WRITTEN QUESTION P-0488/03 by Freddy Blak (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Circumvention of rules on invitation to tender by Dansk Tipstjeneste.
Date: 2003-02-17
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Denmark, EU control, State monopoly, animal show, audiovisual co-production, game of chance, invitation to tender, legal status, public contract, services of general interest

10.7.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161 E/221

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(25 March 2003)

The Commission does not have the statistics requested concerning how many fires in the Member States
are caused by heating systems, connecting pieces or chimneys. Neither does the Commission hold statistics
concerning how many people suffer from carbon monoxide poisoning from stoves and fireplaces (exhaust
emissions).

The Commission does not have information regarding inspections of heating appliances by the Member
States after their installation.

(2003/C 161 E/232)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0488/03

by Freddy Blak (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(17 February 2003)

Subject: Circumvention of rules on invitation to tender by Dansk Tipstjeneste

Dansk Tipstjeneste A/S has a monopoly on the football pools and lotteries in Denmark. Since 1 July 2000,
Dansk Tipstjeneste has also had a monopoly on betting on horse and dog racing via its subsidiary
DanToto A/S.

In January 2002, DanToto A/S transferred newly acquired TV production equipment to an external TV
production company following the DanToto Board’s decision that TV production was not within the
company’s sphere of competence.

The production equipment was sold to the production company for DKK 9 million. At the same time, the
parties concluded an agreement on broadcasts from horse and dog races. Under the agreement, DanToto
has undertaken to pay an eight-figure sum per year for the broadcasts. The agreement may be terminated
by giving 12 months’ notice, though not until the end of 2004 at the earliest.

Despite the value of the contract, no tenders were invited. In a new report, the National Audit Office of
Denmark criticises DanToto for not having invited tenders from other TV producers and for not having
consulted the market. At the same time, the National Audit Office writes that, in its opinion, DanToto is
not a public body and that therefore DanToto A/S is not required to invite tenders throughout the EU even
though the company is making purchases, including services, above the thresholds.

Does the Commission take the view that the Danish Government can circumvent EU rules on the award of
public contracts by conferring a state monopoly on a limited company? If the Commission considers that
the Danish Government has circumvented EU rules on invitations to tender, will it say what options it has
available to intercede?

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(12 March 2003)

Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of
public service contracts (1) (hereafter the Directive) applies to public service contracts for pecuniary interest
concluded in writing between a service provider and a contracting authority.

An obligation for DanToto to put the broadcasting contract referred to in the question to tender in
accordance with the Directive only exists if DanToto is to be considered a contracting authority. Because
DanToto is not a State, regional or local authority, it must be examined whether DanToto is indeed a body
governed by public law, in order for it to be categorised as a contracting authority in accordance with the
Directive.

While it is clear from the national law regulating DanToto (Lov om væddeløb i forbindelse med heste- og
hundevæddeløb) that it has legal personality and has a board appointed by the Minister of Taxation who
also has to approve the company’s statutes, it is less obvious whether DanToto is established for the

C 161 E/222

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

10.7.2003

specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, without having any industrial or commercial
character. In fact, only a body meeting all of the said requirements can be considered as a ‘contracting
authority’ subject to the public procurement rules established by the above-mentioned Directive 92/50/
EEC.

In this respect, it is to be noted that, on the one hand, the Danish authorities state that the aims of the
Danish gambling model, which is largely made up of state-controlled gaming companies such as DanToto
and its owner Dansk Tipstjeneste, are to protect the gambler and combat crime as well as supporting
charitable and non-profit organisations. It would therefore seem that DanToto was indeed established for
the specific purpose of meeting certain needs in the general interest.

However, on the other hand, the law regulating DanToto states that the profits are split between the
parent company Tipstjenesten (whose profits support charitable organisations) and a fund to promote and
finance horse racing. According to jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, if a body is managed
according to criteria of performance, efficiency and cost-effectiveness and operates in a competitive
environment, it cannot be considered as a body established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in
the general interest, since it does have an industrial or commercial character.

Therefore, on the basis of available information, the Commission is at present not in a position to assess
whether Dan Toto has an industrial or commercial character. The Commission intends to further enquire
on this issue.

Should the Commission come to the conclusion that the Danish authorities are not in compliance with the
the Danish
relevant Community rules,
government in the accordance with Article 226 of the Treaty establishing the Community.

infringement procedures against

the Commission may start

(1) OJ L 209, 24.7.1992.

(2003/C 161 E/233)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0493/03

by Glyn Ford (PSE) to the Commission

(21 February 2003)

Subject: Consumer Credit Directive and the fight against financial crime

The Consumer Credit Directive, in its current format, runs the risk of preventing the sharing of data for
the purposes of identification of customers, fraud prevention or money-laundering prevention. It will have
the following adverse effects:

(cid:1) Anti-fraud data-sharing schemes such as CIFAS and HUNTER, which help building societies to prevent
fraudulent mortgage advances of approximately GBP 25 million per year, would come to an end. This
would leave them open to exploitation.

(cid:1) By lending to fraudsters, building societies take on more bad debt, and then inevitably have to pass the

cost of this on to genuine customers.

(cid:1) If building societies are unable to carry out anti-money-laundering identification checks by sharing
data, their ability to comply with the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations and 2001 FSA rules would
be put in jeopardy.

What plans does the Commission have to take these factors into consideration?

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(25 March 2003)

The proposal for a new Directive on credit for consumers (1)
lays down provisions on information
collected by lenders and intermediaries from consumers, guarantors or third persons in connection with
the conclusion and management of credit and surety agreements covered by the Directive. These
provisions provide that processing of the obtained information has to be limited to the purpose of
assessing the financial situation of the consumer or guarantor and their ability to repay.