WRITTEN QUESTION P-0837/03 by Jean Lambert (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Israeli authorities' refusal to grant parole to Mordechai Vanunu.
Date: 2003-03-12
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU relations, Israel, State secret, barring of penalties by limitation, freedom of expression, political prisoner, prison system

7.11.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 268 E/153

(cid:1) of the eight CAAVs, Bari airport has no radar and in terms of movements is no busier than Genoa,
Catania, although busier, has no radar and provides only control-tower services, whilst Olbia is similar
to Genoa in terms of facilities and number of aircraft movements.

Would the Commission say why it was thought that such restructuring was called for?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(4 April 2003)

Normally CAAV airports (Centri Aeroportuali di Assistenza al Volo, Airport Centres for Flight Assistance)
are chosen on the basis of volume and complexity of traffic as well as of their geographical location.

It is true that according to these parameters, Genova is well equipped and enjoys more movements than
other airports that have retained the CAAV qualification, such as Olbia, Bari and Catania. However, these
airports serve wider areas due to their geographical location than Genova could have done as it is close to
other major centres like Milano and Torino.

Therefore, the determination by the Italian authorities not to retain Genova as a CAAV airport appears to
be reasonable. The Commission should point out that in any event there is no basis in law for it to
intervene in Member States’ decisions on these matters.

(2003/C 268 E/167)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0837/03

by Jean Lambert (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(12 March 2003)

Subject: Israeli authorities’ refusal to grant parole to Mordechai Vanunu

Mordechai Vanunu has been in jail
in Israel since 1986 for divulging details of his country’s nuclear
programme in 1986. There had been signs that Vanunu, who spent more than 11 years in solitary
confinement, might be granted his freedom in recognition of the harsh treatment that he has suffered.
However, in February a parole board decided that Vanunu will not be granted an early release, on the
grounds that he could still cause ‘grave damage’ by divulging what he knows.

This is a highly tenuous argument, especially as more recent disclosures about Israel’s nuclear programme
have prompted no official complaint. More importantly, the behaviour of the Israeli authorities with regard
to the abduction, the conduct of the judicial procedure, and the conditions in which Mordechai Vanunu is
being detained have been unacceptable. Vanunu should be released immediately.

Moreover, given current concern about weapons of mass destruction and the need for non-proliferation,
there are particularly strong grounds for his release.

In this light, does the Commission intend to take any action with regard to Vanunu’s case?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2003)

The Commission is aware of
the conditions in which Mordechai Vanunu has been held since his
conviction, and would certainly be glad to see them normalised and would welcome his early release. It
shares the view that, in terms of the original purpose of the measure, which was to prevent Mr Vanunu

C 268 E/154

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

7.11.2003

from publishing sensitive information relating Israeli security these are no longer grounds for him to be
kept in isolation. The Community regularly raises the issue of human rights in Israel in its dealings with
the Israeli authorities, as well as at official Association Committee and Association Council meetings. The
Commission has followed Mr Vanunu’s case particularly closely, and will continue to do so, in particular
through its Delegation in Tel Aviv.

(2003/C 268 E/168)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0838/03

by Raimon Obiols i Germà (PSE) to the Commission

Subject: Safety on the Madrid-Lleida high speed train link

(18 March 2003)

On 24 February 2003, the Ministry of Development opened Spain’s second high speed rail link, joining
Madrid and Lleida, with the first of a series of promotional trips, marred by a whole series of technical
problems which led to the sudden sacking of the project’s top technical manager and the immediate
suspension of the programme of events designed to introduce the service to the public.

With regard to the problems detected particularly alarming are reports confirming that one of these trips
was made when neither the security nor the control systems for the new lines had been completed and
tested. Workmen were posted along various sections of the line using mobile phones to check the trains as
they passed, since the signalling and safety systems, based on the European Rail Traffic Management
System, had not yet been tested and passed. It has also been reported that the trains on the line, which
should be travelling at over 350 km an hour, were able to travel only at 200 km an hour (cid:1) and even so,
there were problems with vibration and defective air pressure.

All of this has led to a perfectly understandable concern that there may be major defects endangering the
safety of potential users of a very necessary transport link, co-funded with European money, whose
completion and entry into service are already behind schedule.

What control, monitoring and assessment measures can the Commission apply to guarantee maximum
safety in the building and entry into service of the Madrid (cid:1) Lleida high speed rail link?

Does the Commission believe that all the signalling system and traffic control mechanisms on the line are
ready for use?

How does the Commission view the fact that the Spanish Ministry of Development can decide on and
carry out promotional trips under the conditions indicated above, with signalling and safety mechanisms
not yet guaranteed as fully operational, and thus putting passengers at risk?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2003)

The past track record of high-speed railway projects in Europe shows that in their huge majority these
have been affected by technical, operational and/or logistic constrains. These often have an input to their
planned start date for commercial service. This fact is rooted in the complexity of the task as well as the
need to manage a myriad of contractors with quite different specialities (civil, electrical, signalling,
software).

This manifold complexity always creates teething problems that are expectable and that require a fine-
tuning of the whole installation (track, train and other ancillary equipment) once this is deemed complete,
as a necessary condition for its opening-up to commercial exploitation. Based on past experience such a
tuning requires field-testing to iron-out not only the technical but also the operational processes that
underpin the commercial operation. It is up to the national safety authorities, and not to the Commission
to ascertain that such principles are fully adhered to.