Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Preparation of the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference"
Date: 2003-07-17
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: World Trade Organisation, international conference

30.9.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 234/95

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Preparation of the 5th WTO
Ministerial Conference’

(2003/C 234/23)

On 18 July 2002 the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of
Procedure, decided to draw up an initiative opinion on the ‘Preparation of the 5th WTO Ministerial
Conference’.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the
subject, adopted its opinion on 24 June 2003. The rapporteur was Mr Vever.

At its 401st Plenary Session on 16 and 17 July 2003 (meeting of 17 July), the European Economic and
Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 46 votes to two with 26 abstentions.

1. Summary

The 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun (Mex-
1.1.
ico) on 10-14 September 2003 will carry out a mid-term
review of the Doha Development Agenda. It is going to play a
decisive role in the completion of negotiations by the end of
2004. The conclusion of these negotiations should not mean
a lower common denominator for the Member States, but
should rest on a sustainable consensus that is commensurate
with the issues at stake. The success of the Cancun conference
is particularly necessary in the present circumstances in order
to:

— revive economic growth, which has fallen sharply since

Doha,

— bolster investor confidence, which has been shaken by

the ongoing stock market and financial crisis,

— improve the general climate, which is still dominated by
international security concerns and the war on terrorism,

— provide a more solid and wide-ranging overview of the
issues at stake and progress made with regard to economic
openness and development, thereby transcending the
approaches adopted in technical and detailed nego-
tiations,

— make more effective progress in the support of developing
countries at a time when economic, budgetary and social
problems have continued to worsen in many of these
countries.

1.2.
The situation in the run-up to this conference is
contrasting: Member States have played quite an active part in
preparations, and certain interim deadlines set in the Doha
Agenda have led to the submission of work programmes
(differential treatment, implementation), but elsewhere dead-
lines have been missed (health, intellectual property). Delays
have thwarted the initial plan to achieve a balance between
the three main areas of negotiations (services, goods and
agriculture) by the start of 2003 by means of mutual con-
cessions. Accordingly, positions still remain quite a long way
apart on a number of questions.

1.3.
If negotiations are to receive a new decisive fillip at the
Cancun Conference, the Committee thinks that all parties must
feel that an overall and dynamic balance — borne out by
impact assessments and proportionality tests — has been
attained with regard to market access, with in particular:

— the gradual liberalisation of services, while continuing to
keep public services outside the scope of the negotiations,

— likewise the gradual opening-up of agricultural markets,
which matches the ongoing and planned actions to
reform the EU’s common agricultural policy,

— a balanced and fair scheme — involving all Member
States — for reducing tariffs for industrial products
(including the eradication of tariff peaks).

The Committee would also underline the importance

1.4.
of obtaining the following at the conference:

— a significant reduction in non-tariff barriers, with more
transparency in the field of government procurement,

— an agreement on foreign direct investment, helping to
initiate harmonisation of the various bilateral agreements,

— more appropriate and effective anti-dumping and anti-

subsidy provisions,

— progress in making allowance for environmental protec-

tion, with effective impact indicators.

The Committee points out the key importance of
for the success of the Doha Agenda. This

1.5.
development
presupposes in particular:

— real progress in launching the work programme which
has been agreed on to facilitate the implementation of
commitments, by way of the special and differential
treatment of developing countries,

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— greater clarification of developing countries’ situations
and categories, by making a clearer distinction between
countries which lag behind persistently and countries
which already enjoy the benefits of an emerging economy,

— effective support for administrative capacity building in

the least developed countries.

to be completed by 1 January 2005 at the latest. However, an
important mid-term review is to take place at
the 5th
Ministerial Conference in Cancun (Mexico) from 10 to 14 Sep-
tember 2003. In Cancun a decision will be taken on whether
to pursue the current negotiations and launch the Singapore
package. A real hurdle will therefore have to be overcome at
the conference.

1.6.
The Committee also reiterates the importance which it
continues to attach to progress in the field of fundamental
social rights, which cannot be called into question for the sake
of the development issues at stake. Even if these matters
remain outside the scope of the Doha Agenda negotiations,
the Committee

— supports the ILO initiatives in this field, in particular the

work of its group on the social aspects of globalisation,

— underlines the importance of the ILO being granted the

status of permanent observer to the WTO.

1.7.
The Committee renews its support for the improve-
ment of WTO procedures, as proposed in its recent opinion
entitled For a WTO with a human face. This includes the need
to find as far as possible alternative dispute settlement solutions
that do not penalise enterprises and other parties on which
sanctions have not been imposed.

1.8.
Finally the Committee invites the various civil society
players (businessmen, socio-occupational organisations, social
partners, NGOs) to take steps to:

— participate in information campaigns about the issues at

stake in the Doha Agenda,

2.2.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration attempts to bring
together in one single instrument a series of requests from
States (or groups of States) which wish the WTO to move in
different directions. However, priority is given to one subject
— development — in response to the demands of one group
of countries, viz. the developing countries including first and
foremost
the least developed countries. This priority has
undoubtedly been accentuated since the Monterrey and
Johannesburg Conferences, which placed somewhat more
emphasis on the development side of globalisation.

2.3.
However, this subject can be approached in a variety
of ways which other members or groups of States such as the
industrialised countries find acceptable to a greater or lesser
extent:

2.3.1.
firstly, renegotiation of all or some of the disciplines
agreed on after the preceding Uruguay Round, on the grounds
that
to developing
countries;

these negotiations were detrimental

— organise international meetings, at a cross-sectoral level

or within sectors of activity,

secondly, technical assistance and cooperation plus
2.3.2.
(administrative) capacity building in these same countries, so
as to help them meet their WTO obligations;

— contribute through their assessments, proposals and
participation, to the success of sustainable development
worldwide.

The Committee will take part in these initiatives. Before
1.9.
the conclusion of the Doha Round at the end of 2004, it will
present operational proposals for improving participatory
democracy by involving organised civil society in the WTO’s
activities. These proposals will be the result of joint deliber-
ations with its partners in the European Union and in non-EU
countries.

2. The outlook for the Doha Development Agenda

(DDA)

2.3.3.
thirdly, special and differential treatment or — to put
it another way — asymmetry of obligations in all fields dealt
with by the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) starting with
access to the markets in industrialised products, agricultural
products and services and not forgetting the old rules and
disciplines (though these are to be improved) or the new ones
(investment, competition, etc.).

2.4.
Apart from the developing countries’ demands, the
DDA must also do justice to the priority demands of other
categories of countries:

The Ministerial Declaration issued at the end of the 4th
2.1.
Ministerial Conference in Doha, which was held from 9 to
14 November 2001, set out a work programme which is due

access to the market in agricultural and industrial
2.4.1.
goods as well as services (United States — Cairns — European
Union, though this is also a problem for developing countries);

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2.4.2.
new controls on international trade and financial
transfers (European Union certainly, but also many other
states, as the February 2003 Tokyo Ministerial showed);

2.4.3.
the need to take account of the non-trade dimension
of international trade — cf. the environment (European Union
and civil societies).

In order to attempt to satisfy all these demands —
if not contradictory, are at least heterogeneous —

2.5.
which,
multiple rendez-vous clauses have been laid down:

2.8.
In addition, Doha, Monterrey and Johannesburg have
put the spotlight once again on the need to take account of
development, whose sustainable and social dimension is itself
now under discussion more than ever before. Also — and this
is something which undoubtedly has not been done properly
since Doha — the progress made in this area will have to be
measured more thoroughly, either within the framework of
the WTO or another international institution. This is central
to the development issue and underlines the importance of
concluding the Doha Round and, to this end, overcoming the
divides separating the frequently short-term interests of States
so that better account is taken of the long-term interests of all
parties.

2.5.1.
relation to intellectual property;

end of 2002: implementation and public health in

2.5.2.

spring 2003: the various accesses to the markets;

September 2003: Cancun Ministerial Conference
2.5.3.
(Mexico), search for a consensus on negotiation of
the
Singapore subjects (investment, competition, trade facilitation,
government procurement).

In previous opinions (1), the EESC constantly called for
2.6.
a balanced approach to the WTO negotiations. In the run-up
to Cancun, it must tell negotiators how it thinks negotiations
could be balanced in both general and specific terms and do
justice to:

2.6.1.

the preferences of all parties;

2.6.2.
the interests of the different categories of members,
including first and foremost the least developed countries and
the real developing countries;

2.6.3.
the improvements in commercial and financial flows
which should be brought about not only between North and
South but also between South and South.

Concessions and compromises will be required to
2.9.
achieve this. In the WTO negotiations the European Union is
defending

— not only its future economic growth, its active strategies
for winning foreign markets, its technological advances,
the protection of its consumers and the jobs of
its
inhabitants,

— but also a sustainable development process which meets
the justified demands of both developing countries and
industrialised countries and, more especially, their civil
societies.

The overall framework laid down within the WTO —
2.10.
no matter how balanced it may be — will undoubtedly not
suffice to satisfy all the legitimate expectations of all sides.
Thus, headway must also be made in parallel
in other
international bodies — IFI, UNDP, ILO — to find solutions to a
number of fundamental problems relating to the environment,
living and working conditions and the fight against underdevel-
opment. To this end, the Union is proposing in each area of
negotiations a compromise which is likely to win the support
of a maximum number of WTO members, plus a very
substantial development package.

2.7.
The current situation, which is marked by uncertainties,
regional economic and financial crises and reductions in trade
and foreign investment, demands more than ever that the
international environment be stabilised. This is once again the
challenge facing Cancun.

2.11.
It is the duty of the European Union to also be the
driving force behind such actions and, if need be, to set an
example. The current international political tensions make
these actions necessary. The Economic and Social Committee
must define the main thrust of such actions for the benefit of
national, Community and international decision-makers.

( 1) Opinion on The preparation of the 4th WTO Ministerial Confer-

ence, (OJ C 36 of 8.2.2002)
Information Report CESE 326/2001 of 7.6.2001 on Coping with
globalisation — the only option for the most vulnerable.
Opinion on Human rights in the workplace, (OJ C 260 of
17.9.2001)

The success of

2.12.
the Doha Development Agenda
depends on the success of the Cancun Conference, which is
particularly necessary in the current circumstances in order to:

— revive international economic growth, which has fallen

sharply since Doha;

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— bolster investor confidence, which has been severely
shaken by the ongoing stock market and financial crisis;

— improve the general climate, which ever since the Sep-
tember 11 attacks has been dominated by international
security concerns and the war on terrorism;

3.1.1.4.
Generally, the dynamic involvement of developing
countries in the DDA is not in any way synonymous with
unfailing agreement; with regard to certain issues dear to
industrialised countries, they can provide selective support and
hence help break the deadlock. In addition, in other areas of
negotiation a trade-off is conceivable, e.g. international trade in
services, government procurement with safeguard provisions.

— provide a more solid, profound and wide-ranging over-
view of economic openness and development that tran-
scends the approaches adopted in technical and detailed
negotiations;

3.1.1.5.
Other more traditional issues are also the subject
of bitter negotiations: agriculture — the cornerstone of the
Doha agenda — customs duties, and anti-dumping.

— do more to further development at a time when econ-
omic, budgetary and social problems have continued to
worsen in many developing countries.

3. The state of play in the run-up to the Cancun

Ministerial Conference

3.1.

2003 will be vital for the success of the Round.

3.1.1.
On the one hand, preparations have so far made
satisfactory progress, with Member States playing quite an
active part. Thus, a clear interest is being shown in the DDA
by players as diverse as China, Brazil,
India, Africa and
the ACP countries plus, of course the United States itself.
Furthermore, at the moment, the chairmen of the different
negotiating groups have received a significant number of
contributions which should allow them in due course to draw
up single texts for negotiation:

topics in
However, there are still a number of
3.1.2.
which members must become actively involved, otherwise
negotiations are in danger of ending in stalemate. Examples
include the transparency of government procurement and,
more generally, the so-called Singapore subjects (investment,
competition, trade facilitation, government procurement).

3.1.3.
In addition, the ambiguities underlying the Doha
compromise are bound to resurface throughout the year and
will need to be solved straight away if possible (i.e. before
Cancun), though this does not rule out the Cancun conference
itself devoting the whole of its agenda to these matters. In this
case, Cancun would be a recast of the Doha agreement. Thus,
at the moment, there are a number of extreme positions which
are still far removed from each other and which depart from
the middle ground that the Doha agreement seemed to have
established in the following areas:

— agriculture;

— access to the markets in goods;

— implementation (for the benefit of developing countries);

3.1.1.1.
Following the issuing of a specific mandate to the
Trade Promotion Authority by Congress, the United States has
frequently made its views known very forcefully, both when it
has been on the offensive (access to markets) and when it has
been on the defensive (the various trade policy instruments).

— trade policy instruments;

— the ‘Singapore’ subjects.

The People’s Republic of China, Brazil and India
3.1.1.2.
are playing important role in all areas of negotiation, very
often defending the interests of emerging countries and
developing countries which have been skilfully merged.

At the moment everything seems to indicate that
3.2.
members have been pushing up the bidding with regard to
their preferences, thereby putting off agreed deadlines.

3.1.1.3.
African countries and the ACP countries play a
more important role than in the previous Round, and empha-
sise a number of issues which are particularly dear to them:
implementation, special and differential treatment, essential
medicines, access to the various markets.

3.2.1.
Thus, one major December 2002 deadline has not
been honoured. It had been agreed that priority would be
given to meeting two of the main demands of developing
countries and the least developed countries by then, viz.:

— essential medicines and intellectual property;

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— implementation,

i.e. the granting of solutions which
match their level of development in close on one hundred
fields.

3.3.
Hence the need to use Cancun to make a decisive fresh
start in negotiations on a basis which is regarded by all sides
as being balanced. Better use of impact assessments and
proportionality tests should help matters.

3.2.2.
In the former case, the United States has adopted an
intransigent attitude which has thwarted the search for a
balanced solution. The overall impression is that the opposing
factions have been wanting to up the bidding and defer the
moment when possible concessions could be offered by both
sides under the best possible conditions.

3.2.3.
In the latter case, a work programme has been
proposed on the subject of special and differential treatment,
with a hundred or so proposals.

3.2.4.
The delay on health issues has thwarted the idea
put forward at the Doha Ministerial Conference that the
arrangements for the negotiation of the three market access
packages (products, services and goods) should be laid down
simultaneously, i.e. by spring 2003, so that a balance could be
struck between the total value of the concessions granted.

3.2.5.
However, it is common knowledge that the situations
to date regarding negotiations in these three categories do not
tally:

4. The Committee’s recommendations for the Minis-

terial Conference

4.1.
The Committee’s recommendations take particular
account of the discussions held at the two hearings on the
preparations for Cancun which it held on 9 April and
26 May with representatives of European socio-occupational
organisations and NGOs.
In presenting these recommen-
dations, the Committee would stress how the WTO must
continue to play a central role in the long-term governance at
world level of international economic relations, with due
regard to its beneficial effect on sustainable development.

4.2.
Nothing can be achieved within the framework of the
DDA, as in the case of the Uruguay Round, without the
binding force of a single undertaking, which must be taken
into account in full by all participants. This principle cannot
be ignored if the negotiations are to succeed. Overall progress
on all the subjects discussed will also make it possible to strike
a balance in each area of negotiation.

— in the case of services, the Community offer has not been
matched by a real quid pro quo from its partners,

Overall balance in market access

— in the case of goods, a compromise is feasible based on a
general package covering all products and all countries
— adjusted where necessary by additional sectoral nego-
tiations and, on the sidelines, by requests and offers; the
Girard proposal takes this line, but the asymmetrical
retention of high and lasting levels of protection for some
developing countries poses a problem,

— in the case of agriculture, some progress has been made
in the negotiations but market access is the major
problem; the Harbinson proposal does not come up to
the expectations of the various States to a sufficient extent
to be able to provide a basis for consensus.

3.2.6.
This is bound to slow down the negotiating process
as a whole, since the members which are not satisfied with the
agricultural package will no longer propose concessions in the
fields of goods and/or services until further concessions are
forthcoming in agriculture and, on the other hand, the EU is
not happy with regard to services, which will not help it to
make any major progress in the field of agriculture.

Since the Uruguay Round, the WTO has adopted an
4.3.
overall view with regard to opening up markets and regulating
trade. It could even be affirmed from looking at this insti-
tution’s work in the long term, that the WTO is moving
towards a unified approach towards trade. The idea is that,
ultimately, practically identical rules will be laid down for trade
in goods, services and agricultural products, with the specific
rules for each of these categories being reduced to a minimum.
This is where the DDA has to face its thorniest political
problem, for voices are legitimately calling for the preservation
of the practices that underpin this need for specific rules in
States. This is why the EESC recommends that the WTO
should not forget such considerations.

4.3.1.
which requires gradual liberalisation that takes account of:

This applies first of all to services, the treatment of

— the capacities of the importing States or States in receipt

of foreign investment,

— development needs, the realisation of which may be
greatly helped by the opening-up of international trade
in services,

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— the international expansion needs (exports, investments,

staff movements) of service enterprises,

4.4.
In the field of agriculture, the WTO, while encouraging
some market liberalisation, should not be seeking in the EESC’s
opinion to

— difficulties which may arise momentarily in a particular

sector in a WTO member country,

— questions relating to temporary service provision in
another WTO member country (mode 4); these questions
are already covered by joint single market provisions and
are the subject of an exploratory opinion which the
Committee is preparing at the request of the Commission,

— in the case of financial services, issues relating to security
and the fight against terrorism and money laundering,

— the need to continue to keep public services outside the
scope of negotiations, in accordance with the mandate
agreed between WTO member countries. This exclusion
should not, however, dissuade the EU from pressing
ahead with the opening-up in progress within the Com-
munity or even from envisaging the possibility at some
point in the future of public services with a truly European
dimension being established in areas where there is good
reason for doing so.

4.3.2.
The EU’s strategic offensive is dictated by its already
highly liberalised common market in services (even if the
opening-up of markets within the Community continues to
face numerous delays, despite the strategic programme which
the Commission has been trying to press ahead with for two
years): the progress already made requires that Community
economic operators benefit, especially in industrialised and
intermediate countries, from EU-style open markets, wherever
possible.

In addition, for obvious reasons to do with equal
4.3.3.
competition and the refinement of market opening, it is vital
to establish a body of rules based on the alignment of
domestic regulations, competition,
investment, government
procurement and possible instruments for the temporary and
degressive regulation of imports.

4.3.4.
of pan-European practices, there is a case for:

Finally, for reasons relating to the particular features

— not opening up the Community market to the foreign

providers of traditional public services,

— looking for a sensible way of facilitating the temporary
movement of physical persons, i.e. a way which excludes
the circumvention of
the provisions on immigration
adopted by the European Union.

— speed up ongoing and planned actions regarding the

reform of the EU’s common agricultural policy,

— call into question the competitiveness of European agri-
culture, which makes a huge contribution to satisfying
needs worldwide as the main importer and exporter in
the world,

— copy the reform which is the subject of the DDA
negotiations from a model inspired by countries which
occupy a separate place in the world (Cairns: Australia
and New Zealand),

— disregard the need to retain specific rules in the agricul-
tural sector, in particular in order to give the sector the
means to fulfil its multifunctional role and to help keep
WTO member countries’ domestic markets in balance,

— or finally, ignore non-trade-related concerns when trade

concessions are negotiated.

