Commission and neighbours,
with benchmarks, scoreboards and regular review. EU engage-
ment, as well as the extension of the incentives noted above, will
proceed on the basis of the step-by-step implementation of agreed
measures and reforms. The Communication’s promise of ‘differ-
entiation’ and ‘progressivity’ lies with these Action Plans. 

Innovations
The ‘Wider Europe’ Communication contains, therefore, a num-
ber of new ideas for the Eastern neighbours to consider: 

1. Much emphasis is placed on regional cooperation among the
Eastern neighbours, a notion hitherto avoided by the EU for
fear of Russian dominance.

2. Inspired by earlier Polish proposals, the regional approach to
the WNIS represents a way to engage Belarus in a number of
vital  cooperative  programmes  without  having  to  engage
directly with the Lukashenko leadership. Direct engagement is
not entirely ruled out, as the Communication calls for a step-
by-step approach to Minsk in the run-up to the parliamentary
elections in 2004.

3. The political and security role of the EU receives strong empha-
sis. There is a promise that the EU will take a more active role in
seeking conflict settlement in Moldova — in mediation, post-
conflict reconstruction and security arrangements. The EU
Council  has  increased  its  involvement  in  Moldova  since
December 2002, with a number of strongly worded declara-
tions. In February 2003, the Council decided, with the United
States, to impose a visa ban on the Transnistrian leadership. An
ever-greater EU political role in Moldova can be expected.
4. The  Action  Plan  methodology  raises  the  prospect  of  deep,
extensive and quite constant EU engagement in the new neigh-
bouring states.

5. The Communication contains ideas that may assuage fears
among the Eastern neighbours that the EU will enlarge, build a
wall and retire behind it. Some prospect of lawful migration
and movement of peoples is raised.

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6. The  Communication  contains  some  notion  of  future.  It  is
vague, but the possibility of moving beyond the PCA is raised,
as is eventual access to the four freedoms.

Enduring questions
Despite these innovations, the Communication raises but fails to
answer a number of fundamental questions:

1. Does the offer of ‘proximity’ resolve the inclusion/exclusion dilemma for
those Eastern neighbours that have announced European aspirations?
The Communication retains a ‘new and improved’ PCA frame-
work that is separate from that of accession, and leaves unre-
solved the question of finalité for these states. Is the prospect of
the possible extension of the four freedoms enough for the
élites in Ukraine and Moldova to exit the reform dead-end they
have entered? Can a revolution be justified in the name of join-
ing the EU’s neighbourhood? The prospect of joining Europe
is attractive; joining a neighbourhood is not. The new initiative
may never get off the ground. The EU must be clear: if Brussels
wants these states to ‘become like us’ then the offer of accession
must be on the cards; if the objective is stability and develop-
ment then EU policy is different. The Communication remains
unclear on these points; a strong residue of ‘you must become
like us’ remains, but without the necessary tools of clarity. The
point is not to offer the aspiring states membership – this is not
realistic – but to clarify EU objectives and decide on appropri-
ate tools to attain them.

2. Is the EU good at differentiation? The Communication exacerbates
the perception in Kyiv and Chisinau that differentiation has
never been the EU’s strength. These two states find themselves
recategorised in two new conceptual boxes – the wider notion
of ‘neighbours’, stretching in an arc from North Africa to Rus-
sia, and the new concept of ‘WNIS’, which embraces three very
different states, one of which is intent on integration with the
Russian Federation.

3. Is there enough money? With the EU budget fixed until 2006, the
Neighbourhood Instrument will be a hotchpotch of monies
left over from various integration programmes and TACIS.
The  Commission’s  follow-up  Communication,  entitled
‘Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’, of

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2

The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

1 July 2003, goes some way towards clarifying this question.
The document proposes the coordination of various cross-bor-
der cooperation programmes (CBCs) into single ‘neighbour-
hood programmes’ between 2004 and 2006; that is, TACIS
CBC, PHARE-CBC, Interreg, as well as CARDS and MEDA
(amounting to €955 million).39 The Communication envis-
ages the creation, from 2007, of an integrated and new Neigh-
bourhood Instrument. These are not empty pledges, which
could provide greater coherence to cross-border cooperation
programmes.  However,  all  the  work  lies  ahead;  not  only
between 2004 and 2006 but also for the next budget cycle.
4. Is the EU up to the task? The formulation of Action Plans and their
exploitation will not be easy for the EU. The engagement, in
terms of expert personnel, time and energy, could be very sub-
stantial. Moreover, these tasks would require significant coor-
dination within the Commission, between various Commis-
sioners, who do not agree on everything, as well as between the
Commission and the Council. The Council has already raised
doubts about the Communication. Javier Solana sent a letter to
the General Affairs Council that highlighted the danger of
over-systematisation in the Communication, which brackets
together states that are vastly different, and stressed the need
for  real  differentiation.40 Moreover,  member  states  have
already started chipping away at the offer of four freedoms,
noting that only three of these are realistic and excluding the
free  movement  of  people.  Some  member  states  have  also
rejected direct engagement with Belarus.

5. Is the EU ‘in sync.’ with the Eastern neighbours? Another way of put-
ting the question is: does the Communication speak a lan-
guage that the Eastern neighbours can understand? The lan-
guage of the text is technocratic. Its grammar is sober and
rational. Moldova and Ukraine speak about EU relations in
terms of a declared European vocation and a European iden-
tity. Their syntax is ideas-driven and inspirational. This focus
on inspiration is necessary given the self-doubts about identity
plaguing these states. The Communication plays to their fears
and self-doubts – the former Soviet Union is lumped together
with North Africa, and, thus, with states that have no chance of
ever joining the EU. For Moldova, the Communication is a
source of despair. Chisinau has sought for years to distance
itself from the former Soviet Union, succeeding to be the first

39.  Communication  from  the
Commission, ‘Paving the Way for
a  New  Neighbourhood  Instru-
ment’,  COM(2003)  393  final,
Brussels, 1 July 2003.

40. In particular, Solana is hesi-
tant  about  the  geographical
scope of the initiative. Interviews
with an official in Council Secre-
tariat, Brussels, April 2003.

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Dov Lynch

2

state to join the WTO and also in joining the Stability Pact as a
southern European country. The Communication offers inter-
esting  ideas  for  addressing  Belarus  by  embedding  it  into  a
wider regional framework. However, it fails to open a real per-
spective on how to address the question of Belarus’s future – as
a sovereign European state or as part of the Russian Federation.
6. Is the right model put forward for these states? The Communication
refers to these states becoming as close as possible to member-
ship without participating in EU institutions. The model of
the European Economic Area (EEA) is raised as a framework to
consider. However, the EEA includes states that have every-
thing in common with EU members, in terms of the acquis and
standards, except that they have chosen not to join its institu-
tions.41 The Eastern neighbours have almost nothing in com-
mon in terms of the acquis and they are seeking to join the EU’s
institutions. This points to a gap in understanding and percep-
tion between the EU and the Eastern neighbours.

7. Is the Russia factor addressed? The Communication is confused
about the role of Russia in wider Europe. The new concept of
‘WNIS’ does not include Russia, although geographically this
would be justified. The document notes that national Action
Plans may supersede the EU’s Common Strategies, and thereby
presumably become a central ‘strategic’ plank in the EU-Russia
relationship (drafted by the Commission?). And yet, an Action
Plan with Russia would only be part of the overall ‘strategic
partnership’, which includes the Energy Dialogue and talks on
a Common European Economic Space. It is unlikely that Rus-
sia will agree to a national Action Plan on the lines proposed,
precisely because it would lead to greater EU engagement and,
therefore,  interference  in  Russian  affairs  (sectoral  actions
plans might however be possible). More fundamentally, the
document  does  not  mention  the  Russian  factor  present  in
Belarus — for Brussels, does the road to Minsk go through
Moscow?  —  or  in  Moldova,  concerning  Russia’s  role  in
Transnistria. One may query also, whether, in fact, it is such a
good idea to push for regional cooperation in the WNIS, given
its complex geopolitical context.

Since the Communication’s publication in March this year, a
discussion has been launched within the EU and in the member
states on the best approach to be undertaken towards these states.

41. For more on the EEA, its struc-
ture and involvement with the EU,
including in decision-making, see
The  European  Economic  Area,  An
Overview: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/eea/
index.htm. 

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2

The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

An article on ‘Wider Europe’ is included in the final text, agreed by
the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Commission has
continued to take the lead in discussions in Brussels, and the Pol-
ish  government  in  May  2003  presented  new  proposals  on  the
shape of a future EU approach to these states.42 The Polish pro-
posals insist on the need for differentiation in EU policies towards
the Eastern neighbours, within the framework of a regional East-
ern Dimension. In addition, a Commissioner for Neighbourhood
Relations is also called for to head development of action plans
over the next two years. The proposals include the possibility of
offering Moldova and Ukraine ‘partnerships for association’ to
move  beyond  the  PCAs  once  they  expire  (Belarus  may  also  be
invited to elaborate an action plan). The focus also falls on the cre-
ation of funds to support civil society and small business in the
Eastern neighbours. 

None the less, beyond this work, uncertainty remains concern-
ing the future of the Wider Europe Communication and in terms
of when and how the Council and the future presidencies will take
it forward. The General Affairs Council cleared away some of this
uncertainty in its deliberations on 16 June 2003, where the Wider
Europe Communication was welcomed as a whole.43 In particular,
the Council drew attention to the Action Plans as the means by
which  to  ensure  differentiation  in  relations  with  the  Eastern
neighbours, calling on the Commission to launch proposals for
detailed political documents in 2004, including where necessary
for sector-specific cooperation. Another notable feature of the
Council Conclusions was its attention to developing the political
and security dialogue with the new Neighbours. Moreover, men-
tion of extending the four freedoms in the long term has been
abandoned  for  the  moment,  although  cooperation  in  specific
areas related to these is highlighted.

The steps taken since the European Council in Thessaloniki
are  promising  in  terms  of  responding  to  the  questions  raised
above. The Commission Communication ‘Paving the Way for a
New Neighbourhood Instrument’ tackles the question of financ-
ing with some determination. Shortly after the publication of the
document in early July 2003, the Commission created a Wider
Europe Task Force to take the lead on pushing forward the pro-
posals  developed  in  the  two  Communications,  particularly  in
terms of drawing up and piloting through Action Plans. Signifi-
cantly,  the  Task  Force  will  respond  to  Commissioner  Günter 

42. The New Neighbours – A Frame-
work for Relations (Proposals from
Poland, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, May 2003).

43. ‘Wider Europe – New Neigh-
bourhood  –  Council  Conclu-
sions’, General Affairs Council,
16.VI. 2003, Brussels, 10369/03
Presse 166.

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Dov Lynch

2

Verheugen but be directed by the Deputy Director General in DG
External Relations and seconded by a Director from DG Enlarge-
ment – an interesting combination of internal and external policy
points of contact and policy-makers. The debate launched by the
first  Communication  is  moving  quickly  and  on  a  number  of
fronts.

Faith and God

The fundamental problem with the EU’s approach to its Eastern
neighbours over the last decade, and one that is not resolved in the
‘Wider Europe’ Communication, is that of faith. Since 1992, the
EU has sought to become an agnostic God for these states. The
invocation has been: ‘Make the leap of faith to transform yourself
on my model, pray to me . . . and maybe one day, I will exist for you.’
The Eastern neighbours see the EU as an atheist God, one who
never tires of repeating: ‘Make the leap of faith to transform your-
self on my model, pray to me . . . even if I will never exist for you.’ The
gap of understanding between the EU and the Eastern neighbours
is this fundamental.

What is to be done? For Moldova and Ukraine especially, it is
worth remembering that God helps those who help themselves.44
Given  the  dual  revolution  that  is  under  way  in  the  EU,  with
enlargement and the Convention, these states must take the first
and the last steps to reform. If the declared objective of European
integration is true, it is imperative for them to push through the
transformation  this  requires  in  their  societies,  polities  and
economies. Nothing but cold reality will convince Brussels of their
intent. In seeking to create this reality, these states must seize the
opportunities held in the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative.45 Their strat-
egy should be to engage the EU as deeply as possible in their affairs
through Action Plans, implementation reviews and scoreboards.
Deep engagement will create an image of conditionality, if not its
reality, and support embattled élites (should they exist) in the pur-
suit of reform. The objective of these states must be to make the
question of their joining the EU an elephant in a room: a reality so
unavoidable that the answer can be nothing but positive. If these
states genuinely seek accession, then the road to Brussels starts in
Kyiv and Chisinau (and Minsk). 

44.  This  metaphor  is  used  by
James Sherr, ‘The Dual Engage-
ments of Ukraine’, op. cit. in note
5. pp.108-43.

45. Moldova has so far been luke-
warm in its response to the Com-
munication  and  Ukraine  more
critical.

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2

The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU

For the EU, the challenge is to follow through on the recogni-
tion of its interdependence with the Eastern neighbours. The EU
cannot  choose  to  ignore  these  states,  safely  protected  by  the
Schengen regime: this would be reminiscent of the military think-
ing that inspired the Maginot Line.46 If, therefore, the EU must
become more engaged in this region, the ‘Wider Europe’ Commu-
nication has a number of good starting points, particularly with
regard to the Action Plans. The exploitation of this method will
require from the EU significant time and energy, and, therefore,
expert personnel and money. It is worth it. The only way to blur EU
membership is by creating real proximity, based on daily engage-
ment and constant presence. As such, signals can be sent on a daily
basis  to  those  Eastern  neighbours  with  EU  aspirations.  The
reform of these states on the EU model is far from inevitable. In
fact, the 1990s showed that it is the least likely option. It is very
possible that, no matter what the EU does, the Eastern neighbours
will be sucked further eastwards, with any chance of a serious
reform project abandoned. Still, it is worth seeking to prevent this.
The overall EU objective must address the fundamental gap of
understanding and perception that exists between it and the East-
ern neighbours. The EU should not necessarily seek to speak the
same language, but it should make more effort to explain the
Union’s linguistics. The central plank of EU policy must be an
‘outreach campaign’ in these states that assuages the fears and
self-doubts that plague these states and their societies. The EU
should seek to decouple the ‘EU’ from the notion of ‘Europe’.
These states must be declared and recognised as being unques-
tionably European. Only on this basis can some common lan-
guage be found to fill with substance the still vague concept of
‘proximity’. ‘EU Europe’ and ‘non-EU Europe’ can be bridged only
through contact and commitment.

The EU outreach programme might seek:

1. to explain the intricacies of the EU and to clarify the stakes of

integration and adoption of the acquis;

2. to direct large-scale exchange and educational programmes in
these states that will increase ‘EU knowledge’ and contacts
between youth and teachers/professors and their counterparts
in the Union; 47

3. to create ‘civil society networks’ in these states, based on local

and regional NGO forums;48

46. See James Sherr, op. cit. in note
30.

47. For more details on similar
ideas, see the proposals devel-
oped by Polish and Visegrad re-
search institutes, noted above.

48. The May 2003 Polish proposal
calls for the creation of a Civil So-
ciety Fund.

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Dov Lynch

2

4. to work as a platform for cross-border contacts between busi-

nesses on either side of the Union’s external borders.
This outreach programme will require the establishment of an
EU delegation in Chisinau and Minsk. It may require also the cre-
ation of EU regional offices inside these states, and also greater
coordination between the representations of member states to
ensure greater EU-related coordination, notably on the question
of issuing visas.49 The enlarged EU will be able to draw on the accu-
mulated expertise of the new members to pursue these objectives. 
Finally, the EU must engage at the security and political level
with its Eastern neighbours. The initial focus should be on con-
flict settlement in Moldova.50 With heavy EU political engage-
ment, the conflict with Transnistria may be resolved. This would
require  coordination  with  the  OSCE,  Russia  and  Ukraine  to
explore the possibility of an EU military observer operation to
replace the current peacekeeping operation. Conflict settlement
will require a host of other measures, ranging from monitoring of
the  Ukrainian-Moldovan  border  to  the  demobilisation  of  the
Transnistrian armed and paramilitary forces, and the creation of
international security guarantees for the settlement. These are
neither beyond the EU’s abilities nor irrelevant to its interests. An
EU security presence in Moldova would reverberate through the
Eastern neighbours and catalyse positive cooperation between
them. More than anything, this would signal a serious EU com-
mitment to the region, at long last. 

As a whole, the EU faces the task of reinventing itself as a for-
eign policy actor towards these states. In particular, the EU must
rethink the notion of ‘signals’, and move beyond a concentration
on conditionality and accession/non-accession as the only tools at
its disposal to advance its interests beyond its borders. Political
engagement, the acceptance of security responsibility in the East-
ern states, concrete commitment to propagating stability – all
must lie at the heart of the EU’s new proximity strategy. The new
Eastern states need not become ‘like us’, but they must be con-
vinced that ‘we will be with them’. And it must be a strategy – where
means are coordinated towards ends – not a vague ‘dimension’ or
a diffuse ‘process’.

49. For proposals on the develop-
ment of a regional border strategy,
see Judy Batt, ‘The EU’s new bor-
derlands’, Working Paper (London:
Centre  for  European  Reform,
2003).

50. For an exploration of a possi-
ble EU operation in Moldova, see
the  author’s  ‘Russia  Faces  Eu-
rope’, Chaillot Paper 60 (Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies, May
2003).

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Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

3

The Balkans between
stabilisation and membership

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

As the European Union begins to consider its post-enlargement
frontiers through its intention to establish a neighbourhood pol-
icy with Russia, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and
the southern Mediterranean, it is still struggling to define its rela-
tions with the countries of the Western Balkans. While the Com-
mission’s  ‘Wider  Europe’  Communication  of  11  March  2003
focuses on Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the countries of the
southern Mediterranean, it excludes the Western Balkans, which it
considers ‘have the perspective of membership of the EU’.1 From a
western Balkan perspective, the prospect of EU membership is not
as clear-cut as the Union claims, despite the fact that the opportu-
nities  and  challenges  ‘surrounding  Proximity,  Prosperity  and
Poverty’ are as relevant to the western Balkan area as to all of the
EU’s  new  neighbours.  The  plea  by  the  presidents  of  Croatia,
FYROM, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina (the five western Balkan countries) for the confirmation of an
open-door policy by the EU at their summit in Ohrid on 2 June, on
the eve of the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans summit, is indica-
tive of the assessment in the region that the EU is unwilling to
make a full commitment to the integration of these countries.2

Both the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative and the Western Balkans
were high on the agenda of the 19-20 June Thessaloniki summit.
Although on that occasion the countries of the Western Balkans
did benefit from an upgrading of their status, they have doubts
over the EU’s commitment to integrate them and over their ability
to move beyond stabilisation toward integration.

This paper attempts to explore the current and future relation-
ship between the European Union and the Western Balkans, and
assess the prospects of a workable relationship based on stabilisa-
tion of the region and its eventual integration, in the context of the
EU’s policy (or lack thereof), into its wider geographical neigh-
bourhood. A number of issues or questions are pressing and need
to be resolved in order to ensure the successful stabilisation of the

1. European Commission, ‘Wider
Europe – Neighbourhood: A New
Framework for Relations with our
Eastern  and  Southern  Neigh-
bours’,  COM(2003)104  final,
11 March 2003.

2. See Role Kasule, ‘Balkan lead-
ers issue plea to EU ahead of sum-
mit’, Reuters, 2 June 2003. 

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

3

region.  Equally  important  is  the  post-stabilisation  and  post-
reconstruction phase and the need to construct appropriate and
viable strategies to deal with these.

The Greek EU presidency of the first half of 2003, in its working
document on the presidency’s priorities for the Western Balkans,
stated that ‘[following] the Copenhagen decisions on enlarge-
ment and considering progress made in the region, but also its
fragility, it is important for the EU to keep the Balkans high on its
agenda. The Union must increasingly assume a leading role in the
area, in support of stability, development and integration.’ Fur-
thermore, it also stated that ‘[as] the Western Balkan countries
gradually move from stabilisation and reconstruction to associa-
tion and sustainable development, policies pursuing economic
and social cohesion at both national and regional levels become
increasingly relevant, in particular having in mind the very high
level of unemployment in most of them, as well as the social and
regional dimension of ethnic problems.’3

The report reflects the changing winds in the region since the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in December 2000: though the
region is fragile, it is also well on its way to being stabilised and
eventually  integrated  in  the  wider  European  family.  This  new
phase is not without dangers, as challenges to the ‘new’ status quo
could destabilise the region. Since publication of the presidency’s
report, two events that could lead the international community
(especially the European Union) to rethink its policy of integra-
tion for the region have shaken the region’s core. The first is the
Iraq crisis and its indirect consequences; the second is the assassi-
nation of Serbia’s Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic. The transat-
lantic and intra-European crises over Iraq at the beginning of 2003
demonstrated the importance of the wider context, given that
developments elsewhere in the world could have repercussions in
the Balkans as well. In other words, the Iraq crisis has raised the
spectre of political consensus over enlargement breaking down. If
Western policy towards the Balkans is based on symbiosis between
stabilisation and integration, what happens if the logic of integra-
tion is put on hold or slowed down? Also, the assassination of Ser-
bian premier Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 raises the question
whether the integration approach (i.e., the perspective of EU mem-
bership) actually works for the Western Balkans. It took the assas-
sination, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Serbia, for
the  Government  to  begin  cracking  down  on  ‘the  interlocking

3. Greek Foreign Ministry, ‘Work-
ing Document: Greek Presidency
Priorities 
the  Western
Balkans’, www.eu2003.gr/en/ar-
ticles.

for 

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

nexus of organised crime, war criminals, and police and army offi-
cers hiding behind “nationalist-patriotic” slogans and organisa-
tions.’4 The hope is now that the assassination provides a catalyst
to restart the long-stalled reform process. What does this there-
fore imply for the EU’s approach?

Two parallel stories are at play – the state of the Balkans and the
evolving policy response of the European Union. Both are equally
relevant as, on the one hand, the Balkans attempt to enter the
European mainstream and, on the other, the European Union is
attempting to evolve into a global power with a full array and use
of political, diplomatic and economic instruments. These two par-
allel stories began converging at some point in the mid-1990s,
never  to  part  again.  It  is  the  interplay  between  the  two  in  the
future, given their past and present evolution, that needs to be
assessed  and  understood.  A  framework,  albeit  general,  within
which both the Balkans and the EU evolve and draw nearer to each
other needs to be formulated and defined as both sides need to be
aware of the dangers and virtues to come as well as the ‘road map’
to be followed.

A third story is the transatlantic one, in which the EU’s growing
lead role in the Balkans is ‘a proving ground for a new partnership
between  the  EU  and  the  United  States’.5 The  question  here  is
twofold. First, US policy on the Balkans has to be defined, as it has
been undergoing many alterations since its focus shifted to al-
Qaeda and the war on terrorism and, as a consequence, its military
is being realigned across Europe.66 See, for example, ‘U.S. plans to
train, deploy Rapid Strike Force in Balkans, Associated Press, 3
June 2003. 

Secondly, the question whether Europe has the wherewithal to
take a lead role, given its many internal contradictions, has yet to
be answered. 

Therefore, a number of questions need to be asked and debated
in order to formulate realistic policy options that will lead to a
win-win situation where both the EU and the region come out on
top.
(cid:90) What are and should be the region’s concerns and priorities that

will ensure that it is stabilised?
(cid:90) Is the EU approach the right one?

4. International Crisis Group, ‘Ser-
bia After Djindjic’, ICG Balkans Re-
port no. 141, 18 March 2003, p. i.

5.  Morton  Abramowitz  and
Heather Hurlburt, ‘Can the EU
Hack  the  Balkans?  A  Proving
Ground for Brussels,’ Foreign Af-
fairs, September/October 2002,
p. 2.

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

3

The stakes

The  Balkans  present  a  two-edged  challenge  for  the  European
Union. On the one hand, they represent Europe’s backyard and,
therefore, the need for Europe to manage them is imperative; on
the other, the Balkans represent the principal testing ground of
Europe’s CFSP and evolving ESDP (with Operation Concordia in
FYROM  and  the  EU  Police  Mission  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Simultaneously, for the states of the Balkans, the EU represents the
only viable option if the region is to escape its recent past and its
retarded development. In other words, the stakes are high for all
parties concerned. The successful symbiosis between the European
Union and the Balkans will ensure that the region’s challenges will
be met if realistic policy options where both the EU and the region
come out on top are implemented. Javier Solana, the EU’s High
Representative for CFSP, puts it best when he says that: ‘I make no
apology  for  concentrating  on  the  Balkans.  They  are  on  our
doorstep.  The  security  of  Europe  depends  on  stability  in  the
Balkans. They are also a test-case for Europe’s enhanced Common
Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than [in] the Balkans is
the EU expected to deliver.’7

In  assessing  the  Balkans  today,  defining  the  context,  both
regional and international, is important if one is to have a clear
and balanced evaluation of developments in the region. A number
of givens exist on the ground and in terms of action by the inter-
national community towards the region. At the same time, there
are many unknown variables. It is the relationship between facts
and challenges that shape the Balkans’ present and future direc-
tion.

The contours of the political edifice

The backbone of peace in the Balkans comes in the form of four
international accords: the Erdut Agreement of November 1995
that brought to an end the armed conflict between Croats and
Serbs; the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords that put an end to the war in
Bosnia in November/December 1995; the Rambouillet negotia-
tions (March 1999) and UNSCR 1244 that determined the future

7. Javier Solana, ‘Europe: Security
in the Twenty-First Century’, The
Olof Palme Memorial lecture, 20
June 2001, Stockholm.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

of Kosovo in June 1999; and the Ohrid Agreement of August 2001
that put an end to interethnic conflict in FYROM. The Belgrade
Agreement of March 2002 aimed at defining the transformation of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro
can also be considered part of the region’s architecture, though its
viability is still uncertain. 

Also, three factors that contributed to or fuelled violence for

over a decade have been removed.
(cid:90) The era of nationalist troublemakers in Croatia and Serbia has
come to an end. Not only have these leaders gone but their polit-
ical infrastructure has been crumbling as well.

(cid:90) The potential for further violent disintegration appears to be
containable in that, by early 2002, no state or splinter nation in
the Balkans was in a position to engage in any prolonged war-
fare.

(cid:90) The divisions between the Europeans and the United States over

policy in the region have largely evaporated.8
As a consequence, one can say that there are relatively few,
though not minor, problems in the Balkans today. These include
the question of Kosovo’s final status, dealing with war criminals
and the fight against organised crime. None is insurmountable
given proper attention, although their potential for destabilisa-
tion of the region is great and merits close monitoring. Admit-
tedly,  at  a  time  when  the  grand  strategic  issues  of  the  past  in
Europe (such as how to integrate Germany, liberate Central and
Eastern Europe and promote democracy in Russia) have been set-
tled, dealing with residual problems in the Balkans is not inspiring
but the job still needs to be done.9 Thus while the trend is towards
‘wind-down in the Balkans’; the danger is that the absence of any
great potential by any of the region’s regimes to further destabilise
the region could lead one to the conclusion that the region is on its
way  to  normalisation  and  integration  within  European  struc-
tures. The European Commission President, Romano Prodi, says
it best: ‘My message is that the region’s stabilization process has
just begun. There is also no guarantee it will not come to a halt –
worse – reverse its course. It would take a short time for the region
to become unstable again. To prevent this, we need to multiply our
efforts to consolidate our achievements, but also to proactively
foster  the  consolidation  of  democracy  and  stability  in  the
Balkans.’10 The assassination of Zoran Djindjic has put the nega-
tive spotlight back on the Balkans. The new governments that

8.  Strategic  Survey 2001/2002
(London: Oxford University Press
for the IISS, 2002), pp. 150-1.

9. Ronald D. Asmus, ‘United We’ll
Stand,’ The Washington Post, 6 May
2001, p. A21.

10. Romano Prodi, in a letter sent
to  the  Greek  Prime  Minister,
Costas  Simitis  and  his  Italian
counterpart, Silvio Berlusconi on
21 January 2003, as reported by
the  Athens  News  Agency  on
24 January 2003.

