WRITTEN QUESTION E-0240/03 by Paul Rübig (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Protective measures against fertiliser imports in Hungary.
Date: 2003-02-04
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Hungary, accession to the European Union, chemical fertiliser, fertiliser industry, market protection, trade relations, trade restriction

26.2.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51 E/15

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(6 March 2003)

In the Commission’s view, the definitions provided in Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1177/2002
of 27 June 2002 concerning a temporary defensive mechanism to shipbuilding (‘TDM’) are sufficiently
clear and precise. The definitions reflect those that are standard within the shipbuilding industry and are
based largely on those used by Lloyd’s Register.

Furthermore, it is clear from the TDM that aid may only be granted in relation to contracts awarded to
Community yards, for which there has been competition from a Korean yard offering a lower price.

The Commission will ensure that, in the implementation of schemes and individual aid granted under the
TDM, the requirements of the TDM are met.

(2004/C 51 E/016)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0240/03

by Paul Rübig (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(4 February 2003)

Subject: Protective measures against fertiliser imports in Hungary

The Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport is currently carrying out an investigation as a
basis for a decision on protective measures against the general importation of nitrogenous fertilisers. It was
a Hungarian fertiliser manufacturer that requested the investigation.

According to statement no 13/2002 by the Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport,
‘… imports of ammonium nitrate have grown continuously in recent years. The substantial increase in
imports is causing serious damage to the only domestic producer of nitrogenous fertilisers, or is liable to
cause it damage.’

The aforementioned solitary domestic producer cannot supply the whole Hungarian market, and Hungary
has accordingly imported nitrogenous fertilisers in the past decade (imports grew by 18,3 % between 1998
and 2001).

All nitrogenous fertiliser producers in the EU Member States have to produce under the same conditions
(purchase prices for gas) as the Hungarian producer; they have no advantage over their Hungarian
competitor in terms of raw materials prices or wage costs.

What view does the Commission take of the planned introduction of protective measures against imports
of nitrogenous fertilisers in the context of Hungary’s impending accession to the EU?

Are protective measures against imports of fertiliser from the EU justified on the grounds stated here?

Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(25 March 2003)

the investigation that has been initiated by the
The Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of
Hungarian authorities in respect of importation of nitrogenous fertiliser. If the Hungarian authorities
conclude that safeguard measures should be imposed,
the necessary
information to justify this decision. The Commission will then assess the case and hold consultations with
Hungary in case the evidence provided is not satisfactory.

they will have to supply all

With regard to the argument that the Hungarian industry cannot meet the needs for the domestic
consumption, it should be noted that, from a strictly legal point of view, insufficient domestic production
does not exclude the imposition of safeguard measures on imports. The decisive criterion in this context is
rather the extent of injury that the imports have caused by taking up market shares previously held by the
domestic industry. The principle of proportionality has however to be respected.

C 51 E/16

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

26.2.2004

As to the statement that Community products have no competitive advantage over Hungarian ones, this is
not relevant under international safeguard rules. The fact that
imports have been made under fair
competitive conditions and that their prices have been fair does not preclude the application of safeguard
measures.

Regarding Hungary’s impending accession to the Union, it should be noted that the case in question is a
safeguard investigation. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguard measures apply on an
erga omnes basis, i.e. irrespective of the origin of the imported goods. Hungary can thus not be prevented
from applying protective measures on the grounds of its forthcoming accession to the Union, because this
would prevent it from applying protective measures as a whole (i.e. even on imports of non-Union origin).

However, notwithstanding the above, it goes without saying that the Commission is closely monitoring
and will continue to monitor the developments in this case, and will take action wherever appropriate to
defend the interests of Community exporters and to ensure the respect of relevant international rules.

(2004/C 51 E/017)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0280/03

by Sérgio Sousa Pinto (PSE) to the Commission

(7 February 2003)

Subject: Liquidation of the operator OniWay in Portugal

Can the Commission provide information on a possible breach of Community legislation governing
competition in the telecommunications sector in connection with the liquidation of the operator OniWay?

The liquidation of the fourth operator (cid:1) OniWay (cid:1) will clearly harm the interests of consumers and have
an adverse effect on diversity, competitive emulation and innovation. OniWay held a UMTS licence but
played no part in the GSM generation, and it was hoped that the operator would have a lever effect with
regard to the new UMTS generation technology, breaking with the approach geared to maximising profits
which tended to prevail among established operators.

The third generation was affected by delays caused by factors which affected the whole of Europe and were
aggravated by the lack of interest shown by the three established operators. The regulator then authorised
OniWay to provide GPRS services on the basis of a roaming agreement with another established operator,
TMN, thereby preventing an early closure of the company. The remaining operators launched a boycott,
resisting the interconnection rights granted by the regulator.

With the change of government, the new minister decided to block an administrative order from the
regulator ordering physical
the
company’s fate was sealed and it was decided to sell off its assets to the remaining operators. Now that
OniWay has been killed off to the benefit of its competitors, the government intends to share out the
spectrum assigned to OniWay, which paid around EUR 100 million for the rights, among the remaining
operators.

interconnection among the networks. The operator was paralysed,

A further interesting detail
that news of the sale of OniWay’s assets led to a marked
improvement in the stock market position of the companies holding a share in the firm, particularly
Electricidade de Portugal (EDP).

is the fact

The operation will have a negative impact on consumers and conditions of competition in the sector, and
clearly favours the established operators. A study should therefore be made of whether there has been a
breach of Community rules applying to the telecommunications sector.

Given that the radiophonic spectrum is a public good which is in scarce supply, the above situation could
represent a closing of the market. Moreover, the possibility that one of the operators (TMN) might end up
holding significant market power also needs to be investigated.