2003/600/EC: Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) (notified under document number C(2003) 1065)
Date: 2003-04-02
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: France, application of EU law, beef, competition law

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COMMISSION DECISION

of 2 April 2003

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty

(Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef)

(notified under document number C(2003) 1065)

(Only the French text is authentic)

(2003/600/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

1. THE FACTS

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity,

Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February
1962, first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2),
and in particular Article 15(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962
applying certain rules of competition to production of and
trade in agricultural products (3), as amended by Regulation
No 49 (4), and in particular Article 2 thereof,

(1)

Having regard to the Commission decision of 24 June 2002 to
initiate proceedings in this case,

Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity of
being heard on the matters to which the Commission has
taken objection, in accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation
No 17 and Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/
98 of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain
proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (5),

Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive
Practices and Dominant Positions,

Having regard to the final report of the Hearing Officer in this
case (6),

1.1. Subject of the case and procedure

This Decision relates to a written agreement, dated
24 October 2001, concluded between six French feder-
ations in order to set a minimum purchase price for
certain categories of cattle and suspend imports of beef
into France. Four of
the federations which signed
the agreement represent cattle farmers: the Fédération
nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles (FNSEA),
the Fédération nationale bovine (FNB), the Fédération
nationale des producteurs de lait (FNPL) and the Jeunes
agriculteurs (JA, formerly the Centre national des jeunes
agriculteurs or CNJA). The two other federations which
signed the agreement represent cattle slaughterers: the
Fédération nationale de l’industrie et des commerces en
gros des viandes (FNICGV) and the Fédération nationale
de la coopération bétail et viande (FNCBV). This Decision
also relates to the verbal agreement concluded at the end
of November and beginning of December 2001 between
the same parties and having the same object, applicable
following the expiry of the agreement concluded on
24 October 2001.

Whereas:

( 1) OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
( 2) OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.
( 3) OJ 30, 20.4.1962, p. 993/62.
( 4) OJ 53, 1.7.1962, p. 1571/62.
( 5) OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18.
( 6) OJ C 195, 19.8.2003.

(2)

On 30 October 2001, having learned of the signature
of the agreement of 24 October 2001, the Commission
wrote to the French Permanent Representative to the
European Union requesting further information on the
agreement and on the involvement of the French State.
A reply was received by letter dated 9 November
2001.

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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(9)

On 9 November 2001, the Commission wrote to five
of the federations which had signed the agreement
requesting information pursuant to Article 11 of Regu-
lation No 17; since the Commission was not at that time
aware that the FNCBV had also signed the agreement,
the request for information was not addressed to that
federation. The five federations in question replied
accordingly to the requests for information on 15 and
23 November 2001.

On 26 November 2001, in the light of the information
thus obtained, the Commission sent the six federations
a letter of formal notice stating that the facts which had
come to its knowledge indicated, at first sight, that the
Community competition rules had been infringed. The
addressees were asked to submit their comments by
28 November. Each of them replied that the agreement
would end on 30 November 2001 and that it would not
be extended.

On 17 December 2001, having information indicating
that the agreement was in fact continuing, the Com-
mission carried out investigations on the premises of the
FNSEA and the FNB in Paris pursuant to Article 14(3) of
Regulation No 17, and on the premises of the FNICGV,
also in Paris, on the basis of Article 14(2) of Regulation
No 17.

On 24 June 2002, the Commission adopted a statement
of objections addressed to the six federations. The parties
submitted their written comments between 23 Septem-
ber and 4 October 2002. They also made known their
views at the hearing held on 31 October 2002.

1.2. The Parties

The FNICGV is the trade organisation representing
undertakings of all sizes and types of activity operating
in the meat industry and meat wholesaling (beef and
veal, pigmeat, mutton and lamb, horsemeat and offal).
The FNICGV is a union (syndicat) established under
French law and, on 1 January 2000, had more than
400 members throughout France. Its members account
for more that 75 % of turnover in the sector. In its
comments on the statement of objections, the FNICGV
stated that its share ‘as regards slaughter’ (en matière
d’abattage) is 80 %, or 60 % if the cooperatives, which
are ordinary rather than permanent, members are not
included.

The FNSEA, which is the main French farmers’ union,
has various branches. The basic level is the local farmers’
union (syndicat d’exploitants agricoles); the local farmers’
unions are grouped together at department (départe-
ment)
level. The grouping is called the Fédération
départementale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles
(FDSEA) or Union départementale des syndicats d’exploi-
tants agricoles (UDSEA), and these are members of the
FNSEA. Regional federations coordinate the activities of
the FDSEAs or UDSEAs in each region. The FNSEA also
comprises 38 specialised associations representing the
interests of each type of producer. These specialised
associations include the FNB and the FNPL, both of
which signed the agreement of 24 October 2001. Lastly,
the FNSEA also comprises four social affairs sections,
which are not covered by this proceeding. Young farmers
(under 35 years of age) have their own representative
body, the JA. To be a member of the local young farmers’
centre, one must also be a member of the local FDSEA/
UDSEA trade union. The FNSEA, the JA, the FNB and
the FNPL are trade unions governed by French law.

1.3. The beef sector in France and the October
2000 crisis

of

tonnes

carcase weight

(10) The cattle population in the Community numbers some
81 million head. French cattle numbers account for
more than 25 % of this total. Every year, slaughtered
adult cattle in France represent approximately 1,3
million
equivalent
(1,361 million in 1999, 1,277 million in 2000 and
1,315 million in 2001). Slaughtered dairy cattle (i.e.
cows intended for milk production) or suckler cows (i.e.
cows for the rearing of calves) represent approximately
50 % of this total (620 000, 624 000 and 600 000 ton-
nes of carcase weight equivalent in 1999, 2000 and
2001 respectively) (7).
In a report drawn up by the
French body OFIVAL (Office national interprofessionnel
des viandes, de l’élevage et de l’aviculture) in Octo-
ber 2002 on ‘the beef sector in France’ (8), one of
the tables is headed ‘operators’. Against the heading
‘production’, the table indicates ‘240 000 farms with
more than five’ adult cattle, with turnover estimated at
EUR 4,4 billion. Against the heading ‘slaughter’, the table
cites ‘443 slaughter and cutting enterprises with more
is
than 20 employees’; turnover in ‘butcher’s meat’
estimated at EUR 14 billion, including EUR 6,2 billion
for ‘beef and veal’.

(8)

The FNCBV is the federation representing the cooperat-
ive movement. It comprises 300 cooperative groups of
producers in the cattle, pig and sheep farming sectors
and some 30 slaughter and meat-processing groups or
undertakings.

(7) Document 38.279/107. See also the statistics available on the
website of the Office national interprofessionnel des viandes, de
l’élevage et de l’aviculture (OFIVAL), www.ofival.fr.

(8) ‘La filière bovine en France’, report available on the OFIVAL

website, www.ofival.fr/doctech/sial/bov02-t.pdf.

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(11) Total imports into France (live adult cattle, fresh and
frozen meat) from other Member States amounted to
342 000 tonnes of carcase weight equivalent in 1999,
331 000 tonnes in 2000 and 262 000 tonnes in 2001.
Such imports account for virtually all French imports of
beef and veal (only 5 % of French imports of such
products come from non-Community countries). France
is one of the main meat importers in the Community,
just as it is one of the main exporters to the other
Member States. In 2001, French imports were worth
EUR 1 354 million and French exports EUR 744
million (9). Most of the trade is in fresh or frozen meat,
not live animals. It should be borne in mind that at that
time France was unlawfully banning the import of beef
originating in the United Kingdom. That France thereby
failed to fulfil its obligations has been confirmed by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (10).

(12)

In October 2000, a new case of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) was disco-
vered. It involved an animal from a herd from which, in
the meantime, 11 other animals had been slaughtered
and their meat put up for sale in a supermarket chain.
Other cases of BSE were subsequently discovered in
other Member States. At the same time, sheep in the
United Kingdom were badly hit by an outbreak of foot-
and-mouth disease, which had an impact on meat
consumption in general in other Member States as well
as the United Kingdom.

(13) This situation, which was widely reported in the media,
created a new crisis in the beef sector. As from Octo-
ber 2000, there was a sharp drop in consumption in a
number of Member States, including France, but also a
substantial reduction in French imports and exports; for
example, the last two months of 2000 saw a 50 % drop
in French imports compared with the same months in
1999. However, as from the middle of 2001, consump-
tion in France recovered considerably, so that the decline
for 2001 as a whole compared to 2000 was ultimately
on a much smaller scale than anticipated (a decline of
between 4 % and 5 %). Similarly, though it did not
return to its original level, trade recovered substantially.

(14) The trend of beef production prices was as follows.
Following the October 2000 crisis, prices fell signifi-
cantly. Even though average slaughterhouse entry prices
for cows rose again during the first half of 2001, they
remained below the average prices for the first half of
1999 or 2000. As from the second half of 2001 in
particular, prices started to fall again. Between Septem-
ber/October 2000 and September/October 2001, the

( 9) Information available on the OFIVAL website, citing as its source

‘French customs (2001)’.

( 10) Case C-1/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9989.

decline may be put at about 20 % on the slaughterhouse
entry prices for culled cows, i.e. cows for slaughter (11).
At the beginning of October 2001, following four
months of decline, slaughterhouse entry prices had fallen
back to the level they had reached at
the end of
November 2000, at the height of the new beef crisis (12).
However, it should be noted that, because of the reform
of the common agricultural policy under ‘Agenda 2000’,
intervention prices had been reduced by 13,4 %, in
return for an increase in direct aid for stock farmers. As
from the 43rd week of 2001 (the week from 22
to 28 October 2001), the statistics produced by the
federations in response to the request for information
show a recovery in prices. For example, the slaughter-
house entry price for U3 cows (13) rose, per 100 kg
carcase, from FRF (French francs) 1 941 to FRF 1 956,
then to FRF 2 025 and finally to FRF 2 034 respectively
for weeks 42 (the week before the agreement was
signed), 43, 44 and 45 of 2001 (14).

(15) By contrast, final consumer prices remained stable or
increased slightly throughout 2001. This is partly due to
the additional costs imposed by BSE, which, in France at
any rate, are borne by intermediaries and passed on to
the final consumer, or to the loss of income on certain
parts of the animal no longer sold to the consumer (15).
It is also possible that the decrease in volume sold was
offset by an increase in the margins of the various
operators involved up to the point of sale to the final
consumer.

(11) See document 38.279/162 and 163.
(12) All the weekly price figures from January 1999 to mid-Novem-

ber 2001 are set out in document 38.279/109 to 111.

(13) The Community rules have established a grading scale for adult
cattle carcases based on the combined use of two criteria. The
first (conformation) is divided into six categories represented by
the letters SEUROP (the letter S stands for ‘superior’, E for
‘excellent’ and so on to letter P, which stands for ‘poor’). The
second criterion is the degree of fat cover; it is subdivided into
five categories, from 1 (low) to 5 (very high). A third-level
subdivision (identified by the signs ‘+’, ‘−’ and ‘=’) is also possible
(see Council Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 of 28 April 1981
determining the Community scale for the classification of
carcases of adult bovine animals (OJ L 123, 7.5.1981, p. 3), as
last amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1026/91 (OJ
L 106, 26.4.1991, p. 2)).
(14) Document 38.279/109.
(15) An FNSEA memo of 30 August 2001 states that ‘the additional
cost imposed by the new BSE crisis on the production and sale
of 1 kilo of minced steak’ (le surcoût lié à la nouvelle crise ESB
sur la fabrication et la vente d’un kilo de steak haché) may be put
at ‘14 % of the industrial selling price to large retailers’ (14 %,
prix de vente industriel à la grande distribution)
(document
38.279/534).

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1.4. The common organisation of the market in
beef and veal and the measures adopted to deal with
the crisis

Article 47(3) sets the intervention price at gradually
decreasing levels from 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2002.

1.4.1. Common organisation of the market: general rules

Under Article 47(2) of the basic Regulation, intervention
buying-in may not cover more than 350 000 tonnes per
year for the Community as a whole.

(16) The common organisation of the market in beef and
veal (the CMO), as applicable at the time of the events
involved in this case, is based on Council Regulation
(EC) No 1254/1999 (OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21) (the
basic Regulation).

(19)

From 1 July 2002, Articles 26 and 27 of the basic
Regulation introduced new mechanisms (namely, private
storage aid and an intervention system known as the
‘safety net’). However, these mechanisms are not relevant
here, given the period to which the facts involved in this
case apply.

(17) As the second recital to the basic Regulation states, ‘the
aim of the common agricultural policy is to attain the
objectives set out in Article 33 of the Treaty’. It goes on
to state that ‘in the beef and veal sector, in order to
stabilise markets and to ensure a fair standard of living
for the agricultural community, provision should be
in
made for internal market measures comprising,
particular, direct payments to beef producers, private
storage aid and a public storage scheme’. The CMO is
thus based on a comprehensive scheme of direct pay-
ments to farmers. A series of premiums is provided for
by the Regulation, such as the suckler cow premium
(Article 6 et seq. of the basic Regulation) and the
slaughter premium (Article 11 of the basic Regulation).

(18) On the other hand, the mechanisms for public inter-
vention, which were deemed to be ‘no longer indispens-
able to balance the market’, were to be phased out
gradually (see recital 20 to the basic Regulation). Accord-
ingly, until 30 June 2002, the national
intervention
agencies were able to buy in products, under tender
procedures, ‘to prevent or mitigate a substantial fall in
prices’ (Article 47 of the basic Regulation). The tender
procedures could be opened whenever the following
two conditions were both met for a period of two
consecutive weeks:

— the average Community market price recorded on
the basis of the Community grading scale (16) for
the carcases of adult bovine animals is less than
84 % of the intervention price,

— the average market price recorded on the basis of
the said scale in the Member State or States or
regions of a Member State is less than 80 % of
the intervention price (Article 47(3) of the basic
Regulation).

( 16) See footnote 13.

(20) The detailed rules for the application of the basic
Regulation as regards the public intervention buying-in
provided for in Articles 27 and 47 were laid down by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 562/2000 (17).

(21)

the basic Regulation provides that

‘when a
Lastly,
in prices is recorded on the
substantial rise or fall
Community market and this situation is likely to con-
tinue, thereby disturbing or threatening to disturb the
market, the necessary measures may be taken’ (Article 38
of the basic Regulation).

1.4.2. Measures adopted to deal with the crisis

(22) The Community institutions adopted various measures
to deal with the crisis that had been affecting the beef
sector since October 2000.

(23) Acting on a proposal from the Commission, the Council
amended the basic Regulation (18). Noting that
the
market had been ‘seriously disrupted because consumers
(...) have lost confidence’, it took the view that ‘a number
of measures that seek to regulate the market by reducing
future production should accordingly be adopted’ (first
recital to the Regulation). In particular,
it raised the
ceiling for intervention buying-in for 2001, increasing it
from 350 000 tonnes to 500 000 tonnes.

