Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing ship and port facility security
Date: 2003-05-02
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: common ports policy, common transport policy, container, harbour installation, international convention, maritime safety

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 2.5.2003
COM(2003) 229 final

2003/0089 (COD)

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL,
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

on enhancing maritime transport security

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on enhancing ship and port facility security

(presented by the Commission)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON ENHANCING MARITIME TRANSPORT
SECURITY………………………………………………………………………………….…4

1.

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

1.4.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

2.6.

3.

Introduction.................................................................................................................. 4

Overview of potential threats ....................................................................................... 4

Maritime transport's share of the European Union's economic exchanges.................. 5

The EU fleet and the fleet controlled by the EU.......................................................... 5

Community ports.......................................................................................................... 5

International awareness of the imperative need to enhance maritime transport
security ......................................................................................................................... 6

Within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) .............................................. 7

Within the International Labour Organisation (ILO)................................................... 8

Within the World Customs Organisation (WCO)........................................................ 8

Within G8..................................................................................................................... 9

American security initiatives ..................................................................................... 10

Action by the Community.......................................................................................... 11

Maritime security : A challenge regarding efficiency, coherence and mutual
recognition ................................................................................................................. 13

3.1.

The implementation of security measures relating to maritime operations ............... 14

3.1.1.

International maritime transport................................................................................. 14

3.1.2.

Special cases: intra-Community maritime traffic and ports occasionally
involved in international maritime transport.............................................................. 15

3.1.3. Cruise ships ................................................................................................................ 16

3.1.4.

Ships engaged in domestic traffic .............................................................................. 16

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

3.5.

3.6.

4.

The security of Community ports .............................................................................. 17

Enhancing the security of the logistics chain as a whole ........................................... 18

Monitoring and administration of maritime security ................................................. 19

Maritime transport risk insurance .............................................................................. 20

International mutual recognition................................................................................ 20

Conclusions................................................................................................................ 20

2

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM……………………………………………………….24

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENHANCING SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY……………….34

ANEXE 1……………………………………………………………………………………47

ANEXE 2……………………………………………………………………………………59

ANEXE 3…………………………………………………………………………………….89

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT……….……………………………………150

IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON BUSINESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMES)………………………………156

3

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

on enhancing maritime transport security

1.

INTRODUCTION

Recent  events  have  shown  that  no  country  in  the  world  is  immune  from  terrorism.
Whatever the reasons behind them,  acts  of  terrorism  can  be  committed  at  any  time
and in any place. Shipping is no exception.

This  issue  is,  alas,  nothing  new  for  the  European  Union,  and  many  of  the
Member States have taken steps to protect their citizens and modes of transport. The
Commission,  for  its  part,  has  already  addressed  the  subject  of  cruise  passenger
security in Europe in the Transport White Paper1. It considers that, in future, there is
a need  to enhance the security  of  the entire maritime transport logistics chain from
the  supplier  to  the  consumer.  Consequently,  since  the  security  of  a  transport  chain
depends upon its weakest link, an approach addressing the multimodal dimension in
parallel will make it possible to improve the security of transport as a whole.

In  addition,  the  Communication  "Towards  integrated  management  of  the  external
borders  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union"2  proposes  working  and
cooperation mechanisms at EU level to enable practitioners of checks at the external
borders  to  coordinate  their  operational  actions  in  the  framework  of  an  integrated
strategy  which  takes  into  account  the  multiplicity  of  aspects  involved.  The
Communication is focused on persons and relies upon the Schengen acquis. It will be
followed by a second Communication centred on all types of goods and merchandise.

Initially, this communication addresses the purely maritime dimension of this chain.

1.1.

Overview of potential threats

Any  ship can be deliberately used  as  a weapon  or  be  a  carrier of  weapons of mass
destruction,  or  even  the  innocent  carrier  of  inappropriate  cargo,  unless  appropriate
security and control measures are taken. Terrorist acts against a ship are possible, in
particular  by  using  another  boat  or  from  inside  the  ship  by  stowaways  or  terrorists
who board the ship by force. Passenger vessels are particular targets because of the
number of lives which can be immediately put in danger. Freight vessels are no less
vulnerable  and  can  be  dangerous  carriers.  The  very  nature  of  cargoes  or  hazardous
substances  could  prompt  terrorists  to  attempt  to  blow  up  such  vessels,  e.g.  in  port
areas, with horrendous human and environmental consequences. Moreover, the illicit
transport of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical products by sea cannot be ruled out,
for subsequent use against the country of destination of the cargo.

1

2

COM(2001) 370 of 12 September 2001.
COM(2002) 233 final of 7 May 2002.

4

                                                
1.2.

Maritime transport's share of the European Union's economic exchanges

Maritime transport is vital for the Community's economic and commercial vigour, as
the  following  figures  demonstrate.  It  is  therefore  essential  to  enhance  maritime
security  in  order  to  maintain  or  even  develop  maritime  transport  and  operators'
confidence in it. The efforts that will be needed in order to raise the level of security
of ships and of Community ports must be seen in the light of the size of the fleet and
the importance of maritime trade for the EU's economy, as indicated in Sections 1.3
and 1.4 below.

In terms of total value, the EU's exports in 2001 represented some EUR 981 billion
and imports EUR 1 027 billion3. In fact, the EU is the main trading partner  of two-
thirds of the  planet.  Keeping  the  markets -  and  borders -  open  is  clearly  one  of  the
main objectives of the EU's commercial policy.

The EU's maritime logistics system, including sea-borne freight transport, ports and
port  handling  services,  accounts  for  over  two-thirds  of  the  total  trade  between  the
Community and the rest of the world. It is therefore important that maritime transport
security  should  be  enhanced,  and  its  competitiveness  maintained,  while  facilitating
trade.

1.3.

The EU fleet and the fleet controlled by the EU

The  market  share  of  the  fleet  controlled  by  European  shipowners  has  stayed  at
around 34% of the world tonnage for the last ten years.

This  fleet4  consists  of  some  8 800  ships,  of  which  1 966  oil  tankers,  1 702 bulk
carriers, 1 104 container carriers, 3 428 general cargo ships (conventional cargo ships
and roll-on/roll-off ships) and 685 passenger ships. In terms of volume, it represents
a  transport  capacity  of  over  257 million  tonnes,  including  over  3.15 million  TEUs
(containers).  In  terms  of  tonnage,  67%  of  this  fleet  is  registered  outside  the  EU:  it
will come as no surprise that a sizeable proportion of ships registered under the flag
of Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Cyprus and Malta is controlled by EU shipowners
and  operators.  The  fleet  registered  under  the  flags  of  the  EU  Member  States
represents 13% of total world tonnage, i.e. some 102 million tonnes, and comprises
over  4  200 ships.  It  employs  180 000 seafarers,  of  whom  around  40%  are  third
country nationals.

1.4.

Community ports

The  EU  has  35 000 km  of  coastline  and  hundreds  of  seaports.  Every  year  some
2 billion tonnes  of  general  cargo,  products  needed  for  the  European  economy  and
trade with other regions of the globe (oil and gas - solid fuel and ore - manufactured
products) pass through European ports every year. 90% of all oil trade with the EU is
sea-borne,  while  almost  70%  of  EU  imports  pass  the  shores  of  Brittany  and  the
English Channel. The volume of operations (in millions of tonnes/km) for EU ports
in 1999 was as follows:

3

4

Source : European Commission, DG TRADE.
Figures  as  1 January  2001,  ships  of  1000  gross  tonnage  and  above  -  Source:  Institute  of  Shipping
Economics and Logistics, Shipping Statistics 2001.

5

                                                
Region

Ocean trades

Inter-regional

Regional trades

Total

Baltic Sea

North Sea

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Total

53

404

153

304

914

trades

101

414

219

87

821

50

183

10

126

369

204

1001

382

517

2104

Table 1. Estimated volume of operations in EU  ports  by  region  in  1999,  in  millions  of  tonnes/km  -
DG TREN

The  25  main  European  ports  are  listed  in  Annex 1  which  indicates  the  volume  of
traffic and the percentage change in the number of tonnes over the period 1996-2000.
Note should be taken of the heterogeneous nature of port services and the diversity of
ports  included  in  this  list  (in  terms  of  status,  ownership,  size,  function,  and
geographical characteristics).

It is scarcely possible to establish a strict typology of ports. While there are a number
of  ports  specialising  in  a  particular  type  of  merchandise,  e.g.  the  oil  and  chemical
industries,  the  motor  vehicle  industry,  or  ferry  services,  most  ports  handle  all
activities, including in the port area.

The growth in maritime transport is based on the use of containers, increasingly large
ships,  specialised  port  terminals  and  the  organisation  of  "multi-spring"  shuttle
services.  Since  the  early  1990s  a  growing  number  of  new  ports,  known  as
"transhipment  hubs"  have  appeared  on  the  scene  in  each  of  the  abovementioned
maritime regions.

* * *

The Community's special vocation for maritime trade and the latter's importance for
the  strength  of  our  economy  undoubtedly  plead  in  favour  of  enhancing  maritime
security worldwide and within the EU in particular, in the face of a security situation
which is uncertain, to say the least, with regard to terrorist.

2.

INTERNATIONAL  AWARENESS  OF  THE  IMPERATIVE  NEED  TO  ENHANCE  MARITIME
TRANSPORT SECURITY

This  has  recently  resulted  in  more  and  more  work  and  initiatives  both  within
international forums and organisations and at regional level.

6

2.1.

Within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

Work on maritime security began within the IMO in February 2002, culminating on
12  December  2002  at  the  IMO  Diplomatic  Conference  with  the  adoption  of  an
amendment  to  the  International  Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS
Convention) and an International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).

Hitherto,  the  SOLAS  Convention  only  addressed  aspects  relating  to  the  security  of
maritime  transport.  The  purpose  of  amending  it  and  adopting  the  ISPS  Code  is  to
take  into  account  maritime  transport  issues  in  connection  with  ships  and  port
facilities5.

The  amendment  of  the  SOLAS  Convention  and  Part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code  consist
entirely  of  mandatory  provisions;  Part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code  is  made  up  of
recommendations which Contracting Governments are requested to implement.

These  provisions  apply  to  passenger  ships,  cargo  ships  of  500  gross  tonnage  and
upwards,  mobile  offshore  drilling  units  and  port  facilities  serving  international
traffic.

The  mandatory  provisions  are  indispensable  to  the  improvement  of  maritime
security. They concern a requirement for ships to be permanently marked with their
identification number fitted with an automatic identification system (AIS) and a ship
security alert system for spreading the alarm in the event of hostile action against the
ship,  and  to  be  issued  with  a  continuous  synopsis  record  (CSR),  a  kind  of  identify
document recording the history of the ship.

They  also  provide  for  a  set  of  active  and  passive  security  measures  based  on  three
security levels (normal, increased, high), their implementation being linked to a risk
assessment. They include the requirement to appoint people responsible for carrying
out  the  security  measures  (ship,  company  and  port  facility  security  officers),  to
prepare security plans taking  account of  the  risk assessment (ship and port facility)
and  to  issue  an  international  ship  security  certificate,  as  well  as  arrangements  for
personnel training and exercises.

Provision  is  also  made,  depending  on  the  potential  risk  to  persons,  property  and
environment, for the possibility of drawing up a declaration of security between the
ship  and  the  host  port  facility  to  define  the  responsibilities  of  each.  Another
possibility is that a  ship in port or  about to enter port can  be inspected  by  the  Port
State authorities for security reasons. In addition, the responsibilities and obligations
of the various players (Contracting Governments, companies, ships' masters and port
facilities) are clearly defined.

Part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code  is  made  up  of  a  set  of  very  detailed  recommendations
intended  as  guidance  for  the  various  players  concerning  the  implementation  of  the
mandatory  provisions.  Contracting  Governments  are  required,  in  particular,  to
designate  recognised  security  organisations  (responsible  for  providing  security
services  for  port  facilities  and  ships)  and  national  or  regional  maritime  security
contact  points,  to  manage  the  security  levels,  and  to  exchange  information  on

5

Port facilities being defined as locations where the ship/port interface takes place.

7

                                                
security matters. This part of the ISPS Code also contains detailed proposals for both
ships  and  port  facilities,  regarding  risk  assessment  and  the  security  plans  to  be
prepared  as  well  as  personal  training  and  exercises.  It  also  indicates  how  and  in
which cases a declaration of security should be drawn up  between the  ship and the
host port facility.

2.2.

Within the International Labour Organisation (ILO)

Seafarers  are  directly  involved  in  the  international  carriage  of  goods  (including
hazardous  materials)  and  passengers,  and  they  have  access  to  all  areas  of  ports,
including those to which access is restricted.

The  special  nature  of  seafarers'  living  and  working  conditions  has  prompted  the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) to  adopt  a wide range  of Conventions and
Recommendations  applying  specifically  to  them.  In  January  2001,  it  decided  to
convene  in  2005  a  maritime  session  of  the  International  Labour  Conference  with  a
view  to  adopting  a  single  instrument  bringing  together  as  far  as  possible  all  the
maritime standards contained in the fifty or so Conventions and Recommendations in
force.

More  specifically,  however,  in  March  2002,  an  urgent  item  concerning  improved
security of seafarers' identification was placed on the agenda  of the 91st  session of
the International Labour Conference scheduled for June 2003 with a view to revising
Convention No 108, the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention, 1958.

The identification of seafarers, which comes within the sphere of competence of the
ILO,  is  in  fact  one  of  the  issues  considered  crucial  by  the  International  Maritime
Organisation for improving maritime security.

Seafarers  should  have  documents  enabling 
their  positive  and  verifiable
identification - "positive"  meaning  that  the  document  holder  is  the  person  to  whom
the document was issued and "verifiable" implying the validation of the authenticity
of the document by reference to a source.

2.3.

Within the World Customs Organisation (WCO)

In  June  2002  the  WCO  adopted  a  Resolution  on  Security  and  Facilitation  of  the
International  Trade  Supply  Chain.  A  Task  Force  organised  around  five  priority
topics6  was  set  up  within  its  Secretariat-General  in  order  to  define  implementing
measures and protect international trade against terrorist attacks and the international
logistics  chain  against  being  used  for  the  illegal  transport  of  weapons  of  mass
destruction for terrorist purposes.

The results expected from this work are as follows:

– 

Development of a needs assessment tool to assist the customs authorities in the
establishment of supply chain security regimes;

6

Legal and procedural questions, commercial affairs and relations with other organisations, development
of capabilities, implementation and intelligence, and promotion, respectively.

8

                                                
– 

Access  for  the  customs  authorities  to  a  WCO  database  on  technical
verifications and detection equipment;

– 

Review of the 1972 WCO containers convention;

–  More  specifically  with  regard  to  the  abovementioned  Task  Force,  by  June

2003:

(cid:1) Review of the WCO data model to include the main elements necessary

for the customs to detect high-risk consignments;

(cid:1) Development  of  guidelines  to  enable  WCO  members  to  adopt  a  legal
basis for the gathering, transmission and exchange of customs data, while
respecting confidentiality;

(cid:1) Developing  guidelines  to  encourage  cooperation  between  customs  and
industry  to  increase  supply  chain  security  and  facilitate  the  flow  of
international trade.

2.4.

Within G8

The Kananaskis Summit (26 and 27 June 2002) addressed the subject both in terms
of maritime security in general and in terms of the particular case of containers.

Accordingly,  the  G8  members  agreed  on  a  set  of  cooperative  actions  to  promote
greater transport security while facilitating trade. G8 will:

(cid:2)

Maritime security

Support, within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), amendment of
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention)
in order to:

– 

– 

– 

advance the date of the installation of automatic detection systems (AIS)
on certain ships to December 2004,

require mandatory ship security plans and ship security officers on board
ships by July 2004,

require  mandatory  port  facility  security  plans  and  port  facility  security
assessments  for  port  serving  ships  engaged  on  international  voyages  by
July 2004.

(cid:2)

Container safety

–  Work  expeditiously, 

international
in  cooperation  with 
organisations,  to  develop  and  implement  a  improved  global  container
security regime to identify and examine high-risk  containers  and  ensure
their in-transit integrity.

relevant 

– 

Develop, in collaboration with interested non-G8 countries, pilot projects
that model an integrated container security regime.

9

– 

– 

Implement expeditiously, by 2005 wherever possible, common standards
for electronic customs reporting, and work within the WCO to encourage
the implementation of the same common standards by non-G8 countries.

Begin work expeditiously within the G8 and the WCO to require advance
electronic  information  pertaining  to  containers,  including  their  location
and transit, as early as possible in the trade chain.

Lastly, G8 members agreed to develop, within the United Nations and other relevant
international  organisations,  an  effective  and  proportionate  security  regime  for  the
overland  transportation  and  distribution  of  hazardous  cargoes  which  potentially
significant security risks.

Progress will be reviewed by the G8 every six months.

2.5.

American security initiatives

Following  the  events  of  11  September  2001,  the  USA  introduced  unilateral
protection  measures,  often  anticipating  the  implementation  of  provisions  being
negotiated  in  international  bodies.  In  the  maritime  sphere  in  particular,  security  is
regarded as a domestic matter.

There  have  been  many  parliamentary  initiatives,  resulting  in  the  adoption  by
Congress on 14 November 2002 of the Maritime Security Act of 2002 (S.1214). This
measure,  when  fully  implemented,  will  impose  broad  security  requirements  on  the
maritime industry.

In  addition,  the  creation  of  a  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  effective  since  1
March 2003, bringing together over twenty government bodies operating in this field
means  that  the  various  authorities  at  present  concerned  by  security  issues  are  even
more actively involved.

In this context,  three  types of  recent  measures  concerning  the  maritime  sector
should be mentioned.

The  Container  Security  Initiative:  In  mid-2002  the  US  launched  the  Container
Security  Initiative  (CSI)  aimed  initially  at  20 ports7  in  Europe  and  Asia  where  the
biggest proportion of maritime container trade to the US is concentrated.

This initiative, implemented with the help  of squads  of  customs observers,  consists
in:

(cid:1) Establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers;

(cid:1) Pre-screening containers before they arrive at US ports;

(cid:1) Using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and

(cid:1) Developing and using smart and secure containers.

7

Algeciras,  Antwerp,  Bremerhaven,  Busan,  Felixstowe,  Genoa,  Hamburg,  Hong  Kong,  Kaohsiung,
Kobe,  La  Spezia,  Laem  Chabang,  Le  Havre,  Nagoya,  Rotterdam,  Shanghai,  Shenzhen,  Singapore,
Tokyo, Yokohama.

10

                                                
The  US Customs Service  has  succeeded in persuading the  competent  authorities  of
the Member States, and most of the Asian  countries  concerned,  to  join  in  with  this
initiative8. Other ports have also joined the CSI9. Unfortunately, the provisions were
drawn  up  and  implemented  without  regard  for  Community  law,  and  without
consulting  the  Commission  which  has  reacted  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty
establishing the European Community.

The 24-hour rule: In August 2002 the US Customs Service announced an amendment
to  the  US  customs  regulations  to  require  that  US  customs  must  in  future  receive
cargo manifest information from carriers 24 hours before cargoes bound for the US
are loaded on board ships leaving from a foreign port. This information is allegedly
needed  to  enable  the  US  Customs  to  assess  the  possible  risk  of  terrorist  threat
represented  by  containers  bound  for  the  US.  This  new  rule  took  effect  on
2 December 2002 and has been put into practice since 2 February 2003.

The  proposed  rule  making  for  the  elimination  of  crew  list  visas :  The  rule  making
proposed by the US State Department provides for the elimination of crew list visas
for  crew  members  on  foreign  ships  making  port  calls  in  the  US.  Until  now  the
provision  of  crew  list  visas  for  crew  members  was  considered  to  be  a  common
acceptable  practice,  despite  the  fact  that  the  US  is  one  of  the  few  major  maritime
countries requiring crew visas at all.

2.6.

Action by the Community

Maritime security has been a matter of concern for the Commission since well before
11 September 2001, as proved by the Transport White Paper which already referred
to the need to enhance the security of cruise ship passengers in Europe.

That  is  why  the  Commission's  Services  have  unreservedly  supported  the
initiative  of  the  International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  to  address
maritime security.

The  EU  needs  global  solutions  with  regard  to  security  in  a  global  economic
context.  That  is  why  the  Commission  encourages  and  supports  any  work  at
international level which will produce tangible and rapid results. Consequently,
the  dialogue  within  the  IMO  and  other  international  forums  (G7/G8,  ILO,  WCO),
and  with  partners  sharing  the  same  concerns,  must  be  continued.  To  this  end,  the
Commission  has  chosen  a  multidisciplinary  approach 
(transport,  customs,
immigration,  trade,  international  policy,  ...)  at  meetings  with  international  partners,
including the US, and during the necessary coordination with the Member States in
connection with work relating to maritime security within international organisations
(IMO,  ILO,  WCO).  In  this  respect,  the  Commission  has  made  a  considerable
contribution towards coordinating the Member States' positions within the IMO. The
Member  States  have  responded  positively  to  this  by  proposing  several  joint  texts
designed to obtain maritime security provisions culminating in realistic, effective and
enforceable texts.

8

9

As of 13 February 2003 the only ports in the above list for which agreements had not yet been signed
were Kaohsiung (Taiwan) and Laem Chabang (Thailand).
As of 13 February 2003 agreements have been concluded for Gothenburg (Sweden), Klang and Tanjung
Pelepas (Malaysia).

11

                                                
The  Commission  will,  however,  resist  any  unilateral  measure  which  might  not
only  affect  international  trade  but  also  be  incomplete,  or  run  counter  to  the
objectives with regard to security, which necessitate global solutions.

In  this  connection,  the  idea  that  it  is  possible  to  combat  the  risk  effectively  by
addressing  the  problem  solely  in  the  main  ports  and  only  with  regard  to  container
transport should be treated with caution. Similarly, the abovementioned 24-hour rule
that  was  suddenly  imposed  is  risky  even  if  it  will  help  the  transparency  that  is
required  for  security,  etc.,  since  it  does  not  address  the  fate  of  the  very  containers
which it is designed to protect within the 24-hour period and it constitutes a threat to
small  operators  which  will  have  neither  the  time  nor  the  resources  to  adapt  to  it
economically.

Faced with this situation, and the individual responses of the Member States to
the American demands, on 18 March  2003  the Commission  was authorised by
the  Council  to  negotiate  on  matters  within  the  Community's  sphere  of
competence in order to reach an agreement between the Community and the US
customs  authorities  concerning  the  development  of  an  export  control  system
which  takes  account  of  the  need  for  security  in  international  container-based
trade.  This  agreement  is  intended  to  replace  the  bilateral  arrangements  that  have
been concluded between certain Member States and the US Customs Service. It will
be based on  the principles  of  reciprocity and non-discrimination  which apply  to  all
trade between the Community and the US. Ultimately, this agreement should allow
joint  monitoring  of  the  implementation  of  measures  developed  by  common
agreement.  This  cooperation  will,  of  course,  be  open  to  all  our  other  international
partners.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Community  has  launched  a
project  to  computerise  customs  export  checks,  in  particular  where  the  Community
export and exit points are located in two different Member States.

Lastly,  the  Commission  cannot  allow  maritime  security  to  become  a  factor
making for unfair competition between ports, especially within the Community.
Joint  security  standards  and  joint  customs  inspection  criteria  are  needed  for
integrated border management. As indicated in the introduction, a security chain is as
secure as its weakest link. Accordingly, the inspections must be carried out by all the
parties,  and  disturb  as  little  as  possible  or  even  improve  the  present  level  of
efficiency  of  world  trade.  The  question  of  reciprocity  is  therefore  equally
important, since the security of the EU is also at issue, and the risk may come from
any  place  of  origin,  be  it  the  US  or  another  third  country.  The  Commission  must
therefore  ensure  that  third  country  ships  wishing  to  call  at  its  ports  operate  to
adequate  security  standards.  This  is  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  proposal  for  a
Regulation presented along with this communication.

It should be noted that the Economic and Social Committee's exploratory opinion
on the security of transport (CES 1156/2002), delivered at its plenary session of 23
and 24 October 2002 supports the Commission's analysis with regard to both the
nature of the subject and the solutions to it.

In  addition,  the  Commission's  Services  have  launched  a  study  to  assess  the
consequences of enhancing maritime security. Other work is in progress in the
context of a multidisciplinary Commission approach to security -related aspects
in  particular  concerning,  with  regard  to  customs  matters,  the  security  of  the
external  borders.  In  addition,  the  Council  has  asked  the  Commission  to  carry

12

out  a  feasibility  study  concerning  controls  at  maritime  borders  aimed  at  the
improvement of checks and surveillance at maritime borders, in particular with
a view to combating illegal immigration by sea. Clearly, the measures envisaged
need to be  examined  in  the  light  of  the  multisectoral  context  (security  aspects,
safety of ships and passengers, and tax, commercial and health aspects).

The  abovementioned  Communication  COM(2002)  233  also  contains  a  proposal
referred  to  as  PROSECUR,  a  procedure  which,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the
information  and  the  risks  identified,  would  establish  direct  links  and  exchanges
between the port and customs authorities and the authorities responsible for checking
persons at the external borders.

In  the  framework  of  the  plan  for  the  management  of  the  external  borders
(implementing many of the proposals contained in COM(2002) 233), work is under
way to develop a common risk analysis model. Although originally intended for the
management of the external borders, this model might contribute to the development
of similar models to enhance maritime security (and vice versa).

3.

MARITIME  SECURITY :  A  CHALLENGE  REGARDING  EFFICIENCY,  COHERENCE  AND
MUTUAL RECOGNITION

Taking security into account in maritime transport must not result in a proliferation
of  disproportionate  and  unreasonably  expensive  measures,  based  on  leap-frogging
which might have more to do with "spin" than efficiency.

That is  why it  must  be based on  a  realistic  risk  analysis  which  should  be  regularly
reassessed with a view to the adoption of the requisite security measures with regard
to  the  international  environment,  while  keeping  the  resulting  costs  under  control.
Any security scheme entails permanent measures,  such as the  drawing-up  of  plans,
the  designation  of  the  responsible  authorities  and  the  installation  of  certain
technologies, but also includes variable provisions only implemented in the context
of  sound  risk  management  when  the  situation  so  justifies.  Often  these  additional
measures take up the greatest amounts of resources of all kinds, and their use should
therefore be properly justified. This approach characterises the measures adopted by
the International Maritime Organisation.

Moreover,  security  must  be  built  in  at  all  stages  of  maritime  transport  operations.
Even though it has not so far been a major concern, it must become a way of thinking
underlying  all  action  in  a  realistic  and  hence  unexaggerated  way.  By  way  of  an
example, it is  clear that, in  the  biggest  ports  in  the  Community  in  particular  where
there is a  steady  flow  of  containers,  not  all  containers  can  be  inspected  even  using
x-ray  equipment  (scanners).  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  equally  inconceivable  to
accept that in future the content of these containers should be described as  "said to
contain...". Greater clarity and greater transparency are therefore now called for at all
stages  in  the  logistics  chain.  Advances  in  technology  and  organisational  efforts,  as
well as the allocation of responsibility, should make a contribution to this. That is the
price  that  will  have  to  be  paid  in  order  to  ensure  the  security  of  transport  and  the
smooth flow of international trade.

It is also important to stress that the measures to be introduced to enhance maritime
transport  security  will  not  simply  represent  an  additional  cost.  They  will  also

13

undoubtedly  have  beneficial  effects  in  terms  of  the  protection  of  port  and  marine
professionals, and passengers as well, and the security of strategic supplies, and also
indirect repercussions in terms of the action to combat all forms  of trafficking,  and
concerning  taxation  and  the  secure  routing  of  freight  transported.  These  measures
will have a dissuasive effect as a result of the checks  carried  out  and  will  facilitate
action  to  stamp  out  illicit  trafficking  and  fraud10.  Lastly,  the  new  level  of
transparency of operations will undoubtedly make it possible to organise them better
and programme them over time for the benefit of all efficient and honest operators.

3.1.

The implementation of security measures relating to maritime operations

The  measures  in  question  were  adopted  on  12 December 2002  at  the  Diplomatic
Conference of the International Maritime Organisation. They relate to ships, shipping
companies  and  port  facilities.  The  security  measures  should  be  implemented  as
rapidly as possible and at all events be effective as of 1 July 2004. It is important that
the Community, whose Member States are parties to the amendment to the SOLAS
Convention  and  to  the  ISPS  Code,  should  play  a  driving  role  and  apply  the
provisions adopted at the IMO without fail.

3.1.1.

International maritime transport

This is the field of application of the abovementioned measures. The prevention and
countering of acts of terrorism against maritime transport therefore call for security
measures  the  implementation  of  which  is  primarily  the  responsibility  of  the
Contracting  Governments.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  ensure  their  uniform
application  within  the  Community  in  order  to  maintain  the  level  of  quality  and
efficiency of our international trade and avoid unfair competition between ports.

The  effective  implementation  of  maritime  security  measures  calls  for  intense
preparation on the part of the various  parties (shipping  companies,  port  authorities)
and  also  the  Contracting  Governments  which  have  vital  responsibilities.  Without
going  over  in  detail  once  again  the  measures  described  in  Section 2.1  above,  it  is
important  to  emphasise  that  the  Governments  will  need  to  put  in  place  a  large
number of measures by June 2004. In particular, they will need to establish the rules
their
defining 
implementation, approve the security assessments to be carried out on port facilities,
draw up the list of port facilities which will need to designate a security officer and
prepare a security plan, validate the security plan and the ship security plans for ships
within  their  jurisdiction,  issue  security  certificates  to  those  ships  and  define  the
checking measures that will need to be organised.

the  conditions  governing 

levels  of  security  and 

three 

the 

The  shipping  companies,  for  their  part,  must,  in  particular,  designate  their  security
officers  and security officers  for  their  ships,  conduct  the  ship  security  assessments,
draw  up  ship  security  plans,  and  fit  ships  with  the  technical  means  (AIS,  alarm
spreading devices, marking) provided for in the new IMO provisions.

The  Commission  stresses  that  it  also  intends  to  support  technological  research  and
the promotion of satellite radionavigation applications (GALILEO and GPS) which,

10

By  way  of  an  example,  while  the  installation  of  container  scanners  in  the  Port  of  Rotterdam  cost
€15 million, in one year their use generated €88 million in customs and tax revenue, even though only
2% of containers, on average, are subjected to such checks.

14

                                                
combined with an efficient radio-telecommunication policy, will make it possible not
only to enhance security but also safety, navigation and management in this area.

(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)

However,  the  amendment  of  the  SOLAS  Convention  and  Part  A  of  the  ISPS Code
consist  entirely  of  mandatory  provisions,  some  of  which  are,  however,  open  to
interpretation  and  adaptation;  Part B  of 
is  made  up  of
recommendations which Contracting Governments are requested to implement.

the  ISPS  Code 

The  Commission  therefore  thinks  it  essential  to  provide  a  basis  for  harmonised
interpretation  and  implementation,  as  well  as  Community  monitoring  of  the
provisions,  in  order  to  put  the  Member  States  in  the  best  possible  position  to
implement  them  in  time;  and  to  ensure  equal  conditions,  throughout  the  EU,  with
regard to access to and monitoring of markets and activities related to the maritime
sector.

For the same reasons, the Commission thinks it essential to make mandatory some of
the recommendations of Part B of the ISPS Code in order, on the one hand, to raise
the level  of  security  sought  and,  on  the  other,  to  avoid  differences of interpretation
from one Member State to another.

Lastly,  it  should  be  noted  that  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  December 2002
amendment  of  the  SOLAS  Convention  have  a  bearing  on  instruments  already
incorporated  into  Community  legislation.  The  provisions  in  question  concern  the
automatic  ship  identification  system  (AIS),  the  ship  identification  number  and  the
continuous synopsis record (CRS) for ships.

3.1.2.

Special cases: intra-Community maritime traffic and ports occasionally involved in
international maritime transport

One  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  Community  transport  policy  is  to  encourage
modal  diversification  in  order  to  avoid  congestion  or  even  saturation  of  certain
modes  of  transport  (in  particular  road  transport).  Accordingly,  maritime  transport
between  Member  States  and  within  individual  Member  States  is  particularly
important. The flexibility which it offers should therefore be maintained.

To  this  end,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  alternative  security  provisions
contained  in  the  amendment  to  the  SOLAS  Convention  should  be  applied  to
intra-Community  maritime  transport.  It  therefore  urges  the  Member  States  to
conclude  with  each  other  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  provided  for  in  the
amendment  to  the  SOLAS  Convention11,  and  in  particular  those  needed  for  the
promotion of scheduled intra-Community short-sea shipping. However, where use is
made  of  this  possible  within  the  Community,  a  clear  distinction  should  be  made
between  port  facilities  serving  intra-Community  traffic  and  those  used  for
extra-Community trade, and they should be subject to separate requirements.

In  the  case  of  ports  which  are  only  occasionally  used  for  international  transport,  it
would  be  unnecessarily  expensive  to  implement  the  measures  contained  in  the
abovementioned  international  instruments  on  a  permanent  basis.  Temporary,  but

11

Regulation 11 (alternative security agreements) of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention.

15

                                                
effective  implementation  of  these  measures  when  international  transport  operations
are carried out would appear to be a more flexible and more economic solution. That
is why the Commission considers that use should be made, within the Community, of
the flexibility arrangements provided for in this connection in the amendment to the
SOLAS Convention12, on an ad hoc case-by-case basis in order to limit this to what
is strictly necessary.

3.1.3. Cruise ships

The  IMO  work  on  security  does  not  address  specific  measures  applicable  to  cruise
ships.  However,  the  Commission  considers,  as  already  indicated  in  its  Transport
White  Paper, that they  deserve special  attention.  Given the  nature of their  journeys
and the large number of passengers on board them, they could be a target in the same
way as other means of collective transport. Consequently, it is necessary that access
to cruise ships should be the subject of tighter controls on people, their property and
the ship's provisions. By way of example, the provisions adopted for the embarkation
of passengers on board cruise ships in the port of Genoa, which seem to based on air
transport  practices,  deserves  special  mention.  In  2002,  the  Commission  funded  a
study  on  improving  the  security  of  cruise  passengers  in  the  Mediterranean  ports  of
the EU. Its findings, combined with those expected from a larger-scale study on the
whole issue of port security, will form part of the basis for a forthcoming legislative
initiative  on  port  security.  The  question  of  checks  on  cruise  ship  passengers  and,
where appropriate, crew members could be examined in the context of the recasting
of the relevant texts, such as the Common Manual for External Borders.

Lastly, emergency measures in the event of malevolent acts at sea against such ships
should  be  envisaged.  Some  Member  States  are  already  well  prepared.  Their  know-
how  should  be  spread  within  the  Community  and  emergency  protocols  should  be
developed.  The  Commission  therefore  wishes  to  encourage  closer  cooperation
between all the Member States with regard to maritime counter-terrorism measures13
in the event of malevolent acts against Community ships, in particular those directly
targeted on cruise ships and passenger ships, or indirectly targeted on Europe ports.

3.1.4.

Ships engaged in domestic traffic

In order for security arrangements to be effective, they have to be applied as widely
as  possible.  The  US  Coast  Guard  is  interpreting  this  principle  very  broadly,  by
envisaging  applying  all  the  new  IMO  security  rules  to  all  boats  operating  in
American  waters,  including  those  engaged  in  domestic  traffic,  and  to  make
mandatory all of Part B of the ISPS Code.

The Commission does  not consider  that such  radical measures  are  needed as  far as
the Community is concerned. However, it considers it to be essential to apply some
provisions  to  domestic  maritime  transport  in  order  to  achieve  the  overall  maritime
transport security objective. It considers that, in order to maintain equality of access
to the market, these measures should be taken in a uniform fashion in all the Member
States. This should take place in compliance with the principle of the proportionality
of  the  measures  to  be  applied  compared  with  the  potential  risks.  Consequently,

12

13

Regulation  2,  paragraph 2  (application  to  port  facilities  occasionally  serving  ships  engaged  on
international voyages) of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention.
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JAI of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164).

16

                                                
priority  should  be  given  to  passenger  transport,  where  the  consequences  of  an
intentional  illegal  act  are  the  heaviest  with  regard  to  the  human  lives  at  stake.
However,  this  must  not  represent  too  big  a  constraint  for  scheduled  maritime
services, provided that the general level of security sought is not compromised.

3.2.

The security of Community ports

The scope of the work  concerning maritime  security at  the  IMO is limited to ships
and to port facilities where the ship/port interface takes place14. Apart from providing
this interface, ports are crossroads for flows of people and goods coming either from
the sea or from inland. It also brings together a range of workers involved in various
kinds of professional activities who are essential to the smooth functioning of trade.

Consequently, without establishing tangible and somewhat "virtual" categorisations,
the  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  number  of  common-sense  practices  with
regard to security should be spread, taking into account an effective analysis of the
risks, the geography and the activity of each port.

In  this  connection,  a  number  of  constants  can  be  identified.  Arriving  at  ports  by
various means of transport, flows of freight, passengers and port workers need to be
identified  and  differentiated  in  order  to  facilitate  processing  and  relevant  security
checks. Reserved areas where access is regulated should be established according to
the sensitivity or hazardousness of the facilities which they contain (e.g. embarkation
areas and storage areas for sensitive or hazardous products).15

Rationalisation should also be sought in the checks to be carried out at the entrance
to  the  port  area,  in  particular  concerning  freight.  The  multiplicity  of  competent
administrations  makes  for  complex  procedures,  the  slowing-down  of  traffic  flows
and  errors  or  emissions,  in  particular  with  regard  to  security  checks.  Where  the
checking  of  goods  is  concerned,  the  customs  are  the  competent  authorities  and  the
ones best able to implement this type of check and coordinate checks carried out by
other national administrations in the framework of their activities. The Commission
is  in  favour  of  establishing  a  "single  entry  point"  where  all  the  various  authorities
involved are present and at  which the various checks  are  carried out. After passing
the  single  entry  point,  all  passengers  and  goods  would  be  regarded  as  secure  and
authorised for embarkation.

In addition, a wider exchange of good practice should be sought between Community
ports.  This  could  be  based  on  the  example  of  the  RALPH  customs  contact  group
made  up  of  senior  customs  officers  from  some  of  the  biggest  ports  in  Northern
Europe16  who  meet  regularly  to  establish  measures  to  create  an  equal  level  of

14

15

16

The IMO Diplomatic Conference of 12 December 2002, gave the ILO a mandate, in collaboration with
the  IMO,  to  draw  up  a  guide  to  good  practice  covering  all  aspects  of  security.  It  would  therefore  be
desirable to extend this good practice to port workers and all the trades people occasionally working in
port areas as well as to seafarers.
The annual report to be produced by the SIT (Safe Intermodal Transport) thematic network funded by
the  Commission  for  the  period  2003-2006  may  be  able  to  provide  the  basis  for  solutions  in  this
connection.
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Felixstowe, Hamburg and Le Havre.

17

                                                
treatment with regard to customs checks. A similar group, ODYSUD, exists for the
ports of Southern Europe17.

Lastly,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  work  in  progress  within  the  ILO
concerning  secure  identity  papers  for  seafarers  will  be  beneficial  both  as  regards
security and as regards improving their living and working conditions.

3.3.

Enhancing the security of the logistics chain as a whole

Maritime safety  depends to  a large  extent  on  the  security  of  other  feeder  modes  of
transport. Any chain is only as secure as its weakest link, especially where maritime
freight transport is concerned where the volumes involved are so large that physical
checking of goods is realistically conceivable at the entrance to the port area only on
the  basis  of  targeted  inspections  based  on  risk  analysis,  documentation  and
intelligence.  In  this  connection,  the  crucial  role  of  the  customs  authorities  in  the
checking  of  goods  throughout  the  international  logistics  chain  should  be  stressed,
particularly as regards containers. It is therefore  very  important  that, right  from the
start of the loading operations at the warehouse of the first supplier sending  freight
for shipment by sea, it should be possible to identify both the goods in question and
those  involved  in  handling  them  (suppliers  and  carriers)  and  their  respective
responsibilities.  This  process  should  be  continued  throughout  the  routing  of  the
goods to the port, particularly if additional loading is carried out.

This  is  only  incompletely  achieved  at  present.  Current  practices  (e.g.  written  load
declaration, physical sealing of containers the inviolability of which is questionable,
last-minute  additional 
the
abovementioned "said to contain ..." practice.

limits  on  security,  particularly 

loading) 

impose 

That  is  why  the  Commission  supports  the  G8  approach  to  container  security.
Furthermore, it considers that encouragement should be given for any technological
solution which makes it possible to develop "smart" secure containers and generalise
their use in all modes  of transport18. The recent initiative to  establish  computerised
customs19  accordingly  seeks  to  introduce  a  technological  solution  involving  all  the
parties  in  the  freight  logistics  chain  in  the  same  computerised  freight  monitoring
system. Generalisation would offer several advantages, the first being an increase in
the  security  of  the  entire  transport  chain  as  a  result  of  real-time  knowledge  of  the
nature of the goods transported, and of the various parties and their responsibilities.
There can legitimately be expected to be an increase in the quality and efficiency of
the transport chain, a reduction in its use for illicit purposes, and a reduction in theft
during  transport.  Similarly,  container  fleet  management  would  be  simplified  and
more  economic,  since  any  container  would  be  useable  for  any  destination  on  any
mode  of  transport20.  It  is  therefore  essential  to  generalise  the  use  of  this  type  of

17

18

19

20

Barcelona, Leixoes, Piraeus, Marseille, Trieste and Koper.
In  this  connection,  mention  should  be  made  of  the  SIMTAG  (Safe  and  Secure  Intermodal  Transport
Across  the  Globe)  project  (under  the  5th  Research  Framework  Programme)  which  covers  a  large
proportion of these concerns on a technical level.
Commission  Communication  on  a  simplified  and  computerised  environment  for  customs,  in
preparation.
Conversely,  if  the  use  of  "smart"  containers  were  to  be  limited  to  international  traffic  this  would,  in
addition  to  the  shortfall  in  security  in  other  types  of  transport,  generate  unnecessary  storage  and
unladen-transport costs for "international" containers (in 2001, the percentage of containers transported
unladen was put at 21.7% of the total transported - source: Policy Research Corporation). Nevertheless,

18

                                                
container  ultimately,  for  undoubted  security  reasons  but  also  to  avoid  any  sort  of
disparity  between  the  different  modes  of  transport21.  This  practice  would  in  fact
make  it  possible  to  meet  the  needs  of  both  speed  of  processing  and  security  of
containers during transhipment22 in ports, which call for special attention which is by
no means always given to them from the security point of view at present.

3.4.

Monitoring and administration of maritime security

the  IMO  clearly  define  certain  security
The  new  standards  adopted  by 
responsibilities,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  Contracting  Governments  and
shipping companies. However, a number of grey or complex areas continue to exist
in the shipping world and hamper the implementation of optimum security.

The  Commission  considers  that  greater  transparency  is  needed  with  regard  to  the
identification  of  ship  operators.  It  notes  in  this  connection  that  in  July  2002  the
OECD's Maritime Transport Committee started drawing up an inventory of practices
which may make for a lack of transparency in this connection.

In  addition,  and  even  though  the  Commission  has  itself  taken  steps  to  address  all
aspects concerning the security of maritime transport, it would be worthwhile if the
Member  States  were  all  to  adopt  a  multidisciplinary  approach  to  this  issue.  The
Commission is perfectly well aware of the historical, cultural and other reasons why
the  Member  States  have  each  adopted  a  different  administrative  and  economic
system  for  maritime  and  port  matters,  in  particular  at  the  level  of  the  supervisory
authorities. Without calling this into question, the Commission above all wants clear
and  comprehensible  procedures  to  be  established  at  both  national  and  Community
level with regard to maritime security.

Concerning the application of security measures in port areas, the Commission is in
favour of a "single entry point" procedure as described in Section 3.2 above.

Moreover,  the  amendment  to  the  SOLAS  Convention  and  the  ISPS  Code  assign
major  responsibilities  for  security  to  the  Contracting  Governments.  Part  B  of  the
Code recommends the designation of a national contact point responsible for national
maritime  security  matters  and  liaising  with  the  contact  points  of  the  other
Contracting Governments. The Commission considers it  essential to designate  such
contact points within the Member States, as sole national authorities responsible for
ship  and  port  facility  security.  Similarly,  a  "competent  authority  for  port  security"
would  seem  to  be  essential  in  order  to  coordinate,  for  each  Community  port,  the
application of security measures for ships and port facilities.

Provisions are therefore contained in the attached proposal for a Regulation so as to
make  it  possible,  at  Community  level,  to  monitor  the  implementation  of  the
abovementioned  security  measures  and  specify  the  possible  role  of  the  European
Maritime Safety Agency in this connection.

it should be pointed out that minimum requirements must be complied with in connection with food and
animal feedingstuffs so as to avoid contamination, and that the best option here is to use special-purpose
containers.
The  Commission  will  advocate  this  approach  in  the  proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council
Directive on intermodal loading units which it will shortly be putting forward.
“transhipment”: keep this word in all the versions

21

22

19

                                                                                                                                                        
3.5.

Maritime transport risk insurance

The insurance industry still tends to regard the risks associated with terrorist acts as
coming  under  the  heading  of  risks  of  war  or  armed  conflict,  where  shipping  is
concerned. In fact, the terrorist risk would seem to be an everyday risk and cannot be
confined to specific geographical areas, as may be possible in the case of risks of war
and,  to  a  certain  extent,  piracy.  Consequently,  the  insurance  industry  should,
analysing the  risks covered, separate the  different types of  risks on the  basis of the
concept of the risk effectively run by the contractor operating in areas recognised as
being  dangerous.  The  Commission  intends  to  analyse  in  2003  the  potential
consequences  in  terms  of  insurance  of  enhancing  maritime  security  in  order  to
encourage better coverage of risk for maritime transport operators and customers. It
will  examine  the  possible  benefits  of  proposing,  in  this  connection,  additional
measures to those contained in the proposal for a Directive on compensation for the
victims of crime23 submitted in October 2002.

3.6.

International mutual recognition

from 

implementation  of 

the  abovementioned  measures  deriving 

The 
the
consequences of international instruments and initiatives taken within the EU should
convince  the  Community's  partners  of  its  desire  to  ensure  the  highest  level  of
security  of  maritime  transport  for  its  benefit  and  for  their  benefit.  The  EU  should
therefore be assured of the same level of security on their side in its trade, so as to
arrive  at  mutual  recognition  entailing  equality  of  treatment.  In  particular,  it  will  be
necessary  to  evaluate  the  assistance  which  should  be  given  to  the  least-favoured
countries  to  enable  them  to  reach  equivalent  security  standards24.  However,  this
cannot  be  achieved  without  cooperation  embracing  all  the  countries  concerned  by
international maritime traffic. Nevertheless, the vigour of trade flows and the security
of the people of the EU are at stake. The Commission will  therefore  encourage  the
establishment of partnership based on mutual and reciprocal recognition of security
and control measures with all its international partners, including the USA, so as to
promote the harmonious and secure flow of world maritime trade.

4.

CONCLUSIONS

The Commission considers that comprehensive and coherent action is needed on the
part  of  the  Community  in  order  to  enhance  maritime  transport  security.  While
continuing  to  encourage  progress  within  the  international  organisations,  there  is  a
need to implement effectively the measures adopted by them as soon as possible; to
define  also  the  necessary  security  measures  not  covered  by  the  future  international
agreements;  and  to  ensure,  at  international  level,  the  recognition  of  the  actions
accomplished,  in  order  to  promote  trade  without  risk  of  distortion  of  competition.
This  is  the  philosophy  that  should  underlie  the  negotiations  with  the  USA  on  the
basis of a mandate given by the Council, and the negotiations which the Community
is  conducting  with  its  major  commercial  partners,  in  particular  China  and  Russia.
Lastly, overall coherence and effective implementation of the measures adopted must
be monitored in order to ensure the Community's credibility in this matter.

23

24

COM(2002) 562 final of 16 October 2002.
It  should  be  noted  that  Resolution  No  5  adopted  on  12  December  2002  by  the  IMO  Diplomatic
Conference calls for such assistance, as well as technical cooperation, vis-à-vis these countries.

20

                                                
Furthermore, since enhancing security measures, even combined with suitable safety
measures,  cannot  totally  rule  out  all  risk  of  accident,  whether  unintentional  or
malevolent, it is appropriate to reflect upon the existing measures in order to limit the
consequences of such accidents. Consequently, in order to limit the consequences of
accidents for people and the environment, whatever their origin, the Commission will
examine the advisability of adopting measures aimed in particular at guaranteeing a
minimum level of information for the general public about how to behave following
an accident. In this context, it will also examine, with the Member States, the need to
ensure that emergency plans are drawn up and regularly tested in order to guarantee
optimum organisation of emergency services in case of need.

On a legislative level, the Commission will act as follows:

– 

– 

– 

Together with this Communication, it is presenting a proposal for a European
Parliament  and  Council  Regulation  on  enhancing  ship  and  port  facility
security, which transposes Chapter  XI-2  of  the  IMO  SOLAS  Convention  and
interpretation  and
ISPS  Code,  provides  a  basis  for 
implementation  thereof,  and  for  Community  monitoring,  and  extends  certain
provisions thereof to domestic maritime traffic

the  harmonised 

It  will  support,  in  consultation  with  the  Member  States,  the  work  of  the
International Labour Organisation concerning the enhancement of the security
of  seafarers'  identification.  As  necessary,  in  the  second  half  of  2003  it  will
launch  a  legislative  initiative  in  this  connection  following  the  scheduled
adoption in June 2003 of the text by the International Labour Organisation

In  the  absence  of  an  international  text  which  at  present  defines  the  security
measures  applicable  to  all  port  areas,  the  Commission  reserves  the  right  to
present  in  the  course  of  2003  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  defining  additional
security measures to be implemented in Community ports.

21

ANNEX 1

Port Traffic - Major EU Seaports

Port traffic league by total cargo traffic 2000 / 1996 (million tonnes)

Port, Country

2000

1996

Change %

2000/1996

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

Rotterdam, NL

Antwerp, B

Marseille, F

Hamburg, D

Le Havre, F

Amsterdam, NL

Teesport & Hartlepool, UK

Genoa, I

Hull & Immingham, UK

London, UK

Trieste, I

Dunkirk, F

Bremen / Bremerhaven, D

Algeciras, SP

Wilhelmshaven, D

Forth Ports, UK

St. Nazaire, F

Zeebrugge, B

Gothenburg, S

Felixstowe, UK

Liverpool/Merseyside, UK

Barcelona, SP

Venice, I

Bilbao, SP

Tarragona, SP

320.0

130.5

284.4

106.5

94.1

85.9

67.5

64.1

51.5

50.8

50.0

47.9

47.6

45.3

44.8

44.0

43.4

41.1

36.6

35.5

33.1

31.6

30.6

29.8

28.2

27.5

27.3

90.7

70.9

56.2

54.8

44.6

45.9

46.8

52.7

41.5

34.9

31.5

34.2

37.2

45.6

24.7

28.5

28.0

25.8

31.0

23.6

24.1

21.7

30.8

12.5%

22.5%

3.7%

21.2%

20.1%

17.0%

15.5%

10.7%

6.8%

-9.1%

14.7%

29.8%

42.2%

28.7%

16.7%

-9.9%

48.2%

24.6%

18.2%

22.5%

-1.3%

26.3%

17.0%

26.7%

-11.4%

Source: Institute 

of 

Shipping 

Economics 

and 

Logistics, 

BREMEN

- Shipping Statistics Yearbook 2001

22

ANNEX 2

The fifteen main EU ports for container traffic in 2000

(in millions transport units - TEU)

Rotterdam

Hamburg

Antwerp

Felixstowe

Bremerhaven

Gioia Tauro

Algeciras

Genoa

Le Havre

Barcelona

Valencia

Piraeus

Southampton

Zeebrugge

La Spezia

6.27

4.24

4.08

2.80

2.71

2.65

2.01

1.50

1.46

1.38

1.30

1.15

1.06

0.96

0.91

Source : Lloyds List Special Report, September 26, 2001 and Policy Research Corporation

23

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) began work on maritime security in February
2002.  The  Commission  therefore  considered  it  preferable  to  await  the  outcome  of  the
discussions within the IMO rather than develop unilateral initiatives.

On 12 December 2002, after a five-day Diplomatic Conference, IMO adopted an amendment
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and in particular a new
chapter  entitled  "Special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security",  and  an  International  Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code .

The  purpose  of  these  instruments  is  to  take  maritime  security  issues  into  account  in
connection with shipping and port facilities.25

IMO's work on maritime security is confined to ships to and port facilities which represent the
ship/port interface. The Commission will be presenting  a legislative initiative  on  security in
Community ports.

It should be noted  that this concerns  all of the Member States as  flag States and thirteen of
them as port States.

The amendment to the SOLAS Convention and Part A of the ISPS  Code consist  entirely of
mandatory  provisions;  Part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code  is  made  up  of  recommendations  which  the
Contracting Governments are requested to implement.26

The main provisions of these international instruments are as follows.

The mandatory provisions (the amendment to the SOLAS Convention and Part A of the ISPS
Code) are indispensable to enhancing maritime security.

They  concern  a  requirement  for  ships  to  be  permanently  marked  with  their  identification
number  and  fitted  with  an  automatic  identification  system  (AIS)  and  a  ship  security  alert
system for spreading the alarm in the event of hostile action against the ship, and for them to
be issued with a continuous synopsis record (CSR), a kind of identity document recording the
history of the ship.

They  also  provide  for  a  set  of  active  and  passive  security  measures  based  on  three  security
levels  (normal,  increased,  high),  their  implementation  being  linked  to  an  overall  risk
assessment. They include the requirement to appoint people responsible for carrying them out
(ship, company and port facility security officers), to prepare a security plan geared to the risk

25

26

"Port facilities" being defined as locations where the ship/port interface takes place.
These provisions apply to passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, and mobile
offshore drilling units, and to port facilities serving international traffic.
The amendment to the SOLAS Convention will be deemed to have been accepted on 1 January 2004
unless, before that date, more than one-third of the Contracting Governments to the Convention, or of
the Contracting Governments whose merchant fleets represent in total at least 50% of the gross tonnage
of  the  world  fleet  of  trading  ships,  have  notified  IMO  that  they  are  raising  an  objection  to  the
amendment.
The  ISPS  Code  will  enter  into  force  on  1  July  2004  when  Chapter  XI-2  of  the  Convention  SOLAS
(Special measures to enhance maritime security) enters into force.

24

                                                
assessment  (ship  and  port  facility)  and  to  issue  an  international  ship  security  certificate,  as
well as arrangements for personnel training and exercises.

Provision  is  also  made,  depending  on  the  potential  risk  to  persons,  property  and  the
environment, for the possibility of drawing up a declaration of security between the ship and
the host port facility to define the responsibilities of each. Another possibility is that a ship in
port or about to enter port can be inspected by the port State authorities for security reasons.
The  duties  and  obligations  of  the  various  players  (Contracting  Governments,  companies,
ships' masters and port facilities) are clearly defined.

Part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code  consists  of  very  detailed  recommendations  intended  to  provide
guidance in implementing the mandatory provisions.

The  Contracting  Governments  are  responsible  in  particular  for  designating  recognised
security organisations (responsible for providing security services to port facilities and ships)
and national or regional maritime security contact points, to manage the security levels and to
exchange information on security matters. This part of the ISPS Code also contains detailed
proposals for both ships and port facilities, regarding assessment of the risks and the security
plans  to  be  prepared,  and  personnel  training  and  exercises.  It  also  shows  how  and  in  what
cases a declaration of security should be drawn up between the ship and the host port facility.

***

The amendment to the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code must enter into force on
1 July 2004. This leaves very little time to complete all the necessary preparations, so some
measures will have to be implemented in advance.

These  international  instruments  contain  provisions  the  scope  of  which  has  to  be  defined  at
Community level. Their application is confined to international shipping, while security has to
be seen from a more global perspective that therefore has to embrace certain national modes
of transport as well, though maintaining a gradation according to the nature of the risks and
their consequences.

Certain  provisions  of  the  December  2002  amendment  to  the  SOLAS  Convention  affect
instruments which already form part of Community law, i.e.:

(cid:5)  amendments  to  Regulation  19V  of  the  SOLAS  Convention,  "Carriage  requirements  for
shipborne  navigational  systems  and  equipment".  These  rules  relating  to  the  automatic
identification system (AIS) will have to be adapted pursuant to Directive 2002/59/EC of the
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  June  2002  establishing  a  Community  vessel
traffic monitoring and information system;

(cid:5) amendments to Regulations 3 and 5 of Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention, concerning
the identification number and synopsis record of ships. These rules will be taken into account
in particular pursuant  to  Council Directive  95/21/EC of 19 June 1995 concerning port State
control of shipping.

***

The Commission therefore considers that steps need to be taken to:

(cid:5)  guarantee  and  monitor  at  Community  level  achievement  of  the  main  objective  of  these
international instruments, i.e. enhancing ship and port facility security;

25

(cid:5) ensure harmonised implementation and equal conditions throughout the European Union for
access to and monitoring of markets and activities related to the maritime sector.

Accordingly, the Commission:

(cid:1)  will  adapt  the  abovementioned  Directives  2002/59/EC  and  95/21/EC  following  the
committee  procedure,  so  as  to  integrate  into  them  relevant  provisions  of  the  new
Regulations in the SOLAS Convention in addition to those in Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS
and the ISPS Code,

(cid:1)  proposes  that  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  should  adopt  as  soon  as
possible this  Regulation on enhancing ship and port facility security, which  transposes
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code, provides a basis for their
harmonised interpretation and implementation, as well as Community monitoring, and
extends some of their provisions to domestic maritime traffic.

NEED FOR A REGULATION

***

(cid:5) Implementation of the amendment to the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code may vary
from  one  Member  State  to  another  since  these  instruments  contain  some  provisions  which
though  mandatory  are  open  to  interpretation  and  adaptation,  and  others  which  are
recommendations.  There  is  a  need  for  uniform  implementation  and  uniform  monitoring  of
ships from third countries visiting our shores and putting into our ports.

(cid:5) Member States may  adopt  national  measures of varying  scope and applicable  on different
dates.  Failure  to  harmonise  these  measures  would  be  potentially  damaging  to  the  shipping
industry. It could provoke imbalances in the level of security sought and might easily lead to
distortions of competition between the Member States.

(cid:5) The objective of enhancing maritime security cannot be achieved by measures confined to
international shipping alone; there have to be measures covering domestic traffic as well, and
only action at the Community level can guarantee this in a harmonised way.

(cid:5)  Finally,  provisions  need  to  be  adopted  which  will  encourage  Member  States  to  promote
scheduled  maritime  traffic  within  the  Community  under  satisfactory  security  conditions  on
fixed routes using dedicated port facilities.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSAL

(cid:5) As regards achieving the objective of providing a basis for harmonised interpretation and
implementation  as  well  as  Community  monitoring  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance
maritime security, by amending the SOLAS Convention and  introducing  the  ISPS  Code,  the
Regulation:

(cid:5) makes mandatory certain provisions  of  Part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code,  which  have  the
status  of  recommendations,  in  order  on  the  one  hand  to  raise  the  level  of  security
sought and on the other hand to avoid variations in interpretation from one Member
State  to  another.  These  provisions  relate  to  the  security  plans  and  assessments  of
ships  and  port  facilities,  certain  responsibilities  of  the  Contracting  Governments  in
the  security  field,  and  the  company's  obligation  to  supply  the  master  with
information on the ship's operators;

26

(cid:5)  calls  upon  Member  States  to  conclude,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  intra-
Community  short-sea  traffic  and  in  the  light  of  regulation  XI-2/11  of  the  SOLAS
Convention, the agreements on security arrangements for scheduled maritime traffic
within  the  Community  on  fixed  routes  using  dedicated  port  facilities,  without  this
compromising  the  general  level  of  security  sought.  It  puts  in  place  a  system  for
checking conformity prior to signature of these agreements;

(cid:5) details the arrangements to be made by Member States for ports only occasionally
serving international traffic;

(cid:5)  establishes  the  system  of  security  checks  prior  to  the  entry  of  ships  of  whatever
origin into a Community port, as well as that of security checks in the port;

(cid:5)  calls  for  a  single  national  authority  responsible  for  the  security  of  ships  and  port
facilities,  and  a  timetable  for  early  implementation  of  some  of  the  measures  it
contains;

(cid:5) provides for a process of inspections to check the arrangements for monitoring the
implementation of national plans adopted pursuant to it;

(cid:5) entrusts to the Agency set up by Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  June  2002  establishing  a  European  Maritime
Safety Agency27 the role of assisting the Commission in the performance of its tasks;

(cid:5) lays down a procedure for the adaptation of its provisions.

(cid:5)  The  Commission  considers  that  the  overall  objective  of  maritime  security  can  be  reached
only by applying certain measures to domestic shipping. It considers that in order to maintain
uniform conditions of access to the market, these measures have to be taken uniformly in all
the Member States, while ensuring that the measures are proportional to the potential risks.
Passenger transport therefore takes priority but this must not  be allowed  to place excessive
constraints on scheduled maritime services, provided that the general level of security sought
is not compromised. Accordingly, the Regulation:

(cid:5) extends all of the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and of Part
A of the ISPS Code to include passenger ships engaged on domestic voyages during
which  they  are  required  to  be  more  than  twenty  nautical  miles  from  the  coast,  and
extends  the  provisions  of  the  same  texts  relating  to  the  making  of  security
assessments, the preparation of security plans and the appointment of company  and
ship security officers to include other ships engaged in domestic traffic;

(cid:5)  establishes  the  security  arrangements  for  passenger  ships  engaged  on  domestic
voyages on scheduled lines, during which they are required to be more than twenty
nautical miles from the coast;

(cid:5) provides for possible exemption, under strict and constantly  verifiable conditions,
from the obligation of security checks prior to entry into a port for ships engaged on
a scheduled service within a Member State or between two or more Member States.

27

OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p.1.

27

                                                
(cid:5) Legal considerations

The Commission proposes to base the Regulation on Article 80(2) of the EC Treaty, without
prejudice  to  Member  States'  national  security  legislation  and  any  measures  that  might  be
taken on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Article 1:

This article sets out the objectives of the Regulation.

Article 2:

This article contains the definitions of the main terms used in the Regulation. Most of them
are based on those used in the special measures to enhance maritime security adopted by the
IMO Diplomatic Conference on 12 December 2002, amending the SOLAS Convention, and
in the ISPS Code.

Article 3:

This article defines the common measures and the scope of the Regulation.

The special measures to enhance maritime security amending the SOLAS Convention and the
ISPS Code apply to the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:

(cid:5) passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;

(cid:5) cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards;

(cid:5) mobile offshore drilling units;

(cid:5) port facilities serving international traffic.

This  Regulation  extends  all  of  the  measures  in  the  IMO  documents  to  passenger  ships
engaged on domestic voyages during which they are required to be more than twenty nautical
miles from the coast, and to the port facilities serving them.

It  also  extends  the  provisions  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  in  the
SOLAS Convention and the  ISPS  Code  concerning  the making of  security  assessments,  the
preparation  of  security  plans  and  the  appointment  of  company  and  ship  security  officers  to
include  other  ships  engaged  in  domestic  traffic  (passenger  ships,  including  high-speed
passenger  craft; cargo ships, including  high-speed craft, of 500  gross tonnage and upwards)
and to the port facilities serving them.

Part B of the ISPS Code contains a set of recommendations for the implementation of IMO's
mandatory instruments (special measures to enhance maritime security amending the SOLAS
Convention  and  Part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code),  of  which  Member  States  must  take  the  utmost
account.

28

To  raise  the  level  of  security  of  shipping  in  the  Community  and  to  avoid  variations  in
interpretation  from  one  Member  State  to  another,  which  could  cause,  amongst  other  things,
distortions of competition, this Regulation is intended to make the following sections of Part
B of the ISPS Code mandatory:

(cid:5) 1.12 on continuous checking of the relevance of ship security plans, and their revision;

(cid:5) 1.16 on the security assessments of port facilities, and their periodical revision;

(cid:5) 4.1 on protection of the confidentiality of security plans and assessments;

(cid:5)  4.5  on  the  minimum  competency  of  the  recognised  security  organisations  which  can  be
authorised  by  Member  States  to  assess  the  security  of  port  facilities  and,  on  behalf  of  the
competent administrations of the Member States, to approve and verify the ship security plans
and certify ships' conformity with regard to security;

(cid:5) 4.8 on the establishment by Member States of the security level for ships and port facilities;

(cid:5) 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 on the establishment of central or regional contact points with regard to
port facility security plans and the security information to be supplied to ship, company and
port facility security officers;

(cid:5)  4.18  on  identification  documents  for  government  officials  appointed  to  inspect  security
measures;

(cid:5)  4.24  on  ships'  application  of  the  safety  measures  recommended  by  the  State  in  whose
territorial waters they are sailing;

(cid:5) 4.28 on observance of the new requirements generated by security tasks when ships' crews
are selected;

(cid:5) 4.41 on the communication of information between States when entry into port is denied or
the ship is expelled from port;

(cid:5) 4.45 on the treatment of ships from a State which is not party to the Convention;

(cid:5)  6.1  on  the  company's  obligation  to  furnish  the  master  with  information  on  the  ship's
operators;

(cid:5)  8.3  to  8.10  on  the  minimum  standards  to  be  observed  with  regard  to  assessment  of  the
security of the ship;

(cid:5) 9.2 on the minimum standards to be observed with regard to assessment of the ship security
plan;

(cid:5) 13.6 and 13.7 on the frequency of security training, drills and exercises for ships' crews and
for company and ship security officers;

(cid:5) 15.3 and 15.4 on the minimum standards to be observed with regard to the assessment of the
security of a port facility;

(cid:5) 16.3 and 16.8 on the minimum standards to be observed with regard to the security plan of a
port facility;

29

(cid:5) 18.5 and 18.6 on the frequency of security training and exercises in port facilities and for
port facility security officers.

Article 4:

the 

This  article  confirms  the  obligation  for  each  Member  State  to  communicate  to  the
International  Maritime  Organisation 
information  requested  under  regulation  13
(communication of information) of the special measures to enhance maritime security in the
SOLAS  Convention,  and  creates  this  obligation  towards  the  Commission  and  the  other
Member  States.  This  information  concerns  the  national  authorities  responsible  for  ship  and
port facility security, the existence of approved port facility security plans, the contact points
available at all times to receive and act upon the various types of alert and maritime security
information  and  to  give  appropriate  advice  or  assistance,  the  authorisation  of  recognised
security organisations, agreements on other security arrangements and any equivalent security
arrangements.

Article 5:

This  article  gives  Member  States  the  possibility  of  concluding  amongst  themselves  the
bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  provided  for  in  regulation  11  (concerning  alternative
security  arrangements)  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  in  the  SOLAS
Convention,  and  in  particular  those  necessary  for  promoting  scheduled  short-sea  shipping
within the Community on fixed routes between port facilities located within their territories.

The  third  indent  of  paragraph  2  allows  the  Commission  to  evaluate  the  draft  agreements
before they are concluded, under the safeguard procedure.

Paragraph  4  allows  Member  States  to  adopt  security  arrangements  for  passenger  ships
engaged  on  a  scheduled  domestic  service  during  which  they  are  required  to  be  more  than
twenty  nautical  miles  from  the  coast,  and  for  the  port  facilities  serving  them,  without  the
general level of security being compromised. In the inspections provided for in article 10 the
Commission will assess the monitoring of these measures.

Article 6:

This  article  makes  provision  for  port  facilities  in  ports  which  only  occasionally  serve
international maritime traffic, where it might be disproportionate to apply all the security rules
in this Regulation on a permanent basis. In the light of the security assessments it will carry
out, each Member  State will draw up  a  list  of the  ports concerned  and  alternative  measures
providing  an  adequate  level  of  protection.  It  will  communicate  all  this  information  to  the
Commission, and only the list to the other Member States.

Article 7:

This article introduces the obligation for any ship declaring its intention to enter a  port of  a
Member  State  to  provide  in  advance  the  information  concerning  its  International  Ship
Security Certificate and the security level it is currently operating and the level at which it has
operated previously, as well as any other practical security-related information.

The article requires Member States to appoint a "competent authority for port security" with
the task of coordinating, for each  Community  port, the application  of  the  security  measures
laid down by this Regulation for ships and port facilities.

30

Finally, Member States are required to keep a record of the procedure followed for each ship.

Article 8:

This article provides for the possibility of exempting from these security checks prior to entry
into  a  port  ships  engaged  on  scheduled  services  within  a  Member  State  or  between  two  or
more  Member  States.  This  exemption  is  tied  to  a  requirement  for  the  shipping  company  to
keep  at  the  disposal  of  the  authorities  of  the  Member  States  concerned  a  list  of  the  ships
involved and all the information normally required in each case.

The  list of companies and  ships  involved  is  sent  to  the  Commission  by  each  Member  State
concerned.

Article 9:

Security checks in port are normally carried out by the competent security authorities of the
Member States.

However, the presence of the international ship security certificate on board the ship may also
be checked by the port State control inspectors as provided for by Council Directive 95/21/EC
of 19 June 1995 concerning port State control,28 as amended by Directive 2001/106/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2001.29

This  article  therefore  provides  for  complementarity  of  action  by  the  administrations
concerned when different administrations are involved.

Article 10:

This  article  sets  out  Member  States'  obligations  as  regards  administration,  monitoring  and
provision of resources necessary for achieving the objectives of the Regulation, and requires
them to adopt a national plan for implementing its provisions.

It  provides  for  the  setting  up  of  a  single  national  authority  responsible  for  ship  and  port
facility  security,  which  will  be  the  Commission's  contact  point  for  implementation  of  the
Regulation.

In  paragraph  3  it  sets  out  a  timetable  for  the  early  implementation  of  certain  measures,  in
accordance  with  resolution  6  adopted  by  the  IMO  Diplomatic  Conference  on  12  December
2002, in order for the security system to be up and running by 1 July 2004, the date fixed by
IMO. This timetable covers the following measures:

(cid:1) the appointment of a single national authority, as described in the previous paragraph, by 1
January 2004;

(cid:1)  the  making  of  ship  and  port  facility  security  assessments  and  the  appointment  of  ship,
company and port facility security officers by 1 March 2004;

(cid:1) the approval of the ship and port facility security plans by 1 May 2004;

(cid:1) the issuing of the international ship security certificates by 1 June 2004.

28

29

OJ L 157, 7.7.1995, p.1.
OJ L 19, 22.1. 2002, p.17.

31

                                                
In paragraphs 4 to 6 it sets out a process whereby inspections supervised by the Commission
are put in place to check the effectiveness of procedures for monitoring the implementation of
each national system.

Paragraph  7  confers  on  the  Agency  created  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1406/2002  of  the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002  establishing  a  European  Maritime
Safety Agency,30 and in accordance with its rules, the role of assisting the Commission in its
tasks.

Article 11:

This article regulates the possibility for the Commission, following the regulatory procedure,
to implement further amendments of the SOLAS Convention and of the ISPS Code, and in the
light of experience to make mandatory provisions of Part B of the ISPS Code in addition to
those  which  this  Regulation  already  makes  mandatory,  or  to  establish  a  harmonised  system
for applying those Part B provisions which have been made mandatory.

Article 12:

The  Commission  is  assisted  by  a  committee  acting  in  accordance  with  the  regulatory
procedure  (Article  5  of  Council  Decision  1999/468/EC  of  28  June  1999  laying  down  the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission31) and the
safeguard procedure (Article 6 of that Decision).

This  committee  is  that  established  by  Article  3  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  2099/2002  of  the
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5  November  2002  establishing  a  Committee  on
Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS)32.

Article 13:

This  article  calls  upon  Member  States  to  institute  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive
penalties for infringement of this Regulation.

Article 14:

In order to keep to the 1 July 2004 time limit set by IMO for implementing the provisions of
the special measures to enhance maritime security amending the SOLAS Convention and the
ISPS Code, and to assist with gradual and ordered implementation, this Regulation will enter
into  force  on  the  twentieth  day  following  its  publication  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the
European Union.

It will be applicable as  from 1 July 2004,  apart from the  provisions  of  Article 10(3), which
will  enter  into  force  and  be  applicable  on  the  dates  specified  by  that  article.  Article  10(3)
concerns:

(cid:1) the appointment of a single national authority by 1 January 2004;

(cid:1)  the  making  of  ship  and  port  facility  security  assessments  and  the  appointment  of  ship,
company and port facility security officers by 1 March 2004;

30

31

32

OJ L 208, 5.8. 2002, p.1 9.
OJ L 184, 17.07.1999, p. 23.
OJ L 324, 29.11.2002, p.1.

32

                                                
(cid:1) the approval of the ship and port facility security plans by 1 May 2004;

(cid:1) the issuing of the international ship security certificates by 1 June 2004.

Annex 1:

This  annex  contains  Chapter  XI-2  (Special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security)  of  the
SOLAS Convention.

Annex 2:

This annex contains Part A of the ISPS Code.

Annex 3:

This annex contains Part B of the ISPS Code.

33

2003/0089 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on enhancing ship and port facility security

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article
80(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission33,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee34,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions35,

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty36,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Malicious acts and terrorism are among the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy
and freedom and to the values of peace, which are the very essence of the  European
Union.

The security of European Community shipping and of citizens using it in the face of
threats of intentional unlawful acts should be ensured at all times.

On  12 December  2002  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the  International  Maritime
Organisation  (IMO)  adopted  amendments  to  the  International  Convention  for  the
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS)  and  an  International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security
Code (ISPS). These instruments are intended to enhance the security of ships used in
international trade and associated port facilities; they comprise mandatory provisions,
the  scope  of  some  of  which 
the  Community  should  be  clarified,  and
recommendations, some of which should be made mandatory within the Community.

in 

33

34

35

36

OJ C […], […], p. […].
OJ C […], […], p. […].
OJ C […], […], p. […].
OJ C […], […], p. […].

34

                                                
(4) Without  prejudice  to  the  rules  of  the  Member  States  in  the  field  of  national  security
and measures which might be taken on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European
Union,  the  security  objective  described  in  recital  2  should  be  achieved  by  adopting
appropriate  measures  in  the  field  of  maritime  transport  policy  establishing  joint
standards for the interpretation, implementation and monitoring within the Community
of the provisions adopted by the Diplomatic Conference of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) on 12 December 2002. Implementing powers should be conferred
on the Commission to adopt detailed implementing provisions.

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Security should be enhanced not only for ships used in international shipping and the
port facilities which serve them, but also for ships operating domestic services within
the  Community  and  their  port  facilities,  in  particular  passenger  ships,  on  account  of
the number of human lives which such trade puts at risk.

Part B  of  the  ISPS  Code  comprises  a  number  of  recommendations  which  should  be
made  mandatory  within  the  Community  in  order  to  make  uniform  progress  towards
achievement of the security objective described in recital 2.

In  order  to  contribute  to  the  recognised  and  necessary  objective  of  promoting  intra-
Community short-sea  traffic, the  Member States should be  asked  to  conclude,  in  the
light  of  regulation  XI-2/11  of  the  SOLAS  Convention,  the  agreements  on  security
arrangements  for  scheduled  maritime  traffic  within  the  Community  on  fixed  routes
using  dedicated  port  facilities,  without  this  compromising  the  general  standard  of
security sought after.

Permanently  applying  all  the  security  rules  provided  for  in  this  Regulation  to  port
facilities situated in ports which only occasionally serve international shipping might
be disproportionate. The Member States should determine, on the basis of the security
assessments  which  they  are  to  conduct,  which  ports  are  concerned  and  which
alternative measures provide an adequate level of protection.

(10) Member States should vigorously monitor compliance with the security rules by ships
intending to enter a Community port, whatever their origin. For each Community port,
the Member State concerned should appoint a “competent authority for port security”
responsible for coordinating the application of the security measures laid down in this
Regulation as they apply to ships and port facilities. This authority must require each
ship  intending  to  enter  the  port  to  provide  in  advance  information  concerning  its
international ship security certificate and the levels of safety at which it operates and
has previously operated, and any other practical information concerning security.

(11) Member  States  should  be  permitted  to  grant  exemptions  from  the  systematic
requirement to provide the information referred to in the previous recital in the case of
intra-Community  or  domestic  scheduled  shipping  services,  provided  the  companies
operating such services are able to provide such information at any time on request by
the competent authorities of the Member States.

35

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

Security checks in the port may be carried out by the competent security authorities of
the  Member  States,  but  also,  as  regards  the  international  ship  security  certificate,  by
inspectors  acting  in  the  framework  of  port  State  control,  as  provided  for  in  Council
Directive 95/21/EC of 19 June 1995 on port State control37, as amended by Directive
2001/106/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 200138.
Where  different  administration  are  concerned,  provision  must  therefore  be  made  for
them to complement each other.

In view of the number of parties involved in the implementation of security measures,
each  Member  State  should  appoint  a  single  competent  authority  responsible  for
coordinating and monitoring the application of shipping security measures at national
level.  Member  States  should  put  in  place  the  necessary  resources  and  draw  up  a
national plan for the implementation of this Regulation in order to achieve the security
objective described in recital 2, in particular by establishing a timetable for the early
implementation  of  certain  measures  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  Resolution 6
adopted  by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the  IMO  on  12 December  2002.  The
effectiveness of the checks on the implementation of each national system should be
the subject of inspections supervised by the Commission.

The  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency  set  up  by  Regulation  (EC)  No 1406/2002  of
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  June  200239  should  assist  the
Commission  as  necessary  in  its  inspection  tasks  and  in  keeping  and  monitoring
relevant data supplied by the Member States.

The measures needed to implement this  Regulation  should  be  adopted  in  accordance
with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for
the  exercise  of  implementing  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission40.  These  tasks
should  be  assigned  to  the  Committee  on  Safe  Seas  and  the  Prevention  of  Pollution
from  Ships  (COSS)  set  up  by  Article 3  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 2099/2002  of  the
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5 November  2002  establishing  a
Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS)41.

A procedure should be defined for the adaptation of this Regulation to take account of
developments  in  international  instruments  and,  in  the  light  of  experience,  to  make
mandatory further provisions of Part B of the ISPS Code not initially made mandatory
by this Regulation.

37

38

39

40

41

OJ L 157, 7.7.1995, p. 1.
OJ L 19, 22.1.2002, p. 17.
OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 1.
OJ L 184, 17.1.1999, p. 23.
OJ L 324, 29.11.2002, p. 1.

36

                                                
(16)

Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely the introduction and application of
appropriate measures in  the  field of maritime transport policy,  cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the European scale of
this  Regulation,  be  better  achieved  at  Community  level,  the  Community  may  adopt
measures  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  set  out  in  Article 5  of  the
Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality set out in that Article, this
Regulation is limited to the basic joint standards required to achieve the objectives of
ship  and  port  facility  security  and  does  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  for  that
purpose,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Objectives

1.

2.

The  main  objective  of  this  Regulation  is  to  introduce  and  implement  Community
measures  aimed  at  enhancing  the  security  of  ships  used  in  international  trade  and
domestic  shipping  and  associated  port  facilities  in  the  face  of  threats  of  intentional
unlawful acts.

The Regulation is also intended to provide a basis for the harmonised interpretation
and implementation and Community monitoring of the special measures to enhance
maritime  security  adopted  by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the  International
Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  on  12 December  2002,  which  amended 
the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and established the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation:

1.

2.

“special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  of  the  SOLAS  Convention”  means
the amendments inserting the new Chapter XI-2 into the Annex to the International
Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea,  1974  (SOLAS  Convention)  of  the
International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO),  as  amended,  set  out  in  Resolution 1
adopted  by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the  IMO  on  12 December  2002  and
attached as Annex 1 to this Regulation,

“ISPS Code” means the International Ship and Port Facility Security  Code  adopted
by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the  International  Maritime  Organisation  on
12 December 2002,

37

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

“Part A  of  the  ISPS  Code”  means  the  Preamble  and  the  mandatory  requirements
forming Part A of the  ISPS Code concerning the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the
Annex  to  the  International  Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea,  1974,  as
amended,  set  out  in  Resolution 2  adopted  by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the
International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  on  12 December  2002  and  attached  as
Annex 2 to this Regulation,

“Part B  of  the  ISPS  Code”  means  the  guidance  forming  Part B  of  the  ISPS  Code
regarding  the  provisions  of  chapter  XI-2  of  the  Annex  to  the  International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, and Part A of the ISPS
Code,  set  out  in  Resolution 2  adopted  by  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  the
International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  on  12 December  2002  and  attached  as
Annex 3 to this Regulation,

“maritime  security”  means  the  combination  of  measures  and  human  and  material
resources intended to protect shipping against intentional unlawful acts,

“single national authority”  means the national authority responsible  for the security
of ships and of port facilities designated by each Member State,

“competent  authority  for  port  security”  means  the  authority  designated  for  each
Community port by the single national authority of the Member State concerned to
coordinate the  application  of  the security measures  laid  down  in  this  Regulation  as
they apply to ships and port facilities,

“international  shipping”  means  any  maritime  transport  service  from  a  port  of  a
Member State to a port outside that Member State, or conversely;

“domestic  shipping”  means  any  transport  service  in  sea  areas  from  a  port  of  a
Member State to the same port or another port within that Member State,

10.

“scheduled service” means a series of sailings organised in such a way as to provide
a service linking two or more ports:

(a)

either on the basis of a published timetable;

11.

12.

(b)

or with a regularity or frequency such as to constitute a recognisable systematic
service,

“port  facility”  means  a  location  where  the  ship/port  interface  takes  place;  this
includes areas such as  anchorages, waiting berths and approaches  from seaward, as
appropriate,

“ship/port  interface”  means  the  interactions  that  occur  when  a  ship  is  directly  and
immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons or goods or the
provision of port services to or from the ship.

38

Article 3

Joint measures and scope

1.

2.

3.

4.

In  respect  of  international  shipping,  Member  States  shall  apply  in  full  the  special
measures to enhance maritime security of the SOLAS Convention and Part A of the
ISPS Code, as defined in Article 2 above, in accordance with the conditions and with
respect to the ships, companies and port facilities referred to therein.

In respect of domestic shipping, the requirements of paragraph 1 above shall apply in
exactly the same way to Class A passenger ships within the meaning of Article 4 of
Council  Directive  98/18/EC  of  17 March  1998  on  safety  rules  and  standards  for
passenger ships42 operating domestic services and to the companies which own  and
operate them and to the port facilities serving them.

The  requirements  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  of  the
SOLAS  Convention  and  the  ISPS  Code  relating  to  the  carrying-out  of  security
assessments, the preparation of a security plan, and the designation of company and
ship security officers shall apply to other ships as defined in Regulation 2, paragraph
1.1 (application / types of ship) of the special measures to enhance maritime security
of the SOLAS Convention operating domestic services. The same requirements shall
apply to the port facilities which serve them.

When implementing  the  provisions  required pursuant  to  paragraphs  1  and  2  above,
Member States shall take fully into account the recommendations contained in Part B
of the ISPS Code, as defined in Article 2(4) above.

Member States shall conform to the following paragraphs of Part B of the ISPS Code
as if they were mandatory:

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

1.12 (revision of ship security plans),

1.16 (port facility security assessment),

4.1 (protection of the confidentiality of security plans and assessments),

4.5 (minimum competencies of recognised security organisations),

4.8 (setting the security level),

4.14, 4.15, 4.16 (contact points and information on port facility security plans),

4.18 (identification documents),

4.24 (ships’ application of the security measures recommended by the State in
whose territorial waters they are sailing),

4.28 (manning level),

42

OJ L 144, 15.5.1998, p. 1.

39

                                                
(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

(cid:5)

4.41 (communication of information when entry into port is denied or the ship
is expelled from port),

4.45 (ships from a State which is not party to the Convention),

6.1 (company’s obligation to provide the master with information on the ship’s
operators),

8.3 to 8.10 (minimum standards for the ship security assessment),

9.2 (minimum standards for the ship security plan),

13.6 and 13.7 (frequency of security drills and exercises for  ships’  crews and
for company and ship security officers),

15.3 to 15.4 (minimum standards for the port facility security assessment),

16.3 and 16.8 (minimum standards for the port facility security plan),

18.5 and 18.6 (frequency of security drills and  exercises in  port facilities  and
for port facility security officers).

5.

6.

The periodic review of the port facility security plans provided for in paragraph 1.16
of Part B of the ISPS Code shall be carried out each time a component changes either
the nature or the intended use of a port facility, and at the latest three years after the
plan was drawn up or last reviewed.

Each  Member  State  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  and  the  other  Member
States  the  contact  details  of  the  contact  officials  referred  to  in  paragraph  4.16  of
Part B of the ISPS Code and the information provided for in paragraph 4.41of Part B
of the ISPS Code when a ship is expelled from or refused entry to a Community port.

Article 4

Communication of information

Each  Member  State  shall  communicate  to  the  International  Maritime  Organisation,  the
Commission and the other Member States the information required pursuant to Regulation 13
(Communication of information) of the special measures to enhance maritime security of the
SOLAS Convention.

Article 5

Intra-Community and domestic shipping

1.

For the purposes of this Regulation, Regulation 11 (Alternative security agreements)
of the special measures to enhance maritime security of the SOLAS Convention may
apply  to  scheduled  intra-Community  shipping  operating  on  fixed  routes  and  using
specific associated port facilities.

40

2.

3.

4.

1.

2.

3.

To that end, Member States may conclude among themselves, each acting on its own
behalf,  the  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  provided  for  in  the  said  Regulation,
and in particular such agreements as are necessary to promote intra-Community short
sea shipping.

The Member States concerned shall notify the draft agreements to the Commission.

The Commission shall examine whether the draft agreements guarantee an adequate
level  of  protection,  in  particular  as  regards  the  requirements  of  paragraph 2  of  the
above-mentioned  Regulation 11,  and  whether 
in  accordance  with
Community law. If the draft agreements do not meet these criteria, the Commission
shall within four months adopt a decision in accordance with the procedure referred
to in Article 12(3); in such cases, the Member States concerned shall adapt the drafts
accordingly before concluding the agreements.

they  are 

The periodic review of such agreements provided for in paragraph 4 of Regulation 11
of the special measures to enhance maritime security must take place at intervals of
no more than three years.

Member States may adopt such security arrangements for passenger ships operating
domestic scheduled services as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of
this Regulation, and for the port facilities serving them, without the general level of
security thereby being compromised.

The Member State concerned shall communicate such measures and the outcome of
periodic reviews thereof to the Commission by 1 July of each year.

The conditions of application of such measures shall be  subject  to the Commission
inspections provided for in Article 10(4)-(7) of this Regulation under the procedures
defined therein.

Article 6

Occasional international shipping

Each Member State shall draw up the list of ports concerned, in the light of the port
facility  security  assessments  carried  out,  and  establish  the  scope  of  the  measures
taken to apply the provisions of paragraph 2 of Regulation 2 (extent of application to
port  facilities  which  occasionally  serve  international  voyages)  of  the  special
measures to enhance maritime security of the SOLAS Convention.

Each  Member  State  shall  communicate  the  said  list  and  the  measures  taken  to  the
Commission by 1 July 2004 at the latest.

Each  Member  State  shall  communicate  the  said  list  to the  other  Member  States  by
the same date.

41

Article 7

Security checks prior to entry into a Community port

1.

When a ship which is subject to the requirements of the special measures to enhance
maritime security of the SOLAS Convention and of the ISPS Code or of Article 3 of
this  Regulation  announces  its  intention  to  enter  a  port  of  a  Member  State,  the
competent  authority  for  port  security  of  that  Member  State  shall  require  that  the
information referred to in paragraph 2.1 of Regulation 9 (Ships  intending to enter  a
port  of  another  Contracting  Government)  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance
maritime  security  of  the  SOLAS  Convention  be  provided.  The  said  authority  shall
analyse  the  information  provided  and,  where  necessary,  apply  the  procedure
provided for in paragraph 2 of that Regulation.

2.

The information referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be provided:

(a)

at least twenty-four hours in advance; or

(b)

(c)

at the latest, at the time the ship leaves the previous port, if the voyage time is
less than twenty-four hours; or

if the port of call is not known or it is changed during the voyage, as soon as
this information is available.

3.

A report shall be kept of the procedure followed in respect of each ship.

Article 8

Exemptions from security checks prior to entry into a port

1.

Member States may exempt scheduled services performed between ports located on
their  territory  from  the  requirement  laid  down  in  Article  7  where  the  following
conditions are met:

(a)

(b)

the  company  operating  the  scheduled  services  referred  to  above  keeps  and
updates a list of the ships concerned and sends it to the competent authority for
security at the port concerned,

for  each  voyage  performed,  the  information  referred  to  in  paragraph 2.1  of
Regulation 9  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  of  the
SOLAS  Convention  is  kept  available  for  the  competent  authority  for  port
security upon request. The company must establish an internal system to ensure
that, upon request 24 hours a day and without delay, the said information can
be sent to the competent authority.

2.

When an international scheduled service is  operated  between two  or more Member
States, any of the Member States involved may request of the other Member States
that  an  exemption  be  granted  to  that  service.  All  Member  States  involved  shall
collaborate in granting an exemption to the service concerned in accordance with the
conditions laid down in paragraph 1.

42

3.

4.

1.

2.

1.

2.

Member States shall periodically check that the conditions laid down in paragraphs 1
and 2 are being met. Where at least one of these conditions is no longer being met,
Member States shall immediately withdraw the privilege of the exemption from the
company concerned.

Member States shall draw up a list of companies and ships granted exemption under
this Article,  and  shall  update that list. They shall communicate the list and updates
thereof to the Commission

Article 9

Security checks in Community ports

Certificate verification, as defined in paragraph 1.1 of Regulation 9 (Control of ships
in  port)  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  of  the  SOLAS
Convention, shall be carried out in the port either by the competent authority for port
security  defined  in  Article 2(7)  of  this  Regulation  or  by  the  inspectors  defined  in
Article 2(5) of Council Directive 95/21/EC of 19 June 1995 on port State control of
shipping43,  as  last  amended  by  Directive  2001/106/EC  of  the  European  Parliament
and of the Council of 19 December 200144.

Where the inspector performing port State control does not belong to the competent
authority  for  port  security  defined  in  Article 2(7)  of  this  Regulation  and  where  he
believes that there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance
with  the  requirements  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime  security  of  the
SOLAS Convention and of the ISPS Code, he shall immediately refer the matter to
the competent authority for port security, which shall take the measures provided for
in  paragraphs  1.2  and  1.3  of  Regulation 9  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance
maritime security of the SOLAS Convention.

Article 10

Implementation and conformity checking

Member States shall carry out the administrative and control tasks required pursuant
to the provisions of the special measures to enhance maritime security of the SOLAS
Convention  and  of  the  ISPS  Code.  They  shall  ensure  that  all  necessary  means  are
allocated  and  effectively  provided  for  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  this
Regulation.

In  accordance  with  Regulation 13  of  the  special  measures  to  enhance  maritime
security  of  the  SOLAS  Convention,  Member  States  shall  designate  the  national
authority responsible for ship and port facility security. This single national authority
shall be the Commission’s correspondent for the application of this Regulation.

43

44

OJ L 157, 7.7.1995, p. 1.
OJ L 19, 22.1.2002, p.17.

43

                                                
3

4.

5.

6.

7.

Each  Member  States  shall  adopt  a  national  plan  for  the  implementation  of  this
Regulation.  Each  Member  State  shall  take  every  measure  to  ensure  the  early
implementation of:

(cid:1) the  appointment  of  a  single  national  authority,  as  described  in  the  previous

paragraph, by 1 January 2004;

(cid:1) the making of ship and port facility security assessments and the appointment

of ship, port facility and company security officers by 1 March 2004;

(cid:1) the approval of the ship and port facility security plans by 1 May 2004;

(cid:1) the issuing of the international ship security certificates by 1 June 2004.

Six  months  after  the  date  of  application  of  this  Regulation,  the  Commission,  in
cooperation with the authority referred to in paragraph 2 above, shall start a series of
inspections  to  verify the means of monitoring  implementation of  the  national  plans
adopted pursuant to this Regulation. These inspections shall take account of the data
supplied by the authority referred to in paragraph 2 above, including the monitoring
reports.  The  procedures  for  conducting  such  inspections  shall  be  adopted  in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 12(2).

The  officials  mandated  by  the  Commission  to  conduct  such  inspections  in
accordance with paragraph 4 above shall exercise their powers upon production of an
authorisation in writing issued by the Commission and specifying the subject-matter,
the purpose of the inspection and the date on which it is to begin. The Commission
shall  in  good  time  before  inspections  inform  the  Member  States  concerned  by  the
inspections.

With  a  view  to  verifying  the  effective  implementation  of  the  national  plans,  such
inspections  may  be  extended,  as  necessary,  to  the  departments  responsible  for
monitoring port facilities,  companies and ships.  In  such cases,  the  inspections  shall
be carried out without advance notice.

The Member State concerned shall submit to such inspections and shall ensure that
bodies or persons concerned also submit to those inspections.

The  Commission  shall  communicate  the  inspection  reports  to  the  Member  State
concerned,  which  shall  indicate  the  measures  taken  to  remedy  any  shortcomings
within  three  months  of  receipt  of  the  report.  The  report  and  the  answer  of  the
authority referred to in paragraph 2 shall be communicated to the Committee referred
to in Article 12(1).

The European Maritime Safety Agency set up by Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 200245 shall, in  accordance
with  its  rules,  assist  the  Commission  in  its  inspection  tasks  and  in  keeping  and
monitoring the data supplied by the Member States pursuant to Articles 3(6), 4, 5, 6,
8 and 10 of this Regulation.

45

OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 1.

44

                                                
Article 11

Adaptations

In accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 12(2), provisions may be adopted in
order:

-

-

1.

2.

3.

to  apply,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Regulation,  subsequent  amendments  to  the
international instruments referred to herein,

in  the  light  of  experience,  to  extend  the  obligations  provided  for  in  Article 3(4)  of
this  Regulation  to  other  paragraphs  of  Part B  of  the  ISPS  Code,  or  to  define
harmonised arrangements for their application.

Article 12

Committee procedure

The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention
of  Pollution  from  Ships  (COSS)  created  by  Article 3  of  Regulation  (EC)
No 2099/2002 of 5 November 2002 of  the  European Parliament and of the Council
establishing  a Committee  on  Safe  Seas  and  the  Prevention  of  Pollution  from  Ships
(COSS)46.

Where  reference  is  made  to  this  paragraph,  Articles  5  and  7  of  Council  Decision
1999/468/EC  of  28 June  1999  laying  down  the  procedures  for  the  exercise  of
implementing  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission47  shall  apply,  having  regard  to
the provisions of Article 8 thereof.

The  period  laid  down  in  Article  5(6)  of  Decision  1999/468/EC  shall  be  set  at  one
month.

Where  reference  is  made  to  this  paragraph,  Articles  6  and  7  of  Decision
1999/468/EC shall apply having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.

Article 13

Penalties

Penalties for breaching the provisions of this Regulation shall be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive.

46

47

OJ L 324, 29.11.2002, p.1.
OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.

45

                                                
Article 14

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of  the European Union.  It shall apply  from 1 July 2004, apart  from the
provisions  of  Article 10(3),  which  shall  enter  into  force  and  apply  on  the  dates  specified
therein.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, […]

For the European Parliament
The President

For the Council
The President

46

ANNEXE 1

AMENDMENTS TO THE ANNEX TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974 AS AMENDED

“CHAPTER XI-2

SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY

Regulation 1

Definitions

1

For the purpose of this chapter, unless expressly provided otherwise:

.1

.2

.3

.4

Bulk carrier means a bulk carrier as defined in regulation IX/1.6.

Chemical tanker means a chemical tanker as defined in regulation VII/8.2.

Gas carrier means a gas carrier as defined in regulation VII/11.2.

High-speed craft means a craft as defined in regulation X/1.2.

.5 Mobile offshore drilling unit means a mechanically propelled mobile offshore

drilling unit, as defined in regulation IX/1, not on location.

.6

.7

.8

.9

Oil tanker means an oil tanker as defined in regulation II-1/2.12.

Company means a Company as defined in regulation IX/1.

Ship/port interface means the interactions that occur when a ship is directly and
immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or
the provisions of port services to or from the ship.

Port facility is a location, as determined by the Contracting Government or by
the  Designated  Authority,  where  the  ship/port  interface  takes  place.  This
includes  areas  such  as  anchorages,  waiting  berths  and  approaches  from
seaward, as appropriate.

.10

Ship  to  ship  activity  means  any  activity  not  related  to  a  port  facility  that
involves the transfer of goods or persons from one ship to another.

.11 Designated  Authority  means  the  organization(s)  or  the  administration(s)
identified, within the Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  this  chapter  pertaining  to  port  facility
security and ship/port interface, from the point of view of the port facility.

47

.12

International  Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security  (ISPS)  Code  means  the
International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities consisting of
Part A (the provisions of which shall be treated as mandatory) and part B (the
provisions  of  which  shall  be  treated  as  recommendatory),  as  adopted,  on  12
the  Conference  of  Contracting
December  2002,  by  resolution  2  of 
Governments  to  the  International  Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea,
1974 as may be amended by the Organization, provided that:

.1

.2

amendments  to  part  A  of  the  Code  are  adopted,  brought  into  force  and
take  effect  in  accordance  with  article  VIII  of  the  present  Convention
concerning the amendment procedures applicable to the Annex other than
chapter I; and

amendments  to  part  B  of  the  Code  are  adopted  by  the  Maritime  Safety
Committee in accordance with its Rules of Procedure.

.13

Security  incident  means  any  suspicious  act  or  circumstance  threatening  the
security  of  a  ship,  including  a  mobile  offshore  drilling  unit  and  a  high  speed
craft,  or  of  a  port  facility  or  of  any  ship/port  interface  or  any  ship  to  ship
activity.

.14

Security  level  means  the  qualification  of  the  degree  of  risk  that  a  security
incident will be attempted or will occur.

.15 Declaration of security means an agreement reached between a ship and either
a  port facility  or  another  ship  with  which  it  interfaces  specifying  the  security
measures each will implement.

.16 Recognized  security  organization  means  an  organization  with  appropriate
expertise in security matters and with appropriate knowledge of ship and port
operations  authorized  to  carry  out  an  assessment,  or  a  verification,  or  an
approval or a certification activity, required by this chapter or by part A of the
ISPS Code.

The term "ship", when used in regulations 3 to 13, includes mobile offshore drilling
units and high-speed craft.

The term “all ships”, when used in this chapter, means any ship to which this chapter
applies.

The term “Contracting Government”, when used in regulations 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12 and
13 includes a reference to the “Designated Authority”.

Regulation 2

Application

This chapter applies to:

.1

the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:

.1.1 passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;

48

2

3

4

1

.1.2 cargo  ships,  including  high-speed  craft,  of  500  gross  tonnage  and

upwards; and

.1.3 mobile offshore drilling units; and

.2

port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

2

Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  paragraph  1.2,  Contracting  Governments  shall
decide the extent of application of this chapter and of the relevant sections of part A
of the ISPS Code to those port facilities within their territory  which, although  used
primarily by ships not engaged on international voyages, are required, occasionally,
to serve ships arriving or departing on an international voyage.

2.1
Contracting  Governments  shall  base  their  decisions,  under  paragraph  2,  on  a  port
facility  security  assessment  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  part  A  of  the
ISPS Code.

2.2
Any  decision  which  a  Contracting  Government  makes,  under  paragraph  2,  shall  not
compromise the level of security intended to be achieved by this chapter or by part A of the
ISPS Code.

3
This  chapter  does  not  apply  to  warships,  naval  auxiliaries  or  other  ships  owned  or
operated  by  a  Contracting  Government  and  used  only  on  Government  non-commercial
service.

Nothing  in  this  chapter  shall  prejudice  the  rights  or  obligations  of  States  under

4
international law.

Obligations of Contracting Governments with respect to security

Regulation 3

1
Administrations  shall  set  security  levels  and  ensure  the  provision  of  security  level
information to ships entitled to fly their flag. When changes in security level occur, security
level information shall be updated as the circumstance dictates.

2
Contracting Governments shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security
level information to port facilities within their territory, and to ships prior to entering a port or
whilst  in  a  port  within  their  territory.  When  changes  in  security  level  occur,  security  level
information shall be updated as the circumstance dictates.

Regulation 4

Requirements for Companies and ships

Companies shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part A

1
of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

2
Ships shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part A of the
ISPS  Code,  taking  into  account  the  guidance  given  in  part  B  of  the  ISPS  Code,  and  such
compliance shall be verified and certified as provided for in part A of the ISPS Code.

49

Prior  to  entering  a  port  or  whilst  in  a  port  within  the  territory  of  a  Contracting
3
Government,  a  ship  shall  comply  with  the  requirements  for  the  security  level  set  by  that
Contracting  Government,  if  such  security  level  is  higher  than  the  security  level  set  by  the
Administration for that ship.

4

Ships shall respond without undue delay to any change to a higher security level.

Where a ship is not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter or of part A of
5
the  ISPS  Code,  or  cannot  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  security  level  set  by  the
Administration  or  by  another  Contracting  Government  and  applicable  to  that  ship,  then  the
ship  shall  notify  the  appropriate  competent  authority  prior  to  conducting  any  ship/port
interface or prior to entry into port, whichever occurs earlier.

Regulation 5

Specific responsibility of Companies

The  Company  shall  ensure  that  the  master  has  available  on  board,  at  all  times,
information  through  which  officers  duly  authorised  by  a  Contracting  Government
can establish:

.1

.2

.3

who  is  responsible  for  appointing  the  members  of  the  crew  or  other  persons
currently  employed  or  engaged  on  board  the  ship  in  any  capacity  on  the
business of that ship;

who is responsible for deciding the employment of the ship; and

in cases where the ship is employed under the terms of charter party(ies), who
are the parties to such charter party(ies).

Regulation 6

Ship security alert system

1

All ships shall be provided with a ship security alert system, as follows:

.1

.2

.3

.4

ships constructed on or after 1 July 2004;

passenger  ships,  including  high-speed  passenger  craft,  constructed  before
1 July 2004,  not  later  than  the  first  survey  of  the  radio  installation  after
1 July 2004;

oil tankers, chemical  tankers,  gas  carriers, bulk carriers  and  cargo  high  speed
craft,  of  500  gross  tonnage  and  upwards  constructed  before  1 July 2004,  not
later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2004; and

other cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward and mobile offshore drilling
units constructed before 1 July 2004, not later than the first survey of the radio
installation after 1 July 2006.

50

2

The ship security alert system, when activated, shall:

.1

.2

.3

.4

initiate  and  transmit  a  ship-to-shore  security  alert  to  a  competent  authority
designated  by  the  Administration,  which  in  these  circumstances  may  include
the Company, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security
of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised;

not send the ship security alert to any other ships;

not raise any alarm on-board the ship; and

continue the ship security alert until deactivated and/or reset.

3

The ship security alert system shall:

.1

.2

be  capable  of  being  activated  from  the  navigation  bridge  and  in  at  least  one
other location; and

conform  to  performance  standards  not  inferior  to  those  adopted  by  the
Organization.

The ship security alert system activation points shall be designed so as to prevent the
inadvertent initiation of the ship security alert.

The requirement for a ship security alert system may be complied with by using the
radio installation fitted for compliance with the requirements of chapter IV, provided
all requirements of this regulation are complied with.

When  an  Administration  receives  notification  of  a  ship  security  alert,  that
Administration shall immediately notify the State(s) in the vicinity of which the ship
is presently operating.

When a Contracting Government receives notification of a ship security alert from a
ship  which  is  not  entitled  to  fly  its  flag,  that  Contracting  Government  shall
immediately notify the relevant Administration and, if appropriate, the State(s) in the
vicinity of which the ship is presently operating.

Regulation 7

Threats to ships

Contracting  Governments  shall  set  security  levels  and  ensure  the  provision  of
security  level  information  to  ships  operating  in  their  territorial  sea  or  having
communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.

Contracting Governments shall provide a point of contact through which such ships
can  request  advice  or  assistance  and  to  which  such  ships  can  report  any  security
concerns about other ships, movements or communications.

Where  a  risk  of  attack  has  been  identified,  the  Contracting  Government  concerned
shall advise the ships concerned and their Administrations of:

.1

the current security level;

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

51

.2

.3

any  security  measures  that  should  be  put  in  place  by  the  ships  concerned  to
protect themselves from attack, in accordance with the provisions of part A of
the ISPS Code; and

security  measures  that  the  coastal  State  has  decided  to  put  in  place,  as
appropriate.

Regulation 8

Master’s discretion for ship safety and security

1

2

The  master  shall  not  be  constrained  by  the  Company,  the  charterer  or  any  other
person from taking or executing any decision which, in the professional judgement of
the master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This includes
denial  of  access  to  persons  (except  those  identified  as  duly  authorized  by  a
Contracting  Government)  or  their  effects  and  refusal  to  load  cargo,  including
containers or other closed cargo transport units.

If,  in  the  professional  judgement  of  the  master,  a  conflict  between  any  safety  and
security  requirements  applicable  to  the  ship  arises  during  its  operations,  the  master
shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the ship. In
such  cases,  the  master  may  implement  temporary  security  measures  and  shall
forthwith inform the Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government
in whose port the ship is operating or intends to enter. Any such temporary security
measures under this regulation shall, to the highest possible degree, be commensurate
with the prevailing security level. When such cases are identified, the Administration
shall ensure that such conflicts are resolved and that the possibility of recurrence is
minimised.

Regulation 9

Control and compliance measures

1

Control of ships in port

1.1 For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  every  ship  to  which  this  chapter  applies  is
subject  to  control  when  in  a  port  of  another  Contracting  Government  by
officers  duly  authorised  by  that  Government,  who  may  be  the  same  as  those
carrying  out  the  functions  of  regulation  I/19.  Such  control  shall  be  limited  to
verifying that there is onboard a valid International Ship Security Certificate or
a  valid  Interim  International  Ships  Security  Certificate  issued  under  the
provisions  of  part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code  (Certificate),  which  if  valid  shall  be
accepted,  unless  there  are  clear  grounds  for  believing  that  the  ship  is  not  in
compliance with the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code.

1.2 When there are such clear grounds, or where no valid Certificate is produced
when  required,  the  officers  duly  authorized  by  the  Contracting  Government
shall  impose  any  one  or  more  control  measures  in  relation  to  that  ship  as
provided in paragraph 1.3. Any such measures imposed must be proportionate,
taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

52

1.3 Such control measures are as follows: inspection of the ship, delaying the ship,
detention of the ship, restriction of operations including movement within the
port,  or  expulsion  of  the  ship  from  port.  Such  control  measures  may
additionally  or  alternatively  include  other  lesser  administrative  or  corrective
measures.

2

Ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government

2.1 For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  a  Contracting  Government  may  require  that
ships intending to enter its ports provide the following information to officers
duly  authorized  by  that  Government  to  ensure  compliance  with  this  chapter
prior  to  entry  into  port  with  the  aim  of  avoiding  the  need  to  impose  control
measures or steps:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

that  the  ship  possesses  a  valid  Certificate  and  the  name  of  its  issuing
authority;

the security level at which the ship is currently operating;

the security level at which the ship operated in any previous port where it
has  conducted  a  ship/port  interface  within  the  timeframe  specified  in
paragraph 2.3;

any special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in
any previous port where it has conducted a ship/port interface within the
timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3;

that the appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during any
ship to ship activity within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3; or

other  practical  security  related  information  (but  not  details  of  the  ship
security  plan),  taking  into  account  the  guidance  given  in  part  B  of  the
ISPS Code.

