2003/261/EC: Commission decision of 27 November 2002 on the State aid implemented by Germany for Ambau Stahl- und Anlagenbau GmbH (Text with EEA relevance.) (notified under document number C(2002) 4483)
Date: 2002-11-27
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Germany, State aid, control of State aid, industrial equipment, industrial restructuring

L 103/50

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

COMMISSION DECISION

of 27 November 2002

on the State aid implemented by Germany for Ambau Stahl- und Anlagenbau GmbH

(notified under document number C(2002) 4483)

(Only the German text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2003/261/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 88(2)
thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
pursuant to the provisions cited above (1) and having regard to
their comments,

Whereas:

I. PROCEDURE

(1)

(2)

By letter dated 29 December 1999 Germany informed
the Commission of aid to Ambau Stahl- und Anlagenbau
GmbH (Ambau). The aid case was registered under
NN 11/2000. By letters dated 21 January, 15 May and
26 October 2000, the Commission asked for further
information. Germany replied by letters dated 4 April,
22 June and 14 December 2000.

By letter dated 16 March 2001, the Commission infor-
med Germany that it had decided to initiate the pro-
cedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in
respect of the aid and invited interested parties to submit
their comments (2). The case was then registered as C 15/
2001. Comments presented by Germany were received
on 19 and 20 June 2001. Comments from the aid
recipient were received by letter dated 28 June 2001.
By letter dated 28 December 2001, the Commission
informed Germany that it had extended the proceedings

to include measures supposedly granted under approved
schemes and again invited interested parties to submit
their comments (3). Comments from Germany on the
extension of the proceedings were received on 7 Febru-
ary 2002. The Commission requested further infor-
mation from Germany by letter of 16 September 2001.
Germany replied by letter dated 17 October 2001.
Further comments from the aid recipient were received
by letter dated 23 May2002.

II. DESCRIPTION

1. The beneficiary

(3)

(4)

The case concerns financial measures for the restructur-
ing of the Gräfenhainichen plant of Ambau, a company
situated in the new German Länder which is active in
the sector of process plant engineering. Ambau operates
two production plants in the new German Länder. One
is situated in Sperrenberg, Brandenburg, and the other
in Gräfenhainichen, Saxony-Anhalt.

The plant in Gräfenhainichen was formerly owned by
Anhaltiner Stahl- und Anlagenbau (ASTA), a State-
owned company. In 1990, ASTA was taken over by the
Treuhandanstalt (THA), which in 1992 privatised the
company through a management buy-out (MBO). In
1996, ASTA incurred losses of DEM 7,5 million and
subsequently had to file for bankruptcy. Until the end of
1997, the operation of ASTA was continued by the
administrator.

(5)

In December 1997, Ambau took over the production of
ASTA as well as 92 of the former 270 employees. Before
the take-over, Ambau employed 42 people at its plant

( 1) OJ C 179, 23.6.2001, p. 6 and OJ C 105, 1.5.2002, p. 7.
( 2) See footnote 1.

(3) See footnote 1.

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/51

in Sperrenberg. Consequently, the company as a whole
employed some 130 people after the transfer of ASTA’s
activity to Ambau. Since then the workforce has not
increased significantly. In the accounting year 2000/
2001, Ambau employed 139 people, i.e. 25 in Sperren-
berg and 114 in Gräfenhainichen. The owners of Ambau
are two private businessmen, each with a 50 % stake.

(6)

On 4 December 1997, Ambau concluded a contract
with the administrator on the leasing of ASTA’s assets.
In January 1998, the Grundstücksfonds Sachsen-Anhalt
(GSA), which belongs to a publicly-owned body, took
over the assets from the administrator and later con-
cluded a new long-term leasing contract with Ambau.
Within the first ten years, the contract could only be
terminated if there were ‘extraordinary circumstances’
within the meaning of the German civil code (4). In this
initial period Ambau also has the option of buying
the assets. Ambau is contractually responsible for the
maintenance and renovation of the site. Despite the
investor’s original intention of founding a new company,
the activity in Gräfenheinichen was integrated into
Ambau GmbH itself at the request of the financing
banks.

2. The restructuring

(7)

The main problems which led to the difficulties of ASTA
were mismanagement and the absence of a clear product

(8)

(9)

profile. According to Germany, ASTA processed almost
every available order without
its
profitability and without having a clear business plan.

taking account of

The restructuring plan provided for a restructuring
period of three years from 1998 to 2001. According to
the new concept, Ambau’s plant in Gräfenhainichen
should specialise in a few main activities. Firstly, due to
the growing importance of sustainable energy, it is to
concentrate on the production of components for new
technologies such as wind energy. Secondly,
it is to
engage in the production of other components for
power plants such as turbines and exhaust systems.
Other fields of specialisation are the assembly for
furnaces to be used in the metallurgic and chemical
industry as well as the production of large steel structures
such as bridges and towers.