Thus, a dynamic balance ought to be obtained that takes
account — as agricultural markets are increasingly opened up
— of developing countries’ need to increase exports and of the
objectives of the EU’s common agricultural policy reform,
thereby leading to enhanced competitiveness on world markets
while at the same time retaining a European rural model based
on a multifunctional agricultural sector.

4.4.1.
Once the sensible aim of eliminating the most clear-
cut trade distortions has been achieved worldwide within a
reasonable timeframe and bearing in mind the political and
social feasibility of these policies in the Member States, it
would appear necessary for the WTO to maintain its measured
approach to sustainable social, economic and agricultural
development.

The task of the WTO is sufficiently ambitious with
4.4.2.
regard to the distortional aspects of certain agricultural policies
for it to devote itself entirely to this matter:

— alignment of export conditions and all forms of support

in this field,

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— establishment of a timetable and realistic procedures for

access to markets in agricultural products,

4.5.3.
In addition, the EU and its industry urgently need a
reduction in the number and scope of non-tariff barriers by all
foreseeable means:

— choice of means for domestic support, which should not

distort international competition.

— improvement in existing non-tariff codes,

4.5. With regard to goods, the EESC thinks that the conflicts
of interest between the various parties could be reconciled.
This could be done first and foremost on the basis of a
compromise comprising:

— a balanced and fair scheme — involving all Member

States — for reducing tariffs,

— plus complementary action to regulate sensitive sectors;
and the reciprocal opening of markets in this area,

— enactment of legislation in a number of areas in advance
of liberalisation, where it would be appropriate to go
further than the formula insofar as a critical mass (80 %
of world trade for example) could be attained (e.g.
chemicals, pharmaceuticals).

4.5.1.
into consideration in a number of ways:

The situation of developing countries can be taken

— greater opening of markets in the countries of the

Northern hemisphere,

— growth in South-South trade,

— guarantee of the perpetuity of preferential systems, there-
by facilitating North/South forms of cooperation which
are particularly suited to co-development,

— different coefficients for reducing tariffs in developing
countries and industrialised countries — a formula which
may, however, also have drawbacks,

— implementation of these reductions over longer periods.

— successful negotiations with regard to the transparency
of government procurement and the facilitation of trade,

— negotiation of requests and offers in packages (export
bans, export taxes, double prices, boycotts of foreign
products),

— quantification and downsizing of these measures wher-

ever possible, as in the case of industrial tariffs,

— liberalisation of products which promote environmental
development in industrialised and developing countries
alike.

4.6.
If, historically speaking, the main mission of the WTO
is to improve market access, there is a strong case at the
moment for calling on the Geneva-based institution to provide
in addition a body of rules to stabilise the international trade
system, from which the development process will benefit at
the same time.

An agreement on foreign direct investment is first of
4.6.1.
all highly desirable, even in the form of an embryonic
instrument. There are two reasons for this:

— it should allow the largest possible number of firms
to invest
in optimum conditions (transparency and
predictability, together with non-discrimination, repatri-
ation of capital, rules with regard to expropriations and
dispute settlement),

— it would benefit the host countries, and in particular the
developing and least developed countries (which would
also be able to pilot this process themselves unimpeded
using ‘positive lists’), and

In the particular case of the EU, the international
4.5.2.
development of Community industry involves a number of
requirements:

— fine-tune the opening of their markets with the aid of
derogations and safeguard clauses, provided that they are
temporary and degressive.

— eradication of tariff peaks,

— major increase in the scope of consolidations, with
the aim of considerably narrowing the gap between
consolidated and applied rates and offering developing
countries the chance of being granted longer transitional
periods.

