Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the consequences of the war in Iraq for energy and transport
Date: 2003-03-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Iraq, air transport, commodity price, energy supply, impact study, maritime transport, nuclear safety, petroleum product, satellite navigation, war, world economy

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 26.3.2003
COM (2003) 164 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

on the consequences of the war in Iraq for energy and transport

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

on the consequences of the war in Iraq for energy and transport

The war in Iraq will have major repercussions, and not all the implications can be measured at
this stage. This Communication is only a first reaction to the consequences of the war in terms
of  energy  and  transport.  Clearly,  in  the  light  of  the  course  of  events,  adjustments  may  be
necessary.

In order to prepare the analysis of the Commission in these sectors, a Task Force to analyse
risks in the fields of energy  and  transport  was set up  by the  Directorate-General for Energy
and  Transport  last  December.  Its  terms  of  reference  were  to  provide  information  for  the
Commission's other  rapid  reaction centres  (DG RELEX's Crisis Room  and  DG ENV's Alert
Centre). Its mission is mainly to identify the sources of risks and the degree of vulnerability of
energy  and  transport  infrastructure  in  the  EU,  the  candidate  countries  and  neighbouring
countries.

In anticipation of the war in against Iraq, a series of measures were prepared to deal with the
most immediate problems.

1. 

AIR TRANSPORT

European civil aviation is likely to be affected by the war in Iraq. The impact on the
air sector is likely to be manifested in at least three ways:

– 

– 

– 

closure  of  airspace  in  the  region  of  the  conflict  and  the  rerouting  of  traffic,
essentially through Russia;

congestion  of  airspace  above  Europe  on  account  of  the  priority  given  to
military operations over civilian traffic;

and, last but not least, a reduction in demand. The aviation industry anticipates
a fall in revenue at world level of around EUR 6 billion in the event of a war
lasting  three  months  (IATA1  data).  However  this  fall  in  revenue  could  rise  if
the war were to be extended beyond expectations.

The impact of the war on the situation in the civil aviation sector, which is already
confronted with a need for consolidation, should not, however, be overestimated (see
Annex I on the present situation in  the  sector).  The reduction  in  flights to  the Near
and Middle East will not necessarily spread to all routes. It is clear that it will depend
on the overall economic slowdown and the usual psychological hesitations normally
observed in a period of conflict.

The Commission is examining a series of measures to support the sector. However,
the  Commission  cannot  accept  measures  which  would  have  the  effect  of  creating

1 

International Air Transport Association.

2

                                                
distortions between States and companies, or accept that the present situation might
serve  as  a  pretext  to  delay  necessary  restructuring.  The  importance  of  strict
compliance with the rules of the EC Treaty concerning State aid should be reiterated.
The  Treaty  provides  for  the  possibility  of  dealing  with  extraordinary  events
(Article 87(2)(b)). The Commission has already had recourse to this provision in the
air transport sector when circumstances so justified.

As a reminder, during the first Gulf War in 1991 and especially following the attacks
of  11 September 2001,  the  Commission  had  already  taken,  for  a  limited  period,  a
series of measures designed to enable the airlines to deal with short-term difficulties:

– 

– 

favourable  examination  of  certain  types  of  State  aid  intended  to  offset  the
additional costs of security insurance;

possibility for the Commission, on a case by case basis to authorise, under the
competition  rules  applicable  to  air  transport  certain  cooperation  agreements
between  airlines;  in  particular  favourable  treatment  for  service  coordination
agreements aimed at ensuring satisfactory services on less frequented routes or
during low periods;

– 

more flexible rules concerning the allocation of airport slots.

The  industry  reacted  well  to  these  difficulties,  and  traffic  resumed  shortly  after  the
war. However traffic was slow to recover after 11 September.

A series of similar measures should now be envisaged.

1.1. 

Financial support for airlines

After 11 September, the insurance companies, without notice, withdrew coverage of
terrorism  and  war  risks,  obliging  the  Member States  to  stand  in  for  them  and  the
Commission to monitor their intervention in the context of the supervision of public
aid, but in this case the consequences will, in all expectations, be more limited.

In  anticipation,  on  10 March 2003  DG  TREN  convened  the  ad  hoc  group  of
Member States' insurance experts set up after 11 September. This group took stock of
the  market  situation.  Most  of  the  Member States'  representatives  considered  that
withdrawal of third party liability cover is not to be expected. The experts anticipate
a  major  increase,  but  limited  in  time,  in  premiums  for  flights  to  the  Gulf  region.
Certain  Member States  have,  however,  requested  the  Commission  to  examine  the
possibility of reintroducing a mechanism for the monitoring of aid in the event of a
significant  increase.  The  Commission  departments  will  continue  to  monitor  the
development  of  this  situation,  day  by  day,  so  as  to  be  in  a  position  to  react  and
coordinate any reactions by the Member States.

In parallel, the US Administration, and also other third countries are likely to adopt
direct aid measures for their companies. It will then be necessary to verify the impact
of these support measures on  European  companies.  In this context, mention  should
be  made  of  the  Commission's  March 2002  proposal  concerning  unfair  air  transport
practices.  The  aim  of  the  proposal  is  to  give  the  Commission  a  commercial
anti-subsidy  defence  instrument  similar  to  that  which  exists  for  other  sectors.  It  is
therefore  essential  that  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  should  adopt  this

3

proposal rapidly in order to avoid any distortion of competition with regard to third
country companies.

1.2. 

Security measures

Immediately  after  the  11 September  attacks,  the  Commission  submitted  a  proposal
for  a  Regulation  establishing  common  rules  concerning  airport  safety.  The
Regulation was adopted by the Council  and the Parliament in January 2003.  It lays
down  common  rules  for  the  inspection  of  luggage  and  passengers  and  organises
control  procedures.  As  from  July 2003,  the  Commission  will  assume  responsibility
for surveillance of effective compliance with the Regulation throughout Community
airports.

The  war  in  Iraq  could  necessitate  stepping  up  day-to-day  cooperation  between  the
national security authorities and the Commission so as to have a collective response
capability  in  the  event  of  special  problems  at  a  particular  location  on  Community
territory.

In the Commission's opinion, the responsibility  for  strengthening security measures
should  be  assumed  by  the  public  authorities.  It  goes  without  saying  that  if  certain
measures  are  imposed  directly  upon  the  airlines  and  other  operators  in  the  sector,
such as airports, the ground handling assistance service providers and air navigation
service  providers,  their  financing  by  the  public  authorities  must  not  give  rise  to
operating aid incompatible with the Treaty.

1.3. 

Slots

The  Community  Regulation  concerning  the  allocation  of  slots  provides  that  an  air
carrier may keep slots assigned to it only if it has used them during at least 80% of
the period (season) for which they were allocated.

the  Regulation  also  accepts 

i.e.
However, 
unforeseeable and inevitable cases over which the carrier has no control, which may
have an  impact on  the use  of  slots  and  justify  not  losing  its  slots  for  the  following
season.

the  exceptional  circumstances, 

Following the 11 September attacks, the Commission had proposed that airlines keep
their  slots  not  used  for  exceptional  reasons.  The  Commission  is  examining  the
advisability of a similar approach for the 2003 summer season.

2. 

MARITIME TRANSPORT

The impact of the war on world trade will have undoubted repercussions on maritime
transport the margins for which  are  now  extremely  small.  However,  it  is  especially
the security shortcomings which are likely to be put in the spotlight.

Maritime  transport has, late in  the  day,  realised  how  vulnerable  it  is,  following  the
attacks  of  11 September,  after  which  all  modes  of  transport  were  assessed  by  the
public authorities.

In  this  context,  a  communication  on  maritime  safety  will  be  adopted  shortly.  It
includes  a  proposal  aiming  to  transpose  the  recent  international  instruments

4

concerning security (amendment of the SOLAS2Convention and a new International
Ship  and  Port  Facility  Security  Code)  negotiated  at  the  International  Maritime
Organisation  Diplomatic  Conference  last  December.  Once  adopted,  this  proposal
should enable significant progress to be made with regard to the security of ships and
port facilities.

However,  additional  work  is  needed  in  other  international  arenas  (World  Customs
Organisation, G8,  International  Labour Organisation) and within  the Community in
order  to  deal  with  the  problem  as  a  whole  and  counteract  any  counter-productive
bilateral  initiatives.  Obtaining  a  negotiating  mandate  on  18 March  to  replace  the
American  unilateral  approach  to  containers  (Container  Security  Initiative)  is  an
important step in this respect. In the same vein, it is essential to ensure the effective
implementation  by  our  Member  States  of  the  measures  adopted,  so  as  to  be  in  a
position  to  require  third  parties  to  recognise  our  security  levels  and  ensure  the
reciprocity of measures.

Lastly, additional action should rapidly be taken in order:

– 

– 

to support the work of the International Labour Organisation with regard to the
identification  of  seafarers  for  the  purposes  of  immigration  control  and
anti-terrorist action,

to  define  additional  security  measures  to  be  introduced  within  Community
ports (securing of port areas and staff) and draw up appropriate legislation.

3. 

GALILEO

The attitude of the American authorities regarding the availability of the GPS signal
during  the  conflict  is  open  to  question.  Several  options  are  possible:  limited
scrambling of the signal in the war area and a reduction in signal quality worldwide
for  all  civilian  users.  The  impact  of  their  decisions  on  transport  and  other  sectors
dependent on satellite navigation will need to be carefully analysed.

In this context, the Commission would point out that the European Council meeting
on  20  and  21 March 2003  requested  that  the  Barcelona  conclusions  concerning
Galileo should be implemented fully and without delay.

4. 

OIL

4.1. 

Oil Price

An increase in oil prices has been underway over the past few months in anticipation
of a possible conflict: this increase has continued in spite of a decrease in the basic
price  per  barrel  declared  by  OPEC,  a  clear  indication,  if  one  was  needed,  of  the
strong role of speculation on prices.

Oil  imports  from  Iraq  to  the  European  Union  account  for  less  than  3.5  %  of  our
overall imports (cf. annex II). A sudden interruption of Iraqi oil would therefore not

2 

Safety Of Life At Sea.

5

                                                
have any dramatic consequence on the stability of our supplies, especially in view of
the  declarations  of  Saudi  Arabia  which  accounts  for  12  %  of  EU  imports  and  has
committed itself, in coordination with other OPEC members, to compensate for any
shortfall from Iraqi exports. The production of the first two oil exporters to the EU,
Norway  with  22.9  %  and  Russia  with  22.5  %  will  not  be  directly  affected  by  the
conflict in Iraq.

The consequences of a conflict on oil production and the evolution of oil prices are
very difficult to predict. According to many analysts, the current price (cf. annex III)
includes already a war premium not justified by the market situation. The following
factors will in any case play a key role:

– 

the length of the war will have an immediate effect on the prices:

– 

– 

in case of a short conflict it can be expected that prices will peak highly
fluctuate

in  case  of  a  more  prolonged  conflict,  price  levels  will  remain  more
volatile and reach a higher level. No serious disruption of supply can be
envisaged,  but  it  can  be  expected  that  speculation  will  keep  the  prices
high.

– 

the  spread  of  the  conflict  will  have  an  impact  on  prices  and  on  security  of
supply:

– 

– 

a  localised  conflict  in  Iraq,  even  if  prolonged,  would  not  have  direct
effects on the offer, even in case of destruction of Iraqi oil fields

a conflict that spread to other countries in the region would on the other
hand  raise  the  issue  of  supply  security  and  lead  to  shortages  and  high
prices.

4.2.  Management of oil stocks

Oil prices may be affected by other developments, notably a release of the American
strategic oil reserves: the International Energy Agency (IEA) could also  envisage a
coordinated  intervention  on  stock  release.  This  last  option  is  at  this  stage  unlikely
due to the difference of views within the IEA and its traditional reticence to act due
to its wide membership which includes numerous non-European countries3: many of
these  member  countries  have  in  the  past  preferred  unilateral  action  rather  than
coordination through the IEA.

The  Commission  has  held  a  meeting  of  the  Group  of  Oil  Supply  experts  on  13th
march  to  review  the  state  of  oil  stocks  and  expectations  of  Member  States.  All
Member  States  have  confirmed  that  oil  stocks  in  the  Community  are  healthy  at  an
average of 115 days of needs, well above the minimum 90 days set by the IEA.

3 

The International Energy Agency has 26 members including the 15 EU Member States plus the USA,
Canada, Japan, Australia, New  Zealand,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  Hungary,  Norway  (which  has  a  special
agreement), the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea (in 2002).

6

                                                
In case of conflict or sharp price fluctuations, the experts could be reconvened by the
Commission  at  short  notice  in  order  to  review  coordination  of  national  measures.
Measures  could  also  include  agreement  on  energy  saving  provisions:  it  could  be
considered whether such measures should be the object of a Commission’s proposal.

The  proposal  for  Directives  for  the  "communautarisation"  of  oil  and  gas  stocks,
adopted  by  the  Commission  last  September  11th,  are  still  under  discussion  in  the
Council and Parliament: it is however already possible to coordinate Member States’
action  on  the  basis  of  existing  legislation  and  their  more  general  obligations  under
the Treaty.

In  this  context  it  should  be  recalled  that  the  Commission  has  the  power  to  make
proposals to face severe difficulties of supply. These proposals based on Article 100,
can be adopted by qualified majority4.

It should also be envisaged to coordinate Member States position within the IEA in
order  to  put  forward  common  European  proposals  and  strengthen  cooperation  with
the IEA.

4.3. 

Coordination of fiscal measures

In case of high oil prices leading to a sustained increase in fuel price, Member States
have shown in the past a tendency to adopt unilateral fiscal measures to reduce the
pressure on the transport sector. At all events, as the Commission has already pointed
out, in the event of a rise in the price of oil, measures should be taken to discourage
the  temptation  to  offset  the  price  rise  by  a  reduction  in  taxation.  This  approach,
supported by the informal Ecofin Council in Versailles in September 2000, was not
actually followed up by a number of Member States which reduced excise duties on
motor fuel following the rise in the price of oil.

4.4. 

Security Measures

Security of energy infrastructure is primarily a responsibility of the Member States:
each country has its own national plans. In the current international context, it would
be  useful  to  bring  together  national  authorities  in  charge  of  such  plans  in  order  to
share  expertise  and  foster  a  common  understanding  of  major  threats  and  the
interaction of national provisions.

5. 

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

In the aftermath of September 11th, the Commission had already reviewed measures
to  be  taken  to  strengthen  nuclear  safety  and  security.  The  Commission  has  a  clear
responsibility under the Euratom Treaty, for all matters relating to non-proliferation,
control of  nuclear materials,  and  health  protection  against  radiation:  300  inspectors
carry out regular controls on all nuclear installations in the Union and verify that the

4

Article 100 (*)
1.  Without  prejudice  to  any  other  procedures  provided  for  in  this  Treaty,  the  Council,  acting  by  a
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission,  may decide upon the  measures appropriate to
the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products.

7

                                                
quantity and use of nuclear materials correspond to the declared purposes. The Union
is assured of the best non-proliferation control system in the world.

To  strengthen  nuclear  safety  and  security  further  measures  could  be  envisaged  for
what concerns other aspects of nuclear safety and security, such as physical security
of  nuclear  installations,  the  use  of  radioactive  materials  other  that  those  in  nuclear
programmes  (in  medicine  or  industry)  and  a  tightening  of  controls  at  all  stages.
Member States could consider:

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

a ban on flights over sensitive installations

a  temporary  ban  on  transport  of  nuclear  material  from  plant  to  deposit  sites:
radioactive  material  is  under  strict  control  within  nuclear  plants  and  once  it
reaches a deposit. It is however more vulnerable in the transportation phase: a
temporary  ban  could  therefore  be  envisaged.  The  maps  in  annex  show  the
distribution of nuclear plants and depository sites across the Union (cf. annex
IV).

set up and coordinate a permanent alert system within existing means,

strengthen security controls and access to all installations

proceed  to  stricter  controls  of  all  radioactive  materials  which  are  not  used  as
nuclear  fuel (and are therefore already under strict control procedures).  There
are in the Union significant quantities of radioactive materials employed in the
sectors,  which  are  not  subject  to  the  same  stringent  criteria  imposed  on  the
nuclear  industry.  Many  of  these  radioactive  sources  may  not  be  officially
declared and therefore escape official controls and proper disposal: it could be
envisaged  to  recommend  to  the  Member  States  to  impose  an  automatic
declaration of all radioactive sources on all operators, with sanctions for non-
compliance.

Annex I: Situation of the main European airlines

Annex II: Oil imports 2002

Annex III: Recent oil price trend

Annex IV: Nuclear power plants and disposal facilities in the EU.

8

ANNEX 1

SITUATION OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN AIRLINES

Passenger traffic trend in 2002

This trend can be measured in terms of:

-  RPK (Revenue Passenger Kilometres). This statistic is obtained by adding the kilometres
travelled by each paying passenger. It therefore measures the level of an airline's business
in real terms;

- 

seat  occupancy:  this  is  a  statistical  measurement  of  the  match  between  supply  and
demand.

The data in question are set out in the table below for the main European airlines. The figure
in brackets is the trend compared with the previous period (percentage change compared with
2001 in the case of RPK, rise/fall in the number of percentage points in the case of the seat
occupancy coefficient):

2002

BA

AF

LH

IB

KL

RY

RPK
(million)

Seat
occupancy

99 103

98 527

93 642

40 416

58 590

( - 4.1%)

( + 2.%)

( + 5.2%)

( - 2.1%)

( + 2.5%)

Not
available

72.7 %

76.1 %

77.1 %

73.0 %

80.3 %

81,0 %

(+ 3.3 p.)

( + 1.2 p.)

(+ 5.2 p.)

(+ 2.3 p.)

(+ 2.5 p.)

(+ 4,0 p.)

Airlines: British Airways (BA), Air France (AF), Lufthansa (LH), Iberia (IB), KLM (KL) and Ryanair (RY).

Air traffic demand fell dramatically in the last months of 2001. The general improvement in
seat occupancy indicates that the airlines concerned were able to adapt their supply to the fall
in demand.

The RPK trend is more varied. Ryanair's figure is not known, but has undoubtedly increased
significantly. Consequently, four airlines out of six have increased their  business.  Iberia has
suffered  a  slight  reduction.  The  special  case  of  British  Airways,  which  was  more  severely
affected than the others because of its great dependence on the trans-Atlantic market, should
be noted. However, this airline has implemented a stringent restructuring plan welcomed for
its scale and results by many analysts.

These  figures  reflect  the  effectiveness  of  the  measures  taken  by  most  of  the  airlines  to
rationalise their networks and adapt their supply commercially. They indicate  a  stabilisation
of the situation following 11 September 2001 and even real signs of a recovery.

9

Financial results (company financial years closed during 2002 - it should be noted that
only Lufthansa and Iberia closed their accounts on 31 December)

The  same  overall  impression  emerges  from  the  financial  results  published  by  the  airlines
concerned.  The  table  below  sets  out  two  main  type  of  data  (turnover  and  operating  results)
taken from  their  financial statements.  The  figure  in  brackets  indicates  the  change  compared
with the previous financial year (2001):

2002

BA

AF

LH (9 months)

IB

KL

RY

Turnover

8 340

12 528

12 641

4 700

6 532

551

( - 10.1%)

( + 2.0%)

( + 2.7 %)

(- 0.8%)

(- 6.1 %)

(+27.3%)

Operat.
result

- 110

235

790

249

-94

163

(- 129 %)

( -47 %)

(+ 172 %)

(not signif)

(- 234%)

(+ 43%)

Data in millions. For British Airways, figures in pounds sterling, for the others, figures in EUR.

Airlines: British Airways (BA), Air France (AF), Lufthansa (LH), Iberia (IB), KLM (KL) and Ryanair (RY).

Lufthansa's complete results for 2002 will be published on 20 March 2003.

These results illustrate to what extent and how quickly the efforts made have paid off. Several
airlines  are  making  significant  profits.  Lufthansa's  performance  is  quite  striking:  its  results
were  better  after  11 September 2001  than  before  (the  periods  compared  are  the  months  of
January  to  September  for  the  years  2001  and  2002)!  Some  carriers  are  recording  losses.
However, these seem to be under control, even for the most exposed airlines such as British
Airways.

10

ANNEX 2

REGISTRATION OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTS AND  DELIVERIES IN THE COMMUNITY
ENREGISTREMENT DES IMPORTATIONS ET DES LIVRAISONS DE PETROLE BRUT DANS LA COMMUNAUTE

European Union

Jan. - Nov. 2002

Country of Origin
Pays d'origine

Volume          (1000 Brl)

Total value
($ 1000)

CIF price 
Prix CAF
($/Brl)

ANNEXE

11 months

Share of Imports in 
%

Norway
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Libya
Iran
Nigeria
Syria
Algeria
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Mexico
Angola
Venezuela
Kuwait
Other Africa
Azerbaijan
Egypt
Cameroon
Other Europe
Brazil
Congo
Tunisia
Other FSU
Gabon
Colombia
Zaire
Ukraine
Other Middle East
Argentina
Oman
Other Latin America
United States
Yemen
Vietnam
Qatar
TOTAL 

722903
710276
353369
249891
165558
125254
125192
106717
100413
84320
60850
56954
46376
40551
36012
31584
27886
23788
18402
16677
13837
11952
7927
5157
3479
2208
2132
1910
1557
1347
1037
890
547
379
227
3157556

24,75
23,54
23,60
24,60
23,38
25,15
23,84
25,11
23,84
24,66
21,65
24,34
21,84
23,48
23,31
25,52
23,11
23,78
23,65
21,99
22,24
24,32
21,79
19,59
23,29
23,02
21,05
22,70
18,41
26,66
18,30
23,10
23,85
25,27
19,87
24,01

22,89
22,49
11,19
7,91
5,24
3,97
3,96
3,38
3,18
2,67
1,93
1,80
1,47
1,28
1,14
1,00
0,88
0,75
0,58
0,53
0,44
0,38
0,25
0,16
0,11
0,07
0,07
0,06
0,05
0,04
0,03
0,03
0,02
0,01
0,01
100,00

17895404
16722860
8340338
6148228
3871407
3149539
2985072
2679861
2394334
2079088
1317553
1386451
1012825
952301
839302
806163
644306
565666
435165
366741
307697
290663
172715
101049
81007
50822
44883
43352
28659
35911
18977
20559
13046
9577
4511
75816031

11

 
 
ANNEX 3

Crude oil -  International Quotations 

25 US$/barrel

l
e
r
r
a
b
/
$
S
U

38

37

36

35

34

33

32

31

30

29

28

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

v
n
a
j
-
1
0

v
n
a
j
-
2
0

v
n
a
j
-
3
0

v
n
a
j
-
4
0

v
n
a
j
-
5
0

v
n
a
j
-
6
0

v
n
a
j
-
7
0

v
n
a
j
-
8
0

v
n
a
j
-
9
0

v
n
a
j
-
0
1

v
n
a
j
-
1
1

v
n
a
j
-
2
1

v
n
a
j
-
3
1

v
n
a
j
-
4
1

v
n
a
j
-
5
1

v
n
a
j
-
6
1

v
n
a
j
-
7
1

v
n
a
j
-
8
1

v
n
a
j
-
9
1

v
n
a
j
-
0
2

v
n
a
j
-
1
2

v
n
a
j
-
2
2

v
n
a
j
-
3
2

v
n
a
j
-
4
2

v
n
a
j
-
5
2

v
n
a
j
-
6
2

v
n
a
j
-
7
2

v
n
a
j
-
8
2

v
n
a
j
-
9
2

v
n
a
j
-
0
3

v
n
a
j
-
1
3

r
v
é
f
-
1
0

r
v
é
f
-
2
0

r
v
é
f
-
3
0

r
v
é
f
-
4
0

r
v
é
f
-
5
0

r
v
é
f
-
6
0

r
v
é
f
-
7
0

r
v
é
f
-
8
0

r
v
é
f
-
9
0

r
v
é
f
-
0
1

r
v
é
f
-
1
1

r
v
é
f
-
2
1

r
v
é
f
-
3
1

r
v
é
f
-
4
1

r
v
é
f
-
5
1

r
v
é
f
-
6
1

r
v
é
f
-
7
1

r
v
é
f
-
8
1

r
v
é
f
-
9
1

r
v
é
f
-
0
2

r
v
é
f
-
1
2

r
v
é
f
-
2
2

r
v
é
f
-
3
2

r
v
é
f
-
4
2

r
v
é
f
-
5
2

r
v
é
f
-
6
2

r
v
é
f
-
7
2

r
v
é
f
-
8
2

s
r
a
m
-
1
0

s
r
a
m
-
2
0

s
r
a
m
-
3
0

s
r
a
m
-
4
0

s
r
a
m
-
5
0

s
r
a
m
-
6
0

s
r
a
m
-
7
0

s
r
a
m
-
8
0

s
r
a
m
-
9
0

s
r
a
m
-
0
1

s
r
a
m
-
1
1

s
r
a
m
-
2
1

s
r
a
m
-
3
1

s
r
a
m
-
4
1

s
r
a
m
-
5
1

s
r
a
m
-
6
1

s
r
a
m
-
7
1

IPEBrent

W estTexasIntermediate

Dubai

12

ANNEX 4

13