The new product profile required new working assets
(stock and inventories) and the development of a new
customer base. Furthermore, outdated machinery needed
to be replaced and the over-large infrastructure, which
initially led to excessive fixed costs, needed to be
reduced.

(10) The main investments during the restructuring were the
modernisation of the production assets, the replacement
and maintenance of some of the machinery as well as
the introduction of new IT and software. The costs of
restructuring initially were indicated as amounting to
DEM 11 249 000.

(11) The following performance originally was projected by the plan:

Turnover

Material costs

Staff costs

(in DEM)

1998/1999

1999/2000

2000/2001

13 700 000

16 700 000

18 500 000

4 679 000

5 797 000

6 420 000

4 480 000

4 490 000

4 781 000

Other operational costs

2 171 000

2 727 000

3 020 000

Result before tax

Profit/loss

– 164 000

494 000

676 000

– 352 000

208 000

390 000

( 4) Circumstances which render the continuation of the contract
unacceptable to the other party, such as serious breach of
contractual obligations or impossibility of
the contractually
specified use of the object (Articles 545 and 569 of the civil code
in the old version, now covered by Articles 542 et seq. in the new
version).

L 103/52

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

3. State financial measures in support of restructuring

(12) Before the decision to initiate formal investigation proceedings the following measures were
indicated as contributions from public sources which were granted after the take-over in 1997 for
the restructuring:

Table 1

Measures originally indicated as public contributions

1. Waiver of former BvS (*)-loans granted in May 1999

(in DEM)

1 000 000

2.

3.

4.

Regional investment grants supposedly granted in accordance with an approved aid
scheme ( 5) (‘GA-Mittel’)

545 000

80 % guarantee of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt in relation to a DKB (**) credit 3 200 000
(‘Avalrahmen’) of DEM 4 000 000 supposedly granted in accordance with an approved
aid scheme (6)

80 % guarantee of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt in relation to BfG (***)-loans of 1 260 000
DEM 1 700 000 supposedly granted in accordance with an approved aid scheme (7)

5.

Consolidation loan supposedly granted in accordance with an approved aid scheme ( 8)

500 000

6.

7.

56 % guarantee granted by the Land of Saxony-Anhalt in relation to a DKB-loan of
DEM 1 500 000 supposedly granted in accordance with an approved aid scheme (9)

840 000

Dormant equity holding by the WSA (****) supposedly granted in 1999 under an 1 500 000
approved aid scheme (10)

Total

8 845 000

(*) Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben.
(**) Deutsche Kreditbank.
(***) Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft.
(****) Wagnisbeteiligungsgesellschaft Sachsen-Anhalt.
(5) SG(99) D/3472, 17.5.1999 (C 84/98).
(6) SG(91) D/15633, 8.8.1991 (N 431/91).
(7) See Footnote 6.
(8) SG(97) D/9273, 10.11.1997 (N 452/97).
(9) SG(91) D/13344, 15.8.1991 (N 297/91).
(10) SG(97) D/9273, 10.11.1997 (N 452/97).

4.

Financial contributions from other sources

(13) Before the initiation of proceedings, Germany indicated the following contributions as contributions

from the recipient or from private-sector sources:

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/53

Table 2

Measures originally indicated as private contributions

8.

Capital increase partially publicly refinanced by the DtA (*)

9.

Loan granted by Sparkasse Teltow in 1995 at 8,5 % p.a. and secured by guarantees of
the investor (this loan was allocated to the restructuring in Gräfenhainichen in June
1999)

10. Own risk of 20 % concerning item No 3 in Table 1

11. Own risk of 20 % concerning item No 4 in Table 1

12. Own risk of 44 % concerning item No 6 in Table 1

(*) Deutsche Ausgleichsbank.

(in DEM)

300 000

204 000

800 000

440 000

660 000

Total

2 404 000

5. Market information

(14) With its plant in Gräfenhainichen, Ambau is active in the field of general-purpose equipment

(NACE Rev. 1 29.1 and 29.2) as well as special purpose equipment (NACE Rev. 1.29.4 and 29.5).