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have come to power in Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM, Albania
and the international protectorates of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo have not been able to shake off the mafias because they
lack the resources and political will to do so. Also, the ongoing
deindustrialisation process and large-scale rural underdevelop-
ment have produced mass unemployment which the mafias are
exploiting as the unemployed become vulnerable to ‘pressure by
mafia groups to deal in trafficking and corruption’.11

The current political landscape (from an EU point of view) is
also relatively straightforward. Enlargement is on the agenda for
all Balkan states although it is more evident for some than others
(though the Iraq crisis has placed doubts on whether the agenda
will be maintained). The conclusions of the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council of 12-13 December 2002 clearly state that ‘the objec-
tive is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of the Euro-
pean  Union  in  2007’,  and  that  the  accession  of  Bulgaria  and
Romania is part of ‘the inclusive and irreversible enlargement
process’ of the Union.12 The Thessaloniki European Council of
19-20 June 2003 reaffirmed the 2007 objective for the two coun-
tries and determined that the ‘European Council in December
2003, based on the regular reports from the Commission and the
strategy paper, will assess progress achieved with a view to setting
out  the  framework  for  the  conclusion  of  accession  negotia-
tions.’13

For the other Balkan countries, the Copenhagen European
Council ‘reaffirms the European perspective of the countries of
the Western Balkans in the Stabilisation and Association Process 
. . . and underlines its determination to support their efforts to
move closer to the EU.’14 The Thessaloniki summit ‘reiterated its
determination to fully and effectively support the European per-
spective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an
integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria.’ It
endorsed the ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: mov-
ing towards European integration’, a document which reaffirmed
the EU’s commitment to the eventual inclusion of the Western
Balkans into the bloc but set no timetable and emphasised that
their entry would depend on the pace of their reforms.15 Further-
more, an EU-Western Balkans summit followed the Thessaloniki
European Council, at which the leaders of the western Balkan
countries endorsed the European Council’s decisions. 16

11. Judy Dempsey, ‘Europe needs
to remember the Balkans,’ Finan-
cial Times, 18 March 2003. See
also, European Stability Initiative,
‘The Road to Thessaloniki: Cohe-
sion and the Western Balkans’,
12 March  2003,  www.esiweb.
org.

12.  ‘Presidency  Conclusions’,
Copenhagen European Council,
12 and 13 December 2002, paras.
13-17.

13.  ‘Presidency  Conclusions’,
Thessaloniki European Council,
19 and 20 June 2003, para. 37.

14. Ibid., para. 23.

15. 2518th Council meeting, Gen-
eral  Affairs  and  External  Rela-
tions, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003.

16. EU-Western Balkans summit
declaration, Thessaloniki, 21 June
2003.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

The year 2003 also brings with it some new challenges that will
or could have an impact on the Balkans. The first has to do with
the gradual US disengagement and its implications for the region
and the European Union, which will have to step up its efforts and
presence diplomatically and militarily as the real powerbroker in
the region. Secondly, enlargement could sidetrack the EU, as it will
begin looking inwards to integrate its newcomers rather than
address  its  new  peripheries  (the  ‘left-outs’  in  the  case  of  the
Balkans).  Thirdly,  the  anti-immigration  mood  in  Europe  as
reflected in polls in many EU member states might reinforce the
sentiment shared by many Serbs and Albanians that they are not
welcome. Finally, the cultivation of partition agendas both within
and outside the region could be potentially destabilising. The lat-
est examples come with the Bosnian polls of September 2002,
interpreted by many (especially in the West) as the failure of Day-
ton and the need to radically revise it; the Kosovo partition scenar-
ios propounded by Serbia in early 2003; and the public disavowals
of the Ohrid Framework by its principal signatories in FYROM.

The socio-economic mire

The biggest challenge, though, has to do with continuing unem-
ployment rather than the slow pace of reconciliation between eth-
nic communities. Romano Prodi’s warnings regarding the fragility
of the region are not to be taken lightly. There are tell-tale signs that
trouble could be brewing if developments and challenges are not
carefully assessed and no appropriate responses by both the inter-
national community and the states of the region are implemented.
The  results  of  the  South-East  Europe  Public  Agenda  Survey
released on 21 March 2002 are telling, as across the region the three
issues most consistently identified by the survey as causes of public
concern are unemployment, corruption and crime.17 The elections in
the region in the autumn of 2002 are indicative of these concerns.
While with this round of elections, free and fair elections were held
for the first time across the region, the protest vote is growing. It is
governing  the  political  process  in  the  Balkans.  The  reformist
momentum has suffered a serious setback, as the reformists do
not have a strong and well-articulated public majority and no gen-
uine new reforming leader has emerged. An anti-élite vote is grow-
ing across the region. 

17. South East Europe (SEE) Pub-
lic Agenda Survey, an opinion sur-
vey released by South East Europe
Democracy Support (SEEDS), a
network of regional survey organi-
sations and think tanks supported
by the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance 
IDEA),
(International 
March  2002,  http://www.
idea.int.

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South-Eastern Europe overtook Central Europe in terms of
GDP growth in 2001 and will probably do the same in 2002. The
region’s growth rate was 4 per cent in 2001 and estimated at 3.8 per
cent in 2002, despite the slowdown of the world economy.18 On
the other hand, the region is plagued by unemployment, which
stands at about 30 per cent in Serbia and FYROM, 40 per cent in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and 60 per cent in Kosovo.19 Also, combating
corruption and a huge informal sector is considered a key chal-
lenge ‘in the context of the design and the implementation of fis-
cal policies in the Western Balkans’. Such high unemployment
helps breed criminality and the black economy. Javier Solana has
often spoken out on the dangers of organised crime: 

Organised crime poses arguably the single greatest threat to soci-
ety and long-term stability in our own region. Unless it is tackled
decisively, our efforts to build peace in societies recovering from
conflict will be continuously set back. And the democratic institu-
tions which allow societies to resolve conflict in a peaceful manner
will  be  continuously  eroded.  Addressing  this  challenge  also
requires  new  tools  and  new  and  deeper  forms  of  cooperation
between governments and between regional organisations.20
The fight against organised crime is one of the key challenges we
face today. The reasons why organised crime threatens the political
and economic stability of the Balkans are obvious for all of us . . .
Every country of the region is blighted by the smuggling of drugs
and cigarettes, by the trafficking of people and weapons, by cor-
ruption and by racketeering.
The cumulative effect is intolerable – important war criminals
remain at large, often sustained by organised crime. It is an affront
to justice, a barrier to the progress and development of the coun-
tries of the region, and a threat to the security of us all. Quite sim-
ply, it must stop . . .
Organised crime is a common threat. It demands a co-ordinated
and an enduring response. The fight against organised crime in the
Western Balkans has to be systematically on the agenda of our dif-
ferent meetings. Therefore the commitments from the future EU
Presidencies are particularly valuable.
At the same time, organised crime in the Western Balkans is first
and foremost a problem for the region. It is in [the] interest of local
governments to find solutions to the problems faced by their citi-
zens and demonstrate their willingness in concrete terms. This
attitude will also pave the way towards the European Union.21

18. European Commission, Di-
rectorate-General for Economic
and Financial Affairs, ‘The West-
ern Balkans in Transition’, Occa-
sional paper 1, January 2003, pp. 1-
2.  The  growth  rates  vary  by
country. In 2001, the economy of
Kosovo grew by 11 per cent, Alba-
nia by 6.5 per cent, FRY by 5.5 per
cent and Croatia by 4.4 per cent
and Bosnia-Herzegovina by 2.3
per cent, while the economy of FY-
ROM shrank by 4.1 per cent. 

19. See European Commission,
DG RELEX, ‘Country Strategy Pa-
pers 2002-2006’. See also, Daniel
Daianu, ‘Conflicting Perceptions
and Economic Challenges,’ South-
east European Times, 3 February
2003, http://www.balkantimes.
com.

20. Javier Solana, intervention at
the Regional EU Conference on
Conflict Prevention, Helsingborg,
30 August 2002.

21. Javier Solana, Intervention at
the London Conference on Or-
ganised Crime in South-Eastern
Europe, London, 25 November
2002.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

According to the Commission, the percentage of firms bribing
frequently was estimated in 2002 at 36 per cent in Albania, 23 per
cent in FYROM, 22 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16 per cent in
FRY and 13 per cent in Croatia.22 Also, the region is showing an
increasing addiction to foreign aid which, while it has contributed
to rebuilding infrastructure, does not necessarily foster viable
economies and ‘mainly finances consumption’.23

The mid- to long-term challenges

In his intervention before the European Parliament in January
2003, the High Representative was perfectly aware of the challenges
ahead:

Important progress has indeed been achieved in the stabilisation
of the region after a decade of conflicts and crises. The European
perspective remains our strongest tool to further consolidate sta-
bility  and  encourage  sustainable  and  EU  compatible  reform
through the Stabilisation and Association Process.
The Copenhagen decisions on enlargement have however raised
the spectre of marginalisation and ‘enlargement fatigue’ in the
region. It is therefore extremely important to keep the Balkans
high on the EU’s agenda and to send a strong message confirming
that the European vocation of the Balkans is real. But eventual
membership will however require hard work and genuine commit-
ment to reforms by the countries of the region. This is the double
message we need to send during the coming months. I look for-
ward to work closely with the Greek Presidency with a view to a suc-
cessful Thessaloniki Summit, which should mark a new milestone
in the special relationship between the European Union and the
Western Balkans.24

The question is whether the EU can successfully meet the chal-
lenges of the region if it is unable to provide the states of the West-
ern Balkans a clear ‘road map’ for adhesion. The point to be made
is that despite the well-meaning pronouncements and policies of
the  High  Representative  and  Commission  officials,  it  can  be
argued that EU policy does not go far enough towards meeting the
region’s challenges. The case of the Stabilisation and Association
Process and regional cooperation are two examples of unfulfilled
potential.

22. European Commission, Di-
rectorate-General for Economic
and Financial Affairs, ‘The West-
ern Balkans in Transition’, Occa-
sional paper 1, January 2003, p. 15.

23. Daniel Daianu, op. cit. in note
19.

24. Javier Solana, Intervention be-
fore  the  European  Parliament,
Brussels, 29 January 2003.

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The Stabilisation and Association Process

The EU’s relations with the Western Balkans are defined through
the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which ‘is designed
to encourage and support the domestic reform processes that these
countries have embarked upon. It is a step-by-step approach based
on  aid,  trade  preferences,  dialogue,  technical  advice  and,  ulti-
mately, contractual obligations. In the long term, the SAP offers
these  countries  the  prospect  of  full  integration  into  EU  struc-
tures.’25 Yet, while there is a stated intention to integrate the coun-
tries of the region into EU structures, the lack of a clear perspective
for accession does leave those countries in a kind of limbo between
stabilisation and integration. In other words, the SAP is not inte-
grated into the enlargement process. Let me explain.

While the SAP does not differ much in terms of content with
the Europe Agreements that provided the framework for bilateral
relations between the EC and the partner countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, they do differ in terms of commitment to EU
membership. Whereas the Europe Agreements ‘[prepared] the way
for the EU and the partner countries to converge economically,
politically, socially and culturally’, under the SAP ‘[i]n return for
the EU’s offer of a prospect of accession on the basis of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU) and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and
an assistance programme to support that ambition, the countries
of the region undertook to abide by the EU’s conditionality and
use the Stabilisation and Association process, and in particular
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements when signed, as the
means to begin to prepare themselves for the demands of the per-
spective on accession to the EU.’26 In other words, the conditions
imposed by the SAP and the individual SAAs are ‘not internal to
the process of accession, but are linked to the implementation of
the SAA itself. Thus, they are perceived as being externally imposed
on the country that has signed a SAA with the EU.’27 This, in itself,
begs the question as to whether the SAP needs to be integrated
into the enlargement process to be effective. The record shows that
the  only  mechanism  able  to  kick-start  post-communist
economies ‘is the programme of European accession’.28 As long as
the SAP is perceived to be exogenous to the enlargement process,
its impact on the domestic political agenda is going to be mini-
mal.29 The Greek presidency has not been unaware of this prob-
lem and called for the further development of the SAP and its

25.  See  http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/see/in-
dex.htm.

26. For the Europe Agreements,
see . For the SAP, see http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/see/actions/sap.htm.

27. Belgrade Centre for European
Integration, ‘Enhancing Relations
Between  the  EU  and  Western
Balkans’, Belgrade, April 2003,
p. 7.

in 

28.  See,  for  example,  Misha
Glenny and Gerald Knaus, ‘Thes-
saloniki  and  Beyond:  Europe’s
Challenge 
the  Western
Balkans’, paper presented at the
World Economic Forum, South-
East Europe Meeting, 23-24 May
2003, Athens. http://www.wefo-
rum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Co
ntent/South-East+Europe+Meet-
ing.

societies 

29. ‘Romania’s fortunes act as a
simple measure of the extraordi-
nary  impact  that  the  concrete
prospect of EU membership can
have on the perception of appar-
ently  weak 
and
economies. Five years ago, FDI
into Romania stood at $1 billion
p.a. Once accepted as a candidate
country, FDI began to rise expo-
nentially reaching $9 billion last
year and estimated to reach $18 in
five year’s time. Despite the pain
involved,  the  Romanians  have
worked hard on ensuring the pas-
sage and implementation of legis-
lation to meet the Copenhagen
criteria.’ See Misha Glenny’s con-
tribution on the issue of EU-US re-
lations to the Informal EU General
Affairs  and  External  Relations
Council,  2-3  May  2003.
http://www.eu2003.gr/en/arti-
cles/2003/5/1/2622/.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

adaptation to the challenge of enlargement in its widely circulated
working paper of January 2003.30 Its solution, however, which
called for the introduction of cohesion funds for the countries of
the Western Balkans (highly disputed given the technical difficul-
ties of transferring pre-accession aid (Heading 7 funds), to the
external  relations  budget  (Heading  4  funds)  which  metes  out
Balkan assistance)31 was not part of the Thessaloniki Council con-
clusions and the follow-up EU-Western Balkans summit. Also the
additional €200 million assistance for the region over the next
three years to supplement the allotted €4.65 billion (for the 2000-
06 budget), fell significantly short of the presidency’s goal of over
€900 million in additional funds. 

Also, the question about what follows the successful imple-
mentation of an SAA by a country of the Western Balkans remains
unanswered. Croatia’s application for membership in February
2003 necessitates a response by the Union ‘[as] to whether or not
an additional contractual stage will be required between accession
and membership’.32 The expected application by FYROM in the
autumn of 2003 makes this clarification all the more pressing. Yet
the  EU-Western  Balkans  summit  failed  to  dispel  some  of  the
doubts regarding the post-SAP phase. According to the summit
Declaration, the SAP ‘will remain the framework for the European
course of the Western Balkan Countries, all their way to their
future accession.’ Although the EU did provide a clearer accession-
oriented dimension to the process of integration, doubts remain
as to whether all EU member states are ready to provide a full com-
mitment to membership. Though the Commission does attempt
to address the gap between the expectations of the states of the
Western Balkans and what the EU and its member states are will-
ing to offer, its proposed ‘European Integration Parnerships’ were
diluted to ‘European Partnerships’ in the Thessaloniki agenda.33

Regional cooperation

The EU has also stressed the benefits of regional cooperation to the
countries of the Western Balkans. The Zagreb summit Declaration
of 24 November 2000 clearly asserts that ‘[d]emocracy and regional
reconciliation  and  cooperation  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  rap-
prochement of each of these countries with the European Union
on the other, form a whole.’34 Furthermore, the five states com-

30. Hellenic Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,  ‘Working  Document:
Greek Presidency Priorities for the
Western  Balkans’,  13  January
2003.  http://www.eu2003.gr/
en/articles/2003/1/13/1487/pri
nt.asp.

31. See Judy Dempsey, ‘Greece
seeks  more  EU  aid  for  the
Balkans’, Financial Times, 22 May
2003. For the rationale behind the
transfer and allocation of cohe-
sion funds to the countries of the
Western Balkans, see European
Stability Initiative, ‘The Road to
Thessaloniki: Cohesion and the
Western Balkans’, 12 March 2003
at http://www;esiweb.org.

32. Marie-Janine Calic, ‘The EU
and the Balkans: From Associa-
tion to Membership?’, SWP Com-
ments 7, May 2003, p. 4.

33.  COM(2003)  285,  21  May
2003.

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

3

prising the Western Balkans ‘undertake to establish between their
countries regional cooperation conventions providing for a polit-
ical dialogue, a regional free trade area and close cooperation in
the field of justice and home affairs, in particular for the rein-
forcement of justice and the independence thereof, for combating
organized crime, corruption, money laundering, illegal immigra-
tion, trafficking in human beings and all other forms of traffick-
ing. These conventions will be incorporated in the stabilization
and association agreements as they are concluded with the Euro-
pean Union.’35

The reality, however, is that only 10 per cent of the CARDS
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and
Stabilisation) appropriations programme is allotted to regional
projects despite the fact that CARDS is advertised as having ‘an
important regional component’. While the Greek presidency has
been a particularly strong proponent of regional integration via
the Stability Pact and the South-East Europe Cooperation Process
(SEECP), an ongoing tug-of-war between the Commission and the
Office of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe has compli-
cated the regional dimension of the EU’s vision for the Western
Balkans.36 The Thessaloniki Agenda does reaffirm the principle of
regional cooperation, but by introducing a high-level multilateral
forum (the EU-Western Balkans Forum) between the EU and the
SAP countries, the Stability Pact’s effectiveness could be further
diluted, as the purpose of regional cooperation, which in part aims
to bring about regional stabilisation, could be sacrificed to the
Europeanisation  agenda  of  the  EU  and  the  desire  of  western
Balkan leaders to share the political spotlight with their EU coun-
terparts.

Whither the holistic approach?

As the European Union continues to grow exponentially in both
geographic and political terms, it becomes all the more important
for it to reflect on and proffer ideas about what its growth implies
to itself and its relations with the rest of the world. The Union
remains, par excellence, a civilian power which has made great
strides over the last decade in the realms of foreign, security and
defence policy. In other words, while the EU as a civilian power
emphasises diplomacy, cooperation and economic means of exert-

34. See the Zagreb summit Decla-
ration  at    http://europa.eu.
int/comm/external_relations/see
/sum_11?00/statement.htm.

35. Ibid.

36. See, for example, Calic, op. cit.
in note 32, pp. 3-4.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

ing influence, the international context and the Union’s promi-
nence are such today that it needs to define clearly its vision of
international relations and how to regulate them.

At the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in May 2003,
Javier Solana, the EU’s security chief, was asked to prepare an EU
strategy paper outlining the principles that should govern the
Union’s future security relations, to be presented and debated at
the June European summit in Thessaloniki. The twin effects of
enlargement and the Union’s present and future relationship with
the United States as well as the flux in the international order,
induced the foreign ministers to begin thinking proactively as
many analysts have argued for years but to no avail.

The construction of a security paradigm implies by necessity a
holistic approach to the Union’s relations with its neighbour-
hood. In many respects, the growing EU role in crisis management
and post-conflict reconstruction is secondary and irrelevant if it
grows and develops to propagate current policies that attempt to
preserve the political edifice that has been constructed since 1995.
Without addressing the questions of status, and the institutional
and  economic  structural  deficiencies  of  the  countries  of  the
region, the EU could conceivably fail to preserve the peace. The
problem with the reticence in not giving the states of the Western
Balkans firmer accession commitments is that the EU is not pro-
tecting its interests as it should. The divergences among member
states regarding a clearer commitment for accession and the reso-
lution of status issues by necessity implies half-measures which
could potentially hinder the Union from developing an objective
strategic assessment of its geographical and political interests. 

The Union is not unaware of the security dimension of its inter-
ests in the Balkans. Javier Solana has broached the Balkans on
many occasions:

I have devoted much time and effort to the Balkans and for good
reason. This is ‘our backyard’, our neighbourhood. The replace-
ment of war and disorder with peace and stability in the Balkans
has a direct and immediate impact on the lives of the Union’s citi-
zens.37
Events in the Balkans directly affect Europe’s security as a whole.
And the European Union has an immediate interest in the region;
it is on its doorstep, and it shares much in common with it. That 
is why I have spent much of my time concentrating on the Balkans

37. Javier Solana, address to the
External Action Working Group of
the Convention, Brussels, 15 Oc-
tober 2002.

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

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. . . Our approach depends on long-term commitment, both politi-
cal, military and financial. But the alternative route of endless and
brutal conflict is ultimately much more costly.38
The European Union is today more deeply engaged in the Western
Balkans than ever before. The EU does not have an ‘exit’ strategy
but an ‘entry’ strategy, with the perspective of EU membership. But
the situation today remains fragile and our continuing attention
remains necessary to consolidate the positive trends that emerged
only relatively recently.39

Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, has
also devoted much of his time to resolving Balkan problems and
formulating appropriate policy towards the region. In a major
address on the Balkans in July 2001, he was quite clear:

Europe is ringed – from Kaliningrad in the North, to the Caucasus
and Central Asia, to the Balkans – by an arc of danger and instabil-
ity. We have to manage that danger, remove that instability. In the
Balkans, we are providing evidence of a more coherent, long-term
EU approach, in which we try to harness all the immense resources
of the European Union, and deploy them in support of our policy.
We are slowly, steadily reinforcing and stitching together what
Winston  Churchill  memorably  called  ‘the  sinews  of  peace’.
Whether we succeed or not is a key test of our nascent common for-
eign and security policy, of our ability to project stability beyond
our borders and into our immediate neighbourhood.40

Speaking in April 2002, still in the aftermath of the events of

11 September, Patten was even more explicit:

Even before the horror of 11 September, the recent tragic history of
the Balkans had shown to Europe and to the wider international
community the danger that failed, or failing, states can pose to our
stability and security in this small and interconnected world. The
Balkans have demonstrated how instability is contagious, how
quickly someone else’s problem can become everyone’s problem.
They have reminded us that it is less costly – in political or financial
capital, and above all in blood – to take early and decisive action,
rather than prevaricate until matters have spiralled out of control.
It is worth noting that our intervention in FYROM has cost just a
fraction of our effort in Kosovo or Bosnia. In the wake of Septem-
ber 11, these are all lessons that plainly have a wider application.

38. Javier Solana, ‘Europe: Secu-
rity in the Twenty-First Century’,
The Olof Palme Memorial lecture,
Stockholm, 20 June 2001.

39. Javier Solana, intervention on
‘The EU’s Role in the Balkans’, at
the informal meeting of EU de-
fence  ministers,  Rethymnon,
5 October 2002.

40. Chris Patten, ‘EU Strategy in
the Balkans’, speech to the Inter-
national Crisis Group, Brussels,
10 July 2001.

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The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

They have reminded us and this too has wider application that
standing up for our values when they are in danger, standing up for
democracy, for others’ rights, for justice, is not flabby idealism: it is
a matter of hard security, and profoundly in our self-interest. 
The choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability
to the Balkans, or the Balkans export instability to us. I know
which I would prefer.41

The problem is that the EU approach is questionable in prac-
tice. Beyond the aforementioned problems with the SAP and the
faltering regional cooperation, the Kosovo anomaly remains pred-
icated on the imposition of a new untenable(?) union between Ser-
bia and Montenegro.42 The mid- and long-term challenges for the
Western Balkans and the EU fundamentally raise the issue of the
EU’s credibility both in the Balkans and its ‘Wider Europe’ con-
text. According to an American observer, ‘in order to make the
vision of a future within Europe more credible, the European
Union needs to stop treating the Balkans as a distant region that
needs to be stabilized and begin to view it as a neighboring area
into which the EU intends to expand.’43 He could not be more pre-
scient in his observations. The EU has the wherewithal but lacks
the clear-headedness to objectively identify and promote its inter-
ests. While its ‘Wider Europe’ initiative addresses only countries
that do not currently have the perspective of membership, its
Western Balkans approach lacks a clear commitment for EU acces-
sion. As a consequence, ‘the EU itself, while possibly providing a
framework for “fuzzy statehood” internally, is becoming much
harder round its edges in response to the anxieties of its member-
states  about  the  perceived  threats  of  illegal  immigration  and
cross-border criminal activity.’44

A fog of uncertainty

While the opportunity for these contradictions to be addressed at
the Thessaloniki summit was real, the probability of granting the
Western Balkans anything more than European Partnerships as
long as the wider discussion on the linkages between an enlarged
Europe’s neighbourhood (the ‘Wider Europe’ countries, Romania,
Bulgaria, the Western Balkans and Turkey) and the various forth-
coming EU-level constitutional and institutional changes have not

41. Chris Patten, speech at the
Western Balkans Democracy Fo-
rum, Thessaloniki, 11 April 2002.

42.  See,  for  example,  George
Soros, ‘A chance for soft power in
the  Balkans’, Financial  Times,
22 May 2003; Dimitrios Trianta-
phyllou (ed.), ‘What Status for
Kosovo?’, Chaillot Paper 50 (Paris:
Institute for Security Studies of
WEU, October 2001). 

43. Daniel Serwer, ‘The Balkans;
From War to Peace, from Ameri-
can to European Leadership’, tes-
timony before the US House of
Representatives Committee on In-
ternational Relations, Subcom-
mittee on Europe, 10 April 2003.

44. Judy Batt, ‘ “Fuzzy Statehood”
versus Hard Borders: the impact
of EU enlargement on Romania
and Yugoslavia’, ESRC One Eu-
rope  or  Several?  Working  Paper
46/02, p. 29.

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

3

been finalised. The issue is not whether or not the western Balkan
countries are moving towards EU integration but the effect of the
slow pace of integration on these countries. What are the implica-
tions for their reform processes; for their reforming political élite;
for their publics and their expectations? The fear is that ‘the EU’s
tough attitude could discourage Balkan reformers and play into
the hands of precisely the corrupt and criminal elements that the
EU is trying to combat.’45

The Thessaloniki summit has left a bittersweet aftertaste as to
their eventual integration into the EU as the assessment is that it
met  neither  the  expectations  of  the  countries  of  the  Western
Balkans nor those of the Greek presidency.46 The western Balkan
countries can rightly claim that many of their expectations were
unfulfilled by the Thessaloniki summit. They did not get candi-
date status but are considered potential candidates. Countries like
Croatia, which expected to obtain a 2007 target date for accession,
were told that no ‘fast-track’ treatment would be forthcoming
until all accession criteria had been met. The EU did not liberalise
its visa regime towards them but promised to hold talks to deter-
mine benchmarks. Many additional funds were not allotted as
expected, as the Greek presidency’s effort to promote cohesion
funds for the region went nowhere. On the positive side, the lead-
ers of the western Balkan states did manage to share centre-stage
with their 25 EU counterparts and were granted an enriched Sta-
bilisation and Association Process, which includes the application
of enlargement methods with its emphasis on twinning arrange-
ments, as well as additional funds. As a consequence the Western
Balkans lie in a fog of uncertainty until at least early 2005. The
European Council of December 2003 is due to define more clearly
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession date and the 2004 calendar is
charged with the formal accession of 10 countries to the Union in
May 2004, European Parliament elections in June, the selection of
a new Commission in the autumn, a decision on Turkey’s EU bid
in December as well as the completion of the next Intergovern-
mental Conference sometime during the year. 

Simultaneously, the embryonic discussion of an EU security
strategy, stemming from the High Representative’s recommenda-
tions presented at the Thessaloniki European Council, could lead
to a clearer assessment that the Union needs to link the various
parts of its diverse external relations and actions if it is to export
stability, democratisation and the rest of its values in a coherent

45. See Patrick Moore, ‘EU Mem-
bership For Western Balkan States
Remains “Over There, Far Away” ’,
RFE/RL  Balkan  Report,  vol.  7,
no. 20, 27 June 2003.

46. For a critical assessment see
Wim  van  Meurs  and  Stefani
Weiss, ‘The Next Europe: South-
eastern  Europe  after  Thessa-
loniki’, Bertelsmann Stiftung and
Centre  for  Applied  Policy  Re-
search, University of Munich, June
2003.

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3

The Balkans between stabilisation and membership

manner to its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Paradoxi-
cally, the debate on security strategy could lead to the hardening of
the Union’s borders and to a consensus that the Western Balkans
remain outside rather than within for a long time, given the ambi-
guity the Balkan region projects. After all, the High Representative
clearly suggests in his security strategy that:

The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states
will increase our security but they also bring Europe closer to trou-
bled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries
to  the  East  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  borders  of  the
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative rela-
tions. 
The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans where the
European Union, with NATO and other partners, is committed to
achieving stability, good governance, and the closest possible inte-
gration of the region into Europe. This effort will have to be sus-
tained for some years to come.47

Thus, until early 2005 at best, the states of the Western Balkans
will find themselves waiting for the Union to decide whether and
how to proceed with their integration and accession or how to
cope with their non-inclusion. Until then, the Western Balkans
will continue to sap the Union’s energies by keeping in place a defi-
cient institutional edifice and being unable to address the region’s
chronic concerns of unemployment and underdevelopment. The
Union has failed to deliver the necessary and consistent bench-
marks and guidelines for the European integration of the Western
Balkans culminating in their accession or a new clearly defined
strategy based on ‘the promotion of a ring of well governed coun-
tries’ along the EU’s borders.