(24) The Commission for its part implemented the instru-
ments provided for in the basic Regulation. Use was
made of the intervention mechanisms that allow certain
quantities of cattle to be withdrawn from the market, so
as to stabilise supply in relation to demand. The relevant
rules were also amended so as to broaden their scope
of application. For example, by way of derogation,

(17) OJ L 68, 16.3.2000, p. 22.
(18) Council Regulation (EC) No 1512/2001 amending the basic

Regulation (OJ L 201, 26.7.2001, p. 1).

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intervention was extended to include products which
had not hitherto been included and carcases of a
weight greater than that hitherto authorised (19). These
derogation measures were extended throughout 2001
and into the beginning of 2002 (20).

(28) All

in all, during the year following the start of the
second mad-cow crisis, more than 750 000 tonnes of
meat were thus withdrawn from the market, equivalent
to more than 10 % of annual consumption in Europe (24).

(25) The Commission also adopted special new instruments
under Article 38 of the basic Regulation (see recital 21
of this Decision).

(29)

(26)

(27)

Firstly, on 18 December 2000, the Commission adopted
Regulation (EC) No 2777/2000 adopting exceptional
support measures for the beef market (21), applicable for
the first half of 2001. The first recital in the Regulation
states that ‘the Community beef market is currently
going through a deep crisis due to a lack of consumer
confidence in beef’, with a fall in consumption and a
substantial reduction in prices. The Regulation accord-
ingly introduced an exceptional measure, pursuant to
Article 38 of the basic Regulation. A purchase scheme
was established, under certain conditions, for live ani-
mals that were to be subsequently slaughtered and
destroyed, so as to prevent surpluses from developing
on the market. Regulation (EC) No 2777/2000 specified
that the purchase scheme would be co-financed by the
Community at the rate of 70 %.

Secondly, on 3 April 2001, the Commission adopted
Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 on special market support
measures in the beef sector (22). The Regulation intro-
duces a purchase scheme, based on a tender procedure,
for carcases or half carcases. Under the scheme, where
certain price conditions are met, tendering is opened in
the Member States. The meat purchased by the com-
petent authorities in the Member States following the
tender procedure (the purchase price is 70 % financed
by the Community) is either destroyed or stored, for
example for use in providing humanitarian aid. The
Regulation, which was scheduled to expire at the end of
December 2001, was extended until March 2002 (23), ‘in
order to avoid a further collapse of the market’ (recital 2).

State

French

declared

Lastly, under the Community rules governing State aid,
the Commission authorised a number of Member States
to grant aid to the beef sector. On 25 July 2001, the
Commission
of
EUR 267 million granted to stock farmers hit by the BSE
crisis compatible with Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty (25).
On 3 April 2002, the Commission declared a further
grant of French state aid, amounting to EUR 75,5
million, to stock farmers hit by the crisis compatible
with Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty (26). France was the
largest provider of direct state aid to farmers to help
them deal with the October 2000 crisis.

aid

1.5. The situation prior to the agreement of
24 October 2001

(30) Despite these measures to stabilise the market, deemed
insufficient by the farmers, who blamed the different
degrees of strictness in applying the measures from one
Member State to another, relations between farmers and
slaughterers in France became tense in September and
October 2001. At that time, throughout most of France,
groups of farmers illegally stopped lorries in order to
check the origin of the meat being transported. In the
documents drawn up by the farmers’ unions, these illegal
interceptions are generally described as ‘inspections’
(contrôles). In addition, slaughterhouses were blockaded
by farmers, who prevented any vehicles from entering
or leaving the slaughterhouse and/or checked the geo-
graphical origin of the meat. These protests and their
consequences were widely reported in the press (27). In
most cases, the protest action resulted in the loss of
meat which had gone bad after several days of being
held up in a blockade, or in meat of non-French origin
being burned. Occasionally,
the protests resulted in
material damage, sometimes on a very substantial scale.
For example, on 15 October 2001, farmers ransacked
two premises in the department of Ille et Vilaine and
destroyed several tonnes of meat (28).

( 19) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1209/2001 of 20 June 2001
derogating from Regulation (EC) No 562/2000 laying down
detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1254/1999 as regards the buying-in of beef (OJ L 165,
21.6.2001, p. 15). The maximum weight allowed for intervention
was raised once again by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1496/
2001 (OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 3).

( 20) Most recently by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2579/2001

(OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 68).

( 21) OJ L 321, 19.12.2000, p. 47.
( 22) OJ L 95, 5.4.2001, p. 8.
( 23) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2595/2001 (OJ L 345,

29.12.2001, p. 33).

(24) Document 38.279/631.
(25) OJ C 247, 5.9.2001, p. 10. The full text of the Decision can be
found on the Commission’s Internet site,
in French, at the
following address (aid measure No NN 46/01): http://www.euro-
pa.eu.int/comm/secretariat–general/sgb/state–aids/agriculture–
2001.htm.

(26) OJ C 110, 7.5.2002, p. 7.
(27) See, for example, the press review attached to the FNICGV’s
reply of 23 November 2001 to the Commission’s request for
information (document 38.279/187 to 304).
(28) Ibid. See also document 38.279/719 and 720.

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(31) These protests and blockades of slaughterhouses were
particularly frequent in mid-October 2001, affecting
establishments throughout France. In return for lifting
blockades, the protesters made the slaughterers under-
they
take to suspend imports and to apply what
called the union price scale. It appears that,
in mid-
October 2001, in order to prevent the decline in prices,
the FNB decided to introduce a slaughterhouse-entry-
price scale applicable to culled cows ‘because of the
importance of this category’ (29). The application of the
price scale entailed the coordination of a number of
measures, including measures against imports, particu-
larly in the restaurant and catering industry (30), staff
restaurants and canteens being large consumers of
imported meat, which is cheaper (31). A few days after
the price scale was adopted at national level, the FNB
called on the unions to mobilise in order to ensure that
it was applied. This meant not only press coverage (32),
but also meetings with the slaughterers ‘in order to
get the price scale adopted’ (33). A number of major
slaughterers in the Pays de Loire region agreed to apply
the price scale as from 22 October 2001, following a
blockade that had lasted several days (34). When signing
one of the agreements, the FNB Vice-President described
it as ‘historic’, in that ‘beef prices have always been set
on the basis of supply and demand’ and ‘for the first
time, a minimum price scale will determine market
prices’ (35). The press reported on such local agreements,
noting that they also included a clause suspending
imports up to 31 December 2001 (36).

( 29) Document 38.279/613 and 614. See also document 38.279/
615, confirming the existence of the scale. The file also shows
that discussions on such a price scale had already taken place in
the weeks leading up to this, for example, at a meeting held on
2 October 2001 (document 38.279/950 and 951).

( 30) Document 38.279/614. This sector (restauration hors domicile)
covers hotels and restaurants, but especially staff restaurants,
hospitals, military bodies and canteens.
( 31) See in particular document 38.279/612.
( 32) A press article published on 25 October 2001 reported on
discussions on a planned price scale for weanlings and stated
that ‘last week, the FNB distributed a minimum slaughterhouse
entry price scale for cull cows to cattle markets and processing
firms’ (la semaine dernière, la FNB a diffusé une grille de prix
minimum des vaches de réforme entrée abattoir, auprès des
marchés aux bestiaux et des entreprises de transformation)
(document 38.279/201).

( 33) Document 38.279/615. See also document 38.279/614.
( 34) Document 38.279/615.
( 35) Document 38.279/200.
( 36) For example, with regard to an agreement signed by a slaughter-
house in the Vendée region following a blockade by farmers, the
General Secretary of the local FDSEA stated: ‘the operators have
solemnly undertaken to stop importing foreign meat until
1 January and to apply the union price scale’ (les opérateurs se
sont engagés solennellement à stopper les importations de viande
d’origine étrangère jusqu’au 1er janvier et à appliquer la grille des
prix syndicale)
(reported in Le Maine Libre on 19 October
2001, document 38.279/221). See also extracts from the daily
newspaper Ouest France published on 19 October 2001 (docu-
ment 38.279/223 and 224).

the FNSEA,

(32) Documents in the file show that, on a proposal from the
FNB, the introduction of a price scale was discussed by
the FNPL and the CNJA on
the FNB,
16 October 2001 (37). The four federations agreed to do
so (38). On that date, the price scale was also discussed
with the ‘federations in the sector’, but without reaching
an agreement (39). A further meeting took place on
23 October 2001 in order to ensure ‘the application of
the price scale set by the FNB Bureau’, but no agreement
was reached (40). In a notebook containing handwritten
notes by the FNB’s director, it is noted that the FNCBV’s
President and the FNICGV’s representative stated that
they did not have any mandate to negotiate a price scale;
the following is also noted against their names:
‘the
problem is the supply/demand surplus’ and ‘we cannot
operate on an artificial market’ (41).

(33) A further meeting took place on 24 October 2001, at
the request of the Minister for Agriculture. The Minister
did not conceal his backing for the discussions that were
taking place between the six federations, and some of
the discussions were held on the Ministry’s premises. On
24 October 2001, the Minister told the lower house of
the French parliament: ‘I arranged for a cross-industry
meeting to be held this morning at eight thirty in order
to get everyone to face their responsibilities. People are
now negotiating with the help of the Ministry, which is
trying to iron out any difficulties. I would like to get
downstream undertakings to agree to stop purchasing
abroad for a few weeks, or indeed a few months. Of
course, I have no means of obliging them to do so, the
State cannot force them to do so. However (...) if such
undertakings were to stop importing for two, three or
six months, until stocks had run down, it would be an
act of good citizenship’. The Minister went on to state: ‘I
would like to get all parties to agree to a fair purchasing
price scale’ (42).

(34)

In the FNB director’s handwritten notes on this meeting,
under the heading ‘Ministry nego.’, the following is noted
at the outset: ‘Minister: — stopping imports: — there
must be a price scale; — I will provide money if
necessary’ (43).

(37) See the record of the coordination meeting, document 38.279/

620.

(38) Document 38.279/1159. See also document 38.279/981.
(39) Document 38.279/1159.
(40) Document 38.279/1156.
(41) Document 38.279/1011.
(42) Document 38.279/309 and 310.
(43) Document 38.279/889.

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(35) A number of statements by the FNCBV President indicate
that he actively supported the conclusion of the agree-
ment. In an article published by the newspaper Ouest
France on 31 October 2001, the FNCBV President states:
‘we have played a key role in getting the principle of a
price scale accepted’ (44). Similarly,
in a memo sent
by the FNCBV President to the FNSEA President on
9 November 2001, it is stated that ‘the FNCBV played
an active role in the negotiations of 24 October which
resulted in the agreement on a minimum price scale for
cows’; the President makes the point: ‘I think that, with
my federation, I made a major contribution to this’ (45).

1.6. The provisions of the agreement of
24 October 2001

(36) The meeting held on 24 October 2001 culminated in an
agreement between the FNSEA, the FNB, the FNPL, the
CNJA, the FNICGV and the FNCBV.

1.6.1.

Substance of the agreement

(37) The agreement concluded between the six federations
on 24 October 2001 (but formally signed the next
day (46)) covers two aspects.

is a ‘temporary commitment
to suspend
(38) The first
imports’
(engagement provisoire de suspension des
importations). This commitment does not contain any
specification as to the type of beef to which it applies. It
therefore covers all types of beef imports, as is borne
out by a number of documents found by the Com-
mission during the investigations. For example, the FNB
director’s handwritten notes state, with regard to the
FNSEA President’s press conference on 25 October
‘suspension of all imports’ (47). They also state,
2001:
with regard to a draft reply to the Commission’s
request for information: ‘types of meat covered by the
agreement: — price scales: carcases of culled cows; —
commitment to temporarily suspend imports: all beef
products’ (48). The documents in the file, notably press
articles, referring to ‘inspections’ (contrôles) carried out
by farmers as to the geographical origin of meat do not
show that any distinction was made as to type of beef.

(39) The second aspect covered by the agreement relates to
prices. This is a ‘commitment to apply the slaughter-
house entry purchase price scale to culled cows’ (engage-

( 44) Document 38.279/195.
( 45) Document 38.279/410.
( 46) Document 38.279/1121.
( 47) Document 38.279/893.
( 48) Document 38.279/1025. See also document 38.279/1038:
‘scope imports: only cows? definition vague, because crisis
agreement!’ (portée imports: que sur les vaches? définition floue,
car accord dans la crise!).

ment d’application de la grille de prix d’achat entrée-
abattoir en vaches de réforme) in accordance with the
arrangements set out in the agreement. There then
follows a list of prices per kilogram for certain categories
of cow (mainly U and R category cows); in the case of
other categories, the agreement stipulates how the price
to be charged should be calculated, on the basis of the
price deriving from the special purchase (49). Since the
special purchase price was set every fortnight, the prices
in the price scale were accordingly adjusted as from mid-
November 2001 (50).

(40) Broadly speaking, the prices thus set were some 10 % to
15 % higher than the prices the previous week (51).

1.6.2. Duration of the agreement

(41) The agreement was to enter into force on 29 October
2001 and remain in force until 30 November. Although
the agreement does not make any provision for its
continued application, it is in fact clear that the parties
envisaged extending it beyond 1 December. The French
Minister for Agriculture had, moreover, clearly stated in
the lower house of parliament, during the first sitting on
24 October 2001, i.e. when the agreement was still
being discussed, that the suspension of imports should
cover ‘two, three or six months’, and that he ‘would like
to get the downstream undertakings to agree to stop
purchasing abroad for a few weeks, or indeed a few
months’ (52). A number of documents, show that this
was indeed the intention of the parties, or at least of
some of them. These documents include the following:

— handwritten notes by the FNB’s director at a
press conference given by the FNSEA President on
25 October 2001 state the following: ‘effect Mon-
day (...) and until 30 November. Meeting already
planned for then, for the follow-up’ (53),

— in those handwritten notes, on a page which is
undated, but was probably written between 9 and
12 November 2001, given the context, it is stated,
under the heading ‘imports’: ‘not to be extended in
the new December agreement’ (54),

(49) An FNB document dated 26 October 2001 gives a number of
additional explanations on price calculation methods (document
38.279/618). Document 38.279/631 (FNSEA memo preparatory
to the meeting with the French Prime Minister on 8 November
2001) states: ‘for O and P cows, prices have been calculated in
such a way as to be able to maintain special purchase for these
categories’ (pour les vaches O et P les prix ont été établis de façon
à pouvoir maintenir l’achat spécial sur ces catégories).

(50) See document 38.279/802 and 38.279/803.
(51) Document 38.279/109 and document 38.279/198.
(52) Document 38.279/310, full report on parliamentary debates,
first sitting of Wednesday, 24 October 2001, Journal officiel de la
République française.
(53) Document 38.279/893.
(54) Document 38.279/1023.

