Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Partnership for implementing the Structural Funds"
Date: 2003-09-24
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: EU regional policy, Structural Funds, development aid, regional aid

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Partnership for implementing
the Structural Funds’

(2004/C 10/07)

On 18 February 2003 the European Commissioner responsible for regional policy, Mr Michel Barnier,
acting on behalf of the Commission, asked the European Economic and Social Committee to draw up an
opinion on the ‘Partnership for implementing the Structural Funds’.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was
responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 September
2003. The rapporteur was Mr Barros Vale and the co-rapporteur was Mr Di Odoardo.

At its 402nd plenary session on 24 and 25 September 2003 (meeting of 24 September), the European
Economic and Social Committee unanimously adopted the following opinion.

1.

Introduction

extends from the planning stage to monitoring and ex post
evaluation (2).

1.1.
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
has always devoted special attention to the arrangements for
public policy coordination and consultations between elected
authorities and their representatives and organised civil society,
at both EU level and in the Member States.

1.2.
This concern led the Committee to include in its 2003
work programme the drafting of an own-initiative opinion
setting out its thoughts on the Partnership for implementing
the Structural Funds. The European Commission subsequently
asked the Committee to draw up an exploratory opinion on
the subject. This shows the topical interest of a matter that
needs further study, especially with a view to the future
revision of the Structural Funds regulations and the forth-
coming accession to the EU of many new Member States.

1.3.
The partnership forms one of the principles pursued
within the legal framework of structural policy, as stated
clearly and unequivocally in Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/
1999 of 21 June 1999, and it has gained in importance with
each successive reform.

There were two main reasons for this increased concern

1.6.
for the partnership:

— firstly, the social partners had expressed a wish for the

partnership’s role to be strengthened;

— secondly, studies had found that a broad-based and
integrated partnership contributed to the success of the
programmes because:

a)

b)

c)

involving the partners from the outset ensures that
measures draw on more specialist knowledge and
enjoy greater legitimacy;

a broad-based and integrated partnership also makes
it easier to coordinate the organisation of
the
programmes;

appropriations are used more effectively, both
because the selection of projects is improved and
because the potential beneficiaries and co-financiers
are better informed;

d)

there is greater transparency, as Community action
has a higher and clearer profile.

1.4.
The partnership first became generalised in the 1994-
it has
1999 period.
In the current period (2000-2006)
been further extended (1) to include local authorities, socio-
economic partners and some non-governmental organisations
(NGO).

2. The partnership concept

1.5.
In parallel with this increase in the number of potential
partners, their role has also been stepped up so that it now

2.1.
A clearer definition is first needed of what the partner-
ship exactly involves, strengthening its key role in the proper
implementation of the Structural Funds as an instrument for
ensuring social fairness and not as a political instrument.

(1) Article 8 of the abovementioned regulation.

(2) Article 15 of the regulation.

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The partnership defined in Council Regulation (EC)
2.2.
No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Struc-
tural Funds (1) concerns two main types of partners (the
differing functions of which could usefully be spelt out more
clearly within the regulation):

— the ‘institutional’ partners, and in particular the regional

and local authorities;

— the economic and social partners.

Additionally, as part of the general revision of the
3.6.
Structural Funds regulation, it would be helpful to spell out
that particularly when general structural policy
the fact
objectives are being fixed,
the Commission must always
consult not only the Member States but also the socio-
economic partners at EU level. The current Article 10 signifi-
cantly makes no mention of these partners: ‘... after consulting
the Member States, the Commission shall publish broad,
indicative guidelines on relevant and agreed Community
policies in relation to the objectives referred to in Article 1’.

The present opinion discusses the partnership in
2.3.
general but obviously pays particular attention to the stand-
point of the socio-economic partners on this matter.

3. The current situation

The first type of partnership in the Structural Funds is
3.1.
conducted at EU level, coming even before the partnership at
national
level. Right from the general programming stage,
Community activities must be based on consultations between
the Commission, the Member States and the socio-economic
partners.

3.7.
It is very difficult to get a detailed picture of the
partnership arrangements in the Member States for the 2000-
2006 programming period. Analysis of the development plans,
Community support frameworks, operational programmes
and single programming documents (SPDs) shows that in most
cases only vague reference is made to the involvement of the
socio-economic partners, and that the details of their role in
the monitoring committees vary greatly and are extremely
sketchy.

Article 8 of the abovementioned regulation on the
3.2.
Structural Funds states that ‘each year, the Commission shall
consult
the European-level organisations representing the
social partners about the structural policy of the Community’.