(15) According to the initial information received, between 1998 and 1999 Ambau achieved 30 % of
its turnover in Germany and 70 % through direct and indirect exports. At the end of 1998, Ambau
held a market share on the German market of 2,5 % in the field of plant construction in the wind
energy sector and 0,089 % in the field of equipment for the metallurgic and chemical industry. At
European level Ambau’s market shares are stated to be marginal and therefore, according to
Germany, cannot be specified in percentage terms. The turnover of DEM 18,5 million in 2000/
2001 is generated as follows: turbines for power generation (35 %); components for wind energy
(35 %); equipment for metal-using industries and mechanical engineering and repair work (30 %).

(16) On the basis of the initial information provided, capacities in Gräfenhainichen would remain the

same.

6. The decisions to initiate and extend the proceedings under Article 88(2) of the
EC Treaty

(17)

In the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the aid was assessed under the
Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty adopted in 1994 (11) (the
1994 Guidelines), since the aid was awarded before the publication of the new Guidelines in
1999 (12) (the 1999 Guidelines).

(11) OJ C 368, 23.12.1994, p. 12.
(12) OJ C 288, 9.10.1999, p. 2.

L 103/54

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

(18)

In the decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission expressed the following doubts:

(a) whether the leasing contract between the GSA and the investor included aid, since the GSA is
a publicly owned body and the Commission did not possess sufficient information to assess
whether the contract was concluded under market conditions.

(b) whether the ad hoc aid granted to the company complied with the conditions of the 1994

Guidelines. In particular:

(i) whether the recipient is eligible for restructuring aid;

(ii) whether, in view of the company’s limited resources and the decline of the company’s
equity in particular, the restructuring plan was suitable to restore viability within a
reasonable time scale;

(iii) whether the aid did not unduly distort competition, since, on the basis of the market
information available at the time proceedings were initiated, it could not be excluded
that Ambau had to reduce its capacity and that the information at that time only
indicated that the capacity was not being increased;

(iv) whether the aid was in proportion to the costs and benefits of the restructuring, since it
was doubtful whether measures 8 and 9 in Table 2 above could be considered as
contributions by the recipient from its own or external commercial resources. Measure 8,
the DtA-loan, appeared to be partially financed through public resources and may
constitute aid. It was not clear whether measure 9, the Sparkasse-loan, was used for the
plant in Sperrenberg or Gräfenheinichen.

(19)

Since it also was not clear whether the 56 % guarantee of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt (measure 6 in
Table 1) and the dormant equity holding of the WSA (measure 7 (13)) complied with the conditions
of the schemes referred to by Germany, the Commission issued an information injunction pursuant
to Article 10(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed
rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (14).

(20) Germany subsequently supplied additional information on the application of the aforementioned
schemes. Concerning the 56 % guarantee (measure 6 (15)), Germany informed the Commission that
this measure was granted to Ambau in 1996 before the take-over of the ASTA plant in
Gräfenhainichen and therefore was not granted to a company in difficulty. Concerning the dormant
equity holding (measure 7 (16)), Germany informed the Commission that this measure actually was
granted under a different aid scheme than initially indicated (17). Additionally, concerning the DtA
loan (measure 8 (18)) which initially was indicated as a contribution by the recipient, Germany
corrected the information it had provided and stated that this measure was financed under an aid
scheme (19) and subsequently should be considered to be existing aid.

(21)

In the decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, with regard to the 54 % guarantee
(measure 6 (20)) the Commission stated that it was not to be further assessed since, according to the
additional information, it appeared to comply with the conditions of the scheme referred to.
Furthermore, the Commission considered that the dormant equity holding (measure 7) did not
comply with the conditions of the scheme referred to by Germany since it was granted in

(13) See Table 1.
(14) OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.
(15) See Table 1.
(16) See Table 1.
(17) SG(97) D/6976, 12.8.1997 (C 337/97).
(18) See Table 2.
(19) SG(99) D/9273, 28.1.1999 (N 463/98).
(20) See Table 1.

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/55

combination with other restructuring measures and therefore had to be assessed as ad hoc aid. The
DtA-loan (measure 8) has to be considered ad hoc aid since the interest rate of the DtA-loan was
lower than provided for in the scheme referred to by Germany and the measure was not granted
within four years after the start-up, as provided for in the scheme.

(22) These two measures must therefore be assessed as individual aid measures in this decision.

III. COMMENTS FROM GERMANY AND THE RECIPIENT

(23) During the formal investigation proceedings, Germany supplied the following new or amended
information, which also comprises comments from the recipient received after the decisions to
initiate and extend the proceedings.

