WRITTEN QUESTION E-1360/03 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Shipments of uranium and enrichment technologies by the Urenco company to Iran and other states seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
Date: 2003-04-10
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran, Iraq, export, fuel enrichment, nuclear industry, nuclear safety, nuclear technology, nuclear weapon, third country, uranium

21.11.2003

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 280 E/133

of the EC Treaty. The Greek authorities replied, giving their comments. The reply is now being examined.
If the Commission finds that Greece has failed to meet the requirements of Community legislation, it will
deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter.

It should be noted that the Commission recently received a complaint on the malfunctioning of the landfill
in Ano Liosia, also linked to the discharge of sewage sludge from Psittalia on this site. The Commission
will not hesitate to take all necessary measures to ensure that Community law is observed.

(2003/C 280 E/152)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1360/03

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(10 April 2003)

Subject: Shipments of uranium and enrichment technologies by the Urenco company to Iran and other

states seeking to develop nuclear weapons

1.
Is the Commission aware that the Uranium Enrichment Company (Urenco), which is established in
Capenhurst (UK), Gronau (D) and Almelo (NL), and which was set up in 1970 on the basis of a treaty by
the governments of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands for the
commercial development of ultracentrifuge technology, commands a 12 to 15 % share of the world market
in enriched uranium?

Is the Commission also aware that in the 1970s Urenco attracted controversy, not least for having
2.
supplied enriched uranium to the then Brazilian dictatorship, interested as it was in developing nuclear
weapons, by going against the wishes of the United Nations in using uranium originating in the Rössing
mine in what was then South-African occupied Namibia, and by unintentionally playing into the hands of
the Pakistani government by creating the possibility for it to develop its own atomic bomb on the strength
of industrial espionage by Abdul Qadeer Kahn, an employee of the Dutch FDO company working in
cooperation with Urenco?

Can the Commission confirm that Urenco centrifuge technology and centrifuge rotors were found

3.
during inspections in Iraqi installations early in 1996, possibly shipped via Pakistan or Brazil?

4.
Is Urenco now supplying Iran with centrifuge technology and other apparatus suitable for use in
uranium enrichment, as brought to public attention by the government of the Russian Federation? Have
such shipments always been registered by the IAEA in Vienna?

Does the Commission share the view of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the effect that Iran had

5.
a more aggressive nuclear programme than the International Atomic Energy Agency had thought?

6. What action will the Commission take to prevent Urenco from wittingly or unwittingly contributing
to the further proliferation of the means of producing nuclear weapons to states with non-democratic
regimes?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(6 June 2003)

The figures suggested by the Honourable Member concerning the market share of Urenco agree with

1.
the information available to the Commission.

The Commission does not have further information on the issues raised by the Honourable Member

2.
outside the public information released by the media.

The Commission has not participated in any inspection in Iraq; the public information released by

3.
the media is known to the Commission.

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Official Journal of the European Union

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21.11.2003

4.

The Commission is not aware of such a case.

5.
The Commission is aware of the concerns of the United States. Member States are discussing this
specific issue in the appropriate fora, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board
of Governors on the basis of the preliminary report of Dr El Baradei. The final report is expected in June
2003.

6.
The Commission undertakes, through a comprehensive safeguards system, to prevent any diversion
of nuclear materials from the intended use as declared by the users within the Union. The Commission
co-operates in this respect closely with the IAEA, supporting its international non-proliferation regime.

It should also be noted that the equipment and technology required for enriching uranium are expressly
covered by the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). Accordingly, exports of such equipment
and technology require an export authorisation from the competent authorities in each Member State.
All EU Member States participate in the work of the NSG. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of
22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and
technology (1) restates the need for an export authorisation and makes it a legal obligation at Community
level.

(1) OJ L 159, 30.6.2000.

(2003/C 280 E/153)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1375/03

by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(15 April 2003)

Subject: Radioactive contamination of mineworkers in Shinkolobwe heterogenite mines

According to various international media sources, young Congolese in Shinkolobwe in the Democratic
Republic of Congo are mining the radioactive cobalt ore heterogenite, without protection. The ore lies in
former uranium mines, which, following their closure, were covered with concrete by the then Union
Minière in order to protect the surrounding area against radioactive contamination from the mines.

However, under the government of Kabila the mines were re-opened in order to mine the cobalt ore
heterogenite, a cheap raw material for cobalt which is very competitive on the world market. The ore is
being mined by young people working under conditions which they describe as ‘slavery’. Furthermore,
Alex Stewart, a specialist company providing laboratory services to the mining industry, has found a high
concentration of the highly radioactive uranium-235 in steels from Shinkolobwe. That means that not only
mineworkers are at risk, but also people living near sites where the ores are stored, including in the town
of Lisaki where tonnes of the uranium-containing ore lie piled up.

Is the Commission aware of the situation in Shinkolobwe in south-eastern Congo?

What steps can the Commission take to identify those responsible for these abuses?

What further action does the Commission intend to take to address the problem?

Answer given by Mr Nielson on behalf of the Commission

(11 June 2003)

The Commission is aware of the problem of unprotected young miners handling radioactive substances at
Shinkolobwe, and of the effects of radioactivity on the entire population living in the vicinity of the mine.
This is part of the wider problem of failure to manage the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). It is the State, through Gécamines, that owns the Shinkolobwe uranium mine which has
been officially closed since 1969. However, the fact that ‘wildcatters’ operate on the site is an open secret.