WRITTEN QUESTION E-1536/03 by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE-DE) to the Council. Granting of loans by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to Greece and Turkey.
Date: 2003-05-06
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EIB loan, European Commission, Greece, Türkiye, credit guarantee, earthquake, exchange of information, private sector, report

C 51 E/106

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

26.2.2004

As regards the accounting of Member States’ debt cancellations, the methodological reference for national
accounts in the Community is the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA95). It was
adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996. According to the ESA95 rules, debt
cancellations are recorded as capital
transfers are a component of government
expenditure which contribute to the government deficit. Paragraph 4 165 (f) of ESA95 specifically quotes
‘the cancellation by the government of a debt owed to it by a foreign country’ as an example of a capital
transfer. Other accounting systems, such as the worldwide System of National Accounts of 1993 (SNA93)
of the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Government Finance Statistics Manual
of 2001 also provide for similar accounting recordings.

transfers. Capital

The Commission considers that the aim of government deficit and debt accounting should be to give a
picture as faithful as possible of economic reality. To remain credible and useful for economic analysis and
policy-making, the government deficit and debt must be compiled on the basis of scientific and technical
criteria irrespective of the merit of the government expenditure categories or of any ethical consideration,
e. g. the cancellation of the debts of the highly indebted poor countries. Debt cancellation is not without
cost for the creditor countries. It is, therefore, appropriate that the act of debt cancellation implies a higher
fiscal deficit.

The analogy between the debt cancellations and the recording of swap-related flows does not seem to be
warranted. The specific accounting treatment of swap-related flows for the excessive deficit procedure
established by Regulation (EC) No 2558/2001 of the Parliament and of the council of 3 December 2001
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 as regards the reclassification of settlements under swaps
arrangements and under forward rate agreements, was not for any consideration about the merit of swaps
but exclusively for technical reasons. On this latter issue, the Honourable Member is referred to the
explanatory memoranda of the Commission proposal (1) that led to Regulation (EC) No 2558/2001 and of
the respective Parliamentary Report (A5-0071/2001 Kauppi).

(1) OJ C 116 E, 26.4.2000.

(2004/C 51 E/118)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1536/03

by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE-DE) to the Council

(6 May 2003)

Subject: Granting of loans by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to Greece and Turkey

On 2 April 2003 the EIB decided to grant EUR 350 million to Turkey to support the private sector and for
the reconstruction of the areas hit by the 1999 earthquake.

Does the Council have any information from the EIB (tables or studies) regarding which specific projects
the Turkish administration will fund with these loans? Is there an evaluation of the use made of the first
tranche of EUR 150 million in loans to Turkey, granted for the same purpose?

In 1999 Greece was granted a loan of EUR 300 million for the same purpose. Does the Council have
details on the use made of these loans and the take-up rate? The first envelope which the EIB approved
made provision for the granting of EUR 900 million. What reasons can the Council give for the delay in
continuing with the granting of these loans, and what plans are there for payment of the remaining
amount?

Reply

(2 October 2003)

Council decision 1999/786 EC granting a Community guarantee to the EIB against losses under loans for
projects for the reconstruction of the earthquake-stricken areas of Turkey, provides in its Article 3 that the
Commission shall inform each year both the European Parliament and the Council of the loan operations
carried out under this Decision and shall submit at the same time an implementation assessment.

26.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51 E/107

Concerning the earthquake in Greece of September 1999, the Council granted by virtue of Decision 2000/
786 EC EUR 2 million to Greece in order to compensate partially for the interest paid in 2000 on loans
from the EIB for the reconstruction of buildings, infrastructure and industrial installation affected by this
earthquake. Given the limited nature of this grant, no special reporting requirements on its implementation
were provided.

(2004/C 51 E/119)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1544/03

by Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza (PSE) to the Council

Subject: System for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances

(7 May 2003)

As regards the proposal for a directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse-gas emission allowance
trading, its entry into force might have worrying consequences for certain sectors, since it does not take
account of important points such as:

1.

2.

3.

4.

the fact that companies with production units in various European countries might adopt different or
even contradictory provisions;

indirect emissions produced outside the premises of a business but caused by the energy sources used
in them (such as blast-furnace gases),

distortions of competition which may arise between sectors and countries,

the transmission of rights corresponding to the transfer of capacity as the result of the closure of
plants belonging to one and the same group.

All this seriously restricts the margin for adjusting to the directive for businesses in the steel sector, for
specific reasons such as the impossibility of passing on cost increases (a limited number of customers and
suppliers of raw materials), the fact that there are only two ways of manufacturing steel (blast furnaces and
electric furnaces (cid:1) both directly affected by the Directive) and the recycling of gases from blast furnaces
(which reduce CO2 emissions when generating energy, although, paradoxically, the allowances are not
granted to industry but to the energy companies).

Will the Council bear these points in mind in order to avoid seriously jeopardising the restructuring of a
sector which was finally beginning to be consolidated at Community level?

Reply

(2 October 2003)

The Council adopted its common position on the proposal for a Directive establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/
EC on 18 March 2003. Its provisions strike a balance between the advantages of a Community-wide
scheme and the principle, of subsidiarity and proportionality, while contributing to the fulfilment of the
joint commitments of the Community and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol in a cost-effective
manner.

Among the key objectives of the Common Position are to ensure the proper functioning of the internal
market and to avoid distortions of competition. The Common Position contains such Community-level
provisions relating to the allocation of allowances that are necessary to pursue those objectives. Thus, the
Member States determine the total quantities of allowances to be allocated, consistently with their
respective obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, on the basis of a set of common criteria aiming
to ensure a level playing field for all participants in the scheme.

Like the Kyoto Protocol, the Common Position addresses direct emissions.