76

47. Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Eu-
rope in a Better World’, presented
at  the  Thessaloniki  European
Council, 
2003,
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/r
eports/76255.pdf.

June 

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The13th candidate — Turkey:
Whither its march towards
the EU?

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

4

The story of Turkey and the European Union is akin to the myths
of Sisyphus and Tantalus: it is difficult to distinguish who is who.
Like Sisyphus, the European Union is unable to date to carry the
weight of its own ambitions because the EU as a concert of 15/25
nation-states does not know what these are. The same applies to
Turkey, which constantly stalls its European projects due to the
burden of its domestic political and institutional soul-searching.
Like Tantalus, the EU as a model of peace, security and prosperity
tempts Turkey, while Turkey tempts the EU with its huge market
and economic potential but the questions of Turkey’s identity and
the free movement of its citizens within the EU keep both sides
apart.

Like the countries of the Western Balkans, Turkey is not part of
the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative; unlike them, its EU candidacy status
is more clearly defined, though not without major difficulties for
a variety of political, economic and security reasons. While it goes
without saying that the accession process has led to a number of
important legislative and constitutional changes in Turkey, such
as a civilian majority in the National Security Council of, now, 9
compared  with  5  military  members,  the  lifting  of  the  death
penalty in peacetime, the possibility of radio and television broad-
casts in Kurdish, enhanced freedom of expression and greater free-
dom for non-Muslim religious minorities,1 its candidacy is prov-
ing  a  headache  for  itself  and  the  Union.  The  signatory  of  an
Association Agreement with the EC/EU since September 1963
(the so-called ‘Ankara Agreement’), Turkey formally presented its
application for membership to the EC in 1987. After a Customs
Union Agreement in 1995, Turkey’s candidacy suffered a rebuttal
at the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 as it
failed to make the list of candidates for accession for a variety of
reasons including its human rights record, its position on Cyprus
and its tenuous relations with Greece. Despite the Turkish official

1. European Commission, ‘2002
Regular  Report  on  Turkey’s
Progress  towards  Accession’,
SEC(2002) 1412, Brussels, 9 Oc-
tober  2002,  http://europa.eu.
int/comm/enlar gement/r e-
port2002/tu_en.pdf According
to the Report: ‘The decision on the
candidate  status  of  Turkey  in
Helsinki in 1999 has encouraged
Turkey to introduce a series of fun-
damental reforms. A major con-
stitutional reform was introduced
in  October  2001  aimed  at
strengthening guarantees in the
field of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and restricting
the grounds for capital punish-
ment.  A  new  Civil  Code  was
adopted  in  November  2001.
Three  sets  of  reform  packages
were adopted in February, March
and  August  2002.  The  death
penalty has been lifted in peace-
time. The state of emergency has
now been lifted in two provinces in
the South East and the decision
has been taken to lift it in the two
provinces where it still applies by
the end of this year.’

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The 13th candidate — Turkey: whither its march towards the EU?

attitude which ‘combined bitterness for the rebuff with an atti-
tude  that  dismissed  the  importance  of  EU  membership  for
Turkey’,2 the EU confirmed ‘Turkey’s eligibility for accession to
the European Union’ and decided to draw up a strategy ‘to prepare
Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union
in every field’.3

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 pro-
duced the great leap forward in EU-Turkish relations in welcom-
ing ‘recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Com-
mission’s progress report, as well as its intention to continue its
reform towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria.’ The
Council therefore concluded that ‘Turkey is a candidate State des-
tined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied
to the other candidate States.’4 Apart from paragraph 12 of the
Helsinki Council conclusions, which laid down the criteria for
membership, Turkey is bound to paragraphs 4 and 9 (a). Para-
graph 4 refers to the ‘principle of the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes in accordance with the United Nations Charter’, while urg-
ing candidate states ‘to resolve any outstanding border disputes
and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reason-
able time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
The European Council will review the situation relating to any
outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions
on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement
through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end
of 2004.’5

The  reference  here  is  obviously  to  Turkey’s  disputes  with
Greece. Paragraph 9 (a) expresses the European Union’s ‘strong
support for the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process
[comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem] to a successful
conclusion.’ The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 Decem-
ber 2002 also significantly advanced Turkey’s cause, as it defined
the parameters of the Union’s future relations with Turkey. More
specifically,  the  conclusions  of  the  Copenhagen  Council  state
that:

The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis
of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. It

2.  Thanos  Veremis,  ‘The  Pro-
tracted Crisis’, in Dimitris Keridis
and  Dimitrios  Triantaphyllou
(eds.), Greek-Turkish Relations in the
Era of Globalization (Dulles, Va.:
Brassey’s, 2001), p. 46. 

3. ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Lux-
embourg  European  Council,
12 December 1997, http://ue.eu.
int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LA
NG=1.

4. 
‘Presidency  Conclusions’,
Helsinki European Council, 10-
11 December 1999, http://ue.eu.
int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LA
NG=1.

5. Ibid.

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

4

strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent
legislative packages and the subsequent implementation meas-
ures which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the
Accession Partnership . . .
The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform
process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of
a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides
that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European
Union  will  open  accession  negotiations  with  Turkey  without
delay.6

With the adoption of a revised Accession Partnership by the
Council of the European Union in May 2003 that establishes the
priorities Turkey should pursue in its legislative reforms and sup-
ported by increased pre-accession financial assistance, the Thessa-
loniki European Council reaffirmed the Union’s intention to take
a decision on Turkey’s candidacy at the December 2004 European
Council.7

As things stand today, therefore, EU-Turkish relations will fun-
damentally and qualitatively alter in December 2004. Here both
the international and the domestic contexts are equally important
for Turkey. It should be remembered that the Helsinki European
Council was also groundbreaking in that it formally launched the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a necessary com-
ponent of the EU’s embryonic crisis management capability and
the subject of intensive negotiations with Turkey regarding the
country’s participation in decisions on EU-led operations using
NATO assets as ESDP became a key concern for EU-NATO rela-
tions.8 Also, the Copenhagen summit made Cyprus’s accession to
the EU a de facto reality by May 2004, whether or not the Cyprus
problem had been resolved. Since Copenhagen, the Iraq crisis has
shaken US-Turkish relations to the core, thereby simultaneously
challenging Turkey’s strategic dependence on the United States,
and vice versa, as well as fundamentally bringing to the fore the
necessity for greater strategic thinking on the part of the Euro-
pean Union as it widens both its frontiers and its neighbourhood. 

6. 
‘Presidency  Conclusions’,
Copenhagen European Council,
12-13 
2002,
December 
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/new-
main.asp?LANG=1.

with 

7. See Council Decision of 19 May
2003 on the principles, priorities,
intermediate objectives and con-
ditions contained in the Accession
Partnership 
Turkey
(2003/398/EC). Also see ‘Presi-
dency Conclusions’, Thessaloniki
European Council, 12-13 Decem-
ber 2003, para. 38, which states
that the ‘Accession Partnership
constitutes the cornerstone of EU-
Turkish relations, in particular in
view of the decision to be taken by
the European Council in Decem-
ber 2004.’

8. For a substantive analysis of
Turkey and ESDP see, Antonio
Missiroli, ‘EU-NATO Coopera-
tion in Crisis Management: No
Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security
Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 1, March
2002, pp. 9-26.

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The 13th candidate — Turkey: whither its march towards the EU?

The domestic scene

A series of events since 1996 (including the post-modern coup of
February 1997, the Izmit earthquake of August 1999 and the twin
economic catastrophes of November 2000 and February 2001)
have  contributed  to  surging  pro-EU  sentiment,  a  broad-based
demand for further democratic reform and fury directed at any and
all institutions – no matter how previously sacrosanct – deemed
responsible for the calamities of recent years. Popular support for
EU membership is new, and suggests that this great goal of repub-
lican Turkey is no longer the special preserve of élites and their ‘ide-
ological’  obsession  with  the  EC/EU  which  was  interpreted  as
‘Turkey having made a political choice between East and West’.9
Ultimately, the push for change, the claims of a rising counter-élite
to a place in the power structure, and the popularity of EU mem-
bership all point to a fundamental fact: Turkey is now ready to
shake off the shackles of the 1982 military-drafted constitution as
well as the mentality that framed it.10 Yet whether the establish-
ment that drafted or supported this constitution is willing to
accept the changing domestic political balance of power and allow
the ‘Muslim Democrats’ to rule effectively remains to be seen.11

In other words, Turkey’s European aspirations do not conform
to  its  Kemalist  political  and  institutional  edifice:  ‘[w]hile  it
remains the state ideology in Turkey it will be impossible to assess
the extent to which – as its adherents maintain – Kemalism is the
reason for Turkey being [more] democratic than other Muslim
countries or whether it is irrelevant, or even, as its opponents
argue,  an  obstacle  to  complete  democratisation.’12 What  this
augurs for the future is hard to tell. As long as Turkey does not
come to terms with its domestic political and economic heritage
and the necessity to undergo the necessary political and economic
changes that are not only exigencies for accession (the so-called
‘Copenhagen criteria’) but basic preconditions for truly liberal
democratic societies, its relations with the EU will remain in stale-
mate.

It is in the context of foreign policy and in particular with
regard to relations with the EU that Turkey is judged. To date the
results have been mitigated by the perceived inability of the Erdo-
gan government to promote its foreign policy initiatives, begin-
ning with early resolution of the Cyprus issue. Here the struggle

9 Philip Robbins, Suits and Uni-
forms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the
Cold  War (London:  Hurst  and
Company, 2003), p. 140.

10.  See  Soli  Ozel,  ‘After  the
Tsunami’, Journal of Democracy,
vol. 14, no. 2, April 2003, p. 91.

11.  See,  for  example,  Duygu
Bazoglu Sezer, ‘The Electoral Vic-
tory of Reformist Islamists in Sec-
ular Turkey’, The International Spec-
tator, 
XXXVII:4,  October-
December 2002, pp. 7-19.

12. Gareth Jenkins, ‘Muslim De-
mocrats  in  Turkey?’,  Survival,
vol. 45, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 61.

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between the AKP’s new thinking and the status quo will be para-
mount, as will the debate over the strategic value of the country. In
Turkey’s  case,  unlike  any  other  candidate  for  accession,  the
geostrategic dimension shares centre stage with the Copenhagen
criteria. Hence the paradox – how reconciling these factors is to be
seen, given the fact ‘[that] the record shows that when Turkey col-
lects high strategic rents, its democracy is liable to suffer’.13

This is to say that the domestic tug-of-war in Turkey between
democratisation and the army-dominated secular establishment
could paradoxically lead to a (last-ditch?) coup attempt in Turkey
as the country’s strategic importance has been reduced, given the
successful  conclusion  of  the  war  against  Saddam  Hussein.14
According to Gareth Jenkins, ‘[p]rivately, the military continues to
insist that, if necessary, it will not hesitate to intervene to protect
secularism. This would initially be in the form of a warning but, if
this was not heeded, would eventually include forcing the govern-
ment from office.’15

The EU

For the Union, it is primarily economics and political criteria rather
than strategic prerogatives that direct its policy towards Turkey.
The major obstacle seems to be Turkey’s ‘unproductive and unsta-
ble economy, and the related threat that with accession to the EU,
millions of Turks in search of jobs and higher wages would emi-
grate to Germany and elsewhere in Europe.’16 Turkey’s sizeable
population of nearly 67.8 million growing at a rate of 1.6 per cent
annually, coupled with a low per capita income (per capita GDP is
at about €5,200 – 22 per cent of the EU average); a large agricul-
tural  workforce  (about  40  per  cent  of  the  population);  large
regional disparities; high inflation (the average annual consumer
price inflation was 69.9 per cent during the period 1997-2001,
with large fluctuations between 101 per cent year-on-year in Janu-
ary 1998 and 33 per cent in February 2001); low foreign invest-
ment (0.8 per cent of GDP on average during 1997-2001); a high
public sector debt (35-40 per cent of GNP); and a slow rate of pri-
vatisation, suggest that Turkey’s structural adjustments are mon-
umental.17 The EU’s reluctance to admit Turkey is understand-
able, given the aforementioned, slow progress in fulfilling the

13. Ozel, op. cit. in note 10, p. 93.

14. ‘Turkey and the United States:
Drifting  apart?’,  Strategic  Com-
ments, vol. 9, no. 3, May 2003.

15. Jenkins, op. cit. in note 12,
p. 61.

16. Michael S. Teitelbaum and
Philip L. Martin, ‘Is Turkey Ready
for  Europe?’,  Foreign  Affairs,
vol. 82, no. 3, May-June 2003,
p. 102.

17. For economic data on Turkey
see  European  Commission,
‘2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s
Progress  towards  Accession’.
Also see F. Stephen Larrabee and
Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy
in  an  Age  of  Uncertainty (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003),
pp. 54-6.

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political  criteria  for  membership  and  troubled  relations  with
Greece and Cyprus. Part of the problem is the slow realisation on
the part of the Turkish élite that the southern enlargement of the
1980s  resulting  in  the  entry  of  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal
‘reflected an important shift in the EC’s approach to enlargement’
as it ‘gave priority to political considerations – particularly the
desire to stabilize democracy in these countries – over economic
concerns’.18

This also led to the slow ‘Europeanisation’ of differences with
Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus which the EC/EU had to take
into  account,  both  because  these  differences  slowed  Turkey’s
march towards the EU (as many member states have had and con-
tinue to have doubts about the practicality and viability of Turk-
ish membership) and due to a reticence or inability to import
bilateral differences between two NATO members and close US
allies. Turkey’s relations with Greece and its use of both military
and diplomatic tactics in its disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus
have complicated its pursuit of EU membership. For Greece, there
has been a sea change in its foreign policy towards Turkey since
1996 away from confrontational and towards cooperative politics
as the efficacy of confrontation has come under scrutiny.19 In
Turkey’s case, ‘the “success” of confrontational politics has pre-
vented the development of a new consensus on the consequences
and costs of such policies’ until now, with Cyprus’s accession irre-
spective of resolution of the island’s division.20 The continuing
violations of Greek airspace and the daily dogfights with armed
aircraft and Greece’s decision to protest in May 2003 to the Euro-
pean Commission for the first time are indicative of the distinctive
approaches taken by the two countries in their foreign affairs.

Finally, the issue of identity is relevant in Turkey’s case. The
Turks tend to insist that the EU’s reluctance to begin accession
negotiations with Turkey is due to a feeling among many in the
Union that a predominantly Muslim state has no place in a pre-
dominantly Christian Union. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s famous
interview in Le Monde a month before the Copenhagen European
Council has re-ignited the debate about what constitutes a ‘Euro-
pean’ country.21 It goes without saying that Turkey’s complaints
are not without a certain validity. 

Hence the ‘yes-but’ attitude on the part of the EU, which de
facto raises the question of whether Turkey should ever be admit-
ted to the Union. By being left out of the ‘wider Europe’ document

18. Larrabee and Lesser, ibid.,
pp. 48-9.

19. See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou,
‘Further  Turmoil  Ahead?’,  in
Keridis and Triantaphyllou (eds.),
op. cit. in note 2, pp. 56-79.

20. For example, see Neophytos
G. Loizidis, ‘Greek-Turkish Dilem-
mas and the Cyprus EU Accession
Process’, Security Dialogue, vol. 33,
no. 4, December 2002, p. 438.

21.  Arnaud  Leparmentier  and
Laurent Zecchini, ‘Pour ou contre
l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’U-
nion’,  Le  Monde,  9  November
2002.

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and having its accession undefined, Turkey is left in limbo in spite
of the fact that it has shared a common land and sea border with
the EU since Greece’s accession in 1981. With the accession of
Cyprus and Bulgaria (in May 2004 and 2007 respectively), Turkey
will share new sea and land borders with other EU member states.
With the Union’s neighbourhood growing; an ever-growing role
as powerbroker in the Balkans; ongoing discussions about an EU
Special Envoy for the Caucasus; a greater involvement in the Mid-
dle East peace process via the Quartet and possibly NATO; and
serious discussions for the first time on the formulation of an EU
strategic  doctrine,  EU-Turkish  relations  might  need  to  be
reassessed, paradoxically through the strategic prism, and funda-
mentally address and suggest approaches other than EU accession
while taking into account the consequences for Turkey’s demo-
cratic evolution. 

On the EU side, serious thinking on the development of ties
with Turkey is needed. Though accession negotiations are bound
to start at some stage, their eventual conclusion in a radically dif-
ferent post-enlargement, post-Convention, and post-IGC Union
allow for optimism that Turkish membership (if that happens)
need not necessarily be destabilising for the balance of power
among  its  member  states,  its  project  on  political  union  or  its
greater global role. 

What is important now is to evaluate carefully the implications
of the decisions taken or not taken at Copenhagen, allow time for
and give assistance to Turkey’s continued transformation and
assure a smoother road ahead for EU-Turkey relations. 

As  the  only  NATO  member  that  faced  real  and  immediate
threats from a war with Iraq and its aftermath, Turkey will have to
come around slowly to a closer relationship with its European
neighbours (and vice versa). The discordant debates at the North
Atlantic Council and the National Assembly, as well as the bad
press it received in the United States over its tough negotiating
stance  (and  its  rejection  of  the  economic  package  the  United
States offered in exchange for the use of their territory), must have
the Turks thinking twice about placing all their eggs in one basket.
It should also awaken the Europeans to the realisation that a
clearer strategic vision which does not write off Turkey is neces-
sary for the EU – the Iraqi crisis having demonstrated that Turkey
has much more in common with the vast majority of the current
15 EU member states and their public opinion than most candi-

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The 13th candidate — Turkey: whither its march towards the EU?

date nations. In fact a recently released Pew Global Attitudes Pro-
ject poll shows that majorities in five out of seven NATO countries
surveyed  support  a  more  independent  relationship  with  the
United States on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quar-
ters in France (76 per cent), and solid majorities in Turkey (62 per
cent), Spain (62 per cent), Italy (61 per cent) and Germany (57 per
cent) believe Western Europe should take a more independent
approach than it has in the past. In the United Kingdom and the
United States, narrow majorities in both countries want the part-
nership between the United States and Western Europe to remain
as close as ever. On the other hand, the percentage of Americans
favouring continued close ties with Western Europe has fallen –
from 62 per cent before the war to 53 per cent in the current sur-
vey.22

As at some stage the dust from the transatlantic disagreement
over Iraq begins to settle, the EU might find itself much more will-
ing to engage with a much more receptive Turkey on the notion of
some sort of enhanced or strategic partnership (which does not
foreclose the possibility of EU membership) as shifting strategic
perceptions across the Atlantic could diverge. 

Questions that arise:
(cid:90) Is Turkey ready for the EU?
(cid:90) Does Turkey really want to join the EU?
(cid:90) Does the EU really want Turkey to join?
(cid:90) What role should the strategic dimension have in EU-Turkish

relations?

Options for the EU
(cid:90) Start a serious debate in terms of the strategic pros and cons of

Turkish membership.

(cid:90) Proceed steadfast with EU accession strategy.
(cid:90) Reconsider strategy and find common ground based on strate-

gic partnership.

(cid:90) Consider the implications of the permanent non-membership

of Turkey.

(cid:90) Consider the possibility of early membership with long deroga-

tions.

84

22. Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press, ‘Views of a
Changing World 2003: War with
Iraq  Further  Divides  Global
Publics’,  3  June  2003,  http://
p e o p l e - p r e s s . o r g / r e p o r t s /
pdf/185.pdf .

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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

4

The timeframe for a positive decision regarding the beginning
of accession negotiations with Turkey is rapidly becoming tighter.
The December 2004 date implies achieving the various bench-
marks established by the revised Accession Partnership but also
resolution of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus’s formal acces-
sion on 1 May 2004 and the resolution of bilateral disputes with
member states or the acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction on dis-
putes before the end of 2004. Yet the fundamental unanswered
dimensions are the following:
(cid:90) Are the European Union, its member states and its citizens will-
ing to accept Turkey within the EU’s ranks? It is not just the
issues of Turkey’s size, both physical and in terms of population,
and  its  economic  and  institutional  weight  that  need  to  be
answered but the question of its European ‘identity’ as well. If
‘identity’ comes up as a concern with regard to Ukraine’s inten-
tions to join the EU, how can it not come up in Turkey’s case?
(cid:90) The geostrategic dimension, given Turkey’s neighbourhood,
which is paradoxically more dangerous and problematic than
the enlarged Europe’s new borders as addressed in the ‘Wider
Europe’ initiative. If the intention is to have ‘a ring of well gov-
erned countries’ around the EU and ‘[to extend] the zone of
security around Europe’, is this an achievable objective with
Turkey’s eastern and southern neighbours where WMD and ter-
rorism concerns proliferate? This issue raises a number of ques-
tions regarding the scope and longevity of the conceptualisation
of the security strategy in its present form, as well as the issue of
the limits of the European Union.

Related to these, two further factors merit special mention:
(cid:90) The first has to do with the impact that the EU’s new members
will have on the development of a security culture and dimen-
sion to the EU’s external actions and relations with its neigh-
bouring  states.  The  tell-tale  signs  show  that  the  newcomers
from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  would  be  more  willing  to
expand the Union’s frontiers given the strategic rationale on
their part for joining the Union. Poland’s activism vis-à-vis EU-
Ukrainian relations is a case in point.

(cid:90) The second has to do with the evolution of Turkish-American
relations and their impact on EU-Turkish relations. In spite of
the current turbulence between Washington and Ankara, both
sides are making significant efforts to repair their ties.

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Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

5

A new EU policy on the
Mediterranean?

Martin Ortega

The Mediterranean region is a vast zone that is very different from
other regions bordering the EU. Firstly, the countries situated to
the south and east of the Mediterranean Sea belong not to Europe
but to two other continents: Africa and Asia. Even if the sea has not
prevented fruitful exchanges and both peaceful and bellicose rela-
tions between the north and the south for centuries, today the
Mediterranean de facto separates two worlds that are different
socially, economically and politically. Secondly, the south and east
of the Mediterranean form a zone of instability and conflict on a
scale no longer found in Europe. With the Cold War that opposed
the east and west of Europe over, and having arrived at a modus
vivendi in the Balkans at the end of the 1990s, the European conti-
nent is no longer experiencing real wars or serious political or bor-
der disputes. Thirdly, while the European Union is to enlarge east-
wards, expansion to the south of the Mediterranean is in principle
ruled out. The Union’s objectives in the region were set out in a doc-
ument drawn up by Javier Solana for the Thessaloniki European
Council: ‘Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries
to  the  East  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  borders  of  the
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative rela-
tions.’1

In this chapter, the EU’s overall Mediterranean policy is first
considered. This is followed by a detailed examination of the two
most important aspects of this policy: the Barcelona process and
the EU’s role in resolution of the Middle East conflict. The chap-
ter’s conclusion includes a criticism of the enlarged Union’s new
‘neighbourhood  policy’  proposed  by  the  Commission,  on  the
grounds that adequate instruments for implementing a European
policy on the Mediterranean region already exist but merely need
determination to carry them through.

1. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better
World’, paper presented by Javier
Solana, High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, European Council, Thessa-
loniki, 20 June 2003.

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5
1

The three aspects and five objectives of
the European Union’s Mediterranean policy

The EU’s Mediterranean policy is structured around its position
vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict (since the Venice Declaration of
1980), the Barcelona process (or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP) launched in 1995) and the Mediterranean dimension of
enlargement.  A  new  aspect  has  recently  been  proposed  by  the
Union: a ‘neighbourhood policy’ as it is termed in the Commis-
sion’s Communication of 11 March 2003. It is, however, too early
to say whether this new policy will transform the Union’s tradi-
tional approach to the Mediterranean. The two first aspects, which
are the most important, are closely linked, since it was only possible
to plan and initiate the Barcelona process at a time when the peace
process was making good headway. Moreover, regarding their con-
tent, the EU’s positions on the Middle East conflict and on the
Barcelona process are based on the same principles and the same
vision of international relations, a vision that sees regional rap-
prochement as the path to the peaceful resolution of international
disputes.  This  ‘European’  approach  is  very  different  from  the
purely ‘realist’ approach which, faced with the region’s many con-
flicts and its heterogeneity, would suggest that the rich societies of
the North should keep a distance and maintain an attitude of vigi-
lance  towards  their  neighbours  in  the  South.  The  European
approach is thus quite the opposite of one that exaggerates the
risks and threats from the other, or thinks in terms of the erection
of barriers or the ‘clash of civilisations’.

The third aspect of the EU’s policy is only related to the other
two in so far as, like it or not, Turkey’s application for EU mem-
bership brings Europe closer to the Middle East. The inclusion of
Malta and Cyprus as part of the big ‘wave’ of enlargement in 2004
will have fewer political repercussions than Turkey’s membership
at some time in the future, since the two former countries are
island states.2 And when considering the pros and cons of Turkish
membership, one has to take into account the geopolitical impli-
cations of an EU that has Iran, Iraq and Syria as neighbours. In
that  respect  one  could  say  that  geography  worsens  Turkey’s
prospects of EU membership. Conversely, this implies that Turkey

2. Malta and Cyprus participate in
the CFSP and ESDP but will not
take part in operations involving
the use of NATO assets, and Malta
stressed its neutral status at the
time  it  signed  its  accession  in
Athens in April 2003.

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5
1

A new EU policy on the Mediterranean?

will always endeavour to contribute to stability in the region in
order to give the impression that the fact of having such neigh-
bours would pose no problem, which is in itself positive both for
Turkey and for the region.3 In any event, the southern dimension
of the forthcoming enlargement is minor compared with other
dimensions and will not affect the shift of the Union’s centre of
gravity towards the north-east. This trend will probably change in
the  future  when  enlargement  is  extended  to  countries  with  a
Mediterranean dimension such as Bulgaria and Romania and, in
the longer term, the Western Balkans.

The first two aspects of the EU’s Mediterranean policy share
the following five objectives, which are contained in numerous
documents and declarations by the Union and individual member
states, in particular the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the
Common Strategy on the Mediterranean adopted by the Santa
Maria da Feira European Council in June 2000:
(cid:90)

a negotiated solution to the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians; the creation of two states in accordance with the
relevant UN resolutions; ‘land for peace’ as a basis for negotia-
tion;
a peaceful solution to other controversial issues around the
Mediterranean, for instance in the Western Sahara, Cyprus,
between Israel and Syria or in the Western Balkans;
the promotion of economic development, notably through
Association  Agreements  and  trade,  and  socio-economic
reforms but also EU financial aid;
the establishment of a regional dialogue on political, security,
economic, social and cultural issues;
conflict  resolution  and  dialogue  with  a  view  eventually  to
regional rapprochement in all fields, taking into account each
country’s peculiarities.

(cid:90)

(cid:90)

(cid:90)

(cid:90)

In fixing these objectives, the Union is looking after its interests
and at the same time adhering to its underlying principles and val-
ues. Thus, the EU seeks to advance principles such as the promo-
tion of international cooperation and democracy, the rule of law
and human rights, which are enshrined in its founding treaty. Yet
there is clearly a happy coincidence between these objectives and
the Union’s interests: to improve its security, fight terrorism and
control illegal immigration, it needs a stable, developing neigh-
bourhood.

3. See Suhnaz Yilmaz, ‘The role of
Turkey in Euro-Mediterranean se-
curity’, EuroMeSCo Briefs, February
2003.

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5

The five objectives listed above must of course be put in a long-
term historical perspective, and the EU has therefore defined its
vision of the Mediterranean in a very clear, thorough manner. Yet
when it comes to practical measures, the daily pursuit of these
objectives and the impotence and fragility of the EU’s foreign pol-
icy have been much more evident in the Mediterranean region
than anywhere else. There is therefore a huge gap between the
finely honed vision produced during the 1990s and the reality of
Europe’s weakness that has been obvious particularly following
the crisis that erupted in the Middle East in late summer 2000.

In view of this, the measures to establish a new neighbourhood
policy for a ‘Wider Europe’ seem more restricted than the EU’s ‘tra-
ditional’ Mediterranean policy. Three remarks are in order here.
(1)  The  Commission’s  Communication  of  March  2003  stems
from a General Affairs Council decision of November 2002 whose
main aim was to set up a framework for relations with Ukraine,
Moldova  and  Belarus.  This  gives  the  impression  that  the  new
approach is aimed in a direction other than the Mediterranean. (2)
Many of the instruments provided for in the Communication
already figure in the Barcelona process. For example, the idea of
setting  up  individual  action  programmes  with  neighbouring
countries has echoes of the EU’s dialogue with each partner state
as part of the Association Agreements. (3) The emphasis that the
new Commission Communication of 1 July 2003 puts on rela-
tions across land borders, and only passing references to Mediter-
ranean programmes, reinforce the impression that the Union’s
existing Mediterranean policy is richer and more complex than its
new approach to the consequences of the forthcoming enlarge-
ment to the east.4 Therefore, even though the EU’s neighbour-
hood  policy  might  bring  about  positive  modifications  in  its
Mediterranean policy, the acquis of the ‘traditional’ EU Mediter-
ranean policy should be preserved.