3.8.
Community guidelines must thus be laid down for
improving the content of Member States’ reports on their
arrangements for consulting the partners. More detailed infor-
mation can then be gleaned regarding these arrangements and
best practice can be analysed.

in practice,

3.3.
The Committee recognises the exemplary (and indeed,
multiplier) role which the partnership can play at Member
State level. However,
in recent years EU-level
consultations have been limited to meetings lasting just a few
hours, at which the partners are basically just briefed on the
progress of the Structural Funds and are given no practical
opportunity to put forward any suggestions or set out their
views in detail.

The partnership at EU level has thus been limited to
3.4.
‘providing information’, which is not
the same thing as
‘consultation’ on Community structural policies. Of course,
the EU social partners must also take the initiative and actively
monitor the institutional procedures for implementing the
Funds.

3.5.
The Commission needs to review its arrangements for
consulting the socio-economic partners, so as to provide more
opportunities for meetings and promote effective debates and
consultations with permanent and sectoral partners.

(1) OJ L 161, 26.6.1999.

Extending the type of bodies that can take part in the
3.9.
monitoring committees also improves the management and
implementation of the Funds, which can draw on each body’s
practical experience and knowledge of the region concerned
and of its socio-economic situation, thereby improving the
whole process.

3.10.
Boosting the partnership and the role of the partners
is an important objective which is not always translated into
practical consultations. For example:

a)

in approving the plans submitted by the Member States,
consultation of the socio-economic partners is essential
when the plans are being drawn up; the consultation
arrangements have not always been ideal, and might need
to be amended to ensure effective support/involvement
of the partner bodies;

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b)

c)

d)

e)

in the finalisation of the plans, boosting the partnership
should form part of the negotiations between the Com-
mission and the Member States; in practice, however, the
situation has depended largely on the Member States,
which have failed to follow a clear line regarding the
minimum acceptable threshold for involvement of the
partners;

partnership is one of the factors specified for the mid-term
evaluation of all programmes and single programming
documents; again,
it is important to clarify how the
partnership is viewed and how it influences the evalu-
ation;

the Commission has encouraged the mainstreaming of
partnership schemes that were pursued in the previous
period, such as the territorial employment pacts; however,
in some cases, failings on both sides (authorities and
partners) have meant that the results have sometimes
been disappointing;

the Commission has launched a thematic evaluation of
the territorial employment pacts supported in the pre-
vious period, and case studies are to be carried out that
should yield a list of good practices; the Committee
would like to give its opinion on the latter.

3.11.
The potential partners also have an essential role to
play in strengthening the partnership, as their diverse nature
means that they can bring a different viewpoint from the
existing partners. They should therefore prevail on the national
authorities to include them in the monitoring committees. In
this context they should be able to benefit from technical
assistance and specialist training measures, and adopt any
good practices observed.

3.12.
period (2000-2006), the following points have been noted:

In the first few years of the current programming

a)

b)

in the 100 or more programmes and SPDs for Objective 1,
the 60 for Objective 2 and the 59 for Interreg III which
the Commission has received and examined so far, the
partnership rules (which are a condition for eligibility)
have been respected;

the Commission has also noted that the socio-economic
partners have been consulted on the various plans,
programmes and SPDs, with provision for their involve-
ment in the monitoring committees;

c)

the information provided by the Member States on this
subject, however, varies greatly. Many countries state

d)

e)

f)

g)

h)

merely that the partners have been consulted, without
giving any further details. There are a few exceptions,
when countries have published the programmes online
as a means of public information. The Committee thinks
that the Commission should encourage such practices;

information about participation on the monitoring com-
mittees also varies greatly. In some cases, it is merely
stated that the partners will be involved. The hearings
held by the Committee showed that the partners feel
serious frustration about the results achieved, while the
authorities remain upbeat;

the documents submitted by the same country often
differ from programme to programme in their use of the
term ‘partners’, as a result of the subsidiarity specified in
Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999;

the rights accorded to the socio-economic partners on
the monitoring committees also differ. In many cases,
their status differs from that of other members (no right
to vote, or only limited voting rights, often having a
purely consultative or information role);

despite the constraints which have been observed, the
Committee feels — and the Commission appears to agree
— that there will be results in the medium term. The
monitoring committees have a more important role in
the 2000-2006 period than they did in the past, inter alia
as they are to approve project selection criteria. More
definite conclusions can be reached in the forthcoming
mid-term evaluation, as the impact of the partnership is
one of the elements to be assessed;

the importance of the partnership is thus clear, and the
partnership obviously plays an important role in the
implementation of the Structural Funds. However, given
the diversity of procedures and arrangements for involv-
ing the partners,
there is no clear
it appears that
framework of procedural or practical arrangements for
their participation in the various stages. This matter needs
thought. The differing roles assigned to the
careful
partners and the differing arrangements for their involve-
ment, even within the same Member State, clearly suggest
that a firmer and more detailed framework might be
needed in this area.

