Russia faces Europe.
Date: 2003-08-19
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: East-West relations, European Union, Russia, United States, international affairs, international security

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Chaillot Papers

May 2003

n°60

Russia faces
Europe

Dov Lynch

60-outside cover-ENG.qxd  14/05/2003  15:03  Page 2

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) beca-
me an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European
Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July
2001,  it  is  now  an  integral  part  of  the  new  structures
that  will  support  the  further  development  of  the
CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide
analyses and recommendations that can be of use and
relevance to the formulation of the European security
and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also
acts  as  an  interface  between  European  experts  and 
decision-makers at all levels.

Chaillot  Papers are  monographs  on  topical  questions
written either by a member of the ISS research team or
by  outside  authors  chosen  and  commissioned  by  the
Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a semi-
nar or study group of experts convened by the Institute
and publication indicates that the paper is considered
by the ISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to
the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views
expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Chaillot
Papers are  also  accessible  via  the  Institute’s  Website:
www.iss-eu.org

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Chaillot Papers

May 2003

n°60

A French version is also available

Russia faces Europe

Dov Lynch

Institute for Security Studies
European Union 
Paris

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The author

Dov Lynch
is a Research Fellow at the EU Institute. He received a Doctorate in
International Relations from St Antony’s College, Oxford and was Lecturer in
War Studies at King’s College London prior to joining the Institute. A former
Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, his past
publications include Russian Peacekeeping Strategies towards the CIS (2000), and
Energy in the Caspian Region (2002). 

Institute for Security Studies
European Union 
Paris

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

© EU Institute for Security Studies 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU
Institute for Security Studies.
ISSN 1017-7566
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Alençon (France) by
l’Alençonnaise d’Impressions. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

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Contents

n°60 May 2003

Preface Nicole Gnesotto

Introduction

• Anchoring in troubled seas
(cid:127) Russia and the European Union
(cid:127) Structure of argument

1

2

Drivers of Russian foreign policy

(cid:127) Decision-making concentration
(cid:127) Conceptual consensus: weakness, change and engagement

Strategic directions of alignment

(cid:127) A new quality in Russia-NATO relations
(cid:127) The demise of the OSCE in Russia’s eyes 
(cid:127) The primacy of the UN Security Council
(cid:127) Bilateral links
(cid:127) The Moscow hostage crisis and the Prague summit 

3

Russia and CFSP

(cid:127) Putin’s shift towards the EU
(cid:127) Wide-ranging relations: the Energy Dialogue
(cid:127) The political and security dialogue
(cid:127) Russian views on ESDP: from enthusiasm to realism
(cid:127) The limits of the partnership

4

Proposals for the political and security dialogue

(cid:127) Focus on peace support operations
(cid:127) Joint EU-Russian peace support in Moldova
(cid:127) High-Level Group on Wider Security

5

7

8

16

19

21

21

24

32

33

39

42

44

52

54

54

63

65

72

76

82

86

87

90

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Contents

Conclusions: changing the logic of Euro-Atlantic relations?

94

Annexes

(cid:127) Case study of a joint approach to the Moldovan conflict
— The status quo
— A joint catalyst operation

(cid:127) Abbreviations

(cid:127) Regional maps
— Commonwealth of Independent States - European States
— Moldova
— Russia

96

96

96

100

104

105

105

106

107

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Preface

Nicole Gnesotto

K osovo, 11 September and Iraq: it is in relation to these three crises

that Russia’s foreign policy, and in particular its attitude towards
what is referred to as the ‘Euro-Atlantic community’, has continu-
ously been redefined. Thus, after a period of fairly glacial relations due to the
combined effects of NATO’s enlargement and its intervention in Kosovo, the
11 September attacks against America were to lead to a spectacular rap-
prochement between the Russian and American presidents’ rhetoric, if not
their policies.

For Vladimir Putin, the fight against international terrorism became the
priority that justified a new, pragmatic US-Russian coalition. Former resent-
ment against America - over NATO, the ABM Treaty and National Missile
Defence - was put on hold, while the Russian president reckoned on achieving
substantial benefits regarding Chechnya or Russian entry into the WTO
from his new entente cordiale with America. As for the EU, for Putin it
remained a major economic and trading partner. However, the Europeans’
strategic  weakness,  their  internal  divisions  and  their  haughty  attitude
towards human rights and the crisis in Chechnya hardly made serious dia-
logue with the Union on international security issues an attractive proposi-
tion in Moscow’s eyes. 

In a little over a year, Vladimir Putin therefore deliberately led his coun-
try along a westward path towards cooperation with America. Moreover, he
was the first leader to see 11 September as an historic event that sounded the
death-knell of the Cold War. That strategy of anchoring Russia in the West is
the subject of this Chaillot Paper by Dov Lynch, a new research fellow at the
Institute, who for three years was responsible for Russian studies at King’s
College, London. In addition to analysing the main trends that have changed
the direction of Russian foreign policy under Putin, the author in particular
suggests a number of practical issues - crisis management, Moldova, prolifer-
ation — on which a serious relaunch of strategic cooperation between the
Union and Russia might be based.

Yet might not the war in Iraq confuse the issues once again? How will
Vladimir Putin be able to stick to his strategy of cooperation with the West
when the Euro-Atlantic community has just split into opposing camps over
the handling of proliferation, America’s role in the world and the rules that
the world order should follow?  It is not at all certain that Putin’s Russia has

5

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Preface

reason to congratulate itself on a division between Europe and America that
was the main object of all Soviet leaders. Indeed, it closes off more avenues
than it opens up. How is US-Russia alignment on the fight against terrorism
to be reconciled with the cooling of relations over America’s handling of the
Iraq crisis? How is Russia to be consolidated at home against a background of
growing instability abroad and noticeable divisions within Russia’s big
European  neighbour?  What  is  absolutely  non-negotiable  in  Vladimir
Putin’s strategy of anchoring in the West? These are all open questions.
Whatever happens, for the European Union Russia will remain a partner
that is as necessary as it is difficult to apprehend, so that a renewed security
dialogue between the Union and Russia is all the more urgent. One thing is,
however, out of the question for Europe: an EU-Russian alliance in opposi-
tion to American strategy would be as mistaken as it would be absurd.

Paris, April 2003

6

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Introduction

Russia faces Europe

Developing the partnership with Russia is the most important, the most urgent and
most challenging task that the EU faces at the beginning of the 21st century.

Javier Solana, Stockholm, 13 October 1999

The crisis on Iraq has challenged key features of international rela-
tions. The United States and Britain intervened in Iraq without the
specific support of the United Nations, avoiding a second resolu-
tion in February 2003 precisely because they feared coercive action
would be vetoed. The UN has taken a serious blow and the parame-
ters of international law on self-defence and the use of force are
being redefined by US and British actions. The crisis has also left
the transatlantic relationship in tatters, with the appearance of
serious  divisions  in  Europe  and  inside  the  European  Union.
France, Germany and Russia coordinated their positions against
coercive actions within the UN Security Council, adopting a num-
ber of joint declarations in 2003 on how to strengthen the inspec-
tion regime. With all this, the very notion of the West as it existed in
the Cold War seems under question.

The  divisions  between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  and
within Europe, raise two vital questions for Russia. Is the West fin-
ished as a concept? If so, with which West should Russia seek to
align? First, the divisions are understood in Moscow. They reflect
a confluence of unique, some might say unfortunate, circum-
stances: a vulnerable and powerful America led by neo-conserva-
tive thinkers, the presence of France and Britain in the Security
Council as well as Germany and Spain, a French president no
longer constrained by cohabitation and a populist German leader.
Moreover, the EU faces the double revolution of enlargement and
the Convention on the Future of Europe, both of which give rise to
as much anxiety as excitement in European capitals. Divisions are
to be expected in heady times. Yet these divisions have also objec-
tive foundations that reflect profound changes that have occurred
in the world since the end of the Cold War and after 11 September.
The West is not dead, but it is changing.

7

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Russia faces Europe

In the long term, the emergence of a multipolar West may be
positive for Moscow because it provides Russia with that which it
needs most: options. At the same time, recent events challenge
Putin’s turn to align Russia with the Euro-Atlantic community
launched in 2000: first, by undermining the unity of that commu-
nity, and, second, by placing Russia in a position where it might
have to make a choice between various constituent parts of it. Rus-
sia does not have the luxury of choice; Putin is well aware that
Moscow needs all parts of the West. It is for this reason that Igor
Ivanov stated, at the height of transatlantic tensions, in an article
in the Financial Times on 14 February 2003, “the preservation of a
unified Euro-Atlantic community, with Russia now part of it, is of
immense importance.” Putin’s Russia means it.

Anchoring in troubled seas

When President Vladimir Putin declared before the German Bun-
destag on 25 September 2001 that ‘the Cold War is done with’, he
was not necessarily welcoming this reality.1

The end of an era means the beginning of a new one, raising a
score of questions vital for Russia. What is the nature of the new
system of international relations? What are the new rules of the
game?  How  will  power  and  weakness  be  played  out?  And,  of
course, what role will Russia have?

Always one of Russia’s sharpest analysts, Sergei Karaganov
argued in April 2002 that the world was witnessing ‘the progres-
sive collapse of the international political and strategic systems
that  were  formed  after  the  Second  World  War  and  that  were
canonised in the new level of Russian-American treaties in the
1970s’.2 ‘This process’, he continued, ‘is absolutely inevitable and
is proceeding quite quickly . . . Russia feels uncomfortable in a sit-
uation  where  everything  is  collapsing  and  rapidly  changing
around it.’ 

From the perspective of the start of the twenty-first century,
the 1970s may indeed seem like a heyday of power for Moscow. The
Soviet  Union  was  the  other superpower,  with  global  reach  and
unmatched military strength. The Cold War had become a system
that enshrined the Soviet position in Europe and stabilised the
strategic relationship with the United States. The new Russian
Federation  has  good  reason  to  be  uncomfortable.  Externally, 

1. Daily News Bulletin (DNB), IPD
(IPD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MID), Moscow, 25 September
2001, www.mid.ru.

2. Reported in Nezavisimaya Gazeta
round-table discussion on Russia
and  the  United  States,  8  April
2002.

8

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Introduction

Russia has retreated from Europe, living with borders that had
hitherto never existed and surrounded by weak states. Russia suf-
fers the impact of financial and economic globalisation but with-
out  the  global  influence  it  could  previously  extend.  Russia’s
demoralised armed forces remain embroiled in combat in Chech-
nya. The Russian leadership can only hope for the economy to
reach that of a medium size European state. 

When Putin spoke before the Bundestag, therefore, he did so as

captain of a ship of state buffeted by weakness and uncertainty.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed every-
thing, or so the story goes, and Putin moved to cooperate fully in
the international coalition against terrorism. Certainly, Russia
has cooperated. In 2001, in the Afghan theatre of war, Russia
offered air corridors, shared intelligence with the United States
and the United Kingdom, coordinated its activities with the Cen-
tral Asian states of the former Soviet Union and provided tens of
millions of dollars in military equipment and weapons to the
Northern  Alliance.  The  Russian  government  also  welcomed
(admittedly, with gritted teeth) the deployment of troops in the
Central Asian states and the use of Central Asian air bases by the
United States and its European allies. Closer to Russian borders,
2002 saw the launch of a US Train and Equip programme to sup-
port the development of the Georgian armed forces. 

The scale of Russian movement has been remarkable since 11
September. The changes have marked a shift in Russian policy
away from a previous pursuit of multipolarity that assumed that
Russia was one of the world’s ‘poles’ towards one that seeks Rus-
sia’s  alignment  with  the  Euro-Atlantic  ‘pole’.  Moscow’s  new
approach is founded on a dispassionate recognition of Russia’s
weakness and a determination to concentrate on the revitalisation
of the Russian state. In all the flurry, however, the origins of Russ-
ian shifts have been obscured. 11 September was an accelerator,
not a turning point.

For Moscow, the ‘moment of truth’ occurred in 1999.3 Inter-
nally, Russia’s economy was still recovering from the crash of
August 1998. The crash was financial, but its impact was sys-
temic.4 The collapse of the rouble confirmed for many Russians
the futility of the reform path adopted by the Yeltsin governments
throughout the 1990s. This realisation coincided with the desta-
bilising prospects of approaching presidential elections in 2000.
Moreover, armed Chechen groups had invaded the fragile Russian

3. The phrase was used across the
political spectrum but was espe-
cially  appreciated  by  the  High
Command; see, for example, in-
terview with then Defence Minis-
ter Igor Sergeyev in Krasnaya Zvezda,
25 March 2000.

4. The term is used by Graeme P.
Herd  in  Russian-Baltic  Relations,
1991-1999: Characteristics and
Evolution (Sandhurst: Conflict
Studies Research Centre, RMA
Sandhurst, August 1999).

9

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Russia faces Europe

Republic of Dagestan, raising the prospect of further unravelling
of the North Caucasus. On the international level, 1999 was a
watershed. Operation Allied Force in Kosovo confirmed Russia’s
worst  fears  about  a  deepening  and  enlarging  North  Atlantic
Treaty  Organisation  (NATO).  Moreover,  renewed  conflict  in
Chechnya left Russia isolated in Europe, its voting rights tem-
porarily suspended in the Council of Europe and facing limited
sanctions by the European Union (EU). In Washington, a new US
administration on the verge of power considered Russia not so
much as a partner as a problem to be managed. 

Vladimir Putin drew five conclusions from this catalogue of
failure. Firstly, the world was in flux. The rules of the international
game created after the Second World War and during the Cold
War were disappearing and new ones were being written without
Russia’s involvement. For Russia, NATO actions in Kosovo were
more than bombing raids. They sounded the death knell of the
Cold War as a system, in terms of the importance of international
law and the United Nations (UN) Charter in international affairs
and the primacy of state sovereignty. In addition, the most impor-
tant trends in international relations at the start of the twenty-
first century, in terms of economic and financial globalisation,
European integration or the Revolution in Military Affairs, were
advancing quickly and independently of Russia. Put bluntly, Rus-
sia’s voice in the world no longer carried weight. This situation
might have been acceptable had the world been a friendly place for
Russia. It was not. 

Secondly, the pursuit of multipolarity by the previous Foreign
Minister  and  Prime  Minister,  Yevgeny  Primakov,  left  Russia
stranded in a no-man’s land of international affairs. Primakov’s
insistence on continuing to believe in Russia as a distinct pole,
albeit enfeebled, in the nascent post-Cold War system was shown to
be a case of the emperor’s new clothes. After his appointment in
January 1996, Primakov sought to ensure Russian influence at all
levels  of  security  decision-making  in  Europe,  including  with
NATO.5 Kosovo  shattered  this  policy:  NATO  undertook  an
‘aggressive’ act without due regard to Russia or the UN Charter,
and the OSCE was shown to be useless.6 In the Russian view, Oper-
ation Allied Force not only left Russia on the periphery internation-
ally, it weakened the domestic consensus forged under Primakov
to engage openly in Europe. An article in the main organ of the
Russian  Ministry  of  Defence  (MO),  Krasnaya  Zvezda,  on 

5. See author’s ‘Russia and the
OSCE’, in Mark Webber (ed.),
Russia and Europe: Confrontation or
Co-operation? (London: Macmillan
and St Martin’s Press, 2000); and
‘Walking  the  Tightrope:  The
Kosovo Conflict and Russia in Eu-
ropean Security’, European Security,
Issue 4, Volume 8, 2000.

6. A. V. Grushko, ‘Russia-NATO
Twenty Appears to be Working’,
International Affairs (Moscow), no.
7, 2002, reproduced in the DNB,
IPD, MID., Moscow, 9 July 2002.

7. Colonel General Fyodor Lady-
gin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 May 1999.

10

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Introduction

7 May 1999 was suitably entitled ‘March 24 – We Awoke in a Dif-
ferent World’.7 Russia had to face the reality that it had no influ-
ence and that it was as isolated as Yugoslavia, without allies and
facing a permanent NATO threat.

The third conclusion that Putin drew was that many past for-
eign policies had been a waste of energy, and, even more unpar-
donably, distractions from the primary task of revitalising the
Russian  state.  In  a  speech  to  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign
Affairs (MID) in January 2001, Putin made a point that he has lost
no  opportunity  repeating  since:  Russian  foreign  policy  ‘must
enable us to concentrate efforts and resources as far as possible on
addressing the social and economic tasks of the state’.8 In his view,
Russia had wasted too much energy seeking to block develop-
ments over which it had ultimately little control. Over-zealous
objections to the first wave of NATO enlargement, for example,
produced nothing except further isolation. Putin grasped the dan-
gerous link between internal and external trends facing Russia,
with external isolation reinforcing internal weakness, undermin-
ing the consensus on reform and strengthening radical political
forces. This vicious circle had to be broken. 

Flowing from the domestic focus in state policy, Putin’s fourth
conclusion was the need for a predictable and ‘friendly’ external
environment. This objective required rethinking the order of pri-
orities  in  foreign  policy.  Certain  interests,  whose  pursuit  had
made international relations less predictable, were to be either
moved to the back burner or abandoned altogether. Putin’s choice
has been to opt for greater certainty in international affairs. Igor
Ivanov stressed this point in an interview to Izvestiya on 10 July
2002, when he declared that Russia’s period of uncertainty in for-
eign policy was over: ‘In the early 1990s, we were in a state of
searching and shakiness, unclear whether to be with Europe or
Asia or someone else.’9 The ‘shakiness’ had come to an end, the
foreign minister argued, with Russia now aligned with the West.
Ivanov noted that external threats to Russia arose to the South
and the East and not from the West. 

The final conclusion was the need for pragmatism. As it is
understood in Moscow, pragmatism signifies maintaining for-
eign policy strictly in line with state capabilities. Recognition of
the need for compromise does not necessarily flow from this. Igor
Ivanov described pragmatism as the search for the appropriate
balance between ‘the volume of international obligations of the

8.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
29 January 2001.

9. Izvestiya, 10 July 2002; see dis-
cussion  by  Jeremy  Bransten,
RFE/RL, Prague, 11 July 2002,
htt://www.rferl.org/nca/fea-
tures/2002/07/1107200215465
6.asp.

11

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Russia faces Europe

state and the material resources with which these obligations have
to be provided’. This is seen to dictate a policy of international
engagement: in January 2001, Putin stated ‘our strategic course is
for integration’.10 As a point of principle, Russia has no choice but
to pursue integration: isolation would leave it on the sidelines of
history and without influence over developments that are impor-
tant to Russia’s future. Alignment with Europe and the West, as
the leaders in economic development and tone-setters of globali-
sation, is a particular priority.

Russia’s current leadership draws inspiration from the policy
pursued by Prince Aleksandr M. Gorchakov following Russia’s
Crimean defeat in 1856. Writing in late 1998, Igor Ivanov stated:

The Crimean War left Russia not merely defeated but humiliated:
she was facing nearly all the great empires united against her. The
Russian empire was on the brink of sliding from its Great Power
status into an abyss of a second-rate power. Today, for different rea-
sons, our country is looking into a similar abyss.11

In another article, Ivanov identified two specific principles that
guided Gorchakov: ‘Remove anything that might disturb work in
the area of reform’, and ‘prevent the political equilibrium being
upset during this time to our detriment’.12 These remain guiding
points for contemporary Russian foreign policy. 

Putin’s strategy of alignment, thus, is a response to change, and
the pace of change, in world affairs. In Ivanov’s words, ‘In the new
fast-changing world, experiencing the complex process of forma-
tion of the principles of its future pattern, for contemporary Rus-
sia it is important, perhaps even more than previously, to remain
in the centre of world politics.’13 The lesson drawn from the 1990s
was that isolation was dangerous for two reasons: firstly, it under-
mined the domestic consensus on reform, and, secondly, it closed
down channels of international support to Russia. Instead of seek-
ing to obstruct international developments, in particular those
that were seen as inevitable, Putin proposed tying Russia to them,
in order to avoid being left behind or having to accept imposed
decisions. The solution is seen to lie in Russia’s ‘active participa-
tion in international organisations, and in regional integration
structures and the dynamic evolution of bilateral ties’.14

At the same time, Russian policy remains riddled with ambigu-
ity. The first line of tension concerns the European/American axis.

10.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
29 January 2001.

11. See series of articles under the
title 
‘Honoring  Prince  Gor-
chakov’,  in  International  Affairs
(Moscow), vol. 45, no. 1, 1999,
pp. 154-66; also articles by Pri-
makov  in  International  Affairs
(Moscow), vol. 44, no. 3, 1998;
and Ivanov in International Affairs
(Moscow), vol. 42, no. 2, 1996. It
is  not  coincidental  that  Igor
Ivanov awarded the A. M. Gor-
chakov Commemorative Medal
to Primakov in April 2001 for ‘out-
standing services in strengthening
peace and the promotion of inter-
national cooperation’.

12. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, June
2002, reproduced in DNB, IPD,
MID, Moscow, 28 June 2002.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

12

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Introduction

Soviet  strategy  traditionally  sought  to  drive  a  wedge  between
Western Europe and the United States, in order to best advance
Soviet interests by preventing a united front and by playing one
adversary off against the other. While never dominant in Soviet
policy, wedge-driving was a constant vein in thinking. Following
11 September, serious differences have arisen between the United
States and Europe in terms of interests, ambitions and policies.
This rift has offered Russia the opportunity, if not to choose one
part of the Euro-Atlantic community over the other – something
for which it has neither the desire nor the stomach – then at least
to play off internal divisions to its advantage. All the more so, as
Russia positions itself closer to the United States in the counter-
terrorist struggle than most European states. In the final account,
Russia cannot and will not ignore Europe. However, Moscow is
more than willing to maintain a dose of ambiguity in its strategy. 
A related element of ambiguity concerns the balance between
NATO and ESDP. The Russian government is well aware of the
nascent status of ESDP. Nor can Moscow ignore the reality that
ESDP has secured access to NATO assets, and that there is signifi-
cant overlap between EU and NATO members. However, from a
wedge-driving perspective, ESDP matters for Russia partly also
because it is European and not associated with the United States.
While this view is no longer predominant, it remains a strong cur-
rent of Russian thinking.

Another  line  of  ambiguity  consists  of  the  balance  between
multilateralism and unilateralism in Russian policy. Since the end
of the Cold War, Russia has become a staunch conservative in its
vision of the UN in international peace and security. For Moscow,
the Security Council does more than provide Russia with a veto, it
symbolises the notion of great power multilateralism. The Secu-
rity Council is the last guarantor against diktat (the Russian term)
and unilateral aggression. Given Russia’s extreme weakness, this
function of the UN is vital. 

The surge of American unilateralism is seen to challenge the
primacy of the UN. Russia condemns any attempt to bypass the
Security Council in decisions on the use of force in international
peace and security. At the same time, Moscow sees advantages to
be gained by following in the wake of the United States in rewrit-
ing some of the rules of the international system. Putin’s letter to
the UN and the OSCE on 12 September 2002, threatening Russian
pre-emptive strikes against its southern neighbour Georgia for

13

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Russia faces Europe

harbouring  Chechen  terrorist  groups,  smacked  of  this.  If  the
United States could redefine the notion of self-defence to include
the right of pre-emption, even when not faced with an immediate
threat, then so would Russia. While a staunch supporter of the UN
system, an instinct of unilateralism lurks in Russian thinking. 

Putin’s policy has limits: the aim is not to become a member of
the Euro-Atlantic community or to merge Russia with it, but sim-
ply to align Russia with the most powerful group of states in inter-
national affairs. Russia does not seek membership of NATO or the
EU but the greatest possible advantages of the closest possible
association  with  them.  In  fact,  Moscow  rejects  membership
because this would allow NATO and the EU, and their member
states,  leverage  over  Russia.  Alignment,  thus,  requires  strong
hands at the helm to steer Russia towards association without
moving so close as to become vulnerable to leverage. 

Russia’s strategic alignment has three attributes. Firstly, Russ-
ian policy has an active institutional focus. The United Nations
system resides at the heart of Russia’s vision of post-Cold War
international relations. In contrast to Primakov’s tous azimuths
approach  to  institutions,  however,  Putin  displays  less  institu-
tional fetishism. The OSCE has fallen by the wayside, while the EU
has gained in importance as a potential interlocutor on security
questions. Secondly, bilateral ties with key states have assumed
salience under Putin. In Europe, close relations have developed
with the British and German governments, and later with the
French leadership. Initially faced with an Administration in Wash-
ington  that  proposed  to  neglect  Russia  altogether,  Putin  has
sought to forge close personal ties with George W. Bush. The insti-
tutional and bilateral strands are joined in Russian policy, each
having  specific  significance  in  itself  and  wider  importance  in
influencing the other. The third attribute is its style. From his first
days as prime minister in 1999, Putin has devoted care to image.
After the scandals of the Bank of New York in 1999, which cast
shadows over Russia’s reputation, Putin’s businesslike focus con-
trasts well with the flightiness that sometimes seized Russian
politicians. Primakov turning his aeroplane around in mid-flight
to Washington at the start of the Kosovo crisis was a case in point.
Putin’s  response  to  the  start  of  the  US  Train  and  Equip  pro-
gramme in Georgia was emblematic: ‘This is no tragedy’.15 Putin’s
calm towards seemingly radical shifts serves to downplay their
potentially negative impact on Russian public opinion. His poise

15.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
4 March 2002.

14

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Introduction

also highlights a new system of priorities in foreign policy in which
threats are to be distinguished from risks. 

The terrorist attacks on the United States offered Putin an
opportunity to accelerate Russian alignment. In fact, 11 Septem-
ber left Putin no choice. There were four immediate factors driving
Putin’s address on 24 September announcing cooperation. Firstly,
Putin noted that Russia had been fighting international terrorism
alone throughout the 1990s. It was only natural, therefore, to par-
ticipate in the new phase of the struggle. Secondly, Putin realised
that neutrality would be dangerous. The American response por-
trayed a Manichean world of ‘friendly’ states that participated in
the struggle and ‘unfriendly’ states that did not, with no middle
ground. Neutrality would mean isolation, with all the dangers this
would entail for Russia’s transformation. In any case, Kosovo had
shown that there was little Moscow could do to halt the inevitable. 
Thirdly, ‘international terrorism’ has proved an excellent aide
for Russian purposes. The inherent vagueness of the concept has
provided Russia (and other states) with room to instrumentalise
the ‘war’ for more narrow state interests. Specifically, Russia has
moved to characterise its struggle to restore ‘constitutional order’
in Chechnya as another front in the ‘war.’ While Putin has rejected
George W. Bush’s notion of an ‘axis of evil’, he accepted the broad
point that ‘from the Balkans to the Philippines a certain arc of
instability has emerged’.16

Finally, many Russian analyses noted the paradoxical implica-
tions of 11 September on America. The attacks highlighted the
dramatic vulnerability of the United States, with the rise of new
globalised threats. At the same time, American policies since have
done nothing but underline the country’s unparalleled power.
America’s perception of its own strength was reinforced by the
speed of its success in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
an event that took Russia by surprise.17 These developments have
clarified for Russia one of the main trends in the new era: the world
may be multipolar but there is only one hyperpower. 

Russian  policy  shifts  since  11  September,  therefore,  while
unprecedented in scale, have had clear antecedents in substance.
Putin has sought to exploit the new coalition against interna-
tional  terrorism  as  a  channel  to  align  Russia  with  the  most 
important Euro-Atlantic institutions and with key states. In May
2002, Igor Ivanov stated: ‘After the September 11 events of last
year came a sharp acceleration in the formation of a new system of

16. Interview on Greek television,
Moscow, 5 December 2001, re-
ported 
IPD,  MID,
in  DNB, 
Moscow, 6 December 2001.

17. Alexei Arbatov, Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 26 December 2001.

15

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Russia faces Europe

international relations . . . It is crucial that Russia is not somewhere
on the sidelines of this process but plays an active, initiative-laden
role, relying on its ever broader range of associates and partners.’18
Putin’s foreign policy, thus, reflects a vision of Russia that is both
withstanding the effects of international change and seeking to
catalyse change in directions that sustain Russian power. 

Russia and the European Union

The EU is an important strand in the ‘Putin Doctrine’.19 Looking
across the Continent with a cold eye, Putin has recognised the real-
ity of the EU not as a pole opposed to the United States, as Russian
politicians and analysts often saw it previously, but as a powerful
and  independent  part  of  the  same Euro-Atlantic  community.
Russian policy has started to move away from viewing the EU in
terms that are purely functional to NATO and the United States.
to recognise the EU as an organisation in its own right, with sig-
nificant international impact and posing specific challenges for
Russia.

