Special Report No 3/2003 on the invalidity pensions scheme oft he European institutions, together with the institutions’ replies
Date: 2003-02-27
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU institution, audit, cost analysis, disability insurance, report, social security

7.5.2003

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Official Journal of the European Union

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I

(Information)

COURT OF AUDITORS

SPECIAL REPORT No 3/2003

on the invalidity pensions scheme of the European institutions, together with the institutions’
replies

(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, of the EC treaty)

(2003/C 109/01)

CONTENTS

Paragraph

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AUDIT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE INVALIDITY PENSIONS SCHEME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Statistics and analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE COURT’S PREVIOUS WORK AND THE FOLLOW-UP TO THIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Court’s previous work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations of the ‘Caston Report’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Action taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ABSENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN RESPECT OF ABSENCES
DUE TO ILLNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Absence rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General policy in the institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Roles and coordination of the various parties concerned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shortcomings specific to certain institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical checks on absences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING INVALIDITY PENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Quantifying and monitoring the cost of the scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The assessment of invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Monitoring, analysis of causes and corrective action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early detection, medical and administrative synergy and alternative measures . . . . . . . . . .

I-VII

1-2

3-14

3-9

10-14

15-19

15

16-19

16-17

18-19

20-40

20

21

22-40

22-23

24-29

30-40

41-73

41-43

44-47

48-52

53-55

3

4

4

4

5

9

9

9

9

9

10

10

10

10

10

11

11

13

13

14

15

16

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Paragraph

Page

Opening the invalidity procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Invalidity Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Basis of opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decision on invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical examinations after retirement on an invalidity pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Draft reform of the scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56-57

58-64

58-62

63-64

65

66-69

70-73

74-79

80-82

The institutions’ replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

16

16

17

17

18

18

19

20

21

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SUMMARY

I.
The Court carried out an audit of the Invalidity Pensions Scheme in order to assess the cost of invalidity
pensions, identify potential savings, determine whether invalidity pensions are only granted where a real inval-
idity has been duly recognised, and evaluate whether the institutions have set up the management systems
required for adequate monitoring of, and effective control over, the operation of the scheme.

There are approximately 200 invalidity pensions awarded each year representing a total annual net
II.
actuarial cost of the order of 74 million euro, with recent increases in annual expenditure being attributable,
in the main, to increases in the numbers and age of the workforce at the institutions. However, the modifica-
tions to the Staff Regulations as part of the current reform package are likely to reduce the cost of invalidity
pensions.

The Court’s audit revealed a complex picture. On the one hand the rate of invalidity retirement has
III.
remained stable over the last 15 years; and, in the opinion of the Court’s medical adviser, invalidity pensions
are awarded in a justified way. On the other hand, retirement on invalidity grounds is more common in some
grades than normal retirement, and there is evidence that frustration in the working environment affects some
staff who are eventually retired on ill-health grounds.

Shortcomings were found concerning the overall policy and management systems for absences due to
IV.
illness, characterised by a medical rather than administrative approach, a lack of clarity and coordination
between the various departments involved, a lack of resources, unsuitable IT management tools, and obstacles
resulting from certain provisions of the Staff Regulations.

The result is frequent and costly delays in the opening and progress of the invalidity procedure with
V.
the length of the process itself associated with deteriorating health and consequently with extremely low rates
of reinstatement, especially in the 50 % of cases involving psychological disorders.

VI.
The audit found scope for financial savings through the adoption of adequate administrative measures
for prevention and early treatment, particularly in cases where the grounds for invalidity are psychological.
Such measures should include the development by institutions of an overall policy on absences due to illness,
clearer allocation of roles and responsibilities between the medical services and personnel departments, earlier
and more intensive medical examinations, implementing management information systems capable of iden-
tifying patterns of absence and risk factors associated with eventual invalidity, and modifications to the Staff
Regulations.

In particular, modifications to the provisions of the Staff Regulations should be considered to deal
VII.
with situations where a member of staff impedes or deliberately evades a medical examination, to provide for
an easier and swifter appeals and arbitration mechanism, to lower the threshold period of sick leave required
before the institution can start the invalidity procedure, to lay down conditions under which medical examina-
tions after retirement should be performed, and to modify the composition of the Invalidity Committee to cre-
ate a more permanent and inter-institutional structure.

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AUDIT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

five Member states (4), reflecting a wide range of administrative
traditions present within the Community, as well as a number of
international organisations (5), which face challenges similar to
those of the institutions. Information was gathered on the basis
of interviews with representatives of these Members States and
organisations.

1.
The general objective of the audit was to evaluate the Euro-
pean institutions’ policies and practices in respect of the Invalid-
ity Pensions Scheme. The audit aimed to assess the cost of invalid-
ity pensions, to identify potential savings and to ascertain whether
the institutions have set up the management systems required for
adequate monitoring of, and effective control over, the operation
of the scheme. One of the audit specific objectives was to ensure
that invalidity pensions are only granted where a real invalidity
has been duly recognised.

THE INVALIDITY PENSIONS SCHEME

Rules

The audit consisted of a series of analytical procedures
2.
designed to reveal any risks of abuse of the scheme. It included an
evaluation of the internal control system relating to absences due
to illness, focusing on the issues connected with the medical and
administrative monitoring of long-term absences due to illness,
which usually culminate in retirement on an invalidity pension.
Substantive tests were carried out on a sample of administrative
files on invalidity pensions. The files were selected randomly, but
partly also within the framework of an approach which focused
on a section of the population that presented possible higher risks
of being granted invalidity pensions for which there is no justifi-
cation (1). This resulted in the selection, in the great majority of
cases, of files connected with psychological illnesses, which are
assumed to be more difficult to evaluate. A questionnaire was also
sent by the Court to a sample of beneficiaries concerned (2). In
addition, the Court commissioned a medical expert (hereinafter
referred to as the Court’s medical expert) to carry out an examin-
ation of half the medical files concerned in order to establish
whether the opinions of the Invalidity Committees were based on
sufficient and adequate work and whether retirement due to inval-
idity appeared justified on medical grounds (3). The audit work
focused on the invalidity pensions awarded in the period from
1996 to 2000. For comparison purposes, the Court has visited

3.
The legal basis for invalidity pensions for officials and tem-
porary members of staff is to be found in Article 78 of the Staff
Regulations of officials of the European Communities and in
Article 33 of the Conditions of employment of other servants of
the European Communities (6). Officials or other members of staff
are entitled to an invalidity pension in the case of total permanent
invalidity preventing them from performing the duties corre-
sponding to a post in their career bracket.

The invalidity retirement procedure is initiated either by
4.
the institution, when a member of staff has been absent due to ill-
ness for more than 12 months in any three-year period
(Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations), or at the request of the
member of staff concerned.

5.
An Invalidity Committee is set up (Article 9(1)(b) of the
Staff Regulations). It is called upon to decide whether the member
of staff is suffering from invalidity within the meaning of the Staff
Regulations (Article 13 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations).
The Committee consists of three doctors (Article 7 of Annex II to
the Staff Regulations):

(a)

one appointed by the institution;

(b) one appointed by the member of staff;

(1) The risk factors taken into account were the following:

— no recognition of serious illness by the Joint Sickness Insurance

Scheme (JSIS),
— no major surgery,
— low level of reimbursements for medical expenses by the JSIS

during the two years preceding invalidity retirement,

— staff who had been the subject of an administrative enquiry, dis-
ciplinary proceedings, or proceedings for incompetence, or who
had been marked ‘inadequate’ in their staff reports,
— the awarding of the minimum subsistence amount,
— cases where the retirement pension which would have been
obtained at the age of 60 is less than the maximum rate.

(2) The rate of response to this questionnaire was 57 %.
(3) The Court’s findings have been presented in such a way that the rules
governing medical confidentiality have not been infringed, the medi-
cal expert’s report contains no information which would enable a
connection to be made between an identifiable person and a patho-
logical condition.

(c)

one appointed by agreement between the first two doctors.

6.
If no agreement can be reached on the choice of the third
doctor, he/she is automatically appointed by the President of the
Court of Justice. The Invalidity Committee delivers a unanimous
opinion or, failing this, a majority opinion.

(4) Austria, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden.
(5) European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), International Labour Office (ILO) and
World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Joint Staff Pen-
sion Fund (UNO).

(6) Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (OJ L 56,
4.3.1968, p. 1) as last amended by Council Regulation (EC, ECSC,
Euratom) No 1986/2001 (OJ L 271, 12.10.2001, p. 1).

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If the Invalidity Committee confirms the member of staff’s
7.
invalidity, he is automatically retired on the last day of the month
in which the Appointing Authority recognises his permanent
incapacity to perform his duties (Article 53 of the Staff Regula-
tions). The right to receive payment of invalidity pension has
effect from the first day of the calendar month following the deci-
sion on his retirement (Article 14 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regu-
lations).

8.
While a former member of staff drawing invalidity pen-
sion is less than 60 years of age, the institution may have him
medically examined periodically to ascertain that he still satisfies
the requirements for payment of the pension (Article 15 of Annex
VIII to the Staff Regulations). Where a former member of staff
who has been drawing invalidity pension is reinstated, the time
during which he received invalidity pension is included for the
purpose of calculating his retirement pension, without payment
by him of arrears of contributions (Article 16 of Annex VIII to the
Staff Regulations).

grade if he had still been in the service at the time of payment of
the pension (which means that a member of staff who has retired
due to invalidity has the benefit of increases in step within his
grade). The invalidity pension may not be less than 120 % of the
minimum subsistence figure, an amount equivalent to the basic
salary of an official in grade D 4, step one (Article 78 of the Staff
Regulations). This implies that from grade D 4 up to grade C 2
fifth step, grade C 1 second step, grade B 5 and grade B 4 second
step, the maximum amount of a retirement pension (70 % of the
basic salary) is less than the minimum amount of an invalidity
pension. According to the proposal for amended Staff Regula-
tions submitted by the Commission to the Council in April 2002,
the minimum amount of the invalidity pension will be reduced to
100 % of the minimum subsistence figure.

Statistics and analyses

9.
The invalidity pension is equal to the retirement pension
to which the member of staff would have been entitled at 65 years
of age if he had remained in the service until that age. Where the
invalidity arises from an accident in the course of or in connec-
tion with the performance of his duties, from an occupational dis-
ease, from a public-spirited act or from risking his life to save
another human being, the invalidity pension is 70 % of his basic
salary. The invalidity pension is calculated by reference to the
basic salary that the member of staff would have received in his

10.
Appropriations intended to cover the invalidity pensions
of officials and other staff of all the institutions are entered under
the Commission’s budget item A-1 9 0 1. Table 1 retraces budget-
ary expenditure during the period from 1985 to 2000. In 2000
the payments made amounted to 123,7 million euro. At constant
prices, annual expenditure has almost tripled during this period.
As this table and Diagram 1 show, this expenditure has increased
considerably less than expenditure on retirement pensions, which
has increased almost sixfold.

Budgetary expenditure on invalidity pensions and retirement pensions for all the institutions

Table 1

Invalidity pensions
(Item A-1 9 0 1, ex 1 2 0 1 and 1 1 2 1)

Retirement pensions
(Item A-1 9 0 0, ex 1 2 0 0 and 1 1 2 0)

In Mio ECU/EUR million
(current prices)

Index: 1985 = 100
(constant prices)

In Mio ECU/EUR million
(current prices)

Indice 1985 = 100
(constant prices)

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

26,1
31,4
39,3
44,6
49,6
57,3
64,5
70,6
79,0
83,5
91,1
94,2
97,8
104,9
114,3
123,7

100,0
116,0
140,6
154,0
162,7
178,0
190,6
200,3
216,7
222,0
234,9
237,1
241,2
254,3
273,8
290,4

35,3
41,7
49,3
56,0
63,9
79,7
99,5
119,9
159,8
171,1
198,8
218,7
236,5
254,2
282,8
319,1

Source: Revenue and expenditure account, Volume II, Section III, Commission.