The Barcelona process: mixed results

The 1995 Barcelona process and the Middle East peace process
launched at Madrid in 1991 are complementary, but the relation-
ship is not symmetrical. The multilateral political dimension of the
former was made possible by the existence of a peace process. The
Barcelona process in turn helped create a positive atmosphere in

4. See ‘Paving the way for a New
Neighbourhood 
Instrument’,
Communication from the Com-
mission, COM(2003) 39, 1 July
2003.

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the region, inter alia enhancing the prospects of a resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Yet this idealistic vision came up against many difficulties. The
Barcelona process had to confront two types of problems: difficul-
ties that were inherent in the process itself, on the one hand, and
on the other political problems imported from the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The internal difficulties were above all associated with
the asymmetry between the participants – the EU having a great
capacity to take initiatives and its member states being accus-
tomed to talk to one another, whereas there was no coordination
among  its  Mediterranean  partners.5 The  ‘imported’  problems
made it impossible to progress in the multilateral dialogue on pol-
icy and security issues at the rate that most countries would have
wished; they also prevented adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean
Charter for Peace and Stability at the Marseilles conference in
November 2000 and resulted in the absence of Lebanon and Syria
from the Valencia conference in April 2002. Even though it was
decided at Valencia to take practical steps on cooperation in the
fight against terrorism and organised crime, these measures were
only negotiated during the following months thanks to imagina-
tive  solutions  concerning  dialogue  within  three  geographical
groups: the Maghreb, the Mashraq and a third group composed of
Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey.

Despite these difficulties, since 1995 progress on the Barcelona
process has been possible in its three areas (political and security,
economic and financial, and social, cultural and human), and in
both its dimensions (bilateral and multilateral). The results are
neither entirely positive nor completely negative, but the very exis-
tence of the process already constitutes an important contribu-
tion by the EU to stability and prosperity in the zone, as well as
building up a region in the political sense where it only existed in a
geographical one. The newness of the experience made it necessary
for not only partner countries but European states and the Union
itself to learn ‘on the job’. Two major beneficial effects of the part-
nership must be emphasised before looking at possible reforms:
the economic impact and the creation of regional awareness.

First, the shared desire to arrange Association Agreements and
the emphasis that multilateral activities have given to questions
such as trade, industry and energy have resulted in predominance

5.  The  Commission’s  manage-
ment of the process within the EU
encountered problems during the
early  years,  but  these  were  re-
solved or compromises found. See
the very frank Commission docu-
ment 
the
Barcelona Process’, COM(2000)
497, 6 September 2000.

‘Reinvigorating 

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5

of the financial and economic aspect of the Barcelona process. The
MEDA II financial aid programme was adopted after the Com-
mission’s Communication ‘Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process’
of 6 September 2000. From 1995 to 1999 MEDA I had involved
over €3.4 billion, and on top of that loans of €4.8 billion from the
European Investment Bank (EIB) were made to the Mediterranean
region. In the period 2000 to 2006 the estimated corresponding
figures are €5.35 billion for MEDA II and €7.4 billion loans from
the EIB.6 There are several specific cooperative projects associated
with Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli relations, for example
regional infrastructure improvement programmes, tourism, elec-
tricity distribution networks, the fight against desertification and
development of the Taba-Eilat-Aqaba region. At the same time,
Association  Agreements  have  been  completed:  there  are  such
agreements  with  the  Palestinian  Authority,  Israel,  Jordan,
Lebanon,  Morocco  and  Tunisia.  Agreements  with  Algeria  and
Egypt have been signed but have yet to be ratified.

Second, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has contributed
not only to the Union’s visibility in the south and east of the
Mediterranean but also to awareness of the region throughout the
EU, especially in countries that are not riparian or do not histori-
cally have links with the region. Since 1995, there have been many
ministerial conferences on Mediterranean issues with participa-
tion from the 15 EU member countries plus the 12 partners, as
well as others at expert level in the fields of, for example, culture,
trade, energy, environment and industry. These would not have
taken place had there been no Barcelona process.

Nevertheless, the Barcelona process is today facing very serious
challenges that call for a complete rethink of the EU’s multilateral
efforts. Just as, in 1995, the Union put forward a wide-ranging
project  for  the  Mediterranean  region,  it  is  now  time  (possibly
under Italy’s presidency in 2003 and continuing till 2005, the
tenth anniversary of the EMP) to relaunch the project and create a
new Mediterranean dimension. That does not imply either that
specific reforms must be made or that this experiment should be
ended and another begun, but rather that the process must be
reinvigorated, with determination and political drive on the part
of the Europeans, so as to attain the objectives that have been set.

6.  Commissioner  Chris  Patten
played a very active role in devel-
oping the economic partnership,
in particular insisting on the need
for ‘South-South’ regional coop-
eration. See Commission docu-
ments ‘Euro-Med Regional Strat-
egy Paper 2000-2006’ at   and
‘Euromed  Information  Notes’,
June 2002 at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/europeaid/projects/m
ed/regional/infonotes_200206-
en.pdf.

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Political and security issues need greater attention.
First, it is time to acknowledge that the original, intentional, sepa-
ration of the Barcelona process and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is an artificial one. At the latest Euro-Mediterranean conferences
(Marseilles, Valencia and the informal meeting on Crete in May
2003) the situation was reviewed on each occasion and presidency
conclusions  included  lengthy  analyses  of  the  crisis.  The  Euro-
Mediterranean  Partnership  should  therefore  not  abandon  its
efforts to deal with what is the most important political problem in
the region in a multilateral way. On the contrary, the partnership
should be exploited as an ideal forum for discussing the conflict
(and, when the time comes, the peace) in a regional framework. Sec-
ond, there is a systematic failure to give substance to the political
dialogue because one of the most important aspects of the dia-
logue, the significance of democracy in the regional context, is
ignored. Both bilateral Association Agreements between the EU
and each country and multilateral documents attach great impor-
tance to progress on democracy and human rights, yet in practice
the EU has not shown any determination to see that such under-
takings are respected: for example, it has not applied ‘conditional-
ity’ clauses. The EU should review its attitude to this and become
more involved, as laxness in this respect may be a policy that gives
results in the short term but will in the longer term be a recipe for
instability  or  even  terrorism  in  some  cases.  The  Commission’s
Communication on the Union’s neighbourhood policy, and the
Communication  on  human  rights  and  democracy  of  21  May
2003,7 emphasise the need to make progress on this. The third
requirement regarding political and security issues is for new areas
for dialogue and cooperation to be developed. For example, the
conclusions of the Marseilles conference mentioned international
cooperation  at  sea,  but  that  possibility  has  not  so  far  been
explored. Since the Valencia conference in April 2002, however,
new dialogues on terrorism and European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) have been started with the EU’s Mediterranean
partners.8 These are two areas where specific measures should be
introduced.9

7. See Commission Communica-
tion ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on
human rights and democratisa-
tion  with  Mediterranean  part-
ners’, COM(2003) 294, 21 May
2003.

8. The Italian presidency of the
EU and the EUISS organised a
seminar  on  ‘ESDP  and  the
Mediterranean’  in  Brussels  in
September 2003, the report of
which is available at the Insti-
tute’s website: www.iss-eu.org.
See also the very interesting paper
by Fred Tanner, ‘Security Gover-
nance. The difficult task of secu-
rity  democratisation 
in  the
Mediterranean’, 
EuroMeSCo
Briefs, May 2003.

9.  See  some  proposals  along
these lines in Alvaro de Vasconce-
los,  ‘Priorities  for  the  EU’s
Mediterranean security policy’,
in A European Strategic Concept for
the Mediterranean (Lisbon: Insti-
tuto de Estudos Estrategicos e In-
ternacionais, 2002).

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Economic aspects need to be revisited.
The EU’s laxness on political issues has not been accompanied by
economic growth, Association Agreements have not led to palpable
development (on the contrary, the immediate effects have been
negative), considerable administrative difficulties have arisen in
implementation  of  the  MEDA  programme  and  foreign  direct
investment has not reached the region. The EU should therefore
look again at the economic chapter of the Barcelona process. If the
Europeans really want to prevent economic collapse in their part-
ner countries to the south, they will have to consider more deter-
mined measures, for example by opening up to agricultural exports
or planning major infrastructure projects such as road or rail com-
munications financed by Europe. It is somewhat surprising, to say
the least, that trade with the partner countries has increased in
recent years but that the Union continues to gain the most from
this trade (Algeria is an exception). The Union gives economic assis-
tance to Mediterranean countries through the MEDA programme
but its trade balance with them continues to be very advantageous
– which is rather paradoxical. In round figures, the EU plans to give
aid amounting to €13 billion to its Mediterranean partners in the
period 2000-06 (MEDA II plus loans from the EIB), whereas its
trade surplus with the same countries in 2000 was €23 billion.10 At
the beginning of the Barcelona process, the Europeans were at
pains to point out that the scheme was not intended to be a sort of
Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean. Eight years on, it is perhaps
time to reconsider that view.11

The future of Euro-Mediterranean relations will hinge on eco-
nomic aspects, and the question is political rather than technical.
The Commission Communication of March 2003 includes some
new instruments and others that are only so in appearance, for
example preferential trade relations and the opening of markets.
Before  considering  whether  it  will  be  possible  to  make  more
progress than in the past towards these ambitious objectives, two
questions remain unanswered: will the resistance from some EU
member states to liberalisation of trade in agricultural products
now be eased, and will a 25-country Union devote greater funds to

10. See Stéphane Quefelec, ‘EU-
15  and  the  12  Mediterranean
partners: solid trade links’, in Sta-
tistics  in  focus,  External  Trade
Theme 6-7/2001 (Brussels: Euro-
stat, July 2001). See also Paolo
Passerini and Luis Biedma, ‘EU
trade  and 
investment  with
Mediterranean  partner  coun-
tries’, in Statistics in focus, Economy
and  Finance  Theme  13/2002
(Brussels:  Eurostat,  February
2002).

11. On the economic aspects of
the  Barcelona  process,  see 
publications from the FEMISE 
Euro-Mediterranean  network 
institutes:
of 
www.femise.net.

economic 

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the Mediterranean than the 15 did in the past? One of the central
issues to be resolved when it comes to reforming EU policy on the
Mediterranean will be the conflict between the need to help the
economic development of new members and the requirement to
halt the descent of the Mediterranean partners into poverty and
despair, which leads to insecurity.

True dialogue among societies has to be built up.
The third aspect of the Barcelona process – human, social and cul-
tural dialogue – has not yielded satisfactory results.12 The Euro-
pean countries’ two major concerns, illegal immigration and ter-
rorism, have tainted and weakened this dialogue. Solutions have
to be found so that there is a real dialogue in other significant
areas that does not affect the security agenda. Moreover, the Euro-
Mediterranean  partnership  lacks  an  easily  identifiable  ‘trade
mark’ in both Europe and the partner countries, so the partner-
ship must spend money on improving its own public image.

Unless the Union clearly sets out its policy on the Mediterranan
as a whole and shows that it intends to implement it, it will lack
any credible presence in the region. It must demonstrate that it is
serious in advocating and creating a zone of peace, dialogue and
prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region. The EU’s con-
tribution to solving the Middle East conflict and its role in the
Barcelona process are complementary, but the latter is a longer-
term affair. In the end, the Barcelona process (reformed as neces-
sary) constitutes the EU’s long-term framework for its relation-
ship with the region, whereas the measures required for resolution
of the conflict will in principle be of limited duration. Ideally, res-
olution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will give the Barcelona
process a central role in the region.

The peace process and the logic of war

The European Union confirmed its gradual involvement in the
Arab-Israeli  conflict  during  the  1990s.  Despite  the  difficulties
stemming from a certain amount of disagreement among member
states and limited resources, the Union is continuing to make that
involvement one of the main elements of its Mediterranean policy.
Since the creation of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty (which

12.  See  ‘Euromed  Information
Note’ quoted in note 6.

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5

came into effect in 1993) and the strengthening of that policy in the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, including nomination of a High
Representative in the person of Javier Solana, the Union has sup-
ported or participated in all international efforts to resolve the dis-
pute between Israelis and Palestinians, even when the peace process
turned into a crisis beginning in summer 2000 and then open con-
flict and even a war of attrition.

Indeed, the conflict in the Middle East since summer 2000 has
been a difficult test for Europe’s doctrine of crisis prevention and
management. The policy that the Union had built up over the
years had to be combined with its crisis management capability,
which was itself still in its infancy. As a result, the Union’s involve-
ment was certainly creditable yet could not systematically main-
tain the European position of principle. What exactly did the
Union do, given the attitude of the parties in conflict since the
beginning of the intifada in September 2000, which meant the end
of the peace process and seriously challenged the EU’s vision of
resolution of the conflict? Four periods can be distinguished that
can be termed:
(cid:90) ‘desperate negotiation’, from August 2000 to February 2001;
(cid:90) ‘the search for a cease-fire’, February to December 2001;
(cid:90) ‘paroxysm of violence’, January to September 2002;
(cid:90) ‘a new mediation’, since September 2002.

The first period extends from Yasser Arafat’s refusal to agree
the Clinton plan in July 2000 until Ariel Sharon’s election as Prime
Minister of Israel in February 2001. This was a time of intense
diplomatic activity in which, by modifying and refining the plan
discussed at Camp David, an attempt was made to reach agree-
ment before Bill Clinton was replaced as President of the United
States. To do this both the US administration, and the Israelis and
Palestinians, agreed to the participation in the mediation process
of Egypt, Jordan, the United Nations and the European Union.
Violence had only just begun and, given the relative calm of the
preceding years, it was met with international pressure to find a
negotiated solution. During this period, where a definitive agree-
ment was almost reached at Sharm el-Sheikh and at Taba between
October 2000 and January 2001, the personal intervention and
good offices of the EU’s High Representative (HR) Javier Solana
and its special envoy Miguel Angel Moratinos played a very impor-
tant role.

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Conversely, the second period, from February to the end of
2001, saw a gradual increase in violence and the exclusion of any
mediators. President George W. Bush did not wish to become
involved in the substance of negotiations and adopted a laissez-
faire policy. US involvement was limited to publication of the
independent  Mitchell  Commission’s  report  (in  which  Javier
Solana participated) in May 2001 and the Tenet cease-fire plan
(August 2001), and the sporadic presence on the ground of the
Secretary of State and envoys Anthony Zinni and William Burns.
The EU’s policy was to condemn violence from whichever side it
emanated, repeating that it advocated the resumption of negotia-
tion. To establish the necessary conditions for that, it supported
the Mitchell report and the Tenet plan. A cease-fire was, however,
impossible to achieve, since at the time neither party wished to end
the violence: on the contrary, each preferred to see how far violence
could be used to obtain advantages for its cause.

During the period from the end of 2001 to autumn 2002 the
crisis was at its height. In the face of an escalation of violence US
intervention was very limited, since the idea that the fight against
terrorism had to be pursued following 11 September, exploited by
the Israeli government, had an undoubted effect on President
George W. Bush.13 The Europeans redoubled their efforts during
this period. On the one hand, from 2001 member states individu-
ally attempted to play a role aimed at reducing the violence and
renewing dialogue. The foreign ministers of Britain, France, Ger-
many and many other countries visited in succession but failed to
obtain any tangible results. On the other, the EU as such (particu-
larly through the Council’s statements and actions by the presi-
dency, the HR and the special envoy) always tried to maintain open
dialogue and reduce the effects of the violence. Yet despite the
occupation of Palestinian towns that were under the exclusive
administration of the Palestinian Authority, the siege of Arafat in
his headquarters and open fighting in several areas, EU interven-
tion was restricted to damage limitation and humanitarian issues.
The fourth period began in September 2002. The Quartet had
been set up the previous April, and a second meeting held in July,
but it was not until September that its members arrived at an
agreement, which was to be refined in December. The Quartet is
led by the United States, but it is clear from the text of the ‘road

13. A detailed examination of the
crisis from summer 2000 to sum-
mer 2002 can be found in May
Chartouny-Dubarry, 
‘L’après-
Oslo: paix avortée ou guerre an-
noncée?’, Politique étrangère, juillet-
septembre 2002.

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5

map’ that EU participation has been crucial. Most of the Euro-
peans would have wanted the ‘road map’ to be published before
the military intervention in Iraq in March 2003, but the US gov-
ernment preferred to delay publication until the end of the war
there. Indeed, the end of the war heralded a new period of hope fol-
lowing the summit in Aqaba on 4 June 2003 attended by President
Bush, Ariel Sharon and Abu Mazen, the new head of the Palestin-
ian government. Yet in summer 2003 it seemed clear that, given
the misgivings on both sides, the ‘road map’ would hardly be
workable.

This brief historical overview brings out three lessons on the
EU’s role in management of the Middle East crisis in respect of the
recent past, and four lessons for the future.

Regarding the past, for a number of years the Union has taken
part in efforts to solve the conflict in at least three different ways.
First, the EU has taken a clear, coherent position on resolution of
the conflict, based on principles accepted by the international
community, principles that have been established throughout the
peace process beginning with the Madrid Conference in 1991: the
acceptance by Israel’s neighbours of its right to live in peace and
security and the creation of a Palestinian state, which would allow
the two countries to coexist within stable borders, and negotiation
between the parties – on the basis of ‘land for peace’ – as essential
elements of a solution to all aspects of the problem. EU member
states have endeavoured to reach a shared viewpoint, allowing the
Union to maintain a common position, which has been spelt out
in important statements, notably in those annexed to each Euro-
pean Council since Berlin in March 1999. The Union has done
everything in its power to ensure that this common position is bal-
anced, condemning violence by both parties and repeatedly call-
ing for a resumption of negotiations. 

Second, direct action by the EU has been possible through the
presence  of  the  High  Representative  and  the  Union’s  special
envoy. Their intervention was constructive in all four phases of the
crisis: during negotiations at Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba in winter
2001-02, in the Mitchell commission’s efforts to obtain a cease-
fire, in the security dialogue and humanitarian action during the
worst stage of the conflict in spring 2002 (which was particularly
effective  in  bringing  an  end  to  the  siege  of  the  basilica  in 

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Bethlehem), and in the active participation of the Quartet since its
creation in April 2002, leading to the ‘road map’. The presence of
Javier Solana as representative of the Union rather than any par-
ticular member state is an initiative that has contributed to the vis-
ibility of European policy on the conflict.

Thirdly, the Union has clearly understood that the violence on
the ground has extremely damaging economic and social conse-
quences for both parties. It has therefore done its best to minimise,
or at least not aggravate, the negative consequences of what has
proved to be a war of attrition. The Union has therefore given
emergency assistance to the Palestinian Authority (to prevent its
collapse, which would lead to even greater violence) and has ruled
out the imposition of economic sanctions against either party.
The Commission has ensured that economic and trade relations
are not harmed by the crisis and, like the Council, has emphasised
the need to halt the violence.

For the future, there are other lessons to be drawn that are also
meaningful regarding the EU’s role in crisis management in gen-
eral. Possibly the most important of these is that the violence in
which both the Israelis and Palestinians engaged from summer
2000 ran counter to the European policy of ending the violence
and finding a solution to the dispute mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter. The principles upheld by the Union were aban-
doned when the two parties decided to end the peace process and
embark on a new round of violence. The Union’s principles and
values, together with its security and that of its member states,
were challenged by the crisis. The parties to the conflict suffered
enormous losses and the chances of finding a peaceful solution at
some future date were damaged due to the psychological effects
and harm caused to the confidence of both sides. The European
Union should understand that in future a speedier, more deter-
mined response could be of benefit to the parties concerned, the
Union and international order.

The second lesson is that the EU tried to manage the crisis
using a wide range of actors and means (the Council and its decla-
rations, successive EU presidencies, the High Representative and
special envoy, the Commission and individual member states) but
that the right synergy was never achieved, and consequently the
outcome has been unsatisfactory for European citizens, for mem-
ber countries, the Union and for the parties in conflict. Member
states tried to intervene at various points in the crisis but their 

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5

initiatives, despite their good intentions, merely demonstrated
their powerlessness. The Union was unable to play a more impor-
tant role because of lack of agreement among member states over
how its declared principles should be applied. If European exter-
nal action in conflicts of vital importance to Europe is in future
managed in the same manner, the efforts of both the Union and
member states will be doomed to failure.

Thirdly,  the  Union  did  not  exploit  its  potential  fully.  The
Union has a range of political and economic instruments that
could be used in support of its foreign policy. Yet it preferred not
to employ them, as for example when it ruled out economic sanc-
tions even though the European Parliament had suggested their
use against both parties in its resolution of 10 April 2002. 

The last lesson concerns the EU’s relationship with the United
States. Granted, when the United States takes the lead the Union
can play a very useful accompanying role, but if the former decides
not to become involved (as happened at the height of the violence
in spring 2002) the Union is incapable of acting alone to find a
political solution. Since September 2002, the United States and
the European Union have found that the Quartet is an adequate
framework for cooperation. Nevertheless, just as publication of
the ‘road map’ was a combined effort by the Quartet, all of the
mediators must monitor its implementation closely. It must be
stressed that only objective mediation, in which the Union will
always have an important role, is likely to guarantee the success of
the peace plan in the long term.

Conclusion: the Union’s Mediterranean policy must be
strengthened

The Union’s strategy on its new neighbourhood that it has just fin-
ished drawing up includes a number of elements that concern the
Mediterranean, in particular a restatement of the idea that ‘In
return  for  concrete  progress  demonstrating  shared  values  and
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional
reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s
neighbourhood  should  benefit  from  the  prospect  of  closer 
economic integration with the EU.’14 Yet the Union had some time
previously established a very detailed Mediterranean policy based
on the principles of partnership and the creation of a zone of 

14.  Communication  from  the
Commission on a wider Europe,
11 March 2003, p. 4.

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prosperity and stability that is still valid. The new ‘differentiated,
progressive and benchmarked’ approach may complement and to
some extent correct the Union’s ‘traditional’ policy but does not
transform it. Similarly, the new neighbourhood policy does not
add much to the EU’s policy on pacification of the Middle East cri-
sis, which is a fundamental part of its Mediterranean policy.

Since 1995 the Union has looked forward to close cooperation
with the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean. The
Barcelona process is still the appropriate framework in which to
organise relations within the region as a whole by virtue of its three
basic characteristics.
(cid:90) Regional construction. The partnership makes it possible to deal
with regional questions collectively. The Union has therefore
contributed to the definition of a neighbouring region and by the
same  token  promoted  regional  awareness  in  Europe  and  the
Mediterranean.

(cid:90) Diverse  relationships. Having  both  bilateral  and  multilateral
dimensions, the partnership allows for a special relationship
with the countries bordering the Union collectively but also per-
mits a nuanced relationship with them individually through
Association Agreements.

(cid:90) Comprehensive dialogue. The partnership is all-embracing, cover-
ing  as  it  does  all  possible  areas  of  dialogue  between  states,
including political and security (even military), economic, and
social and cultural.

However, the partnership cannot attain all its declared objec-
tives in a completely satisfactory way, because it faces two major
difficulties: EU member states are not prepared to take the steps
required  to  support  wholeheartedly  and  put  into  practice  the
principles on which the partnership is based; and the Israeli-Pales-
tinian  conflict  has  created  political  conditions  that  hamper
progress.

EU member states should reaffirm their involvement in the
partnership,  because  applying  its  principles  and  pursuing  its
objectives  today  calls  for  greater  determination  on  their  part.
While specific measures adopted recently (for instance individu-
alised relationships as recommended in the Commission’s docu-
ment on a ‘Wider Europe’, or the emphasis on cooperation in the
fight against terrorism and on dialogue on ESDP) are useful, they
constitute an incomplete approach to regional problems. The EU

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5

needs to take a more ambitious approach and consider longer-
term actions if it really wants to help overcome the political and
economic paralysis in the region. It must accordingly strengthen
the political dialogue and be more insistent on the introduction of
democracy and the peaceful, negotiated resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Lasting economic development must also be
achieved through close EU involvement in the region, inter alia by
opening its markets to agricultural products and by giving greater
financial help. Lastly, human and cultural exchanges must be
increased.

In  1995,  Europe  introduced  an  innovative  project  for  the
region that included an impartial point of view on the conflict in
the Middle East. What the EU must now do is not to introduce
rival regional policies on its neighbours to the east but rather to
concentrate on the objectives of its Mediterranean policy. There is
nevertheless a problem over whether the members of an enlarged
Union  will  have  the  required  sensitivity  concerning  Europe’s
Mediterranean neighbourhood. Enlargement will probably lead
to much attention being paid to the consequences of admitting
new  members,  and  to  their  borders.  And  yet  it  will  be  in  the
Union’s economic, security but also moral interests not to over-
look the Mediterranean.

Finally, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is having
a negative effect on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as well as
on the political atmosphere in the region as a whole. The persist-
ence of the conflict is preventing regional rapprochement, spread-
ing mistrust and frustration, holding back economic growth and
heightening the terrorist threat. The EU should therefore play a
greater role in the search for a peaceful solution to that conflict.
Admittedly, since the end of the war in Iraq the Quartet’s ‘road
map’ has been published. The EU attaches much importance to
this new hope for a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, in the
absence of a clear desire for peace on both sides, the role of external
mediators will become more important. The Union should be
aware of this and use all instruments at its disposal to assert the
principles to which it and its member states subscribe.

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Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

6

The enlarged EU’s external
borders — the regional
dimension

Judy Batt

Introduction

EU enlargement has over the past decade proceeded in parallel with
increasing concern among the member states about the manage-
ment of the Union’s external borders. The two are of course closely
connected:  it  was  the  breakdown  of  communist  regimes  that
removed the draconian controls they had maintained on the west-
ern borders of the Soviet bloc, thus opening the way to the reunifi-
cation of Europe. The breach in the Berlin Wall in November 1989
symbolised this perfectly. But the early enthusiasm with which
Western Europe responded to those extraordinary events rapidly
gave way to mounting apprehension, prompted by fears of uncon-
trolled flows of economic migrants and the penetration into West-
ern Europe of Mafia-type gangs of criminals, smuggling drugs,
weapons and human beings. While the Soviet threat had evapo-
rated, new ‘soft security’ threats appeared on the agenda, deriving
from the weak and even disintegrating condition of states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in the wake of decades of communist mis-
rule. 

Simultaneously,  however,  EU  member  states  were  moving
towards the creation of an area of free movement of goods and per-
sons among themselves to complete the single market. In 1995
they removed all controls at their mutual internal borders, in
accordance with the 1985 Schengen agreements. The latter had
originally been concluded in 1985, at a time when the question of
security at the external borders seemed quite manageable to the
five member states involved (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands): Greece, Italy and Spain with their
highly permeable maritime borders, were not then part of the
Schengen group (being admitted only later, in the 1990s). The
eastern border was effectively sealed by communist controls. But
after the events of 1989, more attention clearly had to be paid to
the problem of devising a common framework for managing the

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external border to ‘compensate’ the participating states1 for the
loss of security many of them felt after relinquishing controls at
their internal frontiers. As a result, the EU’s third pillar (Justice
and Home Affairs – JHA) rapidly burgeoned in scope and political
prominence. As member states progressively deepened coopera-
tion in this field, it became one of the fastest-growing areas of the
acquis communautaire.2

The EU’s neighbours in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe watched with growing dismay the erection of a new ‘Paper
Curtain’ in place of the defunct ‘Iron’ one. The fear of exclusion
added to their sense of the urgency of securing membership in the
Union. Once the enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe
began, however, it became clear that this did not solve the prob-
lem, but simply moved it further eastwards. Although where the
external frontier of the enlarged EU will finally be drawn remains
unsettled, clearly it will have to be drawn somewhere. In the mean-
while,  many  other  aspirant  candidates  for  membership  will
remain outside, even if some only temporarily. The questions of
where the border lies and how it is managed are key ones that can-
not be left wholly in the hands of ministers of the interior and con-
fined to the JHA acquis. They are central to the EU’s Common For-
eign  and  Security  Policy,  because  they  affect  profoundly  its
relations with its ‘new neighbourhood’, and thus the credibility of
its ambition to be the pivot of stability and prosperity in Europe as
a whole.    

The opening curtain – hopes and fears

Opinion polls conducted in the declining years of the communist
regime in the more open states like Poland and Hungary regularly
indicated that the one thing that most irked ordinary people was
their lack of freedom to travel. Indeed, the right to move freely
across borders seems to have been at the very heart of Central and
East European citizens’ understanding of what it meant to be ‘free’,
and it has retained this significance in the post-communist period.
Under communism, obtaining a passport involved lengthy, com-
plex and humiliating procedures for the ordinary citizen, includ-
ing securing testimonials of ‘political reliability’ from employers
and the local authorities, and unpleasant interrogations at the
police station. Passports had to be surrendered on return from

1. Only Britain and Ireland now re-
main outside the Schengen sys-
tem.

2. The Schengen agreements, orig-
inally intergovernmental and not
part of the EU’s system of treaties,
were incorporated into the Treaty
of Amsterdam in 1997 and so be-
came a binding part of the acquis
communautaire, except for Britain
and  Ireland,  which  negotiated
‘opt-outs’. See Malcolm Ander-
son and Eberhard Bort, The Bor-
ders of the European Union (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

abroad, and the whole process repeated for each projected journey.
Even with the requisite documentation, crossing the border was a
nerve-wracking experience. Anyone seeking to leave the country
was treated as a potential criminal or dangerous political subver-
sive. 

It is not surprising therefore, that as soon as the communist
controls were removed –  and West European states abolished visas
– many people took advantage of the new opportunities to travel.
Suddenly, on the streets and public transport of major West Euro-
pean cities, one heard the happy – if unfamiliar – chatter of East
Europeans ‘returning to Europe’. A large proportion of these new
tourists in fact also engaged in small-scale trading or took tempo-
rary irregular employment in the West. Informal bazaars even
sprang up in major destinations like Berlin. The dramatic eco-
nomic shocks imposed on the populations of Central and Eastern
Europe in the early years of transition, with surging consumer
prices and falling real wages, prompted many to exploit the oppor-
tunities to travel to the West to supplement their incomes. And
indeed, growing shortages of labour in Western Europe meant
that  there  were  plenty  of  employers  ready  to  exploit  this  new
source of cheap labour. 

This was enough to provoke a sudden panic in the West at the
prospect of a ‘flood’ of impoverished people from the East. Partic-
ular anxieties were awakened by the arrival of groups of Roma, the
most marginalised, destitute and culturally alien people of the
region, who had hitherto been virtually invisible but whose des-
perate problems now came to light. They sought asylum in the
West, citing often convincing evidence of police brutality and vio-
lent attack by skinheads in their home countries. In addition, the
wars in former Yugoslavia brought over one million refugees to
Western Europe in the 1990s, mainly to Germany and Austria;3
and the near-collapse of the Albanian state and economy brought
boatloads of emigrants to the shores of Italy. The political and eco-
nomic turmoil in the Balkans, and the chaotic situation in Russia
and Ukraine, led to further problems, including the spread of
organised crime from those countries through Central and East-
ern Europe to the West. The EU member states responded by reim-
posing visa requirements on many of these countries. 

The  strong  reactions  of  West  European  governments  and 
public opinion to these developments need to be set in the context
of  already  heightened  sensitivities  about  borders  and  border 

3. See United Nations High Com-
mission for Refugees, The State of
the World’s Refugees (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), an-
nex 10, p. 125.

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controls. For some years, concern had been growing about the
numbers of asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants who had been
arriving in the West from much further afield – from Africa and
Asia. This was exacerbated when, in March 1995, the Schengen
member states removed all controls at their internal borders.  The
original aim of the 1985 Schengen agreement had been to realise
the long-cherished vision of Europe as an area of genuinely free
movement of goods and persons, to complete the single market.
However, by 1995 the shape of ‘Europe’ had dramatically changed
from that of 1985. As a result, the emphasis of the Schengen acquis
has shifted markedly to tightening controls at the common exter-
nal frontier of the participating states, and deepening cooperation
in the fields of justice and policing. 

The rapid development of the EU’s JHA acquis was no doubt an
inevitable concomitant of abandoning internal border controls,
and  the  events  of  11  September  have  only  reinforced  the  pre-
occupation of member states with the security of the external 
border. However, this has serious implications for the ‘other’ (now
called ‘wider’) Europe beyond the EU. The external border and visa
regimes have been sensitive issues both in the EU enlargement
process and in the EU’s developing relations with its neighbours.

EU enlargement and Schengen

With the first wave of EU eastward enlargement in 2004, the east-
ern  and  south-eastern  borders  of  the  new  member  states  will
become the new external borders of the EU (only the Czech Repub-
lic will be entirely surrounded by EU member states). It is here that
the key functions of customs and immigration control and secu-
rity are to be carried out on behalf of the whole EU. This requires
implementation of an array of measures, including strict control of
the external frontier according to common rules (contained in the
Schengen  Manual  for  the  External  Frontier);  accession  to  the
Schengen  Information  System,  the  computerised  database  by
means of which information on prohibited immigrants, wanted
persons,  stolen  vehicles  etc.  is  exchanged;  participation  in
enhanced police and judicial cooperation; and adoption of the
EU’s common visa regime with third countries and implementa-
tion of EU asylum and immigration policies.4

4.  See  Malcolm  Anderson  and
Eberhard Bort (eds.), The Frontiers
of Europe (London: Pinter, 1998).

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

Unlike the existing member states Denmark, Ireland and the
United  Kingdom,  which  negotiated  partial  or  full  opt-outs  at
Amsterdam, the accession states have had to sign up to the Schen-
gen acquis as an integral – and therefore non-negotiable – part of
the Treaties.  They will not, however, be admitted fully into the
Schengen system – that is, the current controls on the movement
of goods and persons across their borders with existing Schengen
states will not be lifted – until all the latter agree that they are
implementing border controls at the EU’s new external frontier
satisfactorily. For this, a minimum period of two years’ monitor-
ing by the existing Schengen states is mandatory. In the cases of
Italy and Greece (later adherents to the original 1985 Schengen
group of five), it took up to eight years to convince the then Schen-
gen members to lift internal border controls. A similar delay can
easily be expected in the cases of the new Central and East Euro-
pean members. Thus the new member states will have to ‘harden’
their eastern borders with their non-EU neighbours several years
before their western borders with fellow EU-members are fully
opened. The EU common visa regime will have to be applied to
almost  all  of  their  immediate  neighbours:  Russia,  Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro (but not Croatia,
Romania or Bulgaria, which now enjoy visa-free access to the EU).
This will be expensive for the new member states, as their exter-
nal borders will need substantial investment in order to satisfy
Schengen standards of efficiency and control. Much has been
going on for some years with support from EU PHARE funds and
bilateral assistance, for example, from Germany to Poland to bol-
ster controls along its 1,000 km-long eastern border. Much more
will be required in the coming years. In due course, such invest-
ment should bring improvements from the point of view of ordi-
nary travellers. There are far too few border crossings in the east,
and lengthy delays (at busy times, lasting several days) have long
been the norm. Modernised infrastructure and more crossing-
points could speed things up, and better training of border guards
and customs officials could reduce the incidence of corruption
and arbitrariness frequently reported by travellers. Indeed, the
new member states are just as concerned as the existing ones that
the borders should become effective barriers to organised crime
and illegal migration.

While EU assistance can offset some of the immediate costs of
implementing the Schengen border regime, there are more com-

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6

plex economic and political interests at stake for the new member
states, especially those connected with the problem of implement-
ing the EU’s visa regime. This brings back unhappy memories of
past restrictions on travel in the communist period. For, after the
collapse of communism, control at the borders between former
communist states for some time virtually collapsed and de facto
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  suddenly  became  an  area  of  free
movement of people. Border controls have since been restored,
but nevertheless crossing the border is now much easier than it
was in the communist period. All that was required – until recently
– was a valid passport. This ease of access was an important symbol
of the steadily improving relations between the candidate coun-
tries and their neighbours. This change resulted not only from the
sustained efforts on the part of post-communist governments to
establish new relations based on mutual respect and understand-
ing, but also to pressures from the EU itself, which insisted on can-
didates’ settling all outstanding problems with their neighbours
as a condition of their accession.

It is not often realised in the West that, in the communist
period, travel between member states of the Soviet bloc could
often prove even more difficult and encumbered by oppressive
bureaucratic procedures than travel to the West. Travel to and
from the western regions of the Soviet Union, in particular, was
highly restricted, due in large part to acute Soviet sensitivities
about political control in Belarus and Ukraine, extensive parts of
which had been annexed at the end of the Second World War from
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In the Soviet western terri-
tories, ethnic minorities continued to exist (despite postwar pop-
ulation transfers), and were treated by the Soviet regime as poten-
tially ‘disloyal’ conduits for unorthodox ideas from the western
neighbours into their new Soviet motherland. Families divided by
the new Soviet western border almost completely lost contact, and
policies  of  linguistic  and  cultural  assimilation  were  pursued.
Travel between Central and East European communist countries
themselves was frequently subject to interruption: at times of cri-
sis (as in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Poland in 1980-
81)  the  ‘fraternal  allies’  would  close  their  borders  completely
against the deviant member.  Travel between the Central and East
European states and former Yugoslavia in the communist period
was easier, but by no means free of arbitrary restrictions. 

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The relaxation of conditions of travel after the fall of commu-
nism made it possible for families long divided by the borders to
renew contacts. It also allowed ethnic minorities to restore links
with the ‘mother country’, thus gaining access to their cultural
heritage and receiving various forms of assistance. The case that
has received the most international attention is that of the Hun-
garian minorities living in the countries around Hungary, includ-
ing 1.6 million in Romania, 580,000 in Slovakia, 400,000 in north-
ern Serbia, and 370,000 in Ukraine as at the late 1980s-early 1990s.
A very high proportion of Hungary’s own 10.2 million population
have relatives living in these countries. For nationally conscious
Hungarians, the prospect of the ‘return to Europe’ was closely con-
nected  with  hopes  that  the  long-divided  nation  might  be
‘reunited’ – not by changing the borders, but by making them eas-
ily permeable. But this now seems like wishful thinking. Hun-
gary’s accession to the EU ahead of its eastern and south-eastern
neighbours requires its full adoption of the Schengen acquis. Until
2002, Romania was on the EU common visa list. Ukraine and Ser-
bia and Montenegro seem likely to stay on it for several years at
least, and Hungary will have to fall in line with this. The prospect
of the Hungarian minorities being once again ‘cut-off from the
Motherland’ prompted the then right-wing government of Hun-
gary in 2001 to introduce a controversial ‘Status Law’ awarding
special  privileges  to  members  of  the  Hungarian  minorities,
including preferential employment rights, access to health serv-
ices and education in Hungary, and grants to Hungarian minority
families in their home states in order to support children attend-
ing Hungarian-language schools. This provoked uproar in the
neighbouring states, and, under pressure from the Council of
Europe and the EU, Hungary has several times revised the law to
comply with the principles of non-discrimination and to tone
down its extraterritorial aspects. But it remains a bone of con-
tention in bilateral relations, especially with Slovakia and Roma-
nia. Moreover, the one concession the Hungarian minorities in
Ukraine and Serbia most wanted to see – some mitigation of the
impending visa regime – was completely ruled out by Hungary’s
obligation to implement in full the Schengen acquis.5

While the revival of ethnic identities has sometimes proved an
uncomfortable business, tensions between ethnic communities at
the local level in Central and Eastern Europe have been mitigated
by the practical advantages of the open border. For example, the

5. For a detailed account of this
law, see Brigid Fowler, ‘Fuzzing
Citizenship, Nationalising Politi-
cal Space: A framework for inter-
preting  the  Hungarian  “Status
Law” as a new form of kin-state
policy in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope’, OES Working Paper 40/02
(Brighton: University of Sussex,
2002).

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6

city of Przemysl in south-eastern Poland, whose large Ukrainian
minority population had been forcibly dispersed by the Polish
communist authorities after the war, found it at first hard to come
to terms with the reappearance of large numbers of Ukrainian vis-
itors in the 1990s, and the corresponding rise in the use of Ukrain-
ian in public.6 When the tiny remaining local Ukrainian minority
raised demands for restitution of their Greek-Catholic church
(transferred to the Roman Catholic Church after the dispersal of
the Ukrainians), and for the restoration of the city’s long-neg-
lected Ukrainian cemetery (where Ukrainians who had died fight-
ing Poles during the Second World War were buried), this new
assertiveness evoked fears among local Poles that the ‘Polishness’
of the region would be brought into question. But, over time, local
Poles came to appreciate the economic benefits to be gained from
increasing cross-border contact with Ukrainians, as new shops,
roads and tourist facilities were built to meet the Ukrainian visi-
tors’ needs. The region became an enthusiastic supporter of the
Polish government’s efforts to develop strong links with Ukraine,
and  found  a  new  mission  for  itself  as  ‘Europe’s  gateway  to
Ukraine.’

The  open  border  prompted  the  appearance  in  Central  and
Eastern Europe of what the Poles call ‘ants’ – informal and spon-
taneous armies of individuals regularly crossing the border with a
suitcase or two of goods to trade, exploiting price differentials and
filling gaps in poorly supplied, erratic local markets. It is estimated
that about 240,000 people live by bazaar trade across the Polish-
Ukrainian border, about three-quarters of whom have no other
source of income.7 A flourishing network of bazaars, and, later,
permanent retail facilities, have sprung up in the border regions.
Towns that might otherwise be languishing in the long-neglected
Polish eastern peripheries have been able to sustain above-average
growth through the economic transition by means of cross-border
trade. For example, about 30 to 40 per cent of small and medium-
sized enterprises in the Polish eastern city of Lublin are estimated
to survive by commerce with Ukraine, and the total net surplus
gained by Poland from this ‘grey’ trade across the border with
Ukraine has been estimated at about $1.5 billion a year.8 This has
clearly  helped  to  some  extent  to  offset  the  growing  west-east
regional disparities that have become evident in all Central and
East European states neighbouring the EU. 

6. See Kataryna Wolczuk ‘Polish-
Ukrainian borderlands: the case
of Lviv and Przemysl’, in Kazimierz
Krzysztofek and Andrzej Sadowski
(eds.), Ethnic Borderlands in Europe:
Harmony  or  Conflict? (Bialystok:
University  of  Bialystok,  2001);
and  Marzena  Kisielowska-Lip-
man, 
in
Poland’s eastern borderlands: the
“Ethnic Question” ’, in Judy Batt
and Kataryna Wolczuk (eds.), Re-
gion, State and Identity in Central and
Eastern Europe (London: Palgrave,
2002).

‘Political  transition 

7. See Kataryna Wolczuk and Ro-
man Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine:
A Strategic Partnership in a Changing
Europe? (London:  RIIA,  2002),
p. 84. 

8. Enlargement and EU External Fron-
tier Controls, House of Lords, Select
Committee on the EU, 17th Re-
port, 24 October 2000, London,
p. 16.

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

The implementation of the EU’s common visa regime by the
new member states will unavoidably lead to a dramatic decline in
the numbers of individuals travelling in from the neighbouring
countries, in so far as the administrative infrastructure to process
visa applications at the current level of traffic simply does not
exist, and the costs of expanding it to meet demand at this level will
be very high – and are not at present eligible for EU support. With-
out a network of new consular posts in the western regions of non-
member states, applicants will have to travel to the state capitals to
obtain visas, standing in queues for several hours, possibly requir-
ing two or more days away from home. Although multiple-entry
visas are not ruled out by the common visa regime, these have not
hitherto been widely granted, and the new member states will be
wary of departing from this pattern for fear of provoking the
Schengen countries into delaying their admission to the Schengen
zone. A special regime for residents of border regions has recently
been proposed by the European Commission, allowing border
member states to grant long-term, multiple-entry visas at little or
no charge to citizens of neighbouring states, on a reciprocal basis.
Such visas would be available to permanent residents of a defined
border area only, and the access zone will be rather narrowly lim-
ited to within 50 km of the border.9 This would indeed make life
easier  for  the  Hungarian  minorities  in  Vojvodina  and  Tran-
scarpathia, most of whom live clustered near the border. But this
concession may not be enough to offset the broader regional eco-
nomic impact of the external border regime. So the new member
states are likely to place additional demands on EU regional funds,
to compensate their eastern border regions for the adverse impact
on their economies of declining cross-border traffic with the east-
ern neighbours. 

The impact on the ‘new neighbours’

Of course it is not only the accession states’ eastern regions that will
feel the impact of the new border regime, but also the neighbouring
states, and in particular their regions bordering the enlarged EU.
For the cross-border trade is not merely a matter of smuggled alco-
hol and tobacco. Local observations of shopping centres on the
Hungarian side of the Hungarian-Romanian border indicate that
these provide Romanian customers with daily necessities like sugar

9. European Commission Direc-
torate-General  for  Justice  and
Home  Affairs,  press  release
IP/03/1186, Brussels, 1 Septem-
ber 2003.

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6

and milk. The large quantities purchased also suggest that the cus-
tomers are often firms rather than individuals.10 By the second
half of the 1990s, more than half of the consumer goods (includ-
ing foodstuffs, furniture, household goods, home improvement
products, clothing and footware) purchased in western Ukraine
came from Poland. A study by the UK Department for Interna-
tional Development estimated that informal cross-border trade
conducted out of Lviv region in western Ukraine approximately
equalled  the  region’s  officially  registered  trade  with  Poland.
Despite the negative aspects of this, in terms of lost revenue to
state treasuries, the immediate benefits of such trade for the bor-
der regions and their inhabitants are obvious. 

For many individuals, occasional trips can help top up incomes
that otherwise would fall below subsistence level. Already in the
communist period, about one-third of the working-age popula-
tion  of  Transcarpathia,  the  westernmost  outpost  of  today’s
Ukraine, had to leave the region to find work elsewhere in the
Soviet Union. The break-up of the Soviet Union very considerably
narrowed these opportunities: travelling to and working in Russia
became much harder after Ukraine declared independence, and
then prolonged economic crisis in Ukraine compounded their dif-
ficulties.  Transcarpathia’s  strategic  importance  declined,  so
employment in the military and transport sectors collapsed. But
for access to alternative job opportunities, for example in the con-
struction industries in the rapidly recovering economies of Poland
and Hungary, many Transcarpathians would have become desti-
tute in the 1990s. Smuggling was another means of supplement-
ing salaries for state employees, hard hit by surging consumer
price inflation in Ukraine. For example, in 2000, this author was
told that a Transcarpathian schoolteacher could double his or her
monthly official salary of about $20 by crossing into Hungary
twice with a tankful of petrol to sell on to a Hungarian motorist.
This explains the popularity in the region of large old BMWs with
their outsize fuel tanks.11

The prospect of exclusion from EU enlargement – whether for
the  short-term  (e.g.  Romania),  medium-term  (e.g.  Serbia  and
Montenegro)  or  indefinite  future  (e.g.  Ukraine)  –  has  had  an
often-overlooked impact on the internal political dynamics of the
EU’s neighbours. These are all (albeit in different ways and to dif-
ferent degrees) weak, poorly integrated states confronted with
strong  centrifugal  regional  tendencies,  to  which  the  national 

10. See Gabor Hunya and Andras
Telegdi, ‘Hungarian-Romanian
cross-border economic coopera-
tion’, Vienna Institute for Com-
parative  Economic  Studies,
Countdown project Discussion
Paper, 
at:
http://www.eu-enlargement.org.

online 

2001, 

Judy  Batt, 

‘Tran-
11.  See 
scarpathia: peripheral region at
the “Centre of Europe” ’, in Batt
and Wolczuk, op. cit. in note 6.

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

capitals tend instinctively to respond with heavy-handed central-
ism. The negative impact of the new border regime on the border
regions, disrupting the cross-border economic and cultural inter-
dependencies that have flourished in the post-communist period,
is likely to heighten tensions in the border regions and, poten-
tially, exacerbate already evident centre-periphery tensions within
these neighbouring states.

For example, in Transcarpathia, the new opening to the West
prompted  a  revival  of  the  Rusyn  identity  among  the  majority
Ukrainian population of the region, adding further variegation to
an already complex mosaic of Hungarian, Slovak, Roma and Ger-
man ethnic minorities. Rusyns are a distinct group of eastern
Slavs, whose language is close to Ukrainian but (some Rusyns
maintain)  is  in  certain  respects  closer  to  Russian.  After  Tran-
scarpathia was annexed from Czechoslovakia at the end of the Sec-
ond World War, Stalin officially abolished the Rusyn people as a
national group, and they became submerged in the local Ukrain-
ian population. Their Greek-Catholic churches were transferred
to the Russian Orthodox church. In the late 1980s, alongside the
Ukrainian national revival, an attempt was made to revive Rusyn
national identity as distinct from Ukrainian. As a Rusyn activist
explained to this author, ‘We think in Central European terms,
whether we like it or not. We are not against the Ukrainians, but we
are not Ukrainians’.12 Contacts were established after 1991 with
minorities of fellow Rusyns in neighbouring Poland, Slovakia and
Hungary. 

This evoked intense fears on the part of the new Ukrainian
authorities, already confronting open separatism in Crimea and
restiveness among the Russians in the eastern regions of the newly
independent state. In the meanwhile, Rusyns have made common
cause with Transcarpathia’s minorities of Hungarians, Slovaks,
Germans,  Roma  and  others  in  seeking  greater  administrative
decentralisation, amounting to a special autonomous status for
the region that, they hope, might enable it to act as Ukraine’s ‘gate-
way to Europe’. Given the parlous state of the local economy, this
seems, for the present, a forlorn hope. Nor is Kyiv in the least bit
sympathetic; but it has very little else to offer this remote and
impoverished backwater. Given the lack of political weight of the
region  in  Ukrainian  politics,  in  addition  to  the  dire  state  of

12. Ibid., p. 164.

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6

Ukrainian public finances, Transcarpathia can expect little in the
way of support from the capital to mitigate the impact of the new
border regime. The most likely response of the locals will therefore
be to seek to emigrate permanently westwards. Large numbers of
Hungarians have already exercised this option.

Another border region, and one that has more political cards to
play than Transcarpathia, is Vojvodina in northern Serbia. Vojvo-
dina is at once the most economically developed, and the most
multiethnic of all former Yugoslavia’s entities. Under Tito, Vojvo-
dina gained a large amount of genuine autonomy, and pursued a
policy  of  multiethnic  coexistence  whose  success  was  demon-
strated by its remarkable durability through the decade of ethnic
war that swept through most of the rest of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
One of Milosevic’s first moves in his rise to power was to abolish
Vojvodina’s autonomy (along with that of Kosovo, which had
enjoyed analogous status within Serbia). As a result, Vojvodina
became the heartland of opposition to Milosevic’s rule. Its varie-
gated democratic, regionalist and ethnic minority parties were
crucial components of the coalition movement, the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia, which ousted Milosevic in the elections of
autumn 2000. The majority of parties in the Vojvodina provincial
assembly are united in demanding a renewal of Vojvodina’s auton-
omy. The Serbian parliament passed an interim bill largely restor-
ing the status quo ante – only after protracted wrangling in Belgrade
– in January 2002. 

But Vojvodina regionalists – backed by the local Hungarian
minority – want more devolution. It is hardly surprising, given the
recent history of former Yugoslavia and the precariousness of the
current  union  of  Serbia  with  Montenegro,  that  Belgrade  is
extremely wary of these demands, for fear of further disintegra-
tion of the state. Yet the province is likely to become even more
assertive in future: on the one hand, Belgrade will be blamed for
the  economic  distress  that  will  come  with  the  onset  of  long-
delayed economic reform and restructuring. But the shocks may
be compounded in Vojvodina by the tighter controls on the border
with Hungary and the new Hungarian visa regime, both of which
are expected to deal a blow to the extensive cross-border economic
activity that sustained the province throughout the Milosevic
period.13

13. See Judy Batt ‘ “Fuzzy state-
hood” versus hard borders: the
impact of EU enlargement on Ro-
mania and Yugoslavia’, in Michael
Keating and James Hughes (eds.),
The Regional Challenge in Central and
Eastern Europe (Brussels: P.I.E.-Pe-
ter Lang, 2003).

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

Policy implications

For several years, contradictions have been deepening between the
EU’s rapidly developing JHA acquis in the ‘third pillar’ and its ‘sec-
ond pillar’ Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives, in par-
ticular that of promoting stability and prosperity across Europe as
a whole. The impending 2004 enlargement has, however, focused
attention on the question of the EU’s ‘new neighbourhood’, as
demonstrated by the Commission’s communications of March
2003 on the ‘Wider Europe –Neighbourhood’ and May 2003 on
‘The  Western  Balkans  and  EU  Integration’.  Both  documents,
endorsed in general terms by the Thessaloniki European Council
in June, include references to the need to support and promote
cross-border cooperation at the regional level, and recognise the
mutual benefits to be gained from increased opportunities for
legal migration from the neighbours into the EU. The paper also
acknowledges the difficulties caused by the visa regime, but makes
it clear that no progress can be expected towards visa-free travel
until the EU is satisfied that the neighbouring states are imple-
menting tougher controls on their own borders and cooperating
fully in the fight against illegal migration and organised crime.
Although most experts agree that the visa regime is hardly an effec-
tive instrument for these purposes, the EU nevertheless retains it as
a means of exerting pressure on neighbouring governments, in
effect asking them to apply the JHA acquis.

It should be noted that the neighbours’ willingness to comply
with this is likely to be diminished in so far as they are not offered
the same incentive – namely, the prospect of eventual EU member-
ship – as the accession countries. For the same issues that have
worried accession countries like Poland and Hungary also worry
the neighbours. In order to secure visa-free travel to the EU in
2002, the Romanians had to institute new controls on their bor-
ders with Ukraine and Moldova, thus inhibiting the access of their
Romanian-speaking  kinsfolk  to  Romania.  They  also  had  to
rescind a law allowing members of Romanian minorities abroad
easy access to Romanian citizenship. These politically controver-
sial steps seemed worthwhile in order to secure the greater prize of
accelerating Romania’s accession to both the EU and NATO. 

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6

But Ukraine faces a much bigger challenge in controlling its
vast  (and  in  places  still  undetermined)  border  with  Russia.
Tougher controls on this border, moreover, may reawaken the
antagonism of its large Russian minority (who represent over 20
per cent of the population and are concentrated in the east and
along the borders with Russia). It remains to be seen whether the
enhanced terms of the partnership that the EU is preparing to
offer Ukraine will provide adequate motivation. And while the
prospect  of  eventual  EU  membership  has  been  offered  to  the
countries of the Western Balkans, the timetable seems to them still
uncertain, and in any case accession is widely feared to be a long
way off. Yet the EU’s visa regime, and the EU’s insistence on their
tightening controls at the borders among themselves, seem to be
at odds with the EU’s exhortations that they ease conditions of
travel within the Western Balkans region, notably by lifting the
visa regimes that are still in force among most of these states. 

The need to support and promote cross-border cooperation
not only between neighbouring countries but across the future EU
external border is now recognised. The Commission has worked
up a proposal on a ‘New Neighbourhood Instrument’ to follow up
the ‘Wider Europe’ communication’s aim ‘to help to avoid draw-
ing new dividing lines in Europe and promote stability and pros-
perity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’.14 This
latest communication proposes, for the interim period 2004-06,
measures to coordinate the existing funding instruments Interreg
A and B (applied to EU member states), PHARE CBC (for cross-
border cooperation projects in candidate countries), TACIS (for
CIS  countries)  and  CARDS  (for  the  Western  Balkans),  which
should simplify the application procedure for projects involving
partners from these different groups of countries. The lack of such
coordination has been a major obstacle to such projects in the
past, because each of these instruments pursued a different logic,
with different priorities, financial rules and procedures. But in
itself, this will not offer additional resources. These will have to
await the results of negotiations for the next budgetary period,
from  2007.  For  this  period,  the  Commission  proposes  a  fully
developed Neighbourhood Instrument, with a unified set of rules
and procedures. This should allow for a more successful combina-

14.  European  Commission,
‘Paving the way for a New Neigh-
bourhood Instrument’, Commu-
nication COM(2003) 393 final,
Brussels, 1 July 2003.

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

tion of external policy objectives with those of promoting social
and economic cohesion across the future external border, but of
course its effectiveness will also hinge on how much extra money
is made available.

In its future work to develop policies for the borderlands, the
Commission  might  consider  taking  a  special  interest  in  the
‘Euroregions’ that have already been in existence for some years
along what will become its new external border. These have been
languishing for lack of financial support, and many have lost the
original enthusiasm and sense of political mission that was pres-
ent at their inception in the early 1990s. Yet there is an untapped
potential here. Better support for such ventures would offset the
impression that the EU is mainly interested in strengthening the
protective and exclusionary functions of border controls. It would
demonstrate that the EU was genuinely interested in promoting
greater cooperation and interchange between EU members and
their neighbours.