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— an FNSEA memo of 7 November 2001 states: ‘a
meeting with the undertakings is planned (evening
of 20 November?) to discuss the agreement and
prepare its renewal beyond 30 November’ (55),

— in a joint memo dated 8 November 2001 from
the four agricultural federations to the local and
sectoral union organisations, it is explicitly stated:
‘in order to prepare the ground for the extension of
the price scale after 30 November 2001, we
believe it is essential that we should have all the
information concerning the actions carried out, the
difficulties encountered and the results achieved in
the departments so as to allow proper application
of the price scale’ (56),

— in a memo found in the office of the FNSEA
President, undated but written after 9 November
2001, since it refers to the Commission’s request
for information, it is stated, on the subject of the
price scale, that ‘its renewal will be discussed on
27 November’ (57),

— an FNB memo dated 30 October 2001 bears
undated handwritten notes referring to an FNPL
proposal that should be taken into account ‘when
the price scale is renewed’ (58),

— at the meeting of the FNPL’s National Council
held on 26 November 2001, the FNPL’s General
Secretary stated that ‘pursuing the agreement on
the minimum price scale beyond 31 November
2001 is an important requirement’ (59).

1.6.3. Reactions to the conclusion of the agreement and the

‘Rungis protocol’ of 31 October 2001

(42)

In a press release issued by the Ministry of Agriculture
on 24 October 2001, it is stated that the Minister for
Agriculture ‘warmly welcomes the agreement signed (...)
which he had wished for, instigated and encouraged’ and
‘congratulates the signatories on their keen sense of
responsibility’ (60).

(43)

In a message sent to members on 24 October 2001, the
FNICGV President stated: ‘the Minister for Agriculture,

( 55) Document 38.279/423.
( 56) Document 38.279/1146. Reference may also be made to an
article in No 566, the November 2001 edition, of the Revue Jeunes
Agriculteurs, which states: ‘this price scale, which entered into
force on 29 October, will be revised on 1 December’ (mise en
application le 29 octobre, cette grille sera révisée le 1er décembre).

( 57) Document 38.279/424. See also document 38.279/428.
( 58) Document 38.279/873.
( 59) Document 38.279/519. The date should of course be read as

30 November.

( 60) Document 38.279/203.

who brought us together for the meeting this morning,
wanted us to reach an agreement with the farmers after
a long and difficult day of negotiation’ (61). The FNCBV
President made the following remarks, reported in the
newspaper Ouest France on 30 October 2001:
‘the
Minister himself gave a commitment along these lines,
indicating that he would ensure that the authorities did
not challenge an agreement which the DGCCRF would
otherwise have attacked’ (62).

(44) There were numerous reactions from private parties
following the signature of the agreement. Some mem-
bers of the FNICGV, part of whose business was directly
linked to imports, were highly critical of the part of the
agreement relating to the suspension of imports (63). A
memo sent by the FNICGV President to members on
31 October 2001 refers to a meeting to be held that
same day with ‘a delegation of representatives from
Dutch and German firms’ (64). Similarly, Belgian, British,
Dutch, German and Spanish farmers’ federations criti-
the agreement, which they
cised this aspect of
denounced. For example, at a meeting between the Vice-
President and Director of the FNB and a delegation
of Dutch and German agricultural undertakings and
federations, probably held on 31 October 2001 (65), the
delegation demanded that the suspension of imports be
lifted (66). A Dutch-Belgian importer/exporter stated at
the meeting that, by way of retaliation, a boycott might
be imposed on French products (67). A number of
farmers’ federations also complained in writing to the
French representatives (68). At a meeting held by the

(61) Document 38.279/88.
(62) Document 38.279/195. The initials DGCCRF refer to the Direc-
torate-General for Competition, Consumption and Fraud Preven-
tion (Direction générale de la concurrence, de la consommation
et de la répression des fraudes).

(63) Document 38.279/1200 (individual firm, document of 26 Octo-
ber 2001) and document 38.279/1201 (Rungis meat dealers and
wholesalers union, which is a member of the FNICGV, document
of 26 October).
(64) Document 38.279/94.
(65) This was probably the same delegation as that met by the

FNICGV President, referred to in footnote 64.

(66) Document 38.279/914 to 917.
(67) Document 38.279/917.
(68) See,

for German farmers,

the letter sent by the Deutscher
Bauernverband President to the FNSEA President on 30 October
2001 (document 38.279/387); for British farmers, the letter sent
by the NFU President to the FNSEA President on 13 November
2001 (document 38.279/391); for Belgian farmers, the letter
sent by the Boerenbond President to the FNSEA President on
19 November 2001 (document 38.279/394); for Dutch farmers,
the LTO memo of 15 November 2001 (document 38.279/683);
for Spanish farmers, the letter sent by the President of the
l’Asociación española de criadores de vacuno de carne to the
FNB President on 7 November 2001 (document 38.279/1125).
In a memo drawn up by the FNSEA in preparation for a meeting
with the French Prime Minister to be held on 8 November 2001,
it is stated that ‘the undertakings have agreed to temporarily
suspend imports, which will inevitably create problems with our
German and Dutch partners’ (les entreprises se sont engagées à
suspendre provisoirement les importations, ce qui ne va pas
sans poser de problèmes avec nos partenaires allemands et
néerlandais) (document 38.279/632).

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Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the Euro-
pean Union (COPA) on 20 November 2001, a number
of federations from other Member States again expressed
their dissatisfaction, pointing out
in particular that
closing borders would not solve the beef crisis (69). Lastly,
the federations representing downstream operators were
highly critical of the agreement as regards both its price
and import components (70). The European Livestock
and Meat Trading Union also wrote to the Competition
DG on 16 January 2002 to denounce the agreement and
the damage caused by the blockades of some of its
members’ abattoirs.

(45) A further meeting between the parties that had signed
took place on 31 October 2001 at
the agreement
Rungis, at the instigation of the FNICGV (71), which was
concerned at its members’ difficulties in complying with
the requirement that imports be temporarily suspended.
The federations which had signed the agreement of
24 October 2001 came up with a new compromise (the
Rungis protocol), which was formulated as follows:
‘in the unprecedented crisis situation currently facing
producers,
the farmers urge
importers and exporters to be aware of the seriousness
of the crisis. In response, the importers and exporters
undertake to demonstrate solidarity’ (72).

the representatives of

1.7. The renewal of the agreement after the end of
November

1.7.1.

Preparing the way for renewing the agreement

(48) Thus, the FNB director’s handwritten notes, found by
the Commission during the investigation carried out on
the FNB’s premises, state, under the heading ‘future of
the agreement’ (73): ‘imports: impossible to re-sign. What
instructions for action to be taken (...). What “official
line”? Should reference be made publicly to Com. interest
in the case? Yes. We hope conduct will be “civic” and
“careful of consumer information”, “advantages of local
contacts”’. Following a subheading ‘prices’, it is stated:
‘difficult to re-sign documents. Reach agreement (?).
How to organise pressure? (...) JB-PDL experience: rec-
ommendations! FNB recommendation: we continue to
take the view following termination of the agreement
that it is legitimate for farmers to obtain price scale
prices’ (74).

(49) With regard to a discussion which took place on
20 November 2001 (it is not evident from the document
who the participants were), the FNB director notes in
particular:
‘create permanent harassment: continuous
presence. Without media coverage. Continue on imports
(...). Imports: don’t say it, and certainly don’t write it’ (75).

(50) The FNB director’s handwritten notes also refer to
discussions for which no date is indicated, but which,
given the context, must have taken place between 22
and 27 November 2001. Under the general heading
‘“sector agreement”: what prospects after end Novem-
ber?’, it is stated:
‘course of action 1: continuing with
written agreement: refusal FNICGV, pb Commission.
Course of action 2: moving on from the agreement’ (76).

(46) As already noted, the agreement of 24 October 2001 was
initially concluded for a period ending on 30 November
2001. It was, however, clear that the agreement was to
be renewed (see recital 41 of this Decision).

(51) A number of documents show that, up until very late
November, consideration was being given to renewal of
the agreement.

(47) The documents in the Commission’s possession show
that the follow-up to the agreement was being discussed
as from mid-November.

(52) An e-mail sent by a representative of the FRSEA Brittany
to the FNB and the presidents of local federations in his
region on 28 November 2001 states: ‘continuation of
the price scale over the weeks ahead: all the slaughterers
encountered said they were willing to maintain the price
scale if all the operators also undertook to do so’ (77).

( 69) Document 38.279/1059 and 1060.
( 70) See, for example, the letter sent by the General Secretary of the
European Livestock and Meat Trading Union to Mr Fischler, the
Member of the Commission responsible for agriculture, as early
as 29 October 2001 (document 38.279/1253 and 1254). See
also the reaction of the President of the Fédération des marchés
de bétail vif (FMBV) and the President of the Fédération française
des commerçants en bestiaux (FFCB) as reported in the press
(document 38.279/197 and document 38.279/201).

( 71) Document 38.279/103.
( 72) Document 38.279/105.

(73) The notes are not dated, but, given their context, they must have

been written between 18 and 20 November 2001.

(74) Documents 38.279/1054 and 1055. The initials ‘JB-PDL’ refer to

two persons belonging to the FNSEA.

(75) Document 38.279/1065.
(76) Document 38.279/1075. The letters ‘pb’ probably stand for

‘problem’.

(77) Document 38.279/1106.

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(53) Another e-mail sent to the FNB on 26 November 2001
from the department of Côtes-d’Armor states that the
price scale is being ‘correctly applied’ in three abattoirs
visited and that ‘these abattoirs have undertaken to
continue applying the price scale if the national cross-
industry commitment to apply the price scale is renewed.
We hope that the negotiations tomorrow will succeed
and that we can come back to ask them to give a
commitment that they will apply it’ (78).

ommendation price scale: should we put it in writing?
In the union newspaper: yes (in the form of recommen-
dations) (...). Speak of indicative prices’ (81). With regard
to the price scale: ‘cannot be renewed as it stands, given
its reprehensible character. Pressure should continue to
apply the intervention prices (in fact, this means applying
the price scale). Avoid any frantic communication with
one another’ (82).

1.7.2. Announcement
renewed

that the agreement would not be

(54) On 19 November 2001,

i.e. a few days after having
received the Commission’s request for information (see
recital 3 of this Decision), the FNICGV President, realis-
ing the risk of fines being imposed on the federation’s
members for infringing the competition rules, informed
the FNSEA President
that he felt ‘obliged to bring
forward to today the final date of application of
the agreement,
initially scheduled for 30 November
2001’ (79).

(55)

In response to the Commission’s letter of formal notice
of 26 November 2001 (see recital 4 of this Decision), all
the federations stated that the agreement of 24 October
2001 would not be extended beyond 30 November,
each of them stressing that the agreement had already
been terminated a few days before by one of the parties.

(56) A document entitled ‘info flash’ issued by the FNICGV
on 30 November 2001 refers to a meeting held on
29 November 2001. It states: ‘The minimum purchase
price scale for culled cows concluded on 24 October
2001 has not been and will not be renewed. This is the
conclusion reached at the meeting held yesterday in Paris
in the presence of the signatories of the agreement’ (80).

1.7.3. The meeting held on 29 November 2001

(57) The FNB director’s handwritten notes, found during the
investigation carried out at
the FNB’s headquarters,
contain a number of passages relating to the meeting
held on 29 November 2001. On a page bearing in the
top right-hand corner the boxed heading ‘meeting
Thursday 29 November 8.00’ (given the context, the
notes were probably taken during preparations for the
meeting held on 29 November), it is stated: ‘negotiate
your price scales regionally. Reply to the Commission.
OK, we accept non-renewal of the agreement. Rec-

( 78) Document 38.279/1098.
( 79) Document 38.279/164.
( 80) Document 38.279/360.

(58) The handwritten notes then contain comments on a
page headed in the top right-hand corner ‘discussion
29 November 2001’ followed by a series of initials (the
Commission is not able to identify all the participants,
but some of the initials are clearly those of two of the
Vice-Presidents, the Director and the General Secretary
of the FNB, the FNPL Director who signed the Rungis
protocol on behalf of the FNPL, the FNCBV President
and the FNICGV President. Two other sets of initials are
probably those of the CNJA representatives (83)). It is
stated on several occasions that
is necessary to
‘continue’ (84). Then, alongside the initials of the FNICGV
President,
‘signed agreement: we cannot
continue it. OK to comply with a price set for with-
figures with the
drawal’. There follows a series of
underlined phrase in the margin: ‘OK agreement’ (85).

it is stated:

it

(59) The following handwritten page comprises a series of
expressions: ‘indicative price, remunerative price, target-
related price, farmer-target price, target price, farmer
target’. This is followed by the initials of the FNICGV
President and the phrase: ‘I will write nothing/tel.’. Then,
under a subheading ‘Press release’, it is stated ‘price scale
= anti-EEC therefore we stop, but we take action to
recommend prices, we farmers, union objectives’ (86).

(81) Document 38.279/736.
(82) Document 38.279/737.
(83) These could be the JA representative at a coordination meeting
on the beef crisis (see document 38.279/620) and one of the JA
representatives at the round table discussion on beef held on
5 December 2001 (document 38.279/580).

(84) ‘The price scale has been of great value: return hope and
continue what has been started, with proper
industrial peace
information’ (document 38.279/738); ‘the market naturally fol-
lows the price scale, let us continue’ (ibid.).

(85) Document 38.279/738.
(86) Document 38.279/739 (underlining removed).

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(60)

‘How:

through union action,

Lastly, under the heading ‘summary’, it is stated: ‘“agree-
ment” (verbal/tel.) on compliance with the “farmer-target
prices”’, followed by a number of prices for certain types
of meat.
recommen-
dations’ (87). Another handwritten page states ‘by general
agreement, we will no longer
in
writing’ (88). Another handwritten document, undated
(but written after 27 November 2001) states, following
an indication that caution is required:
‘careful about
putting things in writing

restrictive agreement’ (89).

communicate

(61) A number of handwritten pages reflect local representa-
tives’ difficulties in understanding the arrangements (90).
The FNB organised a telephone conference on 4 Decem-
ber 2001 with its regional representatives in order to
explain ‘“the target price” approach on beef’ (91).

(62) Other handwritten notes state the following: ‘“Agree-
other binding terms] on abiding by the union
ment [
target price” (...). Praise the good citizenship of the
abattoirs in the press (cite the good ones). “Agreement
to make the market more ethical”. Union recommen-
dations’ (92).

(63)

In an interview given by the FNB Vice-President on
4 December 2001, available on the FNSEA website, the
FNB Vice-President states: ‘last week, we pointed out the
usefulness of this price scale in stopping the downward
spiral of prices. The undertakings recognise its impact,
but at the same time want to comply with the rec-
ommendations issued by Brussels. Henceforth, we will
no longer speak of agreement on a price scale, but of a
target in terms of floor prices. We still insist on the idea
of a union price scale’. In reply to the question ‘Have all
the undertakings received a message asking them to
maintain the prices thus discussed?’, the FNB Vice-
President replies: ‘There is nothing in writing on this
new “agreement”. Just words. But extremely important
in scope. The representatives of the undertakings at
national
level have also communicated verbally the
content of our discussions’. Lastly, on the implementing
arrangements,
‘As regards
the Vice-President states:
prices, they must be in line with those discussed last
week. If this were not to be the case, we will blockade
the offending abattoirs. Furthermore, on Tuesday, four
delegations once again requested accounts from the four

(64)

Vendée abattoirs. We are asking them if they received
instructions identical to ours from their national struc-
tures. We will see what is the weight of words, after the
impact of the written document’ (93).

Similarly, a document dated 5 December 2001, access-
ible on the FDSEA Vendée website and reproduced on
the FNSEA website, states: ‘the verbal agreement reached
at the end of last week by the beef sector is slow in being
applied in practice in the field. Like a month ago. The
recalcitrant slaughterers are still the same ones. Of
course, there is no longer any reference to a cross-
industry agreement. “OK”, explains the FDSEA, “But we
are converting the price scale signed a month ago into a
real union price scale by means of a requirement that
these floor prices be applied throughout the country”.
The whole sector should communicate on this “agree-
ment” at the beginning of the week’. After having noted
that, during a visit to an abattoir, the person in charge
had said that he ‘has received nothing from his national
superiors’, the document continues: ‘as to the immediate
and total application of this price scale throughout the
country, the slaughterers can trust the FDSEA. “On
Monday, if there is no solution, we will blockade once
again”. The FNSEA urges all the departments to do the
same’. After a reference to discussions between the
protesters and a slaughterer, the document states: ‘the
persons in charge of the abattoir had talks with (the
FNICGV President). He confirmed last week’s dis-
cussions’. Lastly, quoting one of the leaders of the FDSEA
Vendée, the memo continues: ‘“All slaughtered animals
in the department which are not in line with our scale
of floor prices must be notified by fax to the FDSEA. On
the basis of such information, we will decide whether or
not to blockade the offending undertakings”. The Vendée
leaders forcefully repeated this message to all the FDSEA
people meeting in Paris until Thursday. The price scale
therefore still exists. Although it is not a cross-industry
scale, it remains a union scale. Until the very end’ (94).

1.7.4. The meeting held on 5 December 2001

(65) On 5 December 2001, a ‘national beef day’ (journée
nationale viande bovine) organised by the FNSEA was
held (95). The afternoon was given over to a round table
discussion (96), attended by representatives of the various
parties which had signed the agreement of 24 October
2001.

( 87) Document 38.279/740.
( 88) Document 38.279/750.
( 89) Document 38.279/1150.
( 90) For example, document 38.279/748: ‘how does it work? At what

price?’ (comment ça marche? À quel prix?).

( 91) Document 38.279/1118.
( 92) Document 38.279/750.

(93) Document 38.279/368.
(94) Document 38.279/366.
(95) Document 38.279/474.
(96) Document 38.279/401a.

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reads as

investigation at

(66) An e-mail sent on 6 December 2001 by an FRSEA
Brittany representative to the FDSEA presidents of his
region, which was found by the Commission during
its
follows:
the FNSEA,
‘following yesterday’s meeting, three priorities emerged
from the discussions: ensuring minimum price levels
for females, freeing markets, reflecting on control. On
the first point, while there is no longer any agreement
on the official price for the reasons set out in my last
message, everybody agreed on the need to maintain
through union pressure the prices for females at the
existing price scale level by updating it on the basis of
the prices determined at special purchase (...). On this
aspect of the minimum prices, the FNICGV and FNCBV
national presidents said they were aware of the need
to maintain market prices and to get their members
to see this need. Nevertheless we will have no written
agreement on this point and the maintenance of prices
will depend on our capacity to exert sufficient pressure
in the sector. So I suggest that as from the end of this
(either by
week you should enter
telephone or by delegation) with the slaughterers in
your department
to check up on their
commitment to maintain prices on the existing and
updated basis and to alert them to the union action
which we will be able to implement as from next
week in the event of any failure to comply with this
commitment’ (97).

into contact

so as

(67)

is summarised as follows:

In a weekly information memo issued by the FNPL,
the ‘national beef day’
‘a
union day which has avoided a milk-meat war,
the price scale and
confirmed the continuation of
enabled a lot of participants to express themselves.
Most of the morning was given over to presentation
of the establishment and application of the various
price scales (weanlings, young cattle in the Loire region
and cows). All in all, maintenance of the price scale is
necessary and involves union pressure, even if there
are problems of application. The price scale is,
however, an intermediate stage, the target is to bring
production into line with the market (...). The afternoon
was given over to the round table discussion. The
representatives of
the slaughterers (the FNCBV and
FNICGV Presidents) took note of the unwritten renewal
the heading ‘problem
of
application of the price scale calves for slaughtering’,
it is stated: ‘one abattoir (in the department of Saône-
et-Loire) is not applying the price scale, considers the
in the event of
producers’ claims unacceptable and,

the price scale’. Under

( 97) Document 38.279/487.

union action, is threatening to alert the authorities and
the European Commission. The message
the
FNICGV President) does not seem clear or firm!’ (98).

(of

(68)

it

In the FNB director’s handwritten notes, copied by the
Commission during the investigation carried out on the
FNB’s premises, six pages are given over to the national
beef day held on 5 December 2001 (99). As regards
is stated ‘we’re to stop saying “against
imports,
imports”, and go to restaurants and catering’ (100). After
the initials of the FNSEA President, it is stated: ‘a mistake:
to have stated suspension of imports in writing, but we
have been rapped over the knuckles by Brussels and
others in COPA. Without putting it in writing, let us
continue with “target prices” or prices below which we
don’t want prices (to fall). We are sure that sector
partners commit to price policy’. It is also stated: ‘writing
prohibited’ (101).

(69) On the round table discussion held on 5 December
2001, it is stated under the heading ‘the agreement of
25 October’, after the initials of
the FNB general
secretary:
‘union objective: continue’. There follow
comments from the FNCBV and FNICGV Presidents.
Under the first, it is stated: ‘we can no longer put in
writing, but continue’. Under the second:
‘we will
maintain commitment on special purchase price.
Message passed to our undertakings. Therefore + 30
to + 40 cts. Informally, the price scale will continue’.
Then the FNCBV President once again: ‘yes OK. But it
must be applied by everyone’ (102). Lastly, by way of
conclusion, under the initials of the FNSEA President,
it is stated:
‘the price scale does not stop. But not in
writing, in practice. We will go to speak with those
who do not comply’ (103).

(70)

Similarly,
in a memo dated 14 December 2001,
published on the FDSEA Marne website, the President
of the FDB in the department of Marne states: ‘Since
run foul of European
the signed agreement has
regulations, we will apply it without signature (...).
Anyone who deviates from the chosen path must be
put back on track’ (104).

(98) Document 38.279/489.
(99) Document 38.279/751 to 756.
(100) RHD stands for ‘restauration hors domicile’, or restaurants and
catering. This sector is the main consumer of imported beef
(document 38.279/751).

(101) Document 38.279/751 (underlining removed).
(102) Document 38.279/754.
(103) Document 38.279/756.
(104) Document 38.279/1221.

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1.8.

Implementation of the agreement

1.8.1. General

(71) To quote the terms used in the document itself, the
document concluded between the six federations on
24 October 2001 was an ‘agreement’ (accord) compris-
ing ‘commitments’ (engagements) entered into on behalf
of the federations. The fact that the federations con-
sidered themselves bound by this commitment is more-
over evident
from the announcements they made
immediately after the conclusion of the agreement. For
example, on 25 October 2001, the four agricultural
federations sent a memo to the representatives of all the
local and sectoral federations in which reference is made
to ‘the agreement’ (l’accord) obtained and in which it is
stated: ‘each of us must now be very careful to ensure
strict application of
throughout the
country, starting next Monday’ (105). Similarly, the fax
sent by the FNICGV President to members on 24 October
2001 leaves no doubt as to the existence of an agreement
which had to be implemented (106). This is, moreover,
how operators understood the agreement. A formal
report drawn up by a bailiff on 24 October 2001 at the
request of a slaughterer in Saône-et-Loire states that
the FDSEA representative wanted to conclude a local
agreement with the slaughterer; the slaughterer ‘stated
that there was no point in doing so since the national
agreements applied throughout the country’(107). Simi-
larly, an FNICGV member, replying to the above-
mentioned fax from the FNICGV president, stated that
he had taken note of the agreement (though he did not
like it) and that he was ‘taking every step to comply with
it immediately’ (108).

the agreement

(72) The agricultural federations immediately called on their
members to disseminate as far as possible the price scale
adopted, to ensure that it was applied (109) and to report
immediately any failure to apply the price scale (110). The
FDSEA Vendée President stated in an interview published
in the newspaper La Vendée agricole on 2 November
‘the time for discussion is past. National feder-
2001:
ations signed the agreement with the FNSEA and its
specialised associations on 25 October at 9.00. The
price scale now applies throughout the country and to
all undertakings’ (111).

( 105) Document 38.279/1121.
( 106) Document 38.279/88 and 89.
( 107) Document 38.279/181.
( 108) Document 38.279/1204.
( 109) See, for example, documents 38.279/584, 617 and 1152.
( 110) Many documents provide evidence of this: for example, docu-

ments 38.279/187 and 237.

( 111) Document 38.279/237.

to ‘ratify’

the national agreement at

(73) Numerous local agreements were also concluded in
order
local
level (112). These were agreements concluded between
the local farmers’ federations (generally at department
level) with one or more individual slaughterers. The
conclusion of these agreements, in return for lifting
the blockade on the abattoirs, took place immediately
after the national agreement had been signed, but also
throughout the month of November. Sometimes there
were only verbal agreements to abide by the national
agreement (113).

(74) Generally speaking, the documents in the file show that
the local agreements were carbon copies of the national
agreement concluded on 24 October 2001 (114). Where
local agreements were not concluded, slaughterers ran
the risk of blockades of their plants until they agreed to
sign (115). In some cases, slaughterers did not give in and
obtained expulsion orders from the French judicial
authorities (116).

(112) Document 38.279/204 (Charolles

agreement), document
38.279/279 (Moselle agreement), document 38.279/280 (Ven-
dée agreements) or document 38.279/822 (Loire-et-Cher agree-
ments). See also the agreement between the FRSEA Lower
Normandy and slaughterers in that region concluded at the
beginning of November 2001 (document 38.279/823).

(113) For example, document 38.279/1123.
(114) See, for instance, document 38.279/826 and 827 (department of
Loire); document 38.279/834 (department of Oise); document
38.279/837 and 839 (two agreements in the department of
Corrèze); document 38.279/841 and 845 (department of Allier).
A number of documents also refer to verbal commitments to
comply with the price scale (document 38.279/852, 19 Novem-
ber 2001). See also the FNB director’s handwritten notes,
document 38.279/911. See also the FRSEA Brittany’s fax
reviewing the agreements obtained from slaughterers, by depart-
ment in that region, as at 29 October 2001.

(115) See, for example, document 38.279/882 and 883, document
38.279/420: ‘the price scale is on the whole being complied
with, even if occasionally union action proves necessary’ (cette
grille est dans l’ensemble respectée, même si parfois l’action
syndicale se révèle nécessaire).

(116) See the case of the Tour du Pin abattoir, which refused to
conclude the local agreement (document 38.279/1272), and
was blockaded from 20 to 23 November 2001 (document
38.279/868 to 871 and document 38.279/1268 et seq.), before
obtaining an order from the Bourgoin Jallieux court of first
instance (document 38.279/1255 to 1267).

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(75) However,

in some instances, these agreements went
beyond what had been provided for.
In particular,
although the part of the agreement of 24 October
2001 concerning the suspension of imports had been
reformulated by the Rungis protocol of 31 October
2001, it is evident from the file that local agreements
concluded in November none the less continued to
include explicitly a ban on imports(117). In one instance
of which the Commission has knowledge, the local
agreement was concluded by other operators in the
sector, such as the local livestock dealers’ union (118).

(76) The involvement of the downstream sectors seems to
have been discussed immediately after the national
agreement was signed. In particular, it was planned to
involve the large-scale distribution and restaurant and
catering sectors. However, the documents in the file
provide no evidence that these sectors were involved in
the adoption or application of the price scale (119). In
their replies to the Commission’s requests for infor-
mation of 9 November 2001, the federations confirmed
that they did not possess any documents exchanged
with distributors on the disputed agreement.

1.8.2.

Imports

(77) As noted above, the agreement concluded on 24 October
2001 included a commitment on the ‘suspension of
imports’, applicable to all beef products. On 31 October
2001, the Rungis protocol moderated the terms of this
commitment, referring only to ‘solidarity’.

(78) The statistics available to the Commission show that, in
the week following the signature of the agreement, the
percentage of beef of non-French origin sold at the
Rungis market decreased, though not significantly. Its
level thus remained above that which had existed two
weeks previously (120). The FNICGV also produced, as an
annex to its reply to the letter of formal notice (see
recital 4 of this Decision), tables setting out the volumes

of imports marketed at Rungis in the period from
1 October to 26 October 2001 and in the period from
1 November to 27 November 2001; the figures show
that the volume of imports passing through Rungis not
only did not decrease in November compared with
October, but actually increased (121). However, it should
be noted that, in Annexes 5 and 6 to its reply to the
statement of objections, the FNICGV produced two new
tables, one entitled ‘table showing imports of beef on to
the French market’ (tableau d’importations des viandes
bovines sur le marché français), the other entitled ‘table
showing imports of fresh meat on to the French market’
(tableau d’importations des viandes fraîches sur le mar-
ché français). The tables show an appreciable decline in
imports in November 2001 compared with Octo-
ber 2001, and in December 2001 compared with
November 2001. In January 2002, however, the level
of imports rose sharply. Thus, between October and
December 2001, imports from Germany and the Nether-
lands, the main exporters to France, fell respectively by
more than 25 % and more than 14 %, but rose 24 % and
29 % in January 2002. At the hearing, the FNICGV
representative explained that
this might be due to
cyclical phenomena which were normal at this time of
year (122) and that these fluctuations were due to factors
other than the agreement.

(79)

It should be noted that the local agreements signed after
the agreement of 24 October included a provision on
the suspension of imports. However, there is nothing to
indicate that the Rungis protocol affected the previous
local agreements. In addition, in spite of the protocol,
the local agreements concluded after 31 October 2001
continued to contain a provision on the suspension of
imports; they continued to refer to the ‘commitment
to temporarily suspend imports (including European
imports) pending further national negotiations’ (123).

(80) The day the agreement was signed on 24 October 2001,
the FNB and FNSEA called for a boycott of non-French
meat and threatened those who did not apply the
boycott with reprisals (124). As from 30 October, protests
by farmers took place, with meat originating in other
Member States being destroyed (125). Various documents
(e-mail, memo, message on the FDSEA website) bear

( 117) Thus, the standard agreement drawn up by the FDSEA and
the CDJA in Isère on 13 November 2001 still contained a
commitment on the suspension of imports (document 38.279/
885); even so, this type of agreement was signed on that date
by a number of slaughterers (document 38.279/882). See also
document 38.279/1287.

( 118) Document 38.279/825 to 827, in the department of Loire.
( 119) On the contrary, see the letter sent by the FNCBV President to
the FNSEA President on 9 November 2001 (document 38.279/
410). Document 38.279/617 refers to contacts entered into by
the FNB with the federation representing hypermarkets and
supermarkets, but makes no mention of any result achieved.

( 120) Document 38.279/08.

(121) Document 38.279/356 to 359. The figures for the last five days

in October were not supplied.

(122) The figures, also produced in the table, for the period Octo-
ber 2000 to December 2000 are not representative in this
respect, given the crisis which began in October 2000. The
figures for the period from October 1999 to December 1999,
which appear stable, do not confirm the cyclical explanation.

(123) See, for example, documents 38.279/882, 885 and 1285.
(124) Document 38.279/318.
(125) Document 38.279/322.

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witness to ‘inspections’ of the origin of meat being
carried out by local agricultural federations in various
departments during the months of November and
December. In a fax sent by the FRSEA Basse-Normandie
to the FNB director on 9 November 2001, it is stated:
‘Orne and Calvados are carrying out inspections of
lorries carrying imported meat: nothing to report’ (126).
An e-mail sent to the FNB on 13 November 2001 under
the heading ‘inspection of beef imports Loire-et-Cher’
states: ‘we carried out measures this morning to inspect
the origin of beef. We have found meat from Holland,
Germany and Poland’ (127). In a fax sent by an FDSEA
Maine-et-Loire representative to the FNB director on
11 December 2001, under the heading ‘inspection in
abattoirs in Maine-et-Loire’,
‘no anomaly
it is stated:
found — scale applied — no imports’ (128).

1.8.3.

Prices

(81) The tables showing average prices per week for various
categories of meat, produced by the federations in their
reply to the request for information (see recital 3 of this
Decision), show that, for each of the categories, the price
started to rise as from week 43 (the week in which the
agreement of 24 October 2001 was signed) following
some 20 weeks of decline (129) (see recital 14 of this
Decision).

(82) The implementation and the effects of the price scale of
24 October 2001 are borne out by documentary
evidence.

(83)

Firstly, numerous documents reflect the dissemination
of the price scale to members through the press or by
mail (130).

(84)

Secondly,
in a document entitled ‘Application and
supervision of the union price scale’, accessible on the
FNSEA’s website and dated 14 November 2001, the FNB
Vice-President states: ‘despite the initial fits and starts,
the first fortnight suggests that the price scale is being

( 126) Document 38.279/823.
( 127) Document 38.279/822.
( 128) Document 38.279/849. See also document 38.279/1228.
( 129) Document 38.279/117.
( 130) See the press review attached as an annex to the FNICGV’s reply
to the Commission’s request for information. See also, for
example, document 38.279/584.

applied in the four abattoirs in the department [Vendée]’,
a statement based on checks carried out in the abattoirs.
The document notes that ‘checks are being carried out
at a steady pace’(131).

it

is stated:

(85) Thirdly, in an FNSEA memo dated 7 November 2001
‘it
and entitled ‘Beef: current situation’,
appears today that the price scale is being relatively well
applied in the O and P categories. It is apparently being
a little less well applied in the beef breeds, particularly
R cows, where the price difference seems to be too
great’ (132). In a memo drafted by the FNSEA on 15 No-
vember 2001, it is stated, with regard to the price scale,
under the heading ‘sectoral files — 1. beef’: ‘the price
scale is, on the whole, being complied with by operators;
even if occasionally union action proves necessary’ (133).
A third memo, undated, but written between 9 and
15 November (134), states that ‘appreciable effects have
been recorded for U and R cows and less appreciable
effects for O and P cows. Problem of downgrading in
the application of the price scale’.

(86)

Fourthly, in a letter dated 20 November 2001, the FDB
Aude President states that ‘it has been confirmed to us
that the application of the agreement is not always
complied with or is complied with only under certain
conditions set by the purchaser’ (135). In a fax sent by the
FDSEA Finistère to the FNB on 19 November 2001, the
following handwritten comment has been added:
‘we
have not received any complaints from farmers for non-
compliance with the price scale’ (136). In a fax sent by the
FDSEA Pas-de-Calais to the FNB on 29 November 2001,
under the heading ‘compliance with the price scale’, it is
‘generally speaking, the price scale has been
stated:
complied with as from the first week. Prices have been
slightly higher in S2 and S3 before being limited S4 and
S5. The presence of an FDSEA representative noting all
the prices on the market seems to have worried the
slaughterers, who abided by the price scale’ (137).

(131) Document 38.279/277.
(132) Document 38.279/422. The letters stand for meat categories

under EC regulations (see footnote 13).

(133) Document 38.279/420.
(134) Document 38.279/424: the memo mentions the Commission’s
request for information of 9 November 2001 and the draft
reply thereto (the final reply was drawn up on 15 November
2001).

(135) Document 38.279/851.
(136) Document 38.279/852.
(137) Document 38.279/856.

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(87)

(88)

Fifthly, an e-mail sent to the FNB on 26 November 2001
from the department of Côtes-d’Armor states:
‘this
morning 150 farmers went to three abattoirs (...). They
found that the minimum price scale is being properly
applied’ (138). Another e-mail sent by the FRSEA Brittany
President to, amongst others, the FNB on 28 November
2001 also reports that the price scale was being complied
with by the abattoirs inspected, such compliance being
variously described as ‘total’ or ‘comprehensive’ (139).

Sixthly, in the FNB director’s handwritten notes, similar
comments appear. Thus, with regard to an FNB Council
meeting (140), it is stated, with regard to the department
of Aveyron: ‘pb on reform
inconsistent applic. price
scale’, and with regard to the department of Cantal:
‘price scale: pb on the R’ (141). A few pages further on,
under the title ‘“sector agreement”: what prospects after
end November?’, it is stated: ‘assessment. “Price scale”
aspect: an increase in prices of the order of 0,75 F/kg
has been observed for R and U cows during the week
(...) and a rise of a few cts/kg for P and O cows. Apart
from Angers, the regional slaughterhouse entry prices
have not been aligned on the price scale’ (142). Lastly,
handwritten notes made at a region meeting in Cler-
mont-Ferrand on 3 December 2001 refer to the price
scale and state ‘it’s working: we are winning. The
situation is turning round’ (143).

(89) The implementation of the price scale established by
the farmers’ unions and endorsed by the slaughterers’
federations at
the end of November/beginning of
December 2001 is also borne out by a number of
documents.

(90)

In the first place, the price scale was reported in the press,
the term used being ‘union recommendations’ (144).

( 138) Document 38.279/1098.
( 139) Document 38.279/1106.
( 140) The date of the meeting does not appear in the handwritten
it must be the meeting held on
notes. Given the context,
21 November 2001, the invitation to which is contained in
document 38.279/716.

( 141) Document 38.279/1069.
( 142) Document 38.279/1075.
( 143) Document 38.279/746.
( 144) See the article published in Union Paysanne on 14 December
2001 (document 38.279/1178). The article reports that, ‘after a
few price adjustments, the price scale must be taken today as a
union recommendation, a recommended selling price for
la grille est
farmers’
aujourd’hui à prendre comme une recommandation syndicale,
un prix de vente conseillé aux éleveurs).

(après quelques ajustements de prix,

(91) Then again, the day after the meeting held on 5 Decem-
ber 2001, the FNSEA President wrote to all the presidents
of local and specialised federations asking them ‘to
mobilise [their] network so as to check, as from Monday
10 December among operators in the sector, the prices
charged for the purchase of cattle’ (145).

(92) A fax sent by the FDSEA Maine-et-Loire to the FNB on
11 December 2001 comprises the results of a ‘check’
carried out by farmers amongst abattoirs in the depart-
ment. The fax states: ‘price scale applied’, even though
the author is surprised that it is being fully applied and
wonders whether the farmers have not been ‘duped’ (146).

(93)

Several news reports published on FDSEA websites refer
to new blockades of abattoirs in mid-December 2001.
For example, from 17 to 19 December, the abattoirs of
a slaughter group, ‘the only one in France opposed to
the application of the price scale’ according to one of
these news reports, were blockaded. The group finally
agreed to apply the price scale until 11 January
2002 (147).

(94) During the investigation carried out on the premises of
the FNB, a copy was taken of a one-page document
headed ‘fax received from FDSEA 79, 13/12/01, 17:31’.
The document is entitled ‘agreement of 25 October
2001 (renewed) signed and deemed applicable by the
FNSEA, the FNB, the FNICGV and the FNCBV/SICA’ and
comprises a table ‘union “minimum price” scale’. At the
foot of the page, it is stated: ‘all the groups which are co-
signatories of this agreement have asked the agricultural
and trade union organisations to take steps to ensure
that this price scale is complied with, through any action
which in their eyes may justify intervention with each
operator in the sector’ (148). It should be noted that an
identical document was sent by the FDSEA Deux-Sèvres
to a slaughterer on 13 December 2001 (149).

(145) Document 38.279/492. See also the memo issued by the FNB,
documents 38.279/509 and 510, and the joint memo issued by
the four agricultural federations, document 38.279/522, calling
for mobilisation.
(146) Document 38.279/849.
(147) Documents 38.279/1222 to 1229.
(148) Document 38.279/812.
(149) Document 38.279/1198.

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(95)

It should be noted, lastly, that a number of documents
stress the link between checks on imports and checks
on prices. For example, on 24 October 2001, the day
on which the price scale was discussed amongst the six
federations, the Fédération française des commerçants
en bestiaux sent a letter to the French Minister for
Agriculture stating: ‘in a market economy, there cannot
be any authoritarian setting of market prices without, at
the same time, setting up a whole arsenal of protective
measures at frontiers against foreign competition’ (150).
Furthermore, as early as 11 October 2001, when it was
discussing the establishment of a minimum price scale,
the FNB was aware that a number of actions would be
necessary in order to achieve this result. The first of
such actions listed by the FNB in a memo providing
‘information to the beef sections’ related precisely to
in particular in the restaurant and catering
imports,
sector (151). Furthermore, the public documents in the
Commission’s possession, whether press articles or news
reports published on the FNSEA and FDSEA website,
show that the ‘inspections’ carried out by the farmers’
federations in the abattoirs from October to December
related almost systematically to the price charged and to
whether or not there was any imported meat.

2. MAIN COMMENTS OF THE PARTIES

(96)

In their written replies to the statement of objections
and at the hearing, the various federations put forward
the following arguments.

(97) The FNSEA argued essentially that:

— the agreement cannot be seen in isolation from the
background against which it was signed, namely,
an unprecedented crisis in the beef sector which
began in October 2000. The crisis resulted in a
considerable drop in prices, with no prospect of
a return to normal
in the medium term. The
Community measures taken to deal with the crisis,
which were not properly applied by some Member
States, proved insufficient. Over and above the
crisis in the sector, a human crisis developed, with
farmers facing hardship and resorting to sometimes
violent protest action. This situation eventually led
to breakdowns in law and order. The agreement

concluded on 24 October 2001, which was essen-
tially a media exercise,
‘was the only means of
restoring hope and industrial peace’ (152),

— the FNSEA is neither an undertaking nor an
association of undertakings. It is a trade union
which does not have any means of compelling its
members. It maintains that the agreement was
not anticompetitive, but fitted ‘into the union
framework of defending the interests of the trade’
of livestock farmers, which constitutes a ‘task of
general interest’ (153). The FNSEA also argued that
the FNCBV is an association of cooperatives and
that there cannot be any such thing as an agreement
between a cooperative and its members,

— the agreement of 24 October 2001 was not
renewed. However, decisions are not passed on
immediately at local level and, at all events, non-
renewal does not prevent the continuation of union
action,

— the part of the agreement that related to imports
‘was by its nature contestable’ (154). However, it was
a response to an exceptional situation, was of
short duration since it
the end of
November 2001’ (155) and had no effect,

‘ceased at

— the price agreement does not constitute an illegal
agreement. It is at all events covered by the second
exception in Article 2 of Regulation No 26. This is
because the agreement is ‘necessary’ for attainment
of the objectives of the common agricultural policy
set out in Article 33(1)(b) and (c) of the Treaty and
is not ‘contrary to the achievement of the other
objectives of Article 33’ (156),

— the Minister for Agriculture publicly urged signing

of the agreement,

— as far as imports are concerned, the infringement
ended very rapidly. The incidents known to the
Commission after 1 December are too isolated to
prolong its duration beyond that date,

— at all events, given the general context in which the
agreement of 24 October 2001 was concluded, the
short duration of the ‘imports’ aspects and the lack
of impact, no fine should be imposed.

( 150) Document 38.279/829.
( 151) Document 38.279/620.

(152) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 24.
(153) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 24.
(154) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 26.
(155) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 26.
(156) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 29.

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(98) The FNB and the FNPL sent comments to the FNSEA.
The FNPL also pointed out that it was a union, belonging
to the FNSEA.

(99) The JA essentially made the following points:

— the crisis affecting the beef sector since Octo-
ber 2000 was unprecedented. It entailed substantial
losses of income for stock farmers, with no pros-
It created a deep-seated
pect of
malaise in the sector. At the hearing, the JA stressed
more particularly that the purpose of the agreement
was to send a message of hope to farmers affected
by a serious psychological crisis,

improvement.

the agreement concluded at national level. Nor did
the agreement provide for any retaliatory measures,

— with regard more particularly to the provisions
relating to imports, the agreement did not produce
any effect,

— the Minister for Agriculture ‘strongly urged farmers
and slaughterers to reach an agreement’. Conse-
quently, he ‘imposed anticompetitive conduct on
the undertakings’ (157),

— with regard to fines, the facts of the case justify a

moderate assessment.

— the JA is a union of persons, and not an association

of undertakings,

3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT

— the agreement on the suspension of imports was

symbolic and was of very short duration.

3.1.

Infringement of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty

(100) The FNCBV essentially argued that the agreement of
24 October 2001 was not renewed. Its non-renewal did
not, however, prevent its continued application in the
following weeks. In actual fact, the effects of the national
agreement gradually faded and had ended by Christmas
2001.

(102) Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty states that ‘The following
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings (...) which
may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market’.

(101) The FNICGV argued as follows:

3.1.1. Undertakings and associations of undertakings

— in the autumn of 2001, the crisis affecting the beef
sector reached its climax, resulting in numerous
breakdowns in law and order. The ‘objective’ goal
of the agreement was simply to uphold law and
order,

(103) It has to be considered whether the members of
the federations involved are ‘undertakings’ within the
meaning of Article 81, and then whether the federations
themselves are ‘associations of undertakings’ within the
meaning of that provision.

— the FNICGV terminated the initial agreement as
early as 19 November 2001. It did not participate
in any secret renewal of the agreement. The docu-
ments used as evidence originate only from the
farmers’ unions. They reveal nothing more than the
existence of a unilateral price scale adopted by the
farmers’ unions,

— the agreement was concluded under the threat of
violence on the part of the farmers, which in French
law constitutes a ground for nullity of contracts
(Articles 1111 and 1112 of the French Civil Code).
Moreover, it was not in the slaughterers’ interest to
conclude such an agreement,

— the agreement relates only to a very limited quantity

of animals,

— the FNICGV has no means of imposing anything
on its members. Indeed, some refused to carry out

3.1.1.1. U n d e r t a k i n g s

(104) It is settled case-law that ‘the concept of an undertaking
covers any entity engaged in an economic activity,
regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is
financed’ (158). Even a natural person may constitute an
‘undertaking’
if that person engages in an economic
activity (159). ‘Any activity consisting in offering goods
and services on a given market
is an economic
activity’ (160).

(157) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 7.
(158) See for example Court of First Instance in Case T-513/93
Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v Commission
(2000) ECR II-1807, paragraph 36, with further references.
(159) Commission Decision 76/29/EEC of 2 December 1975 relating
to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26.949
— AOIP/Beyrard) (OJ L 6, 13.1.1976, p. 8), point II(2).

(160) See for example the judgment cited in footnote 158.

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(105) Four of the federations involved here represent farmers.
There is no doubt that farmers engage in an economic
activity, that of producing goods and offering them for
sale. Even though they may be natural persons, therefore,
farmers are ‘undertakings’ within the meaning of
Article 81 of the Treaty. Indeed if they did not engage in
an economic activity Regulation No 26 would serve no
purpose, as the competition rules would not apply in
agriculture in any event.

(106) Slaughterers perform for gain the service of slaughtering
animals, and offer the products of their work for sale.
They too are ‘undertakings’.

(107) It is true that some slaughterers are organised in the
form of cooperatives; the FNCBV itself is a federation of
cooperatives. But in a case involving a cooperative
society in Denmark it was held that the fact that a body
was a cooperative organised in accordance with the law
of a Member State did not affect the economic nature of
its activity (161). In reply to the argument put forward by
the FNSEA (see recital 97 of this Decision, at the end of
the second indent), it will be enough to point out that
the agreement which is the subject of this Decision is
not a matter of the relations between a cooperative and
its members, but an agreement between six distinct
entities, namely the federations to which the Decision is
addressed.

(108) It has to be concluded, therefore, that the members of
the federations involved are ‘undertakings’ within the
meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty.

3.1.1.2. A s s o c i a t i o n s o f u n d e r t a k i n g s

(109) The federations in the case, which bring together
‘undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 81 of the
Treaty, are consequently associations of undertakings,
or associations of associations of undertakings.

(110) The FNSEA and the JA have argued that they are
organised in the form of trade unions (syndicats profes-
sionels) under Title IV of the French Labour Code,
and consequently do not constitute associations of
undertakings. But the Court of Justice has held that the
legal framework within which agreements are made, and

( 161) Court of First Instance in Case T-61/89 Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening

v Commission (1992) ECR II-1931, paragraph 50.

the classification given to that framework by the various
national
legal systems, are irrelevant as far as the
applicability of Article 81 of the Treaty is concerned (162).

(111) Article 81 applies to non-profit-making associations in
so far as their own activities or the activities of undertak-
ings affiliated to them are calculated to produce the
effects which it aims to suppress (163).

(112) The Commission recognises the importance of trade
union freedom, which as the FNSEA points out is
referred to in particular in Article 12(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (164). The
Commission does not in any way underestimate the
work of information, advice and protection of their
members’
interests performed by organisations rep-
resenting particular occupations or professions. But such
organisations step outside those terms of reference when
they assist in the conclusion and implementation of
agreements that are in breach of rules of public policy
such as the competition rules. The conclusion of an
agreement such as the one at issue here, an agreement
between agricultural organisations and organisations of
downstream operators which is aimed at suspending
imports and setting a minimum purchase price, exceeds
the limits of legitimate trade union action.

(113) In a wide variety of industries, including agriculture,
the French Competition Board has frequently taken
decisions holding that the rules of competition have
been infringed by professional or trade associations that

(162) Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (1998) ECR I-3851, para-
graph 40, and Case 123/83 Clair (1985) ECR 391, paragraph 17.
(163) Court of Justice in Case 71/74 Frubo v Commission (1975) ECR
563, paragraph 30; Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78
van Landewyck and Others v Commission (1980) ECR 3125,
paragraph 88; and Joined Cases 96 to 102, 104, 105, 108 and
110/82 IAZ and Others v Commission (1983) ECR 3369,
paragraph 20.

(164) OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1. Article 12(1) of the Charter states
that ‘Everyone has the right to (...) freedom of association at all
levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters’.

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have gone beyond their legitimate role, and has imposed
fines on them (165).

show that the parties were perfectly aware that the
agreement between them was illegal (see recital 43 of
this Decision) (169).

(114) In reality, while it is essential that trade unions be free to
represent their members’ interests, that does not entitle
such associations to engage in unlawful conduct. Quite
the reverse, their role ought to be to seek to prevent
such conduct.

(115) From the documents in the case it is clear that even
when they signed the agreement the parties were aware,
or could not have been unaware, that it was incompatible
with the Community rules. In handwritten notes by one
of the directors of the FNB, dated 25 October and
concerning the press conference on the agreement, there
is the indication ‘against the law’ (166), and more explicit
again, after the name of the President of the FNCBV, ‘a
bit against the law, but can’t be helped’ (167). With regard
to the meeting on 29 October, the same notes remark
‘DGCCRF + Competition Board!!!’ (168). In fact these
notes make it clear that discussions on a possible scale
of prices took place as early as the beginning of
October 2001. At a meeting on 2 October 2001, after
the initials of the President of the FNSEA, there are
the words ‘it’s anticompetitive, but commitment’ (c’est
anticoncurrentiel, mais engagement, document 38.279/
950). After the name of the President of the FNCBV are
the words ‘Can we close ranks? without being caught
out by the DGCCRF?’ (peut-on se serrer les coudes? sans
se faire prendre en faute par la DGCCRF? document
Immediately after the signature of the
38.279/951).
agreement, outside parties complained to the President
of the FNSEA that it was illegal (see recital 44 of this
Decision). The statements that
the
FNCBV made to the press regarding the DGCCRF also

the President of

( 165) Since the setting up of the Competition Board (Conseil de la
concurrence), every one of its annual reports has given examples
of the application of the competition rules to trade unions or
federations (see in particular the reports for 1987 and 1997).
For examples of formal decisions concerning farmers’ unions
see the following Competition Board decisions:
— Decision No 00-D-01 of 22 February 2000 on practices
in the fruit and vegetables trade (this decision was annulled
on 17 October 2000 by the Paris Court of Appeal on
separate grounds to do with an error in the identification
of the addressee of the decision);

— Decision No 96-D-60 of 15 October 1996 on competition

in seed potatoes;

— Decision No 96-D-59 of 8 October 1996 on practices

observed in the Champagne wine trade;

— Decision No 95-D-77 of 5 December 1995 on compe-

tition on the market in honey;

— Decision No 94-D-61 of 29 November 1994 on practices
observed in the production and marketing of veal;
— Decision No 94-D-23 of 5 April 1994 on practices

observed in the olive oil trade.

( 166) Document 38.279/892.
( 167) Document 38.279/893.
( 168) Document 38.279/901.

(116) It should be recalled, in any event, that the decisions of
the Commission and the judgments of the Court of
First Instance and Court of Justice of the European
Communities offer numerous examples of associations
which were perfectly legitimate in themselves but which
nevertheless provided a framework for infringements of
the competition rules (170).

(117) The six federations that are party to the agreement
therefore constitute associations of undertakings (or
associations of associations of undertakings) within the
meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty.

3.1.2. Agreement

(118) It is undisputed that for there to be an ‘agreement’ within
the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty it is not necessary
that the parties should consider it legally binding. An
‘agreement’ may exist where the parties reach a consen-
sus on a plan which limits or is likely to limit their
commercial freedom by determining the lines of their
mutual action or abstention from action in the market.
No enforcement procedures such as might be foreseen
in case of a civil law contract are required. Nor is it
necessary for such an agreement to be made in writing.

(119) An agreement such as the one concluded on 24 October
2001 therefore constitutes an ‘agreement’ between
associations of undertakings within the meaning of
Article 81 of the Treaty (171).

(120) In addition,

the discussions that took place at the
meetings on 29 November and 5 December 2001 attest
the existence of a similar agreement between the same
parties that carried on from the earlier one. The form
had changed from that of the agreement of 24 October,
since no formal written document survives. But, as has
been shown in the account of the facts, the discussions

(169) It may also be worth referring to an article that appeared in the
magazine Les Marchés on 26 October 2001, the day after the
formal signature of the agreement, which states that ‘According
to the FNSEA, the Ministry of Agriculture has made no objection
to the agreement, but some sources already suspect that it does
not comply with the rules on competition’ (selon la FNSEA, le
ministère de l’agriculture n’aurait pas émis de réserve sur cet
accord, que certains soupçonnent cependant déjà de ne pas être
conforme à la réglementation sur la concurrence, document
38.279/198).

(170) Of those already cited, see the judgment of the Court of First
Instance in Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v
Commission (see footnote 158), or the judgment of the Court of
Justice in Clair (see footnote 162).

(171) See for example Court of Justice in Frubo (see footnote 163) and

Clair (see footnote 162), paragraph 20.

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reflect a meeting of minds between the federations that
had signed the initial agreement. This is quite explicit in
the notes taken by the director of the FNB at the
meetings of 29 November and 5 December 2001: the
notes refer several times to the ‘agreement’ between the
parties (see in particular recitals 58, 60 and 69 of this
Decision). Indeed the facts already set out reveal that the
parties had agreed to keep the new agreement secret (see
in particular recital 60); the documents in the case
contain numerous references to the need for the parties
‘to put nothing in writing from now on’ (ne plus rien
écrire, see in particular recitals 59, 60, 68, 69 and 70),
and to confine themselves to a ‘verbal agreement’ (see in
particular recitals 59, 60, 63 and 64). Without repeating
these documents in full, it may be worth pointing out
that the director of the FNB wrote in his handwritten
notes that ‘by general agreement, we will no longer
communicate in writing’. The vice-president of the FNB
said, ‘there is nothing in writing on this new “agreement”.
Just words (...) we will see what is the weight of words,
after the impact of the written document’.

(121) The FNICGV has argued that the farmers had threatened
violence, and that the agreement was concluded under
that threat, which in French law is a ground of nullity.
But for a commitment to be considered an ‘agreement’
within the meaning of Article 81 it is not necessary that
it should constitute a valid and binding contract under
national law (172). And the courts have consistently held
that an undertaking or association of undertakings party
to an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 of the
Treaty cannot rely on the argument that it was compelled
to take part by the other participants. It could instead
have reported the pressure being brought to bear on it
to the appropriate authorities, and lodged a complaint
with the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation
No 17 (173).

(122) Moreover, if an agreement vitiated by a ground of nullity
were to escape Article 81, as the FNICGV contends when
it invokes the threat of violence, no agreement would
ever be caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty: the fact
that an agreement restricts competition is itself a ground
of nullity under Article 81(2) of the Treaty. But the fact

that the agreement was concluded under compulsion
may be taken into account when the victim’s partici-
pation in the infringement has to be assessed for
purposes of the setting of fines.

(123) Lastly, contrary to the parties’ claims, the fact that the
agreement itself made no provision for penalties to be
imposed on parties who failed to comply with it does
not prevent it from being an ‘agreement’ within the
meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty (174).

3.1.3. Restriction of competition

(124) Article 81(1)(a) of the Treaty cites by way of example of
restriction of competition forms of conduct which
‘directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices’. As
further examples Article 81(1)(b) and (c) refer to forms
of conduct which ‘limit or control production [or]
markets’ or ‘share markets or sources of supply’.

(125) An agreement such as the one under consideration here,
which was concluded between farmers’ and slaughterers’
representatives and is aimed at setting minimum prices
for the purchase of culled cows in France, consequently
constitutes a restriction of competition within the mean-
ing of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

(126) In addition, an agreement by which the parties promise
not to import products originating in the other Member
States, among other places, leads to a partitioning of the
market which is incompatible with Article 81(1) of the
Treaty. It is true that the section of the agreement of
24 October 2001 requiring the ‘suspension’ of imports
of beef in general was moderated by the Rungis protocol
of 31 October 2001. But the ‘solidarity’ which importers
and exporters promised to display has to be understood
in the context as a call, at the very least, to limit imports
as far as possible, since total suspension of imports
had proved impossible in practice. Furthermore, it is
undisputed that local agreements were concluded in the
last week of October and in November, that is to say after
the conclusion of the Rungis protocol (see recitals 73 to
75 and 79 of this Decision). But those agreements, which
continued and implemented the national agreement,
contained a suspension of imports clause valid ‘pending

( 172) Court of First Instance in Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission
(2000) ECR II-3383, paragraph 68, and Court of Justice in Case
C-277/87 Sandoz v Commission (1990) ECR I-45, paragraph 13.
( 173) Court of First Instance in Case T-149/89 Sotralentz v Commission
(1995) ECR II-1127, paragraph 53, and Case T-308/94 Cascades
v Commission (1998) ECR II-925, paragraph 122.

(174) See in particular Court of First Instance in Case T-317/94 Moritz
J. Weig v Commission (1998) ECR II-1235, paragraph 134.

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further national negotiations’ (see recitals 75 and 79).
The facts also show that in November and December,
likewise after the signature of the Rungis protocol,
farmers carried out ‘inspections’ of the origin of meat,
and in some cases destroyed meat that was not of
French origin (see recital 80). Several times in those
two months local organisations informed the FNB of
the results of inspections relating specifically to the
origin of meat. For example, it may be recalled that a
local union representative wrote to the FNB on
11 December 2001 regarding an ‘inspection’
in the
‘no anomaly found —
slaughterhouses of the region:
scale applied — no imports’
(same recital). The
handwritten notes by the director of the FNB include
the observation ‘continue on imports’, but ‘don’t say
it, and certainly don’t write it’
(see recital 49,
concerning a conversation on 20 November 2001).
Regarding the meeting on 5 December, the same notes
observe ‘we’re to stop saying “against imports”, and go
to restaurants and catering’ (see recital 68).

(127) It is well established that for the purpose of applying
Article 81(1) of the Treaty there is no need to take
account of the actual effects of an agreement once it
appears that its aim is to prevent, restrict or distort
competition within the common market (175). The
agreement at issue here did have the restriction of
competition as its object, and there is consequently no
need to examine its effects. With regard to the
provisions in the agreement concerning prices, how-
ever,
it may be pointed out that prices did indeed
begin to rise as soon as the agreement of 24 October
2001 had been concluded (see recitals 14 and 81 of
this Decision), and that several documents show that
farmers’ representatives felt that the price scale was
having the desired effect, at least in part (see recitals 85,
86 and 88). With regard to the provisions in the
agreements concerning imports, the facts show that
goods were ‘inspected’ to establish their origin, and
that
in
imported products were destroyed (see
particular recital 80). The figures produced by the
FNICGV in response to the statement of objections
imports from France’s
show that
the volume of
industry fell
main commercial partners in the beef
substantially in November and December 2001 by
comparison with October 2001, before rising again in
January 2002 (see recital 78). But the Commission is
not in a position to say that this was the result of the
infringement.

( 175) See for example Court of First Instance in Case T-305/94 etc.
LVM and Others v Commission (1999) ECR II-931, para-
graph 741.

(128) The FNICGV has contended that the agreement con-
cerned only a limited quantity of animals. This is not
true of imports. That part of the agreement concerned
all beef (see recital 38 of this Decision). It was not
confined to cows, as opposed to other kinds of cattle, or
to animals on the hoof for slaughter, as opposed to
imported fresh or frozen meat. The agreement on prices
did apply only to certain categories of cow intended for
slaughter, but this does not mean that its scope was
narrow.

