WRITTEN QUESTION E-2732/03 by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission. Possible conflict of interests at the Directorate-General for Competition.
Date: 2003-09-11
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Commission, competition, financial control, information, insider trading, professional ethics, share, stock-exchange transaction

C 78 E/158

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

27.3.2004

The general aims were:

(cid:1) to continue stimulating the exchange of experience concerning renewable energies between

municipalities;

(cid:1) to invite them into, and further reinforce, partnerships between the different cities, and encourage

them to join an overall RES Partnership of European cities and regions.

The three different projects were:

(cid:1) ‘City-RES 2001’ (co-ordinated by Energie-Cités);

(cid:1) A plan for a climate-friendly 100 % regenerative energy-supply in the N. German district of Lüchow-
Dannenberg, including heat and power production (CHP) from renewable energies at selected sites (co-
ordinated by the Landkreis (local authority));

(cid:1) A Regional Energy Plan for Hartberg (Austria) (co-ordinated by Joanneum Research, Austria).

Whereas the second and the third project were Pilot Actions, in the form of Regional and Local Energy
Plans, including a Targeted Action on Combined Heat and Power Production (CHP), City-RES 2001 was
again mainly a Promotion and Dissemination Activity, with special emphasis on support to the Campaign
for Take-Off for Renewables managed by the Commission. In addition to relevant events, and further
networking, the major deliverable of the project was the CD-ROM of 105 city best-practice cases referred
to above.

(1) Reference B4.1030/Z/1998-07.

(2004/C 78 E/0162)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2732/03

by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(11 September 2003)

Subject: Possible conflict of interests at the Directorate-General for Competition

The Directorate-General for Competition is entrusted with a variety of sensitive tasks such as deciding
whether to approve company mergers, to approve them conditionally, or to reject them. As part of their
duties, Competition DG officials deal with a range of insider information, which, when made public, has a
considerable effect on the share prices of the companies concerned on Europe’s stock exchanges.

Is there a compliance code at the Competition DG and at the Commission’s departments privy to sensitive
information, as is the case at investment banks,
in order to prevent insider information from being
misused? Is there an official within the Commission responsible for compliance?

Do officials who work with such information have to declare their share-trading activities? Is there a watch
list or a block list covering shares in companies about which sensitive information is known? Do
Commission officials working with sensitive information have to declare the details of their bank accounts
used to carry out securities transactions?

How many in-house reviews has the Commission already conducted to ensure that insider information is
not misused?

Have any of these reviews uncovered cases of suspected misuse of sensitive information?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(14 November 2003)

In 1999, Directorate General
(DG) Competition developed a compliance code based on the Staff
Regulations for its officials, temporary and auxiliary staff, trainees and seconded national experts to
manage the risks concerning conflicts of interest and insider dealing. This code complements, and draws
staff’s attention to, the Belgian criminal law prohibiting insider dealing.

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 78 E/159

The aim of the compliance code is on the one hand to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest and on the
other hand to prevent dealing on stock markets on the basis of non-public information which comes to
the knowledge of DG Competition staff.

As far as conflicts of interest are concerned, the code states that ‘the official must not own shares, or
derivatives (options, warrants, etc.) linked to shares, in the company concerned’. Should a potential or
apparent conflict of interest (e.g. if the case handler or a member of his or her close family owns shares in
one of the companies involved in a case) arise in a particular case, the official is required to report this to
his superior as soon as it becomes known. Appropriate measures can then be taken by the hierarchy,
including if necessary a reallocation of the case to another official.

In terms of insider dealing the code states that ‘officials should never themselves deal, or instruct or advise
in securities on the stock markets on the basis of’sufficiently precise non-public
others to deal,
information‘(expression used in the Belgian Act) which is’liable
the
price‘(expression used in the Belgian Act)’.

significantly to influence

These rules have been implemented since 1999. Whilst there is no specific ‘surveillance list’ or ‘black list’,
all staff have to sign a written declaration that they accept and are willing to apply these specific rules on
conflict of interest and insider dealing as well as the more general security instructions for ‘handling
classified information in DG Comp’. DG Competition requests officials in other DGs who are involved in
merger cases through interservice consultations to sign the same declarations.

According to the internal control standards the Commission has adopted (specifically control standard
number 1 concerning ‘ethics and integrity’), DG Competition has made available several documents to staff
(including the Staff Regulations, Code of good administrative behaviour, Guide to testing for vulnerability
to fraud). These documents, including the ethical code for staff of DG Competition established in 1999
referred to above, are available on the intracom website of DG Competition and hence easily accessible to
all staff of DG Competition.

In addition, DG Competition has developed specific rules and guidelines on assignments and outside
activities of officials and former officials, including when officials apply for ‘Leave on Personal Ground’.

The application of these rules is supervised by the management of the directorates and by the security
officer in DG Competition’s ‘Resources’ Directorate. Moreover, a Deputy Director General has specific
responsibility for matters of security and ethics.

These issues are discussed regularly in management meetings and repeated in communication to staff to
increase staff awareness, ongoing attention and sensitivity. The management of DG Competition has not
discovered any cases of suspected insider dealing, nor has it ever been alerted of any such suspicions by
any stock market authority.

(2004/C 78 E/0163)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2736/03

by Glyn Ford (PSE) to the Commission

(11 September 2003)

Subject: Monkfish quotas

Recent reports say that Cornish fishermen are putting their livelihoods and communities at risk because
they have to throw back large amounts of their catch so as to comply with excessively strict quotas. In the
light of this situation, will the Commission relax the restrictions on the populations of certain species, for
example Monkfish, so as to prevent the loss of large quantities of dead fish that are thrown overboard?