The European Commission should set up a dedicated task
force to work with the Euroregions. This could develop a common
approach to promoting Euroregions all along the EU’s external
border. It would help to engender the sense of ‘ownership’ of proj-
ects that the Commission wants to see by working in partnership
with Euroregions, many of which came into existence as result of
bottom-up initiatives, without EU involvement. They are thus
likely to reflect the aspirations and needs of the people involved. A
dedicated EU task force for these Euroregions could promote bet-
ter coordination of internal and external policy fields, and the
activities of the Commission’s directorates for enlargement, exter-
nal relations, JHA and regional development. Priority areas for EU
assistance should be the development of decentralised local and
regional government structures on both sides of the new external
border capable of managing cross-border cooperation; support
for NGOs and for small businesses in border regions involved in
cross-border activities. The task force should work jointly with the
Council of Europe, which is already actively supporting the devel-
opment of Euroregions and has both experience and legal expert-
ise to offer. The EU and Council of Europe could together provide
training, exchange of experience and best practice with well-estab-
lished Euroregions in Western Europe and along the current EU

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Judy Batt

6

external border between old and new member states. All the states
involved  should  be  encouraged  to  sign  up  to  the  Council  of
Europe’s Madrid Convention, according to which states recognise
Euroregions as legal entities in their domestic legal order. This
would  greatly  simplify  the  legal  framework  for  accessing  and
implementing EU assistance. The right to a special long-term,
multiple-entry visa (as the Commission has already proposed for
residents along a narrow swathe of the border region), should also
be  extended  to  regular  participants  in  Euroregion  activities,
including not only local government officials but also representa-
tives of NGOs and registered local businesses engaging in regular
cross-border trade, which would provide an important incentive
to participate in Euroregion activities and thus breathe new life
into them. 

The EU should encourage Euroregions to allocate a special role
to cultural and educational exchange within the framework of
Euroregions. Development of teaching projects and common cur-
ricula for schools within a given Euroregion, especially in local and
regional history and the history of the neighbouring countries,
could consolidate mutual understanding. Exchanges of school
teaching staff and pupils would increase awareness of neighbour-
ing cultures and improve knowledge of each other’s languages,
and would especially benefit the situation of local ethnic minori-
ties whose ‘mother country’ is a neighbouring state. Cross-border
cooperation between higher education institutions would help to
forge links between the rising generation of élites in each of the
countries. Financially weak provincial universities are especially
hard-pressed to develop new fields of study relevant to political
and  economic  transformation  and  European  integration.  EU
financial support for cross-border cooperation in joint curricu-
lum development, exchanges of academic staff with scarce expert-
ise and joint appointments of teaching assistants would maximise
the benefits of scattered resources. The EU could also directly
fund peripatetic lectors in languages such as English, German or
French, on the basis of joint application and appointment by uni-
versities within the Euroregion. Joint university research teams
could  be  commissioned  to  provide  analysis  of  cross-border
regional issues, which would feed into EU policy-making for the
Euroregions. 

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The enlarged EU’s external borders — the regional dimension

Conclusions

On the eve of enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, the EU
is at last beginning to focus on the problems of its new borderlands.
The  prevalent  tendency  in  the  1990s  was  to  place  ever-greater
emphasis on tightening border controls and restricting cross-bor-
der movement by means of the common visa regime, reflecting a
certain panic among the member states in the face of perceived new
threats. This created the unfortunate impression among the EU’s
neighbours of a ‘fortress Europe’ erecting a ‘new Iron Curtain’,
which tended to belie the EU’s stated ambitions to act as the pivot
of stability, prosperity and security for the whole of Europe. Much
remains to be done in a short period, and the new member states
seem likely to accede in May 2004 well before the EU has adequate
measures in place to implement its ‘Wider Europe’ agenda. In the
next two to three years, therefore, there is a danger of considerable
disruption to traffic across the EU’s new external border, with
associated economic, social and political costs, as new member
states implement the Schengen border and visa regimes. The EU
and its member states will have to demonstrate flexibility, generos-
ity and readiness to respond promptly to the needs of the new bor-
derlands if they are to sustain the credibility of their commitment
to promoting stability and prosperity in the ‘Wider Europe’.

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Conclusions

Partners and neighbours:
a CFSP for a wider Europe

The ‘pull’ of the EU

Clearly, the EU continues to have powerful attractions for all its
neighbours. It has, after all, been a success story, and others want to
share in that. But the EU is already showing signs of ‘enlargement
fatigue’, and some within the existing member states fear a ‘dilu-
tion’ of the achievements reached so far. Enlargement has undeni-
ably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument. It
has been the main motor of the massive political and economic
transformations  that  have  taken  place  in  Central  and  Eastern
Europe since the early 1990s. That motor could falter if the internal
dynamism of an enlarged EU weakens. Such signs of scepticism
about further enlargement are prompting those states that may be
‘left outside’ after 2004 to seek firmer commitments from the EU
as to their membership prospects. The candidate states Romania
and Bulgaria fear their accession may well be postponed beyond the
target date of 2007. Turkey is impatiently awaiting confirmation,
in December 2004, of its full acceptance as a candidate and future
member. And Croatia lodged an application for membership in
February 2003, with the ink scarcely dry on its Stability and Associ-
ation Agreement, which it sees as falling short of the Europe Agree-
ments offered to the Central and East Europeans, in respect of both
the level of commitment to EU membership and the financial sup-
port  on  offer.  The  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  is
expected  to  follow  suit  sooner  rather  than  later.  Meanwhile,
Ukraine and Moldova have also expressed their interest in eventual
membership, only to feel frustrated by the EU’s non-committal
response.

However, enlargement is not a policy that can be applied with-
out limits and, at any rate, ‘Europe’ does not and should not coin-
cide or end with ‘EU-Europe’. Membership has been firmly ruled
out, to date, only for the states to the south of the Mediterranean.

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Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe

Yet wherever the EU decides to set its ultimate borders, it will need
to develop adequate, mutually satisfactory policies for its immedi-
ate neighbours. It has done so in the case of the Mediterranean
countries, and may well also need to do this, at least in the foresee-
able  future,  for  some  western  Balkan  countries  and  possibly
Turkey, if the December 2004 European Council decides that it
has not met the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. In the absence of such poli-
cies, the EU will continue to be faced with demands for full mem-
bership from states that are patently far from being able to meet
the demands of the acquis. Indeed, the acquis itself may in many
respects be far from appropriate for at least some of the neigh-
bours, whose economic development needs, trade patterns and
wider geopolitical links beyond Europe may well be better served
by an alternative form of enhanced partnership with the EU. Rus-
sia, for one, seems to be thinking in these terms. Even for those of
the neighbouring states that already have the prospect of mem-
bership,  preparations  for  eventual  accession  are  likely  to  take
many years, with unpredictable domestic repercussions. In the
interim, they rightly expect the EU to demonstrate sustained and
progressively deepening commitment to prevent them falling ever
further behind the new member states acceding in 2004.

The ‘Wider Europe’ debate

The central question that has troubled the EU in dealing with
Ukraine, Moldova, and to a lesser extent Belarus since the early
1990s is not fundamentally different from that which it faces with
its southern Mediterranean neighbours: how to create a zone of
stability and prosperity on the Union’s borders without offering
the prospect of full membership as incentive? The answers given by
the EU, in the form of the Barcelona process and the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the Central and East
European states, have fallen far short of expectations. The Com-
mission  Communication  ‘Wider  Europe  –  Neighbourhood’  of
March 2003 was designed to respond to the shortcomings of both
at once, and to launch a debate in the enlarged EU and with its
neighbours on the requirements of new circumstances and possi-
ble avenues for increased cooperation between them. Shortly there-
after, in spite of the internal political divisions that characterised

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the EU during the Iraq crisis, the Thessaloniki European Council
adopted  an  EU  security  strategy,  presented  by  the  CFSP  High 
Representative Javier Solana, that stresses the need for extending
the zone of security around Europe. The idea contained therein of
promoting  ‘a  ring  of  well-governed  countries’  with  whom  the
enlarged EU can enjoy close and cooperative relations is in tune
with the debate initiated by the Commission (which had spoken of
a ‘ring of friends’).  

The premise driving the Communication is the recognition by
the  EU  of  the  interdependence  of  the  Union,  and  its  member
states, with the neighbouring countries. This interdependence is
driven by geographical proximity and is translated at the eco-
nomic, social and security levels, although in different blends and
with varying intensity according to the neighbourhood (land or
sea, more or less immediate). So the EU is seen as having a ‘duty’ to
promote political stability, economic development and poverty
reduction in a ‘shared environment’. The new neighbourhood
framework targets countries that do not ‘currently’ have the per-
spective  of  EU  membership:  the  ‘Western  Newly  Independent
States’  (WNIS)  Ukraine,  Moldova  and  Belarus  (for  whom  the
question  remains  ‘open’)  and  countries  in  the  Mediterranean
basin whose relationships with the EU are better defined as a
‘partnership’. So the framework does not apply to the Western
Balkans, which are being offered the prospect of membership, at
least ‘potentially’; nor to Russia, which is not seeking it anyway.
The aim is to separate the question of membership – which can,
realistically,  only  be  settled  in  the  long  term  –  from  the  more
urgent  and  immediate  practical  challenges  to  the  EU’s  neigh-
bours: how to ensure that the enlarged EU does not lead to new
and damaging dividing lines in Europe, and how to ensure that the
neighbours are not excluded from the prosperity and security that
integration is supposed to promote.

The Communication is founded on the concepts of ‘differenti-
ation’ and ‘progressivity’. Differentiation will require different
levels  of  relations  depending  on  the  state  in  question  and  its
progress in reaching agreed benchmarks of reform. Action Plans,
devised  by  the  Commission  with  the  state  in  question  and
approved by the Council, are to become the way forward. On the
one hand, the new neighbourhood approach will not override the
existing  framework  for  relations,  the  PCAs  and  the  Barcelona

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Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe

process. At the same time, the Communication does offer a new
approach to the pursuit of these objectives. In the Communica-
tion, regional and country Action Plans are proposed that would
be jointly formulated by the Commission and the neighbours,
with benchmarks, scoreboards and regular reviews. EU engage-
ment, as well as the extension of the incentives noted above, will
proceed on the basis of the step-by-step implementation of agreed
measures and reforms. The Communication’s promise of ‘differ-
entiation’ and ‘progressivity’ lie with these Action Plans. 

Much of the ‘Wider Europe’ approach reflects the experience of
the Europe Agreements for Central and Eastern Europe and the
Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans.
The latter drew heavily on the former; and the content of the pro-
posed new ‘Neighbourhood Agreements’, as yet not defined in
detail, will no doubt draw heavily on both of these predecessors,
while leaving the question of membership firmly to one side. At
this point it is worth noting a certain difficulty in linking the ‘tra-
ditional’ EU Mediterranean policies with the new ‘Wider Europe’
approach. Indeed, this approach seems to have been tailored in the
first  instance  to  introducing  coherence  in  the  relationships
between the EU and its eastern neighbours, while relations with
the Mediterranean partners were already well established in the
framework of the Barcelona process, in its multi- and bilateral
dimensions. In addition, the Barcelona process is closely related to
the EU’s policy towards the Middle East conflict – a thorny politi-
cal  issue  that  is  obviously  absent  from  the  ‘Wider  Europe’
approach.

The ‘Wider Europe’ Communication contains much that is
positive and new. Emphasis is placed on regional cooperation
among the neighbours, a notion hitherto avoided in the East by
the EU for fears of Russian dominance. In particular, the regional
approach to the WNIS represents a way to engage Belarus in a
number  of  vital  cooperative  programmes,  without  having  to
engage directly with the Lukashenko leadership. Moreover, the
political and security role of the EU receives strong emphasis.
There is a promise that the EU will take a more active role in seek-
ing conflict settlement in its neighbourhood ¯ in mediation, post-
conflict  reconstruction  and  security  arrangements.  Also,  the

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Action Plan methodology raises the prospect of deep, extensive
and quite constant EU engagement in the relevant states. Finally,
the Communication contains some notion of future. It is vague,
but the possibility of moving beyond the PCA is raised, as is even-
tual access to the four freedoms. Again, we should note that pre-
cursors of those instruments were already present in the EU’s
regional policy towards the Mediterranean.

Is ‘Wider Europe’ enough?

For all its novelty, however, the Communication raises a number of
important questions that remain unresolved.

Differentiation
According to the Communication, ‘Wider Europe’ stretches from
Morocco to Russia. Can these states effectively be considered as
part of the same neighbourhood? This arc contains states that are
not only very different but have different aspirations regarding the
EU – some states seeking membership (Turkey and the Western
Balkans), others simply special relations (Russia) and yet others
wanting little to do with Brussels (Belarus). The differences cross
the entire arc and are found also within subregions of the arc. The
differences between the Mediterranean neighbours raise the ques-
tion of how best to develop a regional approach. This problem is
most acute in the so-called WNIS.

Progressivity
Turkey and the western Balkan states in the SAP are not subjects of
the Communication, because of their different status with regard
to possible EU membership. Their absence from the debate on
‘Wider Europe’ implies that while they have a chance of attaining
membership, the states referred to in the Communication do not.
This throws a shadow over the notion of real progressivity in the
Communication. 

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The ‘economic’ versus the ‘strategic’
EU policies towards the new and old neighbours are heavily eco-
nomic and technical. Is this focus in accordance with EU and mem-
ber state interests? With the development of CFSP and ESDP, for
all their problems and weaknesses, the EU must develop a strategic
vision of its new neighbourhood. Such a vision requires looking
beyond  notions  of  criteria  for  membership/non-membership,
indeed beyond the whole question of accession, to the definition of
EU interests in particular regions, EU priorities in terms of threats
on its borders and EU capabilities to respond to these. Neverthe-
less, the EU’s strategy towards its neighbourhood will contain a sig-
nificant economic dimension: it is obvious that economic develop-
ment through reform and trade goes hand in hand with stability.
The European security strategy presented by Javier Solana to the
Thessaloniki European Council highlights this point: ‘Neighbours
who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised
crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population
growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe . . . Our task is to
promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and
on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close
and cooperative relations.’ It is vital for the EU to become a real
strategic actor in its neighbourhood with civilian/military activi-
ties across the political/strategic spectrum, backed up by its eco-
nomic ‘soft power’. Only in this manner will the EU be able to
extend the zone of stability on its periphery.

Adequate funding for the neighbourhood
Current  thinking  on  the  EU’s  neighbourhood  has  so  far  not
addressed the crucial issue of the funds assigned by the EU to the
various neighbouring regions. But a serious policy requires sub-
stantial funding. Even if trade is at the centre of the EU’s endeav-
our, financial aid will undoubtedly be necessary as well. Under-
standably,  an  enlarged  European  Union  will  focus  on  the
assimilation of its new members, but it should not forget the fact
that bordering regions will also need much attention. This is par-
ticularly true for the Mediterranean, since the ‘centre of gravity’ of
the EU will shift towards the East with enlargement, but many of
the major security concerns will continue to be in the South. In a
way, the enlarged Union has to decide whether it wants financial
aid to third countries to be an instrument of its foreign and security

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policy or an autonomous policy with its own rationale. Especially
when accession to the EU is not in sight, the former should increas-
ingly be the case.

Omissions
Arguably, the ‘Wider Europe’ approach may need – even if only tem-
porarily – to include Turkey and the Western Balkans. On the one
hand, the ‘membership perspective’ is what they are demanding at
this stage: it has a highly symbolic value and it is a formidable tool
for enforcing the indispensable domestic reforms. On the other
hand, however, keeping them in wholly separate categories from
the ‘neighbours’ proper may make for administrative complica-
tions. This seems to have been implicitly recognised in the Com-
mission’s recent proposal for a new ‘Neighbourhood Instrument’,
which will, in the interim period to 2007, draw together all the
funding instruments: PHARE (for the candidate states Romania
and Bulgaria), the ad hoc financial packages for Turkey, CARDS
(for ‘potential candidates’ in the SAP), TACIS (whose coverage
includes the WNIS), and MEDA (for the southern Mediterranean).
For the 2007-15 budgetary period, the Commission proposes a
fully integrated funding instrument, which, presumably, will like-
wise cover all neighbours.1

The states of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan) have been left aside from the ‘Wider Europe’ debate,
relegated to a footnote in the Communication. If the Communi-
cation concerns those states on the EU’s borders with no immedi-
ate prospect of integration there is no justification for leaving
these countries aside. Certainly, Georgia is a littoral state of the
Black Sea, and thus soon destined to become an EU neighbour,
whose problems cannot be ignored.

What is to be done?

Focus on the ‘strategic’
As the EU security concept has pointed out, the Union must seek to
enlarge its zone of stability throughout the states on its borders.
Particularly given the security inter-dependence of the Union and
its  neighbourhood,  the  EU  must  become  deeply  engaged  as  a

1.  See  European  Commission
‘Paving  the  Way  for  a  New 
Neighbourhood 
Instrument’,
COM (2003)393 final, Brussels,
1 July 2003.

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Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe

strategic actor in political and security terms. In this sense, the
Union must develop security policies towards the states on its
periphery. Bits and pieces already exist: a fully-fledged and coher-
ent security vision and policy towards the new/old neighbours,
however, is still lacking.

Separate ‘Europe’ from ‘the EU’
The blurring of the notion of Europe, as a cultural and identity
marker, with that of the EU is counterproductive, misleading and
lazy. Brussels must seek to separate the two in the perceptions of
the states on its borders – the borders of the EU are not necessarily
the borders of Europe. Much more than political declarations are
required to decouple the two concepts. Engagement on the ground
and deep commitment are required. The EU message to these states
must shift from ‘you must become like us’ to ‘we will be with you’.
Regional and individual Action Plans are key to this.

Seek real differentiation
The notion of ‘Wider Europe’ as developed in recent EU papers and
communications is not entirely satisfactory, as it lumps together
states and regions with vast differences. Further work within the
‘Wider Europe’ framework might be best pursued through a work-
ing group approach – for example, with working groups on finan-
cial questions across the entire geographical arc, on conflict resolu-
tion, on the WNIS, on the Maghreb and/or the Southern Caucasus.
Each working group could lead the formulation of Action Plans at
both the subregional and state levels.

Preserve the positive acquis of the EU’s Mediterranean policies
In 1995, the EU introduced a global strategy for its relationships
with the Mediterranean region, including the promotion of an area
of peace, stability and shared prosperity and the creation of a free-
trade zone in the future, which is still valid overall. This regional
approach has been complemented with a European position vis-à-
vis the Middle East conflict which seeks a peaceful, negotiated res-
olution of the conflict. The ‘Wider Europe’ approach could be used

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Conclusions

as  a  good  opportunity  to  reform  specific  aspects  of  the  Euro-
Mediterranean  Partnership  and  to  reinforce  it.  Yet  this  new
approach should not end up unravelling or substituting the sub-
stantive policies of the EU towards the Mediterranean region.

Follow through
The formulation of regional and national Action Plans and their
implementation is a huge challenge, almost a monster in the mak-
ing for the EU. The engagement in terms of expert personnel, time
and energy could be very substantial. The EU must follow through
the ideas announced in terms of personnel and time in Brussels.
Moreover,  the  proximity  policy  must  receive  the  attention  it
requires in the process of determining the next EU budget in 2006.

Do not forget societies
In formulating a more strategic and political vision and approach
to new/old neighbours, the EU must not forget the need to develop
ties with the societies, not only the states on its borders. Good gov-
ernance in these states – a key to EU security, as defined by Javier
Solana – starts with healthy societies. Support to civil societies
(education, research, NGOs) should be a vital component of the
EU proximity policy.

The fact is that the EU faces the task of reinventing itself as a
foreign policy actor regarding its neighbouring states. In particu-
lar, the EU must rethink the notion of ‘signals’ and move beyond a
concentration on conditionality and accession/non-accession as
the only tools at its disposal to advance its interests inside and
beyond its borders. Political engagement, the acceptance of secu-
rity responsibility in the new/old neighbours, concrete commit-
ment to projecting and extending stability – all must lie at the
heart of the EU’s new proximity strategy. The EU’s neighbours
need not necessarily become ‘like us’, but they must be convinced
that ‘we will be with them’. And it must be a strategy – whereby
means are coordinated towards ends – not a vague ‘dimension’ or
a diffuse ‘process’.

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annexes

18 November 2002:
New neighbours initiative

Council Conclusions

(doc. 14078/02)

“1. With the forthcoming biggest ever enlargement in its history,
the  EU  will  have  borders  with  a  number  of  new  neighbours.
Enlargement presents an important opportunity to take forward
relations with the new neighbours of the EU which should be based
on shared political and economic values.
2. In particular, the EU wishes to put in place further conditions
which would allow it to enhance its relations with its Eastern Euro-
pean neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. There is a need
for the EU to formulate an ambitious, long-term and integrated
approach towards each of these countries, with the objective of pro-
moting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable develop-
ment and trade, thus helping to ensure greater stability and pros-
perity at and beyond the new borders of the Union.
3. The initiative will be based on a differentiated approach consid-
ering each country’s distinct political and economic situation,
potential and aims. The development of relations with the coun-
tries concerned will, of course, depend on their implementation of
further reforms and their willingness to respect international com-
mitments and common values on democracy, the rule of law and
human rights.
4.  This  initiative  should  be  seen  in  conjunction  with  the  EU’s
strong commitment to deepening co-operation with the Russian
Federation, which is a key partner.
5. The EU also encourages the further development of cross-border
co-operation, including the fight against organised crime and ille-
gal  immigration,  and  regional  co-operation  with  and  among
neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, co-oper-
ation with relevant international organisations in the area, such as
OSCE and the Council of Europe, will be an important element in

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the implementation of the initiative. In this respect, Candidate
countries will play an important role.
6. Based on experience with this initiative, the Council might sub-
sequently reflect on those elements which could be relevant for
relations with partners in other bordering regions.
7. On this basis, the Commission and the High Representative are
invited to prepare as soon as possible more detailed proposals on
how to take this initiative further. Candidate countries will be con-
sulted in this work.”

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annexes

Communication from the 
Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament

Brussels, 11.3.2003
COM(2003) 104 final

Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours

1. Wider Europe: Accepting the Challenge

On 1 May 2004, the European Union will enter a new and historic
phase. An enlarged Union of 25 countries, with a combined popu-
lation of more than 450 million and GDP of almost €10000 billion,
will  fundamentally  increase  the  political,  geographic  and  eco-
nomic weight of the EU on the European continent. Enlargement
will boost EU growth and employment opportunities within a
framework of shared values and common respect for fundamental
liberties. New patterns in the movement of people, capital, goods
and  services  will  increase  diversity  in  culture  and  traditions.
Beyond the EU’s borders, enlargement will change the shape of the
EU’s political and economic relations with other parts of the world. 
Enlargement gives new impetus to the effort of drawing closer
to  the  385  million  inhabitants  of  the  countries  who  will  find
themselves on the external land and sea border, namely Russia, the
Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean.1 The accession of
the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in
enhancing relations with the new neighbours. Over the coming
decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, sta-
bility and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be
distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the
neighbours. 

131

Israel, 

1. Southern Mediterranean: Alge-
ria,  Egypt, 
Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pales-
tinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia.
Independent
Western  Newly 
States 
Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus

(WNIS): 

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Interdependence – political and economic – with the Union’s
neighbourhood is already a reality. The emergence of the euro as a
significant international currency has created new opportunities
for intensified economic relations. Closer geographical proximity
means the enlarged EU and the new neighbourhood will have an
equal stake in furthering efforts to promote trans-national flows
of trade and investment as well as even more important shared
interests in working together to tackle trans-boundary threats -
from terrorism to air-borne pollution. The neighbouring coun-
tries are the EU’s essential partners: to increase our mutual pro-
duction,  economic  growth  and  external  trade,  to  create  an
enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law, and
to foster the mutual exchange of human capital, ideas, knowledge
and culture.

The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the
new member states, but also towards its present and future neigh-
bours  to  ensure  continuing  social  cohesion  and  economic
dynamism. The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-
regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for
political stability, economic development and the reduction of
poverty and social divisions in our shared environment. 

For the EU’s part, the whole range of the Union’s policies (for-
eign, security, trade, development, environment and others) will
need to rise to meet this challenge. The November 2002 General
Affairs and External Relations Council launched the work, noting
in particular the situation of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – new
neighbours  on  the  Union’s  land  border.  The  December  2002
Copenhagen European Council confirmed that the Union should
take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations
with its neighbours on the basis of shared values.2 It repeated the
Union’s determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in
Europe  and  to  promote  stability  and  prosperity  within  and
beyond the new borders of the Union. It reaffirmed that enlarge-
ment will serve to strengthen relations with Russia, and called for
enhanced  relations  with  Ukraine,  Moldova,  Belarus  and  the
Southern Mediterranean countries to be based on a long term
approach  promoting  reform,  sustainable  development  and
trade.3 At the same time, the Council reaffirmed the European
perspective of the countries of the Western Balkans in the Sta-
bilisation and Association Process.

2. Notably democracy, respect for
human rights and the rule of law,
as set out within the EU in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights.

3. The European Parliament has
also called for attention to be
paid to the issues surrounding the
new neighbours, most recently in
its 12 February 2003 report on re-
lations between the EU and Be-
larus.

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a2

This Communication considers how to strengthen the frame-
work for the Union’s relations with those neighbouring countries
that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the
EU.4 It does not, therefore, apply to the Union’s relations with the
remaining candidate countries - Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria –
or  the  Western  Balkans.  The  Communication  argues  that
enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – can
itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable
development both within and without the EU. The communica-
tion proposes that the EU should aim to develop a zone of pros-
perity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with
whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. 
In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values
and effective implementation of political, economic and institu-
tional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis,
the  EU’s  neighbourhood  should  benefit  from  the  prospect  of
closer economic integration with the EU. To this end, Russia, the
countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean
should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal
Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote
the  free  movement  of  –  persons,  goods,  services  and  capital
(four freedoms).

2. Neighbourhood – Different Countries, Common
Interests 

The situations of Russia, the countries of the WNIS and the South-
ern Mediterranean are very different judged by most standards.
The course of the 20th century saw dramatic changes in geography,
politics and culture both on the European continent and in the
Mediterranean. These forces have not necessarily led to greater con-
vergence. 
Differences are reflected in the variety and intensity of the Union’s
existing relations with and among the countries of its new neigh-
bourhood. While, for example, the Union’s relations with Belarus
have progressed little since 1996, the development of EU/Russia
dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, energy,
environment and science and technology over the past few years

4. Given their location, the South-
ern Caucasus therefore also fall
outside the geographical scope of
this initiative for the time being.

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has accelerated rapidly. A new neighbourhood policy will only con-
stitute one pillar of the overall EU/Russia strategic partnership.
Neighbourhood and EU Membership

Neighbourhood and EU Membership

(cid:90) Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that
any European state may apply to become a member of the
European Union. Prospective candidates must meet the cri-
teria for membership: democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, respect for minorities; a functioning market economy,
and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures; the abil-
ity to take on the obligations of membership (meaning to
apply effectively the EU's rules and policies).

(cid:90) The incentive for reform created by the prospect of member-
ship has proved to be strong - enlargement has unarguably
been the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument.
(cid:90) In  some  cases  the  issue  of  prospective  membership  has
already  been  resolved.  Accession  has  been  ruled  out,  for
example, for the non-European Mediterranean partners. But
other cases remain open, such as those European countries
who have clearly expressed their wish to join the EU.

(cid:90) In reality, however, any decision on further EU expansion
awaits  a  debate  on  the  ultimate  geographic  limits  of  the
Union. This is a debate in which the current candidates must
be in a position to play a full role.

(cid:90) The aim of the new Neighbourhood Policy is therefore to
provide a framework for the development of a new relation-
ship which would not, in the medium-term, include a per-
spective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions.
A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and
neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question
of EU accession.

Regional trade and integration is a recognised objective of the
EU’s Mediterranean policy, not least because of the positive effects
on regional political and economic stability that will result from
the creation of a larger Mediterranean market. The EU has Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) in place with the countries of the South-

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ern Mediterranean and the Barcelona process envisages that these
should now be expanded to include the services sector as well as
the goods sector more fully. Regional integration is also foreseen
through  the  rapid  negotiation  and  implementation  of  FTAs
between the Mediterranean partners, as well as with the EU’s cus-
toms union partner Turkey. While some Association Agreements
with the EU still need to be ratified,5 the Mediterranean partners
are already being encouraged to approximate their legislation to
that of the Internal Market. 

In contrast to contractual relations with all the EU’s other
neighbouring countries, the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments (PCAs) in force with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova grant
neither preferential treatment for trade, nor a timetable for regu-
latory approximation. 