(129) First, it is a particular feature of the French market that
consumption is largely oriented towards the meat of
cows (176). Second, it is clear from the price scale drawn
up by the FNB in mid-October 2001 (see recital 31 of
this Decision) that the scale was confined to culled
cows ‘because of the importance of this category’ (177).
Moreover, it would seem contradictory to claim that the
agreement was concluded mainly to send a message of
hope to farmers, to put an end to the strong pressure
being exerted by the farmers and the public authorities,
and to avoid breakdowns of law and order, and at the
same time to claim that the agreement related only to
very small volumes.

(130) It is indisputable that the beef industry was undergoing
a serious crisis at the time the agreement was concluded
(see section 1.3 of this Decision), a crisis which affected
all markets in the Community. The Commission recog-
nised the situation, and precisely for that reason it took
special measures (see section 1.4.2). But as the Court of
Justice has recently had occasion to point out,
‘the
existence of a crisis in the market cannot in itself
preclude the anti-competitive nature of an agree-
ment’ (178). The existence of a crisis might have been
relied upon in order to seek an exemption under
Article 81(3) of the Treaty (179). None of the parties to
the agreement submitted any such application. But even
if this agreement had been notified, it most likely would
not have qualified for exemption. It is well established
that exemption can be granted only when the four tests
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty are all satisfied (180). In this

(176) See French Ministry of Agriculture memo of 17 October 2001

(document 38.279/621).

(177) Documents 38.279/614 and 615 in particular.
(178) Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/
99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P
LVM and Others v Commission, 16 October 2002, not yet
reported, paragraph 487.

(179) Ibid., paragraph 488.
(180) See for example Court of First Instance in Case T-86/95
Compagnie générale maritime and Others v Commission (2002) ECR
II-1011, paragraph 349.

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case it will be enough to point out that the first two tests
are not satisfied. The agreement does not in any way
contribute to improving the production or distribution
of goods or to promoting technical or economic pro-
gress. Nor does it allow consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit.

3.1.4. Appreciable effect on trade between Member States

(131) The courts have consistently held that in order that
an agreement between undertakings may affect trade
between Member States it must be possible to foresee
with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a
set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the
pattern of trade between Member States, such as might
prejudice the realisation of the aim of a single market in
all the Member States (181).

(132) The first part of the agreement provided for nothing less
than a suspension of imports. Although the terms of the
agreement of 24 October 2001 were moderated by the
Rungis protocol, the wording of the protocol and the
facts of the case make it clear that control of imports of
including imports from other Member States,
beef,
continued to be a vital component of the agreement (see
recital 80 of this Decision). This is confirmed by the
written protests of agricultural organisations in other
Member States (see recital 44).

(133) On the minimum prices for culled cows, it should be
pointed out first that an agreement, decision or con-
certed practice extending over the whole of the territory
of a Member State has, by its very nature, the effect of
reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national
basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration
which the Treaty is designed to bring about (182). And
on a market that is open to imports a minimum price
is backed up by
agreement can function only if it

( 181) See for example Court of Justice in Case 42/84 Remia and Others

v Commission (1985) ECR 2545, paragraph 22.

( 182) Court of Justice in Case C-309/99 Wouters, 19 February 2002,
not yet reported, paragraph 95. In a judgment delivered on the
same day in Case C-35/99 Arduino, not yet reported, the Court
held that a tariff fixing minimum and maximum fees for
members of a profession that ‘extends to the whole of the
territory of a Member State (...) may affect trade between
Member States’ (paragraph 33).

measures to control imports (183). Otherwise, in a sector
such as that of beef in France, where the producer price
is already far higher than those in the neighbouring
countries, and notably in Germany, fixing an even higher
minimum price would necessarily lead to an increase in
cheaper imports. The facts set out in this Decision (see
recital 95) show that the link between minimum price
and control of imports was indeed made. In particular,
in the price scale that
it adopted even before the
agreement of 24 October 2001, the FNB listed the trade
union measures that would have to be taken to ensure
the application of the scale: the first such measure listed
was control of imports (same recital). The ‘inspections’
carried out by farmers in October to December 2001
were concerned both with prices and with the place of
origin of the meat.

(134) The volumes of trade between France and the other
Member State are substantial (see recital 11). In fact the
bulk of trade in beef
is inside the Community. The
potential effects of an agreement of the kind at issue
here, whether direct — suspending or limiting imports
— or indirect — keeping up prices — have to be
regarded as appreciable.

3.2. Council Regulation No 26

(135) Regulation No 26 provides that Article 81 is to apply to
all agreements, decisions and practices which relate to
production of or trade in the products listed in Annex II
to the Treaty, now Annex I, which include beef.

(136) By way of exception it provides that Article 81 is not to

apply to restrictive practices of three kinds:

(a)

those which ‘form an integral part of a national
market organisation’;

(b)

those which ‘are necessary for attainment of the
objectives set out in Article 33 of the Treaty’;

(183) Court of Justice in Case 246/86 Belasco v Commission (1989)
ECR 2117, paragraph 34:
‘since the market concerned is
susceptible to imports, the members of a national price cartel
can retain their market share only if they defend themselves
against foreign competition.’

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(c)

restrictive practices ‘of
farmers, farmers’ associ-
ations, or associations of such associations belong-
ing to a single Member State which concern the
production or sale of agricultural products (...)
under which there is no obligation to charge
identical prices, unless the Commission finds that
competition is thereby excluded or that the objec-
tives of Article 33 of the Treaty are jeopardized.’

(137) As the parties have indeed accepted, the exceptions set
out at (a) and (c) cannot apply here. The organisation of
the market in beef is a common one, so that the
exception at (a) is excluded. The exception at (c) is
excluded twice over: the agreement involves parties
other than farmers, namely the slaughterers’ federations;
and it does indeed impose an obligation to charge
identical prices.

(138) The exception at (b) cannot apply either. In line with the
Commission’s practice in its decisions and with the case-
law, Article 2 of Regulation No 26, being an exception
to the general rule, must be interpreted strictly (184). The
third recital to Regulation No 26 states that Article 81
of the Treaty is to apply to agricultural products in so
far as its application ‘does not impede the functioning
of national organisations of agricultural markets or
jeopardize attainment of the objectives of the common
agricultural policy’.

(139) According to the court judgments the exemption in (b)
applies only if the agreement facilitates the attainment
of all the objectives of Article 33(1) of the Treaty (185),
or,
if the
Commission is able to reconcile them so as to enable
the derogating provision to apply (186).

if those objectives should prove divergent,

( 184) Court of Justice in Case C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others
(1995) ECR I-4515, paragraph 23, and Court of First Instance
in Joined Cases T-70/92 and T-71/92 Florimex and VGB v
Commission (1997) ECR II-693, paragraph 152. See also e.g.
Commission Decision 1999/6/EC of 14 December 1998 relating
to a proceeding under Article 85 of the Treaty (IV/35.280 —
Sicasov) (OJ L 4, 8.1.1999, p. 27), recital 68.

( 185) Frubo, paragraphs 22 to 27 (see footnote 163); Oude Luttikhuis,
paragraph 25 (see footnote 184); Court of Justice in Case C-265/
97 P VBA and Others v Commission (2000) ECR I-2061,
paragraph 94.

( 186) VBA, paragraph 94 (see footnote 185).

(140) The agreement at issue here does not in any way help
‘to increase agricultural productivity’. That objective,
listed at Article 33(1)(a) of the Treaty, is quite outside
the scope of the agreement.

(141) The agreement was intended to fix a minimum price,
which would be higher than the market price, and it
might therefore be thought that it would help ‘to ensure
a fair standard of living for the agricultural community,
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of
persons engaged in agriculture’. Article 33(1)(b) lists that
objective, but links it to the achievement of the first
objective, the improvement of productivity, as can be
seen from the fact that it begins with the word ‘thus’.
The agreement at issue here clearly does not pursue the
first objective.

(142) In addition, contrary to what has been argued by the
FNSEA, the agreement cannot be considered necessary
‘to stabilise markets’ (Article 33(1)(c) of the Treaty). The
crisis in the beef sector was due primarily to a massive
imbalance between supply and demand. Fixing a mini-
mum purchase price does nothing to remedy such a
situation. It does not affect the volume of supply, of
which there was a large surplus; an increase in minimum
prices might even cause demand to fall, thus widening
the gap between supply and demand. The view that
fixing a minimum price would not solve anything had
indeed been put forward by the President of the FNCBV
the meeting on
and the FNICGV representative at
23 October 2001 (see recital 32 of this Decision).
Numerous documents in the file show that everyone
was aware that the only real way to end the crisis was to
bring supply and demand into balance (187).

(143) The agreement is not necessary ‘to assure the availability
of supplies’ (Article 33(1)(d) of the Treaty). The market
in beef is not suffering from any shortage of supply.

(187) For example, an FNSEA memo dated 6 November 2001 on the
adoption of the agricultural budget by the lower house of the
French parliament says ‘the Minister pointed out that it was not
enough to write cheques for livestock farmers, supply and
demand had also to be brought into line’ (le ministre a rappelé
que faire des chèques aux éleveurs ne suffirait pas, il faudra aussi
équilibrer l’offre et la demande, document 38.279/400). See
also an interview with the President of the FNSEA in the
newspaper Le Figaro Économie, 17 October 2001 (document
38.279/312), or a memo from the FDSEA of Loire, dated
31 October 2001, according to which ‘everyone agreed that the
only lasting solution was for consumption to increase again,
and that a sustainable future for the trade depended on it’ (tout
le monde a convenu que la seule planche de salut durable était
une remontée de la consommation, et que ceci conditionnait
l’avenir durable de la filière, document 38.279/825).

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(144) Lastly, contrary to what the FNSEA has argued, the
agreement is not likely ‘to ensure that supplies reach
consumers at reasonable prices’ (Article 33(1)(e) of the
Treaty). Especially in the case of consumption via
restaurant and catering services, which are a major user
of cheaper, imported meat, the suspension of imports
could only have the effect of increasing prices.

(145) Thus the agreement is not necessary in order to achieve
at least four of the five objectives of the common
agricultural policy. Even if the view were to be taken
that it did indeed fall within the scope of the objective
in Article 33(1)(b) of the Treaty, nevertheless, when that
objective is weighed against the other four objectives
listed in Article 33(1), which it would not help to
achieve, it has to be concluded that the derogation in
Regulation No 26 does not apply here.

(149) It follows that the agreement cannot be regarded as
‘necessary’ as required by the first sentence of Article 2(1)
of Regulation No 26. Consequently, it is not excepted
from the application of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

3.3.

Intervention by the French State

(150) It has to be considered whether, as some of the parties
contend, the part that may have been played by the
French authorities in the conclusion of the agreement of
24 October 2001 is such as to prevent the application
of Article 81 to the conduct of the six federations.

(146) In addition, as has already been said, beef is the subject
of a common organisation of the market. By definition
such an organisation is established ‘in order to attain the
objectives set out in Article 33’ of the Treaty, as is
expressly stated in Article 34. The same point is made in
the recital 2 to Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 (see
recital 17 of this Decision).

(147) But there is no way in which it can be maintained that
the agreement at issue is among the means indicated by
the Regulation or the legislation implementing it (188).

(151) It appears from the facts that the French State, through
its Minister for Agriculture, was indeed implicated in the
conclusion of the agreement of 24 October 2001. He
strongly encouraged the conclusion of an agreement
whose content was necessarily going to be in violation
of the competition rules. This was expressly stated by
the Minister before the lower house of parliament when
the agreement was under discussion (see recital 33 of
this Decision), and in the press release that the Minister
issued after the agreement was concluded (see recital 42).
But the Minister himself acknowledged that he could
not ‘oblige’ or ‘force’ the parties to conclude an agree-
ment (see recital 33). The agreement continues to be an
agreement between private parties.

(148) Lastly, even if it were to be supposed that the measures
taken by the parties did contribute to the attainment of
the objectives in Article 33(1) of the Treaty — which
they did not — the word ‘necessary’
in Article 2
of Regulation No 26 requires that the measures be
proportionate, that is to say that no other less restrictive
measures would allow the objectives pursued to be
attained. The agreement at issue aimed to fix prices and
suspend imports, both of which are restrictions of
competition expressly named in Article 81(1) of the
Treaty and which constitute manifest infringements for
which penalties have frequently been imposed.

( 188) Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T-70/92 and T-71/92
Florimex and VGB v Commission (1997) ECR II-693, para-
graphs 148 and 149, and opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro
in Oude Luttikhuis
(1997) ECR 4471,
(see footnote 184)
paragraph 14. For examples of recent practice in Commission
decisions see Sicasov (see footnote 184), paragraph 68, and
Decision 1999/210/EC of 14 October 1998 relating to a
proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (British
Sugar plc, Tate & Lyle plc, Napier Brown & Company Ltd and
James Budgett Sugars Ltd) (OJ L 76, 22.3.1999, p. 1), recital 187.

(152) From the case-law it is clear that if anticompetitive
conduct is required of undertakings by national legis-
lation, or if the latter creates a legal framework which
itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity
on their part, Article 81 does not apply. In such a
situation, the restriction on competition is not attribu-
table to the autonomous conduct of
the undertak-
ings (189).

(153) That is not the case here. However the French State may
have been implicated in the discussions that led to the
conclusion of the agreement of 24 October 2001, there
was no question of a legal framework that left the
undertakings no margin for autonomous conduct.

(189) See for example Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-359/95 P
and C-379/95 P Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing (1997)
ECR I-6265, paragraph 33, and Court of First Instance in
Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v Commission (see
footnote 158), paragraphs 58 and 59.

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(154) In their replies to the statement of objections the parties
did not contest this conclusion. The FNSEA and the
FNICGV stressed that the Minister had been implicated,
but they confirmed that while he may have been deeply
involved his role was merely one of encouragement (190).

(155) In addition, it cannot be overlooked that the intervention
on the part of the Minister was itself provoked by
weeks of farmers’ demonstrations, sometimes violent, in
September and October 2001. In its observations in
reply to the statement of objections, the FNSEA pointed
out that ‘law and order was threatened’ and that these
demonstrations ‘were paralysing economic activity in
the whole agri-food sector’ (191); the FNSEA added that
the Minister felt obliged to intervene ‘to try to put an
end to the crisis and the disturbance of
law and
order’ (192).

(156) Thus the conduct of the six French federations does not
fall outside the scope of Article 81 of the Treaty.

3.4. Duration of the infringement

(157) The infringement which is the subject of this Decision
originated with the agreement of 24 October 2001. The
agreement of 24 October 2001 expired on 30 November
2001, but the agreement continued beyond that date.
The Commission has evidence that the agreement con-
cluded at countrywide level continued to have effect at
least until 11 January 2002, the date of expiry of the last
local agreement to apply the national commitment of
which the Commission is aware (see recital 93 of this
Decision). Thus the infringement began on 24 October
2001 and lasted at least until 11 January 2002.