At the same time, Russian perceptions of the EU are riddled
with ambiguity. The EU is Russia’s main trading partner. Accord-
ing to the EU, the Union accounted for nearly 25 per cent (close to
€20 billion) of Russia’s imports and some 35 per cent (€45 billion)
of Russia’s exports.20 The scale of trade imparts strategic impor-
tance to the EU as a key economic interlocutor for Russia. At the
same time, the relationship is unbalanced, with Russia’s share of
EU external trade in 2000 standing at only 4.4 per cent of imports
and 2.1 per cent of exports.21

With enlargement, the importance of the EU for Russia will rise
to  even  greater  levels,  assuming  around  50  per  cent  of  trade
turnover.  Moscow  is  worried  about  the  implications  of  such
marked dependence. In November 2000, Putin stated: ‘We have no
apprehensions about the expansion of Europe . . . we only think
that this process should not hurt either our relations with present
united Europe or our relations with our traditional partners in
Eastern and Central Europe.’22 In 2002, the negotiations with
Brussels on transit to and from Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, an
exclave of some 900,000 people beyond Russia’s borders and soon

18. ‘Russia’s Potential is Called for
in the World’, Kommersant, May
22, 2002, reproduced in DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 22 May 2002.

19. Many Russian commentators
have used the term; see, for exam-
ple, Sergei Mironov in Izvestiya, no.
97, June 2002, reported in CDI
Russia Weekly, no. 210, 2002.

20. ‘The EU’s Relations with Rus-
sia: EU-Russian Trade’, updated
May  2002,  http://wwww.eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/russia/intro/trade.htm.

21. Ibid.

22. Putin interview with French
media, 23 October 2000, DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 1 November
2000.

16

60-English-Text.qxd  14/05/2003  14:21  Page 17

Introduction

to be surrounded by EU members, Poland and Lithuania, symbol-
ised Russia’s concerns with the distinctly ambiguous effects of
enlargement. After years of seeming neglect, Moscow woke up to
the urgency of the question in 2002, with its statements about vio-
lations of the fundamental human right of freedom of movement
within one’s country (in this case between Kaliningrad and Russia
proper), Brussels’s inability to understand the sharp impact of the
question in Russia and unwillingness to compromise with legiti-
mate Russian concerns. Moscow’s tone was full of high rhetoric –
new ‘walls’ were being erected across Europe – and not a little men-
ace – ‘conclusions’ were going to be drawn by Moscow if Brussels
did not listen. In the end, both parties compromised – Moscow on
substance, Brussels on form – with the Commission’s Communi-
cation in September 2002 on means to ‘facilitate’ transit for Russ-
ian citizens to and from Kaliningrad, paving the way for a Joint
Statement at the EU-Russia summit in November.23

Moreover,  deepening  inside  the  EU  is  seen  by  Russia  as
strengthening the Union as an actor on the international stage.
The lacklustre statement in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of
2000, which said that the ‘EU’s emerging political-military dimen-
sion should become an object of particular attention’, belied an
increasing interest in the EU’s CFSP and ESDP.24 In late 2001,
Putin stated: ‘The point is that all relevant actions [on ESDP]
should be absolutely transparent. These processes are occurring in
Europe regardless of whether Russia wants this or not. We are not
going to hinder these processes or encourage them or spur them
on. But we are ready for cooperation.’25 This statement highlights
the essence of Putin’s approach. Moscow recognises that it does
not control dynamic forces in Europe. In response, it seeks to align
Russia with these forces and not against them.

Further ambiguity lies in the balance between the Russia and
the EU as demandeurs in the relationship. The Russian government
has recognised the potentially powerful and independent role the
EU is acquiring in world affairs. From this conclusion flows Rus-
sia’s insistence on developing close ties. At the same time, Russia
views the EU as needing Russia in order to become a truly great
power. Putin’s speech to the Bundestag in September 2002 carried a
hint of this: ‘However, I simply think that . . . Europe will better
consolidate its reputation as a powerful and really independent

23. Kaliningrad: Transit (Communi-
cation from the Commission to
the Council COM(2002)510Fi-
nal,  Brussels,  18.9.2002),  and
Joint Statement on Transit between the
Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the
(Brussels,
Russian  Federation 
11 November,  2002);  http://
www. europa.eu.int/comm/ex-
ternal_relations/russia/sum-
mit_11_02/js_kalin.htm.

24. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russ-
ian  Federation,  28  June  2000,
www.mid.ru.

25. Press conference with Tony
Blair in Moscow, 21 November
2001, DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
24 November 2001.

17

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Russia faces Europe

centre  of  international  politics  if  it  combines  its  own 
possibilities  with  Russia’s  human,  territorial  and  natural
resources, with Russia’s economic, cultural and defence poten-
tial.’26

Building close relations with the EU is seen to tie Russia more
firmly  into  the  Euro-Atlantic  community.  At  the  same  time, 
relations with the EU are functional to the primary task of internal
revitalisation. This means Russia does not propose to become a
EU member. Putin rejects the constraints such a choice would
impose on domestic policy, not only in the economic sphere but
also towards Chechnya. In January 2001, Putin clearly set out the
limits of Russia’s horizons: ‘We do not at present set [ourselves]
the task of becoming a member of the EU but we must seek to dra-
matically improve the effectiveness of cooperation and its qual-
ity.’27

Russia’s turn to Europe presents the EU with a series of chal-
lenges. Firstly, the EU faces the problem of developing an appro-
priate security relationship with Russia that advances both par-
ties’  interests.  The  difficulty  lies  in  determining  which  are
interests shared by Russia and the EU. The second challenge con-
cerns the EU’s eastward enlargement, a process that has a double
effect on Russia. On the one hand, the EU’s notion of ‘Europe’ will
be brought much closer to Russia. At the same time, Russia will
move further away from Europe in terms of membership of its
most exclusive club. EU enlargement presents Brussels with the
need for an active security relationship with Moscow, as Russia’s
political weight on the EU’s new border is undeniable. The EU will
need to work with Russia in this shared border zone. 

Thirdly, the EU faces the challenge of seizing an opportunity.
Russia remains a prickly partner for Europe, at times confused
and confusing, certainly always defensive. None the less, Putin’s
Russia offers an opportunity to be grasped. Under Putin, the new
Russia, born in the Soviet collapse, has never been so predictable
or so pragmatic in its relations with Europe and the West. With the
EU’s interests moving eastwards, Brussels must exploit the chance
of locking in a tighter security link with Russia. The climate is pro-
pitious for this; it may not remain so. 

26.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
25 September 2001.

27.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
29 January 2001.

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Introduction

Structure of argument

Russia poses both positive and negative challenges to Europe. At
the positive level, Russia matters for the EU as a source of energy,
representing over 15% of fuel provisions. European dependence on
Russian oil and gas will only increase. Moreover, since the end of
the Cold War, Russia has provided added value to European diplo-
macy.  Often,  as  with  the  Russia/EU/US/UN  ‘Quartet’  on  the 
Middle East, Russia’s role is quite passive. Its presence is important
largely because it contributes to the image of international consen-
sus on a particular question. In other crises, Russia has played a
more active part. Moscow’s key role during the Kosovo crisis is a
case in point. At a wider level, Russia may be a major security part-
ner for Europe. In the areas of non-proliferation and combating
organised crime, for example, Russian cooperation brings signifi-
cant added value to European security. 

Russia is also a source of challenges, posing a spectrum of risks
stretching from the humanitarian spillover from conflicts inside
Russian to the use of Russian territory by international criminal
organisations. As noted in the Country Strategy Paper 2000-2006,
drafted by the Commission, ‘soft security threats from Russia are
a serious concern for the EU and require continued engagement –
nuclear safety, the fight against crime, including drug trafficking
and illegal immigration, the spread of disease and environmental
pollution.’28

Three years into the Putin presidency, it is vitally important to
take stock of Russia’s new European policy. This Chaillot Paper
examines Putin’s policy of strategic alignment with key states and
security institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. The heart
of the argument lies in the EU-Russian political dialogue, and
specifically, ESDP.29

The paper is divided into four chapters. The first examines
aspects of decision-making in Moscow and explores further the
conceptual premises driving Putin’s foreign policy. The second
chapter analyses Russian policy towards international institu-
tions, specifically the UN, NATO and the OSCE, as well as key
states, with a view to elucidating the scope of change in Russian

28. Country Strategy Paper 2000-
Indicative  Pro-
2006,  National 
gramme, 2002-2003, Russian Feder-
ation
European
Commission,  27  December
2001).

(Brussels: 

29. The focus of the argument will
not carry on a number of related
topics, some of which have been
extensively analysed, such as the
troubling question of the Russian
Kaliningrad Oblast. See Sander
Huisman, ‘A new EU policy for
Kaliningrad’, Occasional Paper 33
(Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, March 2002).

19

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Russia faces Europe

policy. Russian-EU security relations, indeed, are best understood
as one strand of this wider approach. The third chapter explores
the EU-Russia political dialogue, starting with the relationship
before Putin and finishing with a discussion of the range of chal-
lenges facing the EU-Russia ‘strategic partnership’. Finally, the
paper  looks  at  how  the  EU-Russia  security  dialogue  might  be
taken  further  by  focusing  on  questions  of  concern  to  both 
Brussels and Moscow, such as peace support operations, non-
proliferation and military reform. The final chapter raises also the
need for a high-level institutional mechanism to lead a security
dialogue, which is for the moment dispersed and irregular. In the
Annex a case study of a possible joint EU-Russia approach to the
conflict in Moldova is developed.

20

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Drivers of Russian policy

Russia faces Europe

1

Compared with the Yeltsin era, foreign policy under Putin has
reflected an unprecedented degree of coordination. This ‘concen-
tration’ rests on two pillars.30 The first consists of greater coordi-
nation in decision-making in Moscow. Given the confusion that
characterised  the  Yeltsin  era,  this  is  a  not  insignificant  factor
affecting Russia’s interaction with Europe. The second pillar is a
consensus on the basic premises of foreign policy and the nature
of  international  relations.  The  foundations  of  Russian  policy
must be clarified before discussing its substantive directions. 

Decision-making concentration

Foreign policy under Putin has profited from a strong degree of
decision-making  coordination.  Article  86  of  the  1993  Russian
Constitution enshrines foreign policy as an area of presidential
prerogative.31 This Constitution marked the end of the struggle
for power between the President and the Congress of Peoples’
Deputies. It had little effect, however, on attenuating decision-
making clashes within the executive. Moreover, Yeltsin’s sporadic
attention to foreign policy and increasing bouts of illness left the
system in disarray. Speaking in 1995, Vladimir Averchev, then Sec-
retary of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, stated:

Formally, the president is the focal point of an elaborate network
of units and positions intended to provide information, support
and coordination for making and implementing major security
decisions . . . In practice, this network lacks clarity in terms of
authority, subordination and procedural coordination.32

Russian foreign policy between 1993 and 1996, ending with the
first presidential elections, was characterised by inconsistency.
The MID had been given a coordinating role by Yeltsin but was

30. The notion of ‘concentration’
in Russian foreign policy is a refer-
ence to a well-known statement by
Gorchakov: ‘Russia is neither an-
gry  nor  withdrawing,  Russia  is
concentrating.’

31. http://www.constitution.ru/
index.htm. 

32. Cited in Stephen Blank, The
OSCE’s Code of Conduct and Civil-
Military Relations in Russia (Sand-
hurst: Conflict Studies Research
Centre, RMA Sandhurst (hence-
forth CSRC), November 1995),
p. 6.

21

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1

Russia faces Europe

prevented from assuming this position as a result of three factors:
firstly, the political weakness of the then foreign minister, Andrei
Kozyrev; secondly, episodic attention from the president himself;
and finally, the challenge from the defence ministry (MO) under
Pavel Grachev to lead Russian security policy. By late 1995, the
MID had been largely sidelined to the role of implementing policy
rather than formulating it.33

Yevgeny Primakov’s appointment as foreign minister in 1996
marked a shift towards greater coordination and consistency. A
well-respected and long-experienced politician, Primakov quickly
gained support from across the political spectrum for a policy of
engagement. His appointment also coincided with the dismissal
of Grachev and the withdrawal of the MO from active involvement
in foreign policy. Reeling from the first war in Chechnya, the MO
turned to housekeeping and the task of military reform. In these
circumstances, Primakov moved to establish the MID as the cen-
tral player. 

Russian foreign policy stagnated in the period between the
1998 crash and the presidential elections in 2000. Since then, how-
ever, Vladimir Putin has lent unparalleled consistency to decision-
making. For the first time, foreign policy has become truly presi-
dential. In the words of one Russian analyst: ‘The question about
the driving force of Russia’s policy mostly boils down to Putin’s
personal motivations and purposes.’34 The President has assumed
a unique degree of control, leading from the front in all of Russia’s
foreign policy changes of direction since 2000. The decision to
provide  support  to  the  United  States  following  the  terrorist
attacks of 11 September was taken by Putin himself with a small
group of advisers in the Presidential Administration and a few
trusted ministers.35 In crisis moments, Putin has shied away from
making use of such decision-making bodies as Russia’s Security
Council, preferring to build a consensus with a smaller and tighter
group rather than in a much larger and formal setting. 

Foreign policy has reflected the general pattern of personnel
policy under Putin, bringing together a mixture of former Yeltsin
officials and close associates of the President from St Petersburg
and the power structures, especially the secret services.36 Former
Secretary of the Security Council and current Defence Minister,
Sergei Ivanov, combines both of these latter attributes. On the
basis of a close personal relationship with Putin, Sergei Ivanov ini-
tially bolstered the role of the Security Council.37 Putin’s past

33. For a more full discussion, see
the author’s Russian Peacekeeping
Strategies towards the CIS (London:
Palgrave in association with the
RIIA, 2000).

34. Dmitry Glinsky-Vasliyev, from
IMEMO, ‘The Myth of the New
Détente: The Roots of Putin’s Pro-
US Policy’, PONARS Policy Memo
no. 239, December 2001, p. 2.

35. On the role of these two bod-
ies,  see  Mark  A.  Smith,  Putin’s
Power Bases (Sandhurst:  CSRC,
June 2001).

36. See Gregory Feifer, ‘Putin’s
Foreign Policy as a Private Affair’,
Moscow Times, 12 April 2002.

37. See Sergei Ivanov interview on
the role of the Security Council,
DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow, 29 No-
vember 2000; and Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 29 November 2000.

22

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Drivers of Russian policy 

1

experience as Secretary of the Security Council also strengthened
its role in policy formulation and decision-making.38 Then, in
March  2001,  Putin  reshuffled  the  Government,  transferring
Ivanov to the MO and Vladimir Rushalio to the Security Council.
The central position of the Security Council has weakened as a
result. 

Russian policy towards the EU has followed a similar trend.
Putin has played a prominent role during the twice-yearly Russia-
EU summits. He has also used his personal ties with other Euro-
pean leaders to advance Russia’s case on EU questions. Given the
technical nature of much Russia-EU interaction, Putin has also
sought a greater role for the Russian government, exemplified in
his creation of a Russian Inter-Ministerial Commission for Coop-
eration with the EU in 2000, directed by Deputy Prime Minister,
Viktor Khristenko.39

Russian foreign policy has not been exempt from inconsis-
tency. Since his appointment as Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov
has made quite a few statements which have seemed to counter the
more moderate views put forth by the President. Ivanov, para-
chuted into the MO, may be adopting such positions in order to
strengthen his position with the Russian High Command, an
unreservedly conservative institution. Some of these ‘differences’,
however,  may  be  more  wilful  than  not.  Sergei  Karaganov  has
argued: ‘Eighty per cent of such cases reflect a policy of good cop-
bad cop. The rest are the result of incompetence.’40

However controlled the differences may be, Putin has acquired
an unprecedented degree of autonomy in foreign policy. Dmitry
Trenin has argued that several factors underpin his control.41
Firstly, Putin’s approval ratings have remained consistently high,
providing him with a cushion of comfort. Also, foreign policy
issues only temporarily impinge as vital issues of the day for the
Russian public. Putin has also sought greater control over Russia’s
television and press, decreasing the power of the so-called ‘oli-
garchs’. In addition, Putin’s policies have received substantial sup-
port from segments of Russia’s business elite. Finally, no substan-
tial foreign policy alternative to Putin’s foreign policy has been
articulated. This does not mean that there is no opposition to
Putin’s course; simply, the opposition has no significant alterna-
tive vision or figure around which to organise.42

These circumstances do not mean that Putin is invulnerable.
Quite the contrary: leading from the front, Putin has tied his fate

38.  See  discussion  in  Carolina
Vendil, ‘The Russia Security Coun-
cil’, European Security, vol. 10, no. 2,
Summer 2001, pp. 67-94.

39. For further details, see Decree
804, DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
12 October 2000.

40.  Cited  by  Gregory  Feifer,
Moscow Times, 12 April 2002.

41. Dmitry Trenin, ‘Putin’s “New
Course” is Now Firmly Set: What
Next?’ Moscow Carnegie Center Brief-
ing, Issue 6, June 2002.

42. Dmitry Furman of the Institute
of Europe argued more strongly
that there was no ‘substantial and
open  opposition  to  the  new
course among the political estab-
lishment’ in ‘Putin’s Doctrine’,
Vremya MN, 25 July 2002, repro-
duced  in  Johnson’s  Russia  List,
no. 6370, 2002.

23

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1

Russia faces Europe

to the policies undertaken. Moreover, as Trenin has noted, Rus-
sia’s vast bureaucracy, and especially the MID, remains a largely
sullen obstacle to reform. None the less, this is a unique moment
in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy.

Conceptual consensus: weakness, change and engagement

The conceptual consensus behind Russian foreign policy consists
of three points. Firstly, policy is driven by recognition of weakness.
The Russian Federation is not without a number of areas of resid-
ual strength that allow it to retain a degree of influence over devel-
opments in international affairs. At the most basic level, Russia’s
geographic size imparts to Moscow if not the ability then at least
the right to voice its opinion on European, Caucasian, Central
Asian  and  Asian  affairs.  Most  prominently,  Russia  remains  a
resource-rich country, even briefly becoming the world’s first oil
producer in 2003. With rising instability in the Middle East and
consequent shifts in American thinking, energy resources provide
Russia with a long-term and stable venue of profit as well as influ-
ence in a critically important area of the international political
economy. In military terms, Russia inherited the poisoned chalice
of  the  massive  Soviet  military  and  military-industrial  system.
While this has largely collapsed and atomised as a sector, there are
areas where Russian equipment remain highly competitive. Of
course, Russia inherited the USSR’s stockpile of tactical and strate-
gic nuclear weapons, an inheritance that has become less impor-
tant in purely military/deterrence terms and more important in
political terms as justification for quasi-permanent discussions
with the United States. In addition, Russia retains forward military
positions throughout the former Soviet Union, which provide it
with elements of strategic early warning and power projection at
least in its immediate geographical vicinity.

These residual traits of strength are not insignificant. However,
the reality of the last decade is that of extreme weakness, internally
and externally. Even more important than this reality is the per-
ception of it. Throughout much of the 1990s, Russia vacillated
between recognising weakness and acting accordingly (sometimes
abjectly), and ignoring it in gestures of bluff and bluster. This has
changed under Putin.

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Drivers of Russian policy 

1

The ‘National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,’
approved in December 1999, marked a key step in Russian think-
ing. Previous official documents and thinking took note of the
internal problems facing Russia but were dedicated to exploring
the range of external threats. The 1999 Concept was blunt about
the real nature of threat. A decade of inconclusive reform, the doc-
ument argued, had resulted in ‘inadequate organisation of state
power and civil society, socio-political polarisation of Russian
society . . . the weakening of the system of state regulation and con-
trol, an inadequate legal base and the absence of a strong state pol-
icy in the social sphere.’43 At the start of the twenty-first century,
Russia faced a multilevel social, economic, demographic/health
and political crisis. In response, the Concept insisted that the
main  task  was  the  pursuit  of  ‘economic  revival’,  which  would
occur by strengthening the state in regulating the economy and
society and restoring a powerful constitutional regime across the
Russian Federation. Vladimir Rushailo, Secretary of the Russian
Security Council, made the point clear: ‘We can’t overlook external
threats; they demand close attention. But counteracting internal
threats undoubtedly takes priority.’44

In response, Putin has concentrated on strengthening the state
as the centre of gravity of Russian reform. Putin’s emphasis on cre-
ating a ‘dictatorship of law’, a feature of his election campaign in
2000, is best understood as a centralising, statist reflex. The cre-
ation of seven federal districts in May 2000, layered above the
republic/region system and staffed mainly by former members of
the ‘power’ ministries, is another case in point. Putin inherited a
weak state which was characterised by enfeebled federalism with
varying levels of autonomy that undermined Russia as a unified
space and rendered the conduct of reform difficult. 

Chechnya brought all of these problems together. The incur-
sions of Chechen groups into Dagestan in August 1999, followed
by a series of bombs laid in Russian cities, were striking signals of
weakness. In Russian security thinking, the North Caucasus is
linked with the rest of the country in a tightly woven ‘security com-
plex’. A further weakening of central power in that region, there-
fore, would echo throughout the entire Federation. In Putin’s
view, the Chechen problem could no longer be contained. It had to
be uprooted and destroyed, and the price paid in so doing would
not be more than the threat that separatist Chechnya posed to the

43. ‘National Security Concept of
the Russian Federation,’ Decree
no. 1300 of 17 December 1999;
Rossiskaya  Gazeta,  18  January
2000.

44. Interview in Izvestiya, 21 July
2001.

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Russia faces Europe

Russian state. In Putin’s words: ‘If we retreat today, they will come
back tomorrow . . . By localising the conflict, we will drive them
into caves. That is exactly where they belong. And we will destroy
them in those caves.’45 The second Chechen war was more than a
ticket for Putin to win the presidential elections in March 2000.
The Russian Federation had never looked so weak as it did in
August 1999; for Putin, Russia’s rebirth was to start in Chechnya
In parallel, Putin has launched a wider reform programme,
encompassing reform of the federal system, simplification of the
tax code, measures to ease the return of billions of dollars from
abroad, as well as some movement on land ownership and the
labour code.46 Military reform has been an important, if disap-
pointing, plank of Putin’s programme. Although it remains confi-
dential, its main lines are clear. The plan focuses on the profes-
sionalisation of the armed forces by 2010, a switch to simply three
services (ground, air and naval forces) with the reorganisation of
the Strategic Rocket Forces and emphasis on strengthening the
Ground Forces, and reform of the military district system.47 More
broadly, Putin has set the strategic objective of accelerating Rus-
sia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).48

The Russian economy recovered quickly after the 1998 col-
lapse, and Russia has since achieved sustained growth rates. How-
ever, much of the recovery has been driven by import substitution
resulting from a weak rouble and high energy exports. The Russ-
ian economy remains perilously fragile, with falling growth rates
in 2002. Moreover, significant obstacles remain before accession
to the WTO, including reform of the banking sector and the ques-
tion of intellectual property rights. The main repayment period
for Russia’s debt to the Paris Club ($36 billion) lies between 2003
and 2005, marking these as the heaviest years. On top of these
immediate concerns, long-term structural weaknesses have not
disappeared. 

The Russian leadership is vulnerable and fearful. Putin’s first

Address to the Nation was illuminating in its honesty:

For  several  years  now  the  population  of  the  country  has  been
diminishing by an average of 750,000 a year. To believe forecasts –
and they are based on the real work of those who know what they
are doing and have devoted their life to this research – the popula-
tion of Russia could dwindle by 22 million in 15 years. Please, think
about it. A seventh part of the national population. If the current

45. Interview in Vremya MN, re-
ported by Federal News Service,
27 September 1999, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts (SU), SU/3651,
B/1-3.

46. For a succinct summary, see
Nikolai Petrov, ‘Politicization ver-
sus Democratization: 20 Months
of  Putin’s  “Federal”  Reform’,
PONARS  Policy  Memo no.  241,
25 January 2002.

47. See, for example, the interview
with  Sergei  Ivanov  in  Krasnaya
Zvezda, 10 August 2001, repro-
duced 
IPD,  MID,
in  DNB, 
Moscow, 10 August 2001.

48.  See  discussion  in  Randall
Stone,  ‘Russia  and  the  World
Trade  Organization’,  PONARS
Policy Memo no. 233, 25 January
2002.

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Drivers of Russian policy 

1

trend persists, the nation’s survival will be threatened. We are fac-
ing a real threat of becoming an ageing nation . . . Another serious
and persisting problem is the economic weakness of Russia. The
growing gap between industrialised countries and Russia is push-
ing us into the ranks of Third World countries.49

Putin has lost few opportunities since of reiterating that the
main task of state policy is ‘to ensure economic growth and higher
living standards’.50 The corollary of this, according to Putin, fol-
lows logically: ‘One cannot achieve it [growth] without creating a
favourable political environment around Russia.’ It is interesting
to note that Putin has evoked de Gaulle and Erhard as ‘models’ of
statesmanship, and as leaders who, in his view, dedicated them-
selves to getting their country ‘back on its feet.’51 Weakness is the
fundamental factor conditioning Russian policy.

The second point of consensus is that, despite all earlier decla-
rations, the Cold War came to an end in 1999 with NATO’s actions
in Kosovo. The Cold War, as a system regulated by certain rules of
behaviour and codes of interaction between states, was shattered.
In Moscow’s view, the air campaign undermined respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the limitations
on the use of force which lie at the heart of the UN Charter. NATO
operations also undermined the post-1989 consensus on the need
to forge consensus in the Security Council on important issues of
peace and security. NATO actions left ‘lying in ruins the founda-
tions of international law and political trust which seemed so firm
only yesterday’.52

Left standing amidst the rubble are certain realities of a nas-
cent system. The first is the rise of the United States as the ‘new
goliath’.53

In a typically dialectic vision, the Russian leadership has con-
cluded that international affairs are caught between two trends,
the first characterised by the rise of US unipolarity and the second
featuring the existence of multiple poles of power in the world. 

The  ‘Foreign  Policy  Concept  of  the  Russian  Federation’,
approved by Putin shortly after his election in 2000, was unequiv-
ocal. A new challenge to Russia, the Concept noted, was ‘a growing
trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the
world with the economic and power domination of the United
States’.54 The Concept drew attention to the emergence of danger-
ous  new  concepts  that  belittle  the  role  of  the  sovereign  state,

49. Reproduced by RIA Novosti,
8 July 2000. According to the CIA
World  Factbook  2002,  life  ex-
pectancy for Russian women was
approximately 72 years, while for
men 
fallen  to  62;
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/geos/rs.html#Pe
ople. 

it  had 

50.  See  Putin  statement  on
Reuters report, 17 April 2002, re-
produced on Johnson’s Russia List,
no. 6173, 2002.

51. Interview with The Wall Street
Journal, 11 February 2002.

52.  See  Aleksandr  Matveyev,
‘Washington’s Claims to World
Leadership’, International Affairs
(Moscow), no, 5, 1999.

53. Ibid.

54. ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of
the Russian Federation’, 28 June
2000, www.mid.ru (source for all
subsequent citations).

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Russia faces Europe

undermine the norm of non-intervention in the affairs of other
states  and  violate  the  UN  Charter.  The  Concept  was  blunt:
‘Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such con-
cepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” in
order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the UN Secu-
rity Council are not acceptable.’ According to Ivanov, the concept
of humanitarian intervention was illegal, dreamt up to provide a
veneer  of  legitimacy  to  blatant  violations  of  international
norms.55

Russia’s isolation during the Kosovo crisis magnified the wider
reality that Russia stood on the sidelines of international affairs.
The Revolution in Military Affairs, economic and financial glob-
alisation, the increasing role played by international economic
and  financial  institutions,  deepening  regional  integration
processes – Russia was not subject but object to these trends. In his
book The New Russian Diplomacy, Igor Ivanov argued that ‘the inter-
national community has crossed the threshold into a new millen-
nium on the wave of a veritable explosion that is transforming all
facets of life and human endeavour . . . In the area of international
relations we now seem more akin to the Ancient Mariner sailing
forth to discover new lands.’56 The future was full of uncertainty:
‘We still do not have a clear idea what will be the security model on
our continent in ten to fifteen years.’57 This uncertainty combined
with a sense of lack of control to produce deep anxiety in Moscow. 
Not only were global trends occurring independently of Rus-
sia, they were impacting negatively on Russia. The 2000 Foreign
Policy  Concept  noted:  ‘Along  with  additional  possibilities  for
socio-economic progress, the expansion of human contacts, this
tendency gives rise to new dangers, especially for economically
weak states, and increases the probability of large-scale financial
and economic crises.’ Russia’s internal weaknesses exacerbated its
vulnerability to the negative effects of globalisation. The financial
collapse of 1998 and the subsequent economic meltdown were
seen to result from this dilemma. Clearly, Russia’s voice no longer
carried in the world. 