Given these different starting points and objectives it is clear
that a new EU approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy. Differ-
ent stages of reform and economic development also means that
different rates of progress can be expected from the neighbouring
countries over the coming decade.

On the other hand, it is increasingly clear that the EU shares an
important set of mutual interests with each of its neighbours. All
countries in the new neighbourhood are confronted by the oppor-
tunities and challenges surrounding Proximity, Prosperity and
Poverty.

Proximity 
Geographical proximity presents opportunities and challenges for
both the EU and for its neighbours. In the 1995 Barcelona Declara-
tion, the EU and the Mediterranean partners recognised that geo-
graphical proximity increased the value of developing a compre-
hensive policy of close association, reflected in the negotiation of
Association Agreements with each country. In the Partnership and
Cooperation  Agreements  in  effect  with  Russia,  Ukraine  and
Moldova, the parties also agreed on the need to establish a strong
partnership, based on historic links and common values. Both
types of agreements were designed as instruments to help with the
transition  process,  notably  through  gradual  rapprochement
between the EU and the partner countries and to create a wider area
of cooperation.

More specifically, geographical proximity increases the impor-
tance of a set of issues revolving around, but not limited to, the

5. Association agreements with
Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Palestin-
ian Authority and Jordan have en-
tered into force. Those concluded
with Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria
await ratification. An association
agreement with Syria is under ne-
gotiation.

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management  of  the  new  external  border  and  trans-boundary
flows. The EU and the neighbours have a mutual interest in coop-
erating, both bilaterally and regionally, to ensure that their migra-
tion policies, customs procedures and frontier controls do not
prevent or delay people or goods from crossing borders for legiti-
mate purposes. Infrastructure, efficient border management and
interconnected transport, energy and telecommunications net-
works  will  become  more  vital  to  expanding  mutual  trade  and
investment. Cross-border cultural links, not least between people
of the same ethnic/cultural affinities, gain additional importance
in the context of proximity. Equally, threats to mutual security,
whether from the trans-border dimension of environmental and
nuclear  hazards,  communicable  diseases,  illegal  immigration,
trafficking, organised crime or terrorist networks, will require
joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively. 

Prosperity and Poverty 
A new EU approach to its neighbouring countries cannot be con-
fined to the border regions alone. If the EU is to work with its neigh-
bourhood to create an area of shared prosperity and stability, prox-
imity policy must go hand-in-hand with action to tackle the root
causes of the political instability, economic vulnerability, institu-
tional deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion.6

Most of the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbours have a
nominal GDP per capita of less than €2000.7 Poverty and social
exclusion has increased sharply in Russia and the WNIS over the
past decade as a result of falling output and increased inequality in
the distribution of income. This has led to an increased risk of
social and political dislocation. In Russia, GDP is still a third lower
than its level in 1989; Moldova remains at below half of its former
level of GDP. What is perhaps less known is that the Mediterranean
has also had a very poor rate of growth in GDP per capita. Egypt,
Israel  and  Tunisia  are  the  only  countries  to  have  exceeded  2%
growth since 1975, while Algeria, for example, shows a small nega-
tive growth rate. Only sub-Saharan Africa shows a worse overall
growth rate than these two regions. Moldova is by far the poorest
neighbouring country (€417 per capita8), Ukraine the next most
poor (€855). Israel is the richest of the EU’s neighbours (€19578),
with Lebanon (€5284) second richest, albeit at a considerably lower
level of GDP, and Russia some way behind both countries (€2382).

6. As set out in the 10 November
2000 Council/Commission State-
ment on EU Development Policy.

7. See Annex for statistics on GDP,
trade and investment, migration
and assistance.

8. Nominal estimates for 2001,
EBRD Transition Report update,
2002.

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A cluster of countries – Belarus, Egypt, Morocco, West Bank/Gaza
and Syria – has achieved between three and four times the level of
Moldovan GDP per capita (€1292 -  €1663). 

Despite the sluggish rate of economic growth, the Mediter-
ranean  region  has  long  been  characterised  by  a  low  level  of
absolute poverty.9 Relative poverty is, however, an issue as nearly
30% of the population live on less than $2 a day and illiteracy rates
remain high. Only 0.6% of population use the internet and only
1.2% have access to a computer.10 In Russia and the WNIS, poverty
rates have increased considerably since 1990. Russia has seen some
reversal of this trend in recent years. 

Democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties,
the rule of law and core labour standards are all essential prerequi-
sites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained
social  and  economic  development.  Nearly  all  countries  of  the
Mediterranean, the WNIS and Russia have a history of autocratic
and non-democratic governance and poor records in protecting
human rights and freedom of the individual. Generally, the coun-
tries of the WNIS and Russia have taken steps towards establish-
ing democracy and market institutions over the past 12 years. Yet
political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediter-
ranean has not progressed as quickly as desired.

Trade and investment are vital to improving economic growth
and employment. Ensuring secure and sustainable energy sup-
plies will call for additional, vast investments in Russia, the WNIS
and the Mediterranean. At the same time, economic diversifica-
tion towards labour-intensive, employment-creating industries
and services are urgently needed, not only in relatively resource-
poor countries, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Morocco, but also
in energy-rich countries, such as Algeria and Russia. Energy domi-
nates imports from both regions, more so for trade with Russia
than from the WNIS and the Southern Mediterranean, where tex-
tiles and agricultural produce represent a considerable share of
imports from certain countries (Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia). In
2001, a year with high oil prices, exports to the EU from Russia and
the WNIS, and the Southern Mediterranean amounted to approx-
imately €60 billion for each of the two regions, while imports from
the EU were only just over half the exports for both. To compare, in
2001 Hungarian imports and exports to the EU alone totalled
around €25 billion each way. The neighbouring countries all face
weak  levels  of  foreign  direct  investment  when  compared  with

9. Individuals earning less than $1
per day, measured in purchasing
power parity terms.

10. UNDP Arab Human Develop-
ment Report.

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138

countries at similar levels of development and relative to their
needs. For example, per capita foreign investment in Russia is less
than one sixth of the level in Poland, in addition to which Russia
has seen an average annual domestic capital flight of $20 billion
over the last 10 years. 

Promoting Regional and Intra-Regional Cooperation

(cid:90) The Euro-Mediterranean partnership offers a strong policy
framework for the EU’s relations with Mediterranean coun-
tries. Since the Barcelona declaration was adopted in 1995 it
has formed the basis for a continuing dialogue and coopera-
tion in spite of the political turmoil in the region. 

(cid:90) As far as the bilateral dimension of EU relations is concerned,
the basic framework is similar for both groups of countries:
Association  Agreements  or  Partnership  and  Cooperation
agreements, including political dialogue, are accompanied
by national Meda/Tacis programmes and agreements on spe-
cific issues (readmission, fisheries etc.). The most important
difference is that, in the Mediterranean, an explicit regional
dimension encouraging the development of intra-regional
initiatives  and  cooperation  in  a  broad  range  of  sectors  is
included. This policy of promoting intra-regional coopera-
tion consists of three Chapters defined in the Barcelona Dec-
laration supplementing the bilateral framework: the Political
and Security Chapter, Economic and Financial Chapter and
Social,  Cultural  and  Human  Chapter.  Since  1995,  seven
meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the 15+12 have taken
place, together with 16 meetings of sectoral ministers. These
meetings have launched a number of joint cooperation ini-
tiatives, financed through the Meda regional programme.
(cid:90) On the future Eastern external border, regional economic
cooperation among the WNIS is already quite strong, ori-
ented around traditional flows of trade and investment to
and from Russia. However, encouragement for regional polit-
ical cooperation and/or economic integration has not so far
formed a strong component of EU policy towards Russia and
the WNIS. 

(cid:90) The  Northern  Dimension  currently  provides  the  only
regional framework in which the EU participates with its

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Eastern partners to address trans-national and cross-border
issues. But participation is restricted to Russia. 

(cid:90) In the context of a new EU neighbourhood policy, further
regional  and  sub-regional  cooperation  and  integration
amongst the countries of the Southern Mediterranean will be
strongly encouraged. New initiatives to encourage regional
cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Western
NIS might also be considered. These could draw upon the
Northern Dimension concept to take a broader and more
inclusive approach to dealing with neighbourhood issues.

Spreading the benefits of increased economic growth to all sec-
tors of society requires positive action to promote social inclusion
via mutually reinforcing economic, employment and social poli-
cies. Attention to areas including education, health, training and
housing is equally important. Increasing environmental and eco-
nomic efficiency should also proceed hand-in-hand. Serious envi-
ronmental pollution and deficiencies in managing nuclear and
toxic waste affect public health and living standards in many of
the  neighbouring  countries  and  contribute  to  shortening  life
expectancy in some. At the same time, the wasteful and inefficient
use of natural resources reduces present and, crucially, future
prospects for economic growth.

A functioning legal system, implemented by strong regulatory
authorities and effective and independent judiciaries equipped
with the powers to protect property rights, are also required to
maximise economic activity and production, and accelerate eco-
nomic growth.

The  negative  effects  of  conflict  on  economic  and  political
development, especially where sustained over a long period, can-
not be over-estimated. These effects are not only domestic – so
long as conflicts persist there is a danger of spill over. Conflict and
political division in the Mediterranean (Western Sahara, Pales-
tine) over the past half century has seriously retarded the develop-
ment of the region. Unrecognised statelets such as Transdniestria
are a magnet for organised crime and can de-stabilise or throw off
course the process of state-building, political consolidation and
sustainable development.

The EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common

challenges are addressed.

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3. A New Vision and A New Offer

The EU can and should work to spread the benefits of enlargement
for political and economic stability in the neighbouring countries
and to help reduce prosperity gaps where they exist. This should be
reflected in a clear vision for the development of closer and more
coherent relations with the Union’s neighbours over the medium
and long term. The EU should act to reinforce and unite its existing
neighbourhood policy towards these regions around two overarch-
ing objectives for the next decade or longer:
(cid:90) To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an
area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper eco-
nomic integration, intensified political and cultural rela-
tions,  enhanced  cross-border  cooperation  and  shared
responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its
neighbours.

(cid:90) To anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential
relations within a differentiated framework which responds
to progress made by the partner countries in political and
economic reform.

The establishment at pan-European level of an open and inte-
grated  market  functioning  on  the  basis  of  compatible  or  har-
monised rules and further liberalisation would bring significant
economic and other benefits to both the EU and the neighbour-
hood.  A  political,  regulatory  and  trading  framework,  which
enhances economic stability and institutionalises the rule of law,
will  increase  our  neighbours’  attractiveness  to  investors  and
reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. Further reciprocal
market access through preferential agreements covering goods
and services will have the greatest positive impact if accompanied
by measures to facilitate economic activity. Sustainable develop-
ment requires a common understanding that the adoption of a
broader range of policies, including environmental protection,
will support more rapid economic growth. Research and scientific
cooperation can catalyse technological progress. The EU acquis
offers a well established model on which to establish functioning
markets and common standards for industrial products, services,
transport, energy and telecommunications networks, environ-
mental and consumer protection, health, labour and minimum
quality requirements. Enhanced and better targeted EU develop-

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ment  assistance  could  accompany  reform,  helping  to  build
administrative capacity and mitigate social adjustment costs.

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values
and effective implementation of political, economic and institu-
tional reforms, including aligning legislation with the acquis, the
EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer
economic integration with the EU. Specifically, all the neigh-
bouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in
the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisa-
tion to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services
and capital (four freedoms). If a country has reached this level, it
has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a mem-
ber.11 The EU therefore should stand ready to work in close part-
nership with the neighbouring countries who wish to implement
further reforms and assist in building their capacity to align with
and implement parts of the acquis communautaire. 

The EU’s approach could therefore be based on the following

incentives:

(cid:93) EXTENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET AND REGULATORY STRUC-

TURES

Common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neigh-
bours can access and reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal
market as well as to create a more stable environment for economic
activity. The EU acquis, which has established a common market
based on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital,
ensuring competition and a level playing field based on shared
norms and integrating health, consumer and environmental pro-
tection, could serve as a model for countries undertaking institu-
tional and economic reform.

Both the Association and Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments set, in broad terms, an agenda for legislative and regulatory
approximation, albeit without fixed deadlines. For the WNIS, this
agenda could be developed as currently explored in the Common
European Economic Space (CEES) initiative launched with Rus-
sia. The CEES itself should be developed to set out a deeper and
broader timetable for legislative approximation between the EU
and  Russia.  Participation  in  selected  EU  activities  and  pro-
grammes, including aspects such as consumer protection, stan-
dards, environmental and research bodies, could be opened to all
neighbouring countries. Efforts to support the further develop-

11. President Prodi’s speech to the
Sixth ECSA-World Conference,
Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.

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ment of enterprise policy by the partner countries should accom-
pany regulatory approximation.

(cid:93) PREFERENTIAL TRADING RELATIONS AND MARKET OPENING
Although countries can benefit from approximating their eco-
nomic rules and structures on those of the EU before proceeding
with trade liberalisation, more open trade is a key component for
market integration. 

As provided for in the Barcelona process, the free trade agree-
ments that are already in place with the Mediterranean countries
should cover more fully the goods and services sectors. Creating a
more integrated market requires that our partners also conclude
agreements of a similar depth among themselves, as well as with
Turkey. For Russia and the WNIS, Free Trade Areas are envisaged
in  the  PCAs,  but  with  no  timetable  attached.  Objectives  and
benchmarks could be developed. The sequencing of economic
rapprochement is important to ensure that liberalisation really
helps development. For Moldova which does not currently pos-
sess the competitive strength or administrative capacity to take on
the reciprocal obligations of an FTA yet, the EU is ready to con-
sider developing new initiatives to grant better market access, in
line with WTO obligations.

(cid:93) PERSPECTIVES FOR LAWFUL MIGRATION AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
The EU and the partner countries have a common interest in ensur-
ing the new external border is not a barrier to trade, social and cul-
tural interchange or regional cooperation. The impact of ageing
and demographic decline, globalisation and specialisation means
the EU and its neighbours can profit from putting in place mecha-
nisms that allow workers to move from one territory to another
where skills are needed most – although the free movement of peo-
ple and labour remains the long-term objective. Significant addi-
tional opportunities for cultural and technical interchange could
be facilitated by a long-stay visa policy on the part of the EU mem-
ber states. 

An efficient and user-friendly system for small border traffic is
an essential part of any regional development policy. The EU is
currently looking at ways of facilitating the crossing of external
borders for bona fide third-country nationals living in the border
areas that have legitimate and valid grounds for regularly crossing
the border and do not pose any security threat. The EU could also

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consider the possibilities for facilitating the movement of citizens
of neighbouring countries participating in EU programmes and
activities. EU member states should also consider using the possi-
bilities for granting visa-free access to holders of diplomatic and
service passports. Beyond this, provided the necessary conditions
are in place, the EU should be open to examine wider application
of visa free regimes. The EU should develop a common approach
to ensure the integration of third country nationals, with special
emphasis on citizens of the neighbouring countries lawfully resi-
dent in the Union. The EU should assist in reinforcing the neigh-
bouring  countries’  efforts  to  combat  illegal  migration  and  to
establish efficient mechanisms for returns, especially illegal tran-
sit migration. Concluding readmission agreement with all the
neighbours,  starting  with  Morocco,  Russia,  Algeria,  Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova, will be an essential element in joint efforts
to curb illegal migration.

(cid:93) INTENSIFIED COOPERATION TO PREVENT AND COMBAT COMMON

SECURITY THREATS

Cooperation, joint work and assistance to combat security threats
such as terrorism and trans-national organised crime, customs
and taxation fraud, nuclear and environmental hazards and com-
municable diseases should be prioritised. 

Both domestic measures and intensified bilateral and multilat-
eral action are indispensable to fight organised crime. Particular
attention  should  be  paid  to  drugs  trafficking,  trafficking  in
human  beings,  smuggling  of  migrants,  fraud,  counterfeiting,
money laundering and corruption. The EU should explore the
possibilities for working ever more closely with the neighbouring
countries on judicial and police cooperation and the development
of mutual legal assistance. The approach taken in the EU/Russia
Action Plan against organised crime and the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) Action Plan for Ukraine, which includes a score-
board, could be developed for other neighbouring countries. The
EU should capitalise on the cooperation initiated in the Mediter-
ranean to introduce reforms to the judicial system, improve police
training and other cooperation in the fight against organised
crime. The fight against terrorism is a potential area for closer
cooperation. The new neighbours should also be assisted in the
implementation of all the relevant international instruments in
this field, notably those developed in the UN. EU political focus

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and assistance must continue to support efforts to take forward
nuclear clean-up in north west Russia and follow-up to the closure
of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Efforts to combat trans-
boundary pollution - air, sea, water or land - should be modelled
on the collaborative approach taken by the Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership (NDEP) and the Danube-Black Sea
Task Force.

(cid:93) GREATER EU POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Shared  values,  strong  democratic  institutions  and  a  common
understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human
rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the
Union’s  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and  the
development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
A  shared  neighbourhood  implies  burden-sharing  and  joint
responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by con-
flict and insecurity.

The EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of
the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transdnies-
tria (in support of the efforts of the OSCE and other mediators).
Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to spe-
cific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the
EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of con-
flict resolution in the neighbouring countries. Once settlement
has been reached, EU civil and crisis management capabilities
could also be engaged in post-conflict internal security arrange-
ments.  Additional  sources  of  funding  for  post-conflict  recon-
struction and development would be required.

(cid:93) GREATER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, FURTHER CUL-

TURAL COOPERATION AND ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Shared values and mutual understanding provide the foundations
for, inter alia, deeper political relations, enhanced cooperation on
justice and security issues, environmental improvement and gover-
nance. The importance of dialogue between civilisations and the
free exchange of ideas between cultures, religions, traditions and
human  links  cannot  be  over-emphasised.  The  EU  should  con-
tribute to the development of a flourishing civil society to promote
basic liberties such as freedom of expression and association. The
EU also needs to make a greater effort to create a positive image in

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the neighbourhood and act to combat stereotypes which affect per-
ceptions of the neighbouring countries within the EU.

EU programmes and activities in research, education, culture
and bilateral visitor programmes should be expanded. Exchange
programmes between youth and universities, the creation of Euro-
pean studies courses and the opening of new Euro-information
centres,  ‘people-to-people’  activities,  including  professional
exchange/visit programmes, activities in the field of media, train-
ing and journalists exchanges merit close consideration. Ideas cir-
culated  by  the  new  member  states  should  be  looked  upon
favourably. Exchanges on a regional level regarding governance
and  human  rights  training  issues  have  proven  beneficial  and
should be explored further. In the Mediterranean, work could take
place under the auspices of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation.
Attention should be given to strengthening EU information pol-
icy  in  Russia  and  the  WNIS  in  cooperation  with  the  member
states. Twinning opportunities between local government and
civil society organisations and judicial cooperation should be fully
utilised. A PRINCE information campaign to make the European
public aware of the benefits and challenges of the wider Europe
framework will be launched.

(cid:93) INTEGRATION INTO TRANSPORT,  ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICA-

TIONS NETWORKS AND THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA

Full integration into EU markets and society requires compatible
and interconnected infrastructure and networks as well as har-
monised  regulatory  environments.  EU  policies  such  as  Trans-
European Networks (TENs), Galileo and other research activities
should draw up strategies for the Eastern and Southern neigh-
bours. 

The Meda regional programme is producing blueprints for
infrastructure  interconnection  and  regulatory  approximation
and harmonisation in transport, energy and telecommunications
(Trans-Euro-Mediterranean Networks). These blueprints should
be implemented with loans and risk capital from the EIB through
the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
(FEMIP) as well as the other International Financial Institutions
(IFIs). The EU should encourage and support telecommunica-
tions markets in the neighbouring countries, improving the avail-
ability of Internet access for business and private use and encour-
aging the growth of knowledge-based economies. As set out in the

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6th Framework  programme  for  Research  and  Technological
Development (RTD), the EU should take forward the opening of
the European Research Area (ERA) to integrate the scientific com-
munities of the neighbouring countries, exploit scientific results,
stimulate innovation and develop human resources and research
capacities.

(cid:93) NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
A  stronger  and  more  stable  climate  for  domestic  and  foreign
investment  is  critical  to  reducing  the  wealth  gap  that  exists
between  the  EU  and  its  neighbours.  Foreign  investment  can
encourage reform and improved governance at the same time as
contributing to the transfer of know-how and management tech-
niques and the training of local personnel.

Future  agreements  concluded  with  our  neighbours  could
include reciprocal provisions granting companies national treat-
ment for their operations as well to strengthen the overall frame-
work to protect investment. The EU should continue to assist the
fight against corruption, strengthening of the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary. The EU should help to enhance
business-to-business dialogue initiatives, involving EU and the
neighbours’  companies.  The  EU-Russia  Industrialists  Round
Table process and the Business Summits with the Mediterranean
countries  have  been  useful  instruments  for  entrepreneurs  to
develop practical suggestions on how to improve the investment
and business climate in the neighbouring countries. Regional
bodies representing entrepreneurs and EU business associations
in the neighbouring countries are valuable partners in this area.

(cid:93) SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
WTO  Membership  is  an  integral  part  of  a  positive  economic
agenda and expanding trade and investment links. 

The EU should support a high rhythm of WTO negotiations
with the applicant countries - Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, Lebanon
and Syria – and continue to offer assistance to prepare for acces-
sion on acceptable terms as soon as possible. The Tacis and Meda
programmes could provide further trade-related technical assis-
tance and training for customs cooperation and trade facilitation,
intellectual property rights, regulation of the service sector and
the approximation and implementation of Internal Market legis-
lation. 

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(cid:93) ENHANCED ASSISTANCE, BETTER TAILORED TO NEEDS
Proximity calls for further efforts to encourage cross-border and
trans-national  cooperation  and  development,  both  locally  and
regionally. This includes the strengthening of all forms of eco-
nomic, legal and social cooperation across the borders, especially
between regional and local authorities and within civil society. The
EU should work with the neighbours to facilitate common man-
agement of migration flows and border transit and to address
trans-border organised crime, including illicit trafficking, as well as
corruption, fraud, environmental, nuclear issues and communica-
ble  diseases.  The  EU’s  cooperation  instruments  must  be  suffi-
ciently flexible to address the entire range of needs.

For  Russia  and  the  WNIS,  constraints  on  coordination
between the existing EU instruments create obstacles to cross-bor-
der  and  sub-regional  activities.  Taking  into  account  the  con-
straints that may arise in the short-term, the Commission will
consider the possibility of creating a new Neighbourhood Instru-
ment which builds on the positive experiences of promoting cross-
border cooperation within the Phare, Tacis and INTERREG pro-
grammes12. This instrument will focus on trans-border issues,
promoting regional and sub-regional cooperation and sustain-
able development on the Eastern border. For the Mediterranean,
consideration should be given to whether such a unified proxim-
ity instrument could also apply to shorter sea crossings (between
the enlarged EU and a number of Barcelona partner countries).
The  EU  should  accompany  progress  made  in  reforms  with
enhanced assistance to mitigate the impact of adjustment on the
poor and vulnerable. The WNIS should benefit from more direct
grant aid and budget support for tackling poverty, social and eco-
nomic inequality and exclusion to achieve greater social cohesion.
Criteria for eligibility for EU exceptional macro-financial assis-
tance (MFA) should be clarified. The need for a MFA framework
regulation could be re-assessed.

(cid:93) NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE
EU technical and grant assistance is not the only means for pro-
moting reform or catalysing private investment. The IFIs have a key
role to play in reducing poverty, helping to mitigate the social con-
sequences of transition, assisting accelerated reform and increased
investment as well as developing infrastructure and the private
sector.

12.  Although  outside  the  geo-
graphical scope of this paper, sim-
ilar considerations apply to cross
border aspects of the CARDs pro-
gramme in the Western Balkans.

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Community financial instruments and the EIB should con-
tinue to support infrastructure investment in the Mediterranean.
FEMIP or, subject to Council review, a possible Euro-Med bank,
are means of providing additional support for private sector devel-
opment in the region. For Russia and the WNIS, community,
EBRD and EIB supported initiatives should be further developed.
While the central role played by the EBRD should continue to be
supported, the EU could also consider the progressive and tar-
geted  increase  of  EIB  lending  to  Russia,  and  its  extension  to
Ukraine, Moldova and, eventually, Belarus. The EU should ensure
the IFIs take adequate account of the importance of spending on
education, health and social safety net provisions in their policies
towards the neighbouring countries.

4. A Differentiated, Progressive, and Benchmarked
Approach 

The long term goal of the initiatives set out in Chapter 3 is to move
towards an arrangement whereby the Union’s relations with the
neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close political and
economic links currently enjoyed with the European Economic
Area. This implies the partners taking on considerably deeper and
broader obligations, specifically when it comes to aligning with
Community legislation. However, the new neighbourhood policy
should not override the existing framework for EU relations with
Russia and the countries of the Western NIS, and the Southern
Mediterranean. Instead, it would supplement and build on existing
policies and arrangements. 

Belarus

(cid:90) EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996-7 as a consequence of
serious  setbacks  in  the  development  of  democracy  and
human rights in Belarus, in particular the replacement of the
democratically elected parliament with a national assembly
nominated by the President in violation of the 1994 consti-
tution.

(cid:90) The GAC reacted in 1997 by freezing conclusion of the PCA,
signed in 1995, and restricting ministerial level contacts and
the scope of EU assistance to Belarus.

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(cid:90) Despite repeated approaches by the EU, OSCE and Council
of Europe since 1997, Belarus has applied a constant policy
of deviation from its commitments to the Council of Europe
and OSCE. Confrontation with the OSCE over its represen-
tation in Minsk led to a decision of 14 member states to
impose a visa ban on government representatives in Novem-
ber 2002.

(cid:90) The EU faces a choice in Belarus: either to leave things to
drift – a policy for which the people of Belarus may pay dear
and one which prevents the EU from pursuing increased
cooperation on issues of mutual interest - or to engage, and
risk sending a signal of support for policies which do not
conform to EU values.

(cid:90) In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 2004, the EU
should aim to engage Belarus in a measurable, step-by-step
process focused on creating the conditions for free and fair
elections and, once achieved, the integration of Belarus into
the neighbourhood policy, without compromising the EU’s
commitment to common and democratic values.

As noted above, the neighbouring countries do not start from
the  same  point  in  their  relations  with  the  EU.  Some  partners
already have FTAs with differing degrees of scope and depth; oth-
ers have begun the process of developing a strategic partnership
with the EU, with economic integration with the EU as one aspect
of  this.  While  the  EU  should  aim  to  ensure  a  more  coherent
approach, offering the same opportunities across the wider neigh-
bourhood, and asking in return the same standards of behaviour
from each of our neighbours, differentiation between countries
would remain the basis for the new neighbourhood policy. 

The overall goal will be to work with partner countries to foster
the political and economic reform process, promote closer eco-
nomic  integration  and  sustainable  development  and  provide
political support and assistance. The EU should start from the
premise that the institutions of state need to be capable of deliver-
ing full transition to comply with international political, legal and
human rights standards and obligations. Partners will start from
variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid reform
and comprehensive transition. They will need to show a strong
commitment to building up their administrative, institutional

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and legal capacity. There is therefore no alternative to a step-by-
step approach. The extension of the benefits set out in Chapter 3,
including increased financial assistance, should be conducted so
as to encourage and reward reform – reforms which existing EU
policies and incentives have so far not managed to elicit in all cases.
Engagement should therefore be introduced progressively, and
be conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform. New bene-
fits should only be offered to reflect the progress made by the part-
ner countries in political and economic reform. In the absence of
progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities. 

This communication proposes that the principles of differen-
tiation and progressivity should be established by means of coun-
try and/or regional Action Plans. These should be political docu-
ments – drawing together existing and future work in the full
range of the EU’s relations with its neighbours, in order to set out
clearly the over-arching strategic policy targets and benchmarks
by which progress can be judged over several years. They should be
concise, complemented where necessary by more detailed plans
for sector-specific cooperation.

The setting of clear and public objectives and benchmarks
spelling out the actions the EU expects of its partners is a means to
ensure  a  consistent  and  credible  approach  between  countries.
Benchmarks also offer greater predictability and certainty for the
partner countries than traditional ‘conditionality’. Political and
economic benchmarks could be used to evaluate progress in key
areas of reform and against agreed targets. Beyond the regulatory
and administrative aspects directly linked to market integration,
key benchmarks should include the ratification and implementa-
tion of international commitments which demonstrate respect
for  shared  values,  in  particular  the  values  codified  in  the  UN
Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and Council of Europe
standards. Wherever possible, these benchmarks should be devel-
oped in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves,
in order to ensure national ownership and commitment.

International organisations, notably the OSCE and the Coun-
cil of Europe, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and
the IFIs, can assist with establishing benchmarks. These organisa-
tions should also be engaged in the process of supporting related
reforms. 

Action Plans and accompanying benchmarks should be estab-
lished by the Council, based on proposals from the Commission,

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wherever possible with prior discussion with the partner countries
concerned. The Action Plans, once agreed, will supersede common
strategies to become the Union’s main policy document for rela-
tions with these countries over the medium term.

When it comes to the institutional and contractual arrange-
ments of the Association Agreements and Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreements, the full implementation and exploitation of
the provisions contained in the existing Agreements remains a
necessary precondition for any new development.

Libya

(cid:90) The EU has no contractual relations with Libya. 
(cid:90) In April 1999, following the suspension of UN sanctions,
Libya acquired observer status in the Barcelona Process and
was invited to become a full member as soon as the UN Secu-
rity Council sanctions have been definitively lifted and once
Libya has accepted the full Barcelona ‘acquis’. 

(cid:90) The EU has suspended sanctions against Libya and lifted
restrictions on diplomatic and consular personnel and visas;
the embargo on arms exports remains in place. 

(cid:90) Although  Libya  has  not  so  far  accepted  the  Barcelona
acquis, in particular because of disagreement over the posi-
tion  of  Israel  and  the  Palestinian  Authority,  it  regularly
observes in Foreign Ministers and Senior Official’s meet-
ings. 

(cid:90) The EU should therefore give consideration to how it could
incorporate Libya into the neighbourhood policy. In order
to send a coherent message, further engagement needs to be
pursued within a conditional framework and a clear under-
standing of the benefits of making progress towards cooper-
ation based on respect for shared values.

Thereafter, the EU will examine the scope for new Neighbour-
hood  Agreements  to  build  on  existing  contractual  relations.
These would supplement existing contractual relations where the
EU and the neighbouring country have moved beyond the existing
framework, taking on new entitlements and obligations. If, how-
ever, the Neighbourhood Agreements contain provisions going
beyond  those  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Association  Agree-

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ments,  similar  arrangements  could  be  offered,  on  equivalent
terms, to the Mediterranean partners.

5. Next Steps

A three step process could be envisaged for developing and imple-
menting the Action Plans for each country:

I. Dialogue in the existing frameworks (Association and Partner-
ship  and  Cooperation  Agreements)  jointly  analysing  the
achievements and failures of reform hitherto. The Association
and Cooperation Committees should be mandated to prepare
this work.

II. A document would then be drawn up by the Commission and
the Member States, to be agreed in association with each coun-
try,  setting  out  common  objectives  and  benchmarks  and  a
timetable for their achievement. This action plan should be
given a political endorsement by the EU and the partner(s)
involved,  if  appropriate  at  the  level  of  the  Association  and
Cooperation Councils. 

III. An annual review of progress in implementing the Action Plan,
integrated into the existing institutional cooperation frame-
work with the partner countries, would be a concrete demon-
stration of enhanced EU political interest and provide govern-
ments with the opportunity to receive credit from the EU for
their political and economic reform efforts.

The  financial  implications  of  the  new  Neighbourhood  Policy
should be reflected in the Commission’s future budgetary propos-
als. The Commission will consider proposals for a new Neighbour-
hood Instrument focussing on ensuring the smooth functioning
and secure management of the future Eastern and Mediterranean
borders, promoting sustainable economic and social development
of the bordering regions and pursuing regional and trans-national
cooperation. The Commission will consider how objectives and
benchmarks could help regarding regulatory approximation, fur-
ther market opening and preferential trade relations with Russia,
Ukraine and Moldova in line with the commitments and obliga-
tions in the PCAs. Where justified by progress made against the
Action Plans, the Commission will also put forward initiatives to:

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(cid:90) extend existing Community policies, programmes and instru-
ments to neighbouring countries not already benefiting from
them.

(cid:90) implement a progressive and targeted extension of the EIB’s
external mandate to Russia and the WNIS, in close collabora-
tion with the EBRD and the other relevant IFIs.

(cid:90) evaluate FEMIP and consider its possible incorporation into an

EIB majority owned Euro-Med Bank.

The contribution of the new member states will be fundamen-

tal to the development of the new neighbourhood policy.

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annexes

a3

Commission Communication

21 May 2003

The Western Balkans and European Integration (extract)

Conclusions and recommendations

In light of the above, the European Commission’s conclusions and
recommendations are the following:
(cid:90) The  preparation  of  the  countries  of  the  Western  Balkans  for
future integration into European structures is a major priority of
the European Union. These countries should have a clear per-
spective of joining the European Union when they have satisfied
all the necessary criteria.

(cid:90) The Stabilisation and Association process has laid the founda-
tion for the further reforms required for the countries to prepare
for a closer relationship with the European Union, with the goal
of membership and should be further reinforced by the meas-
ures  proposed  in  this  Communication.  The  process  will  be
strengthened further to draw the countries ever closer to the
Union in a shared agenda for European integration.

(cid:90) While the European Union will provide all support possible,
advancement  in  the  process  of  European  integration  will
depend mainly on each country’s own commitment and capa-
bility  as  fully  functioning  states  to  political  and  economic
reform as well as adherence to the core values and principles of
the Union.

(cid:90) The countries of the Western Balkans need to develop further
concrete co-operation among themselves particularly in such
areas as refugee return, migration, freedom of movement, the
fight against organised crime, trade, energy and transport.

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(cid:90) The countries of the Western Balkans should establish a regional
framework for parliamentary co-operation and develop rela-
tions  with  the  European  Parliament  and  Parliaments  of  the
Member States and the Accession Countries.

(cid:90) The  introduction  of  European  Integration  Partnerships,
inspired by the pre-accession phase of the current enlargement,
will give a fresh impetus to reform. The Commission could be
invited to develop further the concept of European Integration
Partnerships with a view to presenting these with the next SAP
reports.

(cid:90) The countries should be invited to associate themselves with cer-
tain declarations, Common Positions and other decisions in the
framework of the CFSP. Political dialogue at different levels
should be strengthened.

(cid:90) Economic dialogue should now be extended to all the countries

of the region.

(cid:90) Support for institution building under the CARDS programme
should be strengthened by further expanding twinning pro-
grammes, by extending TAIEX-like services to the region and by
closely monitoring legislation and administrative capacity. Par-
ticular attention should be given to mobilising expertise from
the new Member States, which have had recent successful expe-
rience of transition and of pre-accession preparations.

(cid:90) In the field of justice and home affairs, the Commission will ini-
tiate a dialogue with the countries in the region with the aim of
establishing key priorities and benchmarks, including in the
area of organised crime and corruption. Programmes should be
further strengthened in this area. The Commission encourages
the countries in the region to establish national action plans to
fight organised crime.

(cid:90) As a means of increasing the region’s export possibilities and
promoting investment and economic growth, the system of pan-
European diagonal cumulation of origin should be extended to
the countries of the Western Balkans when the individual coun-
tries fulfil the necessary conditions, and applied in a manner
fully consistent with all relevant community policies.

(cid:90) Small and medium sized enterprises are particularly important
for economic development and for the successful transition to a
fully functioning market economy. The Western Balkan coun-
tries could make a commitment to the principles in the Euro-
pean Charter for Small Enterprises.

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(cid:90) Participation in relevant Community programmes should be
further  extended  to  the  Western  Balkans.  The  Commission
could be invited to make the necessary proposals.

The Commission suggests that the orientations in this Com-
munication should guide the European Union in working with
the countries of the Western Balkans to bring them closer to the
shared goal of EU membership.

List of abbreviations

(cid:92) Acquis

Acquis communautaire – Community legislation

(cid:92) CARDS

Community  Assistance 
Development and Stabilisation

for  Reconstruction,

(cid:92) CFSP 

Common Foreign and Security Policy

(cid:92) COSAC 

Conférence  des  Organes  Spécialisés  en  Affaires
Européennes

(cid:92) EU 

(cid:92) JHA

European Union

Justice and Home Affairs

(cid:92) SAA 

Stabilisation and Association Agreement

(cid:92) SAP

Stabilisation and Association process

(cid:92) TAIEX 

Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
Office

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a4

annexes

Communication from the
European Commission
(extract)

Brussels, 21 May 2003
COM(2003) 294 final

Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democra-
tisation with Mediterranean partners (extract)

The situation with respect to Human Rights and democratisation
in the MEDA countries [Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority] is varied
and complex, but it is possible to identify certain broad trends. The
UNDP Arab Human Development report of 2002 concluded that,
although substantial progress has been made in some areas, fur-
ther  economic  and  social  development  is  hampered  by  deeply
rooted shortcomings in the structures of governance in the Arab
world. The report identifies three “deficits” relating to freedom,
empowerment of women and knowledge. It concludes that thor-
ough  reform  and  consolidation  of  governance,  strengthening
political and economic freedoms and improving public participa-
tion are all essential for achieving lasting economic, social and
human development.

The Arab countries fall considerably below world average on all
of six variables of governance used in the UNDP report, except for
“rule  of  law”  where  they  slightly  exceed  the  average.  In  many
MEDA countries, a powerful executive branch exerts significant
control and is subject to inadequate checks and balances from the
legislative and judicial branches. Obsolete norms of legitimacy
can prevail. Representative democratic structures are weak and
not always genuine. Women remain marginalised in economic
and political structures and are broadly discriminated against in
law and custom.

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The  long  standing  international  consensus  that  Human
Rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, indivisible and
interrelated is reflected in the fact that most MEDA countries have
ratified most major international Human Rights instruments,
and universal Human Rights principles are enshrined in constitu-
tions, legal codes and government pronouncements. Some posi-
tive steps are being taken in the area of Human Rights, with MEDA
partners such as Morocco, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority
engaged in a broadly positive process of relevant reforms.

However, generally speaking, the implementation of Human
Rights  standards  in  the  region  falls  short  of  compliance  with
international  norms.  Promotion  of  democracy  and  Human
Rights is complicated by the fact that religious extremism has
emerged as a powerful political alternative. A tension between
internal security concerns and the promotion and protection of
Human Rights can result in negative consequences in human
rights terms, particularly apparent under the umbrella of the “war
on  terror”  in  the  wake  of  September  11th  2001.  Freedoms  of
expression and association are frequently curtailed, mainly by
resorting to emergency legislation. Human Rights defenders and
NGO’s practising advocacy in the human rights field face legal
and administrative constraints, are frequently marginalised and
sometimes repressed.

A quick analysis country by country would confirm insuffi-
cient progress as regards regulatory frameworks (and their appli-
cation), institutional capacity, educational activity, and levels of
participation of civil society in the promotion and protection of
Human Rights.

The situation could be summarised as follows:

(cid:90) Deficits in governance hamper the development of democratic
values, and the promotion and protection of Human Rights;
(cid:90) Marginalisation of women undermines political representation

and hamper economic and social development;

(cid:90) Implementation of international Human Rights conventions is

poor;

(cid:90) Legal and judicial systems lack sufficient independence;
(cid:90) NGOs  working  in  the  civil  and  political  spheres  are  weak,
severely circumscribed in their action and cut off from interna-
tional networking;

(cid:90) Education, though relatively better funded than in many other

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developing countries, is unevenly dispensed, does not serve to
overcome traditional discriminatory patterns and is ill adapted
to the requirements of the modern economy;

(cid:90) Authoritarianism and poor economic and social performance
favour political marginalisation and provide fuel for radical
movements and violence;

(cid:90) Some political interpretations of Islam exploit cultural differ-

ences to question the universality of Human Rights.

Compared to the other MEDA partners, Israel presents distinct
characteristics. It functions as a well established parliamentary
democracy, with an effective separation of powers, a functioning
system of governance, and active participation of NGOs and civil
society in all internal aspects of political and social life. However,
Israel’s compliance with internationally accepted standards of
Human Rights is not satisfactory. Two important specific areas
need to be tackled. Firstly, the issue of reconciling the declared
Jewish nature of the State of Israel with the rights of Israel’s non-
Jewish minorities. Secondly, the violation of Human Rights in the
context of the occupation of Palestinian territories. There is an
urgent need to place compliance with universal human rights
standards and humanitarian law by all parties involved in the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict as a central factor in the efforts to put
the Middle East peace process back on track. This will require a
special  effort  by  the  EU  and  the  setting  up  of  an  appropriate 
strategy.

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annexes

a5

Council conclusions

18 June 2003

‘Wider Europe – new neighbourhood’

1. The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 repre-
sents a historic step for the entire European continent and presents
a unique opportunity to strengthen co-operation with its neigh-
bours to the East and to the South. The Council recalls the Decla-
ration adopted by the European Conference in Athens on April
17th, 2003.

2. Noting that geographical proximity will generate converging
interests  and  increase  the  importance  of  working  together  to
address common challenges, the EU wishes to define an ambitious
new range of policies towards its neighbours based on shared val-
ues such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and the rule of law. This should be seen as sep-
arate from the question of possible EU accession that is regulated
by article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

3. The Council welcomes the Communication of the Commission
“Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” as well as contribu-
tions made by the High Representative, and considers that they
provide a good basis for developing a new range of policies towards
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya1, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and, at the
same time reinforcing EU-Russia strategic partnership. At a later
stage, the Council will examine whether the Southern Caucasus
countries could also be covered within these policies.

1. Libya has been invited to accept
the Barcelona acquis in order to
join the Barcelona Process.

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4. The new neighbourhood policies should not override the exist-
ing framework for EU relations with Russia, the Eastern European
countries, and the Southern Mediterranean partners, as developed
in the context of the relevant agreements, common strategies, the
Northern Dimension Initiative and of the Barcelona Process. They
should encourage and support policies of the New Eastern and
Southern neighbours aimed at coming closer to the EU. Imple-
mentation of existing agreements remains a priority.

5. The overall goal of the new policies will be :
a. To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of
shared prosperity and values based on free trade, deeper eco-
nomic integration, intensified political and cultural relations,
enhanced cross-border co-operation and shared responsibility
for conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

b. To anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential
relations within a differentiated framework which responds to
progress made by the partner countries in defined areas, in par-
ticular political and economic reform as well as in the field of
JHA.

6. The EU’s approach could therefore be based on the following
incentives:
a. More effective political dialogue and co-operation.
b. Intensified co-operation to prevent and combat common secu-

rity threats.

c. Greater co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis manage-

ment.

d. Perspectives for participating progressively in the EU’s Internal
Market and its regulatory structures, including those pertaining
to sustainable development (health, consumer and environmen-
tal protection), based on legislative approximation.

e. Preferential trading relations and further market opening in

accordance with WTO principles.

f. Enhanced co-operation on matters related to legal migration.
g. Enhanced co-operation to tackle drugs trafficking, trafficking in
human beings and organized crime, through, inter alia, support
for border management and cross-border co-operation.

h. Enhanced cultural co-operation, mutual understanding and

people-to people contact.

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i. Perspectives of integration into transport, energy and telecom-

munications networks and the European Research Area.

j.  New  instruments  for  investment  promotion  and  protection
while preserving the respective competences of the Community
and the Member States.

k. Support for WTO accessions and integration into the global

trading system.

l.  Enhanced  and  improved  assistance,  better  tailored  to  needs,
including improved interaction of all relevant sources of finance,
including IFIs.

m. Promotion of intra-regional, sub-regional and cross-border co-

operation.

n. Enhanced co-operation in the field of education, training, and

science.

o. Enhanced co-operation in environmental protection.

7. Differentiation will be the basis for the new EU policies towards
its neighbours, which will be implemented by Action Plans. Action
Plans will become key policy instruments of the EU for relations
with the neighbouring countries over the medium term. These
should be political documents, building on existing agreements
and setting out clearly the over-arching strategic policy targets,
common objectives, political and economic benchmarks used to
evaluate progress in key areas, and a timetable for their achieve-
ment which enable progress to be judged regularly. They should be
concise, complemented where necessary by more detailed plans for
sector-specific cooperation, and should inform EC country assis-
tance.

8. On the basis mentioned above, the Council invites the Commis-
sion with the contribution, where appropriate, of the High Repre-
sentative, to:
a. launch dialogue within existing frameworks on achievements
and failures of meeting agreed targets under existing agreements;
b. from 2004 onwards, present proposals for Action Plans for all
countries  concerned  as  appropriate,  commencing  i.a.  with
Ukraine, Moldova, and Southern Mediterranean partners with
Association Agreements;

c. examine measures to improve the interoperability between the
different relevant instruments for support to the border areas
and further alignment of TACIS, PHARE, CARDS, MEDA and

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INTERREG programmes and report thereof to the Council;

d. present a communication on a new Neighbourhood Instrument,
focussing on promoting sustainable economic and social devel-
opment of the bordering countries and pursuing regional and
trans-national  co-operation,  including  people-to-people  con-
tacts, and on ensuring the smooth functioning and secure man-
agement of the Eastern and Mediterranean borders, based on the
evaluation of existing instruments and as an integral part of the
consideration of the relevant financing instruments in the new
financial perspectives after 2006.

9. At the appropriate time, on the basis of evaluation of implemen-
tation of existing agreements and taking into account the principle
of  differentiation,  the  EU  will  examine  the  scope  for  new  or
enhanced agreements. These would supplement existing contrac-
tual relations where the EU and the neighbouring country have
moved beyond the existing framework.

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annexes

a6

EU security strategy
(extract)

20 June 2003

Extending the Zone of Security around Europe

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in
the European interest that countries on our borders are well-gov-
erned.  

Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states
where  organised  crime  flourishes,  dysfunctional  societies  or
exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for
Europe.

The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding
states will increase our security but they also bring Europe closer
to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed
countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of
the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative
relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans where
the European Union, with NATO and other partners, is commit-
ted to achieving stability, good governance, and the closest possi-
ble integration of the region into Europe.  

This effort will have to be sustained for some years to come.
Following the failures of the nineties, the European Union,
over the past years, has considerably strengthened its engagement
in the still fragile Western Balkans. It has helped to stabilise the
situation in Southern Serbia and FYROM and facilitated the con-
stitutional arrangements between Serbia and Montenegro. The
European  Union  took  over  the  police  mission  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina from the United Nations and the military operation
in FYROM from NATO. With the Stabilisation and Association
process the European Union has created an effective framework

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for reforms and for progress towards Europe. It is not in our inter-
est that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. 
We need to extend the benefits of economic and political coop-
eration to our future neighbours in the East. Ukraine, Moldova
and Belarus – while resolving political problems there. We should
take a stronger interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus,
which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for

Europe. 

Without this, there will be little chance of dealing successfully
with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union has
been  involved  in  this  question  for  more  than  twenty  years.  It
remains an essential interest, which is now being taken forward
through the Quartet.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo seri-
ous problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unre-
solved conflicts. 

The European Union’s interests require a continued engage-
ment with Mediterranean partners, through more effective eco-
nomic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the
Barcelona Process.

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annexes

a7

Treaty references to
‘European-ness’

a. Art.O, Maastricht Treaty on European Union (formerly Art.
237 of the Rome Treaty) 
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Union.
It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unan-
imously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the
assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute
majority of its component members. 

The  conditions  of  admission  and  the  adjustments  to  the
Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission
entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member
States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted
for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements. 

b. Art. 49, Amsterdam Treaty on European Union
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article
F(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address
its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after
consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its
component members.

[sub-paragraph unchanged]

c. Draft Constitution (as released by the European Convention)

Art. I-57: Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession
to the Union
The Union shall be open to all European States which respect the
values referred to in Article 2, and are committed to promoting
them together.

Any European State which wishes to become a member of the

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Union may address its application to the Council of Ministers.
The European Parliament and the Member States’ national Par-
liaments shall be notified of this application. The Council of Min-
isters shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The con-
ditions and arrangements for admission shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the candidate State.
That agreement shall be subject to ratification by each contracting
State, in accordance with its respective constitutional require-
ments.

d. Draft Constitution (as released by the European Conven-
tion)

Art. I-56: The Union and its immediate environment
The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring
states, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neigh-
bourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized
by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.

For this purpose, the Union may conclude and implement spe-
cific agreements with countries concerned in accordance with Art.
III-227 of the Constitution. These articles may contain reciprocal
rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking
activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of
periodic consultation.

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annexes

a8

About the authors 

Judy  Batt  (British),  Research  Fellow  at  the  EU  Institute  for  Security  Studies
(EUISS), has a Doctorate in East-Central European politics from the University
of  Birmingham.  Senior  lecturer  in  Central  and  East  European  Politics  at  the
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham 1991
to 2003, and from 2002 Jean Monnet Chair in the European Integration of South
East  Europe.  Former  research  fellow  in  the  Soviet  Programme  at  the  Royal
Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), she was seconded to the UK
Foreign Office Policy Planning Staff 1992-93.

Dov Lynch (Irish), Research Fellow at the EUISS, has a Doctorate in International
Relations from St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. M.Phil. in Russian and
East  European  Relations  from  University  of  Oxford.  Lecturer  in  War  Studies,
King’s  College  London,  from  1999  to  2002.  Former  University  Lecturer  in
International  Relations/Russian  Foreign  Policy  at  the  University  of  Oxford  in
1999 and Research Fellow at St Antony’s College. Former Research Fellow at the
Russia and Eurasia Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Antonio Missiroli (Italian), Research Fellow at the EUISS, has a Doctorate in
contemporary history from the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa and Master of
International  Public  Policy,  Johns  Hopkins  University.  From  1993  to  1996,
lecturer  in  West  European  Politics  at  Dickinson  College,  Carlisle  (Pa.)  and
Bologna,  as  well  as  Head  of  European  Studies,  CeSPI,  Rome.  From  1996  to
1997, British Council Visiting Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford.

Martin Ortega (Spanish), Research Fellow at the EUISS, has a Doctorate
in public international law from the Autonomous University, Madrid, and
was a senior associate member of St Antony’s College, Oxford, in 1988-89.
He lectured in public international law and international relations at the
Autonomous University from 1990 to 1992, and held a similar position at
the  University  of  Salamanca  from  1992  to  1997  and  subsequently  at
Complutense University. In 2001-02 he was Director of INCIPE, a think tank
on international issues based in Madrid. 

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Greek), was, until July 2003, Research Fellow
at  the  EUISS.  He  holds  a  BA  in  Political  Science  and  History  from  the
University  of  California,  Berkeley  and  an  MA  and  Ph.D.  in  International
Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
He is also Associate Editor of the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies. He was previously Deputy Director of the Hellenic Foundation for
European  and  Foreign  Policy  (ELIAMEP),  Athens  (1996-99)  and  foreign
policy  adviser  to  a  member  of  the  European  Parliament  (1995).  He  will
shortly be joining the London School of Economics and Political Science.

168

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a9

annexes

Abbreviations

AKP 
CARDS 

CBC  
CFSP 
CIS 
COPS 
CSR 
DG 
EAPC 
EC 
ECHO 
EEA 
EIB 
EMP 
ESDP 
EU 
EUMS 
EUPM 
FDI 
FRY 

FTA 
FYROM 
GDP 
GNP 
HR 
ICJ 
IFI 
IGC 
Interreg 

JHA 
KFOR 
MEDA 
MO 
NATO 
NGO 
NIS 
NRC 
OSCE  
PCA 
PfP 

Justice and Development Party (Turkey) 
Community  Assistance  for  Reconstruction,  Development 
and Stabilisation 
Cross-Border Cooperation 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Political and Security Committee 
Common Strategy on Russia 
Directorate-General 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
European Community 
European Community Humanitarian Office 
European Economic Area 
European Investment Bank 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
European Security and Defence Policy 
European Union 
European Union Military Staff 
European Union Police Mission 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro) 
Free Trade Agreement 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Product 
High Representative 
International Court of Justice 
International Financial Institutions 
Intergovernmental Conference 
Community initiative aimed at stimulating interregional 
cooperation 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Kosovo Force 
Mediterranean European Development Agreement 
Russian Ministry of Defence 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Newly Independent States 
NATO-Russia Council 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Partnership for Peace 

169

 
 
64-English-Text.qxd  29/09/2003  16:26  Page 170

PHARE 

PJC 
PMR 

SAA 
SAP 
SEE 
SEECP 
SEEDS 
SFOR 
SPSEE 
TACIS 

TEU 
UK 
UNSCR 
US 
USSR 
WEU 
WMD 
WNIS  
WTO  

Poland-Hungary: Aid for the Reconstruction of 
Economies 
Permanent Joint Council 
Pridniestrovsksya Moldavskaya Respublika, or 
Transnistria 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
Stabilisation and Association Process 
South-Eastern Europe 
South-East Europe Cooperation Process 
South East Europe Democracy Support 
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 
EU programme of Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia 
Treaty on European Union 
United Kingdom 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
United States 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Western European Union 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Western Newly Independent States 
World Trade Organisation 

a9

170

 
64-English-COVER.qxd  29/09/2003  16:28  Page 3

Chaillot Papers

All Chaillot Papers
can be accessed via the Institute’s website:
www.iss-eu.org

The European Union and armaments — getting a bigger bang
for the euro
Burkard Schmitt

The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East
Muriel Asseburg, Dominique Moïsi, Gerd Nonneman and Stefano Silvestri,
edited by Martin Ortega

EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia
Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper;
edited by Burkard Schmitt

Russia faces Europe
Dov Lynch

European armaments cooperation: core documents
compiled by Burkard Schmitt

Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment
Harald Müller

From Laeken to Copenhagen — European defence:
Core documents, Volume III
compiled by Jean-Yves Haine

International terrorism and Europe
Thérèse Delpech

What model for CFSP?
Hans-Georg Ehrhart

August 2003

July 2003

June 2003

May 2003

April 2003

March 2003

February 2003

December 2002

October 2002

The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire? 
Pierre Hassner

September 2002

Enlargement and European defence after 11 September
Jiri Sedivy, Pal Dunay and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski;
edited by Antonio Missiroli

Terms of engagement. The paradox of American power and 
the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September
Julian Lindley-French

From Nice to Laeken — European defence: core documents
Volume II
compiled by Maartje Rutten

What status for Kosovo?
Dana Allin, Franz-Lothar Altmann, Marta Dassu, Tim Judah, Jacques Rupnik and
Thanos Veremis; edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Enlargement: a new NATO
William Hopkinson

June 2002

May 2002

April 2002

October 2001

October 2001

n°63

n°62

n°61

n°60

n°59

n°58

n°57

n°56

n°55

n°54

n°53

n°52

n°51

n°50

n°49

T
E
p
n
b
f
t
ty
m

ty
fu
h
e
w
‘c
a
c
t

e
o
fu
r

a
i.
w
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(t
w
C
t
g
in
c
m

64-English-COVER.qxd  29/09/2003  16:28  Page 4

This  Chaillot  Paper  is  the  product  of  collegial  reflection  by  the
EUISS’s  research  team.  The  effects  of  the  current  enlargement
process are already making themselves felt in not only the inter-
nal  but  also  the  external  policies  of  the  widening  Union.  New
borders and neighbours are bringing new challenges while recon-
figuring old ones. This new reality requires more than just addi-
tions to existing policies: the entire neighbourhood, or proximi-
ty, policy of the enlarged EU will have to be reassessed and refor-
mulated. 

First, enlargement itself – for long the most successful securi-
ty  policy  of  the  EC/EU  –  may  be  reaching  its  geographical  and
functional limits. For the Union, the main problem will become
how  to  exert  influence  on  its  neighbours  comparable  to  that
exerted  in  the  past  decade  on  the  Central  and  East  Europeans
without  offering  the  prospect  of  membership  linked  to  strict
‘conditionality’. Belonging to ‘Europe’ and joining ‘EU Europe’
are distinct conditions and processes that may overlap and even
coincide eventually but may have to remain separate in the short
term.

Second, those neighbours that are entirely excluded from the
enlargement process demand no lesser engagement on the part
of the EU. Both the overall amount and the actual use of the EU
funds  and  programmes  allocated  to  them  require  constant
review in the light of the policy goals the Union sets itself.

Third, all neighbourhood or proximity policies have to strike
an effective balance between regional and individual approaches,
i.e. between creating (or maintaining) a common regional frame-
work for relations with the EU and more targeted programmes
that take into account the peculiarities of each neighbour.  

Finally,  such  policies  will  be  effective  only  if  their  recipients
(the various neighbours) receive clear messages and are presented
with  clear  options  by  the  Union  and  all  its  member  states.
Commitment and coherence should be shown in trade, aid, assis-
tance,  border  policies  and  dialogue  with  societies,  not  just
governments. Yet they also have to guide the political will to act
in accordance with values, norms and principles set out in advan-
ce. This has not always been the case – but should become com-
mon practice for the enlarged EU.

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