WRITTEN QUESTION E-2516/03 by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission. Eurostat Task Force and OLAF independence.
Date: 2003-07-29
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Anti-fraud Office, Eurostat, administration of the Institutions, administrative transparency, management audit, operation of the Institutions, powers of the institutions (EU)

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84 E/29

(2004/C 84 E/0032)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2516/03

by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(29 July 2003)

Subject: Eurostat Task Force and OLAF independence

On 9 July 2003 the Commission decided to set up a task force to investigate the complaints against
Eurostat. Commission Press Release IP/03/979 states: ‘A multidisciplinary Commission Task Force will be
set up to take rapidly forward the internal and external sides of the enquiries currently managed by OLAF
alone. The Task Force will also carry out a full-scale administrative enquiry aimed at assessing the personal
responsibilities of other staff involved with any financial irregularities. The Task Force will be managed
by Mr Peter Zangl, currently Deputy Director-General of DG INFSO, and under the authority of
Mr F.-H. Brüner, Director-General of OLAF.’

This decision conflicts with the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-
Fraud Office (1), by which the Commission handed over to OLAF its powers to carry out internal and
external administrative investigations (Article 2 of the Decision). It also conflicts with Article 3 of this
independence in exercising its investigative powers.
Decision, which expressly guarantees OLAF’s
In particular, the appointment of an official who does not belong to OLAF to lead the Task Force
conflicts with the stipulation that the Director of OLAF may not take instructions from the Commission.

In these circumstances, has the Commission looked into the risk that officials and firms affected by the
Task Force’s investigations may challenge their legality?

What conclusions does the Commission draw in this connection from the recent Court of Justice rulings in
Cases C-11/00 and C-15/00, which stressed the particular importance of OLAF investigations being
independent?

(1) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.

(2004/C 84 E/0033)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2530/03

by Gabriele Stauner (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(22 July 2003)

Subject: Eurostat Task Force

On 9 July 2003, in the wake of the accusations made against Eurostat and in response to a proposal from
Mr Kinnock, Vice-President, the Commission decided to set up a Task Force which is to take over the
internal and external investigations hitherto conducted by OLAF. Pursuant to the Commission decision, the
Task Force will be headed by Mr Peter Zangl, an EU official who is not on the staff of OLAF but Deputy
Director-General in the Information Society DG.

Can the Commission indicate why, in opting to follow the proposals of its Vice-President, it has in this
way interfered in the independence of OLAF which is guaranteed by the legislator (in Regulation (EC)
No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1)) and by the Commission itself (in
Commission Decision 1999/352/EC (2))?

Can the Commission indicate in particular the manner in which the Director of OLAF was involved in its
Decision of 9 July 2003 and the extent to which its actions comply with the provision that,
in the
performance of his investigative duties, the Director of OLAF must neither seek nor take instructions from
the Commission?

In its judgments of 10 July 2003 in Cases C-11/00 and C-15/00, the European Court of Justice emphasised
the special importance of the independence of OLAF’s investigations.

That being the case, has the Commission assessed the risk that any officials or undertakings concerned by
the Task Force’s investigations may contest the regularity of those investigations?

(1) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.