( 190) Comments of FNICGV, p. 7, last paragraph (‘The Minister for
Agriculture strongly encouraged farmers and slaughterers to
reach agreement’ (le Ministre de l’agriculture a fortement incité
les éleveurs et
les abatteurs à s’entendre)), and comments
of FNSEA, p. 23, penultimate paragraph (‘The Minister for
Agriculture himself publicly encouraged the conclusion of an
agreement which he considered indispensable’ (le Ministre de
l’agriculture lui-même a incité publiquement à la signature d’un
accord jugé comme indispensable)).

( 191) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 15, last

line.

( 192) Comments in reply to the statement of objections, p. 23,

penultimate paragraph.

3.5. Persons to whom this Decision should be
addressed

(158) This Decision should be addressed to the six federations
directly implicated in the infringement, that is to say
those who were party to the agreement of 24 October
2001 and who continued to apply it, though in a
different form, beyond 30 November 2001.

3.6. Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17

(159) Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17 states that where the
Commission finds
infringement of
that
Article 81 of the Treaty it may by decision require the
undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to
an end. According to the information available to the
Commission the agreement of 24 October 2001 was
extended in another form beyond 30 November 2001.

there is

(160) In view of the statements made by the parties it is
probable that the infringement has ceased to have effect,
but that cannot be asserted with absolute certainty.

(161) The Commission should therefore require the feder-
ations to which the present Decision is addressed to
bring the infringement to an end,
if they have not
already done so, and henceforth to refrain from any
agreement, concerted practice or decision which might
have the same or a similar object or effect.

3.7. Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17

(162) Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 empowers the
Commission to impose on undertakings or associations
of undertakings
from EUR 1 000 to
EUR 1 000 000, or a sum in excess thereof but not
exceeding 10 % of turnover, where either intentionally
or negligently they infringe Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

fines of

3.7.1. The amount of the fine

(163) In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission is to
have regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particu-
lar to the gravity and duration of the infringement.

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(164) The Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed
pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and
Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (193) state that ‘In
assessing the gravity of the infringement, account must
be taken of its nature, its actual impact on the market,
where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant
geographic market’.

(165) The infringement at issue consists of a minimum price
agreement and a commitment to suspend or at least
to limit
the
infringement
is a particularly serious one. This is
especially so because measures had been taken by
the Community institutions to resolve the crisis and
authorise the granting of aid to the farmers affected.

imports, and by its nature,

therefore,

(169) Each of the federations should be fined, because, as is
clear from the facts and their legal assessment, each of
them played an individual part in the infringement. The
parties should be distinguished in such a way as to
reflect each one’s relative strength and thus its degree of
responsibility for the infringement. Market shares do not
provide an appropriate criterion. First, as the parties are
federations, they have not got market shares properly so
called. Second, in the case of the farmers’ federations
even the market shares of the members do not provide
a basis for a comparison between the federations
is a
themselves. One of the federations, the FNSEA,
grouping of farmers in general; another represents a
particular social category of
farmer, namely young
farmers; and the other two specialise in particular areas
of activity, namely beef and dairy production.

(166) Turning to the size of the relevant geographic market,
the French market
is one of the main agricultural
markets in the Community, and the French beef herd
alone amounts to more than 25 % of the Community
In addition, one aspect of the agreement was
herd.
concerned with imports, so that
the
infringement went beyond France itself.

the scope of

(167) It has already been said (see recital 127)

that the
Commission is not able to quantify the real effects on
prices and on intra-Community trade that can be
attributed to the agreement. The slaughterhouse entry
price did rise in the three weeks following the conclusion
of the agreement (see recital 14); the statistics in the
Commission’s possession show that the increase did not
last long, and that the prices reached remained lower
than those of October and November 1999, before the
second ‘mad cow’ crisis (194). As regards the volume of
trade between Member States, the reduction in imports
shown in the figures supplied by the FNICGV at the
hearing (see recital 78) cannot be said with certainty to
be a result of the agreement.

(168) In view of the nature of the infringement and the
geographic extent of the relevant market, it is clear that
the infringement is very serious.

( 193) OJ C 9, 14.1.1998, p. 3.
( 194) Statistics regularly updated on OFIVAL’s Internet site, www.

ofival.fr.

(170) The ratio between the amount of the annual membership
fees collected by each of the farmers’ federations and
that collected by the main farmers’ federation appears to
be an objective criterion reflecting the relative size of the
different farmers’
federations, and consequently their
individual degree of responsibility in the infringement.
This degree of responsibility reflects the real capacity of
the members of each federation to cause serious harm.
The same criterion should be applied to the two
slaughterers’
that they do not
operate on the same market as the farmers is irrelevant
here, given that the basic amounts of the fines cannot in
any event be determined by reference to market shares,
as has just been said. Accordingly, the basic amount of
the fine to be imposed on the main federation involved,
the FNSEA, in order to take account of the gravity of the
infringement, should be set at EUR 20 million. Those
imposed on the FNPL, the FNICGV and the JA should be
set at, respectively, 1/5th, 3/20ths and 1/20th of that
amount, and those imposed on the FNB and the FNCBV
at 1/10th of that amount.

federations. The fact

(171) Turning now to the duration of the agreement, the facts
set out above show that the infringement began on
24 October 2001. For purposes of the fine it may be
held that it
lasted until 11 January 2002, as the
Commission has no evidence that would demonstrate
that it continued beyond that date. The infringement
was therefore of short duration, which may well be due
in large part to the rapid intervention on the part of the
Commission. This also shows that in so far as the
agreement did produce any effects, it did so for only a
short time. In accordance with the guidelines, the short
duration of the infringement means that there should be
no increase in the basic amount.

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(172) Taking account of the gravity and duration of the
infringement, therefore, the basic amount of the fine is
to be determined as follows:

— FNSEA:

EUR 20 million,

— FNB:
— JA:

EUR 2 million,
EUR 1 million,

— FNPL:

EUR 4 million,

— FNICGV:

EUR 3 million,

— FNCBV:

EUR 2 million.

3.7.2. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

3.7.2.1. A g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s

(173) Under the heading of aggravating circumstances account
should be taken of the fact that the farmers who were
members of the farmers’ federations in question used
violence in order to compel the slaughterers’ federations
to accept the agreement of 24 October 2001. They also
used physical force to set up mechanisms to verify that
the agreement was being applied, such as the illegal
‘inspections’ to establish the place of origin of meat. The
information available to the Commission,
including
press articles, repeatedly refers to the local sections of
the FNSEA,
this
aggravating circumstance the amount of
the fines
imposed on those three farmers’ federations should be
increased by 30 %.

the JA and the FNB.

In view of

(174) Account should also be taken of the fact that the parties
continued their agreement in secret, in another form, at
the end of November and the beginning of Decem-
ber 2001, even though they had received a letter of
formal notice from the Commission, and had given an
assurance that the written agreement of 24 October
2001 would not be extended (see recital 4 of this
Decision). The basic amount of the fine imposed on
each of the six parties should therefore be increased by
20 %.

(175) Lastly, there is the preponderant role played by the FNB,
the federation of livestock farmers, in the preparation
and implementation of the infringement. It is clear from
the documents in the case that the initiative for a price
scale and associated measures in respect of imports came
from the FNB. The FNB was especially emphatic in
support of an oral agreement, as statements made by its
vice-president show. The basic amount of the fine
imposed on the FNB should therefore be increased by
30 %.

3.7.2.2. M i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s

(176) Among mitigating circumstances there is the forceful
intervention of the French Minister for Agriculture in
favour of the conclusion of such an agreement. This was
reflected in his speeches in parliament and his press
release the day the agreement was concluded. His
intervention put strong pressure on the slaughterers to

conclude an agreement. In particular, it will be seen
from the facts set out here that at a meeting between
the parties on 23 October 2001, before the Minister
intervened, the slaughterers refused to sign the agree-
ment presented to them by the farmers (see recital 32).
Account should be taken of this mitigating circumstance
by reducing the fine imposed on each of the slaughterers’
federations by 30 %. But the Minister’s intervention was
in turn the result of several weeks of demonstrations by
farmers who were members of the farmers’ federations
involved, demonstrations which were aimed at securing
the slaughterers’ signature to an agreement; conse-
quently, the benefit of this mitigating circumstance
should not be allowed to the four farmers’ federations.

(177) The two federations of slaughterers, the FNICGV and the
FNCBV, were faced with a very special situation. In the
weeks preceding the conclusion of the agreement their
members were subjected to illegal action in which
industrial plants were blockaded, thus preventing from
carrying on any economic activity, and meat was
destroyed. In some cases serious damage was done to
their premises. From the account of the facts it will be
seen that the two federations representing the slaugh-
terers nevertheless opposed the conclusion of any agree-
ment until 23 October 2001 (see recital 32). This
physical coercion should be considered a mitigating
circumstance in the case of the FNICGV, and to a lesser
extent in the case of the FNCBV, in view of the role that
the President of the FNCBV attributed to his federation
after the fact (see recital 35). The amount of the fine
should accordingly be reduced by 30 % in the case of
the FNICGV and 30 % in the case of the FNCBV.

(178) The Commission has no evidence to show that the
federation representing milk producers, the FNPL, played
any special part in the conclusion or the application of
the agreement at issue. It would appear that the FNPL
played a passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role in the agree-
ment. The amount of the fine imposed on that federation
should therefore be reduced by 30 %.

(179) Taking account of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances set out above, the amount of the fines
should be set at:

— FNSEA:

EUR 30 million,

— FNB:

EUR 3,6 million,

— JA:

EUR 1,5 million,

— FNPL:

EUR 3,6 million,

— FNICGV:

EUR 1,8 million,

— FNCBV:

EUR 1,2 million.

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3.7.3. Other circumstances

(180) In point 5(b) of the Guidelines on the method of setting
fines (see recital 164 of this Decision), the Commission
states that ‘Depending on the circumstances, account
should be taken (...) of certain objective factors such as a
specific economic context, any economic or financial
benefit derived by the offenders (...) the specific charac-
teristics of the undertakings in question and their real
ability to pay in a specific social context, and the fines
should be adjusted accordingly’.

(181) Thus the guidelines allow the Commission to take
account of the specific circumstances of a case. The
present Decision is the first to penalise an agreement
concluded entirely between federations and which relates
to a basic agricultural product and involves two links in
the production chain, and the Commission accordingly
considers that it ought to take account of the specific
economic context of the case; the relevant factors are as
follows.

(182) First, beef consumption had been falling for some ten
years; the fall quickened after the first ‘mad cow’ crisis,
in 1996, and again after the second crisis, in 2000. Over
the whole of 2001 consumption fell by 7 % as compared
with 2000 (see recital 13). The difficulties in France in
the second half of 2001 came at a time when the sector
was already weakened by several hard years.

(183) The Community adopted measures aimed at regulating
the beef market and restoring balance. Measures of this
kind were in force throughout 2001 and at the beginning
of 2002. As explained in recitals 23 to 27, the inter-
vention measures provided for in the CMO were adapted
in the course of 2001, widening their scope in order
to deal with a market that was still
‘disrupted’ and
‘unstable’ (195); a special scheme applied in the period
from July 2001 to March 2002, under Article 38(1) of
the CMO (see recital 21 of this Decision). The French
authorities made extensive use of these mechanisms.
They were the first to take advantage of the special
scheme in force from July 2001 to March 2002; two
thirds of the purchases made under that arrangement
took place in the period covered by the agreement at
issue. In 2001 and 2002 the Commission also authorised
France to grant aid to the farmers most seriously affected.
The analysis justifying the authorisation was based on
the existence of ‘exceptional occurrences’ within the

meaning of Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty (196). The
authorising decisions emphasised in particular that what
the beef sector was facing was not merely a short-term
fall in prices or the presence of a well-known disease.
Factors such as the loss of consumer confidence linked
to the fear of Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, which affected
human beings, had created a specific context; that
context ought to be taken into account in this case too.

(184) At the time the agreement was concluded the slaughter-
house entry prices farmers were receiving for cattle
had fallen again, despite the Community adjustment
measures, which were applied on a large scale in France.
As explained in recital 14, the prices of the cows that
were the main subject of the agreement had dropped by
some 15 % to 20 % from the middle of 2001,
reaching levels that were even lower than those of
November 2000, when the second ‘mad cow’ crisis was
at its worst. Final consumer prices, on the other hand,
had remained stable (see recital 15).

(185) In this specific context, which went beyond a straightfor-
ward collapse in prices or the presence of a well-known
disease, the fines should be reduced by 60 %.

(186) In these circumstances the final amount of the fine
imposed on each of the parties to the agreement should
be set at:

— FNSEA:

EUR 12 million,

— FNB:

EUR 1,44 million,

— JA:

EUR 600 000,

— FNPL:

EUR 1,44 million,

— FNICGV:

EUR 720 000,

— FNCBV:

EUR 480 000,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles
(FNSEA), the Fédération nationale bovine (FNB), the Fédération
nationale des producteurs de lait (FNPL), the Jeunes agriculteurs
(JA) (formerly the Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs), the
Fédération nationale de l’industrie et des commerces en gros
des viandes (FNICGV) and the Fédération nationale de la
coopération bétail et viande (FNCBV) infringed Article 81(1)
of the Treaty by concluding on 24 October 2001 an agreement
which had the object of suspending imports of beef into France
and fixing a minimum price for certain categories of cattle,
and by concluding verbally an agreement with a similar object
at the end of November and the beginning of December 2001.

( 195) See for example the recitals to Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1922/2001 (OJ L 261, 29.9.2001, p. 52) and Commission
Regulation (EC) No 2579/2001 (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 68).

(196) See the decisions on State aid referred to in footnotes 24 and

25 to this Decision.

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The infringement began on 24 October 2001 and continued
to have effect at least until 11 January 2002.

Article 2

After that time interest shall automatically be payable at the
interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main
refinancing operations on the first working day of the month
in which this Decision was adopted, plus 3,5 percentage
points.

The federations named in Article 1 shall immediately bring the
infringement to an end, in so far as they have not already done
so, and shall henceforward refrain from any restrictive practice
that has the same or an equivalent object or effect.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to:

Article 3

The following fines are hereby imposed:

— FNSEA:

EUR 12 million,

— FNB:

EUR 1,44 million,

— JA:

EUR 600 000,

— FNPL:

EUR 1,44 million,

— FNICGV:

EUR 720 000,

— FNCBV:

EUR 480 000.

Article 4

The fines shall be payable within three months of the date of
notification of this Decision, to the following account:

Account No 642-0029000-95

Commission européenne/Europese Commissie

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA)

IBAN code: BE76 6420 0290 0095

SWIFT code: BBVABEBB

Avenue des Arts/Kunstlaan 43

B-1040 Brussels

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles,
11, rue de la Baume, F-75008 Paris;

Fédération nationale bovine, 149, rue de Bercy, F-75012
Paris;

Fédération nationale des producteurs de lait, 42, rue de
Châteaudun, F-75014 Paris;

Jeunes agriculteurs, 14, rue La Boétie, F-75008 Paris;

Fédération nationale de l’industrie et des commerces en
gros des viandes, 17, place des vins de France, F-75012
Paris;

Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail et viande,
49, avenue de la Grande-armée, F-75116 Paris.

This Decision shall be enforceable under Article 256 of the
Treaty.

Done at Brussels, 2 April 2003.

For the Commission

Mario MONTI

Member of the Commission