Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Green Paper on European Space Policy" (COM(2003) 17 final)
Date: 2003-06-19
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: European Space Agency, aerospace industry, space policy, space station, use of outer space

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Green Paper on European
Space Policy’

(COM(2003) 17 final)

(2003/C 220/05)

On 21 January 2003, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social
Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the Green Paper
on European Space Policy.

The Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption, which was responsible for preparing
the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 4 June 2003. The rapporteur was
Mr Buffetaut.

At its 400th Plenary Session on 18 and 19 June 2003 (meeting of 19 June), the European Economic and
Social Committee unanimously adopted the following opinion.

1.

Introduction

With this Green Paper the Commission has opened a broad
debate on European Space Policy and its future, at a time when
the European space industry faces a more difficult situation
than in the past owing to greater competitive pressure,
shrinking telecommunications markets and factors peculiar to
the development of our space industry, which is based
primarily on civil and commercial activity; more generally,
space is a high-risk and commercially fragile sector, even
though the potential of its applications is still expanding.
Long-term economic returns do exist,
in non-commercial,
non-competitive public service sectors, such as weather fore-
casting and earth observation from space. In addition there are
real economic benefits for the commercial sector (fishing,
transport, agriculture and tourism), but they are indirect and
for the common good.

1.1. Background

1.1.1.
The European space project was born in the 1960s,
in particular at the instigation of France, which wanted to
ensure independent access to space, and the sector has
developed on the basis of growing European and international
cooperation. National space projects were gradually merged
and at the same time international collaborative programmes
were set up, in particular with the USA and later with Russia,
China and Japan.

1.1.2.
Today, Europe has a mature space sector producing
highly reliable launchers and satellites (in the past decade
Ariane has put over half of all commercial telecommunications
satellites into orbit). European space activities cover the whole

spectrum of production, from design and manufacture of
space systems to scientific research and its value-added appli-
cations such as telecommunications, earth observation and
satellite navigation.

1.1.3.
This process was essentially initiated by the national
space agencies, particularly by France’s CNES (Centre National
d’Études Spatiales) and since then has been supported in an
intergovernmental framework, primarily under the auspices of
the European Space Agency (ESA), which is a crucial coordinat-
ing player.

The European Union itself has gradually become
1.1.4.
involved in space, e.g. with the Galileo project and the GMES
initiative (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security).

The nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy and Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy must go hand in hand with
the formulation of a strong European space policy.

1.1.5.
particular features:

The European space sector is characterised by very

— the wish to maintain and increase autonomous access to
space by developing launchers and to ensure independent
use of space by developing its own satellites;

— efforts to develop scientific knowledge and applications;

— the development of a competitive and innovative indus-

trial base;

— the priority given to civilian and commercial applications;

— the development of a number of space applications,
particularly satellite telecommunications, but also earth
observation, management and prevention of natural and
technological disasters, sustainable management of the
environment, navigation and weather forecasting;

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— international cooperation with the leading space powers
for major instruments and large-scale missions, including
(but not limited to) manned flight, which is the most
spectacular aspect and is emblematic of the original spirit
of adventure and discovery;

— the relative underdevelopment of military applications.

1.1.6.
It must be acknowledged that the commercial success
of launch activities was boosted in the 1980s on the one hand
by the virtual abandonment of conventional launchers by the
United States and on the other by the fact that Soviet launchers
had no access to the commercial market.

1.1.7.
respects, both in competitive and market terms.

The current environment is very different in many

1.2.5.
Against this background of increased competition
and contraction of commercial markets, especially in the
telecommunications sector, with nothing like the same degree
of assistance and complementarity of military and civilian
applications that exists for example in the USA, and existing
in a more complex institutional and political environment
than those of its competitors, the European space sector is in
a difficult situation. The problems relate not only to the
absence of a military space programme but also to the
vulnerability of
the European institutional market which
(unlike the US market, particularly as regards launchers) is
completely unprotected, and to our space industry’s over-
dependence on the commercial market.

It is in this context that the Commission decided to
1.2.6.
draw up a Green Paper on European Space Policy, in conjunc-
tion with which workshops will be held across Europe until
June 2003 and which will be followed by a White Paper.

1.2. Current environment

1.2.1.
The political determination of the United States in
the space sector is being more strongly asserted than ever
before. The USA sees space systems as an instrument of
strategic, scientific and economic ascendancy based on the
notion of ‘controlling space’ and ‘controlling information
systems’ (which explains, for instance, a certain opposition on
its part to the Galileo project).

1.2.2.
This objective finds practical expression in a very
high level of investment, representing 80 % of world spending
in the space sector (civilian and military). Thus US public
spending on the space sector in 2002 was EUR 31,8 bn (half
military and half civilian) compared with EUR 5 bn in Europe
(90 % civilian). In the United States the military sector can
therefore be said to drive civilian applications, whereas in our
case the civilian research sector benefits the military. The US
figures for 2003 are EUR 15,4 bn for the civilian sector,
EUR 16,6 bn for the military sector together with a further
EUR 6 bn for classified programmes, amounting to a total of
EUR 38 bn.

1.2.3.
Despite its current situation inherited from the
bankrupt Soviet system, Russia has maintained a substantial
scientific, technological and operational base. However, it has
expanded cooperation with the USA more than with its
European partners.

2. The Commission’s approach

2.1.
The Commission has divided its document into three
broad chapters subdivided into topics, on which 12 questions
are formulated.

2.1.1.

E u r o p e a n s p a c e i n a c h a n g i n g g l o b a l
c o n t e x t

The Commission raises issues about autonomous access to
space, maintaining scientific excellence, the industrial and
technological base and its possible weaknesses, market con-
ditions and institutional demand, potential and opportunities
for international cooperation, the problem of manned flight
(e.g. return on investment), financial resources and the relation-
ship between spending at European and national level, and
finally the future of professions in the space sector.

2.1.2.

P l a c i n g s p a c e m o r e a t
E u r o p e a n d i t s c i t i z e n s

t h e s e r v i c e o f

Its neighbour Ukraine has an effective technical capability in
the launcher sector.

1.2.4.
Finally, recent years have seen the emergence of new
countries in space competition: Japan, China, India, Israel,
Australia and Brazil, with potential launch sites in the equa-
torial zone.

2.1.2.1.
Under this very general heading, which seems to
beg the question, the Commission first addresses the issue of
the business applications or general interest of space activities
and research. It gives examples of current applications and
applications in development (weather forecasting, satellite
navigation, transport, citizens’ security, sustainable develop-
ment, control and implementation of the common agricultural
policy and common fisheries policy, management and preven-
tion of natural and technological disasters, etc.).

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2.1.2.2.
The Commission also considers the emergence of
economically viable and competitive applications and the
possibility of public support for them, as well as the issue of
space capability in the context of the European Common
Security and Defence Policy. Although Europe does have
strategic capabilities, they are widely spread and the systems
are not inter-operable.

living conditions in areas to which access is difficult (telemedi-
cine, telelearning, etc.). Furthermore, from a strategic and
military perspective, independent access to and use of space is
a key factor in preserving Europe’s autonomy. European space
policy is therefore of considerable importance for the future,
from both a civilian and a political and military point of view.

2.1.3. T o w a r d s

a

m o r e

e f f i c i e n t

a m b i t i o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d
w o r k

a n d
f r a m e -

This chapter deals with institutional issues in a sphere where
national, intergovernmental and Community remits overlap
and where questions of European independence and political
will are critically important.

The Commission notes that the national framework in
2.2.
this sphere was superseded over 30 years ago and recognises
the effective role played by the ESA.

3.1.2.
The fact that all the major countries have come to
the same conclusion — i.e. that a national space policy is
impossible without independent access to space — has now
led to a worldwide overcapacity of means of launch. In the
launch services market, supply is primarily linked to strategic
considerations rather than commercial demand. The continued
existence of an industrial and technological base, and of space
research, is contingent on guaranteeing independent access
to space. Responsibility for maintaining independent access
currently lies with the States which have decided to provide it
and to commit the requisite investments to support their
decision. Europe is now at a crossroads and must take vital
political and financial decisions if it is to maintain its autonomy
in the space sector.

2.3.
tutions:

It asks two questions relating to policies and insti-

3.2. The space industry

— how to exploit the space ‘acquis’ in Europe for the benefit

of Union policies;

— how to reinforce the political and juridical bases necessary
for efficient action by the European Union and Europe in
the space field (specifically how to include arrangements
on space in the future Union treaty).

2.4.
It adds two further questions of a more economic and
technical nature: on the implications of restructuring in the
aerospace industries and on the regulatory obstacles that are
hampering the development of space telecommunications
services.

3. General comments

3.1.

The issues

The EESC notes that space has many applications for
3.1.1.
civilian and military initiatives in the most buoyant sectors of
the information society, such as satellite navigation, pos-
itioning, earth observation and weather forecasting. It empha-
sises that major sectors of commercial activity and civil society
— including civil aviation, transport, fishing, agriculture and
tourism — depend on the availability of space technologies
and services. It also notes that space-based resources promote
European cohesion by making it possible to reach the more
remote regions and reduce, in technical terms, the ‘digital
divide’,
in concert with terrestrial technologies. They could
also become a vehicle for new services helping to improve

It is worth pointing out the economic and social importance
of this industry, which has an overall turnover of EUR 5,3 bn
and employs directly some 35 000 people, many of them
highly skilled.

3.2.1.

I n d i v i s i b i l i t y / d u a l i t y
i n d u s t r y

o f

t h e

s p a c e

3.2.1.1.
The space industry can be both civil and military
and is therefore simultaneously indivisible and dual. Despite
the importance of this aspect, it is all too rarely pointed
out. We are not looking at two separate space industries,
commercial and civilian on the one hand and military on the
other, but at a dual launcher and satellite industry. It therefore
requires a comprehensive space policy which avoids unnecess-
ary duplication.

3.2.2. V u l n e r a b i l i t y o f

t h e E u r o p e a n s p a c e

i n d u s t r y

3.2.2.1.

The following key points need to be made:

— with far greater reliance on the commercial market than
its American counterpart (52 % of its turnover compared
to 20 % for the USA), the European space industry is
much more vulnerable to the economic climate, and
particularly to the fluctuations in the telecommunications
sector, whose financial and commercial support has been
vital to the development of the European space sector
and satellite operators;

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— unlike its US counterpart, the European space industry
does not have the stabilising element that would be
provided by military programmes. In addition, from a
legal perspective, the recitals of the ESA Convention of
30 October 1980 expressly state that its aim is ‘to define
a European space programme for Exclusively Peaceful
purposes’;

3.2.3.3.
Private funding comes in when operational appli-
cations can generate a commercial return on investments. If
this is not the case, or if the economic returns are indirect,
public funding is needed, but careful account must be taken of
its knock-on effects in downstream sectors.

— it is important to ensure that the industry has all the
basic technologies necessary for totally autonomous
development (for example, it should not depend on the
USA for the on-board atomic clocks on Galileo and
certain electronic components). In addition, delays or
procrastination in implementing programmes (such as
Galileo) risk dispersing or dissipating engineering teams,
whereas high-technology industrial capacity is dependent
on people and their skills. It takes a considerable time to
build such capacity, but very little time to destroy it.

3.2.3.

F i n a n c i n g

3.2.3.1.
Public funding comes from the national space
agencies, the ESA and the Commission. It plays a vital, and in
a sense seminal role. It enables other sources of funding to be
found for developments that would not be possible without
mobilising financial contributions not directly related to space
(such as financial resources allocated to weather forecasting).

3.2.3.2.
The system for financing ESA programmes, which
is based on the principle of fair return, has encouraged a
number of states to get involved in the space field and led to
the emergence of space activities in areas where there were
previously none. From this point of view, the principle has
been beneficial, but there are now good reasons for questioning
its continued effectiveness. In fact, many of the delays in
implementing the Galileo programme have been due to
problems with the application of this principle, which can
paralyse action and lead to both fragmentation of the space
industry and a weakening of centres of excellence. If there are
already difficulties in applying the principle within the current
perimeter of the ESA, these will only be aggravated if some or
all of the future EU members wish to join the ESA. Looking to
the future, consideration should be given to new regulations —
for example on ‘strengthened space cooperation’ programmes
between signatories to the ESA Convention, or amendment of
the rule of fair return. If, as is desirable, space becomes a
shared competence, it will be possible to launch Community
programmes without being constrained by the rule of geo-
graphic return. In any event, states which do not have a space
sector of their own always benefit, at least indirectly, from the
development of European space activities.

4. Specific comments

4.1.

Independent access to space

4.1.1.
One of the key factors for the development of
European space policy is maintaining independent access to
space. There are lessons to be drawn from the USA, where the
practice is to support national launch activities as a strategic
priority. The adoption of a similar attitude in Europe would
both ensure a better economic balance in the use of European
launchers and express the will of the public authorities to
encourage a sector which is of strategic importance for
Europe’s future.

4.1.2.
The notion of ‘space domination and control’, which
the USA sees as one of the guarantees of its national security,
poses the problem of freedom of access and use of space. The
desire for control of space can lead to a temptation to deny
access to others, or, at the very least, to exercise close and
permanent control over access. Europe cannot accept this and
must have the means to act autonomously in four key areas:
observation, telecommunications, navigation, and access to
space, without being confronted by ‘access denial’, even if the
control of the risks caused by the very existence of space
systems must be the subject of close cooperation (for example,
dissemination of high-definition images of sensitive areas).

4.2.

Space science

The issue of space science is addressed only briefly in the
Green Paper. However, the EESC notes that the Commission
has opportunely organised a high-level workshop on this
subject in order to underline its importance and compensate
for the Green Paper’s weakness in this area.

4.2.1.
European space science has played a pioneering role
across the whole spectrum of civilian space activities. Over the
past few decades, space science has reached a high level of
excellence and has successfully competed with the USA in key
domains. The ESA’s scientific programme, together with the
associated large-scale national programmes, have played a key
role in this respect.

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4.2.2.
The pioneering nature of scientific space missions
makes them an effective source of innovation and progress.
The prerequisite development of new instruments and new
types of satellites and data analysis methods has produced
important industrial spin-offs. For example, the high-efficiency
detectors and supermirrors developed for astronomic space
missions have led to practical applications in the medical field
and the optics industry. The same applies for the scientific
instruments used in earth observation, which are also used in
the observation and monitoring of the climate, meteorological
phenomena and the environment, and in exploring and
prospecting for terrestrial resources.

4.2.3.
Scientific space missions have led to the acquisition
of particularly interesting and exciting knowledge about the
earth and its immediate environment, the solar system and the
universe. They thus have considerable cultural and educational
value. If, as was asserted at the Lisbon Summit, the European
Union is to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, it will have to invest
in new knowledge.

4.2.4.
Nevertheless, as things currently stand, Europe’s
space industry is suffering from the decrease in national budget
allocations. One consequence is that the scientific community
is ageing, whilst young scientists are faced with an insecure
future and uncertain careers.

Europe’s technological deficit

4.2.5.
is linked with its
research and development capacity. Europe’s space industry
lacks essential satellite components and/or technologies in
some fields. In many cases, these components are available in
the United States, but American export regulations prevent
European industry from actually accessing them. If Europe is
to maintain its access to space and its freedom to build the
satellites it wants, it is vital that it secure independent control
over these technologies.

4.3.

The commercial market and institutional demand

4.3.1.
As has already been emphasised, the space industry
is a dual one, and it would be artificial to distinguish a civilian,
institutional or commercial industry and a military industry.
Although public funding has a substantive spill-over effect,
means of arousing the interest of new sectors need to be found
in order to stimulate demand.

unknown, and can therefore also stimulate and maintain
public interest in the pursuit and future applications of the
‘space adventure’. In this respect the International Space Station
(ISS) represents a unique example of space cooperation
between 15 countries for strictly scientific and peaceful
purposes. However, Europe must assess its participation in the
ISS in terms of the strategic, scientific and economic benefits
which it derives from it.

4.4.2.
Any new and future projects, such as manned space
flight to other planets, should be planned and implemented
from the very outset as global projects for humanity as a
whole and not as prestige initiatives for a particular state or
for the European Union alone (it is self-evident that the USA
and other space powers such as Russia, China and Japan would
have to be involved in projects of this kind). Nevertheless, in
order to have the capacity to be a serious and influential
partner in such enterprises, the EU needs to have a successful
space programme of its own.

4.5. Budgetary and financial resources

4.5.1.
The wording of Question 5 may not be appropriate.
With the exception of Belgium, which has invested exclusively
in European programmes, the states which make the highest
contributions to the ESA, proportionate to their GDP, are also
the countries which allocate the highest funding to their own
national space agencies. The important question is not the
origin or the destination of the funding but how much is
committed overall.

4.5.2.
In practice, resources come from three sources: the
public funding allocated to space research, contributions
from public and institutional users (weather forecasting), and
contributions from private users. It would be desirable for all
three sources of funding to be increased, by getting new sectors
interested in space applications and to consider how the
current ESA funding rules could be adjusted so as to prevent
delays, such as those encountered for the Galileo programme.

4.6. Career development and skills

4.4. Manned space flight

4.4.1.
Although it has opened new avenues for scientific
and medical research, and whilst future missions should lead
to technological and scientific progress in a number of fields,
manned space flight cannot be justified in terms of
its
economic and scientific returns alone. On the other hand, it is
a fundamental expression of humankind’s deeply rooted
desire for adventure, new experiences and exploration of the

4.6.1.
Given that the really vital resource is people, without
whom Europe could not envisage building and maintaining a
strong and ambitious space sector, the main challenge is to
provide highly-skilled, stable and attractive employment with
good career prospects. Unless we can enhance and recompense
the skills of both individuals and teams, we may be faced with
a brain-drain. The answer lies in a strong political commitment
to space policy and for Europe to recognise that ‘the only
genuine form of wealth is people’.

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4.7.

The emergence of economically viable and competitive appli-
cations

4.7.1.
The concept of economic viability does not correlate
exactly with the idea of commercial viability, which now only
applies in the telecommunications sector. Support for the
development of new services, such as broadband services,
would guarantee a long-term demand for high quality satellites
as well as helping to relaunch space activity and creating a
new market for our launchers and satellites.

4.7.2.
There may be an obvious economic interest in some
areas, but does this necessarily mean that investments are
economically viable? For example, how can it be judged
whether an investment in weather forecasting is economically
viable? In this case, although the returns are considerable,
they cannot be clearly identified or classed as commercial
transactions. On the other hand, the services provided to
various sectors of the economy (air, maritime and terrestrial
navigation, agriculture and fisheries) are self-evident and lead
to increases in productivity, quite apart from their contribution
to the safety of goods and persons. Notwithstanding these
considerations, institutional support is necessary during the
demonstration phase aimed at establishing the technical and
economic feasibility of an activity, before the sector invests in
its development.

4.8.

Improving the security of citizens

4.8.1.
Consideration must be given to the question of
whether European space activity can be viable in the long term
without the mutual support of the civilian and military sectors.
It is also important to consider that in the military sector,
existing systems are uncoordinated and not interoperable.
Attention must be given to the shortcomings of European
military space activity, particularly in the areas of information,
intelligence and the fight against terrorism.

This is essentially a political question.

If the EU
4.8.2.
wishes to play an international role,
it will have to take
independent decisions and have its own sources of intelligence
and consequently its own military space capacity. Although
Galileo and GMES remain civilian projects, they have eminently
strategic value and can have dual applications.

A list of national and multinational military space
4.8.3.
initiatives in Europe would demonstrate that responses to
requirements in this area have been fragmented and made
without consultation. France,
Italy,
Germany, Spain and Belgium all take part in these initiatives
and it is possible that in future other Member States may wish
to develop space programmes in the military sector or take
part in existing programmes.

the United Kingdom,

4.8.4.
The expression of Europe’s military requirements
and responses to them therefore need to be coordinated. This
could be the first step towards establishing a truly European
space sector of security and defence, which could boost the
whole of Europe’s space activities, guarantee their long-term
existence and maintain Europe’s autonomy. The introduction
of closer cooperation in this area could be the cornerstone of
this process.

4.9. The EU,

the ESA and the Member States: objectives,

responsibilities and mutual relations

4.9.1.
Before specifying roles and relations, it is important
to define objectives. Space policy must ensure autonomous
access to space for Europe, disseminate applications of space
activities in the economy and society, strengthen demand
for services using space-based resources and expand it to
encompass new actors and fields, and develop initiatives in the
area of security and defence. This calls for a reorganisation of
roles and relations. To be successful, it is vital to avoid sterile
disputes over
responsibilities between the various actors
concerned. A clear and firm policy presupposes a political
authority that is recognised at European level. With this in
view, roles must be allocated in accordance with efficiency
requirements, by avoiding the risk of duplicating programmes
and in compliance with the subsidiarity principle. Given the
prospect that space policy will become a shared competence,
the ESA could evolve into an executive space agency of the
European Union. Seen against this background, the EESC
regrets that negotiations between the ESA and the Commission
on the framework convention have not been concluded, since,
by defining a proper European space policy with the ESA as
its ‘weapon arm’, the convention could be the cornerstone for
relaunching European space policy and developing the roles
of each party.

4.9.2.
The EESC notes that the ‘perimeter’ of the ESA
Convention no longer correlates with that of the European
Union. For instance, Switzerland and Norway belong to the
ESA whereas Greece and Luxembourg do not and Canada is
an observer. The accession to the EU of ten new Member
States will probably strengthen this tendency. This should
incite the EU to put Community funding towards space policy
(and therefore to provide the EU with shared and/or parallel
competences in this area), from which all the Member States
could benefit, even if this investment produced no direct or
immediate returns. The EU should also consider options for
variable geometry cooperation programmes. In addition, a
number of accession countries and other eastern European
countries are already involved through cooperation conven-
tions in the space field.

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4.10.

The political and legal bases for the Union’s and Europe’s
action in the space field

The fact

4.10.1.
that space is referred to as a shared
competence in the draft Constitutional Treaty is important, so
long as it expresses a genuine political will and is accompanied
by the requisite additional financial resources.

strength of its political commitment and the clarity of its
budget decisions. The introduction of a shared and/or parallel
competence for the space sector in the future European
constitutional treaty would provide the European Union with
the political, legislative and financial means to define and
implement a strong space policy, which will have to, inter alia:

4.11.

Transparent and stable regulatory framework

The question of negotiations on frequency spec-
4.11.1.
trum, orbital positions and standardisation is even more
important than the issue of regulatory barriers to exports.
European action would be far more efficient if it were better
coordinated. Despite the progress made by the European
Conference of European postal and telecommunications
administration, the satellite industry is still faced with inconsist-
ent and ill-adapted regulations on frequencies, authorisations
and licenses. Satellite operators need secure access to frequenci-
es, as well as alignment of the rules on authorisation and
licensing and the introduction of common standards for the
use of frequency spectra and access rights, whose sole aim is
to cover administrative costs. Lastly, European directives and
decisions on these matters need to be transposed into national
law.

5. Conclusion

The European Economic and Social Committee considers that
Europe’s position in the space sector will depend on the

Brussels, 19 June 2003.

— guarantee autonomous access to space for Europe;

— contribute to Europe’s strategic autonomy;

— develop a programme of scientific excellence;

— promote applications benefiting EU citizens and sectoral

policies;

— coordinate a dual research programme in space tech-
nologies in order to ensure our independence in civil,
commercial, security and defence activities.

Our scientific,
technical and industrial capacity puts us
amongst the leading players in the space field. The example of
Galileo is a clear demonstration that we must act swiftly and
decisively, or risk forfeiting our first-rate capital in the space
sector. The stakes are high: does the European Union have the
political will and the economic clout to maintain its autonomy
and remain among the elite in the world of space? Will ‘old
Europe’ act with determination, vigour and confidence in the
future or will it let itself become a vast retirement home for
nations which were once great?

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH