The impact of 11 September 2001 on the developing countries and the implications for EU development policy : working paper.
Date: 2003-07-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: United States, common foreign and security policy, conflict prevention, democracy, developing countries, development policy, economic consequence, foreign investment, international security, poverty, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, the EU's international role, tourism, transport market

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Directorate-General for Research

WORKING PAPER

THE IMPACT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
ON THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY

DEVE 106 EN

QA-50-03-401-EN-N

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Directorate-General for Research

WORKING PAPER

THE IMPACT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
ON THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY

DEVE 106 EN
01/2003

This study was requested by the European Parliament's committee on Development and
Cooperation within the annual research programme.

This paper is published in the following languages:
DE (original), EN, FR

Author
Documentation

:
:

Reinhart PABST
Rayed BOUKHCHINA

Responsible Official :

Reinhart PABST
Division for agriculture, regional policy, transport
and development
Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:DG4-Agriculture@europarl.eu.int

(+352) 4300-22792
(+352) 4300-27719

Manuscript completed in January 2003.

Paper copies can be
obtained through                 :

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Fax:
E-mail: 

(352) 43 00-24053/20347
(352) 43 00-27722
dg4-Publications@europarl.eu.int

Further information on DG4 publications
can be accessed through     :

 www.europarl.eu.int/studies

Luxembourg, European Parliament, 2003
ISBN:.......................

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

©  European Communities, 2003

Printed in Luxembourg

 
 
Impact of 11 September 2001 on developing countries and implications for EU Development Policy

CONTENTS

Summary

A. Effects

     1. Short-term effects
         (a) The southern Mediterranean states
         (b) Individual sectors
         (c) Countries and regions most affected

     2. Long-term effects

     3. Other effects

B. Implications for EU development policy

    1. The world after 9-11
        (a) 9-11 as the worst ever attacks on America
        (b) Attacks in other countries
        (c) Reaction of the world community
        (d) International conferences

    2. Understanding the attacks

    3. Islam and the conflicting pressures of tradition and modernity
        (a) Attitude of religious leaders
        (b) Conflicting trends within Islam itself and modernisation
        (c) Failure of the state: influence of the Islamists

    4. Role of Islam in Black Africa
         (a) Increasing influence of Islam
         (b) Situation in some African countries

    5. Conclusions to be drawn from the attacks

page

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Impact of 11 September 2001 on developing countries and implications for EU Development Policy

    6. The EU response to terrorism:
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        development policy or military force?
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        (a) Criteria for a military response
        (b) Limits of EU solidarity with the USA
  27
        (c) Role and weight of EU development policy in conflict prevention   28
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        (d) Need for coherent policies
  29
        (e) Development policy outside and beyond conflict prevention
  30
        (f) Respect for other cultures as a sine qua non of cooperation
  30
        (g) Need for self-critical analysis and reconsideration

    7. Relationship between the CFSP and development policy

    8. Conclusions for the EU's development policy
        (a) The Mediterranean states
        (b) Preservation of cultural and traditional differences
        (c) Influence of the Middle Eastern conflict
        (d) Other regions and countries

   9. Individual policy areas
         (a) Democracy, respect for human and civil rights,
             the rule of law and good governance 
         (b) Conflict prevention
         (c) Poverty reduction
         (d) Education and training

   10. Intercultural dialogue
         (a) Need for intercultural dialogue
         (b) Role of the EU
         (c) Situations which beget violence
         (d) Starting points for dialogue
         (e) Obstacles to be overcome
         (f) Benefits and principles of intercultural dialogue
         (g) Programmes to intensify intercultural dialogue

   11. Role of the media

Conclusions

Endnotes

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Impact of 11 September 2001 on developing countries and implications for EU Development Policy

SUMMARY

This  study  briefly  reviews  the  effects  of  the  terrorist  attacks  on  the  economies  of
developing and emerging countries, where the main sufferers have been companies in the
tourism and transport industry. The structurally weak economies there were particularly
hard hit, at a time when economic activity had already slowed. Particularly serious is the
disruptive and probably longer-lasting blow to the climate of investment, which relies on
confidence in the normal economic processes and a sustainable return on investments.

The attacks of 11 September, or '9-11', were the culmination of a long series of attacks by
Muslim  extremists  on  Western,  chiefly  American,  interests.  At  the  same  time,  Islamic
groups within a number of Muslim states have for many years been perpetrating acts of
terror against their own governments. The threat has altered radically since the terrorist
Al-Qaeda organisation began operating because this organisation, unlike earlier terrorist
groups which tended to work in isolation, has built up a well-funded worldwide network.

The  study  airs  a  number  of  theories  exploring  the  reasons  behind  the  attacks.  It  leans
ultimately  towards  the  theory  that  they  were  prompted  on  the  one  hand  by  a  desire  to
resist the Americans, who were resented as invaders of the holy places of Islam in Saudi
Arabia, as the military and economic superpower and for playing a dominant role in the
Gulf region in order to secure their oil supplies. The attacks are also a reflection of hatred
and  contempt  for  Western  civilisation  with  its  many  shortcomings  and  signs  of
decadence,  as  symbolised  by  the  USA  in  the  perpetrators'  eyes.  They  are  also  an
explosive and destructive manifestation of the frustration felt by Islamic extremists at the
inability  of  much  of  the  Islamic-Arab  world  to  resist  the  progress  and  modernising
pressures  of  the  West  and  to  solve  their  own  social  problems.  These  motives  were
justified superficially by the exhortation in the Koran to destroy the Jews and Christians
through jihad (holy war) and thus also by the Palestinian liberation struggle.

The  attacks  have  deepened  the  ambivalence  of  US  relations  with  rulers  in  the  Gulf
region,  especially  Saudi  Arabia,  who  on  the  one  hand  (and  so  far)  have  reliably
guaranteed  oil  supplies  but  who  on  the  other  hand  fund  Islamic  interests  worldwide
which  increasingly  threaten  the  West.  The  case  of  the  Taliban  shows  the  dangers  of  a
short-sighted  foreign  policy  in  which  long-term  values  are  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of
immediate interests.

The study considers the reactions of the world community, especially the United Nations
and EU. The attacks have brought about radical shifts in international relations. The focus
of  development  policy  has  to  change  too.  Over  and  above  the  formal  coalition  against
terror the US Administration expects the community  of  nations  to  give  it  unconditional
support in its fight against terror. The European Council and European Parliament have
voiced  express  solidarity  with  the  USA.  But  there  are  major  reservations,  born  of  the
belief  that  international  law  must  take  precedence  over  the  possible  expediency  of  pre-
emptive  military  strikes,  but  born  too  of  the  whole  political  view  of  how  best  to  fight

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terrorism. The study seeks to identify the limits to solidarity with the USA, pointing out
the  EU's  system  of  values  and  its  different  policy  approach,  which  is  geared  more
towards eradicating possible causes of terror.

The  study  accepts  the  principle  that  a  military  response  to  terrorist  attacks  of  such
severity  is  appropriate,  given  that  the  adversary  is  so  very  dangerous.  But  at  the  same
time  it  points  to  the  part  which  a  long-term  development  policy  can  play  in  preventing
conflict  and  eradicating  possible  causes  of  terror.  It  notes  that  there  is  an  increasing
willingness  worldwide  to  use  force  in  pursuit  of  political  aims,  created  by  unbridled
nationalistic aspirations or ethnic or religious conflicts taking place against a background
of a socioeconomic struggle for resources. Where there is democratic deficit and a lack of
proper internal crisis management these conflicts erupt and may even lead to the collapse
of law and order.

The study judges the attacks of 9-11 to be acts of Islamic fundamentalism, but refuses to
equate Islam with terror. The faith of Islam and the majority of moderate Muslims cannot
be  held  collectively  responsible  for  the  acts  of  a  few  extremists  who  misappropriate
passages of the Koran to justify acts of violence.

The  study  reviews  in  detail  the  challenges  faced  by  Islam  at  present  in  its  attitudes
towards state and society and the culture of the West. The Islamic world is currently in a
critical  phase  of  pressure  to  modernise,  which  is  intensifying  the  traditional  tensions
between  the  various  branches  of  the  faith.  Extremists  who  are  prepared  to  use  force
exploit  these  religious  tensions  to  gain  a  leadership  role.  They  are  helped  here  by  the
twofold  role  of  Islam  as  a  secular  and  religious  force  and  by  the  susceptibility  of  poor,
uneducated  and  indoctrinated  people  to  manipulation.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  strengthen
the moderates and bring about political and socioeconomic stability.

 As  the  leading  world  player  in  development  aid  the  EU,  through  a  coherent  and  long-
term  development  policy  which  is  coordinated  with  its  foreign  and  external  economic
policy, can help to balance the interests of North and South, build democracy, enforce the
observance  of  human  rights  and  ensure  solidly  based  institutions  of  state  in  the
developing  countries,  as  well  as  improving  people's  material  living  conditions  and
opportunities  for  education.  To  this  extent  a  coherent  and  credible  development  policy
helps to prevent conflict.

The  study  points  to  the  urgent  need  for  state  institutions  to  provide  basic  services  in  a
number  of  Arab/Muslim  countries.  Where  the  government  has  failed  to  do  this,  poor
groups of the population become reliant on religious, charitable establishments headed by
religious  leaders,  who  can  mobilise  the  people  for  their  own  ends  and  who,  by  solving
social problems, seek popular support on their way to taking power. The picture is similar
with  centres  of  education,  many  of  which  –  in  Pakistan  especially  –  are  religious
foundations under the control of powerful religious leaders.

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In  view  of  the  specific  nature  of  the  threat,  measures  to  be  considered  thus  include
measures  to  alleviate  poverty,  improve  education  and  training  opportunities  and
encourage democracy.

Intercultural dialogue with secular and spiritual leaders of the Islamic world will play a
key role here, in pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the joint resolution of international
problems, which requires an attitude of basic solidarity with other countries and cultures.
This dialogue requires first of all that both sides should critically examine their own value
systems and their own priorities. Fruitful dialogue also presupposes openness, tolerance
and  respect  vis-à-vis  the  partner's  culture,  traditions  and  religious  beliefs  –  which,  by
their  very  nature,  do  not  require  any  justification.  Dialogue  must  not  constitute
interference in the internal affairs of other states. Meaningful dialogue must be aimed at
achieving consensus and so must not exclude the discussion of fundamental issues such
as democracy, human dignity and human rights, gender equality and the fair and peaceful
reconciliation  of  opposing  interests.  Civil  society  as  well  as  the  intellectual  elite  must
have a voice in the dialogue, to be fostered through programmes.

The media have an important role to play in furthering understanding between cultures.
Governments often take decisions under pressure of public opinion, which is significantly
influenced by the media. Conflicts are usually reported in a superficial and sensationalist
way which does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the subject or serve the public's
need  to  be  informed.  Content  should  be  presented  as  objectively  as  possible,  reflecting
the opinions of the parties to the conflict and with an analysis of the causes and motives.
Very  often  journalists  are  not  sufficiently  well  briefed  or  educated  in  the  historical  and
cultural  background  to  events  and  so  cannot  evaluate  them  properly.  Training  seminars
held in the context of intercultural dialogue would thus be a good thing.

The study examines the relationship between the CFSP and development policy. It warns
against  any  scaling  down  of  bodies  within  the  EU  Council  of  Ministers  and  against
merging  the  development  and  foreign  policy  remits,  because  this  will  create  the  risk  of
development  considerations  being  treated  as  less  important  in  the  decision-making
process  or  even  excluded  from  it  altogether.  The  attacks  of  9-11  prove  that  long-term
coherent development cooperation is vital, and so the Council of Development Ministers
must be retained as a separate body.

The  MEDA  programme  based  on  the  Barcelona  Declaration  of  27  and  28  November
1995  and  the  resolutions  adopted  at  the  Valencia  Euro-Mediterranean  conference  of  22
and 23 April 2002 are seen as an excellent framework for successful cooperation with the
Arab/Muslim world of the southern Mediterranean states.

There  can,  however,  be  no  significant  progress  on  this  cooperation  and  on  achieving  a
comprehensive  balance  with  the  Arab  world  until  a  fair  and  peaceful  settlement  of  the
Middle Eastern conflict is reached. The Palestinian liberation struggle (in view too of the
continuing problem of refugees, especially in the neighbouring states) inevitably has an
effect  of  strengthening  solidarity  amongst  the  Arab  nations  which  overshadows  all
relations with the Arab world.

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The study thus urges the EU to throw its full political weight into seeking a swift end to
the  conflict.  To  that  end  it  needs  to  speak  with  one  voice  and  must  not  leave  it  to  the
Americans alone, whose bias in favour of Israel has hampered the search for a settlement.

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A.

EFFECTS

Industrialised countries

Because the developing countries depend on the prevailing economic climate and mood
in  the  industrialised  countries,  many  major  events  in  the  industrialised  world  impact
indirectly on them. Recession in the USA, Japan and Europe caused the rate of economic
growth in the developing countries to fall from 5.5% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2001, though the
9-11 factor cannot be measured exactly. The threat of further attacks in the industrialised
world  would  slow  the  pace  of  economic  recovery  and  might  produce  a  further  indirect
impact on the developing countries.

The  cost  of  the  9-11  attacks  was  huge  in  the  highly  capitalised  industrialised  countries,
over and above the immediate loss of human life and the material damage sustained. In
addition to the direct damage suffered by buildings and businesses, aviation and tourism
were particularly hard hit. The full cost of the damage is thought to run to 12 figures. The
overall indirect effects may well be far greater than the direct material damage, in view of
the  massive  increase  in  military  spending  undertaken  by  the  USA  and  the  additional
security  measures  taken  worldwide,  which  reduce  productivity.  And  there  is  no  way  of
measuring  the  effects  of  the  climate  of  fear  on  corporate  decision-making.  All  these
effects spill over on to the developing countries.

Developing countries

The consequences of the attacks are all the more serious for the developing countries in
that they affected sectors vital to them at a time of slowing economic growth. A World
Bank press release on 1 October 2001 estimated that the attacks had condemned a further
10 million people to poverty and tens of thousands of infants to death. It is very hard to
quantify the damage, especially long-term, partly because of the difficulty in evaluating
the  'confidence'  factor  which  is  essential  to  economic  activity.  This  factor  permeates
numerous areas and will persist for a long time, because it creates uncertainty amongst all
the  players  in  the  economy  –  producers,  investors,  money  lenders,  money  markets
generally and consumers. Uncertainty grows in the face of further threatened attacks and
a  general  increase  in  willingness  to  use  force  in  conflicts.  This  situation,  which  is
completely  new  in  terms  of  its  scale,  means  that  the  policy-makers  are  faced  with  an
extremely difficult task. Part 2 of this study describes the implications of all this for the
EU's development policy.

Analysis of the effects of terrorism

At their meeting of 5 and 6 November 2001 the Council of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign
Ministers  commissioned  a  report  on  the  potential  effects  of  the  events  of  9-11  on  the
Mediterranean  countries  which  are  partners  in  the  Barcelona  Process.  The  substance  of
that  report  is  covered  in  the  analysis  which  follows.  This  analysis  also  draws  on  the
findings of an OECD report on the economic consequences of terrorism.

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Different types of damage

A distinction is made between short- and long-term damage. Short-term damage is in turn
divided  into  direct  damage  (immediate  loss  of  income,  e.g.  from  tourism)  and  indirect
damage  (e.g.  drop  in  exports,  more  difficult  access  to  money  markets).  Long-term
damage  concerns  the  potential  for  growth  of  the  countries  concerned.  Disadvantage  of
this  kind  stems  from  e.g.  a  desire  to  avoid  risk  (reduction  in  investments)  or  increased
spending on security.

1. 

Short-term effects

(a) The southern Mediterranean states

In 2001 a worldwide recession had already begun and was particularly pronounced in the
countries  of  the  Mediterranean,  so  the  events  of  9-11  impacted  on  an  economic  order
which was already weakened.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks the economy recovered quickly in the USA and
Europe thanks to good crisis management, notably by the central banks, so the immediate
effects  were  largely  short-lived.  The  longer-term  effects  are  hard  to  ascertain,  partly
because  of  structural  weaknesses  in  the  southern  Mediterranean  economies  concerned.
The events of 9-11 to some degree acted as a catalyst: the importance of how to resolve
their debt problem now receded compared with the problems of the structural weakness
of  economic  growth,  unemployment  (about  20%  regionally)  and  poverty.  Population
growth means that some 25 million new jobs will be needed over the next 15 years. It is
also  necessary  to  strengthen  the  confidence  of  economic  players,  foreign  players  in
particular,  and  to  press  on  more  energetically  with  reforms  in  the  financial  sector,  with
regard to foreign investment and a market economy which works properly. The climate
for productive investment must be improved. This will not be possible without peace in
the Middle East.

(b) Individual sectors

(i) One of the first measurable effects was the sharp 28,6% fall  or so in crude oil prices
from  24,5  USD/barrel  in  August  2001  to  about  17,5  USD/barrel  in  December  2001,
caused by a fall in demand and the fear of a worldwide recession.

(ii)  International  tourism,  which  counts  many  developing  and  emerging  countries
amongst  its  main  destinations,  especially  in  the  Arab/Muslim  world,  is  one  of  the
economic  sectors  which  has  suffered  the  most.  In  the  countries  bordering  the
Mediterranean, tourism provides 25% of foreign currency income and 10% of jobs. In the
Middle East, tourism was down some 34% by the end of 2001, though admittedly this fall
was due largely to the second intifada and the reaction of the Israeli Government.

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There was a 65% cancellation rate for holidays to the Caribbean1, where hotel occupancy
was just 15%. A quarter of the population in this region works in hotels and catering and
related  sectors.  Tourism  as  a  proportion  of  GNP  in  the  Caribbean  ranges  from  13%  in
Trinidad and Tobago to 69% in St Lucia.

(iii) The attacks had a direct impact on money markets too, on financial service providers
and  the  transport  industry.  Thousands  lost  their  jobs  here.  Foreign  direct  investment  in
many  developing  and  emerging  countries  also  dipped  sharply,  and  is  likely  in  future  to
concentrate on more secure areas of the world.

(c) Countries and regions most affected

(i) Turkey and Egypt
These  countries  experienced  a  severe  economic  recession.  Turkey's  national  economy,
hard hit by the collapse of the financial sector, suffered greatly as interest rates rose due
to the country's high level of national debt (90% of GNP). Egypt's income from tourism
fell  by  50%.  Income  from  Suez  Canal  dues  and  foreign  investment  were  also  markedly
down.

(ii) Mashreq countries and Israel
The effects on these are hard to ascertain due to the simultaneous increase in violence.

(iii) Maghreb countries
This group of countries seems to have absorbed the direct effects relatively well. Tunisia
stands  out  by  virtue  of  the  April  2002  attack  on  a  synagogue  in  Djerba  (income  from
tourism down 22%). The country also had to cope with the aftermath of a severe drought.
Morocco initially lost around 15% of its tourist income but has since made this up. Most
of the Mediterranean countries made swift adjustments to their budgetary and balance of
payments policies.

(iv) Latin America
This  region  will  continue  to  feel  the  effects  of  9-11  acutely,  due  to  the  woes  of  the
financial  sector  in  some  countries  but  also  to  the  region's  dependence  on  the  US
economy. The World Bank expects economic growth in 2001 to be just 1%, down 3.2%
on the year 2000. The IMF predicts a fall of 2.5%.

2. 

Long-term effects

An OECD report of June 20022 on the economic consequences of terrorism points to the
potential long-term effects of the attacks, which may resonate in three areas:

(a) Transport costs
In the short term the increase in maritime transport and air freight costs was no more than
10%.  But  in  the  longer  term,  additional  security  measures  (especially  for  perishable  air
freight)  is  likely  to  push  up  transport  costs,  and  smaller  exporters  in  the  developing
countries  may  lose  their  competitive  edge  due  to  time-consuming  administrative

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procedures. Sizeable cost increases are also likely as a result of discriminatory measures
(compulsory certification) in respect of certain places of origin regarded as unsafe. The
cost  of  delays,  customs  clearance  and  safety  checks  in  developing  countries  may  add
5-13% to the price of goods. Industry experts expect an overall increase in prices solely
as a result of additional security measures.

(b) Tourism
According  to  the  World  Tourism  Organisation  the  fear  of  further  attacks  prompted
cancellations of 12-15% in October 2001 compared with the previous year. Even now the
situation has not quite returned to normal. In the developing countries tourism accounts
for around 2-3% of GNP. The figure is higher in the Caribbean, South Pacific and some
countries  of  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa.  It  is  expected  to  fluctuate  over  the
medium term, the factors determining it being outside the control of national authorities.

(c) Remittances from foreign workers
Stricter  immigration  controls  are  reducing  the  numbers  of  foreign  workers  in  the
industrialised and emerging countries and with them the volume of remittances they send
home.  These  remittances  are  a  major  source  of  income  in  the  workers'  home  countries,
even  outstripping  export  earnings.  This  phenomenon  affects  Central  America,  the
Caribbean, Middle East and the Mediterranean countries.

3.

Other effects

Consumer spending in the Mediterranean countries has fallen and the rate of savings has
risen,  leading  to  a  further  slowing  of  growth.  Figures  are  not  yet  available  to  show
whether the rate of foreign investment, already the lowest in the world (GNP has risen by
only 1.5-2.5% over a decade), has fallen any further. But in all probability it will have.
Markedly  higher  risk  premiums  have  been  charged  on  the  money  markets.  Some
countries will be more heavily reliant on external financial aid.

In many Muslim countries the governments cracked down hard on Islamic groups in the
wake of the 9-11 attacks. Many extremists and agitators thought to be a threat to national
security  were  jailed,  opposition  parties  were  watched  more  closely  and  civil  liberties
were  curbed.  Press  and  media  freedom  in  the  Islamic  countries  has  remained  broadly
unaffected,  though  The  Annual  Survey  of  Press  Freedom  2002  published  by  Freedom
House reports a few cases of tighter restrictions in e.g. Jordan, where an amendment of
the  penal  code  now  means  that  journalists  'face  prison  if  they  publish  material  which
could breach national unity, divide the population or damage the image and reputation of
the state'. In the fight against terrorism it is inevitable that some Arab governments will
display reactionary tendencies.

Due  to  stricter  selection,  the  number  of  students  from  Islamic  countries  studying  at
Western  universities  has  fallen  and  they  are  supervised  more  closely  by  their  host
universities.  This  has  direct  implications  for  the  educational  level  of  those  wishing  to
study, who may rethink their plans and turn their backs on the West.

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It is academic to wonder how far the funding of development policy is losing out because
of the new priorities. The Monterrey Conference of 18-22 March 2002 suggests that most
donor  countries  realise  only  too  well  that,  in  view  of  the  huge  dangers  which  threaten,
development  policy  is  more  important  than  ever.  But  there  is  no  escaping  the  fact  that
money spent on defence and security means that less money is available elsewhere.

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"The  coalition  against  terrorism  must  advance  hand  in  hand  with  a  coalition  for
development" (Romano Prodi, addressing the European Parliament on 24 October 2001).

B.

Implications for European development policy

The  question  'what  are  the  implications  for  development  policy  of  the  attacks  of
11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the failed
attack on the White House in Washington?' implicitly assumes that development policy
can  cushion  the  effects  being  felt  at  present  and  perhaps  help  to  prevent  conflicts  in
future.

To determine how effective development policy can be in doing this we need to look very
closely at the perpetrators of the attacks and their motives, the root causes of their action,
and also at the economic, social, intellectual and cultural background, particularly in the
Arab/Muslim  world.  These  attacks  can  only  be  explained  in  terms  of  a  larger  timescale
and context. An unprejudiced analysis is needed of the role of the Western industrialised
nations,  especially  the  USA,  in  international  relations.  Power  politics  and  economic
considerations, above all oil supplies, are essential parts of the equation here. Oil supplies
play  a  fateful  role  for  the  development  of  the  oil-producing  countries  and  international
relations too. Proper analysis is required here, if we are to identify the correct course of
action to be taken, which, however, is not  confined to development policy alone. As the
Bible tells us, trying to understand our adversary does not mean we have to agree with
him.

l. The world after 9-11

The  events  of  9-11  struck  to  the  very  heart  of  the  USA  and  ushered  in  a  new  era  in
international  relations.  The  attacks  mark  the  culmination  of  a  long  series  of  ongoing
hostile acts aimed chiefly at US citizens and interests. The current wave of suicide attacks
dates  back  to  April  1983  when  a  suicide  bomber  attacked  the  US  embassy  in  Beirut,
killing 63 people. That attack was followed by another against a US army base in Beirut
in which 299 people died.

(a) 9-11 as the worst attack yet on America

It  is  now  virtually  accepted  that  the  attacks  were  inspired  and  financed  by  Osama  Bin
Laden,  the  millionaire  exiled  by  the  Saudi  regime,  and  his  supporters  in  the  Al-Qaeda
organisation. The USA had previously suspected him of masterminding earlier attacks on
US  targets:  a  building  occupied  by  US  military  advisers  in  Saudi  Arabia  attacked  on
13 November 1995, an attack in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996 in which many
people  were  killed  and  injured,  the  bombing  in  August  1998  of  the  US  embassies  in
Nairobi  and  Dar  es  Salaam  which  killed  hundreds  and  injured  thousands  more,  and  the
attack on the US destroyer USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden in October 2000.

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(b) Attacks in other countries

Not  only  US  citizens  and  interests  have  been  targeted.  From  the  1970s  onward  several
attacks were  carried out in  Egypt  by  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  other  groups,  which
claimed not only 1 200 victims, mainly tourists (e.g. 58 Swiss tourists and four Egyptians
killed  at  Luxor  in  1997),  but  also  the  life  of  the  country's  president  Anwar  al  Sadat  in
1981. Other attacks have occurred in Algeria, where in the space of more than ten years
tens  of  thousands  of  civilians  have  been  killed,  mainly  by  Islamic  groups  such  as  the
GIA; in Pakistan in May 2002 (against French submarine builders) and in India, where
there is fighting chiefly between different religious groups, and lastly in the Philippines,
where  an  Islamic  criminal  gang  (Abu  Sayyaf)  carries  on  its  dirty  work  (kidnappings,
extortion  and  hostage  killings),  allegedly  in  retaliation  for  decades  of  economic
oppression by central government. The 1980s and 1990s saw several attacks in Paris in
which  many  people  were  killed  and  injured.  Recently  (December  2000)  plans  were
discovered for an attack on institutions in Strasbourg. In April 2002 there was an arson
attack on the Jewish synagogue in Djerba, thought to be the work of Al-Qaeda.

(c) Reaction of the world community

The United Nations Security Council condemned the attacks the next day in the sharpest
terms, as a threat to world peace and security. At the same time it declared itself ready to
fight terrorism. On 28 September the Security Council called on all states to implement a
comprehensive package of measures to combat terrorism.

From 27 to 29 November 2001 a conference was convened jointly by the United Nations
Development  Programme,  the  World  Bank,  Asian  Development  Bank  and  the
Commission to identify needs and priorities for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The governments of almost all states, including the Islamic states, condemned the attacks
in  official  statements.  The  USA  successfully  assembled  a  broad-based  coalition  against
terror, which included many Islamic states, aimed principally at destroying the Al-Qaeda
network  and  the  Taliban  regime  in  Afghanistan  which  supported  it  and  which  has  now
been removed by force.

The extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001 in Brussels approved a Plan
of Action for initiatives in the following areas: police and justice cooperation, diplomatic
measures,  humanitarian  aid,  aviation  safety,  economic  and  financial  measures  and
emergency  aid.  Significantly,  the  summit  declined  to  equate  terrorism  in  any  way  with
the Arab/Muslim world and declared that Europe would join with the USA in resolutely
fighting terrorism.

On  4 October  2001,  in  a  resolution  on  the  extraordinary  European  Council  of
21 September  20013,  the  European  Parliament  made  a  number  of  demands  regarding
internal and external security, justice cooperation and economic questions and expressed
solidarity with the Government and people of the USA. At the same time it called for a
more in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which

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terrorism  originates.  Most  significantly,  it  unequivocally  condemned  any  misuse  of
religion as a justification for murder and refused to recognise any particular civilisation
as superior by virtue of its religion.

The Ghent European summit of 19 October 2001 set priorities for the implementation of
agreed measures in the areas of police and justice cooperation and resolved to cooperate
closely  with  the  USA.  In  particular,  the  Council  gave  support  to  the  American  military
operations in Afghanistan begun on 7 October, and declared them to be reconcilable with
the United Nations Charter, given that the Taliban regime had refused to hand over the
leaders  of  Al-Qaeda  suspected  of  being  behind  the  attacks.  The  Council  pledged  large-
scale  humanitarian  aid  and  EU  help  in  rebuilding  Afghanistan.  It  also  called  for  a
resumption of the Middle Eastern peace process and closer cultural cooperation with the
Arab/Muslim world to prevent it from being equated with terrorism.

The Laeken  European summit  of  14 and 15 December  2001  again  urged  an  end  to  the
violence  in  the  Middle  East  and  expressed  support  for  the  sending  of  an  international
force to Afghanistan to restore stability and order. Humanitarian aid of EUR 360 million
was promised.

Following the attacks of 9-11 and as part of the efforts to build an international coalition
against  terror  the  current  President  of  the  Council,  the  High  Representative  for  the
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for external
relations Christopher Patten paid visits to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Syria and,
together with President Prodi, to other countries of the Middle East. Pakistan was given
the sum of EUR 100 million by the EU. Other meetings were held around the margins of
the  UN  plenary  session  of  9  to  15 November  2001.  At  the  same  time  an  intensive
schedule of visits was completed by the Commissioner for Development, Poul Nielson.

(d) International conferences

Following  the  attacks  of  9-11,  conferences  and  seminars  were  held  worldwide  on  the
nature  of  Islam  and  relations  between  this  faith  and  its  militant  supporters  and  the
civilisation of the West. A few of them are mentioned below.

Fifty leading activists representing women's movements met in Brussels on 4 December
2001  for  a  conference  with  Afghani  women  and  called  for  the  Taliban  regime  to  be
replaced by a democratic government which respected women's rights.

On 28 November 2001 a colloquium of Arab intellectuals was held in Cairo, which called
for  a  critical  analysis  of  the  religious  texts  of  Islam.  Fundamentalist  ideology,  they
claimed, was misusing the faith to mobilise the masses.

On 19 and  20 December  2001  an  'Interfaith  Meeting'  was  held  in  Brussels,  attended  by
leaders of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and chaired by Commission President Romano
Prodi  and  Ecumenical  Patriarch  Bartholomew,  to  examine  the  role  of  the  faiths  in  the
peace process.

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On  12  and  13 February  a  joint forum  was  held  in  Istanbul  between  all  the  EU  foreign
ministers  and  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  to  reinforce  good  relations
between the civilisations.

In April the Arab League held a meeting in Beirut, chiefly on the Middle Eastern conflict
and its consequences for the world situation.

In  the  course  of  the  ASEM  (Asia-Europe  Meeting)  on  6  and  7 June  the  EU  foreign
ministers agreed to cooperate closely in the fight against terrorism.

2. Understanding the attacks

Since  9-11  numerous  attempts  have  been  made  to  understand  the  reasons  behind  the
attacks.  There  is  some  overlap  of  supposed  motives.  What  matters  is  that  the  planning
had  started  years  beforehand,  so  the  reasons  do  not  lie  solely  in  the  political  situation
immediately  prior  to  the  attacks.  They  have  to  be  viewed  as  part  of  a  broad-based
campaign of Islamic terrorism and in the context of the series of attacks which began as
far back as 1993 with the earlier attempt to blow up the WTC.

(a) America's role in world politics

Given that the attacks were targeted chiefly at US citizens and institutions, a determining
factor  is  the  view  which  the  perpetrators  have  of  their  adversary  as  the  dominant
economic  and  above  all  military  power:  the  attacks  were  aimed  at  the  symbols  of
America's military and economic might.

-

-

Public  branding  of  the  USA  as  'the  great  Satan'  by  the  revolutionary  regime  in
Iran after 1979 painted a picture of the enemy which the Shi'ite leaders in Teheran
kept alive for decades in the world media to good effect by regularly organising
mass  demonstrations.  Years  before  that  the  USA  had  already  been  vehemently
attacked for the Vietnam War and its intervention in other parts of the world.

Bitterness at the US role in Saudi Arabia and her presence in the 'holy places' of
Islam,  particularly  at  the  fact  that  the  defence  of  Saudi  Arabia  against  Iraqi
invasion coincided neatly with the safeguarding of American oil supplies, with the
USA  propping  up  an  undemocratic  and  unpopular  regime  (which  had  expelled
Bin  Laden  for  his  involvement  in  earlier  attacks  and  under  pressure  from  the
Americans had not allowed him back in after he was expelled from Sudan).

This suggests that the reason is nationalistic resistance to foreign interference, inspired by
religious fanaticism. In a video, Bin Laden notably stressed that the Arab world had been
humiliated  for  80  years,  ever  since  the  Arab  provinces  of  the  now  defunct  Ottoman
Empire were divided up between the mandate powers Great Britain and France (plus, in
the  case  of  Palestine,  the  League  of  Nations)  at  the  San  Remo  conference  of  19  to
26 April 1920.

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At present Arab nationalism, in its objective of a fairer share-out of petrodollar income,
comes up against the Saudi-US community of interests (protection of the Saudi regime in
return  for  guaranteed  oil  supplies  for  the  USA).  Dangerous,  inconsistent  and  thus
politically explosive is this American support for the Wahhabis who, by funding Islamic
groups worldwide, are ignoring aspirations towards democracy in Arab countries too and
are seeking to buy (an increasingly endangered) peace in their own country. Democratic
reform  through  the  encouragement  of  moderate  forces  and  investment  in  widespread
education  are  the  only  way  to  ensure  a  peaceful  and  lasting  balance  of  interests  in  the
region,  but  these  can  probably  only  be  achieved  if  the  Wahhabi  royal  house  takes  the
radical step of renouncing its claim to absolute rule. In the long term the double game, in
which the Americans are involved actively by their role as protectors but paradoxically as
victims too, will be impossible to sustain. In this case too it may prove that the USA, by
following a failed, short-sighted policy which prioritises stability and secure oil supplies,
has  been  ill-advised  in  supporting  a  conservative  regime,  against  the  flow  of  the  tide.
Increased American interest of late in a change of regime in Iraq might well stem from
belated realisation of this fact, and if that change is brought about by force it may prove
to be a further and fatal mistake. Unpopular though the Iraqi dictator may be, even with
the Arabs, US military intervention in Iraq would create an effect of solidarity against the
West  which  would  affect  the  security  interests  of  the  EU  too.  If  the  Middle  Eastern
conflict  continued  without  a  settlement,  Arab  governments  would  face  public  pressures
which would be hard to resist.

-

-

Political  and  ideological  rejection  by  the  Americans  of  the  Taliban  regime,  with
which Bin Laden and his followers were closely identified, after they had initially
supported it for reasons of US oil interests (pipeline through Afghanistan). It is a
bitter  irony  of  history  that  it  was  the  USA,  Pakistan  and  Saudi  Arabia  which
supplied the Mujahideen with money and weapons to resist the Soviet occupying
force during the war in Afghanistan, those same Islamic warriors who then made
no distinction between the Soviet and American 'Satan', since both powers were
perceived as invaders. Even after this, the USA and Pakistan gave support to the
fundamentalists  educated  in  Pakistani  madrassahs.  Fighters  from  Chechnya,
Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, tried and tested in the war against the
Soviets,  then  took  their  message  of  violence  home  to  their  own  countries.
Algeria's GIA continues to bear bloody witness to its past training.

US  action  perceived  as  hegemony  and  imperialism  in  the  Gulf  region,  where  it
claims a national interest by virtue of its need for guaranteed oil supplies, which it
would be prepared to defend by force of arms. This is seen as misappropriation,
though  the  Americans  can  refer  to  an  agreement  of  1945  between  President  F.
Roosevelt  and  King  Ibn  Saud  concerning  oil  supplies.  No  one  denies  that  the
industrialised nations have a huge interest in oil supplies from the Gulf region, but
the  way  in  which  the  USA  uses  its  muscle  to  secure  its  economic  interests  is
criticised.

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-

-

The not-unbiased position of the USA in the Middle Eastern conflict. This would
mean  that  the  attacks  are  intended  to  show  solidarity  with  the  Palestinian
'brothers' in their second intifada (begun in September 2000). The Americans are
accused of applying international law selectively here. The bitter consequence of
the attacks is they have given Israel and the USA an excuse vis-à-vis the rest of
the world for taking a tougher line with the Palestinians.

The  continuing  bombing  of  Iraqi  targets  for  failure  to  observe  the  no-fly  zones,
and  the  embargo  against  Iraq  which  continues  to  be  enforced  by  the  Security
Council  but  is  criticised  even  in  the  West  for  its  terrible  effects  on  food  and
medical supplies, with young children suffering the most. The American threat to
bomb Iraq back into the stone age was prompted by deep bitterness and a feeling
of  humiliation.  The  attacks  on  the  WTC  were  seen  as  a  retaliation  against
America for waging war with 'smart' weapons, which killed thousands of Iraqis.
There is in addition the continuing threat of war against Iraq to topple the regime,
which the Americans went on supporting even after its war of aggression against
Iran as a way of containing the expansionist Shi'ite regime in Teheran (1980-88),
perceived by America as a threat.

(b) Conflicts between civilisations in general

-

-

The attacks were seen as a desperate last stand by declining radical Islam against
Western  economic  and  technological  superiority  as  embodied  by  the  USA  and
regarded  as  a  provocation;  this  interpretation  sees  the  Arab/Muslim  countries  as
an outdated civilisation which, having failed to advance its own civilisation in the
present age, can only make its mark by violently and destructively opposing the
dominant  culture  of  the  West:  terrorism  as  a  defence  against  the  pressures  of
progress and modernisation. This theory argues that Bin Laden had to attack the
USA,  the  political  superpower,  as  a  way  of  giving  legitimacy  to  Islam  as  the
universal power and so earning approbation and support from the Islamic world.

International  Islamic  movements  have  adopted  popular  frustrations  and  social
demands as their own cause. Given that many countries are in fact Islamic states,
opposition to the ruling government cannot be fought on a religious and cultural
platform, which leaves the industrialised world as the only target for aggression.

Frustration is born of an unsuccessful transition from colonial rule which brought neither
prosperity  nor  democracy  and  the  failure  of  the  neoliberal  economic  system,  which
excludes large groups of the population from the benefits of the modern age and further
accentuates  the  gulf  between  rich  and  poor.  Efforts  were  thus  also  made  to  justify  the
attacks  as  a  legitimate  war  against  a  Western  world  which  exploits  the  developing
countries.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  15  of  the  19  hijackers  were  Saudis  from  the
educated and trained social middle class, who are hardly poor.

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-

-

-

-

Another  view  is  that  the  faithful  are  waging  'holy  war'  against  the  infidel  to
combat a social model which is irreconcilable with Islam and deeply offensive to
Muslim  beliefs  (role  of  the  sexes,  family  planning,  role  of  religion  in  state  and
society, understanding of democracy, law, extravagance and moral decadence of a
society  driven by  consumerism and pleasure which knows no taboos and whose
only god is money). Presented in this way, the West can easily become the focus
of emotions such as hatred and contempt in a society of traditional values.

The attacks of 9-11 are of course acts perpetrated by Islamic terrorists, but they
are  seen  too  as  a  reaction  to  undesirable  worldwide  phenomena  (nationalism,
religious fanaticism, poverty, injustice and the social deprivation of whole groups
of  society,  the  North-South  divide).  They  are  seen  as  heralding  future  quarrels
which  for  the  moment  are  being  acted  out  in  the  developing  and  emerging
countries  over  the  ownership  of  and  struggle  for  resources  but  which  are  also
penetrating the industrialised countries of the West, the nations supposedly truly
to blame (cf. the religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, clashes
between  Indian  and  Pakistani  nationalist  and  religious  forces  over  Kashmir,  and
internal conflicts in Sudan and Nigeria).

In the Islamic world it is widely held that the attacks cannot have been the work
of  Muslims  because  they  are  irreconcilable  with  the  laws  of  the  Koran,  which
forbid  suicide  and  the  killing  of  the  innocent.  So  there  must  have  been  a
conspiracy.  But  this  is  given  the  lie  by  the  fact  that  the  hijackers  were  devout
Muslims and it is clear from documents they left behind that their aim was to kill
as  many  Jews  and  Christians  as  possible.  The  plan  for  these  attacks  cannot  of
course  be  seen  as  representative  of  Islam  as  a  whole  in  the  way  that  it  is  in  the
context of Afghanistan and Pakistan (radicalisation through a state of war).

Huntington's  theory  of  cultural  conflict  focuses  on  the  potential  nature  of  future
conflicts  and  suggests  ways  of  resolving  such  conflicts  peacefully.  Huntington
sees the events of 9-11 as vindicating his theory of the 'clash of civilisations' and
at the same time warns against allowing intra-Islamic conflicts to become global,
pointing  out  that  in  most  Islamic  states  the  government  in  power  is  not
democratic,  whilst  the  opposition  is  fundamentalist.  Following  the  attacks,  Bin
Laden  said  that  his  intention  had  been  precisely  to  trigger  war  between  the  two
civilisations.  The  fact  that  the  USA  managed  to  build  a  coalition  against  terror
which  also  included  a  number  of  Arab/Muslim  countries  does  not  necessarily
invalidate Huntington's argument.

When all the motives are considered it seems most likely that the attacks, on the evidence
of the presumed attackers themselves, are acts of Islamic terrorism inspired by religious
fanaticism in pursuit of real political aims, namely to fight the US position of hegemony
in  the  Arab/Islamic  region.  A  further  aim  of  Bin  Laden  was  doubtless  to  win  Arab  and
Muslim support for the Islamic cause. But we must again emphasise the disastrous way in

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which  the  US  secret  services,  in  conjunction  with  the  government  of  Pakistan,  have
helped to feed this Islamic militancy over the years.

3. Islam and the conflicting pressures of tradition and modernity

(a) Attitude of religious leaders

Two  eminent  spokesmen  for  the  two  main  branches  of  Islam,  Sheikh  Mohamed  Sayed
Tantawi,  the  Grand  Imam  of  Al-Azhar  in  Cairo  who  leads  the  Sunni  Muslims,  and
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, spiritual leader of the Shi'ites in Iran, publicly and emphatically
condemned the attacks of 9-11, saying that nothing in the Koran justified them. But the
Sunni leader did this not out of principle, but on the grounds that Bin Laden had harmed
the Islamic cause, discredited Islam in the eyes of the world when it was gaining ground,
and robbed it of its legitimacy.

Spokesmen  for Islam  repeatedly  said that the perpetrators had not acted in the name of
Islam. There was no jihad, since this could only be proclaimed by a religious authority in
a  fatwa.  Also,  holy  war  was  only  allowed  in  defence  of  one's  own  territory.  Certain
passages  of  the  Koran  such  as  the  9th  sura,  verse  29,  which  urged  Muslims  to  'fight
against those who do not believe in Allah', had to be seen in their historical context, when
Islam needed to establish, spread and define itself in relation to Christianity. The idea of
just  war  is  not  alien  to  Christianity  either,  as  the  writings  of  St  Augustine  prove4.  A
number  of  leaders,  however,  for  example  Omar  Bakri,  spokesman  for  the  international
Islamic  movement  Al-Muhajiroun,  and  Maulana  Shah  Ahmed  Noorani,  the  leader  of
Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan, publicly endorsed the attacks.

(b) Conflicting trends within Islam itself and modernisation

The Islamic world is not monolithic: Islam, like all the major faiths, is taught and lived
differently  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  The  various  branches  disagree  violently,  and
the  fundamentalists  use  the  Koran  and  traditions  to  support  an  ideology  of  violent
conflict. They also point to the 47th sura, verse 35: 'So be not slack and do not sue for
peace (with the unbelievers) for you will, certainly, have the upper hand'.

In areas where Islam is followed strictly the traditional values, particularly Shari'ah5, the
Islamic code of laws which to the Western mind appears inhumane, has remained totally
untouched by the Enlightenment and rationalism6.

The  powerful  influences  of  the  West,  above  all  its  pressure  to  adopt  democracy,  a  new
understanding of the role of the state, the emphasis on human rights, the Western ideal of
free  development  of  the  individual,  the  value  attached  to  individuality,  have  led  to
conflict  in  the  Islamic  states  and  even  tested  them  to  breaking  point.  Given  the  rapid
advance of globalisation, the feeling of being swamped by the culture of an economically
and technologically superior West was bound to engender feelings of alienation, a kind of
cultural  colonisation,  and  thus  powerful  resistance  movements.  Islam  is  currently
experiencing  a  period  of  upheaval,  and  in  Europe  during  the  Reformation  and  religious

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wars of the 16th and 17th centuries this led to a degree of radicalisation, so that one can
fairly  speak  of  a  shift  in  the  stages  of  civilisation.  Islamic  fundamentalism  is  a  major
worry to the Muslim states themselves, and in Arab states too there is increasingly talk of
Islam having failed as a political movement. (Except in Algeria the fundamentalists have
suffered  electoral  defeat  everywhere  in  recent  years.)  Religion  as  a  basis  for  defining
one's identity is challenged. The need to modernise, perceived as essential, whilst at the
same time remaining true to the traditions, leads to conflict for the individual as well as
for society as a whole. This conflict, together with the pressing social issues, can only be
resolved  by  opening  up  Islam.  An  encouraging  sign  is  the  recent  agreement  of  the
warring  parties  in  Sudan  to  remove  the  constitutional  reference  to  Shari'ah  as  the  state
religion.  This  was  a  constant  barrier  to  peaceful  coexistence  between  Christians  and
Muslims.

In  the  longer  term  Islam  will  certainly  adapt,  just  as  secularisation  in  Europe  had  to  be
achieved  gradually  and  in  the  teeth  of  strong  opposition  from  representatives  of  the
Roman Catholic Church who played an ambiguous role in the areas of democracy, human
rights  and  gender  equality.  This  adaptation  to  modern  ways  -    some  religious  leaders
would rather 'islamize' modernity than modernize Islam  -  becomes all the more pressing
and probable as the network of international relations and exchanges becomes denser. In
this context we should bear in mind the recent new moves towards democracy in Turkey.

(c) Failure of the state: influence of the Islamists

The  economic  and  political  climate  in  many  Islamic  states  is  currently  difficult.  In
economic  and  social  terms  they  are  unable  to  cope  with  the  fast  growth  in  their
population  (poor  popular  acceptance  of  family  planning).  Large  sections  of  the
population, especially young people, have no prospects and no voice in political decision-
making.  Influential  religious  leaders  exploit  this  situation  and  challenge  the  state.  They
use Islam as a social 'glue' which binds people together and gives them an identity, and
their  highly  active  Islamic  institutions  provide  basic  services  and  welfare  in  all  areas
where the state does not fulfil its duties or does so only imperfectly. Phenomena which
are  initially  religious  in  nature  take  on  a  socially  relevant  substance.  (Religious
foundations in the industrialised countries of the West, which are socially very important,
have a fundamentally different ethos: they do not compete with the state but complement
it.)

At the same time this means that burgeoning secular civil societies are squeezed out. The
fundamentalists want to get the masses behind them and make a social movement into a
political one. Because the state is manifestly incompetent and corrupt it constantly feels
obliged  to  justify  itself.  This  plan  succeeded  in  Iran  in  1979.  It  clearly  shows  that  the
mullahs' ultimate concern was to hang on to their power, which they saw as having been
expropriated by the Shah and now see as being threatened by efforts towards reform and
democratisation.

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Whilst poverty is in itself no excuse for terrorism, it is a fact of life that impoverished and
poorly educated masses can be manipulated by those with spiritual, religious or financial
influence.  Realisation  of  this  is  a  valuable  starting  point  for  development  measures.  A
population which follows irrational, fanatical and hate-filled leaders who claim to uphold
Islamic values and interests can only be persuaded by a successful programme of poverty
reduction and education.

But it would be a grave mistake to assume that the modernisation of Islamic states simply
means  their  adoption  of  Western  culture  and  values.  Modernisation  does  not  mean
westernisation.  It  is  equally  fatal  to  support  authoritarian  regimes  just  because  they  are
secular and not Islamic.

4.

Role of Islam in Black Africa

(a) increasing influence of Islam

In  Black  Africa  there  are  several  Islamic  movements  running  against  the  moderate
mainstream.  For  decades  the  dominant  groups  were  the  so-called  brotherhoods  of  the
Tijaniyya,  Murridiyya  or  Qadiriyya  or  other  groups  influenced  by  North  Africa  or  the
Gulf  region.  At  this  level  there  were  links  with  Arab  Muslims  and  the  organs  of  state.
Since  the  1970s  African  society,  discouraged  by  economic  crisis,  the  slide  of  broad
groups  of  the  population  into  poverty  and  the  failure  of  Western-style  state  power,  has
become more receptive to Islam as preached by Muslims in the Gulf region, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In Nigeria there has been an increasing trend towards radicalisation.