100,0
113,9
130,3
142,9
155,0
182,9
217,1
251,2
323,7
336,3
378,8
406,6
431,0
455,6
500,5
553,5

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Comparison of expenditure on retirement pensions and invalidity pensions between 1985 and 2000 (payments
in constant prices)

Diagram 1

Over the 1985 to 2001 period, the number of retirements
11.
due to invalidity averages 166 per year (see Table 2). In 1986 and
1987 the figure is markedly higher by comparison with the pre-
ceding period. The number fell sharply in 1988, followed by mod-

erate fluctuations until 1997. The threshold of 200 retirements
per year is passed in 1998, with a strong upward trend thereafter.
In 2001, 226 persons retired due to invalidity, that is 0,78 % of
the staff employed at 31 December 2000. Diagram 2 shows (at

Number of retirements due to invalidity during the 1985-2001 period

Table 2

Year

Commission

Parliament

Council

Court of
Justice

Court of
Auditors

ESC/COR

Agencies

Total

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001
2001 as % of staff (1)

Total

Average 1985 to 2001

108

166

146

130

102

108

105

89

99

109

113

120

107

140

151

153

157

19

13

22

12

24

18

13

17

21

17

19

13

18

27

19

23

30

8

9

13

16

9

11

9

12

11

8

12

7

15

19

17

14

18

2

4

4

2

1

2

2

1

2

5

3

2

4

1

7

10

6

1

2

2

3

1

2

3

3

6

0

2

2

3

7

3

7

6

0

4

3

5

0

1

1

2

1

2

2

7

5

4

4

5

7

0

0

3

0

0

1

1

2

0

1

2

2

5

4

4

1

2

138

198

193

168

137

143

134

126

140

142

153

153

157

202

205

213

226

0,78

0,78

0,71

0,61

1,15

0,92

0,15

0,78

1 946

124

295

19

190

12

52

3

47

3

46

3

26

2

2 602

166

(1) Officials and temporary agents as at 31 December 2000.
Note: The figures are based on the date on which the invalidity retirement decision took effect.
Source: The Commission’s Sysper database.

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Diagram 2

Evolution of the invalidity rate (1) at the Commission

Years

1985
1990
1995
2000
2001

Percentage

0,95
0,77
0,67
0,80
0,78

(1) The invalidity rate can be defined as the number of agents retiring on medical grounds each year divided by the total number of Commission officials and temporary staff.

Source: The Commission’s Sysper database.

intervals of five years) that the invalidity rate at the Commis-
sion (1) fell between 1985 and 1995, but had risen again by 2000,
with a slight decrease in 2001.

12.
The variation in retirements due to invalidity over the
whole period does not, in itself, reflect an abnormal trend, since,
as the analysis carried out in respect of the Commission shows, it

seems to be mainly attributable to the increase in the number of
staff and age of staff. As Table 3 shows, during the period from
1970 to 2000 the number of staff tripled and the average age of
staff rose from approximately 40 to 45. While the percentage of
staff aged over 50 was only 13,7 % in 1970, it was 28,6 % in
2000. As Table 4 reveals, the rate of exposure to the risk of inval-
idity increases significantly for staff aged over 50, who account
for more than three quarters of retirements due to invalidity.

Table 3

Changes in the age structure of the Commission’s staff

< 25

25-30

30-35

35-40

40-45

45-50

50-55

55-60

60-65

Total

Average age

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

7,5 % 4,7 %

3,4 % 11,3 % 19,2 % 19,0 % 17,9 % 15,5 %
1,5 % 100 % 6 162
3,8 % 13,8 % 16,2 % 18,6 % 16,1 % 14,0 % 10,6 % 4,7 % 2,2 % 100 % 8 524
9,7 % 18,0 % 16,1 % 16,7 % 13,9 % 11,8 % 8,5 % 3,2 % 100 % 9 751
2,1 %
8,5 % 16,6 % 19,9 % 14,6 % 14,2 % 11,3 % 8,6 % 4,8 % 100 % 11 406
1,4 %
6,9 % 15,8 % 20,6 % 19,4 % 13,8 % 11,9 %
0,5 %
7,4 % 3,7 % 100 % 14 113
5,6 % 13,7 % 19,9 % 19,4 % 16,9 % 11,4 % 8,9 % 3,9 % 100 % 16 840
0,4 %
2,2 % 11,7 % 18,7 % 20,6 % 18,2 % 15,1 % 9,2 % 4,3 % 100 % 19 097
0,0 %

39,79
40,02
41,84
42,40
42,53
43,36
44,74

Source: The Commission’s Sysper database.

(1) Commission staff account for approximately 75 % of the beneficiaries

of invalidity pensions.

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Retirements due to invalidity by age group (%) 1968 to 2000

Table 4

< 25

25 to
30

30 to
35

35 to
40

40 to
45

45 to
50

50 to
55

55 to
60

60 to
65

1968 to 1972
1973 to 1977
1978 to 1982
1983 to 1987
1988 to 1992
1993 to 1997
1998 to 2000

0,30 % 0,76 % 2,34 %
0,00 % 0,06 % 0,03 % 0,07 % 0,09 % 0,19 %
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,07 % 0,11 %
0,40 % 1,00 % 1,06 %
0,03 % 0,18 %
0,00 % 0,02 % 0,09 % 0,31 % 0,37 % 0,77 % 1,41 % 4,23 % 6,96 %
0,00 % 0,02 % 0,08 % 0,25 % 0,79 % 1,00 % 1,87 % 4,05 % 6,03 %
0,19 %
0,26 % 0,06 % 0,13 %
0,41 % 0,68 % 1,33 % 3,23 % 3,18 %
0,20 % 0,34 % 0,53 % 0,94 % 2,43 % 2,96 %
0,00 % 0,02 % 0,10 %
0,30 % 0,59 % 1,27 % 2,82 % 2,74 %
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,09 % 0,14 %

Total

0,17 %
0,18 %
0,99 %
1,17 %
0,76 %
0,65 %
0,77 %

Average

0,04 % 0,03 % 0,09 % 0,18 %

0,33 % 0,56 % 1,07 % 2,65 % 3,61 %

0,67 %

Source: The Commission’s Sysper database.

13.
As the Court has already highlighted in its Annual Report
concerning the financial year 1987, the majority of those retired
due to invalidity are in categories C and D, who have the charac-
teristics of, firstly, retiring more frequently because of invalidity
than staff in other categories and, secondly, of leaving more fre-

quently on an invalidity pension than on a retirement pension. In
fact, as Table 5 shows, at the end of 2000 categories C and D
accounted for 62 % of beneficiaries of invalidity pensions but
only 21,7 % of beneficiaries of retirement pensions. Likewise,
pensions paid in conformity with the provisions concerning the

Distribution by grade of the number of beneficiaries of invalidity pensions and retirement pensions
between the end of 1987 and the end of 2000

Table 5

Retirement pensions

Invalidity pensions

Of which, invalidity pensions paid to staff > 65

1987

2000

1987

2000

1987

2000

A 1
A 2
A 3
A/LA 5/4
A/LA 7/6
A/LA 8

Total A

B 1
B 3/2
B 5/4

Total B

C 1
C 3/2
C 5/4

Total C

D 1
D 3/2
D 4

Total D

67
133
225
373
29
0

134
278
654
1 461
40
0

2
7
47
197
36
0

3
12
69
362
93
1

827

55,6 %

2 567

50,1 %

289

20,3 %

540

18,7 %

211
129
12

1 051
370
21

129
130
41

229
259
69

352

23,7 %

1 442

28,2 %

300

21,1 %

557

19,3 %

250
336
46

628
624
128

2
4
10
44
5
0

65

42
28
9

79

63
58
8

2
4
47
185
15
0

19,9 %

253

22,2 %

24,2 %

136
119
21

276

242
177
17

24,2 %

19,3 %

632

44,4 %

1 380

47,9 %

129

39,6 %

436

38,2 %

125
75
1

201

2,4 %

255
150
1

14,1 %

406

14,1 %

41
12
0

53

16,3 %

116
59
0

175

15,4 %

161
78
5

244

16,4 %

51
13
0

64

4,3 %

851
132
8

991

106
16
0

122

Grand total

1 487

100 %

5 122

100 %

1 422

100 %

2 883

100 %

326

100 %

1 140

100 %

Note: The number of beneficiaries = the number of staff retired – deaths – staff returning to work.
Source: The Commission’s Sysper database.

7.5.2003

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Official Journal of the European Union

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minimum subsistence amount still account for approximately one
third of all invalidity pensions and are still paid practically in full,
i.e. at the rate of 97 %, to category C and D staff (1). Grades C 3 to
D 4 receive this systematically.

Follow-up

Recommendations of the ‘Caston Report’

14.
Approximately two thirds of the Invalidity Committees
are convened on the initiative of the institution when the member
of staff has accumulated more than 12 months’ absence due to ill-
ness over a three-year period, one-third at the member of staff’s
request. In more than 90 % of cases the procedure ends in retire-
ment due to invalidity. Psychological disorders account for approxi-
mately half the medical causes of invalidity. The other main causes
are osteo-muscular (approximately 20 %) and cardio-vascular
(approximately 15 %) ailments.

Psychological illnesses are also the major cause of invalidity (30 % to
60 % of the cases of invalidity) in national administrations and inter-
national organisations (2).

THE COURT’S PREVIOUS WORK AND THE FOLLOW-UP TO
THIS

The Court’s previous work

15.
In its Annual Report concerning the financial year
1987 (3), the Court highlighted a number of facts that might give
rise to concern that the system, which is far from restrictive and
predominantly social in nature, may have certain adverse effects,
for example:

(a)

a significant increase in retirements due to invalidity over the
period 1983 to 1987;

(b)

(1)

a high incidence of invalidity pensions for category C and D
staff, for the vast majority of whom the invalidity pension is
higher than a retirement pension at the maximum rate of
70 % (application of the minimum subsistence figure rule
laid down in the Staff Regulations).

In the case of the A/LA and B categories, the minimum subsistence
figure rule is only applied in rare cases where invalidity occurs after a
relatively short period of employment.

(2) 30 % for Germany in 2000 (Daten und Schlussfolgerungen zum
Zweiten Versorgungsbericht der Bundesregierung, Bundesministe-
rium des Innern, 12 September 2001), 60 % in 1998 to 1999 for
UNO according to data obtained during the visit at the United Nations
Joint Staff Pension Fund.
(3) OJ C 316, 12.12.1988, p. 151.

16.
In response to the Court’s work and at the request of the
heads of administration, an ad hoc interinstitutional committee
was set up and submitted its report in 1989 (dubbed the Caston
Report after the chairman of the committee) to the Committee on
Budgetary Control. The report recommended that a combination
of amendments to the Staff Regulations and administrative mea-
sures should be adopted to prevent abuse of the system and to
reduce the financial attractiveness of invalidity pensions. The
report also recommended early detection and treatment by appro-
priate measures of problems relating to career, mobility, relations
with hierarchical superiors or conduct that are liable to aggravate
a member of staff’s health problems.

17.
The interinstitutional committee noted a lack of valid sta-
tistics and checks with respect to absences due to illness. It sug-
gested improving the coordination of medical and administrative
measures in order to identify, at an early stage, persons who might
retire due to invalidity. It also emphasised that, in some cases,
there was a need for swift administrative measures in order to
avoid situations where, at the end of the day, an invalidity pen-
sion is the easy solution.

Action taken

The report was warmly welcomed by the heads of admin-
18.
istration, who forwarded the conclusions of the report to the
Commission so that it could take the necessary action with regard
to measures which involve a reform of the Staff Regulations, with
the administration of each institution having to take the appropri-
ate administrative measures.

19.
The Commission drew up proposals for amendments to
the Staff Regulations in respect of invalidity pensions. These met
with the opposition of the trade union and staff organisations. In
1991, the Commission withdrew the proposals on the grounds
that it had come to the conclusion that the arrangements for
invalidity pensions as provided for in the Staff Regulations were
sound and that it would be more appropriate to intensify checks
and penalise any abuses that were detected. As part of the cur-
rent proposal for a reform of the Staff Regulations, i.e. ten years
later, the Commission is proposing a series of amendments to the
Staff Regulations that are very similar to those envisaged at that
time and then withdrawn. Concerning the administrative mea-
sures, as explained in this report, these have not been taken or
remain broadly insufficient, and at present there are no plans to
take any significant action in this area.

C 109/10

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Official Journal of the European Union

7.5.2003

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ABSENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN
RESPECT OF ABSENCES DUE TO ILLNESS

Roles and coordination of the various parties concerned

Absence rates

General observations

Absences have a considerable financial impact. Accord-
20.
ing to the information submitted to Parliament by the Commis-
sion in July 2001 (1), the rate of absence calculated for 2000 var-
ies, depending on the institution, between 3,3 % and 5,9 % of
theoretical working time (2), which equates to about seven to 12
working days per person a year (3).

22.
Absence management calls on the services of three par-
ties: the employing department, the personnel department and
the medical service. The effectiveness of the system is undermined
by an unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities and the lack
of or delays in the exchange of the necessary information. While
roles and responsibilities are generally clear as regards reporting
absence and maintaining absence records, it is not clear:

Average absence rates in some national administrations or interna-
tional organisations showed a similar picture, although different cal-
culation methods may have been applied.

(a) who is supposed to be the first point of contact with the
member of staff during his absence, and what frequency and
method of contact are appropriate;

General policy in the institutions

(b) who is responsible for monitoring absence rates both on an
individual basis and across the whole institution, and accord-
ing to which benchmarks;

21.
Although certain internal rules and procedures have been
put in place, no institution has adopted an overall policy, with
clear objectives and the range of measures required to deal with
all aspects of absences in an appropriate manner, i.e. fairly, con-
structively, but also firmly. This does not allow the institutions to
ensure:

(a)

that support is provided, when needed, to staff who are
unable to attend work for long periods;

(b)

that due efforts are made to maximise attendance for the
good of the staff and their employing department; and

(c) who is responsible for identifying patterns of absence which

cause concern and for taking the necessary action;

(d) who is responsible for deciding whether to carry out medi-

cal checks, and in what circumstances;

(e) who is responsible for providing any additional support
needed by the member of staff, for example in diagnosing
his health problems in good time and ascertaining their con-
nection with, and repercussions on, his working environ-
ment, and for taking measures to help his rehabilitation;

(c)

that attendance is not adversely affected by inappropriate
assignments of duties or inappropriate working conditions.

(f) whether return-to-work interviews should be conducted after
the end of the absence, in what circumstances, by whom,
how and for what purpose.

As set out below, particular shortcomings and weaknesses were
observed concerning the role of management, the coordination of
the various administrative and medical departments and the
organisation of checks.

(1) SEC (2001) 1128 final (report attached to proposal No 17/2001 for a
transfer of appropriations to cover expenditure for auxiliary staff).
(2) Absence due to illness is entered in calendar days. As a general rule, it
is measured over a reference period of one calendar year and is
expressed as an average percentage rate of absence for the whole
population for the year (number of days of absence divided by 365).

(3) On the basis of 205 working days a year.

23.
The lack of clarity concerning the allocation of respon-
sibilities in respect of the decision to conduct medical checks on
absences and their primary purpose may explain why, at the
Commission, few requests for checks come from the personnel
department or the employing departments, as they consider that
this is the responsibility of the medical service. The medical ser-
vice interprets this low number of requests for checks from the
other departments as evidence of their limited interest in what is
mainly a management responsibility. On this particular issue,
institutions should consider following the good practice of the
Court of Justice and the Council, which have set up a joint body
comprising members of the personnel departments and the medi-
cal services, with regular meetings to examine absences and take
decisions on checks.

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Shortcomings specific to certain institutions

directorates-general and the personnel directorate-general do not
have reciprocal access to their respective databases, the exchange
of information is carried out in hard copy format.

24.
In 1999 the Commission began the process of decentralis-
ing leave and absence management in its directorates-general.
This reform was carried out under conditions which were a source
of major weaknesses in the control systems and which would
appear to have led to a certain loss of central control on the part
of the institution, as revealed by the difficulties encountered by
the Commission, in the context of the Court’s audit, in produc-
ing data and information which are nevertheless essential to
everyday management.

25.
The directorates-general (1) did not call for this decen-
tralisation, which they perceived as an additional administrative
burden rather than as a tool for the management of their human
resources. The sharing of responsibilities with the personnel and
administration directorate-general (DG ADMIN) is also confused,
as it is not clear if the latter merely has an advisory and support
role or if it must play a guiding, coordinating and supervisory
role. Likewise, every directorate-general has appointed a human
resources manager and a leave manager but it is not clear whether
their duties with regard to absences should go beyond the purely
administrative tasks, such as recording absences, to which they
appear to limit themselves.

26.
Although the Commission previously had a centralised
database which provided it with general information on all its
staff, decentralisation has been accompanied by a fragmentation
of this system with the installation of a separate database, called
SIC Congés, for each directorate-general. This SIC Congés applica-
tion offers relatively few functions for performing data analysis
and producing data and reports, and those which are available are
not always suitable for monitoring the application of the provi-
sions of the Staff Regulations. The obligation for each directorate-
general to develop its own data analysis programmes, which, of
necessity, are similar to those of the other directorates-general
seems inappropriate.

29.
In the Council the employing directorates-general do not
have access, even for consultation, to the database of the person-
nel and administration directorate-general, which includes the
personnel department and the medical service. The directorates-
general notify absences on paper, causing delays in the recording
of absences in the database and, as a consequence, in the carry-
ing out of any checks required. The employing directorates-
general receive extracts of the absence records from the person-
nel and administration directorate-general but are not sent the
reports, analyses and warning lists which the latter produces on a
regular or occasional basis, and are not in a position to produce
this type of data themselves.

Medical checks on absences

30.
Apart from difficulties already mentioned above, medi-
cal checks on absences are complicated by a number of short-
comings and constraints, which have a considerable impact on
their effectiveness.

Multiple duties of the institutions’ medical officers

The medical officers of the institutions assume a wide

31.
range of responsibilities. Their principal tasks cover:

(a)

occupational health, pre-recruitment examinations, annual
check-ups, questions concerning health and safety;

In addition, the Commission’s medical service does not
27.
have access to the SIC Congés application and has developed its
own database, called Sermed, which, unlike SIC Congés, does not
include absences due to illness which are not supported by a
medical certificate. As a rule, the medical service is not informed
of these absences. This duplication is a source of delays in for-
warding information and difficulties in reconciling information.

(b) medical control, including checks on absences;

(c) medical opinions, serving on invalidity committees;

28.
At Parliament there is an unnecessary duplication of the
databases for leave and absences as both the employing
directorates-general and the personnel directorate-general (per-
sonnel department and medical service) maintain their own data-
bases which contain broadly the same information. There is no
link between the two databases, and since the employing

(d) medical issues provided for in the Staff Regulations, opin-
ions on the medical aspects of applications for entitlements
(e.g. doubling of family allowance for families with a handi-
capped child, etc.);

(1)

Interviews were carried out in three DGs.

(e)

emergencies, and treatments and opinions requested by
members of staff.

C 109/12

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Official Journal of the European Union

7.5.2003

According to the rules concerning professional conduct
32.
set out in the International Labour Organisation’s Convention
No 161 (1) and in the national laws (2) adopted to implement
Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduc-
tion of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and
health of workers at work (3), the duties of a medical officer are
incompatible with those of an examining doctor. Contrary to
these provisions, the medical officers of the Court of Justice and
the Court of Auditors combined, during the audited period, the
duties of occupational medical officer and examining doctor. At
Parliament the medical checks in relation to absences are carried
out by examining doctors employed for this purpose under the
supervision of in-house doctors. These situations raise problems
of professional ethics for the doctors (4) and are a source of confu-
sion with regard to perceptions of their roles in any specific situ-
ation, both for the institution and its staff.

Although the Court has only been able to obtain incom-
34.
plete information on this subject, it seems that, for these reasons,
checks are relatively infrequent. For instance, at the Commission
the checking rate is approximately 6 % of absences; figures allow-
ing to establish the intensity of checks could not be obtained from
Parliament; at the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors
checks are rare; at the Council they are somewhat more frequent.
Generally speaking, checks focus on repeated prolonged absences
and absences which represent a particularly high risk of abuse.
The fact that the system does not provide for earlier and more
intensive checks means that the system provides neither the nec-
essary disincentives (6) nor timely support to those members of
staff who are genuinely in need (see paragraphs 53 and 54).

Intensity of checks

Deadlines for the submission of medical certificates and for carrying out
checks

33.
The resources available to the institutions in terms of
examining doctors are limited. For instance, for its staff in Brus-
sels (approximately 16 000) the Commission had, until recently,
only two part-time auxiliary examining doctors, whose workload
was so heavy that it precluded virtually any possibility of home
calls (5) and early or unannounced checks. The Council has one
part-time examining doctor; at the Court of Justice and the Court
of Auditors, the medical officer, who is employed on a part-time
basis must carry out these checks himself, as far as possible, in
addition to all his other tasks.

35.
The Staff Regulations (Article 59(1)) allow a total of 12
days per year for absences due to illnesses lasting no longer than
three days and provide that a certificate must be produced for the
fourth and subsequent days of absence. However, the Staff Regu-
lations do not set a deadline for submission of the medical cer-
tificate. Each institution has adopted implementing provisions or
practices which vary slightly from those of the others (7). These
rules, which in some cases lack clarity, are applied, in practice,
with considerable flexibility and this is likely to have a bearing on
the effectiveness of controls on absence, in particular in respect
of absences of shorter duration.

(2)

(1) Article 15 of ILO Convention No 161 provides, ‘Occupational health
services shall be informed of occurrences of ill health amongst work-
ers and absence from work for health reasons, in order to be able to
identify whether there is any relation between the reasons for ill health
or absence and any health hazards which may be present at the work-
place. Personnel providing occupational health services shall not be
required by the employer to verify the reasons for absence from work.’
In the case of Luxembourg, Article 12 of the law of 17 June 1994
concerning occupational health services provides that ‘le médecin du
travail exerce sa fonction en toute indépendance professionnelle par
rapport à son employeur et aux travailleurs. En aucun cas le médecin
ne peut vérifier le bien-fondé des congés de maladie. La fonction de
médecin du travail est incompatible avec l’exercice libéral de la profes-
sion.’ (The medical officer shall exercise his duties in complete independence
of his employer and the staff. Under no circumstances may the doctor verify
the legitimacy of absences from work due to illness. The duties of the medical
officer are incompatible with external professional activities. (ECA transla-
tion)).

(3) OJ L 183, 29.6.1989.
(4) For these reasons, moreover, Parliament’s medical officer in Luxem-
bourg recently decided to give up all verifications of the legitimacy of
absences from work due to illness.

(5) Since the end of 2000 the Commission has had recourse to an exter-

The time allowed for submission of the medical certifi-
36.
cate, when added to the time required by the internal procedures
for transmitting the information between the various depart-
ments, means that, as a rule, no checks can possibly be scheduled
in the two weeks following the first day of absence. The checks
are therefore carried out late sometimes, which is normal practice
at the Council, even after the member of staff has returned to
work. This has repercussions on their effectiveness in cases of
absences suspected not to be genuine, as it is then no longer

(6)

In addition, although this has no impact in the context of invalidity,
it must be noted that, to a large extent, short periods of absence
escape controls, including those absences of less than three days which
are not supported by a medical certifcate. This presents a risk of abuse
of a deadline which might be interpreted by some as a right to 12
days’ additional annual leave.

(7) The periods laid down in these internal rules are as follows:
— Commission: no precise period (as soon as possible),
— Parliament: on the fourth calendar day at the latest,
— Council: on the sixth working day at the latest,
— Court of Justice: no written rules; generally, one week at the lat-

est,

— Court of Auditors: no precise period; generally, at the latest when

nal company for conducting checks at home.

resuming work.

7.5.2003

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possible to call into question the legitimacy of the absence, even
in the most doubtful of cases. In its established case-law, the Court
of First Instance (1) has prohibited the calling into question of the
validity of a medical certificate covering the period which pre-
dates the check.

In France, pursuant to provisions applicable to officials of the State (3),
if the person concerned is unable to justify not undergoing the medi-
cal examination, the administration may withhold the payment of his
salary, declare the absence unauthorised and launch a procedure ‘for
desertion of post’ which may lead to his removal from his post.

The rights of the institution to demand a medical examination

37.
The Staff Regulations stipulate (Article 59(1)) that a mem-
ber of staff absent due to illness may be required to undergo a
medical examination arranged by the institution and (Article 60)
that, without prejudice to any disciplinary measures that may
apply, any unauthorised absence which is duly established shall be
deducted from his annual leave and, if this has been used up, shall
give rise to a salary deduction. The Staff Regulations say nothing
about the measures that should be applied when a member of
staff impedes or deliberately evades a medical examination.

38.
It would seem reasonable to assume that an institution’s
inability to exercise control as a result of a deliberate refusal on
the part of the member of staff might in itself be grounds for
declaring the absence unauthorised, as from the date fixed for the
medical examination. The General Secretariat of the Council laid
down clear internal provisions to this effect. Parliament’s internal
provisions only provide that, in such cases, the member of staff is
failing to fulfil his obligations and is liable to disciplinary mea-
sures, but in practice it has followed an identical approach to the
one laid down by the Council. However, both institutions had to
abandon this practice following a decision by the Court of First
Instance (2) which established that there is no legal basis for it.
According to the Court of First Instance, the presentation of a
medical certificate creates a presumption of regularity in respect
of the absence. Deducting an absence from annual leave presup-
poses that the unauthorised nature of the absence has been duly
established. The member of staff is required to undergo an exami-
nation, but failure to fulfil this duty does not in itself authorise the
institution to reverse the presumption of regularity in respect of
the absence due to illness which attaches to a medical certificate
that has been duly presented. On the other hand, this failure can,
where appropriate, form the subject of disciplinary proceedings.
In reality, the institutions are therefore practically powerless in the
face of those situations, happily rare, where there is reason to
doubt the legitimacy of the absence, as this cannot be resolved,
whatever the case, by any disciplinary procedure.

The examining doctor’s conclusions with regard to the
39.
member of staff’s fitness to resume work may be challenged,
which is normal. The appeal and arbitration mechanism is, how-
ever, extremely unwieldy and inappropriate. If the member of
staff submits a new medical certificate and if, following a second
examination, the difference of opinion between the attending
physician and the examining doctor persists, the case should then,
according to the Court of First Instance’s case-law (4), be referred
to the Invalidity Committee. This procedure, with the amount of
time it entails, is completely unsuited to handling disputes of this
type as it is difficult to imagine that the Invalidity Committee
could legitimately rule on whether, several months before, the
member of staff had been fit to resume work or not (5).

In France, pursuant to provisions applicable to officials of the State (3),
the person must resume work as soon as he receives the administra-
tive decision to do so. He may challenge the examining doctor’s con-
clusions in front of a medical college, composed of doctors appointed
for three years by the administration (and meeting at least twice a
month). In cases where the dispute is about the renewal of an absence
of more than six consecutive months, he may make an appeal against
the opinion of the medical college to a high medical college (appointed
for three years by the Ministry of Health).

40.
These factors have a bearing on the effectiveness of the
medical checks, especially in cases where strong doubt exists as
to the legitimacy of the absence.

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING INVALIDITY PENSIONS

Quantifying and monitoring the cost of the scheme

The institutions have not equipped themselves to estab-
41.
lish and monitor the cost of the invalidity pensions scheme. This
shortcoming also means that the staff, who also contribute to the
funding of the scheme, are not aware of their responsibilities and

(1)

(2)

In particular, Case T-36/96 Gaspari v Parliament, Judgment of 10 July
1997.
Joined cases T-110/99 and T-260/99 F v Parliament, Judgment of
13 December 2000.

(3) Fonctionnaires et stagiaires de l’Etat, Protection sociale contre les ris-
ques maladie et accidents de service (Circulaire du 30 janvier 1989).

(4) Case T-171/98 Biasutto v Council, Judgment of 22 February 2000.
(5) As an example, this arbitration procedure took eleven months in one

case at the Court of Justice.

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Official Journal of the European Union

7.5.2003

not in a position to exercise any control over the functioning of
the scheme. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that since the cost
of invalidity pensions is financed from the budget year by year
there was not felt to be any need to establish supervisory and con-
trol mechanisms similar to those used to safeguard the equilib-
rium of a pension fund. For the institutions other than the Com-
mission, the budgetary cost of the pensions awarded to members
of their staffs is not shown in their financial statements, so that
there is even less incentive to perceive that such mechanisms are
desirable.

42.
The budgetary expenditure charged to Commission item
A-1 9 0 1 does not provide any information about the cost of this
scheme, for several reasons. Firstly, it only reflects the cost of the
pensions paid during the financial year. The specific future cost
of invalidity pensions is unknown and is included in the total
future cost of pensions shown in the balance sheet. Secondly,
unlike other schemes where an invalidity pension ceases to be
paid once the recipient reaches retirement age and starts to receive
a retirement pension, under the Community scheme an invalidity
pension continues to be paid until the beneficiary dies. The Court
estimates that, for the financial year 2000, out of the 123,7 mil-
lion euro of budgetary expenditure against A-1 9 0 1, around
40 %, or 50 million euro, was paid to beneficiaries over 65 and
was thus more in the nature of retirement pensions (1). The
changes to the Staff Regulations that are currently being consid-
ered aim to make this distinction in future.

The assessment of invalidity

Article 78 of the Staff Regulations provides that an offi-
44.
cial or a member of the temporary staff ‘shall be entitled to an
invalidity pension in the case of total permanent invalidity pre-
venting him from performing the duties corresponding to a post
in his career bracket’.

If ‘total permanent invalidity’ were intended as a state
45.
involving total loss of physical and/or psychological integrity,
almost none of the persons retired on an invalidity pension and
included in the sample examined by the Court’s medical expert
would be classified as total invalids. In practice, according to the
spirit of the Staff Regulations, it is a question of determining
invalidity as incapacity for work, that is to say, the impossibility
of the member of staff performing the duties corresponding to a
post in his career bracket. In consequence invalidity covers many
factors and is assessed, on the one hand, on the basis of strictly
medical factors which can be identified and measured by means
of clinical examination and tests, and on the other hand, by means
of non-medical facts which rely on subjective rather than quantifi-
able criteria. The Staff Regulations do not require consideration
of other possible responses to ill health, such as capacity to work
part time or to work in a less demanding level in the organisation.

43.
The Court estimates the average net cost of one case of
invalidity at around 370 000 euro (2). At the current rate of retire-
ment, i.e. around 200 members of staff, the invalidity pensions
awarded each year thus represent a total net cost of the order of
74 million euro. As explained in the note to this paragraph, this
net cost is not the amount of the invalidity pension paid to the
former member of staff.

Most of the national administrations and international organisations
visited by the Court use a similar concept. However, in France, pursu-
ant to provisions applicable to officials of the State (3), the degree of
disability is determined by reference to an official disability scale. In
Sweden, the invalidity can be total or partial; in the case of partial
invalidity (e.g. 75 %) the member of staff must work part-time (e.g.
25 %) (4).

46.
To assess incapacity of performing the duties correspond-
ing to a post in a career bracket, a sound knowledge of the work-
ing background and good medical and administrative synergy are
necessary, especially in the case of psychological illness (5). It is
particularly important to be familiar with the specific working
background of the member of staff and to explore properly and
in good time the possible alternatives to retirement on an invalid-
ity pension. In this respect the systems applied in the European
institutions show significant weaknesses.

(1) The estimation is based on information extracted from the Commis-
sion’s database Sysper, which contains personal data of active and
retired staff.

(2) The net cost of invalidity is defined for the purposes of this report as
the actuarial net impact (expenditure – income) on the Community
budget of awarding an invalidity pension. The impact equals the actu-
arial difference between the net budgetary cost of retirement on
grounds of invalidity (i.e. the cost of an invalidity pension plus the sal-
ary of the person recruited to replace the recipient of the invalidity
pension) offset against the net budgetary cost if the member of staff
continued to follow a normal career (i.e. the salary received by the
member of staff up to normal retirement age plus his retirement pen-
sion and the salary of his replacement after that date).

47.
In the institutions, invalidity is currently approached only
from a medical angle, something that the medical officers of the

(3) Fonctionnaires et stagiaires de l’Etat, Protection sociale contre les ris-
ques maladie et accidents de service (Circulaire du 30 janvier 1989).
(4) Data obtained during the visit to the Swedish Agency For Govern-

ment Employers.

(5) These account for almost half the cases of invalidity in the European

institutions.

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institutions are the first to find regrettable. The departments
responsible for personnel management and the employing depart-
ments mainly confine themselves to the purely administrative
aspects of the procedure. The Invalidity Committee is therefore
left with the responsibility of assessing not only the purely medi-
cal part of the problem, but the non-medical aspects as well (1).
Very often the Invalidity Committee does not have sufficiently
precise information about the nature of the duties performed by
the patient and those which he could reasonably perform. Inca-
pacity is then assessed in relation to a theoretical reference frame-
work, which assumes that posts within the category in question
are uniform, whereas the reality is diverse, with the working envi-
ronment, and the relational aspects in particular, constituting one
of the major factors of difference. The system thus lends itself to
a broad interpretation of the concept of invalidity.

Monitoring, analysis of causes and corrective action

48.
The institutions have not established a monitoring sys-
tem that enables them, on a continuous or regular basis, to quan-
tify, in particular, the frequency of retirement on an invalidity
pension and to obtain information about the pathology of such
retirements, to analyse trends using a set of relevant parameters
(age, sex, category, length of service, etc.), to pinpoint the popula-
tion groups that are most at risk, analyse the causes of the high-
est frequencies, or frame and implement possible measures con-
cerning prevention, early detection, research into alternative
solutions. This shows a certain lack of interest on the part of the
institutions, both as regards the financial management of the
scheme and the aspects of the working environment and person-
nel management that are more likely to have an incidence on the
problem.

49.
Some statistics were drawn up on or immediately after
publication of the Court’s observations in the Annual report con-
cerning the year 1987. They essentially comprise information sup-
plied by the Commission in replying to two parliamentary ques-
tions in October 1991 and June 1993, and a report which it
presented in December 1993, at the Council’s request, in connec-
tion with the examination of the preliminary draft budget for
1994. However, the analysis is very cursory. The Court did not
find any evidence of attempts to quantify or produce a general
analysis of the scheme’s operation after those dates.