If requested by the Contracting Government, the ship or the Company shall provide
confirmation, acceptable to that Contracting Government, of the information required
above.

2.2 Every ship to which this chapter applies intending to enter the port of another
Contracting Government shall provide the information described in paragraph
2.1  on  the  request  of  the  officers  duly  authorized  by  that  Government.  The
master  may  decline  to  provide  such  information  on  the  understanding  that
failure to do so may result in denial of entry into port.

2.3 The ship shall keep records of the information referred to in paragraph 2.1 for

the last 10 calls at port facilities.

53

2.4

If,  after  receipt  of  the  information  described  in  paragraph  2.1,  officers  duly
authorised by the Contracting Government of the port in which the ship intends
to  enter  have  clear  grounds  for  believing  that  the  ship  is  in  non-compliance
with the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, such officers
shall  attempt  to  establish  communication  with  and  between  the  ship  and  the
Administration in order to rectify the non-compliance. If such communication
does not result in rectification, or if such officers have clear grounds otherwise
for believing that the ship is in non-compliance  with the requirements  of  this
chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, such officers may take steps in relation to
that  ship  as  provided  in  paragraph  2.5.  Any  such  steps  taken  must  be
proportionate,  taking  into  account  the  guidance  given  in  part  B  of  the  ISPS
Code.

2.5 Such steps are as follows:

.1

.2

.3

a requirement for the rectification of the non-compliance;

a  requirement  that  the  ship  proceed  to  a  location  specified  in  the
territorial sea or internal waters of that Contracting Government;

inspection  of  the  ship,  if  the  ship  is  in  the  territorial  sea  of  the
Contracting Government the port of which the ship intends to enter; or

.4

denial of entry into port.

Prior  to  initiating  any  such  steps,  the  ship  shall  be  informed  by  the  Contracting
Government  of  its  intentions.  Upon  this  information  the  master  may  withdraw  the
intention to enter that port. In such cases, this regulation shall not apply.

3

Additional provisions

3.1

In the event:

.1

.2

of the imposition of a control measure, other than a lesser administrative
or corrective measure, referred to in paragraph 1.3; or

any  of  the  steps  referred  to  in  paragraph  2.5  are  taken,  an  officer  duly
authorized  by  the  Contracting  Government  shall  forthwith  inform  in
writing the Administration specifying which control measures have been
imposed  or  steps  taken  and  the  reasons  thereof.  The  Contracting
Government imposing the control measures or steps shall also notify the
recognized security organization, which issued the Certificate relating to
the ship concerned and the Organization when any such control measures
have been imposed or steps taken.

3.2 When entry into port is denied or the ship is expelled from port, the authorities
of the port State should communicate the appropriate facts to the authorities of
the  State  of  the  next  appropriate  ports  of  call,  when  known,  and  any  other
appropriate  coastal  States,  taking  into  account  guidelines  to  be  developed  by
the  Organization.  Confidentiality  and  security  of  such  notification  shall  be
ensured.

54

3.3 Denial of entry into port, pursuant to paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5, or expulsion from
port,  pursuant  to  paragraphs  1.1  to  1.3,  shall  only  be  imposed  where  the
officers duly authorized by the Contracting Government have clear grounds to
believe  that  the  ship  poses  an  immediate  threat  to  the  security  or  safety  of
persons, or of ships or other property and there are no other appropriate means
for removing that threat.

3.4 The control measures referred to in paragraph 1.3 and the steps  referred to in
paragraph 2.5 shall only be imposed, pursuant to this regulation, until the non-
compliance giving rise to  the control measures  or steps  has  been corrected to
the  satisfaction  of  the  Contracting  Government,  taking  into  account  actions
proposed by the ship or the Administration, if any.

3.5 When  Contracting  Governments  exercise  control  under  paragraph  1  or  take

steps under paragraph 2:

.1

.2

all possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or
delayed.  If  a  ship  is  thereby  unduly  detained,  or  delayed,  it  shall  be
entitled to compensation for any loss or damage suffered; and

necessary  access  to  the  ship  shall  not  be  prevented  for  emergency  or
humanitarian reasons and for security purposes.

Regulation 10

Requirements for port facilities

Port facilities shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and part A
of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

Contracting Governments with a port facility or port facilities within their territory,
to which this regulation applies, shall ensure that:

.1

.2

port facility security assessments are carried out, reviewed and approved
in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code; and

port  facility  security  plans  are  developed,  reviewed,  approved  and
implemented  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  part  A  of  the  ISPS
Code.

Contracting Governments shall designate and communicate the measures required to
be addressed in a port facility security plan for the various security levels, including
when the submission of a Declaration of Security will be required.

Regulation 11

Alternative security agreements

Contracting  Governments  may,  when  implementing  this  chapter  and  part  A  of  the
ISPS  Code,  conclude  in  writing  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  with  other
Contracting  Governments  on  alternative  security  arrangements  covering  short
international  voyages  on  fixed  routes  between  port  facilities  located  within  their
territories.

55

1

2

3

1

2

3

4

1

2

1

Any such agreement shall not compromise the level of security of other ships or of
port facilities not covered by the agreement.

No ship covered by such an agreement shall conduct any ship-to-ship activities with
any ship not covered by the agreement.

Such agreements shall be reviewed  periodically,  taking  into  account  the experience
gained as well as any changes in the particular circumstances or the assessed threats
to the security of the ships, the port facilities or the routes covered by the agreement.

Regulation 12

Equivalent security arrangements

An Administration may allow a particular ship or a group of ships entitled to fly its
flag  to  implement  other  security  measures  equivalent  to  those  prescribed  in  this
chapter or in part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least as
effective  as  those  prescribed  in  this  chapter  or  part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code.  The
Administration,  which  allows  such  security  measures,  shall  communicate  to  the
Organization particulars thereof.

When  implementing  this  chapter  and  part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code,  a  Contracting
Government may allow a particular port facility or a group of port facilities located
within  its  territory,  other  than  those  covered  by  an  agreement  concluded  under
regulation 11, to implement security measures equivalent to those prescribed in this
chapter or in Part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least as
effective  as  those  prescribed  in  this  chapter  or  part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code.  The
Contracting  Government,  which  allows  such  security  measures,  shall  communicate
to the Organization particulars thereof.

Regulation 13

Communication of information

Contracting  Governments  shall,  not  later  than  1  July  2004,  communicate  to  the
Organization and shall make available for the information of Companies and ships:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the  names  and  contact  details  of  their  national  authority  or  authorities
responsible for ship and port facility security;

the  locations  within  their  territory  covered  by  the  approved  port  facility
security plans.

the  names  and  contact  details  of  those  who  have  been  designated  to  be
available at all times to receive and act upon the ship-to-shore security alerts,
referred to in regulation 6.2.1;

the  names  and  contact  details  of  those  who  have  been  designated  to  be
available  at  all  times  to  receive  and  act  upon  any  communications  from
Contracting  Governments  exercising  control  and  compliance  measures,
referred to in regulation 9.3.1; and

56

2

3

4

.5

the  names  and  contact  details  of  those  who  have  been  designated  to  be
available at all times to provide advice or assistance to ships and to whom ships
can  report  any  security  concerns,  referred  to  in  regulation  7.2;  and  thereafter
update  such  information  as  and  when  changes  relating  thereto  occur.  The
Organization shall circulate such particulars to other Contracting Governments
for the information of their officers.

Contracting  Governments  shall,  not  later  than  1  July  2004,  communicate  to  the
Organization the names and contact details of any recognized security organizations
authorized  to  act  on  their  behalf  together  with  details  of  the  specific  responsibility
and conditions of authority  delegated to such  organizations. Such  information  shall
be  updated  as  and  when  changes  relating  thereto  occur.  The  Organization  shall
circulate  such  particulars  to  other  Contracting  Governments  for  the  information  of
their officers.

Contracting  Governments  shall,  not  later  than  1  July  2004  communicate  to  the
Organization  a  list  showing  the  approved  port  facility  security  plans  for  the  port
facilities located within their territory together with the location or locations covered
by each approved port facility security plan and the corresponding date of approval
and  thereafter  shall  further  communicate  when  any  of  the  following  changes  take
place:

.1

.2

.3

changes  in  the  location  or  locations  covered  by  an  approved  port  facility
security plan  are to  be  introduced  or  have  been  introduced.  In  such  cases  the
information  to  be  communicated  shall  indicate  the  changes  in  the  location  or
locations covered by the plan and the date as of which such changes are to be
introduced or were implemented;

an approved port facility security plan, previously included in the list submitted
to the Organization, is to be withdrawn or has been withdrawn. In such cases,
the  information  to  be  communicated  shall  indicate  the  date  on  which  the
withdrawal  will  take  effect  or  was  implemented.  In  these  cases,  the
communication  shall  be  made  to  the  Organization  as  soon  as  is  practically
possible; and

additions are to be made to the list of approved port facility security plans. In
such cases, the information to be communicated  shall indicate  the location or
locations covered by the plan and the date of approval.

Contracting Governments shall, at five year intervals after 1 July 2004, communicate
to the Organization a revised and updated list showing all the approved port facility
security  plans  for  the  port  facilities  located  within  their  territory  together  with  the
location  or  locations  covered  by  each  approved  port  facility  security  plan  and  the
corresponding date of approval (and the date of approval of any amendments thereto)
which will supersede and replace all information communicated to the Organization,
pursuant to paragraph 3, during the preceding five years.

57

5

6

7

Contracting Governments shall communicate to the Organization information that an
agreement under regulation 11 has been concluded. The information communicated
shall include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

the  names  of  the  Contracting  Governments  which  have  concluded  the
agreement;

the port facilities and the fixed routes covered by the agreement;

the periodicity of review of the agreement;

the date of entry into force of the agreement; and

information  on  any  consultations  which  have  taken  place  with  other
Contracting Governments; and thereafter shall communicate, as soon as
practically possible, to the Organization information when the agreement
has been amended or has ended.

Any  Contracting  Government  which  allows,  under  the  provisions  of  regulation  12,
any equivalent security arrangements with respect to a ship entitled to fly its flag or
with  respect  to  a  port  facility  located  within  its  territory,  shall  communicate  to  the
Organization particulars thereof.

The  Organization  shall  make  available  the  information  communicated  under
paragraph 3 to other Contracting Governments upon request.

58

1

2

3

4

ANNEXE 2

INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS
AND OF PORT FACILITIES

PREAMBLE

The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held in London in December 2002
adopted new provisions in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974 and this Code to enhance maritime security. These new requirements form the
international  framework  through  which  ships  and  port  facilities  can  co-operate  to
detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

Following  the  tragic  events  of  11th  September  2001,  the  twenty-second  session  of
the  Assembly  of  the  International  Maritime  Organization  (the  Organization),  in
November  2001, unanimously  agreed to the development of new  measures  relating
to  the  security  of  ships  and  of  port  facilities  for  adoption  by  a  Conference  of
Contracting  Governments  to  the  International  Convention  for  the  Safety  of  Life  at
Sea, 1974 (known as the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security) in December
2002. Preparation for the Diplomatic Conference was entrusted to the Organization’s
Maritime  Safety  Committee  (MSC)  on  the  basis  of  submissions  made  by  Member
States,  intergovernmental  organizations  and  non-governmental  organizations  in
consultative status with the Organization.

The MSC, at its first extraordinary session, held also in November 2001, in order to
accelerate  the  development  and  the  adoption  of  the  appropriate  security  measures
established  an  MSC  Intersessional  Working  Group  on  Maritime  Security.  The  first
meeting of the MSC Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security was held in
February 2002 and the outcome of its discussions was reported to, and considered by,
the seventy-fifth session of the MSC in March 2002, when an ad hoc Working Group
was established to further develop the proposals made. The seventy-fifth session of
the MSC considered the report of that Working Group and recommended that work
should  be  taken  forward  through  a  further  MSC Intersessional  Working  Group,
which  was  held  in  September  2002.  The  seventy-sixth  session  of  the  MSC
considered  the  outcome  of  the  September  2002  session  of  the  MSC Intersessional
Working Group and the further work undertaken by the MSC Working Group held in
conjunction  with  the  Committee's  seventy-sixth  session  in  December  2002,
immediately prior to the Diplomatic Conference and agreed the final version of the
proposed texts to be considered by the Diplomatic Conference.

The Diplomatic Conference  (9  to  13  December  2002)  also  adopted  amendments  to
the existing provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974  (SOLAS 74)  accelerating  the  implementation  of  the  requirement  to  fit
Automatic  Identification  Systems  and  adopted  new  Regulations  in  Chapter  XI-1  of
SOLAS 74 covering marking of the Ship’s Identification Number and the carriage of
a Continuous Synopsis Record. The Diplomatic Conference also adopted a  number
of Conference Resolutions including those covering implementation and revision of
this  Code,  Technical  Co-operation,  and  co-operative  work  with  the  International
Labour  Organization  and  World  Customs  Organization.  It  was  recognized  that
review and amendment of certain of the new provisions regarding maritime security
may be required on completion of the work of these two Organizations.

59

5

6

7

8

9

The provision of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 and this Code apply to ships and to port
facilities. The extension of SOLAS 74 to cover port facilities was agreed on the basis
that  SOLAS  74  offered  the  speediest  means  of  ensuring  the  necessary  security
measures entered into force and given effect quickly. However, it was further agreed
that  the  provisions  relating  to  port  facilities  should  relate  solely  to  the  ship/port
interface. The wider issue of the security of port areas will be the subject of further
joint  work  between  the  International  Maritime  Organization  and  the  International
Labour Organization. It was also agreed that the provisions should not extend to the
actual response to attacks or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack.

In  drafting  the  provision  care  has  been  taken  to  ensure  compatibility  with  the
provisions  of  the  International  Convention  on  Standards  of  Training,  Certification
the
and  Watchkeeping  and  Certification  for  Seafarers,  1978,  as  amended, 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the harmonised system of survey
and certification.

The  provisions  represent  a  significant  change  in  the  approach  of  the  international
maritime  industries  to  the  issue  of  security  in  the  maritime  transport  sector.  It  is
recognized that they may place a significant additional burden on certain Contracting
Governments.  The  importance  of  Technical  Co-operation  to  assist  Contracting
Governments implement the provisions is fully recognized.

Implementation of the provisions will require  continuing effective co-operation and
understanding  between  all  those  involved  with,  or  using,  ships  and  port  facilities
including ship’s personnel, port personnel, passengers, cargo interests, ship and port
management  and 
in  National  and  Local  Authorities  with  security
responsibilities.  Existing  practices  and  procedures  will  have  to  be  reviewed  and
changed  if  they  do  not  provide  an  adequate  level  of  security.  In  the  interests  of
enhanced maritime security additional responsibilities will have to be carried by the
shipping and port industries and by National and Local Authorities.

those 

The  guidance  given  in  part  B  of  this  Code  should  be  taken  into  account  when
implementing  the  security  provisions  set  out  in  Chapter  XI-2  of  SOLAS  74  and  in
part A of this Code. However, it is recognized that the extent to which the guidance
applies may vary depending on the nature of the port facility and of the ship, its trade
and/or cargo.

10

Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted or applied in a manner inconsistent with the
proper  respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  as  set  out  in  international
instruments,  particularly  those  relating  to  maritime  workers  and  refugees  including
the  International  Labour  Organization  Declaration  of  Fundamental  Principles  and
Rights  at  Work  as  well  as  international  standards  concerning  maritime  and  port
workers.

60

11

Recognizing  that  the  Convention  on  the  Facilitation  of  Maritime  Traffic,  1965,  as
amended, provides that foreign crew members shall be allowed ashore by the public
authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in port, provided that the formalities
on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled and the public authorities have no reason to
refuse permission to come ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public
order, Contracting Governments when approving ship and port facility security plans
should  pay  due  cognisance  to  the  fact  that  ship's  personnel  live  and  work  on  the
vessel  and  need  shore  leave  and  access  to  shore  based  seafarer  welfare  facilities,
including medical care.

61

PART A

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI-2

OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974,

AS AMENDED

1.

GENERAL

1.1.

Introduction

This  part  of  the  International  Code  for  the  Security  of  Ships  and  Port  Facilities  contains
mandatory  provisions  to  which  reference  is  made  in  chapter  XI-2  of  the  International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended.

1.2.

Objectives

The objectives of this Code are:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

to  establish  an  international  framework  involving  co-operation  between
Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the
shipping  and  port  industries  to  detect  security  threats  and  take  preventive
measures  against  security  incidents  affecting  ships  or  port  facilities  used  in
international trade

to  establish  the  respective  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  Contracting
Governments,  Government  agencies,  local  administrations  and  the  shipping
and port industries, at the national and international level for ensuring maritime
security

to  ensure  the  early  and  efficient  collection  and  exchange  of  security-related
information

to provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans
and procedures to react to changing security levels; and

to  ensure  confidence  that  adequate  and  proportionate  maritime  security
measures are in place.

1.3.

Functional requirements

In order to achieve its  objectives, this Code embodies a number of  functional  requirements.
These include, but are not limited to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

gathering  and  assessing  information  with  respect  to  security  threats  and
exchanging such information with appropriate Contracting Governments

requiring  the  maintenance  of  communication  protocols  for  ships  and  port
facilities

preventing unauthorized access to ships, port facilities and their restricted areas

preventing  the  introduction  of  unauthorized  weapons,  incendiary  devices  or
explosives to ships or port facilities

62

.5

.6

.7

providing means for raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security
incidents

requiring ship and port facility security plans based upon security assessments;
and

requiring training, drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans
and procedures

2.

DEFINITIONS

2.1.

For the purpose of this part, unless expressly provided otherwise:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

.10

Convention means the  International Convention for the Safety of  Life  at  Sea,
1974 as amended

Regulation means a regulation of the Convention

Chapter means a chapter of the Convention

Ship  security  plan  means  a  plan  developed  to  ensure  the  application  of
measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo
transport units, ship’s stores or the ship from the risks of a security incident

Port facility security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of
measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo
transport  units  and  ship’s  stores  within  the  port  facility  from  the  risks  of  a
security incident

Ship  security  officer  means  the  person  on  board  the  ship,  accountable  to  the
master, designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship,
including  implementation  and  maintenance  of  the  ship  security  plan  and  for
liaison with the company security officer and port facility security officers

Company  security  officer  means  the  person  designated  by  the  Company  for
ensuring that a ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan
is  developed,  submitted  for  approval,  and  thereafter  implemented  and
maintained  and  for  liaison  with  port  facility  security  officers  and  the  ship
security officer

Port facility security officer means the person designated as responsible for the
development,  implementation,  revision  and  maintenance  of  the  port  facility
security  plan  and  for  liaison  with  the  ship  security  officers  and  company
security officers

Security  level  1  means  the  level  for  which  minimum  appropriate  protective
security measures shall be maintained at all times

Security  level  2  means  the  level  for  which  appropriate  additional  protective
security  measures  shall  be  maintained  for  a  period  of  time  as  a  result  of
heightened risk of a security incident

63

.11

Security level 3 means  the level  for  which  further  specific  protective  security
measures  shall  be  maintained  for  a  limited  period  of  time  when  a  security
incident  is  probable  or  imminent,  although  it  may  not  be  possible  to  identify
the specific target

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

The term “ship”, when used in this Code, includes mobile offshore drilling units and
high-speed craft as defined in regulation XI-2/1.

The  term  “Contracting  Government”  in  connection  with  any  reference  to  a  port
facility,  when  used  in  sections  14  to  18,  includes  a  reference  to  the  “Designated
Authority”.

Terms not otherwise defined in this part shall have the same meaning as the meaning
attributed to them in chapters I and XI-2.

3.

APPLICATION

3.1.

This Code applies to:

1

the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:

.1

.2

passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft

cargo  ships,  including  high-speed  craft,  of  500  gross  tonnage  and
upwards; and

.3

mobile offshore drilling units; and

2

port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

3.2.

Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  section  3.1.2,  Contracting  Governments  shall
decide the extent of application of this Part of the Code to those port facilities within
their territory which, although used primarily by ships not engaged on international
voyages,  are  required,  occasionally,  to  serve  ships  arriving  or  departing  on  an
international voyage.

3.2.1. Contracting  Governments  shall  base  their  decisions,  under  section  3.2,  on  a  port

facility security assessment carried out in accordance with this Part of the Code.

3.2.2. Any  decision  which  a  Contracting  Government  makes,  under  section  3.2,  shall  not
compromise the level of security intended to be achieved by chapter XI-2 or by this
Part of the Code.

3.3.

3.4.

3.5.

This  Code  does  not  apply  to  warships,  naval  auxiliaries  or  other  ships  owned  or
operated  by  a  Contracting  Government  and  used  only  on  Government
non-commercial service.

Sections  5  to  13  and  19  of  this  part  apply  to  Companies  and  ships  as  specified  in
regulation XI-2/4.

Sections  5  and  14  to  18  of  this  part  apply  to  port  facilities  as  specified  in
regulation XI-2/10.

64

3.6.

4.

4.1.

4.2.

4.3.

4.4.

5.

5.1.

Nothing  in  this  Code  shall  prejudice  the  rights  or  obligations  of  States  under
international law.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS

Subject to the provisions of regulation XI-2/3 and XI-2/7, Contracting Governments
shall set security levels and provide guidance for protection from security incidents.
Higher security levels indicate greater likelihood of occurrence of a security incident.
Factors to be considered in setting the appropriate security level include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the degree that the threat information is credible;

the degree that the threat information is corroborated;

the degree that the threat information is specific or imminent; and

the potential consequences of such a security incident.

Contracting Governments, when  they  set  security  level  3,  shall  issue,  as  necessary,
appropriate  instructions  and  shall  provide  security  related  information  to  the  ships
and port facilities that may be affected.

Contracting Governments may delegate to a recognized security organization certain
of their security related duties under chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code with the
exception of:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

setting of the applicable security level;

approving a Port Facility Security Assessment and subsequent amendments to
an approved assessment;

determining  the  port  facilities  which  will  be  required  to  designate  a  Port
Facility Security Officer;

approving  a  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  and  subsequent  amendments  to  an
approved plan;

exercising control and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9; and

establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security.

Contracting  Governments  shall,  to  the  extent  they  consider  appropriate,  test  the
effectiveness  of  the  Ship  or  the  Port  Facility  Security  Plans,  or  of  amendments  to
such plans, they  have  approved,  or,  in  the  case  of  ships,  of  plans  which  have  been
approved on their behalf.

DECLARATION OF SECURITY

Contracting Governments shall determine when a Declaration of Security is required
by assessing the risk the ship/port interface or ship to ship activity poses to persons,
property or the environment.

65

5.2.

A ship can request completion of a Declaration of Security when:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another
ship it is interfacing with;

there  is  an  agreement  on  a  Declaration  of  Security  between  Contracting
Governments covering certain international voyages or specific ships on those
voyages;

there  has  been  a  security  threat  or  a  security  incident  involving  the  ship  or
involving the port facility, as applicable;

the ship is at a port which is not required to have and implement an approved
port facility security plan; or

the ship is conducting ship to ship activities with another ship not required to
have and implement an approved ship security plan.

5.3.

Requests for the completion of a Declaration of Security, under this section, shall be
acknowledged by the applicable port facility or ship.

5.4.

The Declaration of Security shall be completed by:

.1

.2

the  master  or  the  ship  security  officer  on  behalf  of  the  ship(s);  and,  if
appropriate,

the port facility security officer or, if the Contracting Government determines
otherwise, by any other body responsible for shore-side security, on behalf of
the port facility.

The  Declaration  of  Security  shall  address  the  security  requirements  that  could  be
shared  between  a  port  facility  and  a  ship  (or  between  ships)  and  shall  state  the
responsibility for each.

Contracting  Governments  shall  specify,  bearing  in  mind  the  provisions  of
regulation XI-2/9.2.3,  the minimum  period for  which  Declarations of Security shall
be kept by the port facilities located within their territory.

Administrations  shall  specify,  bearing  in  mind  the  provisions  of  regulation XI-
2/9.2.3,  the  minimum  period  for  which  Declarations  of  Security  shall  be  kept  by
ships entitled to fly their flag

OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY

The  Company  shall  ensure  that  the  ship  security  plan  contains  a  clear  statement
emphasizing the master’s authority. The Company shall establish in the ship security
plan that the master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions
with respect to the safety and security of the ship and to request the assistance of the
Company or of any Contracting Government as may be necessary.

The Company shall ensure that the company security officer, the master and the ship
security  officer  are  given  the  necessary  support  to  fulfil  their  duties  and
responsibilities in accordance with chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code.

5.5.

5.6.

5.7.

6.

6.1.

6.2.

66

7.

7.1.

7.2.

7.3.

7.4.

7.5.

7.6.

7.7.

SHIP SECURITY

A ship is required to act upon the security levels set by Contracting Governments as
set out below.

At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out, through appropriate
measures, on all ships, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code,
in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;

controlling access to the ship;

controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects;

monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;

monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;

supervising the handling of cargo and ship’s stores; and

ensuring that security communication is readily available.

At security level 2, the additional protective measures, specified in the ship security
plan,  shall  be  implemented  for  each  activity  detailed  in  section  7.2,  taking  into
account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

At security level 3, further specific protective measures, specified in the ship security
plan,  shall  be  implemented  for  each  activity  detailed  in  section  7.2,  taking  into
account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

Whenever  security  level  2  or  3  is  set  by  the  Administration,  the  ship  shall
acknowledge receipt of the instructions on change of the security level.

Prior  to  entering  a  port  or  whilst  in  a  port  within  the  territory  of  a  Contracting
Government that has set security level 2 or 3, the ship shall acknowledge receipt of
this instruction and shall confirm to the port facility security officer the initiation of
the  implementation  of  the  appropriate  measures  and  procedures  as  detailed  in  the
ship  security  plan,  and  in  the  case  of  security  level  3,  in  instructions  issued  by  the
Contracting  Government  which  has  set  security  level  3.  The  ship  shall  report  any
difficulties  in  implementation.  In  such  cases,  the  port  facility  security  officer  and
ship security officer shall liase and co-ordinate the appropriate actions.

If a ship is required by the Administration to set, or is already  at, a higher security
level than that set for the port it intends to enter or in which it is already located, then
the  ship  shall  advise,  without  delay,  the  competent  authority  of  the  Contracting
Government  within  whose  territory  the  port  facility  is  located  and  the  port  facility
security officer of the situation.

7.7.1.

In  such  cases,  the  ship  security  officer  shall  liaise  with  the  port  facility  security
officer and co-ordinate appropriate actions, if necessary.

67

7.8.

7.9.

An Administration requiring ships entitled to fly its flag to set security level 2 or 3 in
a port of another Contracting Government shall inform that Contracting Government
without delay.

When  Contracting  Governments  set  security  levels  and  ensure  the  provision  of
security  level  information  to  ships  operating  in  their  territorial  sea,  or  having
communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, such ships shall be advised to
maintain  vigilance  and  report  immediately  to  their  Administration  and  any  nearby
coastal States any information that comes to their attention that might affect maritime
security in the area.

7.9.1. When advising such ships of the applicable security level, a Contracting Government
shall, taking into account the guidance given in the part B of this Code, also advise
those  ships  of  any  security  measure  that  they  should  take  and,  if  appropriate,  of
measures that have been taken by the Contracting Government to provide protection
against the threat.

8.

8.1.

8.2.

8.3.

8.4.

8.5.

9.

9.1.

SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT

The  ship  security  assessment  is  an  essential  and  integral  part  of  the  process  of
developing and updating the ship security plan.

The company security officer shall ensure that the ship security assessment is carried
out by persons with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship, in accordance
with this section, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

Subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  9.2.1,  a  recognized  security  organization  may
carry out the ship security assessment of a specific ship.

The ship security assessment shall include an on-scene security survey and, at least,
the following elements:

.1

.2

.3

.4

identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations;

identification and evaluation of key ship board operations that it is important to
protect;

identification  of  possible  threats  to  the  key  ship  board  operations  and  the
likelihood  of  their  occurrence,  in  order  to  establish  and  prioritise  security
measures; and

identification  of  weaknesses,  including  human  factors  in  the  infrastructure,
policies and procedures.

The ship security assessment shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained
by the Company.

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

Each ship shall carry on board a ship security plan approved by the Administration.
The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels as defined in this Part of
the Code.

68

9.1.1.

Subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  9.2.1,  a  recognized  security  organization  may
prepare the ship security plan for a specific ship.

9.2.

9.2.1.

9.3.

9.4.

The Administration may entrust the review and approval of ship security plans, or of
amendments to a previously approved plan, to recognized security organizations.

In  such  cases  the  recognized  security  organization,  undertaking  the  review  and
approval of a ship security plan, or its amendments, for a specific ship shall not have
been involved in either the preparation of the ship security assessment or of the ship
security plan, or of the amendments, under review.

The submission of a ship security plan, or of amendments to a previously approved
plan, for approval  shall  be accompanied  by  the  security  assessment  on  the  basis  of
which the plan, or the amendments, have been developed.

Such a plan shall be developed, taking into account the guidance given in part B of
this Code and shall be written in the working  language  or  languages  of  the  ship.  If
the language or languages used is not English, French or Spanish, a translation into
one  of  these  languages  shall  be  included.  The  plan  shall  address,  at  least,  the
following:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

measures  designed  to  prevent  weapons,  dangerous  substances  and  devices
intended for use against persons, ships or ports and the carriage of which is not
authorized from being taken on board the ship;

identification  of  the  restricted  areas  and  measures  for  the  prevention  of
unauthorized access to them;

measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship;

procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security, including
provisions for maintaining critical operations of the ship or ship/port interface;

procedures 
Governments may give at security level 3;

responding 

for 

to  any  security 

instructions  Contracting

procedures for evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security;

duties  of  shipboard  personnel  assigned  security  responsibilities  and  of  other
shipboard personnel on security aspects;

procedures for auditing the security activities;

procedures for training, drills and exercises associated with the plan;

.10

procedures for interfacing with port facility security activities;

.11

procedures for the periodic review of the plan and for updating;

.12

procedures for reporting security incidents;

.13

identification of the ship security officer;

.14

identification of the company security officer including 24-hour contact details;

69

.15

.16

.17

.18

procedures  to  ensure  the  inspection,  testing,  calibration,  and  maintenance  of
any security equipment provided on board;

frequency  for  testing  or  calibration  of  any  security  equipment  provided  on
board;

identification  of  the  locations  where  the  ship  security  alert  system  activation
points are provided; and

procedures,  instructions  and  guidance  on  the  use  of  the  ship  security  alert
system, including the testing, activation, deactivation and resetting and to limit
false alerts.

Personnel conducting internal audits of the security activities specified in the plan or
evaluating  its  implementation  shall  be  independent  of  the  activities  being  audited
unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the Company or of the
ship.

The Administration shall determine which changes to an approved ship security plan
or to any security equipment specified in an approved plan shall not be implemented
unless the relevant amendments to the plan are approved by the Administration. Any
such changes shall be at least as effective as those measures prescribed in chapter XI-
2 and this Part of the Code.

The  nature  of  the  changes  to  the  ship  security  plan  or  the  security  equipment  that
have been specifically approved by the Administration, pursuant to section 9.5, shall
be documented in a manner that clearly indicates such approval. This approval shall
be  available  on  board  and  shall  be  presented  together  with  the  International  Ship
Security Certificate  (or  the  Interim  International  Ship Security  Certificate).  If  these
changes  are  temporary,  once  the  original  approved  measures  or  equipment  are
reinstated, this documentation no longer needs to be retained by the ship.

The plan may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, it shall be protected by
procedures aimed at preventing its unauthorized deletion, destruction or amendment.

The plan shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

Ship  security  plans  are  not  subject  to  inspection  by  officers  duly  authorized  by  a
Contracting Government to carry out control and compliance measures in accordance
with regulation XI-2/9, save in circumstances specified in section 9.8.1.

If  the  officers  duly  authorized  by  a  Contracting  Government  have  clear  grounds  to
believe that  the ship is not in  compliance  with the  requirements of  chapter  XI-2  or
part A of this Code, and the only means to verify or rectify the non-compliance is to
review  the  relevant  requirements  of  the  ship  security  plan,  limited  access  to  the
specific sections of the plan relating to the non-compliance is exceptionally allowed,
but  only  with  the  consent  of  the  Contracting  Government  of,  or  the  master  of,  the
ship  concerned.  Nevertheless,  the  provisions  in  the  plan  relating  to  section  9.4
subsections .2, .4, .5, .7, .15, .17 and .18 of this Part of the Code are considered as
confidential information, and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise agreed
by the Contracting Governments concerned.

9.4.1.

9.5.

9.5.1.

9.6.

9.7.

9.8.

9.8.1.

70

10.

RECORDS

10.1.

Records of the following activities addressed in the ship security plan shall be kept
on board for at least the minimum period specified by the Administration, bearing in
mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

training, drills and exercises;

security threats and security incidents;

breaches of security;

changes in security level;

communications  relating  to  the  direct  security  of  the  ship  such  as  specific
threats to the ship or to port facilities the ship is, or has been;

internal audits and reviews of security activities;

periodic review of the ship security assessment;

periodic review of the ship security plan;

implementation of any amendments to the plan; and

10.2.

10.3.

.10 maintenance,  calibration  and  testing  of  any  security  equipment  provided  on

board including testing of the ship security alert system.

The  records  shall  be  kept  in  the  working  language  or  languages  of  the  ship.  If  the
language or languages used are not English, French or Spanish, a translation into one
of these languages shall be included.

The  records  may  be  kept  in  an  electronic  format.  In  such  a  case,  they  shall  be
protected by procedures aimed at preventing their unauthorized deletion, destruction
or amendment.

10.4.

The records shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

71

11.

COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER

11.1.

The Company shall designate a company security officer. A person designated as the
company  security  officer  may  act  as  the  company  security  officer  for  one  or  more
ships, depending on the number or types of ships the Company operates provided it
is  clearly  identified  for  which  ships  this  person  is  responsible.  A  Company  may,
depending on the number or types of ships they operate designate several persons as
company  security  officers  provided  it  is  clearly  identified  for  which  ships  each
person is responsible.

11.2.

In  addition  to  those  specified  elsewhere  in  this  Part  of  the  Code,  the  duties  and
responsibilities of the company security officer shall include, but are not limited to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

advising  the  level  of  threats  likely  to  be  encountered  by  the  ship,  using
appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;

ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out;

ensuring  the  development,  the  submission  for  approval,  and  thereafter  the
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan;

ensuring  that  the  ship  security  plan  is  modified,  as  appropriate,  to  correct
deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;

arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;

arranging  for  the  initial  and  subsequent  verifications  of  the  ship  by  the
Administration or the recognized security organization;

ensuring  that  deficiencies  and  non-conformities  identified  during  internal
audits,  periodic  reviews,  security  inspections  and  verifications  of  compliance
are promptly addressed and dealt with;

enhancing security awareness and vigilance;

ensuring  adequate  training  for  personnel  responsible  for  the  security  of  the
ship;

.10

ensuring  effective  communication and  co-operation  between  the  ship  security
officer and the relevant port facility security officers;

.11

ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;

.12

.13

ensuring  that,  if  sister-ship  or  fleet  security  plans  are  used,  the  plan  for  each
ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and

ensuring  that  any  alternative  or  equivalent  arrangements  approved  for  a
particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.

12.

SHIP SECURITY OFFICER

12.1.

A ship security officer shall be designated on each ship.

72

12.2.

In  addition  to  those  specified  elsewhere  in  this  Part  of  the  Code,  the  duties  and
responsibilities of the ship security officer shall include, but are not limited to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

undertaking regular security inspections of the  ship to ensure that  appropriate
security measures are maintained;

maintaining  and  supervising  the  implementation  of  the  ship  security  plan,
including any amendments to the plan;

co-ordinating  the  security  aspects  of  the  handling  of  cargo  and  ship’s  stores
with  other  shipboard  personnel  and  with  the  relevant  port  facility  security
officers;

proposing modifications to the ship security plan;

reporting  to  the  company  security  officer  any  deficiencies  and  non-
conformities  identified  during  internal  audits,  periodic  reviews,  security
inspections  and  verifications  of  compliance  and  implementing  any  corrective
actions;

enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;

ensuring  that  adequate  training  has  been  provided  to  shipboard  personnel,  as
appropriate;

reporting all security incidents;

co-ordinating  implementation  of  the  ship  security  plan  with  the  company
security officer and the relevant port facility security officer; and

.10

ensuring  that  security  equipment  is  properly  operated,  tested,  calibrated  and
maintained, if any.

13.

TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON SHIP SECURITY

13.1.

13.2.

13.3.

13.4.

The  company  security  officer  and  appropriate  shore-based  personnel  shall  have
knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given in part
B of this Code.

The  ship  security  officer  shall  have  knowledge  and  have  received  training,  taking
into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

Shipboard  personnel  having  specific  security  duties  and  responsibilities  shall
understand  their  responsibilities  for  ship  security  as  described  in  the  ship  security
plan and shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties,
taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

To  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  the  ship  security  plan,  drills  shall  be
carried out at appropriate intervals taking into account the ship type, ship personnel
changes,  port  facilities  to  be  visited  and  other  relevant  circumstances,  taking  into
account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

73

13.5.

The  company  security  officer  shall  ensure 
the  effective  coordination  and
implementation  of  ship  security  plans  by  participating  in  exercises  at  appropriate
intervals, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

14.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY

14.1.

A  port  facility  is  required  to  act  upon  the  security  levels  set  by  the  Contracting
Government  within  whose  territory  it  is  located.  Security  measures  and  procedures
shall  be  applied  at  the  port  facility  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cause  a  minimum  of
interference with, or delay to, passengers, ship, ship’s personnel and visitors, goods
and services.

14.2.

At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out  through  appropriate
measures in all port facilities, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this
Code, in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

ensuring the performance of all port facility security duties;

controlling access to the port facility;

monitoring of the port facility, including anchoring and berthing area(s);

monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;

supervising the handling of cargo;

supervising the handling of ship’s stores; and

ensuring that security communication is readily available.

14.3.

14.4.

At security level 2, the  additional  protective measures, specified in the  port facility
security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking
into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

At security level 3, further specific protective measures, specified in the port facility
security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking
into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

14.4.1.

In  addition,  at  security  level  3,  port  facilities  are  required  to  respond  to  and
implement  any  security  instructions  given  by  the  Contracting  Government  within
whose territory the port facility is located.

14.5. When a port facility security officer is advised that a ship encounters difficulties in
complying with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or this part or in implementing the
appropriate measures and procedures as detailed in the ship security plan, and in the
case of security level 3 following any security instructions given by the Contracting
Government  within  whose  territory  the  port  facility  is  located,  the  port  facility
security  officer  and  ship  security  officer  shall  liase  and  co-ordinate  appropriate
actions.

74

14.6. When a port facility security officer is advised that a ship is at a security level, which
is higher than that of the port facility, the port facility security officer shall report the
matter to the competent authority and shall liase with the ship security officer and co-
ordinate appropriate actions, if necessary.

15.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSMENT

15.1.

15.2.

The port facility security assessment is an essential and integral part of the process of
developing and updating the port facility security plan.

The  port  facility  security  assessment  shall  be  carried  out  by  the  Contracting
Government  within  whose  territory  the  port  facility  is  located.  A  Contracting
Government may authorise  a  recognized  security  organization  to  carry  out  the  port
facility security assessment of a specific port facility located within its territory.

15.2.1. When  the  port  facility  security  assessment  has  been  carried  out  by  a  recognized
security  organization,  the  security  assessment  shall  be  reviewed  and  approved  for
compliance with this section by the Contracting Government within whose territory
the port facility is located.

15.3.

15.4.

The persons carrying out the assessment shall have appropriate skills to evaluate the
security of the  port facility  in  accordance  with  this  section,  taking  into  account  the
guidance given in part B of this Code.

The  port  facility  security  assessments  shall  periodically  be  reviewed  and  updated,
taking account of changing threats and/or minor changes in the port facility and shall
always be reviewed and updated when major changes to the port facility take place.

15.5.

The port facility security assessment shall include, at least, the following elements:

.1

.2

.3

.4

identification  and  evaluation  of  important  assets  and  infrastructure  it  is
important to protect;

identification  of  possible  threats  to  the  assets  and  infrastructure  and  the
likelihood  of  their  occurrence,  in  order  to  establish  and  prioritize  security
measures;

identification,  selection and prioritization of counter measures  and  procedural
changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability; and

identification  of  weaknesses,  including  human  factors  in  the  infrastructure,
policies and procedures.

15.6.

The Contracting Government may allow a port facility security assessment to cover
more than one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design
of these port facilities are similar. Any Contracting Government, which allows such
an arrangement shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

75

15.7.

Upon completion of the port facility security assessment, a report shall be prepared,
consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a description of each
vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of counter measures that
could  be  used  to  address  each  vulnerability.  The  report  shall  be  protected  from
unauthorized access or disclosure.

16.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN

16.1.

A port facility security plan shall be developed and maintained, on the basis of a port
facility  security  assessment,  for  each  port  facility,  adequate  for  the  ship/port
interface. The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels, as defined in
this Part of the Code.

16.1.1. Subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  16.2,  a  recognized  security  organization  may

prepare the port facility security plan of a specific port facility.

16.2.

16.3.

The port facility security plan shall be approved by the Contracting  Government in
whose territory the port facility is located.

Such a plan shall be developed taking into account the guidance given in part B of
this  Code  and  shall  be  in  the  working  language  of  the  port  facility.  The  plan  shall
address, at least, the following:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

measures designed to prevent weapons or any other dangerous substances and
devices  intended  for  use  against  persons,  ships  or  ports  and  the  carriage  of
which is not authorized, from being introduced into the port facility or on board
a ship;

measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to the port facility, to ships
moored at the facility, and to restricted areas of the facility;

procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security, including
provisions  for  maintaining  critical  operations  of  the  port  facility  or  ship/port
interface;

procedures  for  responding  to  any  security  instructions  the  Contracting
Government, in whose territory the port facility is located, may give at security
level 3;

procedures for evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security;

duties of port facility personnel assigned security  responsibilities and of other
facility personnel on security aspects;

procedures for interfacing with ship security activities;

procedures for the periodic review of the plan and updating;

procedures for reporting security incidents;

.10

identification  of  the  port  facility  security  officer  including  24-hour  contact
details;

76

.11 measures to ensure the security of the information contained in the plan;

.12 measures designed to ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo handling

equipment at the port facility;

.13

procedures for auditing the port facility security plan;

.14

.15

procedures for responding in case the ship security alert system of a ship at the
port facility has been activated; and

procedures  for  facilitating  shore  leave  for  ship’s  personnel  or  personnel
changes,  as  well  as  access  of  visitors  to  the  ship  including  representatives  of
seafarers’ welfare and labour organizations.

16.3.1. Personnel conducting internal audits of the security activities specified in the plan or
evaluating  its  implementation  shall  be  independent  of  the  activities  being  audited
unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the port facility.

16.4.

16.5.

The port facility security plan may be combined with, or be part of, the port security
plan or any other port emergency plan or plans.

The  Contracting  Government  in  whose  territory  the  port  facility  is  located  shall
determine which changes to the port facility security plan shall not be implemented
unless the relevant amendments to the plan are approved by them.

16.6.

The plan may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, it shall be protected by
procedures aimed at preventing its unauthorized deletion, destruction or amendment.

16.7.

The plan shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

16.8.

Contracting Governments may allow a port facility security plan to cover more than
one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design of these
port  facilities  are  similar.  Any  Contracting  Government,  which  allows  such  an
alternative arrangement, shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

17.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER

17.1.

17.2.

A  port  facility  security  officer  shall  be  designated  for  each  port  facility.  A  person
may be designated as the port facility security officer for one or more port facilities.

In  addition  to  those  specified  elsewhere  in  this  Part  of  the  Code,  the  duties  and
responsibilities of the port facility security  officer  shall  include,  but  are  not  limited
to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

conducting an initial comprehensive security survey of the port facility taking
into account the relevant port facility security assessment;

ensuring the development and maintenance of the port facility security plan;

implementing and exercising the port facility security plan;

undertaking  regular  security  inspections  of  the  port  facility  to  ensure  the
continuation of appropriate security measures;

77

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

recommending  and  incorporating,  as  appropriate,  modifications  to  the  port
facility security plan in order to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to
take into account of relevant changes to the port facility;

enhancing security awareness and vigilance of the port facility personnel;

ensuring adequate training has been provided to personnel responsible for the
security of the port facility;

reporting  to  the  relevant  authorities  and  maintaining  records  of  occurrences
which threaten the security of the port facility;

co-ordinating  implementation  of  the  port  facility  security  plan  with  the
appropriate Company and ship security officer(s);

.10

co-ordinating with security services, as appropriate;

.11

.12

.13

ensuring  that  standards  for  personnel  responsible  for  security  of  the  port
facility are met;

ensuring  that  security  equipment  is  properly  operated,  tested,  calibrated  and
maintained, if any; and

assisting  ship  security  officers  in  confirming  the  identity  of  those  seeking  to
board the ship when requested.

17.3.

The  port  facility  security  officer  shall  be  given  the  necessary  support  to  fulfil  the
duties and responsibilities imposed by chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code.

18.

TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON PORT FACILITY SECURITY

18.1.

18.2.

18.3.

The port facility security officer and appropriate port facility security personnel shall
have knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given
in part B of this Code.

Port  facility  personnel  having  specific  security  duties  shall  understand  their  duties
and responsibilities for port facility security, as described in the port facility security
plan and shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties,
taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

To ensure the effective implementation of the port facility security plan, drills shall
be carried out at appropriate intervals taking into account  the  types  of  operation  of
the port facility, port facility personnel changes, the type of ship the port facility is
serving and other relevant circumstances, taking into account guidance given in part
B of this Code.

18.4.

The  port  facility  security  officer  shall  ensure  the  effective  coordination  and
implementation  of  the  port  facility  security  plan  by  participating  in  exercises  at
appropriate intervals, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

19.

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION FOR SHIPS

19.1.

Verifications

78

19.1.1. Each ship to which this Part of the Code applies shall be subject to the verifications

specified below:

.1

.2

.3

an initial verification before the ship is put in service or before the certificate
required  under  section  19.2  is  issued  for  the  first  time,  which  shall  include  a
complete  verification  of  its  security  system  and  any  associated  security
equipment covered by the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2, this Part of the
Code  and  the  approved  ship  security  plan.  This  verification  shall  ensure  that
the  security  system  and  any  associated  security  equipment  of  the  ship  fully
complies with the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2 and this Part of the
Code,  is in  satisfactory condition  and  fit  for  the  service  for  which  the  ship  is
intended;

a  renewal  verification  at  intervals  specified  by  the  Administration,  but  not
exceeding five years, except where section 19.3 is applicable. This verification
shall ensure that the security system and any associated security equipment of
the ship  fully  complies with  the  applicable  requirements  of  chapter XI-2,  this
Part  of  the  Code  and  the  approved  ship  security  plan,  is  in  satisfactory
condition and fit for the service for which the ship is intended;

at  least  one  intermediate  verification.  If  only  one  intermediate  verification  is
carried out it shall take place between the second and third anniversary date of
the  certificate  as  defined  in  regulation  I/2(n).  The  intermediate  verification
shall  include  inspection  of  the  security  system  and  any  associated  security
equipment of the ship to ensure that it remains satisfactory  for the service  for
which the ship is intended. Such intermediate verification shall be endorsed on
the certificate;

.4

any additional verifications as determined by the Administration.

19.1.2. The verifications of ships shall be carried out by officers of the Administration. The
Administration  may,  however,  entrust  the  verifications  to  a  recognized  security
organization referred to in regulation XI-2/1.

19.1.3.

In  every  case, the  Administration  concerned  shall  fully  guarantee  the  completeness
and  efficiency  of  the  verification  and  shall  undertake  to  ensure  the  necessary
arrangements to satisfy this obligation.

19.1.4. The  security  system  and  any  associated  security  equipment  of  the  ship  after
verification  shall  be  maintained  to  conform  with  the  provisions  of  regulations  XI-
2/4.2 and XI-2/6, this Part of the Code and the approved ship security plan. After any
verification  under  section  19.1.1  has  been  completed,  no  changes  shall  be  made  in
security  system  and  in  any  associated  security  equipment  or  the  approved  ship
security plan without the sanction of the Administration.

19.2.

Issue or endorsement of certificate

19.2.1. An International Ship Security Certificate shall be issued after the initial or renewal

verification in accordance with the provisions of section 19.1.

19.2.2. Such  certificate  shall  be  issued  or  endorsed  either  by  the  Administration  or  by  a

recognized security organization acting on behalf of the Administration.

79

19.2.3. Another  Contracting  Government  may,  at  the  request  of  the  Administration,  cause
the  ship  to  be  verified  and,  if  satisfied  that  the  provisions  of  section  19.1.1  are
complied  with,  shall  issue  or  authorize  the  issue  of  an  International  Ship  Security
Certificate to the ship and, where appropriate, endorse or authorize the endorsement
of that certificate on the ship, in accordance with this Code.

19.2.3.1.A copy of the certificate and a copy of the verification report shall be transmitted as

soon as possible to the requesting Administration.

19.2.3.2.A certificate so issued shall contain a statement to the effect that it has been issued at
the  request  of  the  Administration  and  it  shall  have  the  same  force  and  receive  the
same recognition as the certificate issued under section 19.2.2.

19.2.4. The  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  shall  be  drawn  up  in  a  form
corresponding to the model given in the appendix to this Code. If the language used
is not English, French or Spanish, the text shall include a translation into one of these
languages.

19.3.

Duration and validity of certificate

19.3.1. An  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  shall  be  issued  for  a  period  specified  by

the Administration which shall not exceed five years.

19.3.2. When  the  renewal  verification  is  completed  within  three  months  before  the  expiry
date  of  the  existing  certificate,  the  new  certificate  shall  be  valid  from  the  date  of
completion  of  the  renewal  verification  to  a  date  not  exceeding  five  years  from  the
date of expiry of the existing certificate.

19.3.2.1.When  the  renewal  verification  is  completed  after  the  expiry  date  of  the  existing
certificate,  the  new  certificate  shall  be  valid  from  the  date  of  completion  of  the
renewal verification to a date not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the
existing certificate.

19.3.2.2.When  the  renewal  verification  is  completed  more  than  three  months  before  the
expiry date of the existing certificate, the new certificate shall be valid from the date
of completion of the renewal verification to a date not exceeding five years from the
date of completion of the renewal verification.

19.3.3.

19.3.4.

If a certificate is issued for a period of less than five years, the Administration may
extend the validity of the certificate beyond the expiry date to the maximum period
specified  in  section  19.3.1,  provided  that  the  verifications  referred  to  in  section
19.1.1 applicable when a certificate is issued for a period of five years are carried out
as appropriate.

If a renewal verification has been completed and a new certificate cannot be issued
or  placed  on  board  the  ship  before  the  expiry  date  of  the  existing  certificate,  the
Administration  or  recognized  security  organization  acting  on  behalf  of  the
Administration  may  endorse  the  existing  certificate  and  such  a  certificate  shall  be
accepted as valid for  a  further  period  which  shall  not  exceed  five  months  from  the
expiry date.

80

19.3.5.

If  a  ship  at  the  time  when  a  certificate  expires  is  not  in  a  port  in  which  it  is  to  be
verified,  the Administration may  extend the  period  of validity  of  the  certificate  but
this extension shall be granted only for the purpose of allowing the ship to complete
its voyage  to  the  port  in  which  it  is  to  be  verified,  and  then  only  in  cases  where  it
appears proper and reasonable to do so. No certificate shall be extended for a period
longer than three months, and the ship to which an extension is granted shall not, on
its  arrival  in  the  port  in  which  it  is  to  be  verified,  be  entitled  by  virtue  of  such
extension  to  leave  that  port  without  having  a  new  certificate.  When  the  renewal
verification  is  completed, the new certificate  shall  be  valid  to  a  date  not  exceeding
five  years  from  the  expiry  date  of  the  existing  certificate  before  the  extension  was
granted.

19.3.6. A certificate issued to a ship engaged on short voyages which has not been extended
under the foregoing provisions of this section may be extended by the Administration
for a period of grace of up to one month from the date of expiry stated on it. When
the renewal verification is completed, the new certificate shall be valid to a date not
exceeding  five  years  from  the  date  of  expiry  of  the  existing  certificate  before  the
extension was granted.

19.3.7.

If  an  intermediate  verification  is  completed  before  the  period  specified  in  section
19.1.1, then:

.1

.2

the expiry date shown on the certificate shall be amended by endorsement to a
date which shall not be more than three years later than the date on which the
intermediate verification was completed;

the  expiry  date  may  remain  unchanged  provided  one  or  more  additional
verifications  are  carried  out  so  that  the  maximum  intervals  between  the
verifications prescribed by section 19.1.1 are not exceeded.

19.3.8. A certificate issued under section 19.2 shall cease to be valid in any of the following

cases:

.1

.2

.3

if  the  relevant  verifications  are  not  completed  within  the  periods  specified
under section 19.1.1;

if  the  certificate  is  not  endorsed  in  accordance  with  section  19.1.1.3  and
19.3.7.1, if applicable;

when  a  Company  assumes  the  responsibility  for  the  operation  of  a  ship  not
previously operated by that Company; and

.4

upon transfer of the ship to the flag of another State.

19.3.9.

In the case of:

.1

a  transfer  of  a  ship  to  the  flag  of  another  Contracting  Government,  the
Contracting Government whose flag the ship was formerly entitled to fly shall,
as soon  as  possible, transmit  to  the  receiving  Administration  copies  of,  or  all
information  relating  to,  the  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  carried  by
the ship before the transfer and copies of available verification reports, or

81

.2

a  Company  that  assumes  responsibility  for  the  operation  of  a  ship  not
previously operated by that Company, the previous Company shall as soon as
possible, transmit to the receiving Company copies of any information related
to  the  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  or  to  facilitate  the  verifications
described in section 19.4.2.

19.4.

Interim certification

19.4.1. The  certificates  specified  in  section  19.2  shall  be 

the
Administration issuing the certificate is fully satisfied that the ship complies with the
requirements of section 19.1. However, after 1 July 2004, for the purposes of:

issued  only  when 

.1

.2

.3

.4

a  ship  without  a  certificate,  on  delivery  or  prior  to  its  entry  or  re-entry  into
service;

transfer  of  a  ship  from  the  flag  of  a  Contracting  Government  to  the  flag  of
another Contracting Government;

transfer of a ship to the flag of a Contracting Government from a State which is
not a Contracting Government; or

when  a  Company  assumes  the  responsibility  for  the  operation  of  a  ship  not
previously operated by that Company;

until the certificate referred to in section 19.2 is issued, the Administration may cause
an  Interim  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  to  be  issued,  in  a  form
corresponding to the model given in the Appendix to this Part of the Code.

19.4.2. An  Interim  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  shall  only  be  issued  when  the
Administration or recognized security organization, on behalf of the Administration,
has verified that:

.1

.2

.3

the  ship  security  assessment  required  by  this  Part  of  the  Code  has  been
completed,

a copy of the ship security plan meeting the requirements of chapter XI-2 and
part A  of  this  Code  is  provided  on  board,  has  been  submitted  for  review  and
approval, and is being implemented on the ship;

the ship is provided with a ship security alert system meeting the requirements
of regulation XI-2/6, if required,

.4

the company security officer:

.1

has ensured:

.1

.2

.3

the review of the ship security plan for compliance with this Part of
the Code,

that the plan has been submitted for approval, and

that the plan is being implemented on the ship, and

82

.2

has  established  the  necessary  arrangements,  including  arrangements  for
drills, exercises and internal audits, through which the company security
officer  is  satisfied  that  the  ship  will  successfully  complete  the  required
verification in accordance with section 19.1.1.1, within 6 months;

.5

.6

arrangements have been made for carrying out the required verifications under
section 19.1.1.1;

the master, the ship’s security officer and other ship’s personnel with specific
security duties are familiar with their duties and responsibilities as specified in
this Part of the Code; and with the relevant provisions of the ship security plan
placed  on  board;  and  have  been  provided  such  information  in  the  working
language of the ship’s personnel or languages understood by them; and

.7

the ship security officer meets the requirements of this Part of the Code.

19.4.3. An  Interim  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  may  be 

the
Administration  or  by  a  recognized  security  organization  authorized  to  act  on  its
behalf.

issued  by 

19.4.4. An  Interim  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  shall  be  valid  for  6  months,  or
until  the  certificate  required  by  section  19.2  is  issued,  whichever  comes  first,  and
may not be extended.

19.4.5. No  Contracting  Government  shall  cause  a  subsequent,  consecutive  Interim
International Ship Security Certificate to be issued to a ship if, in the judgment of the
Administration  or  the  recognized  security  organization,  one  of  the  purposes  of  the
ship  or  a  Company  in  requesting  such  certificate  is  to  avoid  full  compliance  with
chapter  XI-2  and  this  Part  of  the  Code  beyond  the  period  of  the  initial  interim
certificate as specified in section 19.4.4.

19.4.6. For  the  purposes  of  regulation  XI-2/9,  Contracting  Governments  may,  prior  to
accepting  an  Interim  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  as  a  valid  certificate,
ensure that the requirements of sections 19.4.2.4 to 19.4.2.6 have been met.

83

Appendix to Part A

APPENDIX 1

Form of the International Ship Security Certificate

INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE

(official seal)

Certificate Number

(State)

Issued under the provisions of the

INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT FACILITIES
(ISPS CODE)

Under the authority of the Government of _________________________________________

(name of State)

by_________________________________________________________________________
(persons or organization authorized)

: ............................................................................................
Name of ship
: ............................................................................................
Distinctive number or letters
: ............................................................................................
Port of registry
: ............................................................................................
Type of ship
: ............................................................................................
Gross tonnage
IMO Number
: ............................................................................................
Name and address of the Company : ............................................................................................

THIS IS TO CERTIFY:

1

2

3

that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship has been
verified in accordance with section 19.1 of part A of the ISPS Code;

that  the  verification  showed  that  the  security  system  and  any  associated  security
equipment of the ship is in all respects satisfactory and that the ship complies with
the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the ISPS
Code;

that the ship is provided with an approved Ship Security Plan.

Date of initial/renewal verification on which this certificate is based .........................................

This Certificate is valid until........................................................................................................

subject to verifications in accordance with section 19.1.1 of part A of the ISPS Code.

Issued at...............................................

(place of issue of the Certificate)

Date of issue………………………….

…………………………………………..

(Signature of the duly authorized official

issuing the Certificate)

(Seal or stamp of issuing authority, as appropriate)

84

ENDORSEMENT FOR INTERMEDIATE VERIFICATION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that at an intermediate verification required by section 19.1.1 of part
A of the ISPS Code the ship was found to comply with the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2
of the Convention and part A of the ISPS Code.

Intermediate verification

Signed ...................................................
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

ENDORSEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL VERIFICATIONS*

Additional verification

Additional verification

Additional verification

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

___________

*

This part of the certificate shall be adapted by the Administration to indicate whether it has established
additional verifications as provided for in section 19.1.1.4.

85

ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION A/19.3.7.2 OF
THE ISPS CODE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that at an additional verification required by section 19.3.7.2 of part A
of the ISPS Code the ship was found to comply with the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2
of the Convention and part A of the ISPS Code.

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

ENDORSEMENT TO EXTEND THE CERTIFICATE IF VALID FOR LESS THAN
5 YEARS WHERE SECTION A/19.3.3 OF THE ISPS CODE APPLIES

The ship complies with the relevant provisions of part A of the ISPS Code, and the Certificate
shall, in accordance with section 19.3.3 of part A of the ISPS Code, be accepted as valid until

........................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

ENDORSEMENT WHERE THE RENEWAL VERIFICATION HAS BEEN
COMPLETED AND SECTION A/19.3.4 OF THE ISPS CODE APPLIES

The ship  complies  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  part  A  of  the  ISPS  Code,  and  the
Certificate shall, in accordance with section 19.3.4 of part A of the ISPS Code, be accepted as
valid until

........................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

86

ENDORSEMENT TO EXTEND THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE
UNTIL REACHING THE PORT OF VERIFICATION WHERE SECTION A/19.3.5
OF THE ISPS CODE APPLIES OR FOR A PERIOD OF GRACE WHERE
SECTION A/19.3.6 OF THE ISPS CODE APPLIES
This Certificate shall, in accordance with section 19.3.5 / 19.3.6*of part A of the ISPS Code,
be accepted as valid until ..................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

ENDORSEMENT FOR ADVANCEMENT OF EXPIRY DATE
WHERE SECTION A/19.3.7.1 OF THE ISPS CODE APPLIES

In accordance with section 19.3.7.1 of part A of the ISPS Code, the new expiry date**is

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

*

**

Delete as appropriate.
In case of completion of this part of the certificate the expiry date shown on the front of the certificate
shall also be amended accordingly.

87

                                                
APPENDIX 2

Form of the Interim International Ship Security Certificate

INTERIM INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE

(official seal)

Certificate No.

(State)

Issued under the provisions of the

INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT FACILITIES
(ISPS CODE)

Under the authority of the Government of _________________________________________

(name of State)

by _________________________________________________________________________
(persons or organization authorized)

Name of ship
Distinctive number or letters
Port of registry
Type of ship
Gross tonnage
IMO Number
Name and address of company
Is this a subsequent, consecutive interim certificate? Yes/ No*
If Yes, date of issue of initial interim certificate.......................................................

: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................
: ............................................................................................

THIS  IS TO CERTIFY THAT the requirements  of  section  A/19.4.2  of the  ISPS Code have
been complied with.

This Certificate is issued pursuant to section A/19.4 of the ISPS Code.

This Certificate is valid until.........................................................

Issued at...............................................

(place of issue of the Certificate)

Date of issue………………………….

…………………………………………..

(Signature of the duly authorized official

issuing the Certificate)

(Seal or stamp of issuing authority, as appropriate)

*Delete as appropriate

88

ANNEXE 3

Part B

GUIDANCE REGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF
CHAPTER XI-2 OF THE ANNEX TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974 AS AMENDED
AND
PART A OF THIS CODE

1.

INTRODUCTION

General

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

1.4.

1.5.

The preamble of this Code indicates that chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code establish
the new international framework of measures to enhance maritime security and through
which  ships  and  port  facilities  can  co-operate  to  detect  and  deter  acts  which  threaten
security in the maritime transport sector.

This introduction outlines, in a concise manner, the processes envisaged in establishing
and  implementing  the  measures  and  arrangements  needed  to  achieve  and  maintain
compliance with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and of part A of this Code and identifies
the main elements on which guidance is offered. The guidance is provided in paragraphs
2 through to 19. It also sets down essential considerations, which should be taken into
account  when  considering  the  application  of  the  guidance  relating  to  ships  and  port
facilities.

If the reader’s interest relates to ships alone, it is strongly recommended that this Part of
the Code is still read as a whole, particularly the sections relating to port facilities. The
same  applies  to  those  whose  primary  interest  are  port  facilities;  they  should  also  read
the sections relating to ships.

The  guidance  provided  in  the  following  sections  relates  primarily  to  protection  of  the
ship when it is at a port facility. There could, however, be situations when a ship may
pose a threat to the port facility, e.g. because, once within the port facility, it could be
used  as  a  base  from  which  to  launch  an  attack.  When  considering  the  appropriate
security  measures  to  respond  to  ship-based  security  threats,  those  completing  the  Port
Facility  Security  Assessment  or  preparing  the  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  should
consider  making  appropriate  adaptations  to  the  guidance  offered  in  the  following
sections.

The reader is advised that nothing in this Part of the Code should be read or interpreted
in conflict with any of the provisions of either chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code and
that the aforesaid provisions always prevail and override any unintended inconsistency
which  may  have  been  inadvertently  expressed  in  this  Part  of  the  Code.  The  guidance
provided  in  this  Part  of  the  Code  should  always  be  read,  interpreted  and  applied  in  a
manner  which  is  consistent  with  the  aims,  objectives  and  principles  established  in
chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

89

Responsibilities of Contracting Governments

1.6.

Contracting Governments have, under the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this
Code, various responsibilities, which, amongst others, include:

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

setting the applicable security level;

approving  the  Ship  Security  Plan  and  relevant  amendments  to  a  previously
approved plan;

verifying the compliance of ships with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A
of this Code and issuing to ships the International Ship Security Certificate;

determining which of the port facilities located within their territory are required
to  designate  a  Port  Facility  Security  Officer  who  will  be  responsible  for  the
preparation of the Port Facility Security Plan;

ensuring completion and approval of the Port Facility Security Assessment and of
any subsequent amendments to a previously approved assessment;

approving  the  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  and  any  subsequent  amendments  to  a
previously approved plan; and

exercising control and compliance measures;

testing approved plans; and

communicating information to the International Maritime Organization and to the
shipping and port industries.

1.7.

Contracting  Governments  can  designate,  or  establish,  Designated  Authorities  within
Government  to  undertake,  with  respect  to  port  facilities,  their  security  duties  under
chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and allow Recognized Security Organizations to
carry  out  certain  work  with  respect  to  port  facilities  but  the  final  decision  on  the
acceptance and approval of this work should be given by the Contracting Government
or  the  Designated  Authority.  Administrations  may  also  delegate  the  undertaking  of
certain  security  duties,  relating  to  ships,  to  Recognized  Security  Organizations.  The
following  duties  or  activities  cannot  be  delegated  to  a  Recognized  Security
Organization:

– 

– 

– 

– 

setting of the applicable security level;

determining  which  of  the  port  facilities  located  within  the  territory  of  a
Contracting Government are required to designate a Port Facility Security Officer
and to prepare a Port Facility Security Plan;

approving a Port Facility Security Assessment or any subsequent amendments to a
previously approved assessment;

approving  a  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  or  any  subsequent  amendments  to  a
previously approved plan;

– 

exercising control and compliance measures; and

90

– 

establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security.

Setting the security level

1.8.

The setting of the security level applying at any particular time is the responsibility of
Contracting Governments and can apply to ships and port facilities. Part A of this Code
defines three security levels for international use. These are:

– 

– 

– 

Security  Level  1,  normal;  the  level  at  which  ships  and  port  facilities  normally
operate;

Security  Level  2,  heightened;  the  level  applying  for  as  long  as  there  is  a
heightened risk of a security incident; and

Security Level 3, exceptional, the level applying for the period of time when there
is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

The Company and the Ship

1.9.

1.10.

1.11.

1.12.

Any Company operating ships to which chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code apply has
to designate a Company Security Officer for the Company and a Ship Security Officer
for  each  of  its  ships.  The  duties,  responsibilities  and  training  requirements  of  these
officers and requirements for drills and exercises are defined in part A of this Code.

The  Company  Security  Officer’s  responsibilities  include,  in  brief  amongst  others,
ensuring  that  a  Ship  Security  Assessment  is  properly  carried  out,  that  a  Ship  Security
Plan is prepared and submitted for approval by, or on behalf of, the Administration and
thereafter  is  placed  on  board  each  ship  to  which  part  A  of  this  Code  applies  and  in
respect of which that person has been appointed as the Company Security Officer.

The Ship Security Plan should indicate the operational and physical security measures
the  ship  itself  should  take  to  ensure  it  always  operates  at  security  level  1.  The  plan
should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the ship itself can
take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore,
the  plan  should  indicate  the  possible  preparatory  actions  the  ship  could  take  to  allow
prompt response to the instructions that may be issued to the ship by those responding at
security level 3 to a security incident or threat thereof.

The ships to which the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code apply are
required to have, and operated in accordance with, a Ship Security Plan approved by, or
on  behalf  of,  the  Administration.  The  Company  and  Ship  Security  Officer  should
monitor  the  continuing  relevance  and  effectiveness  of  the  plan,  including  the
undertaking of internal audits. Amendments to any of the elements of an approved plan,
for  which  the  Administration  has  determined  that  approval  is  required,  have  to  be
submitted for review and approval before their incorporation in the approved plan and
their implementation by the ship.

1.13.

The  ship  has  to  carry  an  International  Ship  Security  Certificate  indicating  that  it
complies with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code. Part A of this
Code  includes  provisions  relating  to  the  verification  and  certification  of  the  ship’s
compliance  with  the  requirements  on  an  initial,  renewal  and  intermediate  verification
basis.

91

1.14. When  a  ship  is  at  a  port  or  is  proceeding  to  a  port  of  a  Contracting  Government,  the
Contracting  Government  has  the  right,  under  the  provisions  of  regulation  XI-2/9,  to
exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship. The ship is
subject to port State control inspections but such inspections will not normally extend to
examination of the Ship Security Plan itself except in specific circumstances. The ship
may,  also,  be  subject  to  additional  control  measures  if  the  Contracting  Government
exercising the control and compliance measures has reason to believe that the security
of the ship has, or the port facilities it has served have, been compromised.

1.15.

The  ship  is  also  required  to  have  onboard  information,  to  be  made  available  to
Contracting Governments upon request, indicating who is responsible for deciding the
employment  of  the  ship’s  personnel  and  for  deciding  various  aspects  relating  to  the
employment of the ship.

The port facility

1.16.

Each  Contracting  Government  has  to  ensure  completion  of  a  Port  Facility  Security
Assessment  for  each  of  the  port  facilities,  located  within  its  territory,  serving  ships
engaged  on  international  voyages.  The  Contracting  Government,  a  Designated
Authority  or  a  Recognized  Security  Organization  may  carry  out  this  assessment.  The
completed  Port  Facility  Security  Assessment  has  to  be  approved  by  the  Contracting
Government or the Designated Authority concerned. This approval cannot be delegated.
Port Facility Security Assessments should be periodically reviewed.

1.17.

The Port Facility Security Assessment is fundamentally a risk analysis of all aspects of
a port facility’s operation in order to determine which part(s) of it are more susceptible,
and/or more likely, to be the subject of attack. Security risk is a function of the threat of
an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target and the consequences of an attack.

The assessment must include the following components:

– 

– 

– 

the perceived threat to port installations and infrastructure must be determined;

the potential vulnerabilities identified; and

the consequences of incidents calculated.

1.18.

1.19.

On completion of the  analysis, it will be possible  to produce an overall assessment of
the level of risk. The Port Facility Security Assessment will help determine which port
facilities  are  required  to  appoint  a  Port  Facility  Security  Officer  and  prepare  a  Port
Facility Security Plan.

The port facilities which have to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part
A  of  this  Code  are  required  to  designate  a  Port  Facility  Security  Officer.  The  duties,
responsibilities  and  training  requirements  of  these  officers  and  requirements  for  drills
and exercises are defined in part A of this Code.

The  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  should  indicate  the  operational  and  physical  security
measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates at security level
1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the port
facility  can  take  to  move  to  and  operate  at  security  level  2  when  instructed  to  do  so.
Furthermore, the plan should  indicate the  possible preparatory  actions  the  port  facility
could  take  to  allow  prompt  response  to  the  instructions  that  may  be  issued  by  those
responding at security level 3 to a security incident or threat thereof.

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1.20.

relevance  of 

the  continuing  effectiveness  and 

The port facilities which have to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part
A  of  this  Code  are  required  to  have,  and  operate  in  accordance  with,  a  Port  Facility
Security Plan approved by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority
concerned.  The  Port  Facility  Security  Officer  should  implement  its  provisions  and
monitor 
including
commissioning internal audits of the application of the plan. Amendments to any of the
elements of an approved plan, for which the Contracting Government or the Designated
Authority concerned has determined that approval is required, have to be submitted for
review  and  approval  before  their  incorporation  in  the  approved  plan  and  their
implementation  at  the  port  facility.  The  Contracting  Government  or  the  Designated
Authority  concerned may  test  the effectiveness of  the  plan.  The  Port  Facility  Security
Assessment covering the port facility or on which the development of the plan has been
based should be regularly reviewed. All these activities may lead to amendment of the
approved plan. Any amendments to specified elements of an approved plan will have to
be  submitted  for  approval  by  the  Contracting  Government  or  by  the  Designated
Authority concerned.

the  plan, 

1.21.

Ships  using  port  facilities  may  be  subject  to  the  port  State  control  inspections  and
additional control measures outlined in regulation XI-2/9. The relevant authorities may
request the provision of information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers and ship’s
personnel prior to the ship’s entry into port. There may be circumstances in which entry
into port could be denied.

Information and communication

1.22.

2.

2.1.

Chapter  XI-2  and  part  A  of  this  Code  require  Contracting  Governments  to  provide
certain information to the International Maritime Organization and for information to be
made  available  to  allow  effective  communication  between  Contracting  Governments
and between Company/Ship Security Officers and the Port Facility Security Officers.

DEFINITIONS

No guidance is provided with respect to the definitions set out in chapter XI-2 or part A
of this Code.

2.2.

For the purpose of this Part of the Code:

.1

.2

.3

“section”  means  a  section  of  part  A  of  the  Code  and  is  indicated  as  “section
A/<followed by the number of the section>”;

“paragraph”  means  a  paragraph  of  this  Part  of  the  Code  and  is  indicated  as
“paragraph <followed by the number of the paragraph>”; and

“Contracting  Government”,  when  used  in  paragraphs  14  to  18,  means  the
“Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located” and
includes a reference to the “Designated Authority”.

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3.

APPLICATION

General

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

The  guidance  given  in  this  Part  of  the  Code  should  be  taken  into  account  when
implementing the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

However, it should be recognized that the extent to which the guidance on ships applies
will depend on the type of ship, its cargoes and/or passengers, its trading pattern and the
characteristics of the port facilities visited by the ship.

Similarly, in relation to the guidance on port facilities, the extent to which this guidance
applies will depend on the port facilities, the types of ships using the port  facility, the
types of cargo and/or passengers and the trading patterns of visiting ships.

The provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code are not intended to apply to port
facilities designed and used primarily for military purposes.

4.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS

Security of assessments and plans

4.1.

Contracting Governments should ensure that appropriate measures are in place to avoid
unauthorized  disclosure  of,  or  access  to,  security  sensitive  material  relating  to  Ship
Security Assessments, Ship Security Plans, Port Facility Security Assessments and Port
Facility Security Plans, and to individual assessments or plans.

Designated authorities

4.2.

Contracting  Governments  may  identify  a  Designated  Authority  within  Government  to
undertake their security duties relating to port facilities as set out in chapter XI-2 or part
A of this Code.

Recognized Security Organizations

4.3.

Contracting Governments may authorize a Recognized Security Organization (RSO) to
undertake certain security related activities, including:

.1

.2

.3

approval  of  Ship  Security  Plans,  or  amendments  thereto,  on  behalf  of  the
Administration;

verification  and  certification  of  compliance  of  ships  with  the  requirements  of
chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code on behalf of the Administration; and

conducting  Port  Facility  Security  Assessments  required  by  the  Contracting
Government.

4.4.

An  RSO  may  also  advise  or  provide  assistance  to  Companies  or  port  facilities  on
security  matters,  including  Ship  Security  Assessments,  Ship  Security  Plans,  Port
Facility  Security  Assessments  and  Port  Facility  Security  Plans.  This  can  include
completion of a Ship Security Assessment or Plan or Port Facility Security Assessment
or Plan. If an RSO has done so in respect of a ship security assessment or plan that RSO
should not be authorized to approve that ship security plan.

94

4.5.

When authorizing an RSO, Contracting  Governments should give consideration to the
competency of such an organization. An RSO should be able to demonstrate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

expertise in relevant aspects of security;

appropriate knowledge of ship  and  port operations, including  knowledge  of ship
design  and  construction if providing services in respect of ships and port  design
and construction if providing services in respect of port facilities;

their capability to assess the likely security risks that could occur during ship and
port facility operations including the ship/port interface and how to minimise such
risks;

their ability to maintain and improve the expertise of their personnel;

their ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness of their personnel;

their ability to maintain appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized disclosure of,
or access to, security sensitive material;

their  knowledge  of  the  requirements  chapter  XI-2  and  part  A  of  this  Code  and
relevant national and international legislation and security requirements;

their knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

their knowledge  on  recognition  and  detection  of  weapons,  dangerous  substances
and devices;

.10

their knowledge  on recognition,  on  a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics
and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;

.11

their knowledge on techniques used to circumvent security measures; and

.12

their  knowledge  of  security  and  surveillance  equipment  and  systems  and  their
operational limitations.

When  delegating  specific  duties  to  a  RSO,  Contracting  Governments,  including
Administrations, should ensure that the RSO has the competencies needed to undertake
the task.

4.6.

4.7.

A Recognized Organization, as defined in regulation I/6 and fulfilling the requirements
of  regulation  XI-1/1,  may  be  appointed  as  a  RSO  provided  it  has  the  appropriate
security related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

A  Port  or  Harbour  Authority  or  Port  Facility  operator  may  be  appointed  as  a  RSO
provided it has the appropriate security related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

95

Setting the security level

4.8.

In  setting  the  security  level  Contracting  Governments  should  take  account  of  general
and specific threat information. Contracting Governments should set the  security level
applying to ships or port facilities at one of three levels:

– 

– 

– 

Security  level  1:  normal,  the  level  at  which  the  ship  or  port  facility  normally
operates;

Security level 2: heightened, the level applying for as long as there is a heightened
risk of a security incident; and

Security level 3: exceptional, the level applying for the period of time when there
is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

Setting security level 3 should be an exceptional measure applying only when there is
credible  information  that  a  security  incident  is  probable  or  imminent.  Security  level  3
should  only  be  set  for  the  duration  of  the  identified  security  threat  or  actual  security
incident. While the security levels  may change  from security level  1, through security
level 2 to security level 3, it is also possible that the security levels will change directly
from security level 1 to security level 3.

At  all  times  the  Master  of  a  ship  has  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  the  safety  and
security  of  the  ship.  Even  at  security  level  3  a  Master  may  seek  clarification  or
amendment of  instructions  issued by those responding  to  a  security  incident,  or  threat
thereof, if there are reasons to believe that compliance with any instruction may imperil
the safety of the ship.

The Company Security Officer (CSO) or the Ship Security Officer (SSO) should liase at
the  earliest  opportunity  with  the  Port  Facility  Security  Officer  (PFSO)  of  the  port
facility the ship is intended to visit to establish the security level applying for that ship
at the port facility. Having established contact with a ship, the PFSO should advise the
ship of any subsequent change in the port facility’s security level and should provide the
ship with any relevant security information.

4.9.

4.10.

4.11.

4.12. While there may be circumstances when an individual ship may be operating at a higher
security level than the port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when a
ship can have a lower security  level than  the port  facility it is  visiting.  If a ship has  a
higher  security  level  than  the  port  facility  it  intends  to  use,  the  CSO  or  SSO  should
advise  the  PFSO  without  delay.  The  PFSO  should  undertake  an  assessment  of  the
particular  situation  in  consultation  with  the  CSO  or  SSO  and  agree  on  appropriate
security  measures  with  the  ship,  which  may  include  completion  and  signing  of  a
Declaration of Security.

96

4.13.

Contracting  Governments  should  consider  how  information  on  changes  in  security
levels  should  be  promulgated  rapidly.  Administrations  may  wish  to  use  NAVTEX
messages or Notices to Mariners  as the method  for notifying such  changes in  security
levels  to  ship  and  CSO  and  SSO.  Or,  they  may  wish  to  consider  other  methods  of
communication  that  provide  equivalent  or  better  speed  and  coverage.  Contracting
Governments should establish means of notifying PFSOs of changes in security levels.
Contracting Governments should compile and maintain the contact details for a list of
those who need to be informed of changes in security levels. Whereas the security level
need not be regarded  as  being  particularly sensitive, the underlying  threat  information
may be highly sensitive. Contracting Governments should give careful consideration to
the type and detail of the information conveyed and the method by which it is conveyed,
to SSOs, CSOs and PFSOs.

Contact points and information on Port Facility Security Plans

4.14. Where a port facility has a PFSP, that fact has to be communicated to the Organization
and  that  information  must  also  be  made  available  to  Company  and  Ship  Security
Officers.  No  further  details  of  the  PFSP  have  to  be  published  other  than  that  it  is  in
place. Contracting Governments should consider establishing either central or regional
points of contact, or other means of providing up to date information  on  the locations
where  PFSPs  are  in  place,  together  with  contact  details  for  the  relevant  PFSO.  The
existence  of  such  contact  points  should  be  publicised.  They  could  also  provide
information on the recognized security organizations appointed to act on behalf of the
Contracting  Government,  together  with  details  of  the  specific  responsibility  and
conditions of authority delegated to such recognized security organizations.

4.15.

4.16.

In the case of a port that does not have a PFSP (and therefore does not have a PFSO) the
central or regional point of contact should be able to identify a suitably qualified person
ashore who can arrange for appropriate security measures to be in place, if needed, for
the duration of the ship’s visit.

Contracting  Governments  should  also  provide  the  contact  details  of  Government
officers  to  whom  an  SSO,  a  CSO  and  a  PFSO  can  report  security  concerns.  These
Government officers should assess such reports before taking appropriate action. Such
reported  concerns  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  security  measures  falling  under  the
jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting  Government.  In  that  case,  the  Contracting
Governments  should  consider  contacting  their  counterpart  in  the  other  Contracting
Government  to  discuss  whether  remedial  action  is  appropriate.  For  this  purpose,  the
contact details of the Government officers should be communicated to the International
Maritime Organization.

4.17.

Contracting  Governments  should  also  make  the  information  indicated  in  paragraphs
4.14 to 4.16, available to other Contracting Governments on request.

Identification documents

4.18.

Contracting Governments are encouraged to issue appropriate identification documents
to Government officials entitled to board ships or enter port facilities when performing
their  official  duties  and  to  establish  procedures  whereby  the  authenticity  of  such
documents might be verified.

97

Fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location

4.19.

Contracting  Governments  should  consider  establishing  appropriate  security  measures
for fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location to allow
interaction with ships which are required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2
and part A of this Code.

Ships which are not required to comply with part A of this Code

4.20.

Contracting Governments should consider establishing appropriate security measures to
enhance the security of ships to which this chapter XI-2 and part A of this  Code does
not  apply  and  to  ensure  that  any  security  provisions  applying  to  such  ships  allow
interaction with ships to which part A of this Code applies.

Threats to ships and other incidents at sea

4.21.

Contracting Governments should provide general guidance on the measures considered
appropriate to reduce the security risk to ships flying their flag when at sea. They should
provide specific advice on the action to be taken in accordance with security levels 1 to
3, if:

.1

there is a change in the security level applying to the ship while it is at sea, e.g.
because  of  the  geographical  area  in  which  it  is  operating  or  relating  to  the  ship
itself; and

.2

there is a security incident or threat thereof involving the ship while at sea.

Contracting  Governments  should  establish  the  best  methods  and  procedures  for  these
purposes.  In  the  case  of  an  imminent  attack  the  ship  should  seek  to  establish  direct
communication  with  those  responsible  in  the  flag  State  for  responding  to  security
incidents.

4.22.

Contracting Governments should also establish a point of contact for advice on security
for any ship:

.1

.2

entitled to fly their flag; or

operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their
territorial sea.

4.23.

Contracting Governments should offer  advice  to ships operating in their territorial sea
or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, which could include
advice:

.1

.2

.3

.4

to alter or delay their intended passage;

to navigate on a particular course or proceed to a specific location;

on the availability of any personnel or equipment that could be placed on the ship;

to co-ordinate the passage, arrival into port or departure from port, to allow escort
by patrol craft or aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter).

98

Contracting  Governments  should  remind  ships  operating  in  their  territorial  sea,  or
having  communicated  an  intention  to  enter  their  territorial  sea,  of  any  temporary
restricted areas that they have published.

4.24.

4.25.

Contracting Governments should recommend that ships operating in their territorial sea,
or  having  communicated  an  intention  to  enter  their  territorial  sea,  implement
expeditiously,  for  the  ship’s  protection  and  for  the  protection  of  other  ships  in  the
vicinity, any security measure the Contracting Government may have advised.

The  plans  prepared  by  the  Contracting  Governments  for  the  purposes  given  in
paragraph 4.22 should include information on an appropriate point of contact, available
on  a  24-hour  basis,  within  the  Contracting  Government  including  the  Administration.
These  plans  should  also  include  information  on  the  circumstances  in  which  the
Administration considers assistance should be sought from nearby coastal States, and a
procedure for liaison between port facility security officers and ship security officers.

Alternative security agreements

4.26.

Contracting Governments, in considering how to implement chapter XI-2 and part A of
this  Code,  may  conclude  one  or  more  agreements  with  one  or  more  Contracting
Governments.  The  scope  of  an  agreement  is  limited  to  short  international  voyages  on
fixed routes between port facilities in the territory of the parties to the agreement. When
concluding  an  agreement,  and  thereafter,  the  Contracting  Governments  should  consult
other  Contracting  Governments  and  Administrations  with  an  interest  in  the  effects  of
the agreement. Ships flying the flag of a State that is not party to the agreement should
only  be  allowed  to  operate  on  the  fixed  routes  covered  by  the  agreement  if  their
Administration agrees that the ship should comply with the provisions of the agreement
and requires the ship to do so. In no case can such an agreement compromise the level
of security of other ships and port facilities not covered by it, and specifically, all ships
covered by such an agreement may not conduct ship-to-ship activities with ships not so
covered.  Any  operational  interface  undertaken  by  ships  covered  by  the  agreement
should  be  covered  by  it.  The  operation  of  each  agreement  must  be  continually
monitored  and  amended  when  the  need  arises  and  in  any  event  should  be  reviewed
every 5 years.

Equivalent arrangements for port facilities

4.27.

For certain specific port facilities with limited or special operations but with more than
occasional  traffic,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  ensure  compliance  by  security  measures
equivalent to those prescribed in chapter XI-2 and in part A of this Code. This can, in
particular,  be  the  case  for  terminals  such  as  those  attached  to  factories,  or  quaysides
with no frequent operations.

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Manning level

4.28.

In establishing the minimum safe manning of a ship the Administration should take into
account that the minimum safe manning provisions established by regulation V/14 only
address  the  safe  navigation  of  the  ship.  The  Administration  should  also  take  into
account  any  additional  workload  which  may  result  from  the  implementation  of  the
ship’s security plan  and  ensure that the ship  is  sufficiently  and effectively  manned.  In
doing so the Administration should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of
rest  and  other  measures  to  address  fatigue  which  have  been  promulgated  by  national
law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various shipboard personnel.

Control and compliance measures

General

4.29.

4.30.

4.31.

4.32.

Regulation  XI-2/9  describes  the  control  and  compliance  measures  applicable  to  ships
under chapter XI-2. It is divided into three distinct sections; control of ships already in a
port, control of ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government, and
additional provisions applicable to both situations.

Regulation  XI-2/9.1,  control  of  ships  in  port,  implements  a  system  for  the  control  of
ships  while  in  the  port  of  a  foreign  country  where  duly  authorized  officers  of  the
Contracting  Government  (duly  authorized  officers)  have  the  right  to  go  on  board  the
ship to verify  that  the  required  certificates  are  in  proper  order.  Then  if  there  are  clear
grounds  to  believe  the  ship  does  not  comply,  control  measures  such  as  additional
inspections or detention may be taken. This reflects current control systems. Regulation
XI-2/9.1  builds  on  such  systems  and  allows  for  additional  measures  (including
expulsion of a ship from a port to be taken as a control measure) when duly authorized
officers  have  clear  grounds  for  believing  that  a  ship  is  in  non-compliance  with  the
requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code. Regulation XI-2/9.3 describes the
safeguards  that  promote  fair  and  proportionate  implementation  of  these  additional
measures.

Regulation XI-2/9.2 applies control measures to ensure compliance to ships intending to
enter  a  port  of  another  Contracting  Government  and  introduces  an  entirely  different
concept of control within chapter XI-2, applying to security only. Under this regulation
measures may be implemented prior to the ship entering port, to better ensure security.
Just as in regulation XI-2/9.1, this additional control system is based on the concept of
clear grounds for believing the ship does not comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this
Code,  and  includes  significant  safeguards  in  regulations  XI-2/9.2.2  and  XI-2/9.2.5  as
well as in regulation XI-2/9.3.

Clear grounds that the ship is not in compliance means evidence or reliable information
that the ship does not correspond with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this
Code, taking into account the guidance given in this Part of the Code. Such evidence or
reliable  information  may  arise  from  the  duly  authorized  officer’s  professional
judgement or observations gained while verifying the ship’s International Ship Security
Certificate or  Interim International Ship Security Certificate issued in  accordance with
part A of this Code (certificate) or from other sources. Even if a valid certificate is on
board the ship, the duly authorized officers may still  have  clear  grounds  for  believing
that the ship is not in compliance based on their professional judgment.

100

4.33.

Examples  of  possible  clear  grounds  under  regulations  XI-2/9.1  and  XI-2/9.2  may
include, when relevant:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

evidence from a review of the certificate that it is not valid or it has expired;

evidence  or  reliable  information  that  serious  deficiencies  exist  in  the  security
equipment, documentation or arrangements required  by  chapter  XI-2  and  part  A
of this Code;

receipt of  a  report  or  complaint  which,  in  the  professional  judgment  of  the  duly
authorized  officer,  contains  reliable  information  clearly  indicating  that  the  ship
does not comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code;

evidence  or  observation  gained  by  a  duly  authorized  officer  using  professional
judgment  that  the  master  or  ship’s  personnel  is  not  familiar  with  essential
shipboard security procedures or cannot carry out drills related to the security of
the ship or that such procedures or drills have not been carried out;

evidence  or  observation  gained  by  a  duly  authorized  officer  using  professional
judgment  that  key  members  ship’s  personnel  are  not  able  to  establish  proper
communication  with  any  other  key  members  of  ship’s  personnel  with  security
responsibilities on board the ship;

evidence  or  reliable  information  that  the  ship  has  embarked  persons,  or  loaded
stores or goods at a port facility or from another ship where either the port facility
or the other ship is in violation of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship
in  question  has  not  completed  a  Declaration  of  Security,  nor  taken  appropriate,
special  or  additional  security  measures  or  has  not  maintained  appropriate  ship
security procedures;

evidence  or  reliable  information  that  the  ship  has  embarked  persons,  or  loaded
stores  or  goods  at  a  port  facility  or  from  another  source  (e.g.,  another  ship  or
helicopter transfer) where either the port facility or the other source is not required
to  comply  with  chapter  XI-2  or  part  A  of  this  Code,  and  the  ship  has  not  taken
appropriate,  special  or  additional  security  measures  or  has  not  maintained
appropriate security procedures; and

if  the  ship  holds  a  subsequent,  consecutively  issued  Interim  International  Ship
Security  Certificate  as  described  in  section  A/19.4,  and  if,  in  the  professional
judgment  of  an  officer  duly  authorized,  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  ship  or  a
Company  in  requesting  such  a  certificate  is  to  avoid  full  compliance  with
chapter XI-2  and  part  A  of  this  Code  beyond  the  period  of  the  initial  interim
certificate as described in section A/19.4.4.

4.34.

The international law implications of regulation XI-2/9 are particularly relevant, and the
regulation  should  be  implemented  with  regulation  XI-2/2.4  in  mind,  as  the  potential
exists for situations where either measures will be taken which fall outside the scope of
chapter  XI-2,  or  where  rights  of  affected  ships,  outside  chapter  XI-2,  should  be
considered.  Thus,  regulation  XI-2/9  does  not  prejudice  the  Contracting  Government
from taking measures having a basis in, and consistent with, international law, to ensure
the safety or security of persons, ships, port facilities and other property in cases where
the  ship,  although  in  compliance  with  chapter  XI-2  and  part  A  of  this  Code,  is  still
considered to present a security risk.

101

4.35. When  a  Contracting  Government 

the
Administration should, without delay, be contacted with sufficient information to enable
the Administration to fully liaise with the Contracting Government.

imposes  control  measures  on  a  ship, 

Control of ships in port

4.36. Where  the  non-compliance  is  either  a  defective  item  of  equipment  or  faulty
documentation  leading  to  the  ship’s  detention  and  the  non-compliance  cannot  be
remedied in the port of inspection, the Contracting Government may allow the ship to
sail to another port provided that any conditions agreed between the port States and the
Administration or master are met.

Ships intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government

4.37.

Regulation XI-2/9.2.1 lists the information Contracting Governments may require from
a ship as a condition of entry into port. One item of information listed is confirmation of
any  special  or  additional  measures  taken  by  the  ship  during  its  last  ten  calls  at  a  port
facility. Examples could include:

.1

.2

records of the measures taken while visiting a port facility located in the territory
of a State which is not a Contracting Government especially those measures that
would normally have been provided by port facilities located in the territories of
Contracting Governments; and

any  Declarations  of  Security  that  were  entered  into  with  port  facilities  or  other
ships.

4.38.

Another  item  of  information  listed,  that  may  be  required  as  a  condition  of  entry  into
port, is confirmation that appropriate ship security  procedures were maintained during
ship-to-ship activity conducted within the period of the last 10 calls at a port facility. It
would  not  normally  be  required  to  include  records  of  transfers  of  pilots,  customs,
immigration,  security  officials  nor  bunkering,  lightering,  loading  of  supplies  and
unloading of waste by ship within port facilities as these would normally fall within the
auspices of the Port Facility Security Plan. Examples of information that might be given
include:

.1

.2

.3

records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship to ship activity with a ship
flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government especially those
measures  that  would  normally  have  been  provided  by  ships  flying  the  flag  of
Contracting Governments;

records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship to ship activity with a ship
that is flying the flag of a Contracting Government but is not required to comply
with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code such as a copy of any
security certificate issued to that ship under other provisions; and

in  the  event  that  persons  or  goods  rescued  at  sea  are  on  board,  all  known
information  about  such  persons  or  goods,  including  their  identities  when  known
and  the  results  of  any  checks  run  on  behalf  of  the  ship  to  establish  the  security
status  of  those  rescued.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  chapter  XI-2  or  part  A  of  this
Code  to  delay  or  prevent  the  delivery  of  those  in  distress  at  sea  to  a  place  of
safety. It is the sole intention of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code to provide
States with enough appropriate information to maintain their security integrity.

102

4.39.

Examples  of  other  practical  security  related  information  that  may  be  required  as  a
condition  of  entry  into  port  in  order  to  assist  with  ensuring  the  safety  and  security  of
persons, port facilities, ships and other property include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

information contained in the Continuous Synopsis Record;

location of the ship at the time the report is made;

expected time of arrival of the ship in port;

crew list;

general description of cargo aboard the ship;

passenger list; and

information required to be carried under regulation XI-2/5.

4.40.

Regulation XI-2/9.2.5 allows the master of a ship, upon being informed that the coastal
or  port  State  will  implement  control  measures  under  regulation  XI-2/9.2,  to  withdraw
the intention for the ship to enter port. If the master withdraws that intention, regulation
XI-2/9  no  longer  applies,  and  any  other  steps  that  are  taken  must  be  based  on,  and
consistent with, international law.

Additional provisions

4.41.

In all cases where a ship is denied entry or expelled from a port, all known facts should
be  communicated  to  the  authorities  of  relevant  States.  This  communication  should
consist of the following when known:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

name  of  ship,  its  flag,  the  ship’s  identification  number,  call  sign,  ship  type  and
cargo;

reason for denying entry or expulsion from port or port areas;

if relevant, the nature of any security non-compliance;

if relevant, details of any attempts made to rectify any non-compliance, including
any conditions imposed on the ship for the voyage;

past port(s) of call and next declared port of call;

time of departure and likely estimated time of arrival at those ports;

any instructions given to ship, e.g., reporting on route;

available information on the security level at which the ship is currently operating;

information  regarding  any  communications  the  port  State  has  had  with  the
Administration;

.10

contact point within the port State making the report for the purpose of obtaining
further information;

.11

crew list; and

103

.12

any other relevant information.

4.42.

4.43.

4.44.

Relevant States to contact should include those along the ship’s intended passage to its
next port, particularly if the ship intends to enter the territorial sea of that coastal State.
Other  relevant  States  could  include  previous  ports  of  call,  so  that  further  information
might be obtained and security issues relating to the previous ports resolved.

In  exercising  control  and  compliance  measures,  the  duly  authorized  officers  should
ensure  that  any  measures  or  steps  imposed  are  proportionate.  Such  measures  or  steps
should be reasonable and of the minimum severity and duration necessary to rectify or
mitigate the non-compliance.

The word “delay” in regulation XI-2/9.3.5.1 also refers to situations where, pursuant to
actions taken under this regulation, the ship is unduly denied entry into port or the ship
is unduly expelled from port.

Non-party ships and ships below convention size

4.45. With respect to ships flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government
to  the  Convention  and  not  a  Party  to  the  1988  SOLAS  Protocol48,  Contracting
Governments should not give more favourable treatment to such ships. Accordingly, the
requirements  of  regulation  XI-2/9  and  the  guidance  provided  in  this  Part  of  the  Code
should be applied to those ships.

4.46.

Ships below Convention size are subject to measures by which States maintain security.
Such measures should be taken with due regard to the requirements in chapter XI-2 and
the guidance provided in this Part of the Code.

5.

DECLARATION OF SECURITY

General

5.1.

5.1.1.

5.1.2.

5.2.

A  Declaration  of  Security  (DoS)  should  be  completed  when  the  Contracting
Government  of  the  port  facility  deems  it  to  be  necessary  or  when  a  ship  deems  it
necessary.

The  need  for  a  DoS  may  be  indicated  by  the  results  of  the  Port  Facility  Security
Assessment  (PFSA)  and  the  reasons  and  circumstances  in  which  a  DoS  is  required
should be set out in the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP).

The need for a DoS may be indicated by an Administration for ships entitled to fly its
flag or as a result of a ship security assessment and should be set out in the ship security
plan.

It  is  likely  that  a  DoS  will  be  requested  at  higher  security  levels,  when  a  ship  has  a
higher security level than the port facility, or another ship with which it interfaces, and
for  ship/port  interface  or  ship  to  ship  activities  that  pose  a  higher  risk  to  persons,
property  or  the  environment  for  reasons  specific  to  that  ship,  including  its  cargo  or
passengers or the circumstances at the port facility or a combination of these factors.

5.2.1.

5.2.1 In the case that a ship or an Administration, on behalf of ships entitled to fly its
flag,  requests  completion  of  a  DoS,  the  Port  Facility  Security  Officer  (PFSO)  or  Ship

48

Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974.

104

                                                
Security Officer (SSO) should acknowledge the request and discuss appropriate security
measures.

5.3.

5.4.

A PFSO may  also  initiate a  DoS prior to ship/port  interfaces that  are  identified  in  the
approved PFSA as being of particular concern. Examples may include the embarking or
disembarking passengers, and the transfer, loading or unloading of dangerous goods or
hazardous substances. The PFSA may also identify facilities at or near highly populated
areas or economically significant operations that warrant a DoS.

The main purpose of a DoS is to ensure agreement is reached between the ship and the
port  facility  or  with  other  ships  with  which  it  interfaces  as  to  the  respective  security
measures  each  will  undertake  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  their  respective
approved security plans.

5.4.1.

The agreed DoS should be signed and dated by both the port facility and the ship(s), as
applicable, to indicate compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and should
include its duration, the relevant security level, or levels and the relevant contact details.

5.4.2. A change in the security level may require that a new or revised DoS be completed.

5.5.

5.6.

The DoS should be completed in English, French or Spanish or in a language common
to both the port facility and the ship or the ships, as applicable.

A model  DoS is  included in  Appendix 1 to this Part of the  Code. This model is for a
DoS  between  a  ship  and  a  port  facility.  If  the  DoS  is  to  cover  two  ships  this  model
should be appropriately adjusted.

6.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY

General

6.1.

6.2.

6.3.

6.4.

6.5.

Regulation  XI-2/5  requires  the  company  to  provide  the  master  of  the  ship  with
information  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Company  under  the  provisions  of  this
regulation. This information should include items such as:

.1

.2

.3

parties responsible for appointing shipboard personnel, such as ship management
companies, manning agents, contractors, concessionaries (for example, retail sales
outlets, casinos, etc.);

parties  responsible  for  deciding  the  employment  of  the  ship  including,  time  or
bareboat charterer(s) or any other entity acting in such capacity; and

in cases when the ship is employed under the terms of a charter party, the contact
details of those parties including time or voyage charterers.

In  accordance with regulation  XI-2/5 the Company  is  obliged  to  update  and  keep  this
information current as and when changes occur.

This information should be in English, French or Spanish language.

With respect to ships constructed before 1 July 2004, this information should reflect the
actual condition on that date.

With  respect  to  ships  constructed  on  or  after  1  July  2004  and  for  ships  constructed
before 1 July 2004 which were out of service on 1 July 2004, the information should be

105

provided as from the date of entry of the ship into service and should reflect the actual
condition on that date.

After  1  July  2004  when  a  ship  is  withdrawn  from  service  the  information  should  be
provided  as  from  the  date  of  re-entry  of  the  ship  into  service  and  should  reflect  the
actual condition on that date.

Previously provided information that does not relate to the actual condition on that date
need not be retained on board.

When the responsibility for the operation of the ship is assumed by another Company,
the information relating to the Company, which operated the ship, is not required to be
left on board.

In addition other relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

SHIP SECURITY

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT

6.6.

6.7.

6.8.

7.

8.

Security assessment

8.1.

8.2.

The  Company  Security  Officer  (CSO) is  responsible for  ensuring that  a  Ship  Security
Assessment (SSA) is carried out for each of the ships in the Company’s fleet which is
required  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  chapter  XI-2  and  part  A  of  this  Code  for
which the CSO is responsible. While the CSO need not necessarily personally undertake
all the duties associated with the post, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that they
are properly performed remains with the individual CSO.

Prior  to  commencing  the  SSA,  the  CSO  should  ensure  that  advantage  is  taken  of
information available on the assessment of threat for the ports at which the ship will call
or  at  which  passengers  embark  or  disembark  and  about  the  port  facilities  and  their
protective measures. The CSO should study previous reports on similar security needs.
Where feasible, the CSO should meet with  appropriate  persons on the ship  and  in  the
port  facilities  to  discuss  the  purpose  and  methodology  of  the  assessment.  The  CSO
should follow any specific guidance offered by the Contracting Governments.

8.3.

A SSA should address the following elements on board or within the ship:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

physical security;

structural integrity;

personnel protection systems;

procedural policies;

radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks;
and

other  areas  that  may,  if  damaged  or  used  for  illicit  observation,  pose  a  risk  to
persons, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.

106

8.4.

Those involved in a SSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition,  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and  behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

methods used to cause a security incident;

effects of explosives on ship’s structures and equipment;

ship security;

ship/port interface business practices;

contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response;

.10

physical security;

.11

radio  and 
networks;

telecommunications  systems, 

including  computer  systems  and

.12 marine engineering; and

.13

ship and port operations.

8.5.

The CSO should obtain and record the information required to conduct an assessment,
including:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

the general layout of the ship;

the  location  of  areas  which  should  have  restricted  access,  such  as  navigation
bridge,  machinery  spaces  of  category  A  and  other  control  stations  as  defined  in
chapter II-2, etc.;

the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;

changes in the tide which may have an impact on the vulnerability or security of
the ship;

the cargo spaces and stowage arrangements;

the  locations  where  the  ship’s  stores  and  essential  maintenance  equipment  is
stored;

the locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored;

the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services;

the  number  of  ship’s  personnel,  any  existing  security  duties  and  any  existing
training requirement practises of the Company;

107

.10

.11

.12

.13

existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ship’s
personnel;

escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be maintained
to ensure the orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship;

existing  agreements  with  private  security  companies  providing  ship/waterside
security services; and

existing  security  measures  and  procedures  in  effect,  including  inspection  and,
identification  systems,  surveillance  and  monitoring
control  procedures, 
equipment,  personnel  identification  documents  and  communication,  alarms,
lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.

8.6.

8.7.

The SSA should examine each identified point of access, including open weather decks,
and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who might seek to breach security. This
includes  points  of  access  available  to  individuals  having  legitimate  access  as  well  as
those who seek to obtain unauthorized entry.

The SSA should consider the continuing relevance of the existing security measures and
guidance, procedures and operations, under both routine and emergency conditions and
should determine security guidance including:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

the restricted areas;

the response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions;

the  level  of  supervision  of  the  ship’s  personnel,  passengers,  visitors,  vendors,
repair technicians, dock workers, etc.;

the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols;

the access control systems, including identification systems;

the security communications systems and procedures;

the security doors, barriers and lighting; and

the security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

8.8.

The  SSA  should  consider  the  persons,  activities,  services  and  operations  that  it  is
important to protect. This includes:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the ship’s personnel;

passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port facility personnel, etc;

the capacity to maintain safe navigation and emergency response;

the cargo, particularly dangerous goods or hazardous substances;

108

.5

.6

.7

the ship’s stores;

the ship security communication equipment and systems, if any; and

the ship’s security surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

8.9.

The SSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types of
security incidents:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

damage  to,  or  destruction  of,  the  ship  or  of  a  port  facility,  e.g.  by  explosive
devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism;

hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;

tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores;

unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;

smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;

use  of  the  ship  to  carry  those  intending  to  cause  a  security  incident  and/or  their
equipment;

use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;

attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor; and

attacks whilst at sea.

8.10.

The SSA should take into account all possible vulnerabilities, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

conflicts between safety and security measures;

conflicts between shipboard duties and security assignments;

watch-keeping duties, number  of  ship’s personnel, particularly  with implications
on crew fatigue, alertness and performance;

any identified security training deficiencies; and

any security equipment and systems, including communication systems.

8.11.

The CSO and SSO should always have regard to the effect that security measures may
have  on  ship’s  personnel  who  will  remain  on  the  ship  for  long  periods.  When
developing  security  measures,  particular  consideration  should  be  given  to  the
convenience, comfort and personal privacy of the  ship’s  personnel  and  their  ability  to
maintain their effectiveness over long periods.

109

8.12.

Upon  completion  of  the  SSA,  a  report  shall  be  prepared,  consisting  of  a  summary  of
how the assessment was conducted, a description of each vulnerability found during the
assessment  and  a  description  of  counter  measures  that  could  be  used  to  address  each
vulnerability. The report shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

8.13.

If the SSA has not been carried out by the Company, the report of the SSA should be
reviewed and accepted by the CSO.

On-scene security survey

8.14.

The  on-scene  security  survey  is  an  integral  part  of  any  SSA.  The  on-scene  security
survey should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures
and operations for:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;

monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;

controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems;

monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;

controlling  the  embarkation  of  persons  and  their  effects  (accompanied  and
unaccompanied baggage and ship’s personnel personal effects);

supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores; and

ensuring  that  ship  security  communication,  information,  and  equipment  are
readily available.

9.

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

General

9.1.

The  Company  Security  Officer  (CSO)  has  the  responsibility  of  ensuring  that  a  Ship
Security  Plan  (SSP)  is  prepared  and  submitted  for  approval.  The  content  of  each
individual  SSP  should  vary  depending  on  the  particular  ship  it  covers.  The  Ship
Security  Assessment  (SSA) will have identified  the  particular  features of  the  ship  and
the  potential  threats  and  vulnerabilities.  The  preparation  of  the  SSP  will  require  these
features  to  be  addressed  in  detail.  Administrations  may  prepare  advice  on  the
preparation and content of a SSP.

9.2.

All SSPs should:

.1

.2

.3

detail the organizational structure of security for the ship;

detail  the  ship’s  relationships  with  the  Company,  port  facilities,  other  ships  and
relevant authorities with security responsibility;

detail  the  communication  systems  to  allow  effective  continuous  communication
within the ship and between the ship and others, including port facilities;

110

.4

.5

.6

detail  the  basic  security  measures  for  security  level  1,  both  operational  and
physical, that will always be in place;

detail the additional security measures that will allow the ship to progress without
delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3;

provide for regular review, or audit, of the SSP and for its amendment in response
to experience or changing circumstances; and

.7

reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Governments contact points.

9.3.

9.4.

Preparation of an effective SSP should rest on a thorough assessment of all issues that
relate to the security of the ship, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation of the
physical and operational characteristics, including the voyage pattern, of the individual
ship.

All  SSPs  should  be  approved  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  the  Administration.  If  an
Administration  uses  a  Recognized  Security  Organization  (RSO)  to  review  or  approve
the SSP the RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared, or assisted
in the preparation of, the plan.

9.5.

CSOs and Ship Security Officers (SSOs) should develop procedures to:

.1

.2

assess the continuing effectiveness of the SSP; and

prepare amendments of the plan subsequent to its approval.

9.6.

The  security  measures  included  in  the  SSP  should  be  in  place  when  the  initial
verification  for  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  chapter  XI-2  and  part  A  of  this
Code  will  be  carried  out.  Otherwise  the  process  of  issue  to  the  ship  of  the  required
International Ship Security Certificate cannot be carried out. If there is any subsequent
failure  of  security  equipment  or  systems,  or  suspension  of  a  security  measure  for
whatever reason, equivalent temporary security measures should be adopted, notified to,
and agreed by, the Administration.

Organization and performance of ship security duties

9.7.

In addition to the guidance given in section 9.2, the SSP should establish the following
which relate to all security levels:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the duties and responsibilities of all shipboard personnel with a security role;

the procedures or safeguards necessary to allow such continuous communications
to be maintained at all times;

the  procedures  needed  to  assess  the  continuing  effectiveness  of  security
procedures  and  any  security  and  surveillance  equipment  and  systems,  including
procedures  for  identifying  and  responding  to  equipment  or  systems  failure  or
malfunction;

the procedures and practices to protect security sensitive information held in paper
or electronic format;

111

.5

.6

.7

the  type  and  maintenance  requirements,  of  security  and  surveillance  equipment
and systems, if any;

the  procedures  to  ensure  the  timely  submission,  and  assessment,  of  reports
relating to possible breaches of security or security concerns; and

procedures  to  establish,  maintain  and  up-date  an  inventory  of  any  dangerous
goods or hazardous substances carried on board, including their location.

9.8.

The remainder of this section addresses specifically the security measures that could be
taken at each security level covering:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

access to the ship by ship’s personnel, passengers, visitors, etc;

restricted areas on the ship;

handling of cargo;

delivery of ship’s stores;

handling unaccompanied baggage; and

monitoring the security of the ship.

Access to the ship

9.9.

The SSP should establish the security measures covering all means of access to the ship
identified in the SSA. This should include any:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

access ladders;

access gangways;

access ramps;

access doors, side scuttles, windows and ports;

mooring lines and anchor chains; and

cranes and hoisting gear.

9.10.

For  each  of  these  the  SSP  should  identify  the  appropriate  locations  where  access
restrictions  or  prohibitions  should  be  applied  for  each  of  the  security  levels.  For  each
security  level  the  SSP  should  establish  the  type  of  restriction  or  prohibition  to  be
applied and the means of enforcing them.

112

9.11.

The SSP should establish for each security level the means of identification required to
allow access to the ship and for individuals to remain on the ship without challenge, this
may  involve  developing  an  appropriate  identification  system  allowing  for  permanent
and  temporary  identifications,  for  ship’s  personnel  and  visitors  respectively.  Any  ship
identification system should, when it is practicable to do so, be co-ordinated with that
applying  to  the  port  facility.  Passengers  should  be  able  to  prove  their  identity  by
boarding  passes,  tickets,  etc.,  but  should  not  be  permitted  access  to  restricted  areas
unless supervised. The SSP should establish provisions to ensure that the identification
systems  are  regularly  updated,  and  that  abuse  of  procedures  should  be  subject  to
disciplinary action.

9.12.

Those  unwilling  or  unable  to  establish  their  identity  and/or  to  confirm  the  purpose  of
their visit when requested to do so should be denied access to the ship and their attempt
to  obtain  access  should  be  reported,  as  appropriate,  to  the  SSOs,  the  CSOs,  the  Port
Facility  Security  Officer  (PFSO)  and  to  the  national  or  local  authorities  with  security
responsibilities.

9.13.

The  SSP  should  establish  the  frequency  of  application  of  any  access  controls
particularly if they are to be applied on a random, or occasional, basis.

Security Level 1

9.14.

At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to
the ship, where the following may be applied:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming their
reasons  for  doing  so  by  checking,  for  example,  joining  instructions,  passenger
tickets, boarding passes, work orders etc;

in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that designated secure areas
are established in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage (including
carry on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take place;

in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to be
loaded  on  board  car  carriers,  ro-ro  and  other  passenger  ships  are  subjected  to
search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP;

segregating  checked  persons  and  their  personal  effects  from  unchecked  persons
and their personal effects;

segregating embarking from disembarking passengers;

identification  of  access  points  that  should  be  secured  or  attended  to  prevent
unauthorized access;

securing, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas
to which passengers and visitors have access; and

providing  security  briefings  to  all  ship  personnel  on  possible  threats,  the
procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for
vigilance.

113

9.15.

At  security  level  1,  all  those  seeking  to  board  a  ship  should  be  liable  to  search.  The
frequency  of  such  searches,  including  random  searches,  should  be  specified  in  the
approved  SSP  and  should  be  specifically  approved  by  the  Administration.  Such
searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close co-operation with the ship
and  in  close  proximity  to  it.  Unless  there  are  clear  security  grounds  for  doing  so,
members  of  the  ship’s  personnel  should  not  be  required  to  search  their  colleagues  or
their  personal  effects.  Any  such  search  shall  be  undertaken  in  a  manner  which  fully
takes into account the  human  rights of  the  individual and preserves  their  basic  human
dignity.

Security Level 2

9.16.

At  security  level  2,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to
protect  against  a  heightened  risk  of  a  security  incident  to  ensure  higher  vigilance  and
tighter control, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

assigning  additional  personnel  to  patrol  deck  areas  during  silent  hours  to  deter
unauthorized access;

limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and
the means of adequately securing them;

deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for example, in liaison with the
port facility, provision of boat patrols;

establishing  a restricted  area on  the  shore-side  of  the  ship,  in  close  co-operation
with the port facility;

increasing  the  frequency  and  detail  of  searches  of  persons,  personal  effects,  and
vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship;

escorting visitors on the ship;

providing  additional  specific  security  briefings  to  all  ship  personnel  on  any
identified threats, re-emphasising the procedures for reporting suspicious persons,
objects, or activities and the stressing the need for increased vigilance; and

.8

carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.

Security Level 3

9.17.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;

granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof;

directions of persons on board;

suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;

114

.5

.6

.7

.8

suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries etc;

evacuation of the ship;

movement of the ship; and

preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.

Restricted areas on the ship

9.18.

The SSP should identify the restricted areas to be established on the ship, specify their
extent, times of application, the security measures to be taken to control access to them
and those to be taken to control activities within them. The purpose of restricted areas
are to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

prevent unauthorized access;

protect  passengers,  ship's  personnel,  and  personnel  from  port  facilities  or  other
agencies authorized to be on board the ship;

protect sensitive security areas within the ship; and

protect cargo and ship's stores from tampering.

9.19.

9.20.

The SSP should ensure that there are clearly established policies and practices to control
access to all restricted areas them.

The SSP should provide that all restricted areas should be clearly marked indicating that
access to the area is restricted and that unauthorized presence within the area constitutes
a breach of security.

9.21.

Restricted areas may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

navigation  bridge,  machinery  spaces  of  category  A  and  other  control  stations  as
defined in chapter II-2;

spaces  containing  security  and  surveillance  equipment  and  systems  and  their
controls and lighting system controls;

ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar spaces;

spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps, or manifolds;

spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances;

spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls;

cargo spaces and spaces containing ship’s stores;

crew accommodation; and

any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the SSA to which access must
be restricted to maintain the security of the ship.

115

Security Level 1

9.22.

At  security  level  1,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to
restricted areas, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

locking or securing access points;

using surveillance equipment to monitor the areas;

using guards or patrols; and

using  automatic  intrusion  detection  devices  to  alert  the  ship’s  personnel  of
unauthorized access.

Security Level 2

9.23.

At  security  level  2,  the  frequency  and  intensity  of  the  monitoring  of,  and  control  of
access  to  restricted  areas  should  be  increased  to  ensure  that  only  authorized  persons
have  access.  The  SSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be  applied,
which may include:

.1

.2

.3

establishing restricted areas adjacent to access points;

continuously monitoring surveillance equipment; and

dedicating additional personnel to guard and patrol restricted areas.

Security Level 3

9.24.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  ship,  in  close  co-operations  with  those
responding and the port facility, which may include:

.1

setting  up  of  additional  restricted  areas  on  the  ship  in  proximity  to  the  security
incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is denied;
and

.2

searching of restricted areas as part of a search of the ship.

Handling of cargo

9.25.

The security measures relating to cargo handling should:

.1

.2

prevent tampering; and

prevent  cargo  that  is  not  meant  for  carriage  from  being  accepted  and  stored  on
board the ship.

9.26.

The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the port
facility, should include inventory control procedures at access points to the ship. Once
on board the ship, cargo should be capable of being identified as having been approved
for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be developed to ensure
that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.

116

Security Level 1

9.27.

At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during
cargo handling, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

routine  checking  of  cargo,  cargo  transport  units  and  cargo  spaces  prior  to,  and
during, cargo handling operations;

checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation;

ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board car-
carriers,  ro-ro  and  passenger  ships  are  subjected  to  search  prior  to  loading,  in
accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; and

.4

checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.

9.28.

Checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:

.1

.2

visual and physical examination; and

using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.

9.29. When  there  are  regular,  or  repeated,  cargo  movement  the  CSO  or  SSO  may,  in
consultation  with  the  port  facility,  agree  arrangements  with  shippers  or  others
responsible  for  such  cargo  covering  off-site  checking,  sealing,  scheduling,  supporting
documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to and agreed with the
PFSO concerned.

Security Level 2

9.30.

At  security  level  2,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied during cargo handling, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces;

intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded;

intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car-carriers, ro-ro and passenger
ships; and

increased  frequency  and  detail  in  checking  of  seals  or  other  methods  used  to
prevent tampering.

9.31.

Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:

.1

.2

.3

increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination;

increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical
devices, or dogs; and

co-ordinating  enhanced  security  measures  with  the  shipper  or  other  responsible
party in accordance with an established agreement and procedures.

117

Security Level 3

9.32.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo; and

verify  the  inventory  of  dangerous  goods  and  hazardous  substances  carried  on
board, if any, and their location.

Delivery of ship’s stores

9.33.

The security measures relating to the delivery of ship’s stores should:

.1

.2

.3

.4

ensure checking of ship’s stores and package integrity;

prevent ship’s stores from being accepted without inspection;

prevent tampering; and

prevent ship’s stores from being accepted unless ordered.

9.34.

For ships regularly using the port facility it may be appropriate to establish procedures
involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of
deliveries  and  their  documentation.  There  should  always  be  some  way  of  confirming
that  stores  presented  for  delivery  are  accompanied  by  evidence  that  they  have  been
ordered by the ship.

Security Level 1

9.35.

At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during
delivery of ship’s stores, which may include:

.1

.2

checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board; and

ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship’s stores.

Security Level 2

9.36.

At  security  level  2,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied during delivery of ship’s stores by exercising checks prior to receiving stores on
board and intensifying inspections.

Security Level 3

9.37.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive checking;

preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of ship’s stores; and

118

.3

refusal to accept ship’s stores on board the ship.

Handling unaccompanied baggage

9.38.

The  SSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to  ensure  that
unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with
the  passenger  or  member  of  ship’s  personnel  at  the  point  of  inspection  or  search)  is
identified  and  subjected  to  appropriate  screening,  including  searching,  before  it  is
accepted on  board the  ship.  It is not envisaged  that such baggage  will  be  subjected  to
screening  by  both  the  ship  and  the  port  facility,  and  in  cases  where  both  are  suitably
equipped,  the  responsibility  for  screening  should  rest  with  the  port  facility.  Close  co-
operation  with  the  port  facility  is  essential  and  steps  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that
unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

Security Level 1

9.39.

At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied when
handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or
searched up to and including 100 percent, which may include use of x-ray screening.

Security Level 2

9.40.

At  security  level  2,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied when handling unaccompanied baggage which should include 100 percent x-ray
screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

Security Level 3

9.41.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

subjecting  such  baggage  to  more  extensive  screening,  for  example  x-raying  it
from at least two different angles;

preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage;
and

.3

refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on board the ship.

Monitoring the Security of the Ship

9.42.

The  ship  should  have  the  capability  to  monitor  the  ship,  the  restricted  areas  on  board
and areas surrounding the ship. Such monitoring capabilities may include use of:

.1

.2

.3

lighting;

watch-keepers, security guards and deck watches including patrols; and

automatic intrusion detection devices and surveillance equipment.

9.43. When  used,  automatic  intrusion  detection  devices  should  activate  an  audible  and/or

visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.

119

9.44.

The  SSP should establish  the  procedures  and  equipment  needed  at  each  security  level
and  the  means  of  ensuring  that  monitoring  equipment  will  be  able  to  perform
continually, including consideration of the possible effects of weather conditions or of
power disruptions.

Security Level 1

9.45.

9.46.

At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied which
may be a combination of lighting, watch keepers, security guards or use of security and
surveillance equipment to allow ship’s security personnel to observe the ship in general,
and barriers and restricted areas in particular.

The  ship's  deck  and  access  points  to  the  ship  should  be  illuminated  during  hours  of
darkness and periods of low visibility while conducting ship/port interface activities or
at a port facility or anchorage when necessary. While underway, when necessary, ships
should  use  the  maximum  lighting  available  consistent  with  safe  navigation,  having
regard to the provisions of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions
at Sea in force. The  following should be  considered when establishing the appropriate
level and location of lighting:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the  ship’s personnel  should  be  able  to  detect  activities  beyond  the  ship,  on  both
the shore side and the waterside;

coverage should include the area on and around the ship;

coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and

coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.

Security Level 2

9.47.

At  security  level  2,  the  SSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

increasing the frequency and detail of security patrols;

increasing  the  coverage  and  intensity  of  lighting  or  the  use  of  security  and
surveillance and equipment;

assigning additional personnel as security lookouts; and

ensuring coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or  vehicle patrols on
the shore-side, when provided.

9.48.

Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security
incidents.  When  necessary,  the  additional  lighting  requirements  may  be  accomplished
by coordinating with the port facility to provide additional shore side lighting.

120

Security Level 3

9.49.

At  security  level  3,  the  ship  should  comply  with  the  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security
measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

switching on of all lighting on, or illuminating the vicinity of, the ship;

switching  on  of  all  on  board  surveillance  equipment  capable  of  recording
activities on, or in the vicinity of, the ship;

maximising  the  length  of  time  such  surveillance  equipment  can  continue  to
record;

preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and

initiation  of  measures,  including  the  slow  revolution  of  the  ship’s  propellers,  if
practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.

Differing security levels

9.50.

The SSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship could
adopt if the ship is at a higher security level than that applying to a port facility.

Activities not covered by the Code

9.51.

The  SSP  should  establish  details  of  the  procedures  and  security  measures  the  ship
should apply when:

.1

.2

.3

.4

it is at a port of a State which is not a Contracting Government;

it is interfacing with a ship to which this Code does not apply;

it  is  interfacing  with  fixed  or  floating  platforms  or  a  mobile  drilling  unit  on
location; or

it is interfacing with a port or port facility  which is not required  to  comply with
chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

Declarations of security

9.52.

The SSP should detail how requests for DoS from a port facility will be handled and the
circumstances under which the ship itself should request a DoS.

121

Audit and review

9.53.

The  SSP  should  establish  how  the  CSO  and  the  SSO  intend  to  audit  the  continued
effectiveness of the SSP and the procedure to be followed to review, update or  amend
the SSP.

10.

RECORDS

General

10.1.

10.2.

Records should be available to duly authorized officers of Contracting Governments to
verify that the provisions of ship security plans are being implemented.

Records may be kept in any format but should be protect from unauthorized access or
disclosure.

11.

COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

12.

SHIP SECURITY OFFICER

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

13.

TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON SHIP SECURITY

Training

13.1.

The Company Security Officer (CSO) and appropriate shore based Company personnel,
and the Ship Security Officer (SSO), should have knowledge of, and receive training, in
some or all of the following, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

.10

.11

security administration;

relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;

relevant Government legislation and regulations;

responsibilities and functions of other security organizations;

methodology of ship security assessment;

methods of ship security surveys and inspections;

ship and port operations and conditions;

ship and port facility security measures;

emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning;

instruction  techniques  for  security  training  and  education,  including  security
measures and procedures;

handling 
communications;

sensitive 

security 

related 

information 

and 

security 

related

122

.12

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

.13

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

.14

recognition,  on  a  non  discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and  behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;

.15

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

.16

security equipment and systems and their operational limitations;

.17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring;

.18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections;

.19

security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; and

.20

assessment of security drills and exercises.

13.2.

In addition the SSO should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training, in some
or all of the following, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

the layout of the ship;

the ship security plan and related procedures (including scenario-based training on
how to respond);

crowd management and control techniques;

operations of security equipment and systems; and

testing,  calibration  and  whilst  at  sea  maintenance  of  security  equipment  and
systems.

13.3.

Shipboard  personnel  having  specific  security  duties  should  have  sufficient  knowledge
and ability to perform their assigned duties, including, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition of characteristics  and behavioural patterns of persons  who  are  likely
to threaten security;

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

crowd management and control techniques;

security related communications;

knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans;

operations of security equipment and systems;

testing,  calibration  and  whilst  at  sea  maintenance  of  security  equipment  and
systems;

123

.10

inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and

.11 methods  of  physical  searches  of  persons,  personal  effects,  baggage,  cargo,  and

ship’s stores.

13.4.

All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with
relevant provisions of the SSP, including:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;

knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition,  on  a  non  discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and  behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; and

.5

techniques used to circumvent security measures.

Drills and exercises

13.5.

13.6.

13.7.

The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient
in all assigned security duties at all security levels and the identification of any security
related deficiencies, which need to be addressed.

To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills
should be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more
than  25 percent  of  the  ship’s  personnel  has  been  changed,  at  any  one  time,  with
personnel that has not previously participated in any drill on that ship, within the last 3
months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should
test individual elements of the plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 8.9.

Various  types  of  exercises  which  may  include  participation  of  company  security
officers, port facility security officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments
as  well  as  ship  security  officers,  if  available,  should  be  carried  out  at  least  once  each
calendar  year  with  no  more  than  18  months  between  the  exercises.  These  exercises
should  test  communications,  coordination,  resource  availability,  and  response.  These
exercises may be:

.1

.2

.3

full scale or live;

tabletop simulation or seminar; or

combined  with  other  exercises  held  such  as  search  and  rescue  or  emergency
response exercises.

13.8.

Company participation in an exercise with another Contracting Government should be
recognized by the Administration.

14.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY

Relevant guidance is provided under section 15, 16 and 18.

124

15.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSMENT

General

15.1.

The  Port  Facility  Security  Assessment  (PFSA)  may  be  conducted  by  a  Recognized
Security Organization (RSO). However, approval of a completed PFSA should only be
given by the relevant Contracting Government.

15.2.

If a Contracting Government uses a RSO, to review or verify compliance of the PFSA,
the RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared or assisted in the
preparation of that assessment.

15.3.

A PFSA should address the following elements within a port facility:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

physical security;

structural integrity;

personnel protection systems;

procedural policies;

radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks;

relevant transportation infrastructure;

utilities; and

other  areas  that  may,  if  damaged  or  used  for  illicit  observation,  pose  a  risk  to
persons, property, or operations within the port facility.

15.4.

Those involved in a PFSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition,  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and  behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

methods used to cause a security incident;

effects of explosives on structures and port facility services;

port facility security;

port business practices;

contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response;

.10

physical security measures e.g. fences;

125

.11

radio  and 
networks;

telecommunications  systems, 

including  computer  systems  and

.12

transport and civil engineering; and

.13

ship and port operations.

Identification  and  evaluation  of  important  assets  and  infrastructure  it  is  important  to
protect

15.5.

15.6.

The  identification  and  evaluation  of  important  assets  and  infrastructure  is  a  process
through which the relative importance of structures and installations to the functioning
of  the  port  facility  can  be  established.  This  identification  and  evaluation  process  is
important because it provides a basis for focusing mitigation strategies on those assets
and  structures  which  it  is  more  important  to  protect  from  a  security  incident.  This
process should take into account potential loss of life, the economic significance of the
port, symbolic value, and the presence of Government installations.

Identification  and  evaluation  of  assets  and  infrastructure  should  be  used  to  prioritise
their  relative  importance  for  protection.  The  primary  concern  should  be  avoidance  of
death  or  injury.  It  is  also  important  to  consider  whether  the  port  facility,  structure  or
installation can continue to function without the asset, and the extent to which rapid re-
establishment of normal functioning is possible.

15.7.

Assets and infrastructure that should be considered important to protect may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

accesses, entrances, approaches, and anchorages, manoeuvring and berthing areas;

cargo facilities, terminals, storage areas, and cargo handling equipment;

systems  such  as  electrical  distribution  systems,  radio  and  telecommunication
systems and computer systems and networks;

port vessel traffic management systems and aids to navigation;

power plants, cargo transfer piping, and water supplies;

bridges, railways, roads;

port service vessels, including pilot boats, tugs, lighters etc;

security and surveillance equipment and systems; and

the waters adjacent to the port facility.

15.8.

The clear identification of assets and infrastructure is essential to the evaluation of the
port  facility’s  security  requirements,  the  prioritisation  of  protective  measures,  and
decisions  concerning  the  allocation  of  resources  to  better  protect  the  port  facility.  The
process  may  involve  consultation  with  the  relevant  authorities  relating  to  structures
adjacent to the port facility which could cause damage within the facility or be used for
the purpose of causing damage to the facility or for illicit observation of the facility or
for diverting attention.

126

Identification of the possible threats to the assets and infrastructure and the likelihood of
their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritise security measures

15.9.

Possible  acts  that  could  threaten  the  security  of  assets  and  infrastructure,  and  the
methods of carrying out those acts, should be identified to evaluate the vulnerability of a
given  asset  or  location  to  a  security  incident,  and  to  establish  and  prioritise  security
requirements to enable planning and resource allocations. Identification and evaluation
of each potential act and its method should be based on various factors, including threat
assessments  by  Government  agencies.  By  identifying  and  assessing  threats,  those
conducting the assessment do not have to rely on worst-case scenarios to guide planning
and resource allocations.

15.10. The  PFSA  should  include  an  assessment  undertaken  in  consultation  with  the  relevant

national security organizations to determine:

.1

.2

.3

.4

any  particular  aspects  of  the  port  facility,  including  the  vessel  traffic  using  the
facility, which make it likely to be the target of an attack;

the  likely  consequences  in  terms  of  loss  of  life,  damage  to  property,  economic
disruption,  including  disruption  to  transport  systems,  of  an  attack  on,  or  at,  the
port facility;

the capability and intent of those likely to mount such an attack; and

the possible type, or types, of attack,

producing  an  overall  assessment  of  the  level  of  risk  against  which  security  measures
have to be developed.

15.11. The PFSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types

of security incidents:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

damage  to,  or  destruction  of,  the  port  facility  or  of  the  ship,  e.g.  by  explosive
devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism;

hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;

tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores;

unauthorized access or use including presence of stowaways;

smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;

use  of  the  ship  to  carry  those  intending  to  cause  a  security  incident  and  their
equipment;

use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;

blockage; of port entrances, locks, approaches etc; and

nuclear, biological and chemical attack.

127

15.12. The  process  should  involve  consultation  with  the  relevant  authorities  relating  to
structures adjacent to the port facility which could cause damage within the facility or
be used for the purpose of causing damage to the facility or for illicit observation of the
facility or for diverting attention.

Identification, selection, and prioritisation of countermeasures and procedural changes and
their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability

15.13. The  identification  and  prioritisation  of  countermeasures  is  designed  to  ensure  that  the
most  effective  security  measures  are  employed  to  reduce  the  vulnerability  of  a  port
facility or ship/port interface to the possible threats.

15.14. Security measures should be selected on the basis of factors such as whether they reduce

the probability of an attack and should be evaluated using information that includes:

.1

.2

.3

.4

security surveys, inspections and audits;

consultation  with  port  facility  owners  and  operators,  and  owners/operators  of
adjacent structures if appropriate;

historical information on security incidents; and

operations within the port facility.

Identification of vulnerabilities

15.15.

Identification  of  vulnerabilities  in  physical  structures,  personnel  protection  systems,
processes,  or  other  areas  that  may  lead  to  a  security  incident  can  be  used  to  establish
options  to  eliminate  or  mitigate  those  vulnerabilities.  For  example,  an  analysis  might
reveal  vulnerabilities  in  a  port  facility’s  security  systems  or  unprotected  infrastructure
such  as  water  supplies,  bridges  etc  that  could  be  resolved  through  physical  measures,
e.g. permanent barriers, alarms, surveillance equipment etc.

15.16.

Identification of vulnerabilities should include consideration of:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

waterside  and  shore-side  access  to  the  port  facility  and  ships  berthing  at  the
facility;

structural integrity of the piers, facilities, and associated structures;

existing security measures and procedures, including identification systems;

existing security measures and procedures relating to port services and utilities;

measures  to  protect  radio  and  telecommunication  equipment,  port  services  and
utilities, including computer systems and networks;

adjacent areas that may be exploited during, or for, an attack;

existing  agreements  with  private  security  companies  providing  waterside/shore-
side security services;

any conflicting policies between safety and security measures and procedures;

any conflicting port facility and security duty assignments;

128

.10

any enforcement and personnel constraints;

.11

any deficiencies identified during training and drills; and

.12

any  deficiencies  identified  during  daily  operation,  following  incidents  or  alerts,
the report of security concerns, the exercise of control measures, audits etc.

16.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN

General

16.1.

16.2.

Preparation  of  the  Port  Facility  Security  Plan  (PFSP)  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Port
Facility  Security  Officer  (PFSO).  While  the  PFSO  need  not  necessarily  personally
undertake all the duties associated with the post the ultimate responsibility for ensuring
that they are properly performed remains with the individual PFSO.

The  content  of  each  individual  PFSP  should  vary  depending  on  the  particular
circumstances  of  the  port  facility,  or  facilities,  it  covers.  The  Port  Facility  Security
(PFSA)  will  have  identified  the  particular  features  of  the  port  facility,  and  of  the
potential  security  risks,  that  have  led  to  the  need  to  appoint  a  PFSO  and  to  prepare  a
PFSP.  The  preparation  of  the  PFSP  will  require  these  features,  and  other  local  or
national  security  considerations,  to  be  addressed  in  the  PFSP  and  for  appropriate
security  measures  to  be  established  so  as  to  minimise  the  likelihood  of  a  breach  of
security and the consequences of potential risks. Contracting Governments may prepare
advice on the preparation and content of a PFSP.

16.3.

All PFSPs should:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

detail the security organization of the port facility,

the  organization’s  links  with  other  relevant  authorities  and  the  necessary
communication  systems  to  allow  the  effective  continuous  operation  of  the
organization and its links with others, including ships in port;

detail the basic security level 1 measures, both operational and physical, that will
be in place;

detail the additional security measures that will allow the port facility to progress
without delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3;

provide  for  regular  review,  or  audit,  of  the  PFSP  and  for  its  amendments  in
response to experience or changing circumstances; and

.6

reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Governments contact points.

16.4.

16.5.

Preparation  of  an  effective  PFSP  will  rest  on  a  thorough  assessment  of  all  issues  that
relate to the security of the port facility, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation
of the physical and operational characteristics of the individual port facility.

Contracting  Government  should  approve  the  PFSPs  of  the  port  facilities  under  their
jurisdiction.  Contracting  Governments  should  develop  procedures  to  assess  the
continuing effectiveness of each PFSP and may require amendment of the PFSP prior to
its initial approval or subsequent to its approval. The PFSP should make provision for
the retention of records of security incidents and threats, reviews, audits, training, drills
and exercises as evidence of compliance with those requirements.

129

16.6.

16.7.

The  security  measures  included  in  the  PFSP  should  be  in  place  within  a  reasonable
period of the PFSP’s approval and the PFSP should establish when each measure  will
be in place. If there is likely to be any delay in their provision this should be discussed
with the Contracting Government responsible for approval of the PFSP and satisfactory
alternative  temporary  security  measures  that  provide  an  equivalent  level  of  security
should be agreed to cover any interim period.

The  use  of  firearms  on  or  near  ships  and  in  port  facilities  may  pose  particular  and
significant safety risks, in particular in connection with certain dangerous or hazardous
substances  and  should  be  considered  very  carefully.  In  the  event  that  a  Contracting
Government  decides  that  it  is  necessary  to  use  armed  personnel  in  these  areas,  that
Contracting  Government  should  ensure  that  these  personnel  are  duly  authorized  and
trained in the use of their weapons and that they are aware of the specific risks to safety
that  are  present  in  these  areas.  If  a  Contracting  Government  authorizes  the  use  of
firearms  they  should  issue  specific  safety  guidelines  on  their  use.  The  PFSP  should
contain specific guidance on this matter in particular with regard its application to ships
carrying dangerous goods or hazardous substances.

Organization and performance of port facility security duties

16.8.

In  addition  to  the  guidance  given  under  section  16.3,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the
following which relate to all security levels:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

the role and structure of the port facility security organization;

the duties, responsibilities and training requirements of all port facility personnel
with  a  security  role  and  the  performance  measures  needed  to  allow  their
individual effectiveness to be assessed;

the  port  facility  security  organization’s  links  with  other  national  or  local
authorities with security responsibilities;

to  allow  effective  and  continuous
the  communication  systems  provided 
communication between port facility security personnel, ships in port and,  when
appropriate, with national or local authorities with security responsibilities;

the procedures or safeguards necessary to allow such continuous communications
to be maintained at all times;

the procedures and practices to protect security sensitive information held in paper
or electronic format;

the  procedures  to  assess  the  continuing  effectiveness  of  security  measures,
procedures and equipment, including identification of, and response to, equipment
failure or malfunction;

the  procedures  to  allow  the  submission,  and  assessment,  of  reports  relating  to
possible breaches of security or security concerns;

.9

procedures relating to cargo handling;

.10

procedures covering the delivery of ship’s stores;

130

.11

.12

.13

.14

the procedures to maintain, and update, records of dangerous goods and hazardous
substances and their location within the port facility;

the means of alerting and obtaining the services of waterside patrols and specialist
search teams, including bomb searches and underwater searches;

the  procedures  for  assisting  ship  security  officers  in  confirming  the  identity  of
those seeking to board the ship when requested; and

the  procedures  for  facilitating  shore  leave  for  ship’s  personnel  or  personnel
changes,  as  well  as  access  of  visitors  to  the  ship  including  representatives  of
seafarers’ welfare and labour organizations.

16.9.

The remainder of this section addresses specifically the security measures that could be
taken at each security level covering:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

access to the port facility;

restricted areas within the port facility;

handling of cargo;

delivery of ship’s stores;

handling unaccompanied baggage; and

monitoring the security of the port facility.

Access to the port facility

16.10. The  PFSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  covering  all  means  of  access  to  the

port facility identified in the PFSA.

16.11. For  each  of  these  the  PFSP  should  identify  the  appropriate  locations  where  access
restrictions  or  prohibitions  should  be  applied  for  each  of  the  security  levels.  For  each
security level the PFSP should specify the type of restriction or prohibition to be applied
and the means of enforcing them.

16.12. The PFSP should establish for each security level the means of identification required to
allow  access  to  the  port  facility  and  for  individuals  to  remain  within  the  port  facility
without  challenge,  this  may  involve  developing  an  appropriate  identification  system
allowing for permanent and temporary identifications, for port facility personnel and for
visitors  respectively.  Any  port  facility  identification  system  should,  when  it  is
practicable to do so, be co-ordinated with that  applying  to ships  that regularly  use the
port  facility.  Passengers  should  be  able  to  prove  their  identity  by  boarding  passes,
tickets,  etc.,  but  should  not  be  permitted  access  to  restricted  areas  unless  supervised.
The  PFSP  should  establish  provisions  to  ensure  that  the  identification  systems  are
regularly updated, and that abuse of procedures should be subject to disciplinary action.

16.13. Those  unwilling  or  unable  to  establish  their  identity  and/or  to  confirm  the  purpose  of
their visit when requested to do so should be denied access to the port facility and their
attempt  to  obtain  access  should  be  reported  to  the  PFSO  and  to  the  national  or  local
authorities with security responsibilities.

131

16.14. The  PFSP  should  identify  the  locations  where  persons,  personal  effects,  and  vehicle
searches are to be undertaken. Such locations should be covered to facilitate continuous
operation regardless of prevailing weather conditions, in accordance with the frequency
laid down in the PFSP. Once subjected to search persons, personal effects and vehicles
should proceed directly to the restricted holding, embarkation or car loading areas.

16.15. The  PFSP  should  establish  separate  locations  for  checked  and  unchecked  persons  and
their  effects  and  if  possible  separate  areas  for  embarking/disembarking  passengers,
ship’s personnel and their effects to ensure that unchecked persons are not able to come
in contact with checked persons.

16.16. The  PFSP  should  establish  the  frequency  of  application  of  any  access  controls

particularly if they are to be applied on a random, or occasional, basis.

Security Level 1

16.17. At  security  level  1,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  control  points  where  the  following

security measures may be applied:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

restricted areas which should be bound by fencing or other barriers to a standard
which should be approved by the Contracting Government;

checking  identity  of  all  persons  seeking  entry  to  the  port  facility  in  connection
with  a  ship,  including  passengers,  ship’s  personnel  and  visitors  and  confirming
their  reasons  for  doing  so  by  checking,  for  example,  joining  instructions,
passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders, etc;

checking  vehicles  used  by  those  seeking  entry  to  the  port  facility  in  connection
with a ship;

verification  of  the  identity  of  port  facility  personnel  and  those  employed  within
the port facility and their vehicles;

restricting  access  to  exclude  those  not  employed  by  the  port  facility  or  working
within it, if they are unable to establish their identity;

undertaking searches of persons, personal effects, vehicles and their contents; and

identification of any access points not in regular use which should be permanently
closed and locked.

16.18. At  security  level  1,  all  those  seeking  access  to  the  port  facility  should  be  liable  to
search. The frequency of such searches, including random searches, should be specified
in  the  approved  PFSP  and  should  be  specifically  approved  by  the  Contracting
Government.  Unless  there  are  clear  security  grounds  for  doing  so,  members  of  the
ship’s  personnel  should  not  be  required  to  search  their  colleagues  or  their  personal
effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account
the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.

132

Security Level 2

16.19. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be

applied, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

assigning  additional  personnel  to  guard  access  points  and  patrol  perimeter
barriers;

limiting the number of access points to the port facility, and identify those to be
closed and the means of adequately securing them;

providing for means of impeding movement through the remaining access points,
e.g. security barriers;

increasing the frequency of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicle;

deny  access  to  visitors  who  are  unable  to  provide  a  verifiable  justification  for
seeking access to the port facility; and

.6

using of patrol vessels to enhance waterside security.

Security Level 3

16.20. At  security  level  3,  the  port  facility  should  comply  with  instructions  issued  by  those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

suspension of access to all, or part of, the port facility;

granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof;

suspension  of  pedestrian  or  vehicular  movement  within  all,  or  part,  of  the  port
facility;

increased security patrols within the port facility, if appropriate;

suspension of port operations within all, or part, of the port facility;

direction of vessel movements relating to all, or part, of the port facility; and

evacuation of all, or part of, the port facility.

Restricted areas within the port facility

16.21. The PFSP should identify the restricted areas to be established within the port facility,
specify  their  extent,  times  of  application,  the  security  measures  to  be  taken  to  control
access to them and those to be taken to control activities within them. This should also
include, in appropriate circumstances, measures to ensure that temporary restricted areas
are  security  swept  both  before  and  after  that  area  is  established.  The  purpose  of
restricted areas is to:

.1

protect passengers, ship’s personnel, port facility personnel and visitors, including
those visiting in connection with a ship;

133

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

protect the port facility;

protect ships using, and serving, the port facility;

protect sensitive security locations and areas within the port facility;

to protect security and surveillance equipment and systems; and

protect cargo and ship’s stores from tampering.

16.22. The  PFSP  should  ensure  that  all  restricted  areas  have  clearly  established  security

measures to control:

.1

.2

.3

.4

access by individuals;

the entry, parking, loading and unloading of vehicles;

movement and storage of cargo and ship’s stores; and

unaccompanied baggage or personal effects.

16.23. The  PFSP  should  provide  that  all  restricted  areas  should  be  clearly  marked  indicating
that  access  to  the  area  is  restricted  and  that  unauthorized  presence  within  the  area
constitutes a breach of security.

16.24. When  automatic  intrusion  detection  devices  are  installed  they  should  alert  a  control

centre which can respond to the triggering of an alarm.

16.25. Restricted areas may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

shore and waterside areas immediately adjacent to the ship;

embarkation  and  disembarkation  areas,  passenger  and  ship’s  personnel  holding
and processing areas including search points;

areas where loading, unloading or storage of cargo and stores is undertaken;

locations where security sensitive information, including cargo documentation, is
held;

areas where dangerous goods and hazardous substances are held;

vessel  traffic  management  system  control  rooms,  aids  to  navigation  and  port
control buildings, including security and surveillance control rooms;

areas where security and surveillance equipment are stored or located;

essential  electrical,  radio  and  telecommunication,  water  and  other  utility
installations; and

other  locations  in  the  port  facility  where  access  by  vessels,  vehicles  and
individuals should be restricted.

134

16.26. The  security  measures  may  extend,  with  the  agreement  of  the  relevant  authorities,  to
restrictions  on  unauthorized  access  to  structures  from  which  the  port  facility  can  be
observed.

Security Level 1

16.27. At  security  level  1,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to

restricted areas, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

provision  of  permanent  or  temporary  barriers  to  surround  the  restricted  area
whose standard should be accepted by the Contracting Government;

provision of access points where access can be controlled by security guards when
in operation and which can be effectively locked or barred when not in use;

providing passes which must be displayed to identify individuals entitlement to be
within the restricted area;

clearly marking vehicles allowed access to restricted areas;

providing guards and patrols;

providing  automatic  intrusion  detection  devices,  or  surveillance  equipment  or
systems  to detect  unauthorized access into, or movement within  restricted  areas;
and

.7

control of the movement of vessels in the vicinity of ships using the port facility.

Security Level 2

16.28. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  enhancement  of  the  frequency  and
intensity  of  the  monitoring  of,  and  control  of  access  to,  restricted  areas.  The  PFSP
should establish the additional security measures, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

enhancing the effectiveness of the barriers or fencing surrounding restricted areas,
including the use of patrols or automatic intrusion detection devices;

reducing  the  number  of  access  points  to  restricted  areas  and  enhancing  the
controls applied at the remaining accesses;

restrictions on parking adjacent to berthed ships;

further restricting access to the restricted areas and movements and storage within
them;

use of continuously monitored and recording surveillance equipment;

enhancing  the  number  and  frequency  of  patrols  including  waterside  patrols
undertaken on the boundaries of the restricted areas and within the areas;

establishing and restricting access to areas adjacent to the restricted areas; and

enforcing  restrictions  on  access  by  unauthorized  craft  to  the  waters  adjacent  to
ships using the port facility.

135

Security Level 3

16.29. At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

setting up of additional restricted areas within the port facility in proximity to the
security incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is
denied; and

preparing for the searching of restricted areas as part of a search of all, or part, of
the port facility.

Handling of cargo

16.30. The security measures relating to cargo handling should:

.1

.2

prevent tampering; and

prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored within
the port facility.

16.31. The security measures should  include  inventory control procedures at  access points to
the  port  facility.  Once  within  the  port  facility  cargo  should  be  capable  of  being
identified as having been checked and accepted for loading onto a ship or for temporary
storage in a restricted area while awaiting loading. It may be appropriate to restrict the
entry of cargo to the port facility that does not have a confirmed date for loading.

Security Level 1

16.32. At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied during

cargo handling, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo storage areas within the
port facility prior to, and during, cargo handling operations;

checks to ensure that cargo entering the port facility matches the delivery note or
equivalent cargo documentation;

searches of vehicles; and

checking of seals and other methods used to prevent tampering upon entering the
port facility and upon storage within the port facility.

16.33. Checking of cargo may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

.1

.2

visual and physical examination; and

using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.

136

16.34. When  there  are  regular,  or  repeated,  cargo  movement  the  Company  Security  Officer
(CSO)  or  the  Ship  Security  Officer  (SSO)  may,  in  consultation  with  the  port  facility,
agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargo covering off-site
checking,  sealing,  scheduling,  supporting  documentation,  etc.  Such  arrangements
should be communicated to and agreed with the PFSO concerned.

Security Level 2

16.35. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be

applied during cargo handling to enhance control, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

.4

detailed  checking  of  cargo,  cargo  transport  units  and  cargo  storage  areas  within
the port facility;

intensified checks, as appropriate, to ensure that only the documented cargo enters
the port facility, is temporarily stored there and then loaded onto the ship;

intensified searches of vehicles; and

increased  frequency  and  detail  in  checking  of  seals  and  other  methods  used  to
prevent tampering.

16.36. Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

.1

.2

.3

increasing the frequency and detail of checking of cargo, cargo transport units and
cargo storage areas within the port facility (visual and physical examination);

increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical
devices, or dogs; and

co-ordinating  enhanced  security  measures  with  the  shipper  or  other  responsible
party in addition to an established agreement and procedures.

Security Level 3

16.37. At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

restriction or suspension of cargo movements or operations within all, or part, of
the port facility or specific ships; and

verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances held within
the port facility and their location.

Delivery of ship’s stores

16.38. The security measures relating to the delivery of ship’s stores should:

.1

.2

.3

ensure checking of ship’s stores and package integrity;

prevent ship’s stores from being accepted without inspection;

prevent tampering;

137

.4

.5

.6

prevent ship’s stores from being accepted unless ordered;

ensure searching the delivery vehicle; and

ensure escorting delivery vehicles within the port facility.

16.39. For ships regularly using the port facility it may be appropriate to establish procedures
involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of
deliveries  and  their  documentation.  There  should  always  be  some  way  of  confirming
that  stores  presented  for  delivery  are  accompanied  by  evidence  that  they  have  been
ordered by the ship.

Security Level 1

16.40. At  security  level  1,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to

control the delivery of ship’s stores, which may include:

.1

.2

checking of ship’s stores;

advance  notification  as  to  composition  of  load,  driver  details  and  vehicle
registration; and

.3

searching the delivery vehicle.

16.41. Checking of ship’s stores may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

.1

.2

visual and physical examination; and

using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices or dogs.

Security Level 2

16.42. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied to enhance the control of the delivery of ship’s stores, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

detailed checking of ship’s stores;

detailed searches of the delivery vehicles;

co-ordination  with  ship  personnel  to  check  the  order  against  the  delivery  note
prior to entry to the port facility; and

.4

escorting the delivery vehicle within the port facility.

16.43. Detailed checking of ship’s stores may be accomplished by some or all of the following

means:

.1

.2

.3

increasing the frequency and detail of searches of delivery vehicles;

increasing the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs;
and

restricting, or prohibiting, entry of stores that will not leave the port facility within
a specified period.

138

Security Level 3

16.44. At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding  and  the  ships  at  the  port  facility  which  may  include  preparation  for
restriction, or suspension, of the delivery of ship’s stores within all, or part, of the port
facility.

Handling unaccompanied baggage

16.45. The  PFSP  should  establish  the  security  measures  to  be  applied  to  ensure  that
unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with
the  passenger  or  member  of  ship’s  personnel  at  the  point  of  inspection  or  search)  is
identified and subjected to appropriate screening, including searching, before is allowed
in the port facility and, depending on the storage arrangements, before it is transferred
between  the  port  facility  and  the  ship.  It  is  not  envisaged  that  such  baggage  will  be
subjected to screening by both the port facility and the ship, and in cases where both are
suitably  equipped,  the  responsibility  for  screening  should  rest  with  the  port  facility.
Close  co-operation  with  the  ship  is  essential  and  steps  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that
unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

Security Level 1

16.46. At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied when
handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or
searched up to and including 100 percent, which may include use of x-ray screening.

Security Level 2

16.47. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be
applied when handling unaccompanied baggage which should include 100 percent x-ray
screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

Security Level 3

16.48. At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

subjecting  such  baggage  to  more  extensive  screening,  for  example  x-raying  it
from at least two different angles;

preparations for restriction or suspension of handling or unaccompanied baggage;
and

.3

refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage into the port facility.

139

Monitoring the security of the port facility

16.49. The  port  facility  security  organization  should  have  the  capability  to  monitor  the  port
facility  and its nearby  approaches, on land  and water,  at all  times,  including  the  night
hours  and  periods  of  limited  visibility,  the  restricted  areas  within  the  port  facility,  the
ships at the port facility and areas surrounding ships. Such monitoring can include use
of:

.1

.2

.3

lighting;

security guards, including foot, vehicle and waterborne patrols; and

automatic intrusion detection devices and surveillance equipment.

16.50. When  used,  automatic  intrusion  detection  devices  should  activate  an  audible  and/or

visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.

16.51. The PFSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level
and  the  means  of  ensuring  that  monitoring  equipment  will  be  able  to  perform
continually,  including  consideration  of  the  possible  effects  of  weather  or  of  power
disruptions.

Security Level 1

16.52. At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied which
may  be  a  combination  of  lighting,  security  guards  or  use  of  security  and  surveillance
equipment to allow port facility security personnel to:

.1

.2

.3

observe  the  general  port  facility  area,  including  shore  and  water-side  accesses
to it;

observe access points, barriers and restricted areas; and

allow port facility security personnel to monitor areas and movements adjacent to
ships  using  the  port  facility,  including  augmentation  of  lighting  provided  by  the
ship itself.

Security Level 2

16.53. At  security  level  2,  the  PFSP  should  establish  the  additional  security  measures  to  be

applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capability, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

increasing  the  coverage  and  intensity  of  lighting  and  surveillance  equipment,
including the provision of additional lighting and surveillance coverage;

increasing the frequency of foot, vehicle or waterborne patrols; and

assigning additional security personnel to monitor and patrol.

140

Security Level 3

16.54. At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those
responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security
measures  which  could  be  taken  by  the  port  facility,  in  close  co-operation  with  those
responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

.1

.2

.3

switching on all lighting within, or illuminating the vicinity of, the port facility;

switching on all surveillance equipment capable of recording activities within, or
adjacent to, the port facility; and

maximising  the  length  of  time  such  surveillance  equipment  can  continue  to
record.

Differing security levels

16.55. The  PFSP  should  establish  details  of  the  procedures  and  security  measures  the  port
facility could adopt if the port facility is at a lower security level than that applying to a
ship.

Activities not covered by the Code

16.56. The  PFSP  should  establish  details  of  the  procedures  and  security  measures  the  port

facility should apply when:

.1

.2

.3

it  is  interfacing  with  a  ship  which  has  been  at  a  port  of  a  State  which  not  a
Contracting Government;

it is interfacing with a ship to which this Code does not apply; and

it is interfacing with fixed or floating platforms or mobile offshore drilling units
on location.

Declarations of security

16.57. The  PFSP  should  establish  the  procedures  to  be  followed  when  on  the  instructions  of
the  Contracting  Government  the  PFSO  requests  a  Declaration  of  Security  or  when  a
DoS is requested by a ship.

Audit, review and amendment

16.58. The PFSP should establish how the PFSO intends to audit the continued effectiveness of
the PFSP and the procedure to be followed to review, update or amend the PFSP.

16.59. The  PFSP  should  be  reviewed  at  the  discretion  of  the  PFSO.  In  addition  it  should  be

reviewed:

.1

.2

if the PFSA relating to the port facility is altered;

if  an  independent  audit  of  the  PFSP  or  the  Contracting  Government’s  testing  of
the  port  facility  security  organization  identifies  failings  in  the  organization  or
questions the continuing relevance of significant element of the approved PFSP;

.3

following security incidents or threats thereof involving the port facility; and

141

.4

following changes in ownership or operational control of the port facility.

16.60. The PFSO can recommend appropriate amendments to the approved plan following any

review of the plan. Amendments to the PFSP relating to:

.1

.2

proposed  changes  which  could  fundamentally  alter  the  approach  adopted  to
maintaining the security of the port facility; and

the  removal,  alteration  or  replacement  of  permanent  barriers,  security  and
surveillance  equipment  and  systems  etc.,  previously  considered  essential  in
maintaining the security of the port facility;

should be submitted to the Contracting Government that approved the original PFSP for
their  consideration  and  approval.  Such  approval  can  be  given  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  the
Contracting  Government  with,  or  without,  amendments  to  the  proposed  changes.  On
approval of the PFSP the Contracting Government should indicate which procedural or
physical alterations have to be submitted to it for approval.

Approval of port facility security plans

16.61. PFSPs  have  to  be  approved  by  the  relevant  Contracting  Government  which  should

establish appropriate procedures to provide for:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

the submission of PFSPs to them;

the consideration of PFSPs;

the approval of PFSPs, with or without amendments;

consideration of amendments submitted after approval; and

procedures  for  inspecting  or  auditing  the  continuing  relevance  of  the  approved
PFSP.

At all stages steps should be taken to ensure that the contents of the PFSP remains confidential.

Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility

16.62. The Contracting Government within whose territory a port facility is located may issue
an appropriate Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility (SoCPF) indicating:

.1

.2

.3

.4

the port facility;

that the port facility  complies with  the  provisions  of chapter  XI-2 and part  A  of
the Code;

the period of validity of the SoCPF which should be specified by the Contracting
Governments but should not exceed five years; and

the  subsequent  verification  arrangements  established  by 
Government and a confirmation when these are carried out.

the  Contracting

142

16.63. The  Statement  of  Compliance  of  a  Port  Facility  should  be  in  the  form  set  out  in  the
appendix  to  this  Part  of  the  Code.  If  the  language  used  is  not  Spanish,  French  or
English, the Contracting Government, if it considers it appropriate, may also include a
translation into one of these languages.

17.

PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER

General

17.1.

In  those  exceptional  instances  where  the  ship  security  officer  has  questions  about  the
validity  of  identification  documents  of  those  seeking  to  board  the  ship  for  official
purposes, the port facility security officer should assist.

17.2.

The port facility  security  officer  should  not be responsible  for  routine  confirmation of
the identity of those seeking to board the ship.

In addition other relevant guidance is provided under sections 15, 16 and 18.

18.

TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON PORT FACILITY SECURITY

Training

18.1.

The Port Facility Security Officer should have knowledge and receive training, in some
or all of the following, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

.10

.11

security administration;

relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;

relevant Government legislation and regulations;

responsibilities and functions of other security organizations;

methodology of port facility security assessment;

methods of ship and port facility security surveys and inspections;

ship and port operations and conditions;

ship and port facility security measures;

emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning;

instruction  techniques  for  security  training  and  education,  including  security
measures and procedures;

handling 
communications;

sensitive 

security 

related 

information 

and 

security 

related

.12

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

.13

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

.14

recognition,  on  a  non  discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and  behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten the security;

143

.15

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

.16

security equipment and systems, and their operational limitations;

.17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring;

.18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections;

.19

security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with ships; and

.20

assessment of security drills and exercises.

18.2.

Port  facility  personnel  having  specific  security  duties  should  have  knowledge  and
receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

knowledge of current security threats and patterns;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition of characteristics  and behavioural patterns of persons  who  are  likely
to threaten security;

techniques used to circumvent security measures;

crowd management and control techniques;

security related communications;

operations of security equipment and systems;

testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems;

inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and

.10 methods  of  physical  searches  of  persons,  personal  effects,  baggage,  cargo,  and

ship’s stores.

18.3.

All other port facility personnel should have knowledge of and be familiar with relevant
provisions of the PFSP, in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

.1

.2

.3

the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;

recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;

recognition of characteristics  and behavioural patterns of persons  who  are  likely
to threaten the security; and

.4

techniques used to circumvent security measures.

144

Drills and exercises

18.4.

18.5.

18.6.

The  objective  of  drills  and  exercises  is  to  ensure  that  port  facility  personnel  are
proficient  in  all  assigned  security  duties,  at  all  security  levels,  and  to  identify  any
security related deficiencies, which need to be addressed.

To  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  port  facility  security
plan,  drills  should  be  conducted  at  least  every  three  months  unless  the  specific
circumstances dictate otherwise. These drills should test individual elements of the plan
such as those security threats listed in paragraph 15.11.

Various  types  of  exercises  which  may  include  participation  of  port  facility  security
officers, in conjunction with relevant authorities of Contracting Governments, company
security  officers,  or  ship  security  officers,  if  available,  should  be  carried  out  at  least
once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. Requests
for  the  participation  of  company  security  officers  or  ships  security  officers  in  joint
exercises  should  be  made  bearing  in  mind  the  security  and  work  implications  for  the
ship. These exercises should test communication, coordination, resource availability and
response. These exercises may be:

.1

.2

.3

full scale or live;

tabletop simulation or seminar; or

combined  with  other  exercises  held  such  as  emergency  response  or  other  port
State authority exercises.

19.

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF SHIPS

No additional guidance.

145

APPENDIX TO PART B

APPENDIX 1

Form of a Declaration of Security between a ship and a port facility49

DECLARATION OF SECURITY

Name of Ship:

Port of Registry:

IMO Number:

Name of Port Facility:

This  Declaration  of  Security  is  valid  from  ………………..  until  ………………,  for  the
following activities ……………………….…………………………..

(list the activities with relevant details)

under the following security levels

Security level(s) for the ship:

Security level(s) for the port facility:

The port facility and ship agree to the following security measures and responsibilities to ensure
compliance with the requirements of Part A of the International Code for the Security of Ships
and of Port Facilities.

The affixing of the initials of the SSO or PFSO under
these columns indicates that the activity will be done,
in accordance with relevant approved plan, by

Activity

The port facility:

The ship:

Ensuring  the  performance  of  all  security
duties

Monitoring  restricted  areas  to  ensure  that
only authorized personnel have access

Controlling access to the port facility

Controlling access to the ship

Monitoring  of  the  port  facility,  including
berthing  areas  and  areas  surrounding  the
ship

49

This  form  of  Declaration  of  Security  is  for  use  between  a  ship  and  a  port  facility.  If  the  Declaration  of
Security is to cover two ships this model should be appropriately modified.

146

                                                
Monitoring of the ship, including berthing
areas and areas surrounding the ship

Handling of cargo

Delivery of ship’s stores

Handling unaccompanied baggage

Controlling  the  embarkation  of  persons
and their effects

Ensuring  that  security  communication  is
readily available between the ship and port
facility

The  signatories  to  this  agreement  certify  that  security  measures  and  arrangements  for  both  the
port facility and the ship during the specified activities meet the provisions of chapter XI-2 and
Part A of Code that will be implemented in accordance with the provisions already stipulated in
their approved plan or the specific arrangements agreed to and set out in the attached annex.

Dated at …………………………………….…….on the……………………………………

Signed for and on behalf of

the port facility:

the ship:

(Signature of Port Facility Security Officer)

(Signature of Master or Ship Security Officer)

Name and title of person who signed

Name:

Title :

Name:

Title :

Contact Details
(to be completed as appropriate)
(indicate the telephone numbers or the radio channels or frequencies to be used)

for the port facility:

for the ship:

Port Facility

Master

Port Facility Security Officer

Ship Security Officer

Company

Company Security Officer

147

APPENDIX 2

Form of a Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility

STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE OF A PORT FACILITY

(Official seal)

Statement Number

(State)

Issued under the provisions of Part B of the
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT
FACILITIES (ISPS CODE)

The Government of____________________________________________

(name of the State)

Name of the Port Facility
:
Address of the Port Facility :

…………………………………...
……………………………………

THIS  IS  TO  CERTIFY  that  the  compliance  of  this  port  facility  with  the  provisions  of
chapter XI-2 and part A of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities
(ISPS  Code)  has  been  verified  and  that  this  port  facility  operates  in  accordance  with  the
approved Port Facility Security Plan. This plan has been approved for the following <specify the
types of operations, types of ship or activities or other relevant information> (delete as appropriate):

Passenger ship
Passenger high speed craft
Cargo high speed craft
Bulk carrier
Oil tanker
Chemical tanker
Gas carrier
Mobile offshore Drilling Units
Cargo ships other than those referred to above

This Statement  of  Compliance is  valid  until  ................................................................,  subject  to
verifications (as indicated overleaf)

Issued at.......................................
(place of issue of the statement)

........................................................................................

Date of issue................

.................................................................................

(Signature of the duly authorized official
issuing the document)

(Seal or stamp of issuing authority, as appropriate)

148

ENDORSEMENT FOR VERIFICATIONS

The Government of <insert name of the State> has established that the validity of this Statement
of Compliance is subject to <insert relevant details of the verifications (e.g. mandatory annual or
unscheduled)>.

THIS  IS  TO  CERTIFY  that,  during  a  verification  carried  out  in  accordance  with  paragraph
B/16.62.4 of the ISPS Code, the port facility was found to comply with the relevant provisions of
chapter XI-2 of the Convention and Part A of the ISPS Code.

1st VERIFICATION

2nd VERIFICATION

3rd VERIFICATION

4th VERIFICATION

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

Signed…………………………………
(Signature of authorized official)

Place......................................................

Date .......................................................

***

149

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Policy area(s): Inland, air and maritime transport policy

Activit(y/ies): Implementation of the provisions on maritime security and the monitoring of
maritime security

TITLE  OF  ACTION:  REGULATION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  ON

ENHANCING SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY

1.

BUDGET LINE(S) + HEADING(S)

06 01 04 02 Transport safety and security - expenditure on administrative management

2.

2.1

2.2

2.3

(a)

OVERALL FIGURES

Total allocation for action (Part B):See point 6.1

Period of application:

Indefinite, starting in 2004

Overall multiannual estimate of expenditure

Schedule of commitment appropriations/payment appropriations (financial intervention)
(see point 6.1.1)

€ million (to three decimal places)

Year
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009 and
subs.
years

Total

Commitments

Payments

b)

Technical and administrative assistance and support expenditure (see point 6.1.2)

Commitments

0.050

0.200

0.050

0.025

0.175

0.025

0.525

Payments

0.050

0.200

0.050

0.025

0.175

0.025

0.525

Subtotal a+b

Commitments

0.050

0.200

0.050

0.025

0.175

0.025

0.525

Payments

0.050

0.200

0.050

0.025

0.175

0.025

0.525

(c)

Overall  financial  impact  of  human  resources  and  other  administrative  expenditure
(see points 7.2 and 7.3)

150

1.589

1.589

1.589

1.589

1.589

1.589

9.534

Commitments/
payments

TOTAL a+b+c

Commitments

1.639

1.789

1.639

1.614

Payments

1.639

1.789

1.639

1.614

1.764

1.764

1.614

1.614

10.059

10.059

2.4

Compatibility with financial programming and financial perspective

New action

[X] Proposal is compatible with existing financial programming.

[...] Proposal  will  entail  reprogramming  of  the  relevant  heading  in  the  financial

perspective.

Proposal  may  require  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Interinstitutional
Agreement.

2.5

Financial impact on revenue

[X] Proposal  has  no  financial  implications  (involves  technical  aspects  regarding

implementation of a measure).

3.

BUDGET CHARACTERISTICS

Type of expenditure

New

EFTA
contribution

Contributions
from candidate
countries

NCE

NDA

NO

NO

NO

Heading in
financial
perspective

No 3

4.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 80(2) of the EC Treaty

151

5.

5.1

DESCRIPTION AND GROUNDS

Need for Community intervention

5.1.1

Objectives pursued

The  European  Union  must  develop  all  necessary  means  of  dealing  with  the  terrorist  threat.
However,  despite  a  number  of  warnings,  the  shipping  world  has  only  very  recently  shown  an
interest  in  its  security.  After  less  than  a  year’s  preparatory  work,  the  International  Maritime
Organisation  (IMO)  adopted  two  international  instruments  laying  the  foundations  for  a  global
system of maritime security at its diplomatic conference on 12 December 2002: an amendment
of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS).

These  instruments  apply  from  1 July  2004  and  require  harmonised  implementation  within  the
Community.

However,  their  scope  is  limited  to  the  sphere  of  activity  of  the  IMO,  whereas  only  a  global
system  can  ensure  an  effective  level  of  security  for  shipping.  The  instruments  adopted  by  the
IMO apply only to international shipping, and their geographical scope is limited to the ship/port
interface. They include some provisions which though mandatory are open to interpretation and
adaptation, and others which are recommendations.

A Community Regulation is therefore necessary to:

(cid:1) provide the Member States with the best possible conditions for the timely implementation of
the  new  maritime  security  instruments  adopted  by  the  IMO  Diplomatic  Conference  on
interpretation  and
12 December  2002  by  establishing  a  basis  for 
implementation,

their  harmonised 

(cid:1)  guarantee  and  monitor  at  Community  level  the  achievement  of  the  main  objective  of  these
international instruments, i.e. enhancing the security of ships and port facilities;

(cid:1) ensure uniform conditions throughout the European Union for access to and control of markets
and activities associated with the maritime sector.

5.1.2 Measures taken in connection with ex ante evaluation

Between February and December 2002 the Member States and the Commission participated in
three IMO technical sessions and a diplomatic conference devoted to urgent consideration of the
security of international maritime transport. The Community as a whole considers that this is a
new subject which requires priority action:

(cid:1)  because  the  bulk  of  world  trade  in  terms  of  volume  and  a  significant  amount  of  strategic

supplies depend on shipping,

(cid:1)  because shipping is at risk as a result of its lack of preparedness and the fact that it operates

worldwide,

(cid:1)  because of constant and current geopolitical factors.

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5.1.3 Measures taken following ex post evaluation

5.2

Actions envisaged and budget intervention arrangements

The Regulation requires each Member State to draw up a national plan and  a plan for
early adoption of the measures intended to enhance maritime security. The introduction
and  implementation  of  the  whole  of  each  national  scheme  must  be  monitored  by  a
national central authority.

As  the  overall  scheme  must  be  consistent  to  ensure  its  reliability  at  EU  level,
particularly  in  view  of  enlargement,  the  Commission  is  called  on  to  carry  out
inspections  to  verify  the  means  of  monitoring  implementation  of  the  national  plans
adopted pursuant to this Regulation.

It also has the task of centralising, analysing and processing a large volume of technical
and operational security data supplied by the Member States.

It  must  also  carry  out  a  prior  check  on  the  conformity  of  any  draft  bilateral  or
multilateral agreements which Member States may wish  to  conclude  concerning  intra-
Community short sea shipping.

5.3

Methods of implementation

Direct  management  by  the  Commission  using  regular  or  outside  staff,  with  support  from  the
European Maritime Safety Agency.

Pursuant to Article 10(7) of the proposal for a Regulation, the European Maritime Safety Agency
is to assist the Commission in its inspections and in keeping and monitoring data supplied by the
Member States.

The  contribution  of  the  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency,  based  on  its  expertise  and  its
knowledge  of  the  shipping  world,  is  essential  to  the  success  of  the  planned  maritime  security
scheme. These tasks require the services of highly specialised experts who cannot and need not
be Commission staff.50

6.

6.1

FINANCIAL IMPACT

Total financial impact on Part B (over the entire programming period)

The  cost  of  this  scheme  is  calculated  by  adding  up  the  individual  costs  on  an  annual  basis,
starting in 2004, when the proposed Community action will have entered into force.

These individual costs consist  of a  flat-rate  amount  of  €25 000  for the organisation  of one-day
meetings  with  experts  from  the  sector  concerned  to  enable  the  Commission  to  draw  up  the
adaptations to the rules provided for in Article 11 of the proposal for a Regulation.

It is expected that two such meetings will be needed each year for the first three years. Thereafter
one meeting a year should suffice.

50

However,  if  staff  numbers  at  the  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency  prove  insufficient,  the  shortfall  will
have  to  be  covered  by  increasing  the  number  of  officials  in  the  Commission’s  maritime  security
inspectorate accordingly, in order to perform all the tasks described in the proposal for a Regulation.

153

                                                
The Commission also intends to commission a study to evaluate the impact and the effectiveness
of the measures adopted. Such a study  should be  conducted in  year N+2, and  then  every three
years.  Such  regular  evaluation  is  necessary  to  enable  the  Commission  to  propose,  via  the
committee procedure, any adjustments to the proposed system which might prove necessary. The
unit cost of each study is estimated at €150 000.

6.1.2

Technical  and  administrative  assistance,  support  expenditure  and  IT  expenditure
(commitment appropriations)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total

2009
and
subsequ
ent
years

(a) Studies

(b)  Meetings  of
experts

0.150

0.150

0.300

0.050

0.050

0.050

0.025

0.025

0.025

0.225

TOTAL 0.050

0.200

0.050

0.025

0.175

0.025

0.525

 (If necessary, explain the method of calculation.)

7.

7.1

IMPACT ON STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE

Impact on human resources

Staff to be assigned to management of the
action using existing and/or additional
resources

Number of permanent
posts

Number of
temporary posts51

Total

0.5
1

1
1

A

B
C

3.5

8

2

10

13.5

Description of tasks deriving
from the action

Principal administrator
(existing)
Administrator
Security inspectors
Administrator’s assistant
Secretaries of the inspectorate

Types of post

Officials 
temporary staff

or

Total

7.2

Overall financial impact of human resources

Type of human resources

Amount (€)

Method of calculation *

Officials
Temporary staff

378 000
1 080 000

Total

1 458 000

Average  cost  of  Commission
officials, 
including  overheads
(€108 000/year/official)

The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.

51

These figures are based on the assumption that the European Maritime Safety Agency has sufficient staff to
perform the tasks assigned to it by Article 10(7) of the proposal for a Regulation.

154

                                                
7.3

Other administrative expenditure deriving from the action

Budget line
(number and heading)

Overall allocation (Title A7)
A0701 – Missions (ABB-06 01)

A07031  –  Compulsory  committees  (ABB-06
01)(1)

Amount (€)

Method of calculation

112 500

18 750

3  inspection  visits  of  about  5
days in each Member State (3 x
25 MS x €1 500)

the  COSS
1  meeting  of 
(maritime 
security
representatives)  Reimbursement
of  national 
travel
expenses,  estimated  at  25  times
an average of €750/expert

experts’ 

Total

131 250

The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.

(1) Specify the type of committee and the group to which it belongs.

I.
II.
III.

Annual total (7.2 + 7.3)
Duration of action
Total cost of action (I x II)

€1 589 250
Indefinite
Indefinite

The needs in terms of human and administrative resources will be covered within the allocation
granted to the managing DG in the framework of the annual allocation procedure.

8.

8.1

FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION

Follow-up arrangements

Follow-up  arrangements  will  be  adopted  involving  inspections  in  the  Member  States  and
periodic impact studies.

8.2

Arrangements and schedule for the planned evaluation

The Commission intends to commission a study to evaluate the impact and the effectiveness of
the measures adopted. Such a study should be conducted in year N+2, and then every three years.

Six  months  after  the  date  of  application  of  the  proposed  Regulation,  the  Commission,  in
cooperation with the national authorities, will start a series of inspections to verify the means of
monitoring  implementation  of  the  national  plans  adopted  pursuant  to  the  Regulation.  These
inspections  will  take  account  of  the  data  supplied  by  the  national  authorities,  including  the
monitoring reports.

9.

ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES

The  activities  of  the  Commission’s  maritime  security  inspectors  will  be  subject  to  the
Commission’s normal audit procedures

155

IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM

THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON BUSINESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES( SMEs)

TITLE OF PROPOSAL

Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  enhancing  ship  and
port facility security

DOCUMENT REFERENCE NUMBER

COM (2003) 229 final 2003/0089 (COD)

THE PROPOSAL

1.

Taking  account  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  why  is  Community  legislation
necessary in this area and what are its main aims?

Recent events and the generalisation of the terrorist threat have raised awareness of
the need to enhance maritime security. In December 2002 the International Maritime
Organisation  (IMO)  adopted  a  series  of  measures  applicable  to  international
shipping.  These  measures  must  be  applied  consistently  throughout  the  Community
and  certain  security  measures  must  be  applied  to  domestic  shipping  within  the
Member States in order to attain a global level of shipping security.

THE IMPACT ON BUSINESS

2.

Who will be affected by the proposal?

–  Which business sectors?

Merchant ships, shipping companies and port facilities.

–  What sizes of company (share of small and medium-sized businesses)?

All sizes of company active in this sector.

–  Are there particular geographical areas of the Community where these businesses

are found?

No, all  Member States are concerned as  flag states  and thirteen  Member  States  are
concerned as port states.

3.

What will business have to do to comply with the proposal?

Introduce security procedures and acquire the necessary equipment. Ensure that staff
receive  training  on  security  requirements.  Additional  staff  will  probably  be  needed
(at  least  ship,  company  and  port  facility  security  officers  and  staff  of  maritime
administrations).

156

4.

What economic effects is the proposal likely to have:

–  on employment?

Jobs will probably be created to perform security tasks on ships and at port facilities,
and at specialised security firms.

–  on investment and the creation of new businesses?

Shipping  companies  and  port  facilities  will  have  to  acquire  security  equipment.
Specialised security firms may expand.

–  on the competitiveness of businesses?

None, in that all will be subject to the same requirements.

5.

Does the proposal contain measures to take account of the specific situation of small
and medium-sized enterprises (reduced or different requirements, etc.)?

Not directly, but  as the  requirements  of the security  measures  take  account of each
type of activity, the impact on small vessels, the companies which own and operate
them and the port facilities which serve them will probably be smaller.

CONSULTATION

6.

List the organisations which have been consulted about the proposal and outline their
main views.

- All international organisations representing this sector participated as observers in
the work of the IMO on maritime security.

The  Commission  has  commissioned  a  study  of  the  impact  of  these  measures.  The
consultant  selected  to  carry  out  the  study  associated  the  European  Sea  Ports
Organisation (ESPO), the Federation of European Private Port Operators (FEPORT)
and the European Community Shipowners’ Association (ECSA) with its work.

While the shipping industry representatives share the concern to enhance the security
of  international  maritime  transport,  they  may  have  some  reservations  about  going
beyond the mandatory measures imposed by the IMO.

157