4.6.2. While the beneficial effects of foreign investment for
industrialised countries and developing countries are a topic
which is gaining ground among DDA negotiators, albeit while
having to be adjusted somewhat to take account of the
concerns of developing countries, competition itself is rightly
beginning to be taken seriously by these same developing
countries. It is universally thought that the ultimate aim is an
embryonic agreement which can gradually evolve with the

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endorsement of all WTO member countries while also helping
to initiate harmonisation of bilateral agreements for the
protection of investments.

4.6.3.
On the other hand, the DDA should perhaps capital-
ise on the advances made in a number of areas (e.g. trans-
parency) and a number of fundamental principles: the creation
of national competition authorities, non-discrimination and
procedural
fairness have the effect, on the one hand, of
facilitating market penetration by abolishing trade barriers and
other trade practices which restrict such penetration (see, for
example, Japan and South Korea) and, on the other hand, of
protecting developing countries and least developed countries
from certain predatory competitive practices falling outside
the remit of the courts.

4.6.4.
The DDA must also regulate trade with the aid of
new or improved rules which eliminate protectionist practices
and other policies that distort competition. Anti-dumping and
subsidies are, for example, two areas where the rules must also
be updated.

Anti-dumping policies have literally flourished
4.6.4.1.
since the Uruguay Round in a good many developing and
emerging countries and have remaining a burning issue
elsewhere, for example in the United States. Without calling
into question the legitimacy of measures providing protection
against dumping and unfair competitive practices, one is
prompted, as time passes, to ask whether deterrent action
should not be taken to combat protectionist abuses, such as
the harassment of the firms targeted and excessive compensa-
tory levy margins going beyond what is necessary to remedy
the damage done, and taking account of the interests of
industrial and final consumers.

The question of subsidies should also be reviewed:
4.6.4.2.
new problems have arisen such as export support and the level
of economic development of the States granting such support,
leading to the unjustified ousting from markets of, for example,
EU economic operators (see the Proex-Brazil aircraft case).

4.6.5.
The Committee would also emphasise the import-
ance of government procurement being more open and
transparent. Joint provisions should also be adopted as a
deterrent in the fight against corrupt practices.

4.6.6.
Progress should also be made on trade and environ-
ment issues by taking account of the impact indicators (SIA)
developed by the European Commission and working in close
cooperation with the relevant international bodies.

New developments in the Doha agenda

4.7.
One of the keys to the failure of Seattle and the success
of Doha is the acceptance by all member countries of the need

to address development problems. It must be noted straight
away that the WTO can only help solve such problems with
others. It is necessary to take advantage of the actions of
international institutions other than the WTO and of certain
national and even regional bodies.

4.7.1.
Nothing would be more dangerous in this respect
than perpetuating the existing situation, which is one of the
main faults of the WTO. This would mean including in
perpetuity among the developing countries a number of
emerging countries where in some, if not in all cases, a certain
minority of the population enjoys the living standards of
industrialised countries and industry is as strong as it is in our
countries.
is anomalous for these
countries to enjoy derogations from the general rules. This
situation should change, in the light in particular of the WTO’s
key instrument — the ‘single undertaking’ rule. This being so,
there is no doubt that industrialised countries will have to
agree to make an effort, either at government or enterprise
level.

In such conditions it

The Committee also supports the modernisation and
4.7.2.
greater transparency of WTO procedures (which must support
the clear interests of all developing countries). More systematic
use should be made of instruments which gauge the impact of
the issues under negotiation more accurately. These instru-
ments should include:

— impact assessments of the main issues at stake in the

negotiations, in the light of different scenarios;

— proportionality tests which examine existing and future

tariff and non-tariff barriers;

— the evaluation of the real level of development in the
various developing countries, in order in particular to
draw a better distinction between newly industrialised
and emerging economies, countries still in the process of
development, and countries still in the LDC category.

4.7.3.
The Committee would also stress how vital capacity
building is to carry through the domestic reforms in developing
countries which WTO rules require. Implementation consti-
tutes a second angle of attack for the problems peculiar to
developing countries, and the demands made by the countries
in the African group in 2002 must be taken into consideration
to a large extent. Health must be treated by Cancun at the
latest. Without a doubt, the WTO cannot do everything in that
area either. Not everything is due to the single issue of patents
and compulsory licences. A partnership between industries
and developing countries is vital and is also wanted by
pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore,
it is necessary to
address new problems that have emerged in the meantime,

30.9.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 234/103

such as the granting of pharmaceutical licences for chemical
components. Medicines are not everything. Medical teams and
hospital facilities are just as important. However, in the final
analysis, the WTO can only work towards a solution akin to
the one thought up by Ambassador Motta at the end of last
year, viz.:

social situation in the world along the lines of the EU single
market scoreboards published by the Commission. This study
for inter-
would become a universal reference document
national organisations (including the WTO), States and parlia-
ments, economic and social committees, businesses, social
partners and NGOs.

— causes: situations of national emergency or extreme

urgency,

— vetting by importing or exporting countries of a certain
number of minimum conditions governing eligibility for
compulsory licences, with a neutral body along the lines
of the WHO being used for this purpose,

— action to combat the hijacking of shipments and misuse
this machinery by certain newly industrialised
of
countries (India, Brazil), especially with regard to the re-
exportation of such products not covered by a licence to
other markets.

With regard to intellectual property, the EESC also urges the
EU to have the breeder’s right, as agreed under the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV Convention), accepted under WTO rules as a ‘sui
generis’ system.

4.7.4.
The Committee would also underline the need to
improve the management of trade disputes and, in particular,
to avoid as far as possible the damage caused to third parties
by trade sanctions by giving them access to additional
compensation on preferential terms.

4.8.
The Committee would like greater consideration to be
given to the social dimension of international trade. Even if
this matter does not directly come under the agenda drawn up
in Doha, progress in this area will be bound to consolidate the
development of sustainable trade (1). The Committee welcomes
the consideration given by a high level ILO group to the social
aspects of globalisation. It hopes that the ILO will step up its
involvement in WTO proceedings by acquiring the official
status of permanent observer. The Committee suggests that
each year the ILO should publish a comparative study of the

( 1) EESC opinion OJ C 133 of 6.6.2003 — For a WTO with a human
face, rapporteur Mr Dimitriadis. Conference on human rights in
the workplace organised by the EESC on 2-3 December 2002 in
Brussels

Brussels, 17 July 2003.

Finally the Committee invites businessmen, socio-
4.9.
occupational organisations, the social partners, NGOs and
other civil society players to take steps to:

— participate in information campaigns about the issues at

stake in making the Doha Agenda a success;

— contribute to the assessments of the implementation

situations in developing countries;

— organise international meetings between industrialists
and/or social partners at a cross-sectoral
level and in
individual sectors of activity, thereby helping to clarify
the issues at stake, make the assessments more detailed
and facilitate agreement in the negotiations;

— support the implementation of openness and develop-

ment programmes promoted by the WTO;

— submit proposals which help further

the interplay
between international trade and sustainable development
at a worldwide level.

4.10.
The Committee, for its part, intends to step up the
dialogue on international trade with its socio-occupational
partners, and especially the representatives of other economic
and social committees both in EU countries and outside the
EU — such as the committees for Mercosur, the ACP countries
or other developing countries. Following the example of the
European Parliament’s transnational initiative in the field of
representative democracy, the Committee would like in this
way to make its contribution to the development of a
participatory democracy in which civil society players are
involved more closely in the monitoring of international trade
negotiations and the general functioning of the WTO.

In particular,

4.11.
the Committee intends to present
operational proposals to this effect before the conclusion of
the Doha Development Round’s negotiations at the end of
2004. These proposals will be based on the joint deliberations
which it is going to continue to step us with its partners inside
and outside the EU.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH