WRITTEN QUESTION E-2014/03 by Robert Goebbels (PSE) to the Commission. Distortion of competition with regard to CO2 emission rights.
Date: 2003-06-17
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU environmental policy, energy industry, industrial pollution, iron and steel industry, reduction of gas emissions, restriction on competition, tradeable emission permit, waste management

6.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 58 E/121

(2004/C 58 E/137)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2012/03

by Glyn Ford (PSE) to the Commission

(17 June 2003)

Subject: Secondment of staff

Could the Commission indicate the number of staff it has on secondment to institutions and organisations
to which it gives subsidies? Could the Commission also provide a list of institutions where staff are
currently on secondment and indicate what steps are being taken to ensure that the relationship is not
abused?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(22 September 2003)

Tables with the number of staff on secondment to institutions and organisations and the amount of grants
that was committed for those of them to whom it was applicable in 2002 are sent directly to the
Honourable Member and to the Secretariat of the Parliament.

These figures clearly demonstrate that the relationship is not abused. In relation to secondments in the
interest of the service, the Honourable Member will notice that in the vast majority of cases, only one
Commission official is seconded per host institution/organisation, a situation which is in keeping with the
interests of the Commission.

In relation to secondments at the request of the official concerned, it should be borne in mind that the
relevant officials are fully paid by the host institution/organisation so that any net
impact on the
Commission (and, therefore, the Union) budget is either marginal or non-existent.

(2004/C 58 E/138)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2014/03

by Robert Goebbels (PSE) to the Commission

(17 June 2003)

Subject: Distortion of competition with regard to CO2 emission rights

The political agreement on the trading of greenhouse gas emission rights provides for a trading system to
come into effect in 2005. Initially, it will cover CO2 emissions from large industrial and energy plants.
However, because implementing procedures vary from sector to sector and from undertaking to
undertaking within one and the same country as well as from country to country, the implementation of
the European Directive may well result in distortions of competition within the European Union. What is
more, the implementation thereof may well penalise European industry vis-à-vis industry in other parts of
the world, especially the United States of America, which has not signed up to the Kyoto Protocol. The
case of the iron and steel industry is particularly striking if we consider that an inconsistent application of
trading quotas may entail a sale price increase of up to 15 %.
that sector’s
competitiveness on external markets would be seriously jeopardised.

is self-evident

that

It

Has the Commission given any thought to the possibility of an iron and steel group retaining the emission
rights relating to sites which are no longer operational and which may be transferred to other sites?

Does the Commission intend to take account of the recovery of blast-furnace gases sold by iron and steel
groups to the electricity sectors?

How does the Commission intend to protect
competitors who do not have to bear such additional costs?

the iron and steel

industry in Europe from foreign

C 58 E/122

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

6.3.2004

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(13 August 2003)

The Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, enables transfers of allowances within the internal market, and
a transfer of production capacities can,
therefore, be accompanied by a corresponding transfer of
allowances both within and across Member State borders during a trading period. It is also relevant in this
context that the annual allocation of allowances with respect to an installation can only be made to a
holder of a greenhouse gas emissions permit relating to that installation.

The Directive makes the operator of an installation accountable only for direct emissions released on-site.
Activities of operators to indirectly reduce greenhouse gas emissions do not fall under the scope of the
Directive. Therefore, if iron and steel groups recover blast-furnace gases in order to sell them to operators
of combustion installations, the gases are not emitted into the atmosphere at the site of those iron and
steel companies. If the gases later give rise to emissions from installations belonging to the electricity
sector, they will have to be taken into account there.

Emissions allowance trading is an instrument used to contribute to the implementation of the targets
accepted by the Community and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol. The Community and the
Member States ratified the Kyoto Protocol in the knowledge that addressing climate change in this way
would involve certain costs at least in the short term. It is true that the United States as an important
trading partner has decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and that developing countries have no
emission limitation commitments under the Protocol. At the same time, other important trading partners
of the Union have undertaken emission limitation obligations under the Kyoto protocol, including for
example all the Accession Countries, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. These countries will hence equally
incur costs for meeting their Kyoto targets.

The Community emissions trading scheme is expected to reduce the costs for the Union economy of
implementing the obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by ensuring that emission reductions are achieved
where they are cheapest. On 23 July, the Commission presented to the Council and the Parliament a
proposal to allow credits from the project mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation,
Clean Development Mechanisms) to be converted into allowances under the Community scheme which
will lead to further significant cost savings. This proposal again underlines the Commission’s commitment
to the most cost-effective implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.

(2004/C 58 E/139)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2023/03

by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(17 June 2003)

Subject: Commercial relations between the Commission and GIM

In her Written Question E-4099/97 (1), Mrs Winifred Ewing asked the Commission in early 1998 for
information about its commercial relations with Geographic Information Management (GIM), a company
with offices in Belgium and Luxembourg. In that Question, Mrs Ewing drew the Commission’s attention to
the fact that 99 % of GIM Belgium’s shares were owned by GIM Luxembourg and that 75 % of GIM
Luxembourg’s shares were owned by a company named Kival Consultants, located in the Bahamas.

Under Bahamian law, it is impossible to verify the shareholdership of the company and identify the major
shareholders.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Commission has maintained its commercial relations with GIM.

Can the Commission indicate how many contracts it has awarded to GIM since 1998, the total value of
those contracts and the procedures in accordance with which the contracts were awarded?