50.
Fragmented or very specific information is sometimes
available, for example on the pathology of invalidity retirement,
but it is the result of individual initiatives on the part of individual

medical officers rather than a response to requests by the institu-
tions. Moreover, the information is either held by the medical ser-
vices for their own information, or, when it is forwarded to the
administration, it is not followed up (2). An interinstitutional
medical board’s suggestion for an epidemiological study did not
receive the necessary funding, and the more recent idea of the
Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme to carry out a study on the gen-
eral state of health of the staff ran into opposition from represen-
tatives of the staff and of some administrations, on the grounds
that there were insufficient guarantees as to how the data might
be used.

51.
In the context of analysis of the causes of invalidity, a
noteworthy initiative was that taken by Parliament’s medical officer
in Luxembourg. He produced five-year reports for the period 1983
to1998 that are a model of what could be done systematically for
the institutions as a whole. These reports are full of information,
including information on the frequency of retirement on invalid-
ity pension and the pathology of it, and they put forward a num-
ber of hypotheses as to the causes of invalidity, with recommen-
dations about the nature of possible action, especially as regards
the organisation of work and the working environment and cer-
tain aspects of personnel management.

52.
According to these reports, the organisation of work and
the psychological and social environment are significant factors in
stress and loss of motivation. They impact on the state of health
of members of staff and may contribute to the high rate (around
50 %) of psychological illness among the medical conditions that
underlie retirement on an invalidity pension. Perceptions of unfair
distribution of work, exclusion from the decision-making process
and shortcomings at managerial level are included among the
causes of lack of job satisfaction. If a member of staff is affected
by a physical and/or psychological condition these may be deci-
sive factors in the process leading up to retirement on an invalid-
ity pension. These problems particularly affect staff in the lower
career brackets, who perceive their work as being under-valued
and under-recognised. This analysis is widely shared by the medi-
cal officers in the other institutions and by the personnel depart-
ments. It also seems to be borne out by the replies which the
Court received in response to the questionnaire sent to a sample
of former members of staff on invalidity pensions (see para-
graph 2). In fact, in around a third of cases, the former members
of staff said that they had been dissatisfied with the nature of their
duties and/or the conditions in which they had to perform them
and, in two thirds of these cases, said that that had had an influ-
ence on the fact that they had applied for or agreed to retirement
on an invalidity pension. They generally blamed over-work, pres-
sure of deadlines, shortage of human and material resources and,
quite frequently, the role of management in relation to these prob-
lems.

(1) Examples of such non-medical aspects are: the level of job satisfac-
tion, quality of relationships with colleagues, mastery of new technol-
ogy, etc.

(2) A Commission doctor in Brussels has, since 1997, kept up-to-date sta-
tistics on the medical causes of invalidity, but they are not circulated
to other services. Since 1999, the Council’s medical officer has sub-
mitted similar annual statistics to the administration: measures are
being envisaged.

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Early detection, medical and administrative synergy and
alternative measures

53.
Due to the abovementioned weaknesses in the absence
control systems the institutions are not in a position to detect sys-
tematically early signs of persons at risk whose health and/or per-
formance is declining. They therefore cannot take appropriate
measures in good time (e.g. mobility, organisation of work, etc.),
that is to say, while it is still possible for the medical service and
the administration to make a concerted effort to avoid a chain of
events that ineluctably leads to removal from the working envi-
ronment and, therefore, to invalidity.

54.
The replies to a questionnaire sent by the Court to a
sample of former members of staff indicated that in approxi-
mately half the cases they had not received any enquiry about
their state of health or the possibility of their resuming work from
the administrative departments or their senior officers during the
periods when they were on sick leave in the year prior to the
opening of the invalidity procedure. They interpreted this as a
general indifference towards them, precisely at a time when they
were experiencing difficulties and were looking for support and
concern on the part of the institution in general and their hier-
archical superiors in particular.

55.
The study by the Court’s medical expert showed that,
with some rare exceptions, the files examined did not contain any
indication that serious action had been taken beforehand with the
aim of reaching an alternative solution and suggestions from the
medical officer, mainly regarding a change of post, were practi-
cally never followed up. An alternative to an invalidity pension
was seldom offered, or was offered too late. One quarter of the
sample of former members of staff receiving invalidity pensions
would probably have been able to continue working if the institu-
tion had detected and treated their cases at an early stage. The
replies received in response to the questionnaire confirm this feel-
ing: 20 % of the former members of staff thought that they would
have been able to continue working had an alternative solution
been offered. On that basis, the Court estimates that, in principle,
savings of about 10 million euro could be made every year on the
net cost of the invalidity pensions granted in the year, by imple-
menting a policy of early detection and treatment of repeated or
prolonged periods of absence due to illness.

tion of the relevance of the length of temporary incapacity before
the procedure is started. For any doctor with experience of social
services and any human resources specialist, it is an acknowl-
edged fact that a person who has been away from the working
environment for an extended period can seldom return to it fully,
because of a combination of medical, psychological, technologi-
cal or sociological factors. This is confirmed by the fact that in
these cases the procedures almost always culminate in retirement
on an invalidity pension. A review of the sample of cases submit-
ted to the Court’s medical expert for study suggests that a thresh-
old of six months’ absence would be more appropriate, on the
one hand, for dealing with the cases where coordinated action is
useful and still possible and, on the other hand, so as not to main-
tain in a situation of undue financial advantage (1) people who,
actually, will never return to work on a permanent basis. From the
information available to the Court it also appears that where the
invalidity procedure is opened on a member of staff’s initiative it
is, on average, after a period of absence of five months in a three-
year period.

Invalidity schemes of national administrations and international organi-
sations vary considerably regarding the length of the period of incap-
acity before the procedure can be opened on their initiative. Compared
to the Community scheme, the period is shorter in Germany (three-
months over a six-month period) and at the EBRD (six months). At
the ILO (18 months over a four-year period) the conditions are more
similar to those of the Community scheme (2).

57.
Moreover, although the smallest institutions (Court of
Justice and Court of Auditors) refer matters to the Invalidity Com-
mittee as soon as the threshold of 12 months’ absence has been
reached, this does not apply in the largest ones, which often delay.
In the sample examined, in 20 % of cases at the Commission and
38 % of cases at Parliament, the invalidity procedure was initiated
after more than 14 months absence, with the total period of
absence averaging around 17 months (3).

The Invalidity Committee

Constitution

Opening the invalidity procedure

58.
One feature of the Community system that makes it
rather cumbersome, compared with other invalidity schemes (see
is that two of the three doctors that make up the
below),

56.
Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations authorises the insti-
tution to refer the matter to the Invalidity Committee only if the
member of staff has had a total of more than 12 months’ sick
leave in any period of three years. This raises the difficult ques-

(1) Continuation of full salary.
(2) Data obtained during the visits.
(3)

It was not possible to make similar estimates for the Council as the
latter did not provide the necessary data.

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Invalidity Committee are not appointed by the organisation that
funds the pension. The two doctors in question are the doctor
representing the member of staff and the third doctor who is
appointed by agreement with the doctor representing the institu-
tion.

The study by the Court’s medical expert nevertheless
62.
leads to the conclusion that in all the cases in the sample, the
choice of the third member of the Invalidity Committee was very
appropriate as to his professional ability and reputation, indepen-
dence vis-à-vis the parties, familiarity with advisory work and
knowledge of the specialist medical fields that the work con-
cerned.

The civil services of the Member States visited act as follows.

In Austria, the ‘Bundespensionsamt’ (Federal Pensions Office) commis-
sions two medical examinations, each of which is carried out by a
single doctor. In Germany the medical opinion is provided by the
medical officer of the administration. In the United Kingdom it is pro-
vided by the Medical Services Advice Board, in Sweden by the doctor
of the pension scheme, and at the EBRD by the doctor of the insur-
ance company. At the UNO, a recommendation is made by the Staff
Pension Committee, made up of representatives of staff, the adminis-
tration and the Member States, on the basis of a medical report by the
Joint Medical Service. In France, advice is provided by the ‘Commis-
sion de réforme’ of the ministry concerned, which is made up of the
head of the department, the financial controller, two staff representa-
tives and the three doctors of the medical committee. The medical
officer of the department concerned may get access to the file, express
his views and attend the meeting of this commission in a consultative
role. The commission may also choose to hear the doctors chosen by
the member of staff and by the administration (1).

59.
Cooperation by the member of staff, who must appoint
one of the members of the Invalidity Committee, appeared to be
deficient in cases where the procedure was instigated on the insti-
tution’s initiative. In fact, it was found that, for the sample exam-
ined, whilst it took an average of 50 days before the Invalidity
Committee could meet in cases where the request had come from
the member of staff, it took twice as long in cases where it was
the institution that took the initiative (2). In 20 % of cases the
average time was more than six months.

Basis of opinions

63.
As set out in paragraph 1, one of the audit objectives was
to verify that invalidity pensions are granted only when invalidity
has been duly recognised. In all 63 cases in the sample studied by
the Court’s medical expert he concluded that the opinions were
based on sufficient and adequate work, demonstrating the exist-
ence of a clear and intelligible (to a physician) link between the
findings and the conclusions of the Invalidity Committee. They
were systematically set out and supported by details of the diag-
nosis and development of the condition, the prognosis of improve-
ment or recovery or, on the contrary, the probability or certainty
that the causes of the incapacity would persist. They took account
of the medical aspects as well as those concerning the member of
staff’s integration in his working environment, though subject to
the constraints on the Invalidity Committee’s work set out in
paragraph 47. The study did not reveal any cases where retirement
on an invalidity pension was clearly not justified; in two cases,
however, the severity of the condition and the disabling nature of
it seemed to be open to question, which is not abnormal, given
the inevitable leeway inherent in any assessment of this kind.

60.
This phenomenon can be explained to some extent by
the fact that the records under consideration are essentially linked
to psychological illness, that, in some cases, there may be a con-
flictual relationship with the institution and that the former
member of staff receives a full salary while on sick leave.

64.
Non-psychiatric conditions were established by means of
appropriate tests, which provided a sound basis for an accurate
and precise diagnosis. The opinions were based on a standard
advisory approach, correctly performed, which provided a sound
basis for a reliable, reproducible opinion, which was impeccably
drafted. In the case of the psychiatric conditions the items on the
file also support the diagnosis and permit an assessment of the
relative severity of the condition.

The length of time taken can also be attributed to difficul-
61.
ties in reaching an agreement between the medical officer of the
institution and the doctor appointed by the member of staff on
the choice of the third doctor. The medical officers mentioned
that they were quite often obliged to oppose proposals putting
forward the names of doctors who had a known propensity to
decide in favour of invalidity. Lastly, delays also result from the
frequent difficulty of convening the three doctors.

(1) Data obtained during the visits.
(2) This difference is partly inevitable, however, in that when the proce-
dure is opened on the member of staff’s initiative he usually gives the
name of the doctor representing him immediately when making the
application.

Decision on invalidity

65.
When the Invalidity Committee establishes a member of
staff’s invalidity, he is automatically retired on the last day of the
month in which the appointing authority recognises his perma-
nent incapacity to perform his duties, and the entitlement to
invalidity pension commences on the first day of the calendar
month following the calendar month of the decision. In almost
25 % of the cases in the sample the Court observed delays in
adopting the appointing authority’s decision, which had the effect
of unnecessarily delaying the member of staff’s retirement on an
invalidity pension by one month.

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Medical examinations after retirement on an invalidity
pension

The Staff Regulations (Article 15 of Annex VIII) provide
66.
that the institution may have a former official drawing invalidity
pension examined periodically, up to age 60 years, in order to
ascertain that he still satisfies the requirements for payment of the
pension.

The frequency of such checks varied markedly from one
67.
institution to another. The Court of Justice and the Court of Audi-
tors systematically have former members of staff examined every
two years, except where the Invalidity Committee considers such
examination unnecessary, because the illness is irreversible. At the
Commission, examinations are carried out with the frequency
prescribed by the Invalidity Committee, usually annual or every
two years. At the Council there is only one examination, between
one-and-a-half and three years after retirement on an invalidity
pension, and in a small proportion of cases (around 17 % accord-
ing to the medical officer). Medical checks of this type are rare at
Parliament.

68.
In the sample studied by the Court’s medical expert, the
Invalidity Committee had not made a medical examination obliga-
tory in 60 % of the cases (1). The decision of the Invalidity Com-
mittee was in all cases justified by appropriate considerations
regarding the condition of the person in question and the prog-
nosis. Where provision for an examination had been made, the
examination had been correctly carried out and the conclusions
reached as a result of it were well-founded.

In practice the possibility of medical examination pro-
69.
vided for by the Staff Regulations does not really allow any rever-
sal of the situation of invalidity. In fact, an interruption of invalid-
ity very rarely results in successful reinstatement. For the reasons
mentioned at paragraph 56, in the rare cases where former mem-
bers of staff return to work, they are almost always retired on an
invalidity pension after a relatively short time.

Draft reform of the scheme

(a)

(b)

replacing the invalidity pension with an invalidity allowance
which is then replaced by a retirement pension once retire-
ment age is reached (between ages 60 and 65, when the
maximum rate is reached);

calculating the invalidity benefit as 70 % of basic salary,
instead of basing it on the rate of retirement pension to
which the former member of staff would be entitled at age
65 if he continued in active employment up to that age;

(c)

abolishing advancement in step for the duration of the
period of invalidity;

(d)

reducing the minimum subsistence figure from 120 % to
100 % of the basic salary of an official in the first step of the
lowest grade;

(e)

introducing an anti-aggregation rule, with deduction from
the invalidity allowance of the part of the income from gain-
ful activity that exceeds the final total remuneration received
while in active service;

(f) making the invalidity allowance subject to pension contribu-

tions;

(g)

calculating the amount of retirement pension on the basis of
the last basic salary received during employment.

71.
In the Court’s opinion the measures would result in a
decrease of around 25 % in the total net cost of the invalidity pen-
sions awarded each year. At current retirement rates this would
decrease from around 74 million euro (see paragraph 43) to
around 55 million euro. Furthermore, the Court estimates that
the measures would result in an average reduction of around 10 %
in the amount of the invalidity pension paid to former members
of staff; the incidence would be higher for category C and D staff
receiving the minimum subsistence level, which would be cut by
some 14 %.

70.
In the context of the proposed reform of the Staff Regu-
lations the Commission put forward a set of proposals seeking to
reduce the financial attraction of invalidity pensions. These pro-
posals are essentially identical to those put forward in 1989 in the
Caston report (see paragraphs 16 and 17):

(1) 38 cases out of 63.

72.
The change to the minimum subsistence rule might be
expected to result in savings of around 2 million euro in the net
cost of invalidity pensions awarded each year. For the beneficia-
ries concerned the change would produce a cut of around 6 % of
the total pension received. The aim of this measure is to provide
greater equity for members of staff who continue to work until
normal retirement age and, also, to offer an incentive to keep on
working by making work financially more rewarding than inval-
idity. In certain cases, the minimum invalidity pension will nev-
ertheless still be higher than a retirement pension.

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The Commission did not discuss the matter with the
73.
institutions’ medical officers, who are, however, the principal
players in the operation of the scheme, and it omitted to take into
account parameters other than financial factors, which, as the
Court has shown in this report, have a predominant effect. The
invalidity problem is both a human and a financial one. The pro-
posed reform omits to take into account the action that should
have been taken beforehand, as part of a policy of prevention
(working conditions,
information campaigns, monitoring
absences, mobility, etc.), and likewise the action that should be
taken afterwards, with a policy of rehabilitation or redeployment
(part-time working, adjusting working hours, etc.), in order to
encourage staff who are in poor health to continue working under
reasonable conditions, without necessarily having to ask for their
retirement on an invalidity pension.

to assess the reality and severity of the pathology and the result-
ant incapacity. On the other hand, retirement on invalidity grounds
is more common in certain grades than normal retirement.
Reports by the institutions’ medical officers and surveys of inval-
idity pensioners reveal frustration in the working environment
frequently to be a significant element in demotivating staff who
are eventually retired on ill-health grounds. A significant part of
invalidity retirements could, moreover, be avoided if adequate
administrative measures for prevention and early treatment of
medical problems and the associated employment problems were
taken in good time.

CONCLUSIONS

74.

The main conclusions of the audit are the following:

(a)

the invalidity pensions awarded each year represent a total
net cost of the order of 74 million euro, with an average net
cost for each case of invalidity at around 370 000 euro (para-
graph 43);

(b)

in all cases of invalidity pension examined the invalidity had
been duly recognised (paragraph 63);

(c)

the institutions have not developed an overall policy regard-
ing absence and invalidity management due to a lack of senior
management commitment (paragraphs 21 and 41);

(d)

the management systems suffered certain shortcomings in
different areas and the management of absences and invalid-
ity was approached solely from the medical point of view
(paragraphs 20 to 40 and 44 to 54);

(e)

financial savings could be obtained through adequate admin-
istrative measures for prevention, early diagnosis and treat-
ment (paragraph 55).

75.
The Court’s audit reveals a complex picture. On the one
hand, over the last 15 years the rate of invalidity retirement has
remained stable and the increase in retirement on invalidity pen-
sions may be explicable by the increase in the numbers and age
of the workforce in the institutions. In the opinion of the Court’s
medical adviser invalidity pensions are awarded in a justified way,
the work of the Invalidity Committees is sufficient and adequate

76.
Shortcomings were found concerning the overall policy
and management systems for absences because of illness, which
generally suffer from lack of clarity and coordination between the
various departments involved, lack of resources, unsuitable IT
management tools, and the obstacles resulting from the provi-
sions of the Staff Regulations. The absence of medical and admin-
istrative synergy in dealing with absences due to long-term and/or
repeated illness and the lack of priority given to finding alterna-
tive solutions in good time results in the relative ease of setting in
train a process which inevitably leads to removal from the work-
ing environment and to retirement on an invalidity pension. To a
large extent the management of invalidity is approached from the
medical angle alone, as the departments responsible for human
resources management and the employing departments do not
involve themselves in the process and by and large confine them-
selves to dealing with it by purely administrative means.

77.
Frequent delays in opening the invalidity procedure and
in the progress of a significant part of the invalidity retirement
procedure entail a substantial cost to the budget and misuse of
human resources. The difficulties of setting-up and convening an
Invalidity Committee, two of the three members of which are
appointed by or with the agreement of the member of staff are
the main cause of this. Excessive delays in adopting the adminis-
trative decision to retire a member of staff on an invalidity pen-
sion were also observed as being frequent.

78.
The provisions of the Staff Regulations regarding medi-
cal examinations after retirement on an invalidity pension are
theoretically satisfactory, but, in practice, have no perceptible
effect, because it is extremely rare for them to lead to successful
reinstatement, i.e. to an effective, long-term return to work. A per-
son whose state of health is deteriorating, especially where psy-
chological problems are involved, and who is absent from the
working environment for an extended period can rarely return to
it successfully and, with a few very rare exceptions, invalidity is
always final in nature.

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As part of the draft reform of the Staff Regulations the
79.
Commission put forward proposals which are limited to the
financial aspects of the invalidity pensions scheme and which are
essentially a reworking of the proposals that were put forward in
1989 and subsequently abandoned. It did not carry out a prelimi-
nary evaluation of the overall scheme in order to identify all the
factors that impinge on the invalidity phenomenon, and it did not
involve the medical officers of the institutions in its preliminary
studies, even though the medical officers are currently the prin-
cipal players in the process and could have made a useful contri-
bution by widening the field under review.

RECOMMENDATIONS

80.
The institutions need to develop an overall policy on
absences due to illness and on invalidity, with performance indi-
cators, strong support from senior management, clearly allocated
roles and responsibilities, strong medical and administrative syn-
ergy, and with careful and resource-intensive attention given to
the needs of those members of staff who need support. This policy
should focus both on actions to be taken in the early stages
through preventative measures that consider the organisation of
work and working conditions, and on those actions required at a
subsequent stage to help rehabilitation and encourage members

of staff who are in poorer health to continue to work under rea-
sonable conditions.

81.
Although medical matters are obviously involved, this
policy is above all the responsibility of management. Managers
have therefore to be made aware of their roles and responsibili-
ties and they should receive the necessary guidance and training.
An adequate management information and monitoring system
should be set up with a view to ensuring the timely identification
of patterns of absence and of cases of retirement on an invalidity
pension which cause concern and the adoption of appropriate
action. Annual reports should be established by the institutions
in order to monitor the performance of the system.

82.
Modifications to the Staff Regulations may need to be
considered to better cope with situations where a member of staff
impedes or deliberately evades a medical examination, and to pro-
vide for an easier and swifter appeal and arbitration mechanism
when the examining doctor’s conclusions are challenged. As far
as provisions on invalidity are concerned, it may be appropriate
to reconsider the threshold period of sick leave before the institu-
tion can start the procedure and the need for medical examina-
tions after retirement or the conditions under which they are per-
formed. A modification of the composition of the invalidity
committee should also be examined, and thought should be given
to creating a more permanent and interinstitutional structure.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 27 February 2003.

For the Court of Auditors

Juan Manuel FABRA VALLÉS

President

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THE INSTITUTIONS’ REPLIES

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Court of Auditors’ Report on the invalidity pensions scheme of the European Union does not give rise to
any observations on the part of the Council.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES

1 and 2. Objectives and methodology

Parliament welcomes the fact that, on the basis of a detailed
examination of 127 of the more difficult cases (invalidity pen-
sions awarded on psychological grounds), including a review by
a Court-appointed medical expert of 63 such cases, the report
finds no evidence of invalidity pensions having been awarded
improperly or as a substitute for other measures. It also welcomes
the report’s emphasis on improved monitoring and preventive
measures as the best approach to this difficult problem.

ive roles of the actors and services involved in operating
them. Indeed, it is precisely these principles which, together with
the close involvement of employing services, are the basis of the
changes that it proposes to its own system of managing absences
(see comments in relation to points 30 to 34). However, it is not
entirely accurate to suggest (point 23) that there is a lack of clar-
ity as regards the allocation of responsibilities in respect of the
decision to conduct medical checks on absences. In Parliament,
the decision in question is vested in the Head of the Personnel
Division, acting on his or her own initiative, on a recommenda-
tion from the Medical Officer or at the request of the director-
general responsible for the employing service involved. Again,
there is nothing to suggest that these procedures are not fully
understood by all the parties involved.

10 to 14. Statistics and analysis

The report points to the higher percentage, both relatively and
absolutely, of category C and D staff who leave with an invalidity
pension and the significant proportion of such staff who benefit
from the provisions relating to the minimum subsistence amount.
It is not entirely clear whether, in invoking these figures, the report
is implying the kind of incentive effect referred to earlier (see
points 1 and 2). If that is indeed the case, Parliament would reiter-
ate its view that, to the extent that the audit itself appears to show
that invalidity pensions for all categories of staff have been prop-
erly awarded, the question of incentives should be discounted.
The main medical causes of invalidity (see point 14) show that the
European institutions are far from having at their disposal all pos-
sible means which might have a real impact on these causes (for
instance, non-professional aspects).

28. Computer systems

The Directorate-General for Personnel is currently heavily engaged
in preparatory work with a view to acquiring a comprehensive
human resources software package designed according to mod-
ern best practice with integrated information across all depart-
ments. When installed, this should obviate the problems alluded
to in the report, including the current inability to keep account
of sickness leave other than in working days.

30 to 34. Medical checks

21 to 23. General policy and coordination

Parliament accepts without reserve the report’s comments (point
22) about the need to define proper procedures and the respect-

As the report indicates, medical checks are carried out by doctors
employed for this purpose, on a contract basis, both in Luxem-
bourg and Brussels, where, respectively, 60 and 21 checks were
carried out in 2001 (while controls were also carried out in the
previous years, no statistics are available for those years).

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These examining doctors do, however, currently operate under
the aegis of the in-house medical officers, and the report is quite
right to draw attention (point 32) to the inherent problems of
incompatibility of roles for the institution’s medical officers and
the fact that current arrangements are in breach of international
standards and norms in this regard. With this in mind, however,
Parliament’s Directorate-General for Personnel is currently work-
ing on a series of reforms which should go a long way towards
meeting this and other criticisms made in the report. These
reforms will involve:

— the transfer of all responsibilities in relation to medical checks,
including responsibility for the examining doctors, from the
Medical Service to the Personnel Department,

— improved handling of medical certificates, possibly based on
the Personnel Department rather than (as is currently the
case) the Medical Service,

— close monitoring, by the Leave Office, of sick leave with a
view to early detection of anomalies and the initiation of
appropriate follow-up action,

— close and early involvement of the Social Affairs Division
where problem cases are detected, with the latter being
responsible, in conjunction with the Medical Officer and,
where appropriate, other support services, for ensuring
adequate follow-up measures, including, where appropriate,
making recommendations to the appointing authority as
regards the administrative situation of the individual con-
cerned.

It is envisaged that the system outlined above will operate in a
context of close liaison between the services of the Directorate-
General for Personnel and the employing departments. The inten-
tion is not merely to resolve the problem of incompatibility of
roles referred to earlier but also to provide a framework within
which the roles of all participants are adequately defined and
which will encourage the close monitoring and early detection of
problems to which the auditors rightly attach so much impor-
tance. It is hoped that a system based on the above principles will
be in operation by the start of 2003 and that it will also lead to
the speedier convening, where necessary, of invalidity committees
and earlier implementation of the latter’s recommendations.

any information which might explain or account for the appar-
ent irregularity. The ultimate ’sanction’, where no reasonable
explanation or medical certificate is forthcoming, is, after referral
to the Head of the Personnel Division, to deduct the relevant
number of days from the individual’s annual leave (or salary) and
to send him a letter apprising him of that decision, although, in
practice, the subsequent production of a medical certificate and a
reasonable explanation for its late submission would normally
lead to such a decision being rescinded.

Such a system, as the auditors point out, inevitably calls into ques-
tion the institution’s ability to set medical checks in train early
enough (in those cases — almost certainly a minority — where
such a procedure would otherwise seem appropriate). On the
other hand, any attempts at draconian enforcement of the fourth-
day rule would be of dubious value and would, at all events, appear
also to be fatally undermined by the implications of the Court of
First Instance in Cases T-10/99 and T-260/99 (the presumption of
regularity established by the subsequent submission of a medical
certificate). Possible solutions to this difficulty will therefore be
considered in conjunction with the other aspects of the judgment
in question (see below).

37 to 40. Implementing the right to control

As the report points out, the presumption of regularity estab-
lished in the judgment of the Court of First Instance referred to
above has driven a coach and horses through the institutions’
undoubted (if now possibly largely theoretical) right to insist on
medical checks just as, if the reasoning in the previous paragraph
is correct, the right to enforce the rules on prompt submission of
medical certificates is similarly undermined.

35 and 36. Deadlines for the submission of medical certificates

Parliament’s rules stipulate that medical certificates must be sub-
mitted on the fourth day of absence. That is a relatively early
deadline and, in practice, a rather longer period would normally
elapse before action is taken to determine the status of the person
concerned and, where appropriate, to endeavour to ensure that
the situation is regularised. In such cases, action normally means
the Leave Office first liaising with the Medical Officer to check
whether there is a certificate in the pipeline and, subsequently,
with the employing department to check whether the latter has

When trying to find a way out of this seeming impasse, which as
the auditors point out, might well make it extremely difficult to
deal with the small minority who are determined to exploit the
weaknesses of the system, we must recognise that what has effec-
tively been ruled out is a system based on declaring absences
irregular in cases where the individual evades the requirement to
submit to a medical check. That requirement is not in itself under-
mined, nor is the possibility of resorting to other forms of dis-
ciplinary sanction to enforce it. The problem, of course, is that the
alternative, recourse to formal disciplinary procedures, is some-
thing of a heavy and blunt instrument and can hardly be applied
indiscriminately. Even where the requirement to submit to medi-
cal checks is successfully imposed, it is, as the auditors point out
(point 39), further undermined by the cumbersome mechanisms
for dealing with disputes between the examining doctor and the
attending physician.

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In such a context, it is clear that the institutions will have to rely
less on standardised mechanisms, such as the declarations of
irregular absence referred to earlier, and more on management
systems, such as those proposed above for Parliament, which
would enable the more flagrantly problematical cases to be identi-
fied, targeted and pursued, however lengthy and cumbersome the
procedures, with the kind of determination which realistically
may be deployed only in a small number of cases. Such an
approach would certainly not be easy and is unlikely to produce
swift results. If pursued energetically, however, its pedagogical
effect on the staff as a whole might well be substantial.

way of management training, improved career planning and guid-
ance, better matching of skills and job profiles via the ROME-PE
project, the action taken to deal with harassment and victimisa-
tion in the workplace and measures to facilitate part-time work-
ing.

Suggestions from the medical officers regarding a change of
employment are followed up. Given the rigidity of the institu-
tions’ employment structures, such solutions are not always pos-
sible. The cases where they are successfully implemented are obvi-
ously not apparent in the sample available to the auditors.

47. The method of dealing with invalidity

56 and 57. Invoking the invalidity procedure

As the auditors point out, the current approach to invalidity is
essentially a medical one. The measures set in the reply to points
30 to 34 of the report are designed, inter alia, to counteract this
tendency. The role envisaged for the Social Affairs Division, in
particular, should enable the decisions taken in individual cases to
be set in a wider framework of assessment, thereby solving the
problem of the theoretical reference framework to which the
report alludes.

48 to 55. Monitoring, analysis of causes and corrective action

Useful work in monitoring invalidity and its causes has been done
by the institution’s own medical officers. The proposals set out in
response to points 30 to 34 above, which should progressively
favour improved monitoring, early detection and remedial action
of the kind called for in points 53 to 55 of the report, are them-
selves a response to the medical officers’ concerns. A number of
other measures have also been taken, namely:

— the appointment of two psychologists to work within the
Medical Service in Brussels, with a similar approach planned
for Luxembourg,

— the creation, within the Social Affairs Division, of a unit
tasked with analysing the causes of repetitive or prolonged
absences and contacting the officials concerned with a view
to seeking solutions to their problems,

— the creation, within the same division, of a unit to deal with
alcohol and drug-related problems in close collaboration
with the Medical Service and the institution’s social work-
ers.

The report suggests that the threshold for invoking the invalidity
procedure should perhaps be reduced from 12 months to six,
arguing that any person who has been away from the working
environment for an extended period (presumably, in this case,
meaning six months or more) can seldom return to it fully. Anec-
dotal evidence, based on cases of long-term illness (six months or
more) which have not led to invalidity procedures, would suggest
that this conclusion is unduly pessimistic. Parliament therefore
sees no real reason to alter, other perhaps than on a very limited
and discretionary basis, the 12-month threshold.

The delays in invoking the procedure even after the 12-month
period to which the auditors refer are not invariably the result of
bureaucratic inertia. It is not the case that invalidity is universally
sought after and, where certain individuals are battling against
long-term and, possibly, even terminal illness, a decision by their
institution to invoke the invalidity procedure may be profoundly
damaging psychologically. In such cases, the financial interests of
the institutions have to be balanced against their welfare obliga-
tions to their staff. Moreover, given that, as the report itself points
out, decisions to grant invalidity pensions are almost invariably
definitive and the scheme itself represents a substantial charge on
the Community budget, it is not self-evident that speedier invok-
ing of the procedure (for example, by reducing the qualifying
threshold as suggested in the report’s conclusions (point 82))
would necessarily always be in the best financial interests of the
institutions.

65. Decision on invalidity

These specific measures also need to be seen in the context of
wider aspects of the institution’s staff policy, with particular regard
to its emphasis on improved human resources management by

As was pointed out earlier (see the comment on 30 to 34), Parlia-
ment hopes that the administrative reforms that it has in mind
will lead to speedier implementation of the decisions taken by
invalidity committees.

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66 to 69. Medical examinations after retirement on an invalidity

pension

According to point 56 of the audit, ’For any doctor with experi-
ence of social services and any human resources specialist, it is an

acknowledged fact that a person who has been away from the
working environment for an extended period can seldom return
to it fully, because of a combination of medical, psychological,
technological or sociological factors’. In these circumstances, Par-
liament intends, as the above comments suggest, to focus its
efforts on early detection and prevention of invalidity.

THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES

SUMMARY

Commission has proposed amendments to the Staff Regulations
in its ‘reform’ package which the Court summarised in point 71.

I to VII.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s observations
concerning the invalidity scheme. They substantially correspond
to its own analysis.

It notes that the audit did not detect serious operational anoma-
lies, such as cases of unjustified retirement on health grounds.

It shares the view that appropriate support for officials suffering
from ill health, improved preventive measures, greater adminis-
trative monitoring of files, or even the creation within the institu-
tion of a multi-disciplinary standing group for monitoring each
problem case, could lead to an improvement in the situation. The
Commission intends to examine the feasibility of implementing
the aforementioned measures in the light of the human resources
at its disposal.

In any case, there would be a gradual, rather than an immediate,
effect from such measures.

The Commission believes that the measures currently being devel-
oped to combat harassment at work, the pilot experiments under
way in the area of family counselling, but also the reforms which
it hopes will soon be adopted by the Council concerning work-
ing conditions such as the new career system, or even the new
arrangements for staff reports, may help to enhance staff motiva-
tion and, as the Court noted, thereby reduce factors contributing
to invalidity.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ABSENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN
RESPECT OF ABSENCES DUE TO ILLNESS

21.
The Commission shares the view that an overall policy
comprising improved preventive measures, appropriate support
for officials suffering from ill health and greater administrative
monitoring of files could lead to an improvement in the situation.
Some aspects of the administrative reforms such as measures to
combat harassment at work, psychological support, improved
working conditions and the new system for career development
and internal transfers should also help to enhance staff motiva-
tion.

In the specific case of individual medical support to be provided
in the event of ill health, arrangements are currently being made
within the Medical Service. Responsibility will lie with a psychia-
trist who will be assisted by social workers; the unit will work in
close cooperation with the human resources services.

The decentralisation does not mean that there is a lack of clarity
Regarding the Respective roles of the Medical Service and, in the
Directorates-General, of human resoursces managers and their
staff who manage absences and leave.

THE COURT’S PREVIOUS WORK AND THE FOLLOW-UP TO
THIS

19.
It is true that previous administrative measures (in par-
ticular as regards organisation) concerning absence through ill
health and invalidity were insufficient. For this very reason, the

From the central point of view, the Medical Service plays a key
role since, with the aid of an ‘inspection’ unit which is adminis-
tratively highly structured, it singles out problem cases which
require individual medical supervision by a doctor who is not an
inspector. It should also be noted that the inspection unit shares
with human resources managers the right to initiate inspections
using IT applications to target the most relevant cases.

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The method employed by the Court of Justice and by the
23.
Council would be difficult to apply at the Commission, which
probably carries out 10 times as many checks. In addition, an
increasing number of checks are made at the request of the DGs’
heads of unit. This situation is the result of a staff-awareness cam-
paign which will continue.

The Commission does not believe that the
35, 36 and 38.
rules for submitting medical certificates are applied too flexibly.
On the contrary, it takes the view that the rules are applied so
strictly that an increasing number of complaints have been made
under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.

24.
The decentralisation measures implemented in 1998/
1999 as part of the ‘MAP 2000’ reform had a number of negative
effects which are stressed by the Court. In particular, the objec-
tive of devolving responsibility to the directorates-general was not
always fully achieved in all directorates-general. The situation has
improved and is continuing to improve, in particular due to the
measures referred to in points 21 and 22.

25.

See comments in point 24.

As regards the deadlines for submitting certificates, the Commis-
sion undertakes to quantify the expression ‘as soon as possible’.

It fears that greater severity would lead to complaints or even
appeals to the Court of First Instance, which unfortunately does
not usually find in its favour in this area.

26 and 27.
factorily following a major effort to improve performance.

The SIC Congés application is now working satis-

The Sermed database is a working tool used exclusively by Medi-
cal Service inspectors. The data are, of course, subject to medical
confidentiality. The tool used to manage staff absences is the SIC
Congés application.

37.
Despite the lack of specific rules in the Staff Regulations,
the Medical Service recommends in such cases that the Appoint-
ing Authority should declare the individual to be absent without
justification. Consequently, Article 60(1) of the Staff Regulations
applies: days of annual leave may be deducted or a proportion of
the salary docked, without prejudice to other disciplinary meas-
ures (certain cases are referred to the Investigatory and Disciplin-
ary Office (IDOC)).

Duplication is necessary as the Medical Service is not responsible
for staff absences. However, it is clear that an improvement must
be sought as regards the speed at which information necessary for
management is transferred from the Medical Service’s inspection
unit to the SIC application.

39.
The Commission shares the view that the current pro-
cedure for disputes concerning absence through ill health is in-
appropriate. An overall review should no doubt be envisaged.

33.
The Commission must point out that the examining doc-
tors have no other internal responsibilities. Furthermore, it believes
that the quality or relevance of the examinations are currently sat-
isfactory and that both of these criteria are more important than
the actual number of examinations (which are sometimes opposed
on the grounds of harassment).

In addition, the Medical Service also employs the services of a
medical inspection company (an outside firm working under con-
tract) which, upon request, carries out examinations at patients’
homes almost immediately.

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING INVALIDITY PENSIONS

The Commission has not published figures for the long-
41.
term cost of invalidity, although this cost does appear in the bud-
get under a specific heading. The information is therefore in the
public domain and, as such, is available to staff.

The Commission believes that the relevance of the exami-

34.
nations is of more value than their frequency.

In this context, it should be borne in mind that the staff have
voiced opposition, through certain trade unions, to the amend-
ments proposed by the Commission as part of the reform.

In this context, it has at the end of 2001 developed a system for
improving the ‘targeting’ of the examinations carried out at the
initiative of the inspection unit. It also believes that the depart-
ments to which staff are assigned are often best placed to draw
attention to the most interesting cases. The recent increase in
inspection requests by the various departments is a favourable
aspect in terms of the relevance of the examinations.

The Commission doubts that an awareness of the cost of invalid-
ity and of the resulting expenditure would reduce the number of
instances of retirement through ill health. The respective deci-
sions are based on medical assessments and are taken on a case-
by-case basis.

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An overview of the cost of the ‘invalidity’ system in terms
42.
of long-term debt could be produced, as the Commission pro-
vides an estimate each year of the total liabilities of the pension
scheme. By evaluating the effect of each component of the sys-
tem, in particular for invalidity, an overview could be produced
when the next actuarial study of the system is carried out.

It is true that once a beneficiary reaches a certain age, he/she
should receive a retirement pension. Consequently, some of the
expenditure currently listed under invalidity pensions should be
listed under retirement pensions. The matter will be resolved by
the Commission’s proposed reform, which establishes a distinc-
tion between the actual invalidity payment and the retirement
pension.

The Commission would like to point out that, as is the
43.
case in each Member State, an invalidity scheme is absolutely nec-
essary. In the absence of such a scheme the productivity of an
invalid is considerably lower than that of a healthy official. The
model applied by the Court to calculate the net cost of invalidity
is based on the assumption that the official concerned, had con-
tinued his career until the normal age of retirement.

It is true that the current system only recognises total
45.
invalidity. On a human level, the Commission acknowledges the
value of ‘partial invalidity’ which would enable the individual to
remain in the workplace. However, under the current system
where the establishment plan contains ‘full’ posts, such posts
would be filled by employees working part-time, which in prin-
ciple would not be in the department’s interests as it would not
have a full complement of staff at its disposal.

Nevertheless, the Commission has proposed a specific provision
as part of the reform of the Staff Regulations which would autho-
rise an official over 55 to prepare for retirement by working part
time.

The Commission believes that the measures currently
52.
being developed to combat harassment at work, the pilot experi-
ments under way in the area of family counselling, but also the
reforms which it hopes will soon be adopted by the Council con-
cerning working conditions such as the new career system, or
even the new arrangements for staff reports, may help to enhance
staff motivation and, as the Court noted, thereby reduce factors
contributing to invalidity.

53.
The Commission wholly agrees with this analysis. It
believes that over and above the measures referred to in point 21
administrative tools should also be developed (e.g. authorisation
by the budgetary authority of ‘transitional’ posts which would
make it easier for officials to return to their posts).

In addition, it is currently setting up a ‘medical monitoring’ facil-
ity (see comments on the Summary).

The rules in force at present, and in particular Article 78(1)
55.
of the Staff Regulations, which states that an official is entitled to
an invalidity pension ‘in the case of total permanent invalidity
preventing him from performing the duties corresponding to a
post in his career bracket’, limit the range of alternatives. Without
questioning the validity of the sample, the Commission believes
it is difficult to accept conclusions reached on the basis of impres-
sions given by individuals who decide, after the event, that their
invalidity could have been avoided if they had been offered alter-
native solutions. Consequently, the Commission does not con-
sider that savings in the amount estimated by the Court could be
made. All the same, the Commission believes that, following the
measures that will be adopted in the context of the Reform, it will
be possible to make savings in future, compared with the present
situation.

56.
The Commission agrees with this interpretation, but has
doubts about the short-term implementation of suggestions which
it believes would require the Staff Regulations to be amended.

47.
As far as the Commission is concerned, the observation
that invalidity is not currently regarded as total inability from the
medical point of view to discharge the duties required of an offi-
cial is pertinent.

The Commission believes that since the Court of Audi-
57.
tors’ audit, significant progress has been made as regards the
periods involved.

A solution to this problem must no doubt be sought before the
matter is referred to the Invalidity Committee. Action has already
been taken to this effect: the duties of the Internal Ombudsman
have been redefined, a specialised unit has been set up within DG
ADMIN with responsibility, inter alia, for career guidance (the
Central Department for Professional Guidance and Career Devel-
opment (SCOP)); an attempt is often made to find a more suitable
position for the official concerned. SCOP will, of course, play a
part in the structure mentioned in the replies to the Summary
(third indent).

As things stand, the medical status of officials suffering from ill
health is systematically examined as soon as the total period of
absence over the previous 36 months exceeds 350 days.

These delays have recently been cut by approximately

65.
50 %.

The Commission is endeavouring to introduce a simple

48.
system of statistical analysis.

70.
The Commission stresses that its proposal to modify the
invalidity scheme essentially aims to establish a more coherent
system and to rectify certain discrepancies, such as the fact that
some invalidity pensions may be larger than retirement pensions.

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The Medical Service took part in the preparatory phase
73.
of the Reform. In addition, the comments made concern behav-
iour or administrative structures rather than the reform of the
Staff Regulations. The Commission is endeavouring to act accord-
ingly (see comments on the Summary).

CONCLUSIONS

The Commission accepts the comments made but believes
76.
that it is important that the concept of invalidity should remain
first and foremost a medical one. As was suggested elsewhere, the
involvement of other parties must be considered before the pro-
cedure is initiated.

and raise awareness in the directorates-general. It is introducing a
counselling and support facility. Once the multi-disciplinary group
responsible for monitoring individual cases (as mentioned in the
replies to the summary) has been operational for a significant
period, it will decide whether it is appropriate to introduce a
broader or more ambitious plan of action while bearing in mind
that large-scale measures call for resources which are currently
unavailable.

The training programme for heads of unit already includes

81.
a course on staff management (and therefore covers absences).

Progress has been made and will continue to be made as

77.
regards delays (see comment on point 65).

A system for monitoring the causes of invalidity will be swiftly
introduced.

RECOMMENDATIONS

80.
As stated above (point 21), the Commission, in the frame-
work of an overall policy, is going to step up its efforts to inform

82.
See comment on point 73. The Commission is not con-
vinced that altering the composition of the Invalidity Commis-
sion would have significant effects.

REPLIES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE

The Court of Justice notes that the report does not contain criti-
cisms specifically levelled at the way in which its administration
manages the invalidity scheme or the related administrative and
medical spheres.

It would, however, point out in connection with the observations
relating to the monitoring of absences on account of illness that
its administration pays particular attention to the administrative
and medical supervision of officials and other members of staff
on long-term sick-leave. Such absences may conceal professional
or personal problems, and in certain cases even lead to future
invalidity.

With that in mind, an informal group (the medical officer, the
nurse, the welfare assistant, the Director of Personnel and Finance,
the Head of the Personnel Division and the Principal Administra-
tor responsible for social and medical matters) meets, in principle
once a week, to discuss those absences and in particular whether
or not it is necessary in each case to have a medical examination
carried out.

Last, it is to be noted that the Court’s administration is at present
in the final stages of appointing an external doctor to carry out
those medical examinations.

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REPLY BY THE COURT OF AUDITORS

The Court of Auditors has carefully noted the observations made
in this report. It has already taken steps, in particular to improve
the monitoring of these absences. Because of its size and the lim-

ited resources at its disposal, the Court cooperates wherever pos-
sible with the competent departments at the Commission.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES

The Economic and Social Committee agrees with the Court of
Auditors about several points raised in the preliminary observa-
tions, and in particular are the following:

sent to the rapporteurs of the various European Parliament com-
mittees that are required to comment on the reform.

— checks on the circumstances leading to invalidity, with review

where necessary,

— simplification and easing of the measures proposed by the
reform in the event that a check on absence due to illness is
challenged.

In the same vein, the Economic and Social Committee would
unreservedly support the introduction of additional measures
such as those proposed in the Court of Auditors’ observations,
especially:

— an overall policy to intensify checks on absences due to ill-
ness (during the past two years these have been carried out
far more frequently at this institution),

— clear and automatic measures in the event of refusals to sub-

mit to a check on absence due to illness,

The Economic and Social Committee presented amendment pro-
posals to the Interinstitutional Staff Regulations Committee in
respect of these matters in early 2002. The proposals were then

— the analysis, preferably at interinstitutional level, of the main

causes of invalidity, and increased monitoring.

THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLY

The Committee of the Regions shares the Court’s opinion on the subject and has no further observations to
make.