WRITTEN QUESTION E-1987/03 by Piia-Noora Kauppi (PPE-DE)and Per-Arne Arvidsson (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Nuclear safety principles applied to the EU accession countries.
Date: 2003-06-16
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Bulgaria, International Atomic Energy Agency, accession negotiations, accession to the European Union, decommissioning of power stations, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, safety standard

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 78 E/63

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(17 July 2003)

Judging from a similar Written Question (E-3254/02 by the Honourable Member) (1) sent
to the
Commission in November 2002, it appears that the research project referred to here is the European
Aerosol Research Lidar Network (Earlinet). A basic conclusion of this project is that it is possible to
develop an infrastructure for setting up a European-wide network of LIDAR systems to study the vertical
distribution of aerosols. Since measurements were not carried out continuously throughout the year there
is a need for caution in drawing other conclusions. In particular online monitoring of ground level particle
concentrations was not in the scope of the project.

Airborne suspended particulate matter (PM) has to be considered as one of the key pollutants affecting
human health. Based on reports officially submitted to the Commission under the provisions of current
Community legislation, annual concentrations of PM10 (i.e. particles with a diameter less that 10
micrometer (µm) in Athens and Thessaloniki are in the range of 50-70 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/
m3) thus clearly exceeding the limit value (plus margin of tolerance) of 46 µg/m3 for the year 2003.
Therefore it certainly represents a major fraction of the overall air pollution, as is the case in other large
European cities. However, other air pollutants like ozone, benzene, nitrogen oxides or sulphur dioxide are
also important.

Current Community legislation on air quality (Air Quality Framework Directive (1996/62/EC (2)) and
accompanying Daughter Directives (1999/30/EC (3), 2000/69/EC (4), 2002/3/EC (5))) sets out limit values for
specific pollutants (including PM10) to be reached by certain attainment dates (2005 for PM10). In the case
of exceedance of the limit value plus a defined margin of tolerance (which decreases yearly reaching zero
at the attainment date), Member States are obliged to submit plans and programmes to demonstrate how
the limit value can be reached. These are due for the first time by the end of 2003. It is Member States’
responsibility to take appropriate measures to reduce the air pollution. These can differ between Member
States. The Commission does not give specific recommendations on how the limit values are to be reached
in individual cases.

While particles do influence the radiation balance through their specific absorption and light scattering
characteristics they are not regarded as a major cause of climate change. Consequently they are not
amongst the substances covered by the Kyoto Protocol.

(1) OJ C 155 E, 3.7.2003, p. 119.
(2) Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management, OJ L 296,

21.11.1996.

(3) Council Directive 1999/30/EC of 22 April 1999 relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and

oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air, OJ L 163, 29.6.1999.

(4) Directive 2000/69/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000 relating to limit values for

benzene and carbon monoxide in ambient air, OJ L 313, 13.12.2000.

(5) Directive 2002/3/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2002 relating to ozone in ambient air,

OJ L 67, 9.3.2002.

(2004/C 78 E/0064)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1987/03

by Piia-Noora Kauppi (PPE-DE)
and Per-Arne Arvidsson (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(16 June 2003)

Subject: Nuclear safety principles applied to the EU accession countries

We refer to the proposal for a Council Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles
concerning the safety of nuclear installations (1). The Directive proposes common safety standards and

C 78 E/64

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

27.3.2004

verification mechanisms to guarantee the application of common methods and criteria with regard to
nuclear safety throughout the enlarged EU. The Directive is based on the Nuclear Safety Convention
concluded under the auspices of the IAEA and lays down a precise legal framework for the nuclear safety
system.

Given the forthcoming harmonization of safety rules and practices in connection with the IAEA safety
system, and having regard to the view of the European Parliament as expressed in a resolution on the
accession process adopted in June 2002 concerning the open-minded approach that should be adopted to
the future of the two nuclear units 3 and 4 at Kozloduy in Bulgaria, and taking account of the
observations and recommendations of the IAEA inspectors, could the Commission specify how account is
being taken of the view of the European Parliament and the IAEA assessments at the accession talks with
Bulgaria?

Given the substantial upgrading which has been done to Kozloduy Units 3 and 4 in the period 1991-
2002, which, according to the IAEA Safety Review Mission conducted in June 2002, has addressed all the
original safety concerns and has brought the units into line with the IAEA nuclear safety standards,
considering, furthermore, the existence of an independent and professionally staffed nuclear regulator in
Bulgaria, and noting the Union’s demand for an early closure of these reactors in the context of the
Accession Conference negotiations on the energy chapter, could the Commission explain how it intends to
apply the principles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to the solution of Kozloduy 3 and 4 issue?

(1) COM(2003) 32 final.

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(24 July 2003)

With regard to the current state of the accession negotiations on the issue of nuclear safety in units 3 and
4 of the Kozloduy power station, the Commission would remind the Honourable Members that, in the
framework of the Accession Conference, Chapter 14 (Energy) was provisionally closed with Bulgaria on
18 November 2002. The terms of the agreement between the Member States and Bulgaria on nuclear
safety, in particular as regards units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy power station, are set out in the EU common
position. The Bulgarian Government has undertaken to close units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy power station
in 2006. As regards the peer review under the auspices of the Council, the European Union will send an
expert mission to Bulgaria as soon as possible, before the conclusion of the accession negotiations. The EU
also notes Bulgaria’s expectation that the Community will continue to provide financial assistance (linked
to the consequences of the early closure of certain units of the Kozloduy power station) and is willing to
consider this matter.

The Commission considers that the questions raised by the Honourable Members concerning units 3 and 4
of the Kozloduy power station must be understood and reassessed in this framework. With regard to
period prior to the abovementioned agreement, the Commission would refer the Honourable Members to
the answers it gave at the time, notably that to Written Question E-3164/02 from Mr Matikainen-
Kallström et Mr Rovsing (1).

The Commission would point out that, like all the other nuclear installations in the candidate countries,
units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy power station were evaluated by the Working Party on Nuclear Safety
(WPNS) under the auspices of the Council. The evaluation gave rise to recommendations, and the WPNS
monitored the implementation of those recommendations in the first half of 2002. The WPNS considered
that the implementation of five recommendations required further close monitoring, and in its reports of
June 2001 and 2002 it stressed that the improvements made to units 3 and 4 should be understood in the
context of the units being closed in 2006.

(1) OJ C 11 E, 15.1.2004, p. 30.