Thus, on the eve of the presidential elections in 2000, Russia
was caught in a cycle of overlapping internal and external trends.
Russia’s domestic problems weakened its ability to channel posi-
tively the effects of globalisation and to promote Russian interests

55. See, for example, article by
Ivanov in Nezavisimaya Gazeta Diplo-
matic Courier, no. 5, March 2000,
reproduced in FSU 15 Nations: Pol-
icy and Security, March 2000, p. 23.

56. I. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplo-
macy (Washington DC: The Nixon
Center and Brookings Institute
Press, 2002), p. 5.

57. Speech to the Russian Interna-
tional  Studies  Association,
20 April 2001, reported in DNB,
IPD,  MID,  Moscow,  23  April
2001.

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Drivers of Russian policy 

1

on the international stage. In turn, Russia’s international isola-
tion exacerbated its internal problems. Putin inherited a state that
was spiralling towards catastrophe. 

As Igor Ivanov noted, the process of globalisation could not be
‘outlawed’ by Russia, nor could Russia ‘alter its strategic course
towards  economic  openness  and  full  integration’.58 However,
Russia was to seek to ‘lend civility’ to these external trends. This
required Russia to align itself into the major regional and interna-
tional  organisations,  and  most  importantly  with  the  Euro-
Atlantic community. The third basic premise in Russian foreign
policy is that only engagement would allow Russia to develop an
international  climate  favourable  to  the  pursuit  of  domestic
reform. The overall aim is to pull Russia out of a limbo in interna-
tional affairs. In the words of Sergei Karaganov, Putin’s foreign
policy seeks to ‘enable Russia to get out of the no-man’s land it
found itself in after the Cold War as a semi-partner semi-enemy of
the  West.’59 In  2000,  Russia  stood  on  the  periphery  of  world
affairs, with few allies, little sympathy and dwindling sources of
support. In response, as Putin argued: ‘From a country that used
to be an antagonist or enemy of most of the world’s industrialised
nations, Russian should become a partner.’60

Much Russian expert analysis has argued that Russian inter-
ests coincide largely with those of the West, whereas the main
threats originate from the south and the east.61 The essence of this
policy  is  not  pro-Western;  it  is  pro-Russian.  Many  in  Moscow
understand that solutions to the threats facing Russia can to be
found only in an association with the West. Vyacheslav Nikonov,
writing in 2001, made a clear distinction between a pro-Western
choice for Russia and a pro-integrationist one.62 In his view, ‘Rus-
sia will not become the West, but there is no need for it to become
anti-West or an island in the world ocean.’ As he saw it, Russia had
to pursue revival through the most ‘maximally possible and realis-
tic integration’ with the Euro-Atlantic institutions and interna-
tional organisations. 

The essence of Russian policy under Putin, therefore, has little
to do with Kozyrev’s pursuit of pro-Westernism in the early 1990s,
where Russia was to merge into the Western ‘family of civilised
countries’. Current policy has a much sharper edge. Russian dif-
ferences with the West have not disappeared. Simply, Putin has

58. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplo-
macy, op. cit., p. 58.

59. Interview by Yelena Aleksan-
drovna in Parlamentskaya Gazeta,
12 March 2002.

60.  Putin  Press  Conference,
24 June 2002; DNB, IPD, MID,
Moscow, 25 June 2002.

61. See, for example, International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 4, 2000,
and V. N. Tsygichko, ‘Russia’s Na-
tional Security Interests in the 21st
Century, ‘Voennaya Mysl’, March,
2001.

62. ‘Towards Russia’s National
Revival’, 
International  Affairs
(Moscow), no. 4, 2001.

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Russia faces Europe

decided that they are best resolved with Russia comfortably inside
the tent rather than with one foot jammed in the doorway. Rus-
sia’s changes in foreign policy since 11 September, therefore, are
based on calculations of priority and interest, where risk is distin-
guished from threat and real needs are separated from false ambi-
tions.

However, with its vital interests tied to internal developments,
Russia can in particular be expected to vehemently pursue foreign
policy issues that are linked to economic reform, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. For example, the second war in Chechnya
quickly became a sore point in Russia-Western relations. However,
Putin has displayed no inclination to compromise in the face of
international concerns. The pursuit of external alignment is over-
ridden when domestic requirements are perceived as more impor-
tant. In this sense, the ‘pragmatism’ pursued by Putin is not based
on compromise but calculation. The objective of international
integration flows from the goal of internal consolidation, and not
vice versa. Putin has recognised also that there are limits to Rus-
sia’s alignment with the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia has no
intention of joining the EU over the medium term. This policy
reflects recognition of the impossibility of accession any time
soon and the desire to avoid wasting energy on even pretending to
try. It also highlights Putin’s desire to allow the EU little leverage
over  the  conduct  of  Russia’s  domestic  reforms.  Sovereignty  is
paramount. 

In April 2001, Igor Ivanov admitted that ‘we [Russia] still do
not have a clear idea of what will be the security model on our con-
tinent in ten to fifteen years.’63 11 September made the picture
even more blurred. However, the government is aware that Russia
is  profoundly  weak  and  is  likely  to  weaken  further  before  it
becomes stronger. Russia’s strategy of alignment is presaged on
the fear and caution stemming from this premise. Put simply, Rus-
sia has to align itself now to main states and institutions of the
Euro-Atlantic community (although not exclusively) in order to
avoid isolation, increase Russia’s voice and promote international
support for Russian reform. In essence, Russia’s minimal foreign
policy objectives are defined negatively: not to be afflicted by inter-
national developments, not to be isolated on the margins of wider
trends and not to pursue external ‘adventures’ that might threaten
internal reform. 

63 Speech to the Russian Interna-
tional  Studies  Association,
20 April 2001, reported on DNB,
IPD,  MID,  Moscow,  23  April
2001.

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Drivers of Russian policy 

1

The 1990s had shown a Russia swept away by international and
domestic  change.  Putin’s  gamble  since  2000  has  been  that  of
embedding Russia into key bilateral relations and international
institutions in order to gain some influence over their develop-
ment. As a result, a window of opportunity has opened for Europe
to lock into tighter security relations with Moscow.

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Russia faces Europe

2

Strategic directions of
alignment

Before  the  Kosovo  crisis,  Russian  policy  to  European  security
rested on three pillars. First, Russia sought a partnership with
NATO to secure some voice inside the Alliance. The ‘Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO
and the Russian Federation’, signed on 27 May 1997, provided for
the creation of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) between Russia
and NATO ‘to develop common approaches to European security
and to political problems’.64 The forum was to engage in three
types of activities.65 Firstly, the PJC was to allow consultation on
any agreed issue. Secondly, it could develop ‘joint initiatives’ on
specific issues between the parties. Finally, on issues where there
was agreement, the PJC could take joint decisions and undertake
actions. Russia seized upon the Founding Act as recognition of
Russian equality in European security. While falling far short of
this, Russian-NATO relations did quickly improve. The Russian
MO participated in a number of Partnership for Peace (PfP) exer-
cises, and the PJC started work on a wide programme, stretching
from discussion of peacekeeping doctrines to military reform.

The second pillar focused on the OSCE. Having abandoned
earlier ambitions of setting the OSCE at the apex of Europe’s secu-
rity institutions, Russia still sought to use the organisation to cod-
ify  legally  the  status  quo  in  Europe  and  prevent  NATO  from
becoming its main axis.66 For Moscow, the OSCE was the forum to
elaborate ‘modalities of cooperation’ between security organisa-
tions and create a network of equal institutions in Europe.67 Com-
bined with ties between Russia and NATO, the OSCE was to for-
malise rules of the game in which Russia would have a ‘special’ as
well as an ‘equal’ voice.68 As the crisis in Kosovo gathered pace in
1998, Moscow sought to use the crisis to enshrine a central posi-
tion for the OSCE.

The third strand was the UN Security Council. In Europe, Rus-
sia sought to use Security Council primacy to constrain NATO
decision-making on the use of force in Kosovo and other areas

64. ‘Founding Act on Mutual Re-
lations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian
Federation’, Paris, 27 May 1997.

65 See discussion in Myron H.
Nordquist, ‘The Framework in
the Founding Act for NATO-Rus-
sia Joint Peacekeeping Opera-
tions’,  in  Michael  N.  Schmitt
(ed.), ‘The Law of Military Oper-
ations’, International Law Studies,
vol. 72 (Rhode Island: Naval war
College Press, 1998), pp. 129-56.

66. See author’s ‘Russia and the
OSCE’, in Mark Webber (ed.),
Russia and Europe: Cooperation or
Confrontation?
(Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2000). The following
section draws from the argument
developed in that chapter.

67 See ‘Speech by Y. M. Primakov
to Meeting of Council of Ministers
in  Copenhagen,  18  December,
1997’, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, no.
1, 1998, p. 25.

68. See author’s ‘Russia and the
OSCE’, op. cit.

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Strategic directions of alignment

2

beyond the Alliance’s remit. Russia feared that a NATO operation
would set a precedent for more out-of-area activities that might
undermine Russia’s strategic interests. 

Operation  Allied Force marked  the  collapse  of  this  strategy.
Moscow suspended its ties to NATO. An attempt to mobilise the
UN Security Council in late March 1999 against the NATO opera-
tion  left  Russia  isolated.69 Russia’s  prized  organisation,  the
OSCE, was discredited. Russia’s initial reactions seemed to indi-
cate a radical shift away from partnership with the West. The MO
pledged  to  take  appropriate  ‘counter-measures,’  including  a
review of the reduction programme of the armed forces and Mili-
tary Doctrine.70 However, despite all the heated rhetoric and the
dash to Pristina airport in June 1999 by airborne troops, Russia
did not shift towards aggressive isolation. Russia’s role in mediat-
ing with Yugoslavia and its participation in the KFOR operation
were signals of a desire to remain positively engaged in Europe. 

The following sections examine the main directions of Russian
policy  towards  European  security  following  Kosovo.  Putin
launched Russia’s active engagement with key states and institu-
tions of the Euro-Atlantic community before 11 September. The
terrorist attacks accelerated this policy and altered the context in
which it is being pursued.

A new quality in Russia-NATO relations

Russian policy towards NATO following Kosovo has been marked
by three distinct periods. The first ended with Putin’s invitation of
Secretary-General George Robertson to Moscow in February 2000.
Before this, Russian ties with the Alliance lay frozen, limited only to
questions relating to SFOR and KFOR. Discussions in the PJC
focused solely on operational issues. Robertson’s visit to Moscow
marked the start of the second period, which lasted until 11 Sep-
tember 2001, during which Putin moved to restore formal ties with
the Alliance across the board. There were several dimensions to
Russian policy towards NATO during this second period.

In December 2000, Igor Ivanov made the point bluntly: ‘There
is a reality in Europe. The reality of NATO.’71 As developed by
Vladimir Baranovsky, this reality consisted of the fact that the
Alliance, far from becoming a political organisation as Moscow
wished, was undergoing a triple expansion in terms of function,

69.  See  interview  with  Sergei
Lavrov  in  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,
30 March 1999.

70.  See  Sergeyev, 
Interfax,
31 March 1999, SU/3498, B/3
and  Itar  Tass,  7  April  1999,
SU/3504, B/7-8.

71.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
18 December 2000.

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Russia faces Europe

membership and zone of responsibility.72 This thinking led Putin
to restore full-scale relations with NATO following Robertson’s
visit. NATO and Russia agreed on a work programme for the PJC
on a scale similar to the situation prior to the Kosovo crisis, with
topics ranging from the Balkans and nuclear questions to search-
and-rescue  cooperation.73 Moreover,  Igor  Ivanov  and  Igor
Sergeyev resumed participation in the foreign and defence minis-
ters’ meetings. Russia retook its place in the Euro-Atlantic Part-
nership Council in May 2000. 

However, the intensity of relations remained low. In April 2001,
Deputy  Foreign  Minister  Yevgeny  Gusarov  explained  Russia’s
enduring fears: ‘What makes NATO expansion plans dangerous is
that the future system of European security may boil down to a
schema with NATO at its centre. We do not deny NATO should
take a worthy place in the future system of European security. But
we do not consider the Alliance as the only deciding factor in the
creation of such a system.’74 In this respect, the MID never aban-
doned previous ambitions of using the PJC to influence develop-
ments within the Alliance. Indeed, a Russian statement, issued in
December 2000, called on the PJC to ‘move from an exchange of
information, views and assessments to the elaboration and adop-
tion of joint decisions on key aspects of the military-political com-
ponent of European security.’75

While recognising the ‘reality’ of the Alliance, the Government
realised that too much time and energy had been devoted to it in
the past. Put bluntly, the triple expansion of NATO was not seen to
pose a vital threat to Russia, nor was the Alliance seen to impact
negatively on genuine threats. In terms of the priorities being set
then by Vladimir Putin, relations with NATO were secondary. This
view explains Putin’s rhetorical coup as acting president, when he
answered a question from a British journalist about Russia joining
NATO with a nonchalant ‘why not?’.76 Putin sought to deflate the
importance that NATO had in domestic politics and foreign pol-
icy. As Sergei Karaganov put it: ‘For a certain time, all Russia’s
European policies and foreign policy [were] focused on this issue
alone, so Russian government foreign political resources were
diverted from many other issues, some of which were much more
relevant.’77 This had to change.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September altered the context of
Russian-NATO  relations.  The  global  war  on  terrorism  has
emerged  as  a  bridge  between  Russia  and  NATO,  where  both 

72. See ‘Russia’s View’, in François
Heisbourg (ed.) ‘NATO Enlarge-
ment’, ESF Working Paper no. 3, July
2001, pp. 9-15.

73. George Robertson, ‘Principles
for NATO-Russia Relations’, pub-
lished  in  Military  Parade,  May
2000, as well as PJC Statement,
Florence,  24  May  2000,
www.nato.int 

74. Speech reproduced on DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow,6 April 2001.

75. ‘A Propos the PJC,’ DNB, IPD,
MID,  Moscow,  13  December
2000.

76.  See,  for  example,  Dmitry
Gornostayev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
7 March 2000.

77. Interview in Vek, no. 26, 6 July
2001, p. 4, reproduced in FSU, Fif-
teen  Nations:  Policy  and  Security,
no. 7, July 2001, pp. 14-15.

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Strategic directions of alignment

2

parties are demandeurs and each can provide added value to the
security needs of the other. This common cause has inspired Russ-
ian and NATO officials to rhetorical heights. Speaking in Vol-
gograd (not coincidentally, the former Stalingrad, destroyed in
the Second World War), George Robertson stated that ‘like fas-
cism sixty years ago international terrorism can only be defeated
by a coalition of like-minded countries working together.’78 More
practically, the PJC issued a statement a few days after the terrorist
attacks that pledged increased cooperation in the fight against
international terrorism. By 2002, this cooperation had expanded
to include the regular exchange of information and consultation
on non-proliferation as well as civil emergency planning.79

The  development  of  substantive  cooperation  in  the  fight
against terrorism ran parallel to negotiations on deepening the
institutional relationship between Russia and NATO. On this
question,  Moscow  found  itself  in  the  rather  novel  position  as
receveur. Launched by Tony Blair and others soon after 11 Septem-
ber, the idea of a new institutional mechanism for Russia-NATO
cooperation was quick to gather pace. During the November sum-
mit in the United States, Putin and Bush issued a joint statement
that called for the creation of a ‘new effective mechanism for con-
sultation,  cooperation,  joint  decision  and  coordinated/joint
action’.80 While the PJC in early December issued a similar state-
ment, negotiations on the new council (briefly and memorably
known as ‘RNAC’, too close for comfort to the French slang term
arnaque – a rip-off) were slowed down by the US administration.
Conservative minds in Washington, in agreement with a number
of NATO members, indeed, sought to ensure that, in all the haste
to forge a new relationship, Moscow was not given a veto on the
autonomy of the Alliance. 

In the final account, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), agreed
at the Reykjavik summit in May 2002, was a compromise. In form,
the  NRC  provides  for  greater  cooperation  and  consultation
between Russia and NATO than the PJC, allowing the two parties
to ‘work as equal partners in areas of common interest’.81 Working
on the basis of consensus, the NRC is to represent a ‘mechanism
for  consultation,  consensus-building,  cooperation,  joint  deci-
sions and joint action’. The NRC is also designed to allow for con-
tinuous dialogue between the parties, supported by a bolstered
institutional framework, including a Preparatory Committee and
numerous targeted working groups. The statutes of the Council

78. George Robertson, ‘NATO
and Russia: A Special relation-
ship’, Volgograd, 22 November
2001, www.nato.int.

79. See MID note on ‘NATO-Rus-
sia Cooperation against Terror-
ism’, DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
31 January 2002.

80 Reproduced in DNB, IPD, MID,
Moscow, 15 November 2001.

81. See ‘NATO-Russia Relations:
A New Quality’, Rome Declaration,
28 May 2002, www.nato.int.

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Russia faces Europe

go some way to addressing Russia’s definition of optimal partner-
ship, providing for ‘early identification of emerging problems,
determination of optimal common approaches and conduct of
joint actions as appropriate’.

In many respects, however, the NRC differs little from the PJC.
The PJC has been over-written, its work programme for 2002 was
transferred  to  the  NRC.  The  nine  areas  for  NRC  cooperation,
which range from the fight against terrorism, crisis management
and non-proliferation to theatre missile defence and search and
rescue at sea, are not vastly different from those discussed under
previous auspices. Moreover, on the question of pre-prepared bloc
positions, the Bush administration noted pointedly in May 2002
that allies retained the right to take common positions in the
NRC. In some ways, therefore, the NRC is old wine in a new bottle.
Russian views on the new council, even on the importance of
the Alliance itself, have displayed ambivalence. Russia maintained
a cautious position throughout the negotiation on the council. In
fact, many Russian commentators argued that NATO had lost its
central place in European security and, more importantly, in US
thinking. In the words of one Russian MID official, 11 September
confronted NATO with the paradox of its own irrelevance.82 In
some Russian views, NATO’s push for a new relationship with
Russia could only be explained by the Alliance’s search for new
purpose after its sidelining.83 The more NATO was interested in a
genuine relationship with Russia the less important in fact the
Alliance was becoming. The Deputy Secretary of the Russian Secu-
rity Council, Oleg Chernov stated: ‘Under present circumstances,
the North Atlantic Alliance must be interested in Russia more
than we are in NATO . . . Without Russia, it will basically lose its
identity and become unnecessary.’84

Moreover, Russia’s cooperation in the struggle against interna-
tional terrorism in Afghanistan and further afield has not been
channelled through NATO. Sergei Ivanov has been blunt on this
point, downplaying the importance of the Alliance in terms of
intelligence sharing and information exchange. These circum-
stances have led some Russian commentators to advise the Gov-
ernment not to rush towards a new relationship with NATO but
instead to focus on bilateral ties with Washington.85 Vyacheslav
Nikonov was especially critical of closer ties with the Alliance:
‘NATO makes no decisions at all – it is just a bureaucratic struc-
ture situated in Brussels. Decisions are made first in Washington,

82. A. V. Grushkov, ‘Russia-NATO
Twenty Appears to be Working’,
International  Affairs (Moscow),
no. 7, July 2002.

83.  See,  for  example,  Yuri  Ko-
valenko, ‘NATO is Becoming a
Club’, Novye Izvestiya, 7 December
2001, reproduced in FSU Fifteen
nations:  Policy  and  Security,
no. 12, December 2001, pp. 6-7.

84.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
16 March 2002.

85. Alexei Pushkov has been espe-
cially outspoken; see Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 27 November 2001 and
27 December 2001.

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and second in Washington.’86 Some in Moscow interpreted the
Prague summit as a confirmation of the declining utility of the
Alliance, with further enlargement making it unwieldy politically
and unusable militarily, especially given the current rift in transat-
lantic relations.

By contrast, Moscow has trumpeted the proximity of Russian
and American positions. In the words of one Russian commenta-
tor:

Afghanistan has convinced Bush that Russia is an even more reli-
able ally in the fight against international terrorism than Western
Europe is. Prague and St Petersburg highlight a telltale trend to the
effect  that  both  Washington  and  Moscow,  which  are  joining
hands, are thus distancing themselves from Western Europe to
some extent.87

None the less, Russia has recognised the importance of the
NRC, and of the Alliance more widely. In uncertain and rapidly
developing international circumstances, the new NATO-Russia
relationship may act as a lever on the United States, if not con-
straining American policy, then at least influencing its direction.
Russian-European cooperation has become especially important
in this respect. Moreover, Putin has used the NRC as a diversion in
domestic politics to offset the negative reactions that will follow
the next wave of NATO enlargement. In an interview with The Wall
Street Journal, Putin stated that new mechanisms for joint action
would lead Russia ‘to look at expansion in a different way’.88 The
Russian government has remained firmly against any ‘mechanical
expansion’ of the Alliance. However, as with the case of the ABM
Treaty, the Russian president reacted with nonchalance to the
decisions of the Prague summit.

Yet for all its similarities, the NRC is not the PJC. It is true that
member states may consult on topics before meetings with Russia,
and that a topic may be withdrawn from discussion ‘at twenty’ at
the request of a member state. In some areas, cooperation in the
NRC has been strained. For example, Russia has sought to miti-
gate the impact of enlargement to the Baltic States by insisting
that the new member states commit themselves formally to the
revised CFE Treaty. Work on a joint framework document for res-
cue at sea was slowed down by Russia’s insistence on having a ‘spe-
cial’  relationship  with  NATO  in  this  area,  outside  the  usual 

86. ‘Does Russia need NATO?’
Trud, 16 March 2002, reproduced
in FSU Fifteen nations: Policy and
Security,  no.  3,  March  2002,
pp. 19-20.

87. M. Sturua, ‘Does the United
States Need NATO?’ Moskovsky
Komsomolets, no. 264, November
2002.

88. The Wall Street Journal, 11 Feb-
ruary 2002.

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Russia faces Europe

agreements  developed  through  the  Euro-Atlantic  Partnership
Council (EAPC). The position of the NRC in NATO decision-mak-
ing in the case of a future crisis remains to be clarified. Moscow,
indeed, is worried that it will suffer a similar fate to the PJC and be
sidelined.

However, thanks to change in the overall climate of Russia-
NATO relations, work in the NRC has taken off. The agenda for
2002 was finalised in the first ministerial and ambassadorial meet-
ings in June and July. A number of working groups in the NRC
made quite substantial progress throughout the year. The meet-
ings have been much more dense and numerous than those of the
PJC, with more in the first six months of the creation of the NRC
than in the entire history of the previous institution. Moreover,
the Secretary-General himself chairs the NRC, giving it greater
concentration and leadership than had the PJC. Cooperation in
emergency response has been notably positive. A substantial joint
exercise, ‘Bogorodsk 2002’, was held near Moscow in late Septem-
ber 2002, simulating a terrorist attack on a chemical plant in Rus-
sia. 

Moreover, the NRC adopted on 20 September 2002 a ‘Joint
Document on the Political Aspects of the Basic Concept for Russ-
ian-NATO Peacekeeping Operations’, laying out the principles of
political control of joint peace support operations. The working
group on theatre missile defence has embarked on a two-year pro-
gramme of assessment. The working groups have agreed to a num-
ber  of  other  documents,  including  on  international  terrorist
threats to joint peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The tasks
for 2003 cover military reform, civilian defence exercises, coopera-
tion in the management of airspace, and assessment of terrorist
threats to the Euro-Atlantic area. The NRC has also created a
working group to coordinate concepts for the struggle against
international terrorism. Moreover, a NATO Military Liaison Mis-
sion was opened in Moscow in late May 2002, with seven staff offi-
cers and two Russian liaison officers.

The creation of the NRC falls in line with Putin’s strategy of
alignment. It is in Russia’s interest to strike a deal with NATO
while the iron is hot in order to lock into a tighter institutional
relationship. In the longer term, the NRC may act as a form of
insurance for Russia. The rapidity and depth of change in interna-
tional affairs means that the NRC serves as a locus of stability that
ties Russia and NATO together and aligns Russia more broadly

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2

with  the  transatlantic  community.  In  December  2001,  Putin
stated  that  ‘a  change  in  the  quality  of  Russian  relations  with
NATO could be a good bridge to the participation of Russia in the
future system of European security.’89 NATO was very supportive
of  Russian  actions  during  the  hostage  crisis  in  the  theatre  in
Moscow in late October 2002. George Robertson stressed Russia’s
right to defend its territorial integrity, folding the Moscow events
into the global struggle against international terrorism. This is
precisely what Moscow wants from NATO.

Relations with NATO, therefore, have instrumental value for
Moscow in creating a more predictable climate in Europe. Despite
ambivalence, better relations with NATO are an important part of
Putin’s  policy  of  anchoring  Russia  institutionally  within  the
Euro-Atlantic community. The struggle against international ter-
rorism has provided an umbrella shielding Russia-NATO rela-
tions from the kind of problems besetting Russia’s relations with
the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU, which have contin-
ued to press Russia on its domestic developments – something
NATO publicly tends to avoid. Despite enduring problems, Russ-
ian-NATO relations have never had it so good.

The demise of the OSCE in Russia’s eyes

Russian  policy  towards  the  OSCE  changed  dramatically  after
Kosovo. Under Primakov, Russia had sought to use the organisa-
tion as a forum to enshrine the status quo in Europe. The ‘Charter
for European Security’, agreed at the Istanbul summit in Novem-
ber 1999, stated that the OSCE was to be ‘the primary organisation
for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and a key
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis manage-
ment and post-conflict rehabilitation.’ 90 In addition, the Charter
contained  a  ‘Platform  for  Cooperative  Security’  designed  to
ensure transparent relations between security organisations in
Europe. In all this, Moscow sought to prevent NATO from obtain-
ing a monopoly on the use of force. As witnessed in Kosovo, that
policy failed.

Russian concerns with the OSCE reside at four levels. Firstly,
far from setting a positive precedent for the organisation, the
Kosovo crisis did the opposite. Andrei Fedorov, from the Council
for Foreign and Defence Policy, wrote in 1999 that Kosovo showed

89. Putin, speaking to Greek me-
dia,  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
5 December 2001.

90 Charter for European Security,
Istanbul,  19  November,  1999,
www.osce.org/docs1999.

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Russia faces Europe

that the hopes Russia ‘pinned on the OSCE as an efficient and
multi-sided mechanism of European security and conflict settle-
ment on the continent were vain’.91 Writing in the General Staff
journal Military Thought, V. V. Voblenko argued that the OSCE ‘not
only failed to tap its peacekeeping potential in averting the con-
flict, but in fact objectively facilitated NATO aggression against
the FRY, adopting a biased approach to assessing the separatists’
action and the response of the Yugoslav authorities.’92

Secondly, Russia has objected to what it has perceived as a nar-
rowing of the OSCE’s functions. Speaking in November 2000,
Igor Ivanov was critical of the ‘incipient tendency to reduce the
OSCE to considering above all humanitarian and human rights
problems’.93 Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarov went fur-
ther in late 2001, accusing some countries of exploiting the OSCE
as a tool of interference in the internal affairs of other states.94
This criticism was linked to Russia’s wider objection to the con-
cept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in international affairs. The
MID issued a statement in August 2000 that ‘the OSCE should
not become a mechanism for interference in the internal affairs of
participating states and even less so an instrument of “humanitar-
ian intervention”. ’95

Thirdly, Russia has criticised the geographical narrowing of
OSCE activities. Moscow argues that, as a result of the interests of
particular states, the scope of OSCE work has been limited from
its  supposed  Vancouver  to  Vladivostok  area  to  focus  on  the
Balkans and the former Soviet Union. This narrowing has under-
mined one of the organisation’s primary advantages in Russia’s
view: its pan-European purview and membership. 

Finally,  the  Russian  leadership  resents  the  criticism  it  has
received from within the OSCE about the conduct of its opera-
tions  in  Chechnya.  From  Moscow’s  perspective,  this  criticism
encapsulates all of the weaknesses of the organisation. As a result,
Russia has been more circumspect about the role of an OSCE mis-
sion in Chechnya than it was during the first war between 1994
and 1996. It took a long time for Moscow to allow the deployment
of the assistance group on the ground, and its activities have been
restricted. In late December 2002, Russia vetoed a renewal of the
mandate of the OSCE mission in Chechnya.

Linked to this, the Russian government has objected to certain
practices inside the OSCE that are seen to undermine the principle
of consensus. Moscow has always highlighted OSCE decision-

91. See ‘New Pragmatism in Rus-
sia’s Foreign Policy’, International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 5, 1999.

92. V. V. Voblenko, ‘Multinational
Peacekeeping Operations in the
Balkans: past and Present’, Voyen-
naya Mysl (Military Thought), Sep-
tember-October, 2001.

93. Ivanov to the Council of For-
eign Ministers in Vienna, 27 No-
vember 2000, reported by DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 29 November
2000.

94. Gusarov to Political Commit-
tee Meeting in Vienna, DNB, IPD,
MID, Moscow, 5 October 2001.

95.  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
1 August 2000.

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2

making as one of its most positive features. Tensions came to a
head in late 2000, when Russia vetoed an OSCE official statement
that  contained  criticism  of  Russian  actions  in  Chechnya.  The
Russian veto, however, did not prevent the then Chair-in-Office,
Austria’s Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Walder, from express-
ing the same criticism in her Chair’s Statement. Moscow objected
to this as a threat to the culture of consensus. Russia also criticised
the  decision  to  terminate  the  OSCE  missions  in  Estonia  and
Latvia in December 2001. In the Russian view, the missions had
not yet completed their tasks. Moreover, the decision was not
taken by the Permanent Council but by a technical procedure
bypassing the need for consensus. In a statement of 18 December
2001, the Russian Delegation noted that ‘the serious malady of
double standards from which the OSCE has been suffering for a
long time is becoming stubborn and chronic.’96

At the same time, Russia has worked comfortably with the
OSCE in some areas of the former Soviet Union. Cooperation has
been harmonious when OSCE requirements tally with Russian
concerns. Moscow has moved to fulfil the requirements set at the
Istanbul summit for the withdrawal of Russian troops, equipment
and bases from Moldova and Georgia. Falling in line with the
defence ministry’s overall policy to reduce forward basing, the
deadlines for completing the Istanbul agreements are largely, if
very slowly, on track. 

Moreover, Russia has not abandoned all hopes of strengthen-
ing the OSCE. Following the Vienna debacle, in January 2001 Rus-
sia presented the OSCE Secretary-General, Jan Kubis, with an
‘Agenda for the OSCE in the 21st Century’, designed to optimise
the working of the Permanent Council.97 In September 2001, Rus-
sia proposed to reform the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC),
with the aim of strengthening the peacekeeping role of the OSCE
as both a mandating authority and lead operational agency.98 In a
move reminiscent of ambitious past policies, Russia proposed the
elaboration  of  a  ‘General  Concept  of  Peacekeeping  Activities
under an OSCE Mandate’. In 2002, Russia actively sought discus-
sion inside the FSC on its ‘Food-For-Thought Paper on Guidelines
for OSCE Peacekeeping Operations’. 

The Kosovo experience was a serious blow to Russian ambi-
tions for the OSCE. In response, Moscow has become increasingly
critical of the organisation. At the same time, the Government has
continued  to  pursue,  albeit  less  actively  and  insistently,  the 

96. ‘Statement of the Delegation
of  the  Russian  Federation’,
PCJOUR/374, 18 December 2001.

97. See DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
11 January 2001.

98. ‘Proposal  on  the  Future
Course of the Work of the FSC’,
OSCE FSC.JOUR/340, 19 Septem-
ber 2001.

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organisation’s reform with two objectives. Russia still seeks to
strengthen the pan-European role of the OSCE as a central hub of
European security. Secondly, Moscow wishes to prevent the OSCE
from  becoming  an  instrument  manipulated  by  other  states
against Russia. These objectives explain the vacillation in Russian
policy between reform of the OSCE and ambivalence about its
potential.

The primacy of the UN Security Council

After the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council assumed
vital importance as a forum enshrining Russia’s voice on all issues
of international peace and security.99 Prior to the Kosovo crisis,
Russia sought to use Security Council primacy in Europe to con-
strain NATO decision-making on the use of force. In his first
speech to the General Assembly in September 1998, Igor Ivanov
stated: ‘We must not allow a precedent to be set in which one or
another military potential is used in crisis situations without the
consent  of  the  UN  Security  Council.’100 Russia  feared  that  a
NATO operation would set a precedent for more out-of-area activ-
ities that would undermine Russia’s interests. Unsanctioned by
the Security Council and justified as ‘humanitarian intervention’,
Operation Allied Force was a blow to Russian plans. None the less,
under Putin’s leadership, Russia has continued to lay emphasis on
the role of the Security Council in global affairs and European
security.

Three dimensions of this policy must be noted. Firstly, in his
speech to the UN’s Millennium Summit in September 2000, Putin
referred to the existence of a ‘UN School’ in international affairs,
arguing that ‘the existence of this organisation is a guarantee from
the arbitrariness of hegemony, from the right to absolute truth
and from diktat.’101 Russia subscribes to a conservative interpreta-
tion of the UN Charter. Thus, when Putin argues that ‘no [UN]
reform  should  loosen  up  its  fundamental  principles’,  he  is 
referring to the strict notion of sovereignty that emerged with
decolonisation during the Cold War. The official Russian reaction
to the Brahimi report on UN reform was indicative: ‘Russia acts on
the premise that only the UN Security Council may authorise the
use of force as a means of enforcing peace . . . It rejects as utterly
unacceptable any attempts to invoke concepts such as humanitar-

99. See, for example, Primakov,
‘The World on the Eve of the 21st
International  Affairs
Century’, 
(Moscow), vol. 42, no. 5/6, 1996.

100. Cited by Dmitry Gornos-
tayev,  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,
23 September 1998.

101. Speech given on 6 September
2000, reproduced on DNB, IPD,
MID,  Moscow,  8 September
2000.

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ian intervention and limited sovereignty to justify the unilateral
use of force in circumvention of the UN Security Council.’102

Linked to this, Russia seeks a limited reform of the organisa-
tion, rejecting any changes of the Security Council that would
dilute the position of the Permanent Five (P5). In a statement in
1999 regarding proposals to expand the Security Council, the
MID argued that such plans would ‘destabilise the UN’.103 For
Moscow, the right of the P5 to veto represents the ‘backbone’ of
the organisation, and the ultimate guarantee against increasing
‘arbitrariness’ in international security.104

In  an  interview  given  the  day  before  11  September,  Sergei
Lavrov, Russia’s Ambassador to the UN, outlined Russia’s vision
for UN reform.105 His proposal began with a call for the reinforce-
ment of UN primacy in any operation using force and in the regu-
lation of regional security (read Europe). Lavrov also called for the
activation of the Military Staff Committee, a long-dead provision
in the Charter. Finally, Russia advocated a greater UN role in dis-
armament and strategic stability. Russia has been active in seeking
to define within the UN limits on the ‘right to self-defence’, in
order to set constraints on the use of force by states and groups of
states.106 However, attempts to push on these last two fronts have
met with no success. 

Finally, Russia has sought to ensure that US and international
reactions to 11 September set a positive precedent for the UN in
the global war on terror. Immediately after the attacks, Russia
argued for the creation of a ‘global system,’ based on international
law and the UN, to counter-act new threats. At the least, Moscow
has  insisted  on  the  Security  Council  as  the  only  mandating
authority. As such, Russia presented Resolution 1373, calling on
all states to participate in the struggle, as a ‘major historical docu-
ment’.107 Following  the  toppling  of  the  Taliban  regime  in
Afghanistan, Russia insisted on a UN mandate for any further use
of force in Iraq or elsewhere. Russia has also called for a UN con-
ference on the anti-terrorist struggle that would take its place in
the new ‘global system for counter-acting contemporary threats
and challenges’.108

Russian reactions to US policy towards Iraq during the sum-
mer of 2002, and following George W. Bush’s speech before the
General Assembly on 12 September 2002, followed these lines.
While not entirely satisfied with UNSC Resolution 1441, the Russ-
ian government was overjoyed at the precedent it set for ensuring

102. Vladimir Shustov, ‘Can the
UN Fight a War?’, International Af-
fairs (Moscow), no. 1, 2001.

103. Interfax, 26 November 1998,
SU/3397, B/10.

104. See the statement of first
deputy foreign minister, Gennady
Gatilov, to the UN General Assem-
bly,  17  November  2000,  DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 21 November
2000.

105. DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
11 September 2001.

106. See statement of Russia’s
representative, Vladimir Tarabrin,
DNB, 
IPD,  MID,  Moscow, 
16 October 2001.

107.  Russian  statement  to  the
Counter-Terrorism Committee,
18 January 2002, DNB, IPD, MID,
Moscow, 23 January 2002.

108. Igor Ivanov speech to the
General Assembly, 13 September
2002, DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
16 September 2002.

109.  See  comments  by  Sergei
Lavrov, 14 November 2002, DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 15 November
2002.

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a UN role.109 The United States may well be setting the direction of
the counter-terrorist struggle but Russia, with some of its perma-
nent and non-permanent partners in the Security Council, have
sought to shape something of the pace of events. This is no mean
feat for such an enfeebled country.

Moreover, Russia has sought to fold its war in Chechnya into
the  global  struggle.  While  international  criticism  of  Russian
actions in Chechnya has been muted since 2000, it has not disap-
peared. In a speech to the General Assembly in November 2001,
Igor Ivanov made a point that the Government has lost no oppor-
tunity in reiterating: ‘There must be no double standards in the
fight against terrorism.’110 Russia has also used the new urgency
to place pressure on its southern neighbour Georgia, which it
accuses of harbouring Chechen terrorists and allowing their free
passage.111

In sum, the importance of the UN for Russia’s European policy
resides at two levels. Firstly, when Russia talks about the primacy
of law, one should read the primacy of the norms of non-interven-
tion in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Secondly, when
Moscow insists on the centrality of the UN, one should under-
stand the centrality of Russia. The Security Council enshrines a
Russian ‘voice’ on all major questions of international peace and
security, locking in a special Russian position for the long term.
The UN principles and system lie at the heart of Russia’s conserva-
tive approach to European security, which seeks to stabilise the
status quo and ensure some Russian influence on any changes
that occur. Russia’s approach to the crisis over Iraq was driven by
these motives.

Bilateral links

110. DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
13 November 2001.

111. Russian pressure was intense
in late 2001 and early 2002 and
fell away with the announcement
of a US ‘Train and Equip’ pro-
gramme in Georgia in February.
As the limited scale of the US pro-
gramme  became  apparent  in
2002, Russian pressure for a joint
operation  to  ‘clean  out’  the
Pankisi Gorge of Chechen rebels
rose again to a high pitch.

Vladimir Putin is far less romantic about personal contacts with
Western leaders than was Yeltsin, but he clearly recognises the facil-
itating role such relations may play, and Putin has devoted signifi-
cant time and energy to building close ties with key states and lead-
ers  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  community.  In  this  sense,  the
Euro-Atlantic  community  largely  coincides  with  the  Cold  War
notion of the West, stretching from the United States through
Europe to Japan. The President has thrown himself into the task
with surprising ease and skill. Bilateral relations are considered

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2

important in their own right, especially for the trade and economic
benefits they may provide. However, Russia also views bilateralism
instrumentally, as a conduit for advancing Russian interests inside
the EU and NATO.

The United States is the sun in Russia’s universe, affecting the
most  powerful  gravitational  pull  on  Moscow.  Russia  and  the
United  States  still  have  the  largest  arsenals  of  nuclear  forces.
Moscow recognises that these capabilities are less important now
as pillars of strategic stability and more vital as bargaining chips in
the relationship with Washington. Still, Russia’s nuclear forces
ensure that Moscow retains a seat at the highest and most exclu-
sive  table  of  international  relations  with  Washington.  Given
Putin’s focus on domestic modernisation, the United States is
vital for securing access to international financial institutions and
economic  organisations.  Indeed,  strong  ties  with  the  United
States are seen to add weight to Russian foreign policies in other
areas.112

The backdrop to Moscow’s vision of the United States is the
fundamental recognition that, although the world may be multi-
polar, there is only one hyperpower. As the sole hyperpower, the
nature of US policy, the degree to which its allies are taken into
account and the manner by which the United States exercises
power, will all determine the texture of international relations. 11
September presented an image of American vulnerability, but it
also gave birth to a United States cognisant of its unprecedented
power  and  seeking  to  refashion  the  international  rules  of  the
game. 

The implications for Russia are profound. In the words of one
Russian commentator, Alexei Pushkov: ‘To prevent the US from
becoming a latter-day Roman Empire and to prevent the estab-
lishment of a Pax Americana is practically impossible. But there
are empires and empires. Some have unlimited sway and some
have limited sway. There are reasonable empires and unreasonable
empires. The question is, what will the US be like and, accordingly,
what will we be like?’113

Russia’s view of the United States after 11 September reflects a
mixture of fear, fascination and interest. Fear and fascination
stem from the scale and rapidity of the American reaction to the
terrorist attacks. However, Russia also looks on the United States
with  interest,  because  of  new  opportunities  for  creating  tight
Russian-US ties opened by the counter-terrorist struggle. In his

112. Many Russian commenta-
tors have noted the importance of
strong ties with the United States
for a better overall international
position for Russia. This goes not
only for Europe but also the Far
East and China.

113. Round Table with Pushkov
and others, 2 October 2002, Fed-
eral News Service, reproduced in
David  Johnson’s  List,  no.  6478,
2002.

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speech to the MID on 12 July 2002, Putin made this point clearly:
‘In the consolidation of global stability a special responsibility,
without doubt, falls in Russia and the USA . . . The confidential
partnership between the Russia and the USA is not only in the
interests of our peoples. It exerts a positive influence on the entire
system of international relations [emphasis added].’114 Close ties
with Washington provide benefits to Russia across the spectrum
of  international  questions.  Even  more,  a  unilateralist  United
States may set precedents that could be exploited by Russia in the
pursuit of its own interests. Russian pressure on Georgia to satisfy
its demands against Chechen rebels follows this logic. At the same
time, Russia seeks to restrain the United States from adventures
that might rent the very fabric of international relations as it
emerged  in  the  twentieth  century  and  relegate  Russia  to  pure
third-rate status. Russia seeks to round off the sharp edges of the
new American ‘empire’. 

When Putin was elected President in 2000, US-Russian rela-
tions stood at their lowest since the end of the Cold War. As presi-
dential candidate, George W. Bush publicly castigated the Russian
government and its previous leaders for corruption.115 Russian
actions  in  Chechnya  were  condemned  outright.  Bush  and  his
advisers, especially Condoleezza Rice, pledged an end to the era of
‘happy talk’ with Moscow. Russia was seen as weak and sometimes
dangerous – overall, a problem to be managed by the United States
but no longer a central partner. Upon becoming president, Bush
dismantled the Bureau for Newly Independent States in the State
Department and demoted the importance of the region in Wash-
ington’s bureaucracy. It was only reluctantly that Bush agreed to
meet with Putin at the end of his European tour in summer 2001. 
Faced with the threat of estrangement from the United States
and the vicious circle of isolation this would create, Putin sought
to reach out to the Republican Party and subsequent Administra-
tion. In the run-up to the US presidential elections, the Russian
government initiated a number of behind-the-scenes meetings
with the Bush campaign team in order to open channels of com-
munication. In February 2000, Putin sent Sergei Ivanov to Wash-
ington to lend official confidence to relations. Subsequent sum-
mits in Europe, America and Russia between George W. Bush and
Vladimir Putin dissipated, at least rhetorically, Moscow’s initial
fears that the new Administration had little interest in Russia. The

114. Speech to Enlarged Confer-
ence of MID, 12 July 2002, DNB,
IPD, MID, Moscow, 15 July 2002.

115. On the evolution of Bush pol-
icy  towards  Russia,  see  James
Goldgeiger and Michael McFaul,
‘George W. Bush and Russia’, Cur-
rent  History,  October  2002,
pp. 313-24.

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2

first summit in Slovenia in June 2001 marked a turn in American
policy.

Putin has sought to ensure that the new American ‘empire’ is,
to borrow Pushkov’s words, reasonable. Firstly, Putin has sought
to imbue Russian-American relations with what he has called a
‘new quality’, as allies in a coalition against international terror-
ism. Most fundamentally, this has meant that confrontation with
the United States will be avoided as much as possible. Putin is
becoming skilled at making a virtue out of necessity, accepting
with little protest the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
a watered-down treaty to reduce strategic nuclear warheads, a new
round of NATO enlargement and US troop deployments in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Russian leadership recog-
nises that the United States would take these measures regardless
of Moscow. More than simple compromises, Putin’s reversal on so
many points marks a shift in Russian understanding of the notion
of strategic stability, which is no longer based on a parity of capa-
bilities but on the pursuit of a relationship of entente. In all this,
Putin has accepted the rise of the United States as a hyperpower,
and  the  consequent  asymmetrical  partnership  it  may  hope  to
strike with Washington.

Putin’s televised address on 24 September 2001 announcing
Russian support in the struggle against terrorism marked a fur-
ther  upgrading  of  the  relationship.  The  terrorist  attacks  con-
firmed what Moscow had been saying for years about the nature of
new  threats.  Based  around  a  similar  vision  of  threats  and
responses to these, US-Russian relations have accelerated rapidly.
Russian intelligence services and military played an important
supporting  role  in  Afghanistan.  Bush’s  early  concerns  about
Chechnya and the development of democratic institutions in Rus-
sia have largely dissipated. To Moscow’s obvious pleasure, the rela-
tionship has become strategically driven, based on common exter-
nal interests and not American attempts to transform Russia in its
own image, as the Clinton administrations had seemed to pur-
sue.116

On this basis, some officials in Moscow see the potential for a
new Russian-American condominium in the war on international
terrorism, with Washington and Moscow working together in the
struggle, on the basis of similar definitions of the nature of the
threat and the means necessary for countering it. The hostage 

116. This explains the vehement
Russian reaction to the ‘pedantic’
tone of the US Russian Democ-
racy Act 2002, passed in Novem-
ber 2002, which seemed a throw-
back to the interfering approach
of the Clinton administrations.
See RIA Novosti, Moscow, 4 No-
vember 2002.

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crisis in Moscow in October 2002 was Russia’s ‘9/11’, and the
United States seems to have accepted this, thereby forging new
bonds of solidarity as self-declared ‘target states’.117

Many Russian officials argue, indeed, that Russia has never
mattered more for the United States, and that Moscow had better
take the most advantage of the situation.118 The Russian govern-
ment has lost no opportunity of reminding the United States of
the support it provided in Afghanistan. A few days before the
Prague summit, Putin’s Adviser, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, put the
point bluntly: ‘I want to recall that it was Russia to offer the most
efficient assistance for the process of the anti-terrorist operation
in Afghanistan and give its fundamental support in the negotia-
tions between the US and a series of former Soviet states.’119 Rus-
sia  accepted  the  second  wave  of  NATO  enlargement  without
protest partly because the Alliance has decreased in importance
for Washington. The Alliance has only just embarked on a process
of transformation, which may make it a more fitting instrument
against international terrorism – but it is not there yet. Moreover,
further enlargement will make decision-making in the Alliance
ever  more  unwieldy.  In  these  circumstances,  as  noted  by  Yas-
trzhembsky  in  the  same  article,  ‘mechanisms  of  international
coalitions,  flexible  structures  are  becoming  more  valuable’.
Moscow seeks to ensure that it has some say over such flexible mis-
sion-led structures.

The crisis over Iraq in late 2002 and 2003 demonstrated the
central role of the United States in Russian thinking. On the one
hand, the crisis underlined the dangers for Russia of an increas-
ingly unilateralist United States, willing to use force without the
sanction of international law and despite international objec-
tions. In response, Russia has placed increasing emphasis on the
need for all states to respect the primacy of the Security Council,
and Moscow developed joint positions with a number of Euro-
pean states to this effect. At the same time, the very fact the United
States intervened in Iraq without full international support has
strengthened the perception in Moscow of the need to retain close
ties, even a partnership, with Washington. As Putin stated almost
three weeks into the war, Russia seeks to avoid any confrontation
with the United States, not only because it is Russia’s largest trad-
ing partner but also because the importance of the UN can only be
reaffirmed with the United States.

117. This point emerged in discus-
sions  with  Russian  officials  in
Moscow in December 2002.

118.  See,  for  example,  Alexei
Pushkov, ‘Why Russia Should Not
Join NATO’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
27 November 2001.

119.  ‘Russia  and  NATO  in  the
Same Boat’, Izvestiya, November
2002.

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The dividends of rapprochement with the United States have
paid off in other areas also. For one, Russia has sought to position
itself as an alternative to the Middle East for oil and gas supplies.
Despite the relatively higher price of Russian energy, the United
States is open to exploring the possibilities of such a long-term
direction.120 More importantly, the United States was instrumen-
tal in pushing to integrate Russia fully into G-8 structures at the
2002 summit in Canada. Russia will assume the presidency of the
organisation in 2006. Moreover, the US decision to recognise Rus-
sia as a market economy in May 2002 was a turning point for Rus-
sia’s integration into global trade on more advantageous terms. It
is not coincidental that the US recognition came a day before that
of the EU. Closer ties with the United States have had positive
impact on Russian relations with Europe. 

At the same time, Russia has sought to use its ties with Euro-
pean states and organisations as leverage over the United States. In
an interview in July 2002, Igor Ivanov stated that the task of Russia
and Europe was ‘to persuade the political elite of the United States
that it is in their own interests to take part collectively and in soli-
darity in solving current problems’.121 The desire to use Europe as
a constraint on the United States is driven by anxiety over future
US policy. It also reflects Russia’s recognition of the fundamental
power disparity between Russia and the United States, and the
weak basis for a ‘partnership’ that follows from this. Alexei Arba-
tov spoke for many when he wrote, in late 2001, that there was no
stable  and  long-term  foundation  to  Russian-US  relations.122
These relations could change quickly, and for the worse. Close ties
with European states are seen as both a channel of influence over
the United States and insurance in the case of a turn for the worse.
Russian ties with major European states thus matter in terms
of their impact on the transatlantic relationship, but Moscow also
views these relations as important for their specifically European
resonance. Following Tony Blair’s visit to St Petersburg during the
presidential  elections  in  2000,  Russian-British  relations  have
assumed significance for both countries, with five personal meet-
ings in 2000 and four in 2001.123 In the Russian view, Tony Blair
has acted both as an initiator and a facilitator for deeper Russian
integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. The Blair govern-
ment was first to call for a new mechanism for Russia-NATO
relations in October 2001. Britain also supported greater Russian

120. An Energy Summit was or-
ganised in Houston in October
2002, bringing together all Russ-
ian and US majors and the two
governments.

121. Interview on ORT television,
7 July 2002, reported in Russian Re-
form Monitor, no. 947, 9 July 2002.

122. Alexei Arbatov, Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 26 December 2001. 

123. For an overview, see ‘Russ-
ian-British Relations’, MID State-
ment, Information Bulletin, Moscow,
19 May 2002.

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Russia faces Europe

involvement in the G-8. The two countries have also developed
close military ties. The ‘Russian Resettlement Programme’ is a
notable example, providing retraining for demobilised Russian
officers. During the war in Afghanistan, defence ties gained depth,
with information and intelligence exchanges.

Russian-French relations fell to a low point in 2000 when the
French  government  criticised  Russian  actions  in  the  second
Chechen war. The weight of French criticism had some impact on
Russia’s interaction with the EU and the Council of Europe. Still,
summits at the highest level have become annual events, with two
meetings between Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin in 2002.
Whereas Russian-British ties are important for their transatlantic
resonance, Moscow values relations with Paris for the similarity in
Russian and French views on international relations. Following
Putin’s first visit in October 2000, the Russian MID noted ‘the
conceptual similarity of the approaches of Russia and France to
key issues of today. At its base lies our countries’ adherence to a
multipolar organisation of the world system that excludes the
individual sway of one power.’124 Both France and Russia are,
indeed, wary observers of US power. Russia was content to work
with France in the Security Council in 2002 and 2003 to push for
strengthened weapons inspections in Iraq and then for a UN role
after the end of the war.

The EU-Russia Paris summit of October 2000 was an impor-
tant moment. Then President of the European Council, Chirac
was instrumental in pushing through the ‘Joint Declaration on
Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Secu-
rity Matters in Europe’.125 This declaration gave priority to the
development of a strategic partnership between Russia and the
EU, calling for regular consultation on defence matters and dis-
cussions on modalities for Russia’s contribution to future EU cri-
sis management operations. Russia views ties with France as a con-
duit for influencing relations with the EU. France and Russia took
up the theme of Russia-EU strategic dialogue on defence again
during Chirac’s visit to Moscow in July 2002.126

The end of cohabitation in French politics in 2002 saw a relaunch
of Franco-Russian ties. In July, Foreign Minister Dominique de
Villepin agreed in Moscow to the creation of a Russian-French
Council for Security Cooperation, designed ‘to deepen the bilat-
eral cooperative effort on international security issues’. Despite its
flimsy appearance, the Council reflects an effort to enhance the

124. ‘Russian-French Relations,
MID Statement, 31 October 2000,
reported  on  DNB,  IPD,  MID,
Moscow.

125.  30  October  2000,  Paris,
www.europa.eu.int/comm/exter-
nal_relations. 

126. Joint Statement, 4 July 2001,
DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow.

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Strategic directions of alignment

2

relationship, on the French side to recapture ‘lost ground’ and on
the Russian side to maximise contacts with its European part-
ners.127 The importance of these ties was brought home during
the flash visit of Chirac to Sochi on 20 July 2002, when the French
in  Franco-Russian 
president  untied  the  Chechen  knot 
relations.128 Chirac also showed sympathy for the Russian posi-
tion on Kaliningrad, much to the dismay of future EU members,
Lithuania and Poland.129

While Britain and France are important, Germany has pride of
place in Russia’s European policy. The two countries maintain
regular  contacts  at  the  intergovernmental  level  and  Putin  has
placed special emphasis on developing ties with the German chan-
cellor. This continues the long-held emphasis on Germany devel-
oped by Yeltsin, starting with financial commitments made by
Helmut Kohl on the occasion of German reunification, which
made Germany Russia’s foremost donor and lender. Throughout
the 1990s, Yeltsin never quite abandoned the notion of developing
a strategic triangle (dubbed the Yekaterinberg triangle after the
location of the first summit) between Russia, Germany and France
as a new directoire in Europe.

Putin’s speech in the Bundestag on 25 September 2001 marked
the  importance  of  these  relations  for  the  Russian  president.
Speaking, as he put it, in the language of Goethe and Kant, Putin
stated that Germany was a symbol of Europe for Russia. Germany
was also Russia’s ‘leading economic partner, most important cred-
itor, one of the principal investors and a key interlocutor in dis-
cussing international politics’.130 Trade and economic relations
are, indeed, vital for Russia. Germany holds 40 per cent of Russian
debt  to  the  Paris  Club,  and  trade  turnover  in  2000  stood  at
DM41.5 billion. The Russian government has sought to increase
the level of trade with Germany. In 2000, a High-Level Working
Group on Strategic Questions of Trade, Economic and Financial
Cooperation was created with this objective in mind. Despite the
political will, Russian-German economic ties have not deepened
as much as Moscow would like, particularly in the high-technol-
ogy spheres, where Putin and Schröder have designated a number
of ‘pilot’ projects. 

Although less important, Russian bilateral ties with Italy have
also acquired greater substance following the election of Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2001. Berlusconi has been a respon-
sive  partner  for  Russia,  also  placing  emphasis  on  personal 

127. The first meeting of the Russ-
ian-French Council for Security
Cooperation occurred in Paris on
15 November 2002 with the for-
eign and defence ministers.

128. Le Monde, 21-22 July, 2002.

129. At Seville, the EU agreed to
take  no  decision  on  the  Kalin-
ingrad question without first con-
sulting Lithuania and Poland. 

130.  Putin  to  the  Bundestag,
25 September 2001, reproduced
on  DNB,  IPD,  MID,  Moscow,
26 September 2001.

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Russia faces Europe

relations in Italian foreign policy. Berlusconi played a notable role
in  pushing  along  negotiations  on  the  NATO-Russia  Council,
which was signed in Italy in May 2002. Economic ties are not neg-
ligible, with trade turnover in 2001 estimated at $9.3 billion, and
Italian investment in Russia standing at six per cent of total for-
eign investment.131 In 2002, the Russian government sought to
strengthen the impact of Russian-Italian relations on wider Euro-
pean questions. The Joint Russian-Italian Statement on Coopera-
tion of 3 April 2002 stated that the relationship would seek to
develop further the ‘process of rapprochement by the Russian
Federation with Euro-Atlantic organisations’ and ‘to impart a
more intensive character to cooperation between Russia and the
European Union’.132

This  Joint  Statement  highlights  the  duality  in  Russia’s
approach to bilateral relations. These ties are valuable in their own
right for economic and financial reasons. At the same time, bilat-
eral relations are viewed as conduits for the pursuit of wider Russ-
ian interests in the European and transatlantic arenas. For exam-
ple, Putin drew on the foundation of personal/bilateral relations
in the final stages of negotiations with Brussels to find a solution
to  the  Kaliningrad  problem  in  2002.  France,  Italy  and  Spain
adopted a position that was not fully concordant with the Com-
mission, clearing the path towards the ‘compromise’ that was
reached in the autumn.133

The Moscow hostage crisis and the Prague summit

The Moscow theatre hostage crisis in late October 2002 and the
NATO summit the following month shed new light on Putin’s
European policy. All Euro-Atlantic states pledged solidarity with
Russia during the crisis. However, the crisis brought Russia and the
United States closer together. Both states perceive themselves as
being the main targets of international terrorism and the most
important actors in the counter-terrorist struggle – this ‘reality’ is
seen to endow them with special responsibilities as well as special
rights. Washington and Moscow have similar definitions of the
international terrorist threat and the means that are to be used to
counter it. While some in Washington have misgivings about Russ-
ian heavy-handedness in Chechnya, the Russian-US strategic dia-
logue  strengthened  in  late  2002.  NATO  has  adopted  a  similar

131. ‘Russian-Italian Relations’,
MID Statement, Information Bulletin,
MID, Moscow,14 May 2002.

132. See  DNB, 
Moscow, 4 April 2002.

IPD,  MID,

133. Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, Kaliningrad:
Transit (COM(2002) 510 Final:
Brussels,  18.9.2002),  http://
eurpa.eu.int/comm/external_
r e l a t i o n s / n o r t h _ d i m / d o c /
com02_510.pdf.

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2

approach. While noting the need for a political solution to Chech-
nya, George Robertson has lent a warm voice to Russia’s role in the
struggle against international terrorism.

The Prague summit marked a turning point in Russian percep-
tions of the Alliance. Far from being obsolete after 11 September,
as many Russians had argued, Prague launched NATO’s adapta-
tion to the counter-terrorist struggle. The agreements reached at
Prague on capabilities and force specialisation, as well as the pro-
jected development of a ‘Response Force’, added new purpose to
an institution that had been thrown into crisis. Since Prague, Rus-
sia has turned to ponder the implications of the Alliance’s new
identity. For one, the proposed ‘Response Force’ has ambiguous
implications. Some analysts in Moscow have started to consider
how Russia might participate in the Force. On the other hand, the
rapidity with which the Force is to be deployed will sideline the
role of the NRC. For Moscow, this gives rise to the threat of a repeat
of Kosovo, when Russia and the PJC were bypassed.134 Despite
these concerns, NATO has once again become a key vector in Rus-
sia’s approach to European security. 

The same cannot be said for the EU. The EU took a principled
stand against the terrorist attack in Moscow, expressing solidarity
with Russia and condemning all forms of terrorism. However, the
EU  drew  different  conclusions  about  the  implications  of  the
attack. Following the crisis, Putin rejected any talk of negotiations
in Chechnya: the hostage crisis was seen to confirm the Govern-
ment’s  view  that  the  conflict  was  part  of  the  global  struggle
against terrorism. This position was not new, but its impact on
Russia’s European policy has been. Russian relations with Den-
mark soured briefly, because the Danish government allowed a
privately  organised  ‘World  Chechen  Congress’  to  be  held  in
Copenhagen.  The  EU-Russia  summit  in  November  had  to  be
transferred  to  more  ‘neutral’  Brussels  as  a  result.  Moreover,
Moscow voiced similar concerns about complicity with Chechen
terrorism to other European states, including France, Germany
and the Netherlands. Still, Europe has been reluctant to accept
Russia’s line that ‘there are no good Chechens – only terrorists’. All
of this confirms once again for Moscow that the EU, and many of
its member states, can be frustrating partners as well as significant
allies on key questions of international security, as witnessed in
the joint positions elaborated by Paris, Berlin and Moscow on the
crisis over Iraq.

134. Interviews with officials in
the Russian MID and State Duma,
December 2002.

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Russia faces Europe

Russia and CFSP

3

None the less, the EU and CFSP, including ESDP, are not com-
pletely devoid of interest for Moscow. While the United States,
NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations are traditional direc-
tions of Russian policy, much less is known about Russian interac-
tion with the European Union and its views on CFSP and ESDP.

An MID statement on ‘Russian European Priorities’, released
in April 2002, affirmed that ‘it is here that [Russia’s] key interests
are concentrated’.135 This is far from being simple ‘official-speak’.
The  statement  argued  that  Russia  could  not  afford  to  ignore
developments in Europe: ‘Of all the external factors, the processes
unfolding in Europe exert the most significant influence on what
is happening in our country.’ The EU is Russia’s first trading part-
ner, giving it an importance that will increase with enlargement.
The development of CFSP and ESDP adds additional urgency to
Russia’s search for closer ties. Put bluntly, Russia is vulnerable to
developments within the EU. Russian policy towards the EU, thus,
has reflected anxiety as well as opportunism, mixed with real inter-
est in cooperation. Still, a number of questions remain. What
changes has Putin brought to Russia’s EU policy? What impor-
tance does Russia attribute to the political dialogue and ESDP?
More fundamentally, what is the political dialogue and what are
its limits?

The following discussion examines first the state of EU-Russ-
ian relations before Putin’s election and the shift that followed his
arrival in power. The paper then discusses Russia’s views on ESDP
before considering the limits of the political and security dialogue.

Putin’s shift towards the EU

Under Yeltsin, policy to the EU reflected the problems affecting
Russian foreign policy as a whole. In the words of David Gowan,
‘Russia paid lip service to the EU but did not make a sustained
effort to understand its structure, its powers, or the relationship

135. ‘Russian European Priori-
ties’, DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
24 April 2002.

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Russia and CFSP

3

between the EU and its member states . . . Russian policy towards
the  EU  remained  largely  declaratory  and  sterile.’136 EU  policy
towards Russia was not much better. Before examining the shift
that occurred in 2000 in Russian and EU policy, it is worth dis-
cussing the main features of their relations in the 1990s. The legacy
of this period has not dissipated.

The  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement  (PCA)  was
agreed at the Corfu European Council in June 1994 after difficult
negotiations. Composed of 112 articles, ten annexes, two proto-
cols and a joint declaration, covering no less than 178 pages, the
PCA is mostly concerned with trade and economic concerns. The
overall objective of the ‘partnership’ reflects a wide range of ambi-
tions,  from  increasing  economic  ties  and  supporting  Russia’s
democratic and market transition to the eventual creation of a free
trade area.137 Classifying Russia as a state with a transition econ-
omy, the PCA goes some way to liberalising trade, based on the
mutual exchange of most-favoured nation status. Despite a heavy
technical focus, the PCA also sets the objective of developing a
‘political dialogue’ between Russia and the EU to ‘bring about an
increasing convergence of positions on international issues of
mutual concern, thus increasing security and stability.’ The PCA
also determined a number of institutional mechanisms for Rus-
sia-EU interaction, with biannual presidential summits, annual
meetings of a Cooperation Council (at ministerial level), biannual
meetings of a Cooperation Committee (at the level of senior offi-
cials), regular meetings of nine functionally designated Sub-Com-
mittees, and the launch of Parliamentary Cooperation Commit-
tee to meet annually. 

The PCA provides an enduring framework for cooperation
between Russia and the EU on an extensive range of economic and
trade issues as well as political questions, underpinned by multi-
ple institutional links ensuring almost constant discussion. More
than  anything,  the  agreement  highlights  the  deeply  technical
nature of the Russia-EU relationship, which, despite a quick refer-
ence to political dialogue, remains overwhelmingly focused on
trade questions. Moreover, the institutional layers of the dialogue
highlight the heavily bureaucratic tone of relations. The structure
and pace of the dialogue is more a function of the internal require-
ments of the EU than those of the relationship itself. For example,
the six-monthly summits are determined by the rotating EU pres-
idency and not the need for continual high-level dialogue. 

136. David Gowan, How the EU
Can Help Russia (London: Centre
for European Reform, December
2000), p. 1.

137. http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/ceeca/
pca/pca_russia.pdf.

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The application of the PCA was quickly upset by internal Russ-
ian developments. The governments that served under Yeltsin
throughout the 1990s never pushed for the full implementation
of many of its provisions. As a result, in the words of Rodric Braith-
waite, a former British Ambassador writing in 1999, ‘the practical
results of the PCA have been disappointing’.138 Moscow’s reluc-
tance stemmed from a desire to control the pace of reform and
protect certain sectors of the economy. Russian governmental
inefficiency and lack of competence were additional explanations
for Moscow’s lack of diligence. Moreover, the entry into force of
the PCA was delayed until December 1997 because of EU concerns
with the first war in Chechnya (1994-96). The Chechen problem
forced  Russia  and  the  EU  to  approve  an  Interim  Agreement,
signed in July 1995, to regulate their relations.139

In the period between the end of the first Chechen war and the
start  of  the  second  in  August  1999,  the  EU  and  Russia  made
progress  in  defining  more  clearly  their  objectives  towards  the
other. Current relations remain conditioned by the work com-
pleted during this period. The Common Strategy on Russia (CSR),
approved in Cologne during the German Presidency in June 1999,
was the Union’s first attempt to formulate a common vision and
interests related to a third party.140 The CSR is a limited exercise: it
remains underpinned by the PCA, and no additional resources are
dedicated to developing relations with Russia. At the same time,
the stated aims of the CSR are nothing less than to assist ‘Russia’s
return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of
friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on
the foundations of shared values, enshrined in the common her-
itage of European civilisation.’ To achieve this grandiose aim, the
CSR sets out four aims: 

138. Rodric Braithwaite, Russia in
Europe (London: Centre for Euro-
pean Reform, 1999), p. 33.

139. European Community-Russian
Federation: Trade and Trade-related
Matters/ Interim Agreement (Press:
224 Nr: 9010/95).

140. ‘Common Strategy of the EU
on  Russia  of  4  June  1999’,
1999/414/CFSP, Official Journal of
the European Communities, 24 June
1999.

1) the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public insti-

tutions in Russia;

2) the integration of Russia into a common European economic

and social space;

3) cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and

beyond;

4) cooperation in responding to common challenges on the Euro-
pean continent, such as on nuclear safety, organised crime and
environmental problems.

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3

Three dimensions of the CSR are important to note. Firstly, the
Strategy calls for a more efficient, operational and permanent
political dialogue ‘to bring [the EU and Russia] closer together
and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the
European continent’. Joint foreign policy initiatives are specifi-
cally supported. In addition, the EU allows for the possibility of
Russian participation in EU operations ‘when the EU avails itself
of the WEU for missions within the range of the Petersberg tasks’.
The CSR envisages cooperation with Russia on all stages of peace
support, from conflict prevention and conflict management to
resolution. Moreover, the political and security dialogue is placed
within the context of the development of a ‘new European security
architecture’ that was to include the OSCE and its 1999 Charter
for European Security. These points in the CSR laid the basis for
the development of security dialogue launched under president
Putin.

The second feature of the CSR is its assumption that for Russia
to return to the ‘European family’ it had to become like Europe.
The Strategy seeks the full transformation of Russia.141 The list of
actions required by Russia is dizzying. A few examples illustrate
the point: ‘In the first instance, an operational market economy
needs to be put in place’; ‘The rule of law is a prerequisite for the
development of a market economy which offers opportunities
and benefits to all the citizens of Russia’; and ‘The emergence of
civil society in all areas is indispensable for the consolidation of
democracy in Russia’. The CSR’s tone is at once condescending
and vapid. The Strategy recognises that Russia will not become a
candidate for membership. And yet, the Union’s approach resem-
bles the heavily conditional and interventionist style it developed
with candidates for accession. There is a tension between the com-
prehensive demands placed on Russia by the Union and the lim-
ited endgame that is envisaged for these relations. 

A  third  feature  of  the  CSR  that  has  complicated  relations
between Moscow and Brussels is the emphasis on values at the
core of relations. On the one hand, the Strategy states that the EU
has a ‘strategic interest’ in Russia. At the same time, it explicitly
declares that a reinforced relationship between the EU and Russia
must be based on ‘shared democratic values’. The CSR, thus, con-
tains two yardsticks for measuring a partnership with Russia: the
‘strategic’ and the ‘democratic’. The tension between these two has
yet to be resolved in EU-Russian relations.

141.  See  discussion  in  Hiski
Haukkala, ‘The Making of the EU
Common  Strategy  on  Russia’,
Working Paper 28 (Helsinki: Finnish
Institute of International Affairs,
2000).

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The  CSR  stimulated  Russian  thinking  on  the  EU.  In  some
respects, serious thought in Russia had started already in 1998 by
then foreign minister Primakov. The entry into force of the PCA,
indeed, launched the various institutional mechanisms of EU-
Russia  interaction,  forcing  Moscow  to  formulate  policy  more
clearly  than  it  had  previously.142 The  result  was  a  more  sober
understanding of the EU by Russian officials, with increasing
recognition that EU enlargement, in particular, might represent a
cause for concern.143 The CSR led Moscow to commission a group
of Russian experts inside and outside the Government to draft a
Russian  response  in  1999.  The  result  was  ‘The  Medium-Term
Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian
federation and the EU (2000-2010)’, written in mid-1999 and pre-
sented to the EU by then still Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in
October.144

The Russian Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) is notable in sev-
eral respects. Firstly, it places great stress on Russian autonomy
with regard to EU demands. The document declares that Russia
will not seek to become an EU member: ‘As a world power situated
on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine
and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and
advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the
CIS, independence of its position and activities at international
organisations.’ The yardstick for relations with the EU is that of
‘ensuring national interests’: there is no reference to shared values.
The MTS also refers to Russia’s right to protect certain sectors of
the economy, implying that this will be done even if such provi-
sions contradict the terms of the PCA or hinder negotiations on
accession to the World Trade Organisation. 

The MTS, therefore, highlights Russia’s refusal to allow the EU
a right to interfere in its sovereign affairs. This point reflects a
strategic disconnect between the EU’s and Russia’s definition of
the scope of their ‘partnership’.

Secondly, the MTS views the EU in heavily instrumental terms.
In the document, relations with the EU stem from Russia’s objec-
tive of establishing a multipolar world. There are several dimen-
sions to this objective. Russian-EU relations must contribute to
the development of a pan-European collective security system. In
this respect, the MTS reflects elements of Primakov’s earlier strat-
egy, which sought to offset NATO dominance with an increased

142.  ‘EU-Russia:  Cooperation
Council,  First  Meeting,  CFSP,
Presidency  Statement’,  (27/1/
1998) (Pres: 15Nr:05273/98).

143. On early Russian policy, see
Igor Leshukov, Beyond Satisfaction:
Russia’s Perceptions on European Inte-
gration (Bonn: Center for Euro-
pean  Integration  Studies,  ZEI,
1999).

144. Available on the website of
the  delegation  of  the  Euro-
pean  Commission  in  Russia:
http://www.eur.ru/eng/neweur/
user_eng.php?func=apage&id=
53.

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role for the OSCE. Cooperation in EU crisis management is seen to
‘counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO-centrism in Europe’. More-
over, the MTS calls for an intensification of work with the EU on
strengthening the OSCE as ‘a key basis of European security’. In
this sense, security cooperation with the EU is perceived as impor-
tant for its impact on the wider shape of European security and
less for its intrinsic value. 

Another instrumental dimension was related to the former
Soviet Union. The MTS presents EU integration as a model for the
development of the CIS. More bluntly, the Russian Strategy states
that ‘the development of partnership with the EU should con-
tribute to consolidating Russia’s role as a leading power in shap-
ing up a new system of interstate political and economic relations
in the CIS area.’ The implications of this line are not spelt out.
However, Moscow seems to be advocating that the EU approach
the former Soviet Union via Moscow. Russia is to be Europe’s gate-
way to the former Soviet Union.

A final notable feature of the MTS is its sobriety. Compared
with earlier statements, the Russian Strategy raises a serious note
of anxiety about EU deepening and enlargement. The MTS lists a
range of specific objectives Russia should seek in trade relations.
The document states that Russia will move towards the ‘approxi-
mation and harmonisation with EU legislation in the areas of
most active EU-Russia cooperation’ as well as in the areas of stan-
dards and certification. However, counterbalancing this recogni-
tion that Russia must become more like Europe is a list of con-
cerns  that  its  interests  will  be  negatively  affected  by  EU
enlargement (‘expansion’, as the Russians put it). The MTS calls
for negotiations with the EU and the candidate states to ensure
the protection of Russian interests, raising a threat to refuse an
extension  of  the  PCA  with  candidate  countries  which  ‘do  not
ensure fulfilment of the generally recognised norms’. 

The difference between the two documents highlights a strate-
gic gap separating Moscow and Brussels. Their tone reflects diver-
gent concerns. The EU focuses on values and Russia’s need to
change profoundly, while the Russian document stresses national
interests and sovereignty. The CSR is vague, while the Russian
strategy is quite specific. Moreover, both strategies have unre-
solved  internal  tensions  that  undermine  their  coherence.  The
aims of the CSR are balanced between the promotion of strategic

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interests  and  democratic  values.  The  MTS  seeks  to  combine 
Russia’s insistence on autonomy with its desire to deepen cooper-
ation. 

In 1999, Moscow and Brussels declared a ‘strategic partner-
ship’. Clearly, both parties had a different vision of the partner-
ship, its scope and the obligations it entailed.

The second war in Chechnya brought these tensions to the sur-
face. The EU pledged support to Russia after Chechen rebel incur-
sions into the republic of Dagestan in August 1999. However, the
movement of the Russian armed forces back into Chechnya in
October, and the resulting massive displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Chechens, led Brussels to criticise Russian actions.
This criticism came to a height during the Helsinki European
Council in December and the meeting of the EU Council of Minis-
ters in January 2000.145 The Presidency Conclusions condemned
the bombing of cities and threats made against civilians by Russia
as violations of international humanitarian law. The EU called for
an immediate halt to such actions and for Russia to allow interna-
tional  humanitarian  agencies  into  Chechnya  and  launch  an
immediate dialogue with Chechen authorities. Failing this, the
Council pledged to ‘draw the consequences from this situation’,
setting forth a series of quasi-sanctions against Russia. Some of
these were vague, such as the possible revision of the terms of the
Common Strategy and the more strict application of the trade
provisions of the PCA. More specifically, however, the EU decided
to limit TACIS 2000 programmes to priority areas, to suspend the
signature of the Science and Technology Agreement with Russia
and not to carry over to 2000 unspent food aid from 1999. The
Conclusions declared: ‘Russia is major partner for the EU . . . but
Russia must live up to its obligations if the strategic partnership is
to be developed. The EU does not want Russia to isolate herself
from Europe.’ The tone was full of menace.

Moscow received these injunctions with a mixture of surprise
and resentment. With presidential elections scheduled for March,
the Russian government could hardly have reacted positively to
EU concerns, even if it had so desired. The central plank of Putin’s
electoral campaign was the struggle to restore the constitutional
order in Chechnya, with the limits of the military campaign being
those of operational effectiveness and not European concerns. 
Little heed was paid to EU demands. The crisis over Chechnya

145. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki
European Council, 10/11 Decem-
(Brussels,
1999, 
ber 
11/12/99.Nr: 00300/1/99).

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shed stark light on the strategic disconnect between Russia and
the EU. More than anything, it showed that the EU had little lever-
age in Russian domestic politics.

The crisis ebbed after Putin’s victory in the presidential elec-
tions. Brussels made the first gesture. There never had been full
consensus in Brussels and amongst the member states on the
imposition of quasi-sanctions. Chris Patten took an early position
against these in a statement before the European Parliament in
November 1999.146 Patten agued that ‘it would be a historic error
to  begin  the  next  century  by  locking  Russia  out  of  European
affairs.’ Instead, he called for EU engagement with Russia to per-
suade it that its actions in Chechnya were short-sighted: ‘It is only
by trying to maintain the partnership that we have any chance of
getting  the  Russians  to  heed  our  message.  That  is  the  awful
dilemma.’ In parallel, from inside the Council, the High Represen-
tative of the EU for CFSP, Javier Solana, was pushing for greater
engagement with Russia. In October 1999, Solana stated that a
meaningful  security  dialogue  with  Russia  was  ‘long  overdue’,
arguing that ‘developing the partnership with Russia is the most
important, the most urgent and most challenging task that the
EU faces at the beginning of the 21st century.’147 Solana insisted
that a secure Europe could not be built without Russia.

Putin’s election was welcomed with a sigh of relief. The EU
moved quickly to resume full ties with the Russian government
after realising its dearth of influence. Putin’s first summit with the
EU as President in Moscow in May 2000 marked the relaunch. The
Joint Statement noted the EU’s concerns with the situation in
Chechnya, but reaffirmed a desire ‘for the progressive develop-
ment of our relations in all areas [emphasis added].’ All talk of
sanctions and ‘drawing conclusions’ was quietly abandoned.

Patten’s  ‘awful  dilemma’  of  engagement  for  persuasion
became EU policy following the Moscow summit. The Swedish
Report  of  June  2001  on  the  implementation  of  the  Common
Strategy on Russia phrased the approach more diplomatically but
its essence remained the same.148 In the words of the Report, the
EU has a ‘dual track’ policy on Russia based on engagement to
raise its concerns about developments inside Russia, including the
conduct of the Chechen war, and also to promote Russia’s inte-
gration and advance ‘shared values’. Brussels had little leverage
over Moscow and could not afford to suspend ties. At the same

146. ‘Declaration on Chechnya’,
Chris Patten to the European Par-
liament, Strasbourg, 17 Novem-
ber 1999, SPEECH/99/166.

147. Javier Solana, ‘The EU-Russia
Strategic  Partnership’,  Stock-
holm,  13  October  1999.  The
speech  can  be 
found  at:
www.ue.eu.int/solana. 

148. Report on the Implementation of
the Common Strategy of the EU on Rus-
sia to the European Council Göteborg
(Brussels, 12 May 2001, 9805/01
PESC 226).

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time, the emphasis on ‘shared values’ as the basis for partnership
did not disappear. The EU remains a judgmental and intrusive
partner for Russia.

Despite a cantankerous Brussels, Putin accelerated the pace
and scope of Russian policy towards the EU. After his election, he
brought immediate focus to EU-Russia relations. This focus had
several features. Firstly, Putin strengthened the decision-making
capacities  inside  the  Government  with  the  appointment  of  a
deputy prime minister responsible for relations with the EU and
the creation of an Intergovernmental Coordination Committee.
More importantly, Putin brought the weight of the Russian presi-
dent to the task, something that Yeltsin had never done. His per-
sonal role in stimulating Russia-EU relations in the bi-annual
summits cannot be underestimated. 

Secondly, Putin’s turn to the EU was part of what he called Rus-
sia’s overall ‘European vocation’. As he stood poised on the brink
of  major  reform,  the  new  president  recognised  the  need  to
strengthen the whole range of economic and political ties with the
EU. More than this, the idea was that Russia had better do so as
soon as possible. With deepening and widening, the weight of the
EU as a political, financial and trade power was bound to increase.
Consequently, one MID official stated in 1999 that ‘the EU will
have levers for influencing Russia in a direction which is advanta-
geous for itself and may not necessarily be so advantageous for
Russia.’149 In addition to presenting a challenge, Putin recognised
that the EU was an opportunity, not only in economic and trade
terms but also in terms of European security. 

The  results  were  immediate.  During  the  Moscow  summit,
Putin expressed an enthusiastic, if still sober, view on ESDP. The
Joint Statement noted that Russia might be invited by the EU to
participate in further crisis management operations. The poten-
tial  for  practical  security  cooperation  with  the  EU  was  most
appealing for Moscow as it arose barely a year after the Kosovo cri-
sis. The EU emerged as a new security actor in Russia’s pursuit of a
multi-polar European model of security.

Putin’s presidential election, therefore, marked the start of a
more focused and more realistic approach by both parties to the
‘partnership’. At the same time, the problems that had charac-
terised relations in the Yeltsin era did not disappear, nor were the
internal tensions in EU and Russian policy fully resolved. None
the less, the stage was set for deeper dialogue across the board.

149. V. N. Pozdnyakov and S. P.
Ganzha, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’,
vol.  13,  1999,  cited  in  David
Gowan, How the EU can Help Russia
(London: Centre for European 
Reform, December 2000), p. 7.

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Wide-ranging relations: the Energy Dialogue

EU-Russian relations are unique for both parties in terms of the
multiplicity of their dimensions. These range from technical trade
cooperation, large-scale regional cooperation frameworks such as
the Northern Dimension and space cooperation to joint action in
combating organised crime and nuclear safety programmes.150
Russian-EU relations are multifaceted, complex and wide-rang-
ing. While not within the scope of this paper, it is worth discussing
briefly  one  non-ESDP  area  where  relations  have  accelerated
quickly since 2000: the Energy Dialogue between Russia and the
EU.151 The Energy Dialogue illustrates the long-term nature and
scale of ties between Moscow and Brussels. It has also a strategic
dimension, given the importance of Russian energy supplies for
the EU. Moreover, the Dialogue is an area of rough parity between
Russia and the EU. Unlike trade, where Russia needs Europe far
more than Europe needs Russia, energy presents a more balanced
relationship. Finally, the Energy Dialogue highlights the diver-
gent visions of the nature of the ‘partnership’ held in Moscow and
Brussels.

Initially an idea of Commission President Romano Prodi,
the Energy Dialogue was launched during the Paris EU-Russia
Summit  in  October  2000  with  the  objective  of  providing  ‘an
opportunity to raise all the questions of common interest relating
to  the  sector,  including  the  introduction  of  cooperation  on
energy-saving, rationalisation of production and transportation
infrastructures, European investment possibilities and relations
between producers and consumer countries.’152

The Dialogue was based on the recognition of three realities by
Russia and Europe. Firstly, trade in energy is vital to both. In 1999,
21 per cent of EU oil came from Russia (representing 16 per cent of
EU consumption) and 41 per cent of EU gas was supplied by Rus-
sia (representing 19 per cent of consumption). The European mar-
ket was equally significant for Russia. In 1999, 53 per cent of Rus-
sia’s oil exports went to the EU; in 2000, 63 per cent of Russia’s
natural gas exports were supplied to European markets. 

The second recognition was that European demand for energy
would only increase over the next twenty-five years. The Commis-
sion’s Energy Green Paper, presented in November 2000, noted
that  the  EU’s  dependence  on  energy  imports  was  expected  to
increase overall from 50 per cent to 70 per cent by 2030, with oil

150. The website of the Delega-
tion of the Commission to Russia
has an overview of areas of coop-
eration:  http://wwww.eur.ru/
eng/neweur/user_eng.php?func-
coopeng. 

151.  See  the  EU  website:
http://www.europa.eu.int/com
m/energy_transport/en/lpi_en_
3.html#ref.

152. ‘Communication of Presi-
dent Prodi, V. P. de Palacio, and C.
Patten to the Commission’, May
2001.

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reliance increasing from 76 per cent to 90 per cent and natural gas
from 40 per cent to 70 per cent.153 The Green Paper called for
measures to ensure the stability of such energy supplies. Clearly, in
circumstances  of  rising  demand  and  decreasing  room  for
manoeuvre, the energy relationship with Russia has gained in sig-
nificance.  It  is  no  coincidence  that  the  Energy  Dialogue  was
launched at the same moment as the release of the Energy Green
Paper.

The third recognition, indeed, concerns the role of Russia in
this area over the long term. For its potential to be realised, the
Russian energy sector requires reform, and especially, investment.
Russia’s capital needs to 2020 are estimated at around $100 bil-
lion for the natural gas sector and $150 billion in the oil sector. For
the Russian energy sector to become attractive for such massive
investment, however, substantial reform is required. For Brussels,
the Energy Dialogue is a framework for channelling European
expertise, not to say pressure, to reform Russia’s energy sector.

For these reasons, the Dialogue took off at a quick pace. Two
high-level interlocutors were designated to conduct the dialogue,
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Viktor Khristenko, and Euro-
pean  Commission  Director-General  (Energy  and  Transport)
François  Lamoureux.  Four  working  groups  were  created  in
November 2000 on energy strategies, technology transfers, invest-
ments and energy efficiency issues. Since late 2000, Lamoureux
and Khristenko have presented three Progress Reports on the dia-
logue, the latest revealed in November 2002. The Dialogue has
progressed in a number of areas. Two pilot projects for energy sav-
ing and efficiency were designated in Astrakhan and Arkhangelsk,
to be financed by TACIS. In November 2002, a EU-Russia Tech-
nology Centre was inaugurated in Moscow, with joint EU and
Russian directors and financing, to provide a locus for expert
cooperation and exchange. In parallel, the Russian government
has also made progress towards designing a more appropriate Tax
Code for Power-Sharing Agreements, an issue of vital importance
for  foreign  investment.  Also,  a  group  of  independent  experts,
which was created to examine projects of ‘common interest’ for
Russia and the EU, has recommended setting up a guarantee fund
to help protect investors. The dialogue has also promoted better
transparency between the two parties in some important areas.
For example, Russia was able to clarify its concerns about the
imposition of limits (30 per cent) on natural gas supplies to a EU

153. ‘Towards a European Strat-
egy  for  the  Security  of  Energy 
Supply’,  (COM  2000  769, 
29 November, 2000).

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member state from a non-EU member, which were never justified. 
These positive measures remain marginal, however, because
the Energy Dialogue has been held up by divergent interpretations
of its meaning by the two parties. Put bluntly, the priorities of Rus-
sia and the EU are different.154 More than anything else, Russia
seeks  European  investment  to  modernise  its  energy  sector.  In
Moscow’s view, the Energy Dialogue is to serve as a channel for
Russian  advocacy  for  European  capital,  particularly  from  the
European Investment Bank, to support a range of production and
infrastructure projects. Secondly, Russia seeks to ensure that the
terms of its energy supplies are not affected adversely by Commu-
nity regulations on market liberalisation and competition. In par-
ticular, Russia seeks to protect the notion of ‘destination clauses’
for its energy supplies to prevent resale within the Community.
The EU and Russia have also clashed over Russia’s desire to retain
long-term gas supply contracts, which contradict Community
law.155

In contrast, European priorities for the Dialogue are to ensure
the long-term stability of its energy supplies. The primary means
by which to achieve this is to seek access to the Russian market
through its reform and liberalisation. As such, the EU has pushed
for open and non-discriminatory access for exploration, produc-
tion and transport. These objectives explain why the EU has pres-
sured Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, which was signed
in 1994 but held up by Russia’s domestic energy lobby. More fun-
damentally, the EU does not seek, through the Energy Dialogue, to
replace private sector companies or direct private sector decisions.
The differences run deep: Russia wants EU support to mod-
ernise its energy sector and protect its position in the Union, while
the  EU  seeks  the  reform  and  opening  of  the  Russian  market
through the creation of a positive business climate.156 The results
of the Dialogue thus far have been mixed, even in this area of
strategic interest where both parties are demandeurs. 

The political and security dialogue

The Moscow summit in May 2000 marked the start of a more sub-
stantial political and security dialogue between Russia and the
EU.157 Since then, the political and security dialogue has broached
the following subjects of cooperation:

154. For a summary of these dif-
ferences,  see  the  unpublished
presentation 
by  Christian
Cleutinx, Head of Unit, DG Energy
and Transport, ‘Towards an en-
ergy  partnership’,  Warsaw,
21 March 2002.

155. A compromise was reached
on some of these contracts at the
9th summit; see Celine Bayou, ‘Les
Relations Russie-UE – Vers Quelle
Integration?’, Le Courrier des Pays de
L’Est, May 2002, pp. 4-16.

156. On these differences, see dis-
cussion of Isabelle Facon, ‘Les Re-
lations Politiques et de Securite
entre la Russie et l’UE’, FRS Docu-
ments no. 28, Septembre 2002,
pp. 20-3.

157.  Joint  Statement,  EU-Russia
Summit, Moscow, 29 May 2000.

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1) Foreign policy issues

Following the Kosovo crisis, a number of security questions
have returned, sometimes prominently, as subjects of the polit-
ical and security dialogue. For example, the EU and Russia have
issued  joint  statements  of  concern  on  the  conflict  between
India and Pakistan.158 However, statements on such questions,
so far away from the immediate concerns of the dialogue, have
been superficial, indicating no joint effort by the two parties to
work together on a particular question. 

The EU and Russia have made efforts to coordinate their
positions on two questions that are closer to home: the Balkans
and the Middle East. After the collapse of cooperation in the
Balkans during the Kosovo crisis, a shift occurred in Russian-
European approaches to the region. Since 2000, Russia has
largely taken a back seat in the region, insisting only on a strict
application of relevant UN resolutions and no changes to state
borders. The EU and Russia have issued a number of joint state-
ments on various questions arising in the region, but the EU has
taken the lead with Russia’s tacit consent. For example, Russia
was kept informed about EU policies during the crisis in Mace-
donia in 2001 but had no say in the development of European
policy.

Russia and EU foreign policy cooperation in the Middle East
has been relatively greater and more equal, even if both stand in
the shade of the United States. Over the course of the 1990s,
Moscow and Brussels developed similar views on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. At first, both called for negotiations on the
basis of the ‘Madrid Principles’.159 This was followed by joint
emphasis  on  implementing  the  recommendations  of  the
Mitchell Commission. In 2002, their roles became sharper in
the framework of the Quartet. Contrary to expectations, the
Quartet has achieved a working pace. In 2002, the Quartet
developed a three-year, three-phased ‘road map’ based on the
vision of two states.160 While US-led, the EU and Russia have
coordinated their positions through this forum.161

Dialogue on the former Soviet Union has been limited. The
EU has sought to use the political dialogue to influence Russian
policy towards the conflicts in Moldova and the South Cauca-
sus.  These  attempts  have  been  to  little  avail.  EU  efforts  to 

158. Joint Statement, Annex 4, EU-
Russia Summit, Moscow, 29 May
2002.

159. Joint Statement, EU-Russia
Summit, Moscow, 17 May 2000.

160. Joint Statement on Middle East,
EU-Russia  Summit,  Brussels,
11 November 2002.

161. As a result, officials in the
Russian MID expressed very posi-
tive  views  of  the  Quartet  in 
discussions with the author in
Brussels in October 2002 and
Moscow in December 2002.

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discuss the question of Belarus with Russia, while always on the
agenda, have also been in vain. 

Thus, while there are broad similarities between Russia and
the EU on a number of important international security ques-
tions, ranging from the role of the UN to the Middle East, the
political dialogue has produced few, if any, meaningful joint
foreign policy positions.

2) Dialogue mechanisms

As noted in the Press Background Note issued before the 9th
EU-Russia Summit in May 2002, ‘the dialogue with Russia is
more frequent than with any other third party’.162

In addition to the summits that occur on a six-monthly basis,
the EU and Russia agreed in 2000 to entertain consultations on
security and defence matters between the EU Political and Secu-
rity Committee (COPS) and the Russian Ambassador in Brus-
sels. Russia and the Union also agreed to start expert-level dis-
cussions on the issues of disarmament and arms control. The
expert groups have met on a regular annual basis, and the sub-
jects for discussion have come to include the conflicts in the
former Soviet Union.

October 2001, Brussels and Moscow decided to increase the
tempo, with the creation of a monthly meeting between the
Russian Ambassador and the COPS Troika ‘to take stock of
consultations on crisis prevention and management’.

In addition, contacts have developed at the military level. The
first meeting of the EU Military Committee Chairman with
officers in the Russian MO was held in May 2002. In November
2002, the Russian MO assigned a liaison officer to work with the
EU Military Staff in Brussels.

In many respects, the security dialogue between Russia and
the EU is over-institutionalised. Meetings occur too often for
the good of the relationship, contributing to a formalistic and
bureaucratic climate. None the less, the multiplicity of contact
levels is not without advantages in terms of mutual habituation
with the other party. 

The monthly meetings of the COPS Troika and the Russian
Ambassador have proved more successful than expected, instill-
ing an informal and continuous pace into the dialogue. By all
accounts, this format has been the most positive experience.163

162. See also Clelia Rontoyanni,
‘Russian and Ukrainian Views of
ESDP’, unpublished paper, 1 July
2002.

163. Interviews with members of
the secretariat of the Council in
October 2002 and with Russians
officials in Brussels and Moscow
in October and December 2002.

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3) EU conflict management operations 

Russia and the EU have also launched a dialogue on future EU
conflict management operations. In the first instance, at the
initiative of the Russian government, Brussels and Moscow
have exchanged views on concepts of conflict prevention and
management. 

Two Russian ‘power’ ministries took the lead in this area. In
early 2001, the MO developed detailed proposals for joint work
on crisis management with the EU, with an emphasis on joint
planning and possible multinational peace support units. In
2002, the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations presented
to the EU an elaborate concept for civilian crisis management.
This was followed up by further proposals on disaster manage-
ment in March 2003. Direct contacts have been established with
both ministries in Moscow. However, the EU has not yet devel-
oped its own concepts, so this area has not advanced.

Since the Nice European Council, EU member states have
worked out modalities for the participation of Russian forces in
EU crisis management operations. The latest clarification of
procedures was issued in the Presidency Report on ESDP in
June 2002.164 The procedures state that the EU will start an
intensified dialogue with Russia in case of an emerging crisis.
Russia will also be informed if the EU is considering an opera-
tion. Once the EU has determined a Concept of Operations,
Russia may be invited to participate in the EU operation and
attend the Force Generation Conference. If Russia provides ‘sig-
nificant forces’ to the operation, Moscow will have the same
rights as participating EU member states in the Committee of
Contributors, the main body for daily operational manage-
ment. Brussels has elaborated similar arrangements for civilian
crisis management operations, such as police missions. 

The possibility of actual Russian involvement was raised in
2001, and took shape in 2002 during EU planning for the EU
Police  Mission  (EUPM)  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  that  was
launched in January 2003. In October 2002, the Russian gov-
ernment put forward five Russian candidates for participation
in the EUPM. This hardly constitutes a ‘significant contribu-
tion’ to the operation. However, Russian involvement in the
EU’s first crisis management operation, even if non-military
and small-scale, is not without symbolic importance. At the very
least, the EUPM signals Russia’s willingness to work under the

68

22 

June 

164.  Presidency  Report  on  ESDP,
Brussels, 
2002,
10160/2/02 REV 2 ESDP 188, An-
nex IV, Arrangements for Consul-
tation and Cooperation between
the EU and Russia on Crisis Man-
agement.

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Russia and CFSP

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EU in the Balkans. 

Russia’s military liaison officer in the EU Military Staff is also
concerned with crisis management. According to the Common
Strategy Implementation Report to Seville of 18 June 2002, one
of the designated functions of the officer is to ‘promote practi-
cal information exchange on military crisis management mat-
ters’. This function remains to be developed.

4) Counter-terrorism

The attacks of 11 September brought counter-terrorism to the
table of the Russia-EU political dialogue. At summit level, the
two parties have issued two relevant joint statements. The first
followed the Brussels summit in October 2001 and pledged to
increase cooperation to form an international coalition.165 The
EU and Russia agreed to exchange information on terrorist
activities and networks, and not to allow any such groups on
their territories. The two parties also agreed to block the finan-
cial sources for terrorism and exchange intelligence on dubi-
ous transactions. 

Russia and the EU issued a second statement on the fight
against international terrorism after the Brussels summit in
November  2002.166 This  statement  placed  emphasis  on  the
need to bring to justice the ‘perpetrators, organisers and spon-
sors of terrorist acts’. More practically, the statement declared
that an agreement was to be finalised between EUROPOL and
Russia on the exchange of technical and strategic information.
This agreement will lay the basis for greater police and judicial
cooperation between the EU and Russia. The Joint Statement
also stressed the role of the UN as the central legal and political
authority in the counter-terrorist struggle.

Moreover, Russia has been invited as a special guest to a num-
ber of conferences on the question organised by the EU. The two
parties have discussed the topic and exchanged views at the
expert level and with the COPS Troika since November 2001. 

Both Moscow and Brussels have noted the link between ter-
rorism and illegal activities. As a result, EU-Russian coopera-
tion in the struggle against organised crime is an indirect facet
of their cooperation in counter-terrorism. In 2000, the two par-
ties agreed to a joint Action Plan on combating organised crime
in the Russian Federation.167 While cooperation has taken a
slow start, meetings of Russian and EU justice and home affairs

165. Statement on International Ter-
rorism, EU-Russia Summit (Press:
342Nr  12423/01:  Brussels, 
3 October 2001).

166.  Joint  Statement  on  the  Fight
against Terrorism, Russia-EU Sum-
mit, Brussels, 11 November 2002.

167. European Union Action Plan on
Common Action for the Russian feder-
ation on Combating Organised Crime
(2000/C 106/02, Official Journal
C 106, 13 April 2000, pp. 0005-
0012).

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Russia faces Europe

ministries have become regular events. In so much as the focus
has been on money laundering, arms and drugs smuggling,
these discussions are not completely unrelated to counter-ter-
rorism. 

(Real progress in this area has been largely formal for the
moment, in part held up by the scale of the criminal challenge
emanating from Russia and the dispersed attention of the Russ-
ian government.)

As will be discussed later, Russian-EU counter-terrorist coop-
eration has been held up by differences between Moscow and
various European capitals over the definition of terrorism and
the means that are appropriate for countering it. The difference
in vision became most apparent after the Moscow hostage crisis
in October 2002, when many European states were reluctant to
accept Russia’s definition of the Chechen conflict as counter-
terrorism.  Russian  efforts  to  secure  the  extradition  of  the
Chechen representative, Akhmed Zakayev, from Denmark and
Britain, produced little more than frustration in Moscow.

5) Military-technical cooperation

In addition, the Russian government has been keen to develop
technical cooperation in areas of perceived comparative advan-
tage. The lack of European strategic airlift has long been noted,
and Russia (like Ukraine) has eagerly put forward its capabilities
as a logical option for the EU. However, European states have
decided to develop a specifically European capability in this area
with the projected development of the A400M, planned for
delivery in 2008. Although the main funder of the project, Ger-
many, faces serious financial problems, the A400M remains a
European priority. 

Russia offered aircraft to the EU for use in Afghanistan in late
2001. The offer was rejected for two reasons. Firstly, the cost of
renting the aircraft was considered exorbitant. Secondly, Russia
sought to impose political limits on the use of the aircraft, lim-
iting the distribution of humanitarian assistance by ECHO to
areas under the control of the Northern Alliance. Quite natu-
rally, Brussels rejected the Russian offer.168

None the less, driven mostly by inertia, the question of using
Russian aircraft remains under assessment in Brussels. A ques-
tionnaire  on  assets  and  capabilities  has  been  given  to  the 
Russian MO for completion. In September 2002, the Russian

168. Interviews with EU officials in
Brussels in October 2002.

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3

Ministry for Emergency Situations also proposed its assets for
use in ESDP.

The Russian government has also proposed that the EU draw
on its satellite imaging to bolster ESDP capabilities. The EU
Satellite Centre in Torrejon has bought Russian satellite images
in the past but no special relationship has been established. At
the wider level, Moscow and Brussels launched a Space Dia-
logue in 1998. Russian-EU space cooperation has run parallel to
the wider development of a European joint space strategy. The
decision  to  develop  the  civilian  satellite  navigation  system,
Galileo, taken in March 2002, marks an acceleration of EU pol-
icy in this area. Russian-EU cooperation in the Space Dialogue
envisages possible Russian involvement in Galileo as well as the
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) ini-
tiative.169

For the moment, however, cooperation in military-relevant
satellite  imaging  is  very  limited.  Russian  images  have  been
bought by the EU Satellite Centre but on a commercial basis
and not always with the most reliable results.170

The EU has no pressing need for access to Russian satellite

capabilities.

In addition, Russia and the EU decided to conduct a regular
dialogue on mine-clearance during the May 2002 summit. In
all, issues of military-technical cooperation between Moscow
and Brussels have more longevity than substance. Some of
these questions were bandied about throughout the 1990s, but
few  have  developed  seriously.  Nor  are  they  likely  to  in  the
future.

6) Non-ESDP security-related issues

Russian-EU relations also feature cooperation on a number of
non-ESDP questions that have security relevance. Some of these
have already been mentioned, such as the Joint Action on com-
bating organised crime in the Russian Federation.

In addition, Russia and the EU have agreed to a framework
for cooperation in the spheres of nuclear safety and disarma-
ment. At the wider foreign policy level, both parties maintain
similar  stances  on  the  need  to  enforce  multilateral  arms 
control and disarmament agreements, such as the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
More specifically, the EU Council approved a Joint Action in

169. A joint memorandum agreed
on 19 December 2000 by the Eu-
ropean Commission, the Euro-
pean Space Agency and the Russ-
ian 
Rosaviakosmnos
established a political framework
for cooperation between Galileo
and Russia’s GLONASS.

agency 

170. See Mark Webber, ‘Third-
Party Inclusion in European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy: A Case
Study of Russia’, European Foreign
Affairs  Review,  vol.  6(4),  2001,
pp. 407-26.

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December  1999  (at  the  height  of  the  crisis  over  Chechnya)
establishing a Cooperation Programme for Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament in the Russian Federation.171 A follow-up
Council decision in June 2001 was approved for the further
implementation of the 1999 Joint Action.172

The thrust of the EU programme is threefold. Firstly, the EU
seeks to support the development of a nuclear safety culture
alongside the monitoring agencies inside Russia. The EU funds
jointly the International Science and Technology Centre in
Moscow to support Russian nuclear scientists. Secondly, the
EU has provided support to studies and experiments regarding
the disposal of nuclear materials, in particular, with regard to
mixed oxide fuels. Finally, the EU supports a number of proj-
ects related to chemical weapons destruction in Russia. 

Since the Kananaskis summit of the leaders of the G-8 in
June 2002, EU programmes in this area have been part of the
wider international effort to support on a much more extensive
scale the process of dismantling and securing Russia’s nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons, agents, materials, and infra-
structure. The G-8-led Global Partnership, indeed, consists of a
pledge of $20 billion over the next ten years, to which the EU
has promised €1 billion.173

While not part of the ESDP-related political dialogue, these
programmes bring added value to the security relationship. The
joint statement issued after the November 2002 summit placed
emphasis on the connection between international terrorism
and  organised  crime,  money-laundering,  and  illegal  move-
ments  of  nuclear,  chemical  and  biological  materials.  These
dimensions are likely to gain in importance.

While the political and security dialogue is quite wide, it lacks
real depth. Before examining the reasons why the partnership is
limited, it is worth discussing Russian perceptions of ESDP and
how these have evolved.

Russian views on ESDP: from enthusiasm to realism

Russian views on ESDP have evolved rapidly since the St-Malo 
declaration.  However,  it  is  possible  to  identify  four  core 
perceptions.

171. Council Joint Action of 17 De-
cember 1999 establishing a EU Coop-
eration Programme for Non-Prolifera-
tion and Disarmament in the Russian
Federation (1999/878/CFSP).

172.  Council  decision  of  25  June
2001  implementing  Joint  Action
1999/878/CFSP with a view to con-
tributing to the EU Cooperation Pro-
gramme for Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament in the Russian Federa-
tion (2001/493/CFSP).

173.  For  more  on  EU  pro-
grammes in this area, see Kathrin
Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette
Schaper,  in  Burkard  Schmitt
(ed.), ‘European Union,’ in Pro-
tecting against the Spread of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons: An
Action Agenda for the Global Partner-
ship,  Volume  3:  International  Re-
sponses (Washington DC: Center
for Strategic and International
Studies, January 2003).

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3

Firstly, and most fundamentally, Russia perceives ESDP as a
project which has just been launched and whose future remains
uncertain.  Igor  Ivanov,  who  had  worked  on  Russian  policy
towards the EU before being appointed Foreign Minister and,
therefore, has quite unique experience in a Russian setting, has
repeatedly emphasised this aspect of ESDP. At a moment of par-
ticularly enthusiastic rhetoric from some Russian circles, Ivanov
stated in April 2001: ‘I would like to stress we are at the beginning
of the road. You see the policy of the EU in the field of security and
defence is in its formative stage.’174 Russia is not blind to the real-
ity that ESDP must be implemented at the same time with the
results  of  the  Convention  and  the  enlargement  of  the  EU  to
twenty-five member states. ESDP is nascent; Moscow is prepared
to  wait  and  see  the  nature  of  the  creature  that  will  finally  be
brought to life. 

Russia’s ‘wait-and-see’ approach has imparted a dose of cau-
tion in its dealings with ESDP. At the same time, the very fact that
ESDP is emerging concurrently with the deepening and widening
of the EU has led Moscow to take it seriously. For all its weakness,
Moscow cannot ignore the fact that the EU is ‘pregnant’ with
power. The second core Russian perception of ESDP, therefore, is
the need for Russia to get involved early and heavily. If Russia is
likely to remain weak while the EU becomes stronger, then Russia
must secure a foothold in ESDP as soon as possible, while the
tables are not too unbalanced. Moreover, Russia seeks to affect the
kind of ESDP that is being formed, in order to ensure that it is not
threatening to Russian interests, and secure maximum influence
over its activities. Igor Ivanov stated in May 2001 that the EU was
‘the largest integration association in the world and a major pole
of an emerging world multipolar system.’175 Russia cannot afford
not to have special ties with it.

Thirdly, inherited from some of its previous dealings with the
WEU, the Russian government sees potential financial gains in
cooperation with ESDP.176 As the deficiencies in European mili-
tary capabilities became clear in the late 1990s, and, most notably,
during the Kosovo crisis, Russian proposals for the EU to draw on
Russian strategic airlift capabilities as well as space reconnais-
sance technology have resurfaced. 

Finally, ESDP matters for Russia in terms of its instrumental-
ity. In 1999, Yeltsin sought to tie the development of the EU as a
security actor to the strengthening of the OSCE.177 Following the

174. Remarks during a joint press
conference with Javier Solana, re-
ported  on  DNB,  IPD,  MID,
Moscow, 5 April 2001.

175. Igor Ivanov, ‘Russia and EU:
Prospects for Strategic Partner-
ship’, Europa Magazine, no. 5, May
2001. 

and 

176.  See  discussion  in  Dmitriy
Danilov 
Stephan  de
Spiegeleire, ‘From decoupling to
recoupling: a new security rela-
tionship  between  Russia  and
Western Europe?’, Chaillot Paper
31 (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies of WEU, April 1998).

177. EU/Russia Summit, Moscow,
18 February  1999 
(Brussels,
18/2/1999,  Press  43  Nr:
6118/99).

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Kosovo crisis, Moscow seized on ESDP to fill the vacuum left in
European security. To date, the link between ESDP and NATO
remains in Russian policy. As noted in the 1999 Medium-Term
Strategy towards the EU, Russia views the EU as contributing to
the development of a multipolar world to offset the rise of one
dominated by a single power. A wider and deeper EU, entertaining
strong ties with Russia, is said to provide for the ‘interrelated and
balanced strengthening of the position of Russia and the EU in the
international community of the twenty-first century’. The devel-
opment of ESDP and the dialogue with Russia is presented in the
Russian Strategy as a means to counterbalance ‘NATO-centrism
in Europe’. At the very least, the development of ESDP may dilute
NATO’s predominant role, providing an alternative locus for deci-
sion-making, with different membership and rules of behaviour. 
Russian approaches to ESDP have evolved over three periods
since 1999. The first period was one of Russian enthusiasm for
ESDP and proactive attempts to develop cooperation as far and as
quickly as possible. Starting in 1999 and lasting till May 2001, the
Russian leadership acted in the shadow of the Kosovo crisis, des-
perate to dilute NATO predominance and restore to Russia some
place in the Continent. Under Putin’s leadership, Russian policy
came quickly to place its hopes in ESDP as the means to build a
‘Greater Europe’. The EU-Russia summit in Paris in October 2000
marked a high point of Russian enthusiasm. Russia’s Ambassador
to Brussels called the Paris summit a ‘sputnik – a rocket to launch
relations into a new orbit’, whose possibilities were ‘gigantic’.178
Vasily Likachev declared in rosy tones that ‘we are approaching a
new concept of European security’. The Russian MO was particu-
larly proactive in early 2001 with proposals for joint conceptual
work, joint operations, and military-industrial cooperation. In a
meeting with Patten, Solana and Swedish Foreign Minister Anna
Lindh, Sergei Ivanov went so far as to state that ‘the Russia-EU 
dialogue ought to be no less intensive than the Russia-NATO 
dialogue’.179 This moment of Russian enthusiasm corresponded
with  proactive  statements  within  the  EU  about  the  need  to
develop ties with Russia.

The following summit in Moscow in May 2001 marked a blow
to burgeoning ties. The Moscow Joint Statement noted that the
two parties would continue to inform each other about their secu-
rity policies, and concluded that ‘cooperation should continue to
evolve gradually and in a structured way’. Nothing more. 

178. See ‘EU/Russia: What are the
Next Steps?’, European Report EIS,
4 November 2000.

179. DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
16 February 2001.

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3

The EU had cooled off. Prospects for developing ties further
with Russia were dim, while a host of more important questions,
such as access to NATO assets, remained unresolved. Moreover,
the EU had no desire to tie itself too tightly to Russia while ESDP
remained in formation because of the political ramifications this
might have on relations with the United States. Increasing frus-
tration with EU passivity marked this second period of Russian
policy. An article written by Sergei Prikhodka, the Deputy Head of
the Presidential Administration, in summer 2001, highlighted
Russian concern, not to say anger, at the slow pace of coopera-
tion.180 Prikhodka argued that the EU and Russia had failed to
develop a serious dialogue, calling on both parties ‘at last to move
from words to action . . . we have no more time for feet dragging
and  procrastination.’  The  Brussels  summit  in  October  2001
marked the end of this second period, resulting in a decidedly low-
key joint statement that conditioned the Russia-EU dialogue on
ESDP ‘in light of progress made by the EU’. Given the modest pace
of progress until then, these words were not promising.

Since October 2001, Russia has become more sceptical about
ESDP. In some respects, Russian policy is no less proactive and
ambitious than it was in 2000. Russia has continued to make
ambitious proposals for military and military-technical coopera-
tion. Russia’s ‘Russia-EU Action Plan in the field of ESDP’ pre-
sented to Brussels in May 2002 showed the range of its ambitions
in terms of dialogue mechanisms and substance. Moscow’s expec-
tations had by then changed as a result of the upheaval in interna-
tional relations caused by 11 September. ESDP as originally envi-
sioned  seemed  out  of  sync  with  Europe’s  strategic  needs.  The
Petersberg tasks were fitting for the wars of the 1990s but not the
twenty-first century. Moreover, if the EU has made any progress in
responding to new threats, they reside mainly, if anywhere, within
the purview of its third pillar (justice and home affairs) and not
ESDP. The terrorist attacks also catalysed a more self-consciously
unilateralist  United  States  that  had  a  jaundiced  view  on  any
entangling alliance that was not mission-led. British policy in
Europe changed as a result, with Tony Blair seeking to position
Britain ever more as the transatlantic bridge. Russian policy has
also taken on a strong US-focus, with the rise of a strategic rela-
tionship with Washington based on similar visions of interna-
tional security. Moreover, although not related to the ESDP, EU-
Russian  relations  in  2002  were  affected  by  the  difficult

180. Sergei Prikhodka, ‘Russia-EU
Cooperation: The Need for a New
Impetus’, Europa Magazine, no. 3,
October 2001.

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negotiations occurring on transit to and from Russia’s exclave of
Kaliningrad, with Moscow insisting in vain that the rules of the
Schengen regime be relaxed in this case. Finally, following a year of
quivering uncertainty, the Prague summit breathed new life into
NATO.

With all this, the importance of ESDP for Russia has taken a

blow.

The limits of the partnership

In addition, the political and security dialogue has been affected by
six factors related to the nature of the two parties, their objectives
and interests.

1) Clashing visions

As noted above, Russia entertains a number of different percep-
tions of ESDP, which coexist, not always coherently, in Russian
policy. The bottom line, though, is that relations with ESDP
should advance Russian interests in Europe, which consist in
creating a model of European security that ensures Moscow an
‘equal’ voice in all security dimensions. In this sense, ESDP is
essentially an instrument to create a ‘Greater Europe’.

ESDP is nothing of the sort for the EU.181 For Brussels, ESDP
is not a motor for the creation of a common European security
space. It is a limited instrument of EU foreign policy: ESDP
serves the EU and not ‘Greater Europe’. Future EU operations
have similarly limited scope and objectives. Their aim is not to
create a common ‘space’, or to accommodate the interests of all
parts of Europe; it is solely that of crisis management. 

2) Modalities for third-party involvement

As a result, the modalities for third-party involvement in ESDP
operations fall short of Russian demands. The Russian govern-
ment has sought to ensure that it has equality with EU mem-
ber states at every level of decision-making in a crisis situa-
tion: that is, joint Russian-EU assessment of a situation and agr
eement that it is indeed a crisis (Russia did not see Kosovo in the
same way as NATO), joint planning and joint command and 
control. 

181. Interviews with officials in
the Council Secretariat, Brussels,
October 2002.

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3

Russia’s  insistence  on  ‘co-decision making’ is completely
inappropriate for Brussels. For the EU, third parties may partic-
ipate if they so desire but only if their participation is considered
necessary. Automatic co-decision making is out of the question.
Most importantly, third-party involvement allows for only
that – involvement. Nothing more. Joint decision-making may
be envisaged only if a third party provides ‘significant forces’, a
notion that has remained wilfully vague in Brussels. Moreover,
even if a third party does provide significant forces, it will not
necessarily be involved in the drafting of the Concept of Oper-
ations. 

In sum, the present modalities for Russian involvement in
EU operations seem less accommodating than those of NATO.
In fact, Russia has called on Brussels to create a forum similar
to the NATO-Russia Council. 

3) Grey areas of future EU operations

There are a number of grey areas surrounding EU operations
that give cause for concern in Moscow. In 2002, Vladimir Bara-
novsky cited an extremist Russian view that the ‘common Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy is potentially more dangerous
than NATO’.182

Firstly, after Kosovo, the definition of what constitutes a cri-
sis is a source of worry for Moscow. Russia fears that what it
might see as an internal problem may be considered an inter-
national crisis for Brussels. For this reason, Russia has proved
extremely  reluctant  to  discuss  Belarus  with  the  EU.  For
Moscow, Belarus poses no international threat and is not a ‘cri-
sis’ in any way. 

Linked  to  this,  the  EU  has  remained  wilfully  vague  in
answering the question of whether it will seek a UN mandate
for its operations.183 The EU’s desire to keep its options open in
this respect is a source of worry for Russia, which seeks to pre-
vent a repetition of the Kosovo precedent of non-UN man-
dated use of force by a regional organisation. 

The Russian government has also shown concern over the
geographical scope of potential EU operations. Unofficially,
the EU may consider mounting operations in a radius of 4,000
km from Brussels, which takes in part of the Caucasus. Russia
is concerned that ESDP might be turned against Russian inter-
ests in the future with forces deployed on its borders. 

182. This excellent work is the
most  thorough  analysis  of  the
range  of  Russian  attitudes  to-
wards the EU: V. Baranovsky, Rus-
sia’s Attitude towards the EU: Political
Aspects, Finnish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Programme on
the Northern Dimension of CFSP,
no. 15: Finland, 2002, p. 113.

183. See discussion in Martin Or-
tega, ‘Military Intervention and
the European Union’, Chaillot Pa-
per 45 (Paris: Institute for Secu-
rity  Studies  of  WEU,  March
2001).

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Finally, the significance of the agreement on EU access to
NATO assets and capabilities, reached in December 2002, is
unclear for Russia. This arrangement may offer an opportunity
for greater Russian involvement in EU operations through the
NATO-Russia Council. It may also have the opposite effect.

Russia’s basic concern with ESDP is that it will follow the
path of the OSCE, towards the ‘narrowing’ of its functions and
focus, but with a strong link to NATO. Russia seeks to be a sub-
ject of ESDP, not its object.

4) Different actors – different security agendas

Russia and the European Union are different kinds of actors.184
Russia is a sovereign state, with a unified political, economic
and military system, an elected leadership dedicated to advanc-
ing  the  state’s  interests  and  institutions  for  coordinating
means to desired ends. 

The EU is nothing of the sort. The European Union is a
unique, not to say strange, political actor, with divided and
clashing institutions, unclear sovereignty, a weak sense of com-
mon interests and few institutions in the political area yet able
to achieve its declared ends. 

These differences have rendered the development of gen-
uine strategic partnership difficult. In interviews, Russian offi-
cials in Brussels and Moscow note the difficulty of dealing with
the EU because of its complexity in terms of different loci of
decision-making and opacity. 

(In the view of some EU officials, however, Russia has come
to master using EU complexity for its purposes, playing various
levels of the organisation off against each other – the Commis-
sion and the Council, the Presidency foreign ministry and EU
bodies. Russia’s skill was evident in the final stages of negotia-
tions on the transit questions surrounding the Kaliningrad
Oblast in 2002, where Moscow drew on close bilateral ties to
reinforce and exploit differences between EU institutions.185)
The security agendas of Russia and the EU are radically dif-
ferent. At the widest level, this clash is between a state that is
deeply defensive about its sovereignty and territoriality and an
association  where  sovereignty  is  pooled  and  traditional
notions of territoriality are diluted. 

184. See also discussion of Marius
Vahl, ‘Just Good Friends? The EU-
Russia ‘Strategic Partnership’ and
the Northern Dimension’, Working
Document no. 166 (Brussels: CEPS,
March 2001).

185. Discussions with officials in
the Commission and the Coun-
cil,  October  and  November
2002.

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Russia has become a staunch conservative in some areas of
international affairs. By contrast, the EU and its member states
stand at the forefront of the elaboration of new customs of
international relations, including the notions of ‘humanitar-
ian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’.

Russia’s security agenda is that of a state under siege from
external pressures and internal conflict, where terrorism min-
gles with separatism and institutional weakness to produce a
volatile cocktail. In the case of Chechnya, defined by the gov-
ernment as a case of outright international terrorism, Russia
continues to believe in the utility of military force. 

The EU’s understanding of the Chechen problem is differ-
ent: Brussels has refused to allow the conflict to be folded into
the wider struggle with hyperterrorism. Moreover, the EU’s
approach to security places less emphasis on the use of force
than on the widest possible range of civilian responses and pri-
marily political tools. 

EU objectives in relation to Russia reflect the peculiarity of
Europe as a political project. Europe is as much a community
of interest between member states on hard issues of economics
and politics as it is a community of shared values. This duality
renders the EU a prickly foreign policy partner. 

The Commission’s Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 of 27
December 2001 highlights the duality in EU objectives. On the
one hand, ‘the EU’s cooperation objectives with the Russian
federation are to foster respect of democratic principles and
human rights, as well as the transition towards a market econ-
omy.’ The same document states that the long-term objectives
of the EU are a ‘prosperous market for EU exports and invest-
ment and reliable source of energy supply, as well as a pre-
dictable and cooperative partner for security on the European
continent.’186

While the simultaneous pursuit of values and interests may
not seem contradictory for Brussels, it does from the Russian
perspective. The emphasis on values is seen as intrusive: the EU
wants Russia to become like it is, while not being willing to pay
for this transformation. This EU policy may have been appro-
priate for accession candidates but it is less fitting for Russia, a
country that is not seeking membership. 

186. Country Strategy Paper 2000-
2006,  National  Indicative  Pro-
gramme, 2002-2003, Russian Feder-
ation,  European  Commission,
27 December 2001, Brussels.

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Russia faces Europe

Russian objectives are not vague notions of shared values
but hard interests. The EU also defends hard interests in rela-
tions with Russia, but mixes these with values and aspirations.
In these circumstances, the scope for misunderstanding and
wasted time is large. 

5) Need for the other?

Moreover, in security terms, neither Russia nor the EU has yet
an immediate and pressing need for the other. Both parties are
caught  up  with  their  own  transformation  projects:  the  EU
towards deepening and widening, and Russia towards state con-
solidation and economic revitalisation. 

In security terms, Russia remains deeply embroiled in the
marasma of the Chechen war, while simultaneously seeking to
reform  the  Russian  armed  forces  and  power  structures.  EU
member states (some at least) are fixed on the implementation
of  ESDP  goals.  In  the  view  of  the  Russian  analyst  Dmitry
Danilov, neither party sees the other as either the solution to its
security needs or as a threat to its security.187 The different pri-
orities of Russia and the EU dilute any urgency either party may
have in developing significant tries with the other.

6) Internal obstacles

The political and security dialogue is also held up by internal
factors specific to the decision-making processes in Russia and
the EU. 

On the Russian side, policy towards ESDP is heavily presi-
dential. This situation has lent greater concentration to Russ-
ian policy. It is also a sign of weakness. The vast bureaucracies of
the foreign ministry and the power ministries standing behind
Putin  remain,  at  the  least,  conservative  and,  at  the  most,
obstructive to the President’s plans. 

For example, a number of Russian ministries have for years
blocked  Russian  ratification  of  the  Multinational  Nuclear
Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation. Various
ministries in Moscow have placed obstacles to greater coopera-
tion with the EU and other partners seeking to support the dis-
mantling  and  securing  of  Russia’s  nuclear,  biological  and
chemical weapons complex. Most notably, despite the pledge
of $20 billion by the G-8-led Global Partnership in 2002, the
Russian government has made slow progress in clearing the

187. D. Danilov in ‘The EU’s Rapid
Reaction Capability’, ESF Working
Paper no. 4 (Brussels: CEPS and
IISS, November 2001).

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3

legal, financial and security-related problems that have held up
cooperation in the past. In sum, the summit-led nature of rela-
tions marks the weak institutional base of Russia’s European
policy.

The dispersal of decision-making power across the various
EU institutions dealing with Russia impacts on the Union’s
ability to interact strategically with Moscow. This situation
concerns the different responsibilities of the Commission and
the Council. More fundamentally, the internal make-up of the
EU is projected onto the relationship with Russia. The six-
monthly summits are a function of the rotating presidency of
the EU and not the actual needs of the relationship, which
might require more or less summit meetings.

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4

Proposals for the political
and security dialogue

Despite its limitations and the blows it has taken, Russia has not
written off CFSP and ESDP. Russia’s approach is less urgent than it
was in 2000, and Russian hopes for the strategic partnership have
become more realistic. But it is exactly for these reasons that there
remains fertile ground for closer security cooperation between
Russia and the EU. More than that, the EU needs to develop this
cooperation further.

Why is there a need for a deeper political and security dialogue?
The most important reason is that the EU and Russia will need
each more with increasing urgency in the future. There are several
levels to this urgency. First, the EU and Russia share a number of
foreign policy concerns about the international system, where
greater cooperation would add value to each party. Brussels and
Moscow share similar visions of the importance of the UN, and the
Security Council, in the new system of international relations.
After 11 September, while neither has completely unambiguous
policies, Russia and the EU member states all recognise the impor-
tance of the body of international law and customs built up dur-
ing the Cold War. In more concrete terms, Russia and the EU, and
many of its members, take common approaches to a number of
key questions affecting current international affairs, from the
conflicts in the Middle East to those in the Balkans. The need to
strengthen the international regime of non-proliferation is pur-
sued by both the EU and Russia, although with different levels of
intensity and not without mishaps. The internal and external
transformation of the EU that will follow the Convention on the
Future of Europe, the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004 as
well as enlargement will increase the potential weight of the Union
on the international stage. For part of this weight to be realised,
however, the EU will need closer strategic ties with Russia, ties
which can add value to European diplomacy.

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The second level of urgency resides with ESDP. 11 September
and  the  rise  of  hyperterrorism  have  not  rendered  ESDP 
obsolete.188 Quite the contrary. As the dust settles from 2001, it is
clear that the original plans for a European Rapid Reaction Force
to undertake a limited range of Petersberg tasks are all the more
vital. If the EU does not undertake peace support operations in
Europe and its immediate periphery, no other organisation will.
11 September accelerated a trend of the United States to withdraw
militarily from direct responsibility for such activities in Europe.
The advent of a Balkans without America is not far off. NATO is
changing as a result. In this process, NATO may lose its middle
range, focusing, at the lowest level, on PfP-related activities and, at
the highest, on high-intensity conflict, but no longer undertaking
peace support operations of long duration. 

The EU will have to step into this breach. The Copenhagen
Council of 2002 marked a turning point in this respect. With the
unblocking of EU access to NATO assets, the Council noted the
EU’s readiness to take over the NATO operation in FYROM and,
more ambitiously, to assume responsibility for a post-SFOR oper-
ation in Bosnia. For all the clarion calls of its imminent death,
ESDP is still alive. All the reasons for arguing that ESDP is weak –
Europe’s capabilities gap and the difficulty of increasing defence
budgets – remain true, but these affect little the political reality
that Europe will assume greater responsibility for peace support
operations, all the more so as European states can undertake such
operations despite these problems. 

These trends have not gone unnoticed in Russia. Since 2000,
the Russian government has been reducing its contribution to
NATO-led operations in the Balkans. At the same time, Russia has
sought to participate in new EU operations in the region, partly in
a classic reflex to retain influence, however little, in all aspects of
European security, but also because of a genuine desire to develop
ties on the ground with a nascent EU security actor. Russia is 
participating in the EU’s first operation, the EUPM in Bosnia. The
contribution is minimal but symbolically important: the United
States, for one, is not involved in EUPM. Moreover, the Russian
government  is  well  aware  that  future  EU-led  peace  support 
operations are likely to move beyond an increasingly stabilised
South-East Europe towards zones closer to Russia’s borders. This

188. See Nicole Gnesotto, ‘React-
ing to America’, Survival, vol. 44,
no. 4, Winter 2002-2003, pp. 99-
106.

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realisation explains something of Russia’s insistence on clarifying
the modalities for third-party participation in EU operations, as
well as its participation in EUPM. The reality is that Russia and the
EU will be forced to cooperate more deeply in undertaking Peters-
berg tasks.

The third level of urgency is geographical. EU enlargement will
bring the Union much closer to the Russian homeland, increasing
the common border between the two. Enlargement creates a new
EU ‘Europe’ with the inclusion of the Baltic states that contain
substantial Russian minorities.189 Based on Russia’s active diplo-
macy to advance the interests of these minorities through the
OSCE in the 1990s, similar pressure from Moscow can be expected
on the EU. Also, Russia’s exclave, the Kaliningrad Oblast, will pres-
ent an enduring challenge to Russia-EU relations, in terms of tran-
sit concerns for Russian citizens and the wider problems posed by
the region to its neighbours, such as crime, smuggling and envi-
ronmental threats. The agreement on facilitating transit to and
from Kaliningrad in 2002 marks the opening of the Kaliningrad
dossier, and not its closure. 

In addition, enlargement will create a new non-EU ‘Europe’ in
the states of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This new borderland
is  replete  with  potential  problems,  from  regime  collapse  to 
economic implosion, in addition to actual threats, ranging from
organised crime, a frozen conflict in Moldova and endemic cor-
ruption.  In  2002,  the  Council  Secretariat  started  an  internal
process to develop a new neighbourhood strategy – known as the
New Neighbourhood Initiative – towards the region. In Septem-
ber 2002, Solana and Patten presented the basic framework for
this new regional approach. In November, the General Affairs and
External Relations Council agreed that the new initiative towards
these three states would be long-term and differentiated, and that
it would work with Russia.190 Patten and Solana have been tasked
to take this further. 

The Presidency Conclusions at Copenhagen in 2002 affirmed
that the EU was ‘determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe
and to promote stability and security within and beyond the new
borders of the Union.’ 191 As enlargement gathers speed, the atten-
tion of the EU to this new borderland has gained substance with
the 11 March 2003 Communication from the Commission on
Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our
Eastern and Southern Neighbours. The Communication proposes to

189. The Russian minorities in
Latvia and Estonia represent re-
spectively 29.6 per cent and 28.1
per cent of the populations, while
the  proportion  is  smaller  in
Lithuania,  standing  at  8.7  per
cent; see CIA World Factbook 2002;
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/index.html.

190. Council Conclusions, New Neigh-
bours Initiative, 18 November 2002,
(doc 14078/02); http://www.eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/ceeca/gac.htm#cs280102.

191. Presidency Conclusions, Copen-
hagen European Council, 12 and
13 December 2002.

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build  closer  ties  with  Europe’s  new  neighbours,  including
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, through the formulation
of an Action Plan jointly with each country that would determine
a set of clear objectives for each state to pursue in return for greater
access to the EU in terms of the four freedoms. Overall, neither
Brussels nor Moscow will be able to ignore the other’s interests in
these three states. 

Finally, it is important to distinguish between frustration and
disdain in Russian policy. If Moscow is frustrated with the EU, it is
not  yet disdainful.  Certainly,  the  enthusiasm  evinced  towards
ESDP in 2000 has waned. However, this is largely a positive devel-
opment – Russia’s enthusiasm then was misplaced and its vision
of the EU purely instrumental. A more profitable security rela-
tionship can and must be built from the bottom-up and on low –
that  is,  realistic  –  expectations.  As  many  officials  in  Moscow
pointed out in late 2002, the EU must now take the first step.192 In
2003, the EU faces a window of opportunity to take the political
and security dialogue further while Russia remains open to this
prospect. 

If there are good reasons for developing the political dialogue,
the next question is: how might cooperation be pursued? This
question has particular salience, as the renewal of the EU’s Com-
mon Strategy on Russia is due in June 2003. The EU’s experience
with common strategies has not been positive. Negative assess-
ments  have  not  come  only  from  academic  circles.  In  his  first
review, Javier Solana was outspoken, arguing that the strategies
lacked detailed proposals and provided little added value.193 The
EU Common Strategy on Russia is riddled with the same weak-
nesses: it is high on rhetoric and low on substance. As the deadline
for renewal approaches, a discussion has emerged in Brussels on
the future of the Common Strategy, with some arguing that the
drafting of a new document should be postponed until after the
completion of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the
Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, at which point the inter-
ests  of  a  new  and  enlarged  Europe  concerning  Russia  will  be
clearer. More ambitiously, others have called for a joint strategy
document that would be drafted with Russia, in order to ensure
better understanding and coordination of policies between the
two parties. The experience of the Northern Dimension has also
been put forward as a path to follow with Russia. The strength
(and weakness) of the Northern Dimension lies in its combination

192. Interviews with officials in
the  Russian  MID  in  December
2002.

193. ‘Council – General Affairs’,
Brussels 2331, 26/27 February
2001 (Press: 61 Nr: 6506/01).

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of horizontal and vertical approaches within a regional context. In
this view, a new EU strategy would profit from borrowing ele-
ments from the philosophy behind the Northern Dimension. The
Commission Communication on Wider Europe (11 March 2003)
introduced the new notion that an Action Plan could be drafted
with Russia that would set forth more detailed objectives and
measures to be undertaken by both parties. However, it seems
unlikely that Moscow will choose to be involved in this part of the
Wider Europe exercise.

Any common strategy towards Russia will necessarily reflect
the disparate and inconsistent nature of the EU as a political actor.
The renewal of the Common Strategy has so far been an uninspir-
ing process. Instead of focusing on doctrinal points, the argument
here explores specific functional areas where security cooperation
between the EU and Russia can and must progress.

Focus on peace support operations

Russia and the EU should focus on security issues that combine
interest and urgency for both parties. In the first place, the question
of  peace  support  operations  (PSO)  fits  these  criteria.  PSO  are
already an area of mutual interest for Moscow and Brussels. They
will gain in urgency as the EU assumes responsibility for peace sup-
port in the Balkans, including with Russian participation. Moscow
contributes to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, and most likely will
participate if the EU launches larger operations in FYROM and
Bosnia. 

The question assumes urgency with the possibility of a EU
operation outside the Balkans and closer to Russia’s borders. It is
only a matter of time before Brussels considers a peace support
role in the new border states that lie between the enlarged EU and
Russia. Neither Brussels nor Moscow should wait until this possi-
bility becomes an issue of contention. It is incumbent on the EU to
lead in this area. Cooperation on peace support operations with
Russia must be undertaken proactively to avoid misperceptions in
Moscow about EU intentions and to maximise possibilities for
joint activities in this region.

There are two dimensions to developing cooperation in peace
support  operations.  The  first  concerns  joint  actions  on  the
ground. The case explored here is that of Moldova. The second

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4

dimension relates to the creation of a new mechanism for high-
level EU-Russia dialogue in this and other areas of mutual interest. 

Joint EU-Russian peace support in Moldova
(See Annex for detailed case study)

The Republic of Moldova lies in the immediate periphery of the
European Union and Russia. For Brussels, Moldova’s importance
will increase with enlargement. This small state is already a crimi-
nal gateway into Europe for drugs and arms smuggling, and, in par-
ticular, human trafficking. Until now, Moldova has not received
the international attention it requires. It is all the more important
for the EU, given its close ties with Romania. In 2002, the Moldovan
parliament decided to allow dual citizenship, opening up the pos-
sibility for Moldovan citizens to obtain Romanian citizenship.
With Romania scheduled for EU membership in 2007, such citi-
zenship questions assume vital importance for Brussels. Until now,
the EU has sought to work with Romania to strengthen a future
external border. In parallel, however, the EU must work closely with
Moldova.

The EU has not addressed Moldova’s conflict with Transnistria
(Pridniestrovskaya Moldovskaya Respublika, or PMR), Moldova’s
eastern-most region that declared independence after the conflict
in 1992. Despite the OSCE’s involvement, there has been little
progress towards resolving the conflict. Should the situation con-
tinue, there is a danger that Moldova will become a black hole on
Europe’s border, radiating instability externally while collapsing
internally. The self-declared PMR is the centre of gravity of all of
Moldova’s weaknesses. A new international push is required to
launch  a  full  settlement  process.  The  EU  and  Russia  are  well
placed to execute a strategy that would combine high-level politi-
cal pressure with targeted economic assistance and a limited mili-
tary observer presence. 

Situated at the juncture of the former Soviet Union and the
Balkans, Moldova is unique in bringing together both the interest
and influence of Russia and the EU. If carefully managed, this thin
area of convergence may provide a positive venue for practical
cooperation. Moreover, the struggle in Moldova does not pose an
impossible challenge. The conflict is not so much ethnic or com-
munal as a clash between élites. Moldova presents nothing similar

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to  the  communal  tensions  that  exist  in  other  Balkan  conflict
zones. Put bluntly, there are few dangers for an international pres-
ence on the ground. This relatively peaceful situation allows time
for planning between the EU and Russia, in order to ensure opti-
mal coordination of instruments in the EU (political, economic
and crisis management) and its relations with Russia.

Settlement of this conflict requires a major political kick-start.
Here lies the EU’s advantage over the OSCE. Brussels can bring to
bear a mixture of political and economic weight across the region
that the OSCE cannot. Moreover, much more than the OSCE, the
EU needs to do so with urgency. The aim of the EU must be to
launch a new dynamic in the region. Constant high-level political
pressure is required to edge the parties, and the PMR in particular,
towards formal settlement of the conflict. The EU’s political and
economic weight in its relations with Romania, a candidate for
accession, Moldova and Ukraine, provide it with some leverage
over the behaviour of these states with regard to the PMR. Future
EU members, especially Poland, are very keen on an increased EU
role in the region. In advance of membership, the Polish govern-
ment has developed with its neighbours the proposal for an ‘East-
ern Dimension’ for the EU, focusing on Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova. Moreover, the Communist-dominated government in
Moldova is demandeur for a greater EU role in the conflict with the
PMR. Certainly Ukraine (and perhaps even Belarus) would sup-
port a greater EU role in the region. In addition, Russia’s diplo-
matic weight in Moldova and Ukraine will be vitally important.
The EU could also draw upon the Russian peacekeeping forces
already deployed in the conflict zone. These forces would have to
be reduced and integrated into a new operation with a new man-
date. From peacekeepers, they would become military observers,
working alongside observers from EU member states. 2003 and
2004  could  be  turning-point  years  in  this  conflict,  bringing
together  a  Communist  pro-Russian  leadership  in  Moldova,  a
more accommodating Russia, with greater international coordi-
nation on an OSCE draft plan to settle the conflict. As examined in
the Annex, a joint EU-Russian approach to the Moldovan conflict,
encompassing  political,  economic  and  crisis  management
strands, could provide a positive framework for securing lasting
progress.

There are two arguments against a joint approach. First, the EU
has its hands full in the Balkans. What is more, no blood is being

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spilled in Moldova, so there is no urgency. The status quo has
existed for a decade; let it continue for another ten years. With a
short-term perspective, this argument is not entirely wrong. The
outline of an EU policy towards the Moldovan conflict has been
developed in the EU Council Secretariat but it never got anywhere
largely  for  these  reasons  (and  because  of  bureaucratic  clashes
within  Brussels).  However,  the  EU  will  have  to  turn  towards
Moldova soon. And in developing relations with Moldova, the EU
cannot ignore the conflict with the PMR. A new approach would
impact not only on Moldova itself but throughout an unstable
region  on  the  EU’s  immediate  border,  with  positive  spillover
effects on relations with Belarus and Ukraine. The EU cannot
enlarge, build a new wall and then retire behind it. 

The  Commission  Communication  on  Wider  Europe  (11
March  2003)  recognises  this.  The  PMR  is  seen  as  a  threat  to
Moldova’s overall process of ‘state building, political consolida-
tion and sustainable development’. In response, the Communica-
tion notes that the EU should be ready to engage in a post-conflict
internal security arrangement and take the lead in the provision of
post-conflict reconstruction and development. The stage is being
set for an EU role in the Moldovan conflict.

The second argument is that Russia will never allow such an
operation: the former Soviet Union has been declared an exclusive
zone of Russian interests. In interviews in late 2002, views held in
part of the Russian government on a possible EU operation in
Moldova ranged from outright rejection by some to a cautious
‘maybe’ from others.194 If the EU can offer Russia significant par-
ticipation  in  a  new  approach  to  the  conflict,  Russian  doubts
might be dispelled. The key is to determine how Russia can partic-
ipate without diluting EU interests. This will require work with
Moscow in discussing a joint approach. The existing modalities
for third-party involvement in EU operations allow for the possi-
bility of assuaging Russia’s concern of being excluded.

Many Russian experts, and not a few officials, recognise that an
increasing  European  presence,  including  military,  in  the  CIS
region is only a matter of time. On this basis, some have argued
that Russia should seek to bring the EU into the former Soviet
Union early and with Russia rather than later and in conflict with
Russia.195 A joint approach to Moldova may be developed with
Moscow on this basis. Nor would the aim be, as it is in the Balkans,
to secure Russia as a pliant junior partner. A new approach to

194. Interviews in Brussels and
Moscow, October and December
2002.

195. See Dmitry Danilov, ‘Border-
land Europe – A Russian View of
the Stability Pact for the Cauca-
sus’,  CEPS  Commentary,  March
2001.

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Moldova  requires  joint  efforts;  If  Russia  has  to  accept  the
inevitable, it might as well agree to it on the best terms possible.

High-Level Group on Wider Security

In addition, EU-Russia cooperation on PSO must be developed at
the conceptual level. The EU has only just started to develop con-
cepts of military and civilian crisis management, whereas Russia
has well-developed doctrines and some practical experience.196
The EU may profit from discussions with Russia on its conceptual
approach and experience with crisis management. The current
institutional mechanisms linking the EU and Russia, however, are
insufficient to sustain a productive security dialogue on such a
specific question. A high-level institution providing for a contin-
ual security dialogue is required in EU-Russian relations. 

There are mechanisms of interaction that the political dia-
logue might emulate. The Energy Dialogue is relevant, with its
combination of independent expert groups and high-level focus.
The EU-Russia High-Level Group on the Common European Eco-
nomic Space (HLG CEES) is another model. The HLG CEES was
launched in May 2001 to start discussions on the long-term cre-
ation of a common European economic space. Its work is directed
by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Viktor Khristenko, and
Commissioner Chris Patten. Despite an overly ambitious title, the
group got off to a quick start. A two-stage work plan was devel-
oped by late 2001 for two years, and a number of expert groups
were  created.197 Work  has  not  been  easy  because  of  different
visions of its purpose: in Brussels, to push for Russian harmonisa-
tion to EU standards, and in Moscow, to secure advantageous
access to Europe. None the less, the experience has been worth-
while in some respects. High-level leadership has provided a posi-
tive mechanism for Russia-EU discussions on a range of impor-
tant questions, such as WTO accession. 

The political dialogue has no similar high-level institutional
link.198 It advances by spurts every six months, driven to and by
the presidential summits. In between, the dialogue is diluted in a
variety of low level and disparate links. On the question of PSO,
the EU-Russia security ‘partnership’ would benefit from a tar-
geted institutional link that reflects the needs of both parties and
brings concentrated focus to specific areas.

196. Of course, this does not in-
clude Russia’s wars in Chechnya,
which are nothing like peacekeep-
ing. On the other hand, Russia has
participated in all of the NATO-
led peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR)
and deployed a peacekeeping op-
eration in Moldova, two opera-
tions in Georgia in its conflicts
with the regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and also in the
conflict in Tajikistan.

197. See, for example, the report
to the 9th EU-Russia Summit, May
2002; 
http://www.europa.
eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/russia/summit_05_02/rep.
htm.

198. Officials in the Council Sec-
retariat have turned to elaborat-
ing the option of creating a per-
manent high-level institutional
link with Russia on security mat-
ters  in  2002,  but  with  little
progress.

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A ‘High-Level Group on Wider Security’ (HLG WS) could be
directed jointly by the High Representative, Javier Solana, and a
Russian deputy prime minister. In order to maxmise the work of
the group, an agenda could be determined for two years to span
several EU presidencies, the completion of the Convention and the
Intergovernmental Conference, as well as the upcoming Russian
elections. Initially, the HLG would focus on the question of peace
support operations. In this area, the agenda could follow two
stages. First, the group could exchange and explore respective con-
cepts of civilian and military crisis management, building on a
process that is already under way. Two working groups (civilian
and military PSO) could be created at this stage, with appropriate
officials from both parties to lead activities. During the second
stage, the two parties could organise joint exercises and even PSO
training programmes. 