(24) Concerning the new leasing contract concluded between Ambau and the GSA, Germany supplied
an expert’s report according to which the lease price had to take into account the particularly bad
condition of the premises, for the restoration and maintenance of which Ambau was contractually
responsible, as well as the fact that Ambau also took over the administration and maintenance of
parts of the premises that it did not use itself.

(25) Germany states that, before the take-over of ASTA’s activity in Gräfenhainichen, Ambau was a very
small enterprise with limited resources, which employed fewer than 50 people. Between 1993 and
1997, Ambau generated annual profits of about DEM 20 000 on average on an annual turnover of
DEM 10 million. Germany also argues that the original activity in Sperrenberg required little
working capital, since it mainly consisted of assembly work, whereas the new activity in
Gräfenhainichen required a much higher working capital which Ambau could not have financed
exclusively out of its own resources. Furthermore, as a result of the take-over of ASTA’s existing
orders, losses of DEM 1,2 million were incurred. The take-over of ASTA’s activity consequently led
to a decrease of Ambau’s equity as well as an increase of the company’s liabilities.

(26) Germany also submitted additional information according to which all the state financial measures

were exclusively used for the restructuring of the Gräfenhainichen site.

(27) With regard to the viability of the restructuring plan, Germany argues that Ambau’s effective equity
ratio is higher than indicated in the company data because for the time being the aid received needs
to be entered as a liability in the annual balance sheet until it is approved by the Commission.

(28) The following information on the actual performance of Ambau was also supplied:

Turnover

Material costs

Staff costs

Other operating costs

Result before tax

Profit/loss

(a) Before the integration of ASTA.
(*) Business secret.

1997/1998 (a) 1998/1999

1999/2000

2000/2001

(...)* (*)

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

(...)*

L 103/56

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

(29) As far as potential distortion of competition is concerned, Germany provided additional information
on the market according to which the markets for plant construction and for wind energy in
particular were growing. Germany stated that after the restructuring the total amount of possible
production hours at Gräfenhainichen would be reduced compared to the ones formerly possible at
ASTA before the take-over. The capacity in Sperrenberg remained stable. The actual market shares
of Ambau in its main sectors of activity were as follows:

Market share in plant construction

Power plants

Wind energy

Bridge
construction

Germany

EU

< 0,1 %

2,5 %

< 0,1 %

< 0,1 %

1 %

< 0,1 %

(30) As to whether the aid was in proportion to the costs and benefits of the restructuring, Germany
informed the Commission that the actual restructuring costs amounted to DEM 15,3 million,
which comprised the following:

1.

Loss coverage

2.

Investments and fixed assets

3.

Operating funds (required for the new product profile)

4.

Provision for warranty

5.

Miscellaneous

Note: Table contains rounded figures.

(in DEM million)

3,19

1,72

5,96

4,00

0,45

Total

15,32

(31)

In relation to the loan of the Sparkasse Teltow (measure 9 (21)), Germany states that it was used for
the restructuring in Gräfenhainichen. Germany argues that the loan therefore has to be regarded as
a contribution by the recipient to the restructuring.

(32) Germany also informs the Commission that the workforce had agreed to a derogation from a
collective labour agreement bringing a saving of DEM 1 919 000 and that Ambau’s suppliers had
agreed to extensions in periods allowed for payment worth DEM 2 150 000, both of which should
be regarded as a contribution by the recipient to the restructuring.

(33) On the question of whether measure 7 in Table 1, the dormant equity holding by the WSA,
complied with the conditions of the scheme referred to by Germany, Germany corrects its previous
statement that it constituted existing aid and now states that this measure should be assessed as ad
hoc aid.

(21) See Table 2.

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/57

(34) On the question of whether the DtA-loan (measure 8 in Table 2) complied with the conditions of
the scheme referred to by Germany, Germany argues that the scheme did allow the stipulated four-
year granting period to be exceeded in exceptional circumstances. Germany also states that the
interest rates applicable within the scheme are flexible and in fact had decreased. Therefore the
conditions of the loan did not exceed the aid intensity provided for by the scheme.

(35) According to the new information, the restructuring is financed as follows:

Measures indicated as public contributions after the initiation of proceedings (22)

Table 3

1. Waiver for the repayment of BvS loans

Regional investment grants

80 % guarantee in relation to DKB credit (Avalrahmen)

80 % guarantee in relation to BfG-loans

Consolidation loan

56 % guarantee in relation to DKB-loan

Dormant equity holding by WSA

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

(in DEM)

1 000 000

550 000

3 200 000

1 260 000

500 000

840 000

1 500 000

DtA-loan (formerly indicated as private contribution; see Table 2)

300 000

Total

9 150 000

(22) See also Table 1.