Fundamentalist movements such as Ibadu Rahman and other Muslim brotherhoods have
attracted considerable support, not least because they accuse the moderates of kowtowing
to the West, of betraying 'true' Islam and its values and of neglecting the poor. A factor in
the equation here is the financial and logistical support provided by the Iranian mullahs
which  enables  the  brotherhooods  to  provide  generous  social  programmes  for  the  poor.
But the Arab Gulf rulers too would do well to keep a critical eye on these fundamentalists
whom they are funding and who might well one day turn on them too. But for the time
being  the  traditional  Muslim  communities  have  remained  in  control,  thanks  to  their
influential religious leaders.

Fundamentalism appears to many Muslims as a welcome weapon against the corrupt state
and the  excessive foreign  cultural  influence which goes with it. To many Africans who
have to deal day in day out with an undemocratic, corrupt and violent machinery of state
which  has  no  respect  for  fundamental  civil  rights,  fails  in  its  duty  to  provide  for  the
population  and  tolerates  social  injustice,  the  events  of  9-11  seemed  like  fair  retaliation
against a superpower concerned only with its own self-interest.

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African governments allow the fundamentalists a free hand out of concern for the people
who benefit from the work of Muslim charities (mosques, schools), where the state fails
to  provide,  but  also  because  other  charitable  bodies  such  as  Christian  organisations  are
allowed considerable freedom to operate. This is true in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
Increasing numbers of African students are also going to Pakistan, where they receive an
Islamic education.

(b) Situation in some African countries

After condemning the attacks almost unanimously, on 17 October 2001 30 or so African
heads  of  state  and  government,  at  a  summit  organised  by  the  Senegalese  President
Abdoulaye Wade, formed an 'African Pact against Terrorism', partly as a way of bringing
the continent out of its isolation.

But  public  opinion  is  by  no  means  unanimous,  especially  in  view  of  the  US  military
response in Afghanistan: the mainly Muslim population in Nigeria, Niger, Senegal (95%
Muslim), Sudan and the Ivory Coast side with their co-religionists and even Bin Laden
himself,  and  gave  vent  to  their  anti-American  protests  in  public  demonstrations.  But
Islamic  activists  in  Senegal  are  confined  to  a  few  specific  organisations.  In  the  early
1980s Gaddafi's creeping influence in Senegal (and in The Gambia too) led to diplomatic
relations being broken off.

In  Niger  there  were  strong  Islamic  movements  especially  in  the  southern  provinces
bordering on Nigeria, which exerts a powerful influence. There Bin Laden is fêted as a
hero. Iranians and Pakistanis are opening free Koranic schools and clinics. Islamists have
opposed  the  government's  family  planning  policy.  Most  people  in  Niger  are  anti-
American because of the war in Afghanistan.

Guinea-Bissau expelled five Pakistanis in mid-October 2001 for constituting a danger to
the  state.  They  were  members  of  the  Hamadiyya  brotherhood,  a  Pakistani  sect  based  in
London. This sect has already built 40 mosques and 20 Koran schools and has trained 60
teachers.

Mali expelled 40 Pakistanis for 'suspect' activities at the end of October 2001.

In Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, Bin Laden was publicly celebrated. In the wake
of the bombings in Afghanistan, pronounced hostilities between Christians and Muslims
on 12 and 13 October 2001 erupted into street battles in Kano between Islamists and the
army and a witch-hunt against Christians. Some 100 people died. But these clashes are
ethnically  and  religiously  motivated,  in  that  several  tribes  are  jockeying  for  power.
Christians are from the southern tribes of the Ibo and Yoruba, whilst the Muslims belong
to the northern tribe of the Hausa. In 12 of the 33 Nigerian provinces Shari'ah has been
introduced  in  violation  of  the  constitution.  Since  1999  thousands  have  been  killed  in
religious quarrels.

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In  Cameroon  a  slight  majority  of  the  population  is  Christian.  There  have  been  clashes
between adherents of Tijaniyya and Wahhabi fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia, keen to
impose their view of Islam.

Up to 1996 Bin Laden, after losing his Saudi citizenship, had found refuge in Khartoum
and  expanded  his  network  from  Sudan  by  financing  trade  bodies  and  Muslim
organisations (including involvement in the diamond trade with Sierra Leone). Sudan is
emerging  from  isolation  following  the  detention  of  Al-Turabi  and  the  introduction  of  a
multi-party system and press freedom. Sudan has renounced terrorism. On 27 September
2001 sanctions against Sudan were lifted in UN Security Council Resolution No 1372.

Gaddafi  is  moving  in  the  same  direction.  As  far  back  as  1994  he  had  already  asked
Interpol to arrest Bin Laden for funding Libyan fundamentalists.

The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were allegedly masterminded by
Bin Laden from Somalia, where he was helped by the lack of organised state structures.

5. 

Conclusions to be drawn from the attacks

The attacks of 9-11 are the fruit of years of preparation by Muslim fundamentalists who
intended  their  acts  mainly  as  a  confession  of  faith  but  in  reality  sought  to  deliver
politically motivated strikes against the USA as the world superpower and representative
of  Western  culture.  The  lengthy  preparation  period  and  meticulous  planning  reflect  a
deep level of hatred and contempt, and this is shared by a considerable proportion of the
population in the Muslim world.

The attacks highlighted the vulnerability of our societies, which is in marked contrast to
the  military  superiority  of  the  USA  in  particular,  but  they  also  revealed  the  mutual
dependencies  which  inform  international  problems  and  interests,  particularly  in  North-
South  relations,  and  should  prompt  us  to  undertake  a  critical  review  of  our  own
responsibilities. The leaders of both industrialised and developing countries must address
this.

If we are to fight terror effectively we must have a clear understanding of its real causes
and the irrational and rational motives behind it. The role of the Middle East conflict and
the  attitudes  of  friendly  powers  on  both  sides  must  be  considered  here.  We  must  also
appreciate  the  link  between  the  geostrategic  interests  (power  and  trade)  of  the  leading
world  players  in  the  Gulf  region,  Western  and  Central  Asia  and  the  reawakened
aspirations for nationhood and autonomy of countries which no longer want to be mere
pawns on the world chessboard.

The tensions thus engendered can only be eased through honest, self-critical and serious
dialogue in which the political and religious leaders of the parties play an active part. It
will be a long-drawn-out process of eradicating prejudice and achieving rapprochement,
which must involve the whole of society and in which the media will have a decisive role

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to  play.  In  our  desire  to  resolve  long-term  problems  we  must  not  overlook  the  present
danger which requires instant action.

Terrorism  cannot  be  tolerated  and,  if  necessary,  it  calls  for  powerful  deployment  of  the
state  security  apparatus  and  armed  forces.  But  more  can  be  expected  in  the  long  term
from a policy of prevention geared towards consensus rather than confrontation and from
support for moderate forces rather than the exclusion of immoderate ones. The leitmotif
must  be  a  fair  balancing  of  interests  within  societies  and  between  nations.  We  need  a
policy for the long term, not one dictated by the interests of the moment.

6. 

The EU response to terrorism: development policy versus military force?

(a) Criteria for a military response

The EU needs to realise that conflicts of this kind (which will not necessarily originate in
the Muslim world) also impact directly on seemingly uninvolved industrialised countries
and may even threaten world peace. Globalisation is not confined to economic ties alone,
but  can  also  be  a  factor  in  the  genesis  and  spread  of  conflicts.  The  declaration  that
terrorism will be stamped out by every means possible is wishful thinking. It may be seen
as a provocation and may actually encourage terrorist attacks. If a military response is the
only way, this must be explained in order to preserve credibility in the eyes of the world.
The objectives must be clearly defined and the means used must be proportionate to the
objective  pursued.  If  possible  a  multilateral  approach  must  be  used,  consistent  with
international  law  and  the  rules  of  the  United  Nations.  A  pre-emptive  strike  against  the
Iraqi regime without UN backing will, given the predictable reaction of Arab solidarity,
carry the very risk which needs to be avoided – that of a war between cultures. The West
could then fall into Bin Laden's trap, if his aim in carrying out the attacks of 9-11 was to
trigger a war of this kind.

(b) Limits of EU solidarity with the USA

The EU cannot escape the question of how far it is prepared, being itself a terrorist target,
to go along with the American policy of a predominantly military response to terrorism in
its objectives and the means it employs. The issue is thrown into relief by the fact that US
military  spending  is  USD 1 000 million  a  day  compared  to  development  spending  of
0.1% of GNP, whilst the ratio for expenditure by the EU Member States is the other way
round.  The  Americans  rely  on  their  strength  and  reject  willingness  to  compromise  as
weakness and capitulation to blackmail. They are suspicious of European 'appeasement',
which was disastrous for the Europeans in the last century. Inside the USA too there was
a passionate debate, with an open letter by 58 intellectuals on a just war being published
in March 2001 and an answering letter in April 2002.

Europe is now required to show solidarity with the Americans, not least because of the
debt of gratitude it owes for the US sacrifices in liberating Europe from the Nazi terror.
Solidarity  is  vital  to  the  European  interest  at  present  because  the  European  defence
capability  is  so  limited.  But  that  solidarity  has  to  end  at  the  point  where  US  values

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fundamentally  depart  from  those  of  Europe.  Notwithstanding  our  respect  for  a
superpower  which  uses  all  its  sovereign  might  to  defend  its  interests  and  above  all  to
keep  its  people  safe,  when  it  comes  to  European  participation  in  military  action  what
counts is the EU's concept of itself as a free alliance of states which are committed to the
idea of peaceful international cooperation, with due respect for human rights and ethnic
and  cultural  differences,  and  which  regard  the  observance  of  international  law  as
paramount.

The USA and the EU cannot do without each other: US efforts for a worldwide coalition
against terror were a convincing proof of the need for international consensus and joint
action.  The  EU  should  make  it  clear  that  in  the  current  world  situation  unilateralism
based on a sense of mission and military superiority is no longer acceptable. It will prove
ineffective  in  the  long  term,  because  it  is  increasingly  important  to  secure  international
legitimacy, which is not the same thing as sympathy. Public opinion is attentive to stated
values  and  credibility.  Leadership  which  persuades  using  these  criteria  will  be  more
likely  to  receive  international  support.  For  the  rest,  the  EU  is  well  able  to  play  an
independent and complementary role through its international ties, contacts and channels
of influence. It must be emphasised that US and European security interests are tied up
with the political, economic and social developments in the Middle East.

(c) Role and weight of EU development policy in conflict prevention

European  development  policy  is  geared  to  the  notion  of  peaceful  international
cooperation  and  the  balancing  of  interests.  The  close  and  multilayered  contacts
maintained  in  various  strata  of  society  mean  that  the  EU's  specific  development  policy
instruments are particularly well placed to identify mistakes and conflicts and take action
against  the  causes.  Top  of  the  list  are  poverty  alleviation  and  better  educational
opportunities,  though  it  must  be  stressed  that  poverty  is  not  the  cause  of  terrorism.  But
extreme poverty can breed despair and radical attitudes in people who have nothing more
to lose. It enables radical religious leaders to exert significant influence on poor sections
of  the  population  who  are  reliant  on  social  institutions.  Ignorance  due  to  a  lack  of
education and information, plus misinformation in the media and tirades of hatred of the
kind which have been heard in Islamic houses of prayer in Europe, are also reasons for
extremism.

Successful  policies  must  be  long-term,  coherent  and  true  to  established  principles,  and
they must not be dictated solely by a 'friend or foe' type of thinking and by the advantages
of the moment. Otherwise it will be hard to use development to remedy the damage done
by foreign policy mistakes, especially those committed using military means.

(d) Need for coherent policies

It  is  a  contradiction  and  thus  counterproductive  when,  for  example,  the  American
decision  to  increase  development  aid  by  USD 10 000  million  over  three  years  and  the
approval of a special programme for Africa of about USD 3 400 million are followed by
a  decision  to  subsidise  agriculture  over  the  next  ten  years  to  the  tune  of  USD 180 000

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million, which significantly reduces the export chances of the developing countries. This
happened  against  the  background  of  a  massive  increase  in  defence  spending  and  the
opening  up  of  markets  to  boost  world  trade,  so  vociferously  advocated  by  the
industrialised countries in the WTO. The American stance on the Kyoto protocol and the
International Criminal Court also fail to reflect the level of international solidarity which
a  world  power  might  be  expected  to  show.  On  the  other  hand,  only  a  few  of  the  EU
Member  States  (the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Luxembourg  and  Denmark)  have  so  far
achieved  the  target  of  spending  0.7%  of  GNP  on  development.  The  results  of  the  UN
Conference on Financing for Development, held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in Monterrey,
Mexico, reflect only a very slow rate of progress.

The USA is a superpower in military terms only. In economic terms, and this will matter
more in the long run, the EU carries more weight. As by far the biggest world player in
development  cooperation  the  EU  can  play  a  leading  role  in  preventing  future  crisis
situations  by  improving  living  conditions  and  at  the  same  time  acting  as  a  moderating
influence to defuse international tensions. For example, especially in view of Palestinian
suspicions,  it  cannot  serve  the  cause  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace  if  negotiations  in  the
Middle  Eastern  conflict  are  left  almost  exclusively  to  the  Americans.  The  EU  should
bring its own political weight to bear in addition to funding support measures. The fact
that  Israel  looks  to  the  USA  whilst  the  Arabs  prefer  to  look  to  the  EU,  or  some  of  its
Member States, demonstrates the need for a moderating role.

(e) Development policy outside and beyond conflict prevention

In  the  whole  debate  on  action  against  terrorism  and  the  justification  of  wars  or  pre-
emptive  strikes  we  need  constantly  to  remind  ourselves  that  it  is  the  freedom  of  us  all
which is at stake here. This means freedom not only for the affluent but also freedom and
justice  for  the  poor  of  this  earth.  For  them  their  living  conditions  are  a  permanent
deprivation of liberty and a constant challenge to the industrialised nations: not without
reason,  the  poor  and  those  without  rights  resent  the  wealthy  industrialised  countries
which  have  it  within  their  power  to  improve  their  lot.  The  West  perceives  extreme
poverty in the developing world rather as an uncomfortable glitch in an existence which
is mostly free of the struggle to survive and it sits up and takes notice only when sudden
upheavals occur rather than drawing conclusions for the longer term. So the response to
the  attacks  must  be  more  than  just  a  tough  military  counter-strike;  it  must  equally
emphatically take the form of cultural dialogue and resolute development policy.

The  attacks  can  actually  be  seen  as  symptomatic  of  the  popular  despair  in  many
developing  countries  which  demands  greater  effort  in  development  cooperation  even  in
the  absence  of  any  specific  threat.  The  emerging  solidarity  of  broad  sections  of  the
population  with  the  perpetrators  in  some  developing  countries  is  proof  of  this.  The
potential  is  there  for  a  whole  raft  of  measures  of  technical,  financial  and  cultural
cooperation. Attitudes, especially willingness for dialogue and respect for other cultures,
will be crucial here for lasting success.

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There are a number of routes to this success:

-

-

-

Poverty reduction by improving basic services, including education;

Insistence  on  human  rights  and  democracy,  creation  of  fairer  conditions  by  a
better international balance of interests;

Stepping  up  political  and  interfaith  dialogue,  overcoming  mutual  prejudices  and
bringing  positions  closer  together  so  that  the  different  faiths  can  coexist
peacefully. The thread running through all this must be the preservation of human
dignity.

(f) Respect for other cultures as a sine qua non of cooperation

Policies  with  these  objectives  can  only  work  with  the  cooperation  of  governments,
religious  leaders  and  thinkers  and  the  population  in  general.  These  policies  must  not
constitute  unacceptable  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  country.  This  requires
acceptance  of  and  respect  for  other  faiths  and  forms  of  civilisation,  together  with  more
diffidence and humility in passing on our own Western achievements in technology and
culture. The Western social and economic model expects world acceptance almost as of
right,  as  witness  the  ill-chosen  words  of  one  European  head  of  government  on  the
supposed cultural superiority of the West. This remark rightly triggered absolute outrage
in  the  Arab/Islamic  world.  It  is  a  mistake  to  apply  one's  own  standards  when  assessing
other forms of civilisation. All the more so since leading scientific and political opinion is
voicing considerable doubt about many areas of policy pursued by the Western countries.
The  extent  to  which  Western  science  in  all  its  glory  can  be  divorced  from  reality  is
apparent from Fukuyama's argument in 'The End of History' that liberal democracy and
the  market  economy  effectively  mark  the  end  of  social  evolution.  This  view  could  not
prevail.  Apart  from  anything  else  it  would  mean  that  the  Islamic  countries  (and  others)
currently had no chance of making their own positive contribution to development.

(g) Need for self-critical analysis and reconsideration

When European development policy is applied, one must bear in mind the picture which
Western civilisation  presents  to  traditional societies,  with its consumerism,  materialism,
uninhibited  commercialism  and  decadence.  Although  the  technology  so  prized  by  the
Islamic world too is based on research which knows virtually no bounds, the hubris of it,
in searching out and manipulating the very last mysteries of life, particularly in genetics,
is  nevertheless  morally  offensive  even  to  non-religious  people  and  destroys  their
confidence in the value system of the West. The breaking of taboos, largely tolerated in
Western societies, is seen by traditional societies as a provocation and leads to a loss of
credibility. This creates irreconcilable differences more serious than the gulf between rich
and poor. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie is materially unacceptable, but it should be
seen as a reaction to the breaking of certain religious taboos and marking a point at which
the  level  of  tolerance  was  exceeded.  What  right,  finally,  do  the  industrialised  countries
have  to  insist  that  the  developing  countries  must  respect  universal  rights,  when  every

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seven  seconds  a  child  starves  to  death  in  the  developing  world  and  the  industrialised
countries could prevent this?

The attacks of 9-11 and the many situations of conflict existing at present should thus be
the starting point for reflection and self-critical analysis by all parties concerned and for
an  intensive  spiritual  and  cultural  examination  of  the  substance  and  practice  of  the
leading world faiths and other forms of civilisation. Freedom is beyond price and yet so
little  is  made  in  the  West  of  the  fact  that  freedom  entails  obligations.  The  bases  of  a
universally valid ethic to go beyond existing international agreements should be worked
out.  The  moment  has  come  to  define  the  essence  of  good  and  evil,  when  President
George W. Bush talks of the axis of evil. Evil could prove easier to identify  than good
and it could also transpire that not everything that is good for the USA is also good for
the rest of the world. This is probably a better way of solving the problems than dividing
other countries into 'good guys and bad guys' and just letting weapons do the talking.

It must also be remembered that Muslims living amongst us send their impressions home
and so help to shape the picture which their co-religionists have of how we live and how
we  treat  our  fellow-men,  i.e.  of  our  system  of  values.  There  are  5.2  million  Muslim
immigrants living in France. In Germany there are 2.5 million, and the United Kingdom
has 1.5 million. A total of almost 11 million Muslims live in the EU. This fact necessarily
has  implications  for  the  domestic  policy  of  the  EU  Member  States  and  their  policy  on
asylum and immigration. A Eurobarometer survey of April 2002 showed that 83% of the
population regarded better relations with the Muslims as essential or at least necessary.

This means of course not only that the perceived image of the EU must improve but also
that  we  must  rethink  our  political  objectives  and  how  we  have  sought  to  achieve  them.
But  we  should  also  place  greater  emphasis  on  our  spiritual  achievements  and
understanding,  on  the  revival  of  interest  in  spiritual  matters  and  our  young  people's
search for ideals. Does not the selfless action of the 300 fire fighters who did their duty
and  sacrificed  their  lives  to  save  others  not  deserve  to  be  emphasised  more  strongly?
Should we not contrast this attitude with the purely destructive attitude of the terrorists?
We  should  also  look  for  what  we  have  in  common  with  other  cultures  instead  of
emphasising  differences.  This  is  particularly  true  of  media  reporting,  which  should
concentrate more on informing and educating people instead of dealing in sensation and
cliché.  Nor  is  it  a  question  of  the  'global  projection  of  European  values',  to  which  the
Commission  refers  in  its  communication  on  the  European  Community's  development
policy7. Those holding different views from ours should not be reviled and we should not
create stereotypical bogeymen. This is what happens when the titles of TV programmes
equate the fight against terror with war against Islam.

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7. 

Relationship between the CFSP and development policy

This study is concerned chiefly with development policy. It is obvious, however, that not
only  the  EU's  common  foreign  and  security  policy  –  particularly  its  military  dimension
and alliances – but also its external economic policy may be far more influential in our
relations  with  non-Member  States,  especially  where  there  is  conflict.  The  systematic
destruction of infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, partly built with EU money, is
eloquent  testimony  to  that.  Effectiveness  in  development  policy  would  thus  seem  to
depend on having the right foreign and security policy.

Traditionally, the objectives of the two policies are different and conflicting signals are
sent, as was very apparent when the Americans were dropping bombs on Afghanistan and
at the same time sending it humanitarian aid. In addition to this one case, recent events
seem to have made everyone aware that incoherent and inadequately coordinated policies
can  result  in  a  contradictory  image  being  projected  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  which  is
damaging  to  development  policy,  and  that  the  security  situation  can  deteriorate  when
development is neglected. Thus we need to adopt a broader view of security which takes
account of the socioeconomic realities in potential areas of unrest.

In its opinion on the Gemelli report8 the Foreign Affairs Committee pointed to the need
for  the  two  policies  to  be  more  closely  integrated,  stressing  the  importance  of  the
interrelation between development aid, conflict prevention and human rights and thus the
need for greater coherence. To this extent it was right to open talks on closer economic
cooperation  with  Iran.  Similar  moves  should  be  made  towards  Pakistan,  India,  Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states.

The decision of the Seville European Council of 21 and 22 June 2002 on the structure and
functioning of the Council must also be considered in this light. It established a Council
body for general affairs and external relations which will, in separate meetings, address
administrative, institutional and cross-cutting issues and separately from these the whole
spectrum  of  the  EU's  external  relations,  i.e.  the  CFSP,  European  security  and  defence,
external trade, development and humanitarian aid. Similar moves are also under way in
the European Parliament. This is not just a matter of procedure, as various governments
have  tried  to  suggest.  After  all,  Article  3  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  gives
development  policy  an  independent  role  as  part  of  foreign  policy.  Any  merging  of
responsibilities  within  a  single  body  creates  a  risk  of  development  considerations  being
seen as less important and even ignored. There is a danger that the developing countries
may,  so  to  speak,  lose  their  spokesman  in  the  most  important  forum  of  European
decision-making. In terms of transparency, specifically, it may no longer be clear whether
and to what extent development has been considered by the Council in any foreign policy
measures it takes. Recent events have shown very clearly how important it is to have an
independent,  permanent  and  long-term  development  policy.  The  attacks  of  9-11  prove
that  the  real  war  is  to  be  fought  against  underdevelopment,  poverty  and  poor  education
and training.

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8. 

Conclusions for the EU's development policy

Whether  one  sees  the  attacks  as  the  latest  in  a  series  and  thus  as  part  of  a  specifically
Islamic  threat  or  as  heralding  a  generally  increasing  tendency  towards  violence  and
radicalisation prompted by the gulf opening up between North and South, greater efforts
in the area of development cooperation may help to defuse tensions, even if there is no
realistic  expectation  that  acts  of  terrorism  can  be  prevented.  But  poverty,  despair  and
ignorance are a fertile breeding ground for dictators and terrorists. This is why we must
give people the chance of a decent life so that terrorist networks worldwide have less to
work  with  in  potentially  unstable  countries  and  are  denied  any  legitimacy  and  a
following.  This  undertaking  is  admittedly  made  difficult  by  people's  ignorance,  poverty
and  susceptibility  to  corruption  in  the  face  of  the  huge  sums  of  money  available  to  the
terrorists from drugs, the arms trade, extortion and money laundering.

As  regards  countering  a  specifically  Islamic  threat,  progress  towards  democracy,  on
human  rights,  press  freedom  and  education  is  what  counts.  Naturally,  the  EU  can  only
play a supporting role here as and when the countries concerned open up as part of their
modernisation  process.  In  any  event,  efforts  should  be  made  at  the  same  time  on  more
than one 'front'.

The EU must of course take its specific conflict prevention measures, with an eye to UN
resolutions  and  particularly  those  of  the  Security  Council,  and  it  must  implement  its
development  policy  generally  in  partnership  and  alignment  with  the  international
organisations  and  principal  donors9.  The  EU  must  make  its  mark  and  speak  with  one
voice in these forums.

As  to  how  successful  the  UN  conferences  have  been  –  announced  with  a  great  fanfare
and  held  at  great  expense  –  it  has  to  be  said  that  they  have  come  nowhere  near  to
delivering on the promises made by the member nations (especially promises of money)
or  yielded  any  of  the  results  which  the  developing  countries  had  reasonably  expected.
The action plans approved in recent years take decades to complete and give false hope to
those who are suffering here and now.

(a) The Mediterranean states

Relations with the Mediterranean states and their predominantly Muslim populations are
shaped by closer EU cooperation with 12 Mediterranean countries10 which began in 1995
with  the  'Barcelona  Process'  and,  pursuant  to  the  Barcelona  Declaration  of  27  and
28 November 1995, created the framework for a comprehensive partnership in political,
economic and cultural matters with the aim of peace and stability, prosperity and closer
ties between nations. The objective is to have a free trade area by 2010 at the latest, with
a common market in goods, capital and services.

The  basic  and  most  important  financing  instrument  of  the  Barcelona  Process  is  the
MEDA  programme  which  has  a  financial  envelope  of  EUR 5 550 000  million  for  the
period  2000-2006.  The  programme  itself  is  an  excellent  way  of  securing  respect  for

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human rights, democracy and conflict prevention. By and large the opinion of the Foreign
Affairs  Committee  on  the  Valdivielso  de  Cué  report11  complains  that  the  cultural  and
social  aspects  of  the  MEDA  programme  have  so  far  received  too  little  attention  (e.g.
exchanges  and  meetings  between  representatives  of  civil  society  in  the  southern
Mediterranean  states  and  EU  and  promotion  of  networks).  Intercultural  dialogue  in
particular needs to be intensified12.

The  Euro-Mediterranean  conference  in  Valencia  on  22  and  23  April  2002  adopted  an
Action  Plan  which  takes  due  account  of  the  events  of  9-11  and  the  Middle  Eastern
conflict. It passed resolutions on the following topics:

-

-

-

-

-

Reinforcement of political dialogue, to include defence matters and human rights
issues;

Firm political commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law;

Participation  of  all  governments  and  civil  society  to  promote  the  social,  cultural
and human dimension of partnership;

Importance  of  promoting  dialogue  and  cooperation  between  cultures  and
civilisations;

Rejection  of  any  military  solution  to  the  Middle  Eastern  Conflict;  an  end  to  the
occupation  of  the  territories  annexed  by  Israel  in  1967  and  establishment  of  an
independent democratic Palestinian state.

(b) Preservation of cultural and traditional differences

The  Barcelona  Declaration  sets  out  a  programme  –  it  is  not  a  legally  binding  text.  The
right of each country to choose its own political, social and cultural, economic and legal
system  is  expressly  acknowledged.  EU  initiatives  have  not  so  far  secured  any  great
improvements in domestic politics as regards democracy and human rights, let alone the
serious  internal  situation  in  Algeria  and  above  all  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict.  But  the
relevant political and religious leaders and sections of population do not view a political
or  socioeconomic  change  of  system  on  the  model  of  the  industrialised  countries  as
opportune at present. Efforts towards reform have gone as far as they can, in the teeth of
powerful  resistance  from  the  Islamic  fundamentalists.  What  counts  here  is  how  the
Islamic states see themselves. In some countries political power is legitimised by religion.
This  is  especially  clear  in  Iran,  where  Seyed  Ali  Khamenei  as  spiritual  leader  has
supreme power and responsibility for policy-making. Islamic beliefs and ideas permeate
the  whole  of  public  and  private  life.  Any  radically  different  approach  to  basic  Islamic
issues, particularly the application of Shari'ah and the possible separation of the political
from the religious, moral and transcendental, in other words secularisation which current
teaching  holds  to  be  irreconcilable  with  the  Koran,  has  to  be  left  to  the  process  of
modernisation  within  the  country  itself.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  it  cannot  be
cautiously  encouraged,  e.g.  through  the  strengthening  of  civil  society  under  EU  aid

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programmes.  Reforms  are  more  likely  to  come  about  from  within,  as  a  result  of
interaction  between  social  forces.  And  endogenous  pressure  for  modernisation  is
especially strong amongst young people in Iran. There are encouraging developments in
Turkey,  a  secular  though  Muslim  state,  where  capital  punishment  in  peacetime  was
recently taken off the statute book. Minority rights and the right to freedom of expression
were also recognised and the right of assembly and association was reformed. Insistence
on these things as prerequisites of Turkish membership of the EU was probably decisive
here.  It  remains  to  be  seen  what  further  action  will  be  taken  by  the  moderate  Islamic
forces  in  power  since  the  most  recent  parliamentary  elections  and  whether  the  laws  are
actually implemented. But reform of the laws marks a historic democratisation of major
areas  of public life. It might be a model for reform  in  other  Islamic  countries.  Turkey's
history  shows  clearly  how  stubbornly  old  religious  traditions  and  ideas  can  hold  out
against the secular state (as proclaimed in the 1924 constitution inspired by Atatürk).

(c) Influence of the Middle Eastern conflict

Another  obstacle  prevents  the  MEDA  programme  from  fulfilling  its  full  potential:  the
Israel-Palestinian  conflict  overshadows  regional  cooperation  with  the  12  partner
countries.  Economic  development  in  the  Middle  East  is  very  much  hampered  by  the
insistence on arms spending, and the tension creates a feeling of threat in the region, the
effects  of  which  are  directly  felt  in  Europe  too  and  are  exacerbated  by  'Muslim'
demonstrations  of  solidarity  in  the  form  of  anti-Israeli  protests,  especially  in  France.
Also,  the  EU's  position  on  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict  is  seen  as  ambiguous  by  most
Arab  partners,  especially  in  comparison  with  the  position  of  individual  Member  States.
Until the conflict is resolved the programme cannot be fully effective in its pursuit of the
economic and political objectives outlined in the Barcelona Declaration. Leading figures
in  the  Arab  world  even  maintain  that  until  such  time  as  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict  is
resolved the West can have very little influence on public opinion in the Arab countries.
Because  of  the  prevailing  suspicion  and  political  uncertainties,  even  purely  cultural
objectives and a rapprochement between nations are unlikely to succeed. It is all the more
regrettable  that  no  official  initiatives  at  all  have  been  taken  to  bring  the  Israeli  and
Palestinian peoples  closer  together, despite  the existence of programmes through which
this could be done. The period immediately after the Oslo peace process would have been
the ideal time for this and would have contributed towards better mutual understanding
and an easing of the situation.

(d) Other regions and countries

Other developing countries are covered by the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000 and
other agreements on development cooperation with countries in Asia and Latin America.
The  Cotonou  Agreement  lays  down  comprehensive  objectives  and  opportunities  for
cooperation with 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. Some countries in sub-
Saharan  Africa  and  parts  of  Asia  have  sizeable  Muslim  populations,  and  religion  is  a
factor in dealings with these.

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9. 

Individual policy areas

(a)  Democracy,  respect  for  human  and  civil  rights,  the  rule  of  law  and  good
governance

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that democracy and respect for human rights
are essential for peace, stability and decent social and economic conditions as the basis of
a decent human existence. Only a sucessful  democracy can prevent the social exclusion
of disadvantaged population groups, and in the developing countries where the effects of
globalisation are particularly keenly felt this is especially important. It is worrying to see
opposition  already  from  some  African  governments  to  the  good  governance  clauses  in
NEPAD,  the  New  Partnership  for  Africa's  Development,  which  they  claim  are
inconsistent with African traditions. One would assume that a culture of corruption and
profligate  spending is not  specific  to Africa.  But  in matters of development we have to
remember that the aim of justice which underpins democracy applies to relations between
states just as much as relations within states. However, it is worth bearing in mind a letter
of protest distributed by representatives of civil society on 19 July 2002 against the basic
thrust of NEPAD, which was felt to be organised too much from the 'top down', relying
on  external  donors  and  ignoring  the  development  work  done  so  far  by  Africans
themselves.

To emphasise the importance of this subject for EU relations with non-Member States, a
separate budget title 'European initiative for democracy and human rights' (B7-70), was
created for 2002 with MEUR 104 appropriations for commitment.

Parliament also proposes in the Diéz González report13 that an interinstitutional code of
conduct be drawn up for the Union's external relations in the field of human rights. Quite
a  lot  of  Africans,  incidentally,  as  well  as  people  in  other  regions  of  the  world,  are
somewhat bemused by this European insistence on universal acceptance of their ideas on
democracy  and  human  rights.  It  was,  after  all,  the  Europeans  who  oppressed,  enslaved
and exploited people all over the world during the colonial era. We should also bear in
mind  that  values  may  well  be  the  same  in  areas  of  the  world  far  distant  from  ours,  but
socioeconomic considerations mean that priorities are different.

The Commission, in its communication of 8 May 2001 on the role of the European Union
in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries14, placed this objective
at the heart of the EU's overall external relations strategy, as part of its efforts to make its
individual policies more effective and more coherent. At the same time it makes good
governance an integral part of the new development policy. This requirement too is an
essential feature in all association agreements with e.g. the MEDA countries.

In  all  meetings  with  those  responsible  for  policy  the  EU  should,  pursuant  to  the
agreements it has signed, raise the issues of democracy and human rights and insist that
they  are  observed.  This  should  take  precedence  over  economic  and  trade  interests.
Ambivalence and double standards damage  EU credibility. In the Diéz González report15
the  European  Parliament  calls,  in  the  context  of  the  proposed  interinstitutional  code  of

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conduct,  for  the  immediate  suspension  of  relations  (apart  from  humanitarian  aid)  with
any states seen to support or sponsor terrorism. Close cooperation with the various bodies
and agencies of the United Nations (Security Council, Commission on Human Rights) is
advocated.

Special attention should be paid to

-

-

-

-

-

Building institutions which guarantee the rule of law;

The  outlawing  of  inhumane  punishments  such  as  stoning  and  amputation
(application of Shari'ah law);

Gender equality in the family and public life; most of the Islamic countries have
women's movements. The consequences of women's rights being suppressed, and
the desperate need to promote them, was most clearly apparent in Afghanistan.

Promotion  of  civil  society,  especially  statutory  safeguards  for  political
associations as the driving force behind moves toward democracy;

Encouraging  awareness  of  the  need  to  live  peacefully  together  in  society,
measures against racism. This is also part of conflict prevention.

(b) Conflict prevention

Conflict  prevention  is  crucially  important,  as  it  ensures  peace  and  is  essential  for
development  work  to  be  sustainable.  Bloody  conflicts  are  currently  in  progress  in  no
fewer than  17 ACP  countries.  Armed  extremists  are  at  work  in  13  Islamic  countries  or
regions16.

Prevention  is  a  matter  for  foreign  and  security  policy  and  for  development  policy.  In
short:  the  best  conflict  prevention  is  a  successful  development  policy.  Commissioner
Christopher  Patten,  in  a  speech  on  4 December  2001  to  the  Swedish  Institute  of
International Affairs, rightly said that 'the idea that a rich world and a poor world can co-
exist  without  dramatic  implications  collapsed  along  with  the  twin  towers  on  September
11th. And nowhere is this more evident than in relation to the failed state. By failed state
I  mean  countries  where  the  institutions,  coercive  power  and  basic  services  of  national
government  have  simply  crumbled  away.  In  some  cases  we  are  not  talking  about  state-
backed terrorism but of terrorist-backed states…  we cannot afford to ignore these long-
running political, economic and humanitarian calamities.'

Following the resolutions adopted by the Göteborg European Council of 15 and 16 June
2001, Parliament gave its views in the Lagendijk report17. Conflict prevention should be
mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue in all common policies of the EU, so all important
Community  decisions,  especially  in  regard  to  trade  policy,  should  be  examined
beforehand  for  their  potential  to  engender  conflict.  The  programmes  of  the  IMF  and
World  Bank  had  a  destabilising  effect  here,  since  they  often  implemented  structural

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adjustment  measures  too  abruptly  and  without  thought  for  their  social  repercussions.
Early  involvement  of  the  IMF  would  mean  that  budgetary  and  financial  policy  did  not
have  to  be  quite  so  rigorous.  The  Commission  was  urged  to  encourage  action  to  make
conflict prevention an integral component of analysis and planning by these international
financial  institutions.  In  the  light  of  the  attacks  in  the  USA,  the  Committee  on
Development and  Cooperation advocated a more thorough analysis of the root causes of
terrorism.

A wide range of different events and situations are relevant to conflict prevention, most
of  them  due  to  poorly  developed  democratic  and  constitutional  structures:  for  example
latent  ethnic/religious  tensions  or  militant  cross-border  nationalist  tendencies,  massive
electoral  fraud,  the  violent  suppression  of  minorities,  social  injustice,  destruction  of  the
environment  and  people's  basis  for  subsistence,  quarrels  over  natural  resources  and
minerals  (diamonds),  plus  organised  crime  and  arms-  and  drugs-trafficking.  Lasting
stability  depends  very  much  on  disarming  erstwhile  rebels  and  integrating  them  into
society and rehabilitating infrastructures and basic economic services. Once conflicts are
over,  a  final,  lasting  and  fair  system  is  needed  to  prevent  new  flare-ups.  Development
policy should also seek closer cooperation with Member States, non-Member States and
the  international  community  with  a  view  to  preventing  conflicts.  Domestic  capabilities
for crisis prevention in the developing countries, that is to say national forces of law and
order,  should  be  strengthened  in  order  to  safeguard  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law.
NGOs and other players in civil society have an important part to play here, particularly
women's movements18 and peace groups. Parliament stressed not only the importance of
the  CFSP  in  conflict  prevention  but  also  the  role  of  development  policy,  humanitarian
aid, the maintenance of internal law and order and government and inter-ethnic dialogue.
Security  and  solidarity  with  the  developing  countries,  i.e.  poverty  reduction  and  the
establishment  of  democracy  are  thus  indissolubly  linked.  Not  least,  a  better  balance
between military and defence spending would greatly reduce the need for the former. In
2001  the  USA's  defence  spending  totalled  USD 310 000  million,  whilst  that  of  the  EU
was  less  than  half  that  at  144 000  million.  The  Islamic  world  spent  about  USD  74 000
million.

In  the  Lagendijk  report  Parliament  again  called  for  a  European  Civil  Peace  Corps  to
undertake  tasks  such  as  arbitration  and  mediation,  distribution  of  non-partisan
information,  confidence-building,  and  monitoring  and  improving  the  human  rights
situation.

In this context mention must also be made of the stabilising effect of humanitarian aid in
case  of  disaster  and  emergency19.  This  aid  can  take  on  the  appearance  of  conflict
prevention  when  it  is  necessary  to  stop  the  struggle  for  resources  between  displaced
population groups. One topical example is the work currently being done in Afghanistan
by  ECHO,  the  European  Humanitarian  Aid  Office,  which  after  the  USA  is  the  second
biggest  provider  of  humanitarian  aid  to  that  country  (more  than  EUR 500 million  since
1991). ECHO can make a valuable contribution here which, given the increasing number
of  disasters  and  their  ever-increasing  scale,  is  essential.  ECHO's  remit  and  role  are

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focused  on  the  direct  saving  of  human  life,  distinguishing  it  from  other  foreign  policy
instruments of the Community.

(c) Poverty reduction

The  prime  objective  of  EU  development  policy  is  to  alleviate  poverty20.  Any  advances
the EU makes in reducing poverty in the developing countries will enhance its reputation
and credibility as regards world conflicts and the need for a fair balance of interests, and
will thus confirm the EU's right to have a voice in conflict resolution.

At the UN Conference on Financing for Development held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in
Monterrey,  Mexico,  the  Community  pledged  (in  the  'Monterrey  Consensus')  more
generous payments of at least an additional USD 20 billion in government development
aid  up  to  the  year  2006  as  part  of  efforts  to  reduce  poverty  and  achieve  sustainable
development  and  the  development  goals  set  out  in  the  United  Nations  Millennium
Declaration of 8 September 200021. The minimum average government development aid
for  all  individual  Member  States  in  2002  is  to  be  the  Community  average  of  0.33%  of
GNP, rising to 0.39% from 2006 onwards. But the EP's resolution of 25 April  2002  on
the funding of development aid urges the EU to go further and set a binding deadline by
which the target of 0.7% must be reached.

Notwithstanding  undeniable  achievements  of  development  cooperation  in  terms  of  life
expectancy,  reduced  infant  mortality  and  poverty,  numerous  factors  such  as  wars,
environmental destruction and the squandering of resources mean that most of the world's
population still do not enjoy a minimally acceptable quality of life: 1 500 million people
subsist  on  less  than  one  dollar  a  day;  800  million  are  permanently  undernourished  or
malnourished,  40%  of  the  world's  population  suffers  from  malaria  and  in  Africa  alone
2 million people die of Aids every year. The income of the world's 20% richest is almost
90 times that of the 20% poorest. In addition there is the threat to water supply, which in
about  20  years'  time  will  affect  two  thirds  of  the  world's  population.  The  rate  of
population growth, which is faster than the rate of economic growth, is a serious problem.
The  leaders  of  the  developing  world  can  help  here  by  encouraging  family  planning.  In
Islamic states, however, where the average population growth is 4.2% as against 1.3% in
the industrialised countries, it will take time for popular attitudes to change.

Extreme  poverty  violates  the  fundamental  human  right  to  a  decent  existence  and  is
irreconcilable  with  true  democracy.  Poverty  and  social  injustice  can  also  lead  to
radicalisation and lend 'legitimacy' to extremist forces. Thus the broader view of security
means that security policy must also seek to improve socioeconomic conditions.

There  are  many  causes  and  manifestations  of  poverty.  Poverty  is  more  than  a  lack  of
money.  Food  security  is  of  paramount  importance.  The  broader  view  of  poverty  also
includes a lack of proper access to education, workable land and soil, credit, services and
infrastructure, and also the lack of a political voice.

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On  9 July  2002,  the  date  of  the  launch  of  the  African  Union,  the  New  Partnership  for
Africa's  Development  (NEPAD)  came  into  being.  This  is  an  initiative  by  a  number  of
African  heads  of  state  (Republic  of  South  Africa,  Nigeria  and  Algeria)  aimed  at
furthering  social  and  economic  development  in  the  African  continent  with  due
observance, amongst other things, of the principles of democracy, good governance and
human rights. Its founders were guided by the realisation that  -  todate  -   Africa had
had  no  vision  of  its  own  to  offer  as  an  alternative  to  the  development  proposals  of
external  aid  donors,  so  that  development  projects  were  doomed  to  failure  because  the
populations  concerned  had  no  immediate  responsibility  for  them  and  thus  did  not  'own'
them. It is encouraging to see that in 2001 17 African countries recorded growth rates of
more than 5%.

People  in  the  developing  countries  have  hitherto  felt  themselves  to  be  the  losers  in  the
globalisation process: fierce competition on the one hand and protectionist measures on
the  other  prevent  them,  especially  in  times  of  falling  demand  for  raw  materials  and
commodities,  from  benefiting  from  a  process  which  ought  to  benefit  the  developing
countries too, since in principle it means faster movement of goods, services and capital.

A range of instruments are available:

-

-

Political  dialogue  to  provide  the  developing  countries  with  advice  and  help  in
channelling  their  own  efforts;  technical  and  financial  development  cooperation.
Greater  attention  must  be  paid  to  ensuring  that  projects  fit  the  local  social  and
economic  context  and  above  all  that  they  take  account  of  cultural  traditions,  so
that they will be broadly accepted by the population, as the NEPAD programme
intends.

Another  instrument  is  trade,  which  plays  a  far  bigger  part  in  development  than
one  would  imagine.  In  the  Deva  report22  the  Committee  on  Development  and
Cooperation  intensified  its  call  for  a  trading  system  to  promote  'pro-poor
economic  growth,  employment  and  sustainable  development'23.  Above  all  it
criticised  existing  trade  barriers,  trade-distorting  subsidies  and  poor  access  to
markets, things which the industrialised countries use to their own advantage and
to the disadvantage of the developing countries. At the same time it pointed to the
EU's  leading  role  in  world  trade  and  the  opportunities  for  influence  which  this
created.

The  industrialised  countries  still  take  more  from  the  developing  countries  through
protectionist  measures  than  they  give  them  in  development  aid.  It  is  the  same  with  the
treatment  of  indebtedness:  many  countries  are  so  in  debt  that  the  flow  of  money  is
outward rather than inward. Poverty reduction has been declared an essential criterion for
countries  to  be  eligible  under  the  HIPC  Initiative  on  debt  reduction,  but  the  debtor
countries  are  still  having  to  pay  back  in  debt  service  too  much  of  the  capital  they
desperately need to spend on development.

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One  gratifying  achievement  is  the  sizeable  reduction  in  the  indebtedness  of  the  Arab
countries over the 5 years to 2000: from USD 160 000 million to USD 144 000 million,
i.e.  50%  of  GNP.  In  2001  the  external  debt  of  the  African  countries  fell  from
USD 310 000 million the year before to USD 215 000 million!

-

Health care is an essential basic service, together with food security and access to
education.  The  Commission  highlighted  the  close  connection  between  these
factors in its communication of 22 March 200224 on health and poverty reduction
in developing countries.

(d) Education and training

Investment  in  human  resources  is  a  key  factor  in  development.  To  neglect  this  is
invariably  counterproductive,  leading  to  socioeconomic  stagnation,  a  brain  drain  and
isolation  in  international  competition.  Education  and  training  are  fundamental  to  the
development  of  human  personality  and  dignity  and  people's  building  of  a  basis  for
subsistence.  This  makes  them  essential  to  any  reduction  of  poverty25.  But  education  is
also  specifically  relevant  for  conflict  prevention  and  reducing  people's  susceptibility  to
extremist  influences,  because  it  sharpens  the  critical  faculty.  We  know  from  experience
that  a  lack  of  democracy,  poverty  and  ignorance  together  form  a  highly  explosive  mix.
Nevertheless  militant  leaders  are  usually  extremely  intelligent  and  well  educated,
manipulating the uneducated and gullible and cynically and contemptuously using them.
In a video, Bin Laden made the chilling revelation that by no means all those involved in
the attacks knew that the real plan was to hit the WTC, so they too were victims of his
murderous  plot.  Without  a  relatively  large  number  of  eveildoers  who  were  both  willing
and ignorant, he could not have carried it out.

The amount of development work still to be done in education and training is huge but
also  rewarding.  In  many  developing  countries  a  fair  amount  has  also  been  achieved  in
this sector. But the United Nations human development reports show that efforts to date
are  not  enough.  This  is  partly  because  of  the  population  explosion  in  Arab/Islamic
countries  and  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  number  of  children  who  do  not  receive
schooling  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  continues  to  increase  and  will  reach  more  than
50 million by 2005.

On the other hand the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report 2000 compiled by Arab
scientists  shows  that  the  Arab  countries  (22  countries  from  the  Maghreb  to  the  Gulf
region, totalling about 280 million people) have made progress on adult literacy, which
has  doubled  in  men  and  trebled  in  women  over  the  last  15  years.  Overall,  however,
average adult literacy in the Arab countries in December 1998 was barely 60%, the levels
in Egypt and Iraq being around 54%, in Algeria 66%, but in Morocco only 47%. Bottom
of  the  class  is  Mauretania  with  just  41%.  No  figures  are  known  for  the  Occupied
Territories. In Saudi Arabia foreign workers account for the relatively low figure of 75%.

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So there is still much to be done before everyone is able to play a full part in political,
social,  economic  and  working  life.  Breadth  has  often  been  achieved  at  the  expense  of
depth.  When  it  comes  to  the  production  of  advanced  technology  and  technological
innovation, the OECD countries are almost on their own. Only a few Muslim countries,
e.g.  Saudi  Arabia,  the  Gulf  states,  Tunisia,  Iran,  Syria,  Egypt,  Algeria  and  Indonesia
make any sizeable use of advanced technology. The UN Report on Human Development
2001  ranks  Malaysia  as  the  potential  leader  here  and  the  El  Ghazala  Communications
Technology Park in Tunisia scores low on the list. In 2000, 83% of the population in the
OECD  countries  were  Internet  users,  whilst  in  the  Arab  countries  the  figure  was  only
0.6% and in southern Africa just 0.4%.

One has to wonder whether certain Arab rulers actually want their citizens to be educated
and  capable,  or  whether  they  do  not  feel  more  confident  of  holding  on  to  power  if  the
people  are  kept  in  ignorance.  Are  the  countless  Koran  schools  which  they  finance  best
qualified  to  equip  people  for  a  world  which  is  modernising  fast?  Are  they  afraid  of  the
emancipating effect of education? Would it not be better for the long-term stability of the
regime if the foundations for a democratic society were laid in a school which taught all
areas  of  knowledge?  There  must  be  objective  education.  The  Community's  contribution
to the very valuable UNRWA education programme for 2001 was EUR 36 million26.

10. 

Intercultural dialogue

(a) Need for intercultural dialogue

The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance,  held  in  Durban  from  29  August  to  8  September  2001,  had  barely  ended
(albeit with a last-minute row over Israel) when the events of 9-11 shocked the world into
realising  just  how  powerfully  the  tensions  between  parts  of  the  Islamic  world  and
Western  civilisation,  which  had  been  building  for  a  long  time,  fanned  by  the  work  of
violent Arab/Muslim extremists, can erupt not only in those Arab countries which come
into contact with Western civilisation, but in the very heart of Western society.

The hatred and destruction unleashed here is prompted partly by objective factors, though
these are no excuse, but largely by different perceptions born of a lack of information and
understanding  of  the  other  culture.  This  underlines  the  need  for  a  more  intensive
intercultural  dialogue  which,  through  long-term  contact,  enables  misconceptions  to  be
corrected.  This  also  accords  with  the  EU's  understanding  of  its  role.  By  virtue  of  its
history  and  cultural  diversity  as  well  as  the  large  Muslim  population  in  some  Member
States, the EU can make a valuable contribution to the equation through its subtlety and
varying approach, its empathy with other cultures and its view of and approach to history
and civilisation.

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(b) Role of the EU

In  his  declaration  of  9 May  1950  Robert  Schuman  already  talked  about  material  and
spiritual  solidarity.  The  EU  should  remember  this  when  it  considers  the  balance  of  the
world and different cultures. Europe cannot tolerate a division of the world along cultural
fault lines any more than it can allow a 'culture conflict' at home – and is not the EU an
example  of  how  different  cultures  can  be  successfully  combined?  If  the  EU  pursues
intercultural dialogue and a pluralist world order, in which human rights and democracy
are  not  subordinated  to  economic  or  short-term  political  interest,  it  can  overcome  its
present crisis of purpose and can, in addition to its economic weight, gain political weight
and influence vis-à-vis the USA and thus greater international credibility. The question is
whether the EU acquiesces totally in a globalisation process led by the USA or whether it
can  offer  its  own  pluralist  model  of  society  as  an  alternative.  This  is  a  question  of  the
utmost  cultural  importance,  far  more  important  than  purely  social  and  economic
considerations.

(c) Situations which beget violence

It  is  no  secret  that  violence  against  the  industrialised  West  and  Islamic  governments
perceived  as  sympathetic  to  the  West  is  preached  not  only  in  establishments  such  as
madrassahs  in  Pakistan  or  elsewhere  in  Central  Asia  but  in  the  EU  countries  too,  as
witness recent tape recordings made in a Dutch mosque. The fact that huge numbers of
people can very quickly be mobilised for demonstrations in Islamic countries shows the
scale  of  the  influence  wielded  by  their  leaders,  who  are  mostly  clerics,  and  how  easily
they  can  manipulate  sections  of  the  people.  These  leaders  are  prominent  individuals  to
whom  the  poorly  educated  and  inadequately  informed  look  for  advice  and  guidance.
There is also the fact, mentioned earlier, that people are economically dependent on the
social  networks  controlled  by  religious  leaders,  which  force  the  masses  to  mobilise,
seeing them as their salvation in the face of the failure of corrupt and incompetent organs
of  state.  Such  forms  of  social  life  are  particularly  likely  to  evolve  where  a  lack  of
education  and  objective  information  means  that  simple  people  have  only  a  rudimentary
critical  understanding,  and  where  democracy  and  the  expression  of  political  aspirations
by political parties is poorly developed (again because there is no secular state) and the
state  also  fails  in  its  duty  to  provide  adequately  for  the  basic  needs  of  the  population.
Situations of this kind drive the masses, particularly young people with no prospects, into
the  arms  of  the  agitators.  It  is  true  that  only  a  few  of  the  Islamic  militants  actually  use
violence.  But  their  power  is  considerable.  Many  leaders  were  imprisoned  by  their
governments  on  grounds  of  state  security  when  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Muslims,
especially  in  Pakistan,  were  gripped  by  anti-American,  anti-government  hostility
following  the  attacks  of  9-11,  and  particularly  when  the  campaign  against  the  Taliban
started.

In  Pakistan  the  religious  party  Jamiat-i-Islam,  led  by  Maulana  Fazlur  Rehman  and  with
close links to the Taliban, runs 830 of the country's 5000 or so Koranic schools. Another
party,  Jamiat  Ulema-i-Pakistan,  runs  about  70  Koranic  schools.  These  schools  have

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20 000  foreign  students  from  Afghanistan,  Africa  and  the  Central  Asian  republics.  In
Somalia 90% of children have access to religious schools only.

(d) Starting points for dialogue

As regards the feasibility of dialogue, most of those prepared to use violence are unlikely
by definition to be dissuaded from their destructive intent, because they deliberately use
the desperate economic and social position of a large section of the population as a means
of underpinning their power, their shared religion serving as substance and justification.
The  militant  extremists  themselves  cannot  be  persuaded  by  dialogue  alone.  The  only
hope is to diminish their resonance in society and thus their potential following. This can
be  done  only  by  rendering  the  arguments  of  the  agitators  invalid  and  decisively
improving general living conditions – words ring hollow unless backed up by deeds – in
particular by creating prospects for young people who lack proper education and training.
Moderate forces can be the intermediaries here, and close and permanent contact must be
maintained with them. But a dialogue of this kind is made difficult if not impossible by
ill-advised  and  insensitive  remarks  by  Western  political  leaders:  e.g.  calls  for  crusades
against  Islamic  countries  or  a  campaign  of  'infinite  justice',  something  which  Muslims
(and  not  only  Muslims)  believe  is  God's  alone  and  which  also  shows  intolerable
arrogance  and  self-righteousness.  The  treatment  of  those  held  in  Guantánamo  Bay  as
suspected  agents  of  the  criminal  Taliban  regime  in  Afghanistan  is  dubious  in  terms  of
human rights and the international conventions, and does nothing to increase confidence
in  the  values  and  supposedly  exemplary  virtues  of  Western  culture.  The  position  of  the
US Government on the International Criminal Court is also seen, not without reason, as a
superpower's wish to impose its own punishments and enjoy a special status.

(e) Obstacles to be overcome

Intercultural dialogue faces numerous obstacles:

-

-

-

Differing interpretations of history and past wars and religious quarrels, together
with  the  unresolved  and  intensifying  Middle  Eastern  conflict,  in  which  the
militarily  stronger  power  knows  it  has  the  backing  of  the  American  superpower
whilst  the  Arabs  are  neither  united  nor  strong  and  the  EU  has  no  decisive
influence.

A different approach to life, whereby Islam holds that religion matters most  and
encompasses  those  areas  of  social  life  which  we  consider  to  be  fundamentally
non-religious and which ought to be shaped by pluralism, pragmatism, efficiency
and exclusively secular thinking.

As a result of this, and of delusion and arrogance induced by the achievements of
Western culture, there is an unwillingness by the non-Islamic world to recognise
the true value of Islamic civilisation. Part of the reason for this is that the dialogue
takes place between unequal partners in terms of power and affluence.

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The absolutism of Islamic belief and consequent incapacity for self-criticism and
logical  argument,  partly  because  Islamic  teaching  based  on  the  Koran  has  not
evolved further and adapted to the modern era.

The  feeling  of  being  totally invaded  and  swamped  by  modern  information  and
telecommunications  technology,  which  knows  no  national  and  cultural  bounds,
together  with  the  fascination  of  everything  which  is  alien,  forbidden  and
'progressive'.

(f) Benefits and principles of intercultural dialogue

Understanding of other cultures and their values, and mutual respect, are a sine qua non
of peace in an increasingly cohesive world of ever-greater interdependence.

We need  first  of all  to  improve understanding  between Islam and the West and remove
the distrust, without missionary zeal and without questioning the validity of other forms
of culture. This will also be an opportunity for rethinking our own position and system of
values.  The  importance  of  intercultural  dialogue  is  matched  by  that  of  dealing  with
extremists within  a  given  religion.  It  is  the  job  of  the  moderates  here  to  influence  the
fundamentalists  and  men  of  violence.  Intellectuals  in  the  Arab  world  should  make  their
voices  heard  more  and  not  leave  the  discussion  of  Islam  amongst  the  Muslims  to  the
spiritual leaders.

Even  before  9-11,  intercultural  dialogue  was  already  established  at  international  level.
From 31 July to 3 August 2001 Tokyo and Kyoto hosted an International Conference on
Dialogue between Civilisations as part of the United Nations University (UNU) project of
the  same  name.  The  value  of  this  dialogue  in  preventing  conflicts  was  expressly
emphasised,  in  that  it  reduced  misunderstanding  and  distrust  and  laid  the  basis  for  the
peaceful resolution of disputes.

On  20  and  21 March  2002  the  Commission  held  a  symposium  in  Brussels  on  closer
(intercultural)  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  its  partners  in  the  southern  Mediterranean.
Its conclusions included the following:

-

-

An  ongoing  intercultural  dialogue  conducted  in  a  spirit of  tolerance,  openness,
understanding and mutual respect is, together with economic and diplomatic ties,
a  significant  factor  in  preventing  conflicts,  promoting  peace,  democracy  and
human  rights  and  should  be  seen  as  every  bit  as  important  as  economic  and
political  negotiations.  Equality  between  cultures  means  nothing  if  there  is  not  at
the same time acceptance of the individual's right to respect for his humanity.

The EU has a shared responsibility with its partners in the southern Mediterranean
for preserving peace and safeguarding human rights. The Mediterranean region is
to  some  extent  a  fault  line  between  North  and  South,  which  both  sides  must
bridge  through  cooperation  and  understanding,  in  an  effort  to  overcome  shared
problems.

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Far  too  little  importance  is  attached  in  the  industrialised  West  to  interfaith
dialogue. Many Muslims find that religion lends meaning to their lives, since the
yearning  for  transcendence  is  part  of  human  nature.  This  explains  why  in  the
islamic world religion matters so much in the social structure and is collective in
nature, in contrast to wide areas of the West where religion is more of a private
thing  and  a  matter  of  personal  belief.  A  shared  platform  for  dialogue  can  be
created, provided the state remains neutral, and this could facilitate secularisation,
an  aspect  of  modernisation:  laity  is  not  a  denial  of  religion,  but  simply  an
expression  of  freedom  of  conscience.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  the
world's  three  great  monotheist  religions  have  a  common  origin:  both  Islam  and
Christianity have shared roots in the Jewish religion.

If dialogue is to be fruitful it must be conducted free of prejudice and any claim to
a monopoly on truth, morality and the 'correct' social model and must recognize
the value of rich cultural diversity and, as a result, does not constitute interference
in the internal affairs of any country.

Dialogue between faiths must not mean that dialogue within faiths and cultures is
neglected, or extremist and militant views may gain the upper hand: the contrasts
between moderates and radicals are particularly acute in Islam.

Intercultural debate must take account of the contribution which each culture has
made to the common fund of knowledge and history; the central role of religious
belief in society must be acknowledged here.

The dialogue must not be a forum simply for the political or intellectual elite, but
must involve as many sections of society as possible, especially young people and
the  media,  who  are  target  groups  and  who  also  pass  on  their  thinking  and
experience to others.

Intercultural dialogue must seek common ground in our approach to issues, values
and  priorities  and  to  problem-solving,  following  the  principle  of  international
solidarity which is born of our shared history in the Mediterranean region and the
current challenges which face us.

Our  search  for  common  values  should  be  based  on  agreement  that  civilisation
means  the  principle  of  democracy,  respect  for  human  rights  and  human  dignity,
personal  freedom,  (religious)  tolerance  and  the  principle  of  the  peaceful
settlement  of  disputes:  the  UN  Millennium  Declaration  of  8  September  2000  is
exemplary  here:  freedom,  equality,  solidarity,  tolerance  and  respect  for  nature.
The ideal should be a peaceful and more equitable world order based on respect
for  human  dignity.  The  EU  should  ensure  that  the  human  rights  clauses  in  its
various agreements are complied with.

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Europe  needs,  then,  to  identify  what  it  has  in  common  with  the  culture  of  the  Islamic
countries, even if this distances it from the USA. The important task which the EU must
face  in  dealing  with  Islam  and  its  extremists  cannot  be  addressed  solely  through  the
policy  of  confrontation  which  the  US  Government  has  followed  so  far.  Although
consultation with the USA is necessary and military measures may be required in certain
cases, the EU must as far as possible act through development policy and the desire for
consensus and peaceful dialogue, but it must act more energetically.

Common  positions  must  be  worked  out  jointly  with  representatives  of  Islam  in  the  EU
and  in  Islamic  countries  on  the  major  material,  political  and  cultural  issues  of  the
moment:  population  growth,  poverty,  the  environment,  natural  resources,  the  role  of
religion  in  public  life  and  its  reconcilability  with  democracy  and  power-sharing.  Frank
and honest debate is needed, not just an exchange of polite diplomatic clichés.

(g) Programmes to intensify intercultural dialogue

The  MEDA  programme  offers  a  sound  basis  for  cooperation  with  the  Mediterranean
countries in the area of culture.

The Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 already emphasises the central importance
of

(1) intercultural and interfaith dialogue;
(2) the media, for conveying information on and an understanding of other cultures;
(3) promoting education and intercultural exchange.

In the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Valencia on 23 April 2002
the  Council  of  Foreign  Ministers  referred  to  the  events  of  9-11  and  the  crisis  in  the
Middle East and called for greater efforts to be made, in cultural cooperation too, as part
of the Barcelona Process. The phenomenon of terrorism should continue being addressed
using  a  global  and  multidisciplinary  approach,  and  in  a  spirit  of  partnership  and
solidarity.

Approval was expressed of the principle of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to
promote further dialogue between cultures and civilisations. A programme of action for
intercultural  dialogue  was  also  agreed.  This  should  involve  broad  sections  of  the
population, especially young people and representatives of the media, to promote mutual
understanding  and  reduce  stereotyping.  The  TEMPUS  programme  for  cooperation
between  universities  was  extended  to  the  Mediterranean  countries  and  Netd@ys  and
eLearning  activities  such  as  school  twinning  were  extended  to  more  countries  in  the
Mediterranean.

To  date  numerous  projects  have  been  aided  as  part  of  regional  programmes  on  cultural
heritage, audiovisual cooperation and a programme of youth exchanges. The Community
also  funds  cultural  activities  organised  by  the  Commission  delegations  in  the  12

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Mediterranean  partner  states,  various  conferences  for  representatives  of  civil  society,
press fact-finding visits to the EU institutions in Brussels and journalist training.

Educational programmes should encourage school and university teaching to give greater
emphasis to the different cultures, civilisations and religions, as a way of acknowledging
cultural  diversity.  Areas  of  focus  should  include  building  awareness  of  the  benefits  of
peace,  democracy  and  religion,  relations  with  the  secular  state,  human  rights,  gender
equality,  solidarity,  foreign  languages,  art  and  literature  (exhibitions  of  painting  and
sculpture, film, theatre, musical events).

The most immediate need is to train the teachers. They above all must be motivated and
trained. As far as possible both sides should be involved in the planning of events. The
Jean Monnet Project is ideally suited to handle these, as it can act in the EU's name. It
should be given the necessary resources.

Possible activities include exchange programmes, bursaries, meetings, training seminars,
conferences,  congresses  for  the  wider  public,  development  projects,  meetings  between
members  of  different  religious  communities  to  identify  and  explore  shared  common
values,  scientific  cooperation,  exchanges  and  training  for  journalists,  seminars  for
professors, artists, businessmen and representatives of civil society on cultural and social
issues of the moment.

Meetings  between  leaders  of  different  faiths  are  held  worldwide.  A  good  example  of
multifaith  cooperation  of  this  kind  is  the  United  Religions  Initiative,  which  groups
representatives  of  all  the  main  world  faiths  and  seeks  to  promote  discussion  and
tolerance. Its network spans the world. This movement has produced a charter outlining
principles  of  mutual  understanding.  Differing  views  ought  not  to  result  in  conflict.
Everyone is entitled to 'his own' form of spirituality. In March 2002 this movement was
welcomed as a guest of the European Parliament.

Public  meetings  of  the  kind  described  should  be  the  vehicle  for  an  active  policy  of
information. Partnerships between representatives of civil society must be encouraged to
reduce inequalities and promote employment, for women and young people in particular.
Representatives of the social partners should be targeted here. Chairs in history and the
social sciences could be endowed to conduct appropriate research on both shores of the
Mediterranean.  Politicians  and  leading  figures  in  civil  society  should  be  encouraged  to
take part because of their influence on public opinion.

One area of focus should be youth exchanges. Young people tend to be more open to new
ways of thinking and will one day determine their countries' destinies. The Commission
has  drawn  up  a  programme  for  this  (EUROMED-Youth).  EU  aid  projects  carried  out
jointly  by  European  and  Arab  young  people  in  Islamic  countries  have  proved  very
beneficial.  Private  initiatives  should  also  be  encouraged  (networks,  voyages  of  cultural
discovery and exploration) to familiarise young people in the West with the rich cultural
heritage  of  North  Africa.  There  are  the  many  archaeological  sites,  places  where  people

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can come together and share a broad range of scientific knowledge. The Commission has
plans for a Euromed heritage programme.

From the EU point of view, this kind of dialogue can only hope to be successful if it is
serious and credible and shows respect for the other culture. A measure of our credibility
abroad will be the way in which we treat Muslims in Europe. They should be encouraged
to play an active part in shaping social and political life, beyond the boundaries of their
own  culture.  This  requires  a  willingness  on  both  sides  to  exchange  ideas  and  work
together.

11. 

Role of the media

The  role  of  the  media  in  international  cooperation  and  in  bringing  different  cultures
together is a decisive one and a heavy responsibility.

On 3 June 2002 the Austrian Foreign Ministry held a specialist seminar on the role of the
media in intercultural dialogue between the EU and Mediterranean states, as part of the
Action  Plan  agreed  in  Valencia  in  April  2002  under  the  Barcelona  Process.  It  was
attended by journalists from radio and television, the press, and writers and scientists of
varying disciplines and persuasions (philosophy, politics, sociology). Journalists from Al-
Jazeera and CNN did not take up the invitation.

The results (conclusions and recommendations) may be summarised as follows:

-

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-

The pictures portrayed in the media, the way in which they are selected, presented
and  commented  on,  have  a  very  powerful  influence  in  shaping  public  opinion.
The resulting public perceptions can influence or justify government action, so it
is  important  that  reporting  should  be  as  independent,  objective  and  balanced  as
possible.

The  media  should  present  difference  as  something  that  enriches,  not  threatens.
Since  news  reporting  has  to  provide  a  'quick  fix',  it  is  far  too  one-sided,  usually
focusing  only  on  the  sensational  and  brutal.  Attention  should  also  be  paid  to
things  which  are  not  spectacular,  such  as  the  many  private  organisations  which
work  to  forge  understanding  and  give  help  in  e.g.  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict,
well  beyond  their  national  and  cultural  boundaries.  For  the  most  part  the  media
talk  up  conflicts  rather  than  point  to  ways  of  overcoming  them.  The  factor  of
religion is also very neglected (or misrepresented) because it is less significant in
the industrialised countries. Efforts should be made to strengthen moderate forces
rather than emphasising differences.

Inappropriate  stereotypes  and  generalisations  should  be  avoided,  in  the  interests
of  critical  analysis  and  a  wide  range  of  views.  Often,  it  was  claimed,  world
opinion was dominated by a country which was unfit for the role, because of its
bias  and  frequently  observed  superficiality.  This  was  a  cause  of  concern
especially to the Arab world. The EU ought to impose its own values more, even

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if  this  opened  up  a  distance  between  itself  and  the  USA.  The  southern  press
should be more widely available in the North. The choice of interlocutors in the
Arab countries was very one-sided, which meant that the same old clichés kept on
being  repeated.  The  uncertainties  on  both  sides  were  more  important  than  the
cultural  differences  between  them.  The  conflicting  parties  were  demonised  (for
the  most  part  by  one  side)  and  dehumanised.  Conclusions  were  overhasty,  and
proper analysis suffered as a result. The presentation on screen and on paper (TV
and newspapers) of the background to events, the history, causes and effects, was
totally inadequate. The causes were rooted more in social and humanitarian issues
and  nationalism  than  in  cultural  differences.  In  the  Middle  East  conflict,  for
example,  the  problem  of  the  occupation  was  played  down  too  much.  There  was
too  much  reporting  on  Islam  but  not  enough  quality  reporting.  Many  journalists
lacked the necessary sound historical knowledge. The EU ought to fund training
on  both  sides  (colleges  of  journalism).  The  Lorenzo  Natali  prize  awarded  to
journalists for services to peace was welcome and beneficial. There was praise for
the  reporting  of  Al-Jazeera  and  its  contribution  towards  democracy.  More
frequent programmes in English would be welcomed.

The  interdependence  of  North  and  South  should  be  correctly  represented,
allowing  people  to  appreciate  the  pressures  which  the  EU  cannot  ultimately
escape – demographic trends in the North mean that immigration is necessary if
living standards are to be maintained. In some Arab countries there is 50% youth
unemployment.

Recognition of the other culture must also take the form of learning its language.
This must not be a one-way traffic: the dominance of English means that Anglo-
American culture also gains ground. More books in Arabic should be translated.
The  balance  between  the  dissemination  of  Arab  literature  in  Europe  and  that  of
European literature in the Arab world is skewed very much in one direction. This
imbalance must be corrected by book fairs and by money for translations.

Given  the  dominant  role  of  the  media,  especially  television,  in  shaping  and
spreading  opinions,  it  should  be  used  more  to  publicise  programmes  of  cultural
exchange  and  the  kind  of  events  listed  earlier.  Exchanges  of  views  and  'public'
debates  on  issues  of  common  interest  can  also  be  conducted  via  the  Internet,
where a web site could be set up for contributions which anyone interested could
then access.

The wide publication of measures such as these ensures that they have a broader
impact.

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CONCLUSIONS

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The  attacks  of  9-11  2001  impacted  indirectly  on  the  developing  countries  by
making  the  economic  situation  even  worse  and  so  pushing  down  demand  for
goods and services still further in the industrialised countries. They also had the
direct  effect  of  causing  wholesale  collapse  in  the  tourism  and  transport  sectors.
Effects  are  likely  to  be  long-term  since,  whilst  the  threat  persists,  confidence  in
normal  economic  processes,  chiefly  trade  with  certain  supplier  countries  and
direct investment, will continue to be shaky.

The attacks were the culmination of a long series of attacks by Muslim extremists
on Western, chiefly American, interests. The threat has altered radically since the
Al-Qaeda  organisation  began  operating,  as  this  organisation,  unlike  earlier
isolated  terrorist  groups,  has  built  up  a  well-funded  worldwide  network  training
thousands of fighters in camps in Afghanistan.

The  attacks  appear  to  have  been  prompted  by  a  desire  to  resist  the  Americans,
who were resented as invaders of the holy places of Islam in Saudi Arabia and the
military  superpower,  especially  in  the  Gulf  region.  These  motives  are  justified
primarily  by  the  exhortation  in  the  Koran  to  destroy  the  Jews  and  Christians
through  jihad  and  thus  also  by  the  Palestinian  liberation  struggle.  A  further
emotional motive is hatred and contempt for Western civilisation and decadence,
as symbolised by the USA in the perpetrators' view.

The attacks have deepened the ambivalence of US relations with rulers in the Gulf
region,  especially  Saudi  Arabia,  who  on  the  one  hand  (and  so  far)  have  reliably
guaranteed  oil  supplies  to  Western  countries  but  who  on  the  other  hand  fund
Islamic interests worldwide including those which increasingly threaten the West.

The  attacks  ushered  in  a  new  era  in  international  relations,  in  which a  large
number  of  states  are  working  together  worldwide  in  a  more  vigorous  effort  to
defeat  terrorism  (the  coalition  against  terror).  The  European  Council  and
European Parliament have expressed firm solidarity with the USA.

Whilst  the  US  Government  is  sharply  stepping  up  its  military  spending,
contemplating a mainly military response to the terrorist attacks, has toppled the
criminal  Taliban  regime  in  Afghanistan  with  the  help  of  its  allies  and  is
advocating  a  pre-emptive  strike  to  remove  the  regime  in  Iraq,  an  increasing
number  of  the  governments  which  make  up  the  coalition  against  terror  favour  a
carefully  considered  and  peaceful  approach  to  overcoming  the  root  causes  of
terror.

- 

There  is  an  increasing  willingness  worldwide  to  use  force  in  pursuit  of  political
aims, created by unbridled nationalistic aspirations or ethnic or religious conflicts
taking  place  against  a  background  of  a  socioeconomic  struggle  for  resources.

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Where  there  is  a  democratic  deficit  and  a  lack  of  proper  internal  crisis
management  these  conflicts  erupt  and  may  even  lead  to  the  collapse  of  law  and
order.

The  terrorist  attacks  of  9-11  are  certainly  acts  of  Islamic  terrorism,  but  Islam
cannot  be  equated  with  terror.  The  faith  of  Islam  and  the  majority  of  moderate
Muslims cannot be held collectively responsible for the acts of a few extremists
who misappropriate passages of the Koran to justify acts of violence.

The Islamic world is currently in a critical phase of pressure to modernise, which
is  intensifying  the  traditional  tensions  between  the  various  branches  of  the  faith
(though  modernisation  does  not  have  to  mean  westernisation  only).  Extremists
who are prepared to use force exploit these religious tensions to gain a leadership
role. They are helped here by the twofold role of Islam as a secular and religious
force  and  by  the  susceptibility  of  poor,  uneducated  and  indoctrinated  people  to
manipulation.

As the leading world player in development aid the EU, through a coherent and
long-term development policy which is coordinated with its foreign and external
economic  policy,  can  help  to  balance  the  interests  of  North  and  South,  build
democracy,  enforce  the  observance  of  human  rights  and  ensure  solidly  based
institutions  of  state  in  the  developing  countries,  as  well  as  improving  people's
material  living  conditions  and  opportunities  for  education.  To  this  extent  a
coherent and credible development policy helps to prevent conflict.

Any scaling down of bodies within the EU Council of Ministers and merging of
development  with  foreign  policy  creates  a  risk  of  development  considerations
being  seen  as  less  important  in  the  decision-making  process  or  even  ignored
altogether.  The  attacks  of  9-11  prove  that  long-term  coherent  development
cooperation  is  vital,  and  so  the  Council  of  Development  Ministers  must  be
retained as a separate body.

The  MEDA  programme  based  on  the  Barcelona  Declaration  of  27  and
28 November  1995  and 
the  Valencia  Euro-
Mediterranean  conference  of  22  and  23  April  2002  are  seen  as  an  excellent
framework  for  successful  cooperation  with  the  Arab/Muslim  world  of  the
southern Mediterranean states.

the  resolutions  adopted  at 

There  can,  however,  be  no  significant  progress  on  this  cooperation  and  on
achieving a comprehensive balance with the Arab world until a fair and peaceful
settlement  of  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict  is  reached.  The  Palestinian  liberation
struggle  (in  view  too  of  the  continuing  problem  of  refugees,  especially  in  the
neighbouring states)  inevitably has  an effect  of strengthening solidarity amongst
the Arab nations which overshadows all relations with the Arab world.

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The EU should throw its full political weight into seeking a swift resolution of the
conflict. To that end it needs to speak with one voice and must not leave it to the
Americans,  whose  bias  in  favour  of  Israel  has  hampered  the  search  for  a
settlement.

There  is  an  urgent  need  for  state  establishments  to  provide  basic  services  in  a
number  of  Arab/Muslim  countries.  Where  the  government  has  failed  to  do  this,
poor  groups  of  the  population  become  dependent  on  religious,  charitable
establishments headed by religious leaders, who can mobilise the people for their
own ends and who by solving social problems seek popular support on their way
to taking power. The picture is similar with centres of education, many of which –
in  Pakistan  especially  –  are  religious  foundations  under  the  control  of  powerful
religious leaders.

In view of the specific nature of the threat, measures to be considered thus include
measures  to  alleviate  poverty,  improve  education  and  training  opportunities,
introduce greater democracy and intensify intercultural dialogue.

Intercultural dialogue with secular and spiritual leaders of the Islamic world will
help to further understanding here, in pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the joint
resolution of international problems, which requires an attitude of basic solidarity
with other countries and cultures. This dialogue requires first of all that both sides
should  critically  examine  their  own  value  systems  and  their  own  priorities.
Fruitful  dialogue  also  presupposes  openness,  tolerance  and  respect  vis-à-vis  the
partner's  culture,  traditions  and  religious  beliefs  –  which  thus  require  no
justification.  Dialogue  must  not  constitute  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of
other states. Meaningful dialogue must be aimed at achieving understanding and
so must not exclude the discussion of fundamental issues such as democracy, the
dignity of human life and human rights, gender equality and the fair and peaceful
reconciliation  of  opposing  interests.  Civil  society  as  well  as  the  intellectual  elite
must have a voice in the dialogue, to be fostered through programmes.

The  media  have  an  important  responsibility  in  furthering  understanding  between
cultures, and must be made aware of this. Governments often take decisions under
pressure  of  public  opinion,  which  is  significantly  influenced  by  the  media.
Conflicts are usually reported in a superficial and sensationalist way which does
not adequately reflect the seriousness of the subject or serve the public's need to
be informed. Content should be presented as objectively as possible, reflecting the
opinions  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict  and  with  an  analysis  of  the  causes  and
motives. Very often journalists are not sufficiently well briefed or educated in the
historic and cultural background to events and so cannot evaluate them properly.
Training  seminars  held  in  the  context  of  intercultural  dialogue  would  thus  be  a
good thing.

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ENDNOTES

1 See ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002, p. 53.
2 Cf. OECD, Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 2002.
3 See also ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002,
p. 81.
4 Cf. also St Bernard's contribution to the 'Primitive Rule of Order' of the Knights
Templar, in which he says that 'knights may kill the enemies of the cross without sinning'.
5 States where Shari'ah is applied either fully or in part: Saudi Arabia, The United Arab
Emirates, Oman, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria.
6 Significantly, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle had no determining influence on the
Islamic faith, even though it was the Arabs who introduced the writings of these two
Greek philosophers to the West.
7 COM(2000) 212.
8 Of 1 March 2001, OJ C 277, 1.10.2001, p. 130.
9 Cf. Commission communication of 2 May 2001 on building an effective partnership
with the United Nations in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs,
COM(2001) 231.
10 Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
Palestinian Authority, Cyprus; Libya was granted observer status in the Barcelona
Process on 16 April 1999.
11 Of 27 November 2000, OJ C 135, 7.5.2001, p. 171.
12 Cf. the Morillon/Cohn-Bendit report dated 11 June 2002.
13 ABl. C284E of 21 November 2002, p. 108.
14 COM(2001) 252; see also Commission report on the implementation of the European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000 (SEC(2001) 801).
15 loc. cit.
16 Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine,
Philippines, Pakistan, Chechnya, Indonesia and Bangladesh.
17 Of 13 December 2001, OJ C 177E, 25.7.2002, p. 291; see also Commission
communication COM(2001) 211.
18 See also Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement.
19 See the van den Berg  report dated 5 February 2002 and report from the Commission
(Humanitarian Aid Office - ECHO) - annual report 2001, 3 July 2002, COM (2002) 322.
20 Cf. Commission communication of 24 April 2002 (COM(2002) 212, also the
conclusions of the 1995 UN conference in Copenhagen and follow-up conference in 2000
and the Nirj Deva report on trade and development for poverty eradication and food
security, adopted by the Committee on Development and Cooperation on 11 June 2002.
21 Main development goals named in the Millennium Declaration are the halving of the
number of poor people, access to primary schooling for all children and a two-thirds
reduction in infant mortality.
22 loc. cit.
23 Cf. also ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002,
p. 53.

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24 COM(2002) 129.
25 Cf. Commission communication of 6 March 2002 on education and training in the
context of poverty reduction in developing countries, COM(2002) 116.
26 See also opinion of the Committee on Budgets on the L. Morgantini report concerning
conclusion of the 10th EC-UNRWA Convention, A5-0010/1999, ABl. C054 of 25
February 2000, p. 106.

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