WRITTEN QUESTION P-0349/03 by Herman Vermeer (ELDR) to the Commission. Possible conflict between sustainability policy in the terms of reference of producers' organisations and competition rules.
Date: 2003-02-06
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, approximation of laws, common fisheries policy, common organisation of markets, competition law, crustacean, fine, producer organisation

15.1.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11 E/83

The Commission considered that the 90 % guarantee constituted State aid in the sense of Article 87(1) of
the EC Treaty and had to be assessed as ad hoc aid under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and the
Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. Under these
Guidelines, the Commission approves rescue aid as one-off support to an ailing firm during the period
needed to devise a restructuring or a liquidation plan. The aid must consist of liquidity help at market
conditions and must be the strict minimum to keep the firm in business during a maximum period of six
months.

Since the rescue aid for Grundig fulfilled the conditions set out in these Guidelines, the Commission
authorised the guarantee for the period requested by Germany. At the same time, Germany committed to
notify a restructuring plan or liquidation plan to the Commission or proof that the loan has been
reimbursed, the latest six months after approval of the rescue aid. Until this notification, the Commission
does not have the information requested by the Honourable Member.

(2004/C 11 E/087)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0340/03

by Elmar Brok (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(10 February 2003)

Subject: Aid C 67/2002 (formerly E 47/2001) (cid:1) state aid to manufacturers of grain spirit

Since their exit
from the spirit monopoly, commercial distilleries have ceased production. The
compensatory amounts paid by Germany for early exit from the monopoly are to be classified not as aid
but as compensation.

Why does the Commission nevertheless take the view that that these compensatory payments constitute
aid which distorts competition?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(24 March 2003)

In the context of the investigation which it has launched following the start of the procedure relating to
the state aid granted to grain spirit distillers (farmers and industrial distillers) in Germany, the Commission
has raised the issue of whether the payments made to industrial distilleries by way of compensation for
their early exit from the monopoly can be classed as state aid incompatible with the common market.

As this matter is still under investigation, the Commission has not taken any decision so far regarding the
status or anticompetitive nature of the compensatory payments.

(2004/C 11 E/088)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0349/03

by Herman Vermeer (ELDR) to the Commission

(6 February 2003)

Subject: Possible conflict between sustainability policy in the terms of reference of producers’ organisations

and competition rules

(The NMA (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (cid:1) Netherlands Competition Authority) has imposed fines
on producers’ organisations in the shrimp fishing industry in the Netherlands (Case 2269) because of
mutual agreements in the framework of
trilateral cooperation with German and Danish producers’
organisations, for which the Commission granted subsidies in 2002, whereas the German and Danish
organisations have not been fined in their respective countries. This is the background to this Written
Question.)

C 11 E/84

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

15.1.2004

Are the terms of reference of European producers’ organisations made sufficiently clear in the context of
prohibitions relating to competition? Are producers’ organisations not in fact under an obligation vis-à-vis
the EC to take market-regulating action in the form of measures to tailor supply more exactly to demand,
so that as producers’ organisations they contribute with their fish products to both a qualitative and a
quantitative valorisation of the industry? Is this consistent with the rules of competition? If sustainability
and competition are in conflict, which of them takes precedence?

What can and will the Commission do to guarantee equal treatment in all the Member States and to
provide clarification in the short term as to the rules to be followed by producers’ organisations?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(17 March 2003)

On 14 January 2003,
totalling
the Netherlands Competition authority (NMa) has
EUR 13 781 million on eight wholesale traders in shrimps, and one Danish, three German and four
Dutch producer organisation in the shrimp fishery industry, for infringements of the European and Dutch
prohibition on cartels. The NMa has established, first of all, that the producer organisations and the
wholesaler traders entered into agreements with each other to limit the size of the catch of North-Sea
shrimps and with regard to minimum prices and that, secondly, these agreements were also implemented
in the period from January 1998 until February 2000.

imposed fines

Concerning the application of competition law on European producer organisations and tasks of such
organisations, the Commission believes that the terms of reference of European producer organisations in
the context of competition are made sufficiently clear. The relation between application of competition
rules and the common market organisations established under the Community’s agricultural and fishery
policies, is set out in Council Regulation No 26 (1) and the relevant jurisprudence. Producer organisations
form the backbone of the common organisation of the markets in fishery products. They are entrusted
with the task of taking market-regulation action. In discharging their task, they must act in accordance
with the goals and procedures foreseen by the common market organisation. As long as producer
organisations limit their action to this, there is no conflict with competition rules.

Concerning a possible conflict with sustainability policy, the Commission refers to the reform of the
common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture by way of Council Regulation (EC)
No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 (2). Its main objective is to ensure that the production and marketing
of fishery products take account of the need to support sustainable fishing. It is, therefore, designed to
comprise measures which ensure that supply is better matched to demand. Producer organisations can
plan their production and its adjustment to demand by implementing catch plans and they can also take
measures to stabilise prices. This is in line with the sustainability focus of the Common Fisheries Policy, a
feature which has been clearly strengthened by the most recent package of decisions on the reform of the
Common Fisheries Policy, which the Council adopted in December 2002. As already indicated above, no
conflict between sustainability requirements and competition rules will occur as long as producer
organisations stick to acting within the bounds of their lawful tasks under the Common Fisheries Policy.
Inversely, sustainability considerations may not be used as an argument to justify practices, such as
agreements between producer organisations and wholesale traders concerning minimum prices and catch
limits, which fall outside the lawful tasks of producer organisations as specified in the relevant legal
instruments and violate the European competition rules.

In this context, the Commission did not subsidise in 2002 a tri-lateral co-operation between the producer
organisations of the three Member States. Such a co-operation has been the subject of an earlier project.
The Commission approved the application for funds for co-operation between the producer organisations,
in 1999, in the framework of the PESCA programme. Only an advance payment has been made at the
time the Declaration by the recipient of a financial contribution was signed. Since then, the Commission
informed the applicants that it could not grant its final approval of the project until it was certain that the
funds had only served to realise the objectives of the work programme and that they had not been used
for activities which constitute a violation of competition rules.

15.1.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 11 E/85

Concerning the issue of equal treatment in all Member States, the Commission wants to stress that it
welcomes the fact that the NMa has investigated and condemned infringements of European competition
law. This is fully in line with the Commission’s policy of decentralising and modernising the application of
European competition law. The Honourable Member will be aware that
these principles were the
underpinning elements for the recently completed reform of European antitrust rules (3). Regarding the
fines imposed, it should be noted that the NMa has imposed fines on all the companies and producer
organisations that took part in the practices described, in proportion to their contribution to the effects of
the prohibited agreements or practices on the Dutch market. Following the decision of the NMa and taking
account of its other enforcement priorities, the Commission does not intend to open an additional
procedure in this matter. The Danish and German competition authorities also have the competence to
apply articles 81 and 82 on their respective territory. However, each public authority sets its own
enforcement priorities.

(1) Council Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to the production of and trade in

agricultural products, OJ 30, 20.4.1962.

(2) OJ L 17, 21.1.2000.
(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid

down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003.

(2004/C 11 E/089)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0383/03

by Antonios Trakatellis (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(13 February 2003)

Subject: Substandard work in construction projects in Greece: findings by ESPEL and OLAF concerning

measures to tackle the maladministration of EU funds

Bearing in mind the reply given by Commissioner Michel Barnier to my question E-3524/02 (1) in which
he stated that the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is notified by the national authorities about issues
relating to the maladministration of Community funds and construction projects in which serious
shortcomings have been detected that cannot be connected without the project being partly or completely
reconstructed (projects known as category III), will the Commission say:

1. How many projects receiving Community funding have so far been included in category III in the EU,
how many are located in Greece (the number and percentage) and what are they (please give a
detailed table or list of category III projects in Greece)?

2. When was OLAF last provided with information by the Greek authorities, concerning findings by the
national council for quality control (ESPEL) about category III projects and what was the content of
this information?

3. What is the amount of Community funds allocated to projects in which serious shortcomings have
been detected and how can the system for the Community funding if projects be protected from
substandard work?

4. Are the Kifisos projects and the Paiania bridge included in category III, and what penalties have been
imposed to punish substandard work or shortcomings in projects that have been executed, such as for
example the road in Drama which had to be closed after one week owing to shoddy workmanship?

(1) OJ C 155 E, 3.7.2003, p. 163.