Measures indicated as private contributions after the initiation of proceedings (23)

Table 4

9.

Loan granted by Sparkasse Teltow

10. Own risk of 20 % in relation to DKB credit

11. Own risk of 20 % in relation to BfG-loans

12. Own risk of 44 % in relation to DKB-loan

(in DEM)

204 000

800 000

440 000

660 000

13.

14.

Derogation from collective labour agreements agreed to by the workforce
(newly indicated contribution)

1 910 000

Extension of periods allowed for payment agreed to by the suppliers
(newly indicated contribution)

2 150 000

Total

6 164 000

Total Tables 3+4

15 314 000

(23) See also Table 2.

L 103/58

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

(36) Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty declares any aid granted
through State resources to specific undertakings which
distorts or threatens to distort competition incompatible
with the common market in so far as it affects trade
between Member States. Measures falling within the
scope of Article 87(1) EC Treaty that do not constitute
existing aid are generally incompatible with the common
market unless they fall within the scope of the derogation
of either Article 87(2) or Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty.

1. State aid

(37)

information submitted by
In view of the additional
Germany and in particular the expert’s study on the new
leasing contract between Ambau and the GSA, according
to which the leasing price took into account atypical
financial burdens related to the leased property, the
Commission concludes that its doubts whether the
contract might contain state aid have been allayed.

(38) Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty applies to all other
financial measures made available by Germany to the
recipient undertaking. The Commission notes that the
BvS, like its predecessor, the Treuhandanstalt, is a federal
agency whose task is the privatisation of the State-
owned companies in the new Länder. The BvS is part of
the Federal Administration and is accountable to it.
Consequently, measures taken by it are attributable to
the State.

(39) All the measures granted by Germany involve conferring
economic benefits on a specific undertaking which it
would not have received from private-sector sources.
The measures therefore constitute aid. By its nature such
aid is likely to distort competition. Given the nature of
the assistance and the existence of intra-Community
trade in the sectors in which the recipient undertaking is
active, the financial measures fall within the scope of
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(40)

Since the waiver of the obligation to repay BvS-loans
amounting to DEM 1 million (measure 1 (24)) was
not granted under an aid scheme approved by the
Commission, it has to be assessed as ad hoc aid in this
Decision.

(41) With respect to the aid stated to be awarded under
approved schemes, it can be noted that, in particular on
information provided by
the basis of the additional
Germany, measures 2 to 6 (25) and measure 8 (26) appear
to comply with the conditions of the schemes referred
to. These measures need not be further assessed in this
Decision.

(42) With regard to the dormant

equity holding of
DEM 1,5 million by the WSA (measure 7 (27)) which,
according to earlier information provided by Germany,
was granted under an approved aid scheme, Germany
informed the Commission that this measure is not
covered by the provisions of the scheme initially referred
to. Consequently this measure also has to be assessed as
ad hoc aid.

(43) Consequently, aid amounting to DEM 2,5 million
(measures 1 and 7 (28)) has to be assessed as to its
compatibility with the common market in this Decision.

(44) The Commission further notes that Germany failed to
comply with its obligation under Article 88(3) of the
EC Treaty to inform the Commission in sufficient time
of its plans to grant the aid. From a formal point of
therefore. This does not
view,
necessarily mean, however, that the aid is incompatible
with the common market. The individual measures must
therefore be examined under Article 87 of the EC Treaty.

the aid is unlawful

2. Derogation under Article 87 of the EC Treaty

(45) Article 87(2) and (3) sets out the conditions according
to which aid is compatible or may be considered
compatible with the common market. Article 87(3)(c) is
relevant here, since the purpose of the aid was to
enable the restructuring of the recipient and no other
derogation mentioned in Article 87(2) and (3) was
invoked or can be applied.

(46)

In its Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructur-
ing firms in difficulty,
the Commission set out the
conditions for positive exercise of its discretion under
Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. Since the information
submitted by Germany indicates that all of the aid that
is to be assessed was granted to the recipient before the
entry into force of the 1999 Guidelines, the 1994
Guidelines apply to the measures in question pursuant
to point 101 of the 1999 Guidelines.

( 24) See Tables 1 and 3.

(25) See Tables 1 and 3.
(26) See Tables 2 and 3.
(27) See Tables 1 and 3.
(28) See Tables 1 and 3.

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/59

(47)

In the decision to initiate the formal
investigation
procedure, the Commission expressed doubts whether
the following conditions of the 1994 Guidelines were
met:

limited resources which at the time of the take-over also
was considerably smaller than ASTA. Even after the
incorporation, Ambau remained an SME with limited
access to commercial financing, whose investors were
two private businessmen that did not have any support
from a larger group.

(a)

Eligibility for restructuring aid

1.

F i r m i n d i f f i c u l t y

(48) Companies that are eligible for restructuring aid are
defined in the 1994 Guidelines as firms in difficulty
which are unable to recover through their own resources
or by raising the funds they need from their shareholders
or borrowing. The 1994 Guidelines do not provide for
a precise definition of a company in difficulty. However,
typical symptoms for a company in difficulty are
described as deteriorating profitability or increasing size
of losses, diminishing turnover, growing inventories,
excess capacity, declining cash flow, increasing debt,
rising interest charges and low net asset flow. In acute
cases the company may already have become insolvent
or gone into liquidation (point 2.1 of the 1994 Guide-
lines).

(49)

Firstly, it has to be noted that, before its activity was
continued by Ambau, ASTA clearly showed a whole
range of the above mentioned symptoms which finally
forced it into insolvency and led to the subsequent
bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, before its activity
was transferred to Ambau, ASTA would have been
eligible for restructuring aid. On the other hand, it must
be noted that, before it
took over ASTA’s activity,
Ambau was a healthy company. The aid measures to be
assessed in this Decision were granted after the transfer
It must therefore be
of ASTA’s activity to Ambau.
determined whether, after the transfer, Ambau was
eligible for restructuring aid.

(50) Generally, a healthy investor incorporating a company
into its own company could be expected to finance
the restructuring from its own resources or external
commercial financing. Therefore, a healthy investor that
incorporates a company in difficulty into its own
company without itself being in difficulty in principle
cannot be considered eligible for restructuring aid.

(52) Here the information submitted by Germany indicates
that the aid was exclusively used for the restructuring of
the former activity in Gräfenhainichen (former ASTA)
and did not help to finance other activities of the firm.
As a separate entity, the activity in Gräfenhainichen
could have been considered eligible for restructuring aid.
The legal incorporation of the activity in Gräfenheini-
chen into Ambau was only undertaken at the request of
the financing banks in order to obtain sufficient securi-
ties for the loans granted. This legal incorporation was
due to Ambau’s very limited resources. Its two investors
were already committed under the financial plan through
guarantees relating to their personal property. No securi-
ties other than the engagement of their business in
Sperrenberg were therefore available to the investors to
obtain additional external commercial funding. Such
additional funding was indispensable since at the time
of the take-over Ambau possessed insufficient capital to
finance and restructure the newly acquired activity in
Gräfenhainichen.

(53)

In the specific circumstances of this case, therefore, the
incorporation did not take place in order to integrate
the activities of both entities, but only for external
motives, i.e. to raise external funding. Only the problems
that the company was facing as an SME made it
necessary here to legally incorporate the entity, which
was in principle eligible into the investor company in
order to provide improved securities. Such a situation
could also be compared to a change of ownership of the
site in difficulties. According to the 1994 Guidelines,
however, a change of ownership does not affect the
eligibility of a firm for restructuring aid.

(54)

In view of these specific circumstances that the company
was facing as an SME, the aid that was granted for the
restructuring of Ambau’s activity in Gräfenhainichen
can be assessed on the basis of the 1994 Guidelines on
rescue and restructuring aid.

2. T a k e - o v e r o f
c u l t y

t h e a c t i v i t y i n d i f f i -

(51) However, the 1994 Guidelines (point 3.2.4) take a less
restrictive attitude on restructuring aid granted to SMEs.
In this particular case, it appears that only the specific
problems the company was facing as an SME had made
it necessary to legally incorporate the company that was
to be restructured. Ambau is a very small company with

(55) The transfer of the activity of ASTA, which was bank-
rupt, to Ambau has to be regarded as the emergence of
a new firm from the bankruptcy proceedings. Generally
a newly created firm, even if already initially being in
difficulties, cannot be eligible for restructuring aid.
However, due to the exceptional circumstances in the

L 103/60

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

new German Länder, the Commission’s practice is to
apply the 1994 Guidelines to the so-called ‘Auffanglö-
sungen’ (29) in these Länder in cases where such arrange-
ments occurred before the end of December 1999. This
exemption applies as long as the activity of the company
is continued and there is not just a sale of individual
assets (30).

(56)

In this instance, the transfer of the activity in Gräfenhai-
nichen is in economic terms very similar to the afore-
mentioned ‘Auffanglösungen’ as the investors took over
the whole activity of ASTA as well as a significant part
of the workforce. However, since Ambau at present only
leases the assets in Gräfenhainichen, the question arises
whether this can be considered to be a take-over of the
activity in difficulties.

(57) Here the original intention of the investors was to buy
the assets in Gräfehainichen which, due to the very
limited resources of Ambau, was not possible at the time
of the transfer, because the available financial resources
were already entirely used up for other restructuring
measures. In this context, it is also noted that Ambau
did not receive any aid to purchase the assets, although
this would have been permissible under the Com-
mission’s practice in relation to the 1994 Guidelines.
Ambau therefore concluded a long-term leasing contract
in relation to the entire activity, including the option of
buying the assets. The contractual obligations such as
the restricted right of cancellation and the maintenance
obligation aimed at ensuring a long-term commitment
by the investor to the site. Ambau subsequently invested
DEM 1,7 million into the renovation of the site. Ambau
also took over existing orders of ASTA in relation
to which losses of DEM 1,2 million were incurred.
Furthermore, the two investors contributed their existing
business in Sperrenberg as well as personal guarantees
to the restructuring.

(58) The leasing contract in respect of the assets did not
therefore take place because of a lack of the investors’
commitment to the restructuring, but was due to their
limited financial resources. Through the leasing contract,
the investor took over the whole production site and

( 29) New companies evolving out of the bankruptcy proceedings,
thereby continuing the operation of the bankrupt business.
( 30) This exemption now is explicitly laid down in footnote 10 of the
1999 Guidelines, establishing that ‘the only exceptions to this rule
are any cases dealt with the Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte
Sonderaufgaben in the context of its privatisation remit and other
similar cases in the new Länder, involving companies emerging
from liquidation or take-over of assets occurring up to 31 Decem-
ber 1999’.

not just individual assets. The investors’ commitment to
the site is also confirmed by the long-term lease with
purchase option and by the investments and the shift of
staff to Gräfenhainichen. Furthermore, with the loss-
making existing orders, the original activity with its
inherent difficulties was taken over. Lastly, the investors
undertook substantial personal risks linked to the success
of the restructuring. Even if it did not become the owner
of the assets, therefore, Ambau had effectively taken
over the activity in difficulty.

(59) Consequently, Ambau was eligible for aid under the
1994 Guidelines as regards the restructuring of the
Gräfenhainichen site in difficulty which it had taken
over.

(b) Restoration of viability

(60) Under the 1994 Guidelines,

the restructuring plan
should lead to the restoration of viability within a
reasonable time scale after which the company should
be able to compete on the market on its own merits.
This is mainly to be obtained by internal measures and
should involve the abandonment of structurally loss-
making activities.

(61) Concerning the viability of the restructuring plan, doubts
whether the company was able to accomplish the goals
set out in the plan arose because of a decrease in the
company’s equity capital. Germany supplied additional
information according to which the low equity ratio
derived from the fact that the aid is entered as a liability
as long as it is not approved by the Commission.
Furthermore, the equity ratio is not the most decisive
factor in assessing the prospects of the plan. At present,
one has to note that, with the considerable staff
reduction at the Gräfenhainichen site, the modernisation
of the production facilities as well as the concentration
on a few key activities, the major problems that led to
the difficulties of ASTA appear to have been adequately
addressed. Therefore, it can be assumed that the restruc-
turing plan, which foresaw a return to profits within
two to three years after the take-over, was suited to
restoring the viability of the company.

(62) The Commission’s initial doubts whether the plan was
suited to restoring viability have therefore been allayed.
This conclusion appears to be confirmed by the actual
performance of the company.

24.4.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 103/61

(c) Avoidance of distortions of competition

(63) Another condition of the 1994 Guidelines is that the
adverse effects of the aid on competition should be
offset as far as possible. In so far as the company is
engaged in markets with excess capacity, this should
mean a reduction in the company’s capacity.

(64)

From the information available before the initiation of
proceedings, it could not be determined whether Ambau
was obliged to reduce its capacity.

(65) Germany supplied additional information showing that
the market shares of Ambau are rather insignificant.
Furthermore, it can be concluded from the new infor-
mation that Ambau is engaged in activities on growing
markets and that the company in fact has to some extent
limited its own capacities. The doubts whether the aid
granted to Ambau did unduly distort competition have
therefore been allayed.

(d)

Proportionality to the restructuring costs and benefits

(66) The Guidelines require that the aid be limited to the
strict minimum needed for the restructuring to be
undertaken. Therefore the recipient is required to make
a substantial contribution to the restructuring from its
own or external commercial sources. The latter has to
be understood as commercial financing at market rates.

(67) According to the latest information, the restructuring
costs amounted to DEM 15,3 million. Germany states
that contributions from the recipient to these costs
amounted to DEM 6,2 million, i.e. some 40 %, compris-
ing measures 9 to 14 in Table 4 above.

(68)

In its decision to initiate proceedings, however, the
Commission expressed doubts as to whether the DtA-
Sparkasse-loan
loan
(measure 9 (32)) could be considered to be a contribution
from the recipient.

(measure

8 (31))

and

the

(70) As regards the Sparkasse loan, it was doubtful whether
it could be counted as a contribution as it was not clear
whether it had been used for the restructuring in
Gräfenhainichen. Germany has
supplied additional
information as to its use at the Gräfenhainichen site as
well as to the terms on which it was granted. It has to be
noted that the Sparkasse is a publicly controlled financial
institution. In view of the fact that, at the time the loan
was granted, Ambau was a very small undertaking and
that the loan was secured only by personal guarantees,
it is not clear whether the actual rate of 8,5 % did in fact
correspond to market conditions and is acceptable as an
external commercial contribution. However, even if this
measure is not taken into account as a contribution
from the recipient from external commercial sources,
this does not have any influence on the outcome of the
proportionality assessment.

(71) As regards the derogation from the collective labour
agreement (measure 13 (33)) which was first mentioned
in the information received after the initiation of pro-
ceedings, the Commission notes that as long as the
employees are not themselves investors in the company,
their contributions cannot be regarded either as an
investor contribution or as public financing.

(72) As regards the agreement by the suppliers to allow
Ambau longer terms of payments, the Commission
reiterates its position as expressed in the decision to
extend the formal
investigation procedure that it is
doubtful whether such short-term postponement can
be considered to be commercial contributions to a
restructuring. However, even if this measure is not taken
into account, this does not have any influence on the
outcome of the proportionality assessment.

(73) The contribution made by the recipient from its own
or external commercial sources therefore amounts to
DEM 1,9 million, i.e. 12,41 %. Furthermore, Ambau is
an SME in an assisted area currently employing some
140 employees. In previous cases the Commission has
in very specific circumstances approved aid to SMEs with
a relatively low investor contribution (34). In addition,
the two investors have committed themselves to the
restructuring with their original business in Sperrenberg

(69)

In the latest information, Germany itself takes the view
that the DtA-loan has to be regarded as aid and therefore
cannot be taken into account as a contribution from the
recipient.

( 31) See Tables 2 and 3.
( 32) See Tables 2 and 4.

(33) See Table 4.
(34) Cases: KHK Verbindetechnik GmbH Brotterode (11,5 %), OJ
L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 80; GMB Magnete Bitterfeld (12 %), OJ C 50,
17.2.1998, p. 6; Stahl- und Maschinenbau Rostock (12 %), OJ
C 365, 18.12.1999, p. 9; Draiswerke (11 %), OJ L 108,
27.4.1999, p. 44.

L 103/62

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

24.4.2003

as well as their private property, since bank loans to the
company have also been secured by personal guarantees
provided by the investors. The investors have therefore
taken considerable personal risks that are linked to the
success of the restructuring process. Furthermore, the
aid did not provide the undertaking with excessive
surplus cash that could be used for distortive practices
vis-à-vis competitors.

V. CONCLUSION

that Germany has unlawfully
The Commission finds
implemented aid to the amount of DEM 2,5 million in breach
of Article 88(3) of the Treaty. However, in view of the above
considerations, the Commission concludes that these measures
are compatible with the common market,

(74)

For these reasons, the Commission considers that the
investor contribution can be considered significant
within the meaning of the 1994 Guidelines and fulfils
the condition of point 3.2.2.(iii) of the 1994 Guidelines
as regards the proportionality of the aid.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The aid which Germany has granted to Ambau Stahl- und
is
Anlagenbau GmbH, amounting to EUR 1,28 million,
compatible with the
to
Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.

common market pursuant

(75) Consequently,

information
in view of the additional
supplied by Germany during the proceedings, the Com-
mission’s original doubts whether the aid complies with
the conditions of the 1994 Guidelines have been allayed.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Done at Brussels, 27 November 2002.

For the Commission

Mario MONTI

Member of the Commission