The overall aim of the dialogue would be limited: to jointly
examine Russian and EU concepts of and experience in crisis man-
agement, and to explore ways by which the approaches of both
parties might best be coordinated in potential and actual opera-
tions on the ground. The EU and Russia should not allow the
political dialogue to become entangled in a search for the impos-
sible. Rather, the dialogue should focus on an area of interest and
urgency for both parties, both at the practical and doctrinal levels. 
While initially focusing on peace support operations, the remit
of the HLG WS could be expanded to include other security ques-
tions that combine urgency and interest for Brussels and Moscow.
One area where high-level political attention would provide sig-
nificant benefits concerns EU-Russian cooperation in non-prolif-
eration. Since the 1990s, the EU has supported a range of pro-
grammes  to  strengthen  Russia’s  nuclear  safety  culture  and
regulatory system. In addition, a number of EU member states
have developed significant profiles in supporting so-called ‘coop-
erative threat reduction’ in Russia. The launch of the Global Part-
nership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction by the G-8 in June 2002, to raise $20 billion over ten
years,  represents  an  upgrading  of  international  attention  to
ensure that Russia does not become a source of nuclear, biological
or chemical proliferation. 

The EU has pledged to raise €1 billion to support the process.
The designation of projects to be supported, and their implemen-
tation, requires high-level discussion and follow-through by the

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EU and the Russian government. In late 2002, Putin designated
Prime Minister Kasyanov as head of an intergovernmental com-
mittee to coordinate Russian cooperation. Moreover, the Russian
government has drafted legislation unblocking some of the legal
and tax-related problems that held up past assistance in this polit-
ically sensitive area. For all this progress, all of the work remains
ahead.  A  High-Level  Group  on  Wider  Security  could  play  a
catalysing role, providing high-level support to unblock the myr-
iad of problems encountered at lower bureaucratic levels as well as
weighty political coordination to lead an extensive range of pro-
grammes.

The high-level dialogue could also explore further ways and
means for cooperation with the Russian Ministry for Emergency
Situations in terms of its assets and concepts of civilian crisis man-
agement. This would widen the scope of interlocutors in Moscow.
In addition, the HLG could wrap up the endless exploratory talks
with Russia on the use of its air transportation assets and satellite
imaging. It would also be relevant for discussions with Russia on
involvement in EU operations in the Balkans.

Finally, the high-level dialogue could touch on the hitherto
unexplored area of Russian military reform. The idea here would
not be to replace the activities undertaken by other organisations,
such as NATO, or by member states at the bilateral level, but to use
the strength of the EU as a multilateral framework to support
Russian reform measures at certain specific levels. Over the 1990s,
a number of European states (Germany in the first half of the
1990s, the United Kingdom and Norway since) have developed
programmes  to  support  the  demobilisation  and  retraining  of
retiring Russian military officers. Thus far, these programmes
have been relatively small (the United Kingdom had spent £8.3
million by March 2002) but quite successful in supporting Rus-
sia’s difficult process of reducing the size of its officer corps. A
Joint Action by the EU on this question might follow the model of
the Joint Action on non-proliferation and disarmament, seeking
not to replace national programmes but to act as an umbrella for
these and as a catalyst for further contributions by other member
states as well as non-member states. Germany and the United
Kingdom have cleared some of the ground in this area, useful
experience has been gained and retraining centres have been built.

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Proposals for the political and security dialogue

4

An  EU  framework  for  existing  programmes  would  galvanise 
further support on a critically important issue that spans defence
with social and economic development and meets the interests of
both Moscow and Brussels.

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Russia faces Europe

Conclusions: changing the logic
of Euro-Atlantic relations?

In  December  2001,  Putin  declared  that  Russia  was  seeking  to
change the ‘logic of interaction’ in international affairs.199 At the
heart of Putin’s foreign policy lies an attempt to drag Russia out of
the no man’s land in which it found itself at the end of the Cold
War – neither a friend of the West nor a foe but something uncom-
fortably  in-between.  Russia’s  avowed  objective  is  to  craft  an
‘alliance’ with the Euro-Atlantic community. ‘Alliance’ is to be
understood more as an informal regime than a formal structure.
What matters most for Moscow is, indeed, changing the logic of
interaction. It is worth repeating that Russian policy is pro-Russ-
ian and not pro-Western; the strategy of alignment is a means to an
end. The most important end is that of domestic revitalisation. In
Putin’s view, this objective is best pursued with the Euro-Atlantic
community  rather  than  outside  it.  Serious  differences  remain
between Russia and the West. These range from policy divergences
to more fundamental value-based clashes. However, changing the
‘logic’ means that Moscow seeks to prevent such divergences from
impacting on an overall positive relationship.200 During the crisis
over Iraq, Moscow was notably careful to maintain open commu-
nication with Washington, reiterating that differences would not
impact on the overall partnership. Russia remains deeply inter-
ested in alignment with the Euro-Atlantic community. However
divided  and  shaky  this  community  may  be,  it  is  the  only  real
option open to Russia.

Russian foreign policy is not free of inconsistency and ambigu-
ity. It is riddled with both. There are tensions in Russia’s vision of
the  Euro-Atlantic  community  between  a  focus  on  the  United
States, as the world’s behemoth, and Europe, as a burgeoning
power. This ambiguity translates at a number of levels, in Russian
assessments of the relative weight of NATO and the EU, as well as
in the balance between unilateralism and multilateralism. Despite
these notes of confusion, the thrust of policy is clear: Russia seeks
the closest possible association with the Euro-Atlantic commu-

199. DNB, IPD, MID, Moscow,
5 December 2001.

200. Reproduced on DNB, IPD,
MID,  Moscow,  22  December
2001.

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Conclusions: changing the logic of Euro-Atlantic relations?

nity without merging into it. As a result, Russia remains a prickly
partner, but Moscow has never been so open to cooperation or so
predictable for the West.

The EU is one strand in Putin’s strategy of alignment. It is not
the most important in security terms, and its weight has decreased
since  2000.  Since  11  September,  Russian  ties  with  the  United
States and NATO have surged forward whereas the EU-Russia
political dialogue has stagnated. However, the political dialogue is
not dead, nor should it be abandoned as wasted effort. Both Rus-
sia and the EU are interested in developing security ties despite and
because of the changes that have occurred in international rela-
tions  since  11  September.  For  the  EU,  Russia’s  significance
remains paradoxical. On the one hand, Russia is a security chal-
lenge, mainly in terms of soft threats. Russia presents also a secu-
rity opportunity that cannot be ignored. In the short term, EU bor-
ders will move closer to Russia and create a new non-EU Europe in
Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine (and beyond in the South Cauca-
sus). Brussels will need to work with Moscow in this new and
unstable borderland. Over the longer term, the EU needs a solid
and permanent security relationship with Russia on a range of
areas of mutual interest. The idea need not be to create a common
European security ‘space’ or a reheated version of Gorbachev’s
‘common European home’. The focus must fall on specific secu-
rity questions that are urgent for both Russia and the EU.

At an initial stage, a joint EU-Russia approach to Moldova
would be one way to combine the EU’s need to develop a political
presence in its new neighbourhood with Russia’s existing influ-
ence and greater openness with regard to the former Soviet Union.
Practical cooperation on the ground on Russia’s borders would
provide  the  security  dialogue  with  a  bottom-up  impetus  that
might satisfy the interests of both parties. The EU political dia-
logue with Russia can only take off if it focuses on areas of genuine
mutual need and interest. With the EU becoming Europe’s peace-
keeper and its borders expanding further east, cooperation in the
first instance in peace support operations is a must. More impor-
tantly, it is feasible. This cooperation, in turn, could provide the
basis for the creation of a ‘High-Level Group on Wider Security’ to
lead cooperation on other areas of interest to both parties, such as
civilian and military crisis management, non-proliferation and
disarmament, and Russian military reform.

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annexes

a1
1

Case study of a joint approach to the
Moldovan conflict

The following presents a case study of a possible joint EU-Russia
approach to settling the conflict in Moldova. This approach would
be primarily political, demanding coordinated attention and poli-
cies from all parties, with a limited crisis management strand. 2003
presents a window of opportunity in a conflict that has been frozen
for more than ten years. A constellation of factors create a situation
that is pregnant with potential. The OSCE has developed a settle-
ment package which has the support of the main external parties,
Ukraine, Russia and even the United States through their leader-
ship of the OSCE mission. The regional context is also favourable,
with neighbouring Romania in line for EU membership in 2007,
and Ukraine (and perhaps even Belarus) keen for closer ties with
Brussels. Russia under Putin has never been so open to interna-
tional involvement in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, for all its
frustration with Brussels, Moscow is ready to develop a deeper
political and security dialogue with the EU and its members states.
At the same time, the EU has started to consider the reality of the
new borders and new neighbours it will face after enlargement.
What is more, the costs of a new approach to Moldova are essen-
tially  political,  with  no  military  requirements  except  a  limited
observer mission. 

All the pieces for a settlement are in place in Moldova; the EU’s
role would be to integrate them in order to break the inertia that
has set in over the last decade. The Commission Communication
of 11 March 2003 on Wider Europe proposes that the EU under-
take a post-conflict security operation in Moldova and recon-
struction, but without giving further detail. The approach devel-
oped below can help fill in some of the blanks.

The status quo

Before exploring the shape of a possible operation, it is worth
examining  the  state  of  affairs  surrounding  the  conflict  in
Moldova. Until 2000, six factors wove together to produce a sus-
tainable status quo.

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a1

1) Moldovan weakness

Moldova is a very weak state. Formerly one of the USSR’s poor-
est republics, Moldova is today Europe’s poorest country. It has
made headway towards reform, which is reflected in its acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001. However, Russia’s 1998 crisis was a
severe blow. Growth rates slipped, output fell, inflation rose,
public salaries fell into arrears and Moldova’s balance of pay-
ments plummeted. An estimated 700,000 Moldovans have left
the country as economic migrants. In addition, Moldova has
heavy external debt, with servicing accounting for over 50 per
cent of the budget.

2) The separatist PMR

On the left bank of its Dnestr River, Moldova’s easternmost
region of Transnistria has declared independence. The PMR has
developed all the features of statehood, including armed forces
and a president (a Russian, Igor Smirnov).201 The conflict there
has an ethnic shape (Russians and Ukrainians represent about
51 per cent of some 650,000), but its root cause is not ethnicity.
Rather, it is a political struggle by PMR élites to control the
area. 

Since 1992, the PMR has consolidated thanks to its position
as a transit point for smuggling and crime crossing its long bor-
der with Ukraine and from the Black Sea. An authoritarian
throwback,  the  deep  criminalisation  of  the  region  affects
Moldova through massive losses in revenue and impacts on the
region with arms and other forms of smuggling. 

Moldova’s energy pipelines pass through the PMR, which
also contains a range of important industries and Moldova’s
only  energy  plant,  so  that  meaningful  economic  reform  is
impossible without it. 

3) Unfavourable regional context

The regional context works against Moldova’s consolidation.
Moldova owes significant debt to Russia, which provides all of
its energy needs. Repayment is a constant bone of contention.
On its western border, Moldovan relations with Romania are
not fully settled. A bilateral treaty was initialled in 2000 but not
signed by the new Romanian government that came to power in
2001.  On  its  eastern  border,  ties  with  Ukraine  are  strained

201. According to Russian esti-
mates,  the  PMR  maintains
around 5000 troops; Former Soviet
Union Fifteen nations: Policy and Secu-
rity,  no.  11,  November  2002,
pp. 122-3.

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a1

because  of  Moldovan  allegations  that  Kyiv  has  not  cracked
down on smuggling into the PMR. 

4) Russian interest

Russian military support was important for the PMR’s victory
in 1992.202 In the 1990s, Russia continued to provide limited
support to the PMR, through gas supplies and the presence of
Russian peacekeeping forces on the banks of the Dnestr River.
In addition, the Russian Ministry of Defence inherited from
the Soviet Union the 14th Army and its massive arms and equip-
ment stocks, based throughout the PMR.203 In the 1990s, Rus-
sia was reluctant to abandon its military presence in Moldova,
given its strategic position on Ukraine’s flank and as a forward
position in the Balkans. 

5) Distorted peacekeeping

A peacekeeping operation was deployed by Russia in 1992 with
the consent of Moldova and the separatists. The operation is tri-
partite:  it  comprises  troops  from  Russia,  Moldova  and  the
PMR.204 The operation is directed through weekly meetings of
a Joint Control Commission (JCC), where Russia, Moldova and
PMR have equal rights. The OSCE and Ukraine also participate
in the JCC as observers. 

This peacekeeping arrangement has become part of the prob-
lem. On the ground, the peacekeeping troops maintain static
posts, which has allowed the PMR to deploy additional ‘security
forces’ in the Security Zone along the Dnestr and has done noth-
ing to halt smuggling across the Dnestr river between the two
Moldovas. Moreover, the veto right accorded to the PMR in the
JCC has prevented a more extensive OSCE role and stymied
Moldovan proposals to clean up the Security Zone.

6) Thin international presence

Moldova has not featured high on the radar of international
organisations. The OSCE Mission was deployed in April 1993
with tasks ranging from inspecting Russian weapons’ disposal
to supporting negotiations between Moldova and PMR.205 But
the Mission comprises only eight members, and thus faces seri-
ous physical constraints. 

The EU has a low profile in Moldova. Some shifts occurred in
2001, when Moldova joined the Stability Pact for South-Eastern

202. See author’s Russian Peace-
keeping  Strategies  towards  the  CIS
(London:  Palgrave  and  RIIA,
2000), pp. 109-26.

203. Russia’s military presence
has  been  reduced  to  around
1,500 troops with the transfor-
mation of the 14th Army into an
Operational Group; see Former
Soviet Union Fifteen nations: Policy
and Security, no. 11, November
2002, pp. 122-3.

204. The numerical strength of the
peacekeeping  forces  stands  at
1,750  men  (446  Russian,  779
PMR and 495 Moldovan); ibid.

205. See OSCE Mission to Moldova,
Mission Survey; http://www.osce
.org/publications/survey/sur-
vey04.htm.

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a1

Europe and the Commission agreed to Strategy Paper 2002-
2006.206 However, the spirit of EU policy has not changed: the
EU has limited weight in Moldova, and there is no strategy
towards the PMR.

Throughout the 1990s, the status quo was sustained by a com-
bination of these factors. In addition, as long as the wars of the
Yugoslav dissolution continued, there was no urgency for greater
international  involvement  to  resolve  the  conflict  in  Moldova,
where, by contrast, a cease-fire held without interruption. And,
Russia’s exclusive pursuit of its interests in Moldova made the
costs of international engagement too significant to consider,
especially  given  a  relative  lack  of  urgency.  These  conditions
allowed  the  separatist  PMR  to  consolidate  itself  despite  non-
recognition. 

These factors are undergoing change. First, despite ongoing
instability, the wars in the Balkans have ended and a regional
framework has been created for long-term stability. This circum-
stance provides the EU with more room to consider its security
needs arising from new neighbours in the east. As already noted,
the EU has recognised the need to develop a neighbourhood strat-
egy towards the region. This strategy will include a particular
focus on Moldova and its conflict.207

Russian  policy  towards  Moldova  has  shifted.  Under  Putin,
Russian relations with the PMR have become more circumspect,
and close ties have developed with Moldova’s communist presi-
dent, Vladimir Voronin, including agreement on a new Treaty on
Friendship and Cooperation. Overall, the regional context is more
favourable now for Moscow than it was earlier in the 1990s: Rela-
tions with Moldova have ameliorated and closer ties have been
forged with Ukraine. As a result, Moscow is less reflexively defen-
sive about the region and the possibility of a greater international
presence. Moreover, Putin is intent on developing closer relations
with the EU. Under the right conditions, an enhanced EU role,
even a joint approach, may fall in line with Russia’s new interests
towards Moldova – to support a ‘friendly’ Moldovan leadership –
and towards Europe – to add substance to the Russia-EU strategic
dialogue.

Moreover, since the OSCE Istanbul summit of 1999, the con-
flict has received a new degree of international attention. In Istan-
bul, Russia committed itself to withdrawing the huge stocks of

206. See the website of the Euro-
pean Commission’s Delegation to
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus:
http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/en
/index.php,  and  the  Commis-
sion’s website: http://www.eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/moldova/intro/index.htm.

207. Interviews with members of
the Council Secretariat, October
2002.

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a1

military equipment and ammunition, mostly in the town of Kol-
basna, in the PMR by late 2002. Progress has been very slow; only
six trainloads of equipment have been repatriated. None the less,
the process has started with OSCE monitoring. The OSCE has
also provided support to the destruction of equipment stocks that
are too dangerous to remove. More importantly, the OSCE Mis-
sion presented a ‘non-paper’ in 2002 for a final settlement of the
conflict, which would lead Moldova to become a federative repub-
lic and accord significant rights to the PMR as a ‘state-territorial’
unit.208 For the first time in the history of the negotiations, which
have stalled and restarted for over a decade, there is an interna-
tional consensus: the draft agreement has the backing of Russia
and Ukraine as well as the United States, which has also taken a
stronger position in the conflict through its chairmanship of the
OSCE mission. More importantly, in February 2003 Moldova’s
president, Vladimir Voronin, presented a potential breakthrough
proposal to redraft the Moldovan constitution with Transnistrian
participation in order to find a constitutional solution to the con-
flict. The redrafting of the Constitution will require external sup-
port and expertise, and, more widely, a comprehensive interna-
tional push to sustain and complete the process, which could
easily become obstructed by internal Moldovan differences and
Transnistrian hard-headedness. 

The EU can step in here to provide the necessary wider frame-
work to keep the constitutional talks on track and ensure obsta-
cles that do emerge are overcome.

A joint catalyst operation

It is worth reiterating the limits of EU objectives in Moldova. The
aims would not be:
1) to paint Moldova blue and gold;
2) to ‘push’ Russia out of the region;
3) to deploy a military operation in the PMR.

By contrast, a new approach would have three strands:

208.  ‘Negotiations  process  on
Transdniestrian 
settlement
restarts in Chisinau’, OSCE Press
release,  23  August  2002;
http://www.osce.org/news/gen-
erate.php3?news_id=2663&uid
=2. 

Political strand
1) The aim of the EU-Russian approach at the political level would
be to spearhead international engagement through the creation
of a Regional Task Force (RTF), comprising the OSCE, Russia,

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Ukraine, Moldova and Romania, as well as representatives from
international  financial  institutions.  It  is  vital  also  that  the
authorities of the PMR be invited to participate in the RTF, in
order to include their view and create a forum to place pressure
on them. The RTF would give strategic direction to the negotia-
tions and provide a wide framework to coordinate the policies
of all the actors concerned.

2) Chaired jointly by the EU and Russia, through Special Repre-
sentatives, the Regional Task Force would work to place politi-
cal pressure on the Moldovan and, especially, PMR parties to
accept the OSCE draft agreement of 2002. This would require
high-level visits and significant visibility to create an impression
of inevitability and join together the various strands of interna-
tional presence in the area.

3) Political pressure would have to include a focus on Ukraine, with
the aim of closing its border with the PMR and putting a halt to
regional smuggling. Current EU policy is already dedicated to
reinforcing  Ukraine’s  borders.  More  attention  and  material
support must be given to its border with the PMR in particular.

4) The Regional Task Force would act as a ‘security guarantor’ to

the implementation of the OSCE settlement plan.

Economic strand
1) As the EU moves to develop a New Neighbourhood Initiative in
the region, consideration must be given to the creation of incen-
tives to underpin settlement in Moldova. The example of the
Stabilisation and Association Process in the Balkans is interest-
ing in its explicit use of future association with the EU as a
means of applying leverage over states in the region. The idea is
not to offer the possibility of membership to Moldova, which is
unfeasible for now. However, the longer-term possibility of a
close form of association, as a new ‘neighbour,’ with the EU can
be raised as an option. 

2) At the same time, the political sensitivities of the PMR leader-
ship, a section of which is deeply anti-Western, must be taken
into account through assurances of a long-term process where
their views would also be heard.

a1

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a1 

102

3) In addition, the EU should consider coordinating its policies
towards Moldova with the IMF and World Bank in order to
achieve  optimal  targeting  of  leverage.  Resumption  of  their
activities in Moldova and an extension of their activities to the
PMR could be considered so as to add positive leverage to the
negotiation process.

Crisis management strand
1) There is no need for a military operation in Moldova. The area is
far too militarised, and Russia already has peacekeeping forces
deployed.  The  Security  Zone  between  Moldova  and  PMR  is
crammed full with the tripartite peacekeeping forces and illegal
PMR ‘security forces’ and ‘customs points.’ 

However,  a  joint  EU-Russian  Military  Observer  Mission
which is larger in size than the present OSCE operation and has
more formal rights and responsibilities could be considered.
Elements of Russian peacekeeping forces could participate in
the Military Observer Mission, alongside military observers
from EU member states.

2)  The  mandate  of  the  Military  Observer  Mission  could  be  to
demilitarise the conflict zone through the following actions:
— By providing additional material support to the Russian
government to help dispose of the arms stocks of the former
Soviet 14th Army;
— By providing support to the PMR for the demobilisation of
its numerous ‘border guards’, ‘customs officers’ and ‘security
forces’ through the creation of a single unarmed force (to be
called the Dnestr Force), based in the PMR, and drawing on the
local population, that would follow the model of the Kosovo
Protection Corps;
— By providing training and material support to the creation of
joint Moldovan/PMR border guards that would be deployed on
the PMR’s border with Ukraine;
— By replacing the functions of the OSCE Observer Mission in
its monitoring of the Security Zone, with the Military Observer
Mission, acting under a wider mandate. This mandate would
include monitoring of the Dnestr Force and the joint border
posts on the eastern border with Ukraine;
— By abolishing the old JCC and creating a new ‘Joint Security
Commission’ to meet on a weekly basis to monitor all develop-

60-English-Text.qxd  14/05/2003  14:21  Page 103

ments in the Security Zone and on the borders. The new Com-
mission would be chaired jointly by Russia and the EU, and
include the OSCE, Moldova, the PMR and Ukraine. The Joint
Security Commission would come under the overall control of
the Regional Task Force.

The costs of EU coordination of a new approach would be
mainly  political,  calculated  in  terms  of  energy  and  attention
expended by Brussels and member states in kick-starting a process
and following it through with high-level pressure and visibility.
Such action has not in the past been beyond the reach of Brussels.
Rapid and heavy EU pressure in Macedonia, coordinated with
other key actors, was a case in point. The benefits of progress in
Moldova would impact not only on this weak state itself but also
throughout an unstable region. A joint approach would also set a
precedent for joint action with Russia (useful in the eventuality of
an active Belarus crisis) and certainly add impetus to the political
dialogue with Russia in an area of mutual interest and urgency.

a1

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annexes

a2

Abbreviationsa2a2a2a2

ABM
CFE

CFSP
CIS
COPS
CSR
EAPC
ECHO
ESDP
EUPM
FYROM
FSC
GALILEO
GMES
HLG
JCC
KFOR
MID
MNEPR

MO
MTS

NRC
PCA
PfP
PJC
PMR
PSO
RTF
SFOR
TACIS

WEU
WTO 

Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe)
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Commonwealth of Independent States
Political and Security Committee
Common Strategy on Russia
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
European Community Humanitarian Office
European Security and Defence Policy
European Union Police Mission
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Forum for Security Cooperation
European Satellite Navigation System
Global Monitoring for Environmental and Security Initiative
High-Level Group
Joint Control Commission
Kosovo Force (NATO-led)
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Multinational Nuclear Environmental Programme in the
Russian Federation
Russian Ministry of Defence
Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between
the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-10)
NATO-Russia Council
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
Partnership for Peace
Permanent Joint Council
Pridniestrovksya Moldovskaya Respublika, or Transnistria
Peace Support Operations
Regional Task Force
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
and Mongolia (EU)
Western European Union
World Trade Organisation

104

60-English-Text.qxd  14/05/2003  14:22  Page 105

a3

annexes

Regional maps

Commonwealth of Independent States - European States

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - 1995

105

60-English-Text.qxd  14/05/2003  14:22  Page 106

a3

Moldova

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - 2002

106

60-English-Text.qxd  14/05/2003  14:22  Page 107

a3

Russia

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - 2002

107

60-outside cover-ENG.qxd  14/05/2003  15:09  Page 3

Chaillot Papers

All Chaillot Papers
can be accessed via the Institute’s website:
www.iss-eu.org

European armaments cooperation — core documents  
compiled by Burkard Schmitt

Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat
assessment
Harald Müller

From Laeken to Copenhagen — European defence:
core documents, Volume III
compiled by Jean-Yves Haine

International terrorism and Europe
Thérèse Delpech

What model for CFSP?
Hans-Georg Ehrhart

April 2003

March 2003

February 2003

December 2002

October 2002

The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?
Pierre Hassner

September 2002

Enlargement and European defence after 11 September
Jiri Sedivy, Pal Dunay and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski;
edited by Antonio Missiroli

Terms of engagement. The paradox of American power and 
the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September
Julian Lindley-French

From Nice to Laeken - European defence: core documents,
Volume II
compiled by Maartje Rutten

What status for Kosovo?
Dana Allin, Franz-Lothar Altmann, Marta Dassu, Tim Judah, Jacques Rupnik and
Thanos Veremis; edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Enlargement: a new NATO
William Hopkinson

Nuclear weapons: a new Great Debate
Thérèse Delpech, Shen Dingli, Lawrence Freedman, Camille Grand, Robert A. Manning, 
Harald Müller, Brad Roberts and Dmitri Trenin; edited by Burkard Schmitt

From St-Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents
Compiled by Maartje Rutten

The southern Balkans: perspectives from the region
Ismail Kadare, Predrag Simic, Ljubomir Frckoski and Hylber Hysa;
edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Military intervention and the European Union
Martin Ortega

June 2002

May 2002

April 2002

October 2001

October 2001

July 2001

May 2001

April 2001

March 2001

n°59

n°58

n°57

n°56

n°55

n°54

n°53

n°52

n°51

n°50

n°49

n°48

n°47

n°46

n°45

D
s
n
p
a
in
p
a
r
p
c
m
W
fr
s

t
S
li
s
1
s
ly
t
p
c
E
M
N
p
u
t
B
jo
n
tu
d
p

60-outside cover-ENG.qxd  14/05/2003  15:09  Page 4

Despite the crisis in Iraq, President Vladimir Putin has accelerated a
strategy of alignment between Russia and the states and security orga-
nisations of the Euro-Atlantic community. In this, Moscow has drop-
ped previously held notions of multipolarity in which Russia figured
as an independent, if enfeebled, ‘pole’, balancing off other ‘poles’ in
international  affairs.  Under  Putin,  Russia  is  seen  to  retain  a  unique
position  in  world  affairs,  but  Russian  interests  are  thought  best
advanced  in  close  alignment  with  the  Euro-Atlantic  community
rather than in opposition. Putin’s foreign policy is founded on a dis-
passionate  recognition  of  internal  weakness  and  limited  ability  to
control  external  developments.  In  blunt  terms,  Russia  has  become
more an object of international relations than the subject it once was.
With  threats  arising  mainly  internally  and  linking  with  challenges
from  the  south  and  east,  Moscow  perceives  the  West  as  a  source  of
solutions to many of its problems. 

Russia’s foreign policy remains riddled with ambiguities in orien-
tation  within  the  Euro-Atlantic  community  –  between  the  United
States and Europe, ESDP and NATO, unilateralism and multilatera-
lism. However, the basic thrust is clear: Russia is open to far deeper
security cooperation than ever before in the post-Cold War era. Since
11 September, the United States and NATO have succeeded in taking
security relations further forward with Russia. The EU has not, main-
ly because it has not tried to do so. The EU is caught up in a massive
transformation  process,  which  leaves  little  time  to  pursue  coherent
policies  towards  third  parties.  None  the  less,  the  EU  must  start  to
consider proactively how to develop the security dialogue with Russia.
Enlargement  will  literally  bring  the  EU  and  Russia  ever  closer.
Moreover,  as  the  United  States  withdraws  from  peacekeeping  and
NATO is transformed, the EU will become Europe’s peacekeeper. Its
political dialogue with Russia must focus on questions of direct and
urgent interest to both parties. Peace support operations fit these cri-
teria.  This Chaillot  Paper argues  for  greater  cooperation  between
Brussels and Moscow on this subject, and explores the possibility of a
joint approach to the conflict in Moldova, a country that falls in the
new periphery between the EU and Russia. The need for a new insti-
tutional mechanism, a ‘High-Level Group on Wider Security’, is also
discussed, in order to catalyse the EU-Russia dialogue in peace sup-
port and other areas, such as non-proliferation and military reform.

published by 

the European Union 

Institute for Security Studies

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Président Wilson

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