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However, much remains to be done on this front,
3.13.
and the Commission has a key role to play. The Committee
considers that the present exploratory opinion is well worth
drafting and will have a real multiplier effect, opening up new
avenues for relations between the social partners and national
administrations. This groundbreaking and innovatory way of
involving civil society, and the socio-economic partners in
particular, in the implementation of public programmes also
places a special responsibility on the European Commission to
ensure that the authorities’ behaviour is beyond reproach.

4. The different levels and stages of the partnership, and

related procedural issues

4.1.
In 1999 the London Tavistock Institute’s evaluation
development and review unit issued a study entitled Thematic
evaluation of the partnership principle, at the request of the
European Commission. This study highlighted significant
differences in the involvement of the partners at the various
stages of the programmes. In most cases, the partners played a
significant role in the programming and general programming
(pre-negotiation), but a totally inadequate role in the monitor-
ing and evaluation stages. The study states that in these latter
stages in many Member States, the partners were merely given
‘an illusion of inclusiveness’.

4.2.
In such circumstances, further thought must be given
to the monitoring committees established under Article 35 of
the Structural Funds regulation. The mechanisms for involving
the social partners must be revised in the light of the new and
important duties assigned to these committees.

4.3.
The abovementioned Tavistock Institute report noted
that for the partners, the monitoring committees had been a
means of obtaining information on the progress of the Funds
rather than a forum for being involved in decisions.

The socio-economic partners must have a chance to
4.5.
contribute to the work of the monitoring committees. For this
to happen, certain prior steps are necessary:

— Meeting agendas must not focus solely (as they often
do at present) on solving administrative or procedural
problems regarding relations between the management
authorities and the Commission; they must concentrate
the
on checking ‘the effectiveness and quality of
implementation of assistance’.

— A special secretariat should be set up or made operational
to provide the monitoring committees with the requisite
technical support, so that the socio-economic partners
can carry out
their duties properly and adopt their
positions in full knowledge of the facts.

— The quality of the partnership achieved in the various
measures should be included among the indicators for
checking the efficiency of the programmes, and should
be a major criterion when allocating the ‘performance
reserve’ (Article 44 of the regulation) which Member
States can activate at the mid-term of the operational
programmes.

4.6.
The Commission should commission a new study of
the different types of participation models that have been used
at national and regional level. Practices which are less well
known, but which could be important for the future, could
then be evaluated and disseminated more widely.

The Committee considers it vital to guarantee that the
4.7.
party evaluating a specific programme is independent from
the national authority that is responsible for implementing it.
Here too, the institutional and socio-economic partners can
play a greater role, thanks to the knowledge acquired with
regard to the practical results of the various measures.

5. The criteria for selecting the partners

4.4.
First and foremost, the involvement of the socio-
economic partners on the monitoring committees must be
made mandatory, and must be strengthened by giving them
the right to vote so that their position on the issues discussed
by the monitoring committees is quite clear.

5.1.
The Committee considers that the selection of the
partners is vital, and that their role and responsibilities must
be made quite clear.

4.4.1.
Expressing the position of the partners simply by
recording their views on the matters under discussion in the
relevant minutes does not give national or regional authorities,
or the EU institutions, a clear picture of the feelings of
the majority of the bodies represented on the monitoring
committees, or of
the relative strength of any differing
positions. The only way to achieve a clear picture is by holding
a vote.

5.2.
A question arises about the compatibility (or otherwise)
of partners being involved in the various stages of programme
implementation when they are also project promoters. In such
circumstances, rules must be established for selecting the
partners so as to ensure that the partnership does not include
bodies which are dependent on the state and whose ability
to act
independently would therefore be functionally or
structurally limited.

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The Committee thinks that an assessment is needed of
5.3.
the appropriate number of partners for each stage of the
programmes, as procedures are made less effective by an
excess of red tape and the widespread loss of individual
responsibility on hugely inflated committees that in some
cases are nothing more than an official forum for passing on
information.

The Committee thinks that clear rules must be estab-
6.4.
lished for each of the groups involved (i.e. programmers,
monitors and evaluators), so as to avoid potential conflicts of
interest that would be contrary to general ethical and legal
principles.

5.4.
The Committee supports the establishment of credible
networks of partners (with the requisite competences) at
different levels, to ensure that they play an effective role and
that their involvement is not just a matter of form.

7. Other types of partnership

Alongside those bodies which traditionally make up
5.5.
the socio-economic partners (trade unions,
industrial and
agricultural organisations, trade and craft associations, the
cooperative and non-profit sector, etc.), a greater role in
Community structural policies should be given to autonomous
bodies such as chambers of commerce, universities, public
housing associations, etc.

6. Conflicts of interest

7.1.
The Committee considers that the arrangements for
involving the institutional and socio-economic partners in the
implementation of the Funds must do far more than just
involve them in the planning, management, monitoring and
evaluation bodies.

7.2.
Greater use should be made of the global grants
procedure, obliging the Member States to adopt this system in
at least a few of their CSFs, as it could prove faster and less
bureaucratic and relieve the strain on national budgets, bearing
in mind the current widespread constraints on public finances.

6.1.
Problems may arise with regard to the membership of
the partnership and possible ineffectiveness of the procedures,
owing to the accumulation of functions that are incompatible
with transparency and independent decision-making (e.g.
involvement of the same people in the programming, monitor-
ing and evaluation stages, when in many cases these people
are also beneficiaries of the programmes concerned).

7.3.
The Committee does not consider that the global grant
procedures should be retained in the form applied hitherto.
After an assessment has been made of past experience, the
rules governing this procedure should be improved so as to
give increasing scope for involving credible operators (not
exclusively state operators) in the management of the Com-
munity Funds — something which many Member States have
unfortunately not done in the past.

There often appears to be potential incompatibility or
6.2.
conflicts of interest in cases where a decision-taker may also
be a beneficiary of the Structural Funds.

6.3.
The stages at which the partners are to be involved,
and their powers, must be made clear. Their role should be
advisory, and they should have no decision-making powers.
Giving the socio-economic partners decision-making powers
would be an infringement of representative democracy,
in
which decision-making bodies are elected. The Committee
thinks that the partners’ right to vote must be limited to
preparatory, monitoring and evaluation bodies and never
extend to project management and decision-making bodies,
although the partners must sit on these bodies or be represent-
ed on them. This is consistent with the principles of partici-
patory democracy without affecting the principles of represen-
tative democracy.

8.

Financing and technical assistance

8.1.
The Committee thinks that the socio-economic part-
ners should have access to financing and training in order to
help them play their full role. This is rarely the case at present.

8.2.
In some cases, the partners are unable to play their
proper role because they lack high-calibre technical experts to
play an active part in Fund-related forums, where they could
and should have a role.

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9. Enlargement

9.1.
The Committee feels that the forthcoming enlargement
of the EU is a further source of concern, given the fragility of
the future Member States. The
civil society in some of
partnership in these countries will not be effective unless
special care is taken to boost the technical and financial
resources of socio-economic organisations, with a view to
establishing the minimum conditions necessary for them to
participate efficiently.

10. Other issues

10.1.
The Committee thinks that the Member States must
make every effort to cut red tape wherever possible. Overly
complex administrative procedures frequently jeopardise the
whole partnership principle, erecting barriers and introducing
practices that often prove counterproductive.

11. Conclusions

The Committee considers that

11.1.
it would be very
helpful to set a minimum participation threshold, laid down
by a Community regulation but leaving the Member States to
establish detailed participation levels in their own national law
or provisions.

11.2.
The role of the socio-economic partners, the content
of the proposals and the participation procedures necessarily
differ at the preparatory, financing, monitoring and evaluation
stages of Community structural measures.
is therefore
necessary to clarify what is expected of the partners, what the
partners need to do to ensure that the programmes are as
levels the partnership is
successful as possible, at what

It

Brussels, 24 September 2003.

conducted, and the political and technical bodies in which the
partners should be involved.

11.3.

The partnership is of crucial importance at two stages:

— at the ‘political’ stage of Fund programming and when
general decisions are taken, at both Community and
national level;

— at the monitoring and evaluation stage.

11.4.
The Committee considers that Article 8 of Regulation
(EC) No 1260/99 should be expanded so as to establish a clear
framework for each group involved in each stage of a
programme, from planning to evaluation, and thus allow real
involvement of the socio-economic players.

11.5.
In the Committee’s view, the management authorities
should retain responsibility for the operational management
of the measures, to avoid any confusion or overlapping of
roles.

The Committee thinks that the experience gained
11.6.
from the territorial employment pacts could provide important
information about the involvement/role of the partners, and
help to clarify responsibilities and limitations, on the part of
both the public authorities and the socio-economic and
institutional partners.

11.7.
Deeper and more responsible involvement of the
socio-economic partners, with the requisite technical and
financial capacity, is highly desirable in the management of
measures that use Community funds. The Committee therefore
proposes the setting of a substantial minimum threshold —
e.g. 15 % of the total CSF funding — to be applied under the
global grants procedure, which has regrettably been used very
little hitherto.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH