WRITTEN QUESTION E-3296/02 by Dominique Vlasto (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Sale of spare parts to clock and watchmakers in the European Union.
Date: 2002-11-21
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Switzerland, application of EU law, clock and watch industry, consumer protection, control of restrictive practices, refusal to sell, selective distribution agreement, spare part

7.11.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 268 E/27

The Union has a strong Common Position on Burma/Myanmar (1). It was first adopted in 1996 (2) and has
been strengthened on a number of occasions since. It includes an arms embargo imposed in 1990, the
suspension of defence co-operation since 1991 and the suspension of all bilateral aid, other than strictly
humanitarian assistance. There is also a Union visa ban on the members of the military regime, the
members of the government, senior military and security officers and their families, as well as the
suspension of high-level governmental visits to Burma/Myanmar.

Separately, Union trade privileges, normally granted to Least Developed Countries, were withdrawn from
Burma/Myanmar in 1997 because of forced labour. This also means that the country is not eligible to
benefit from the Union’s ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative, launched in 2001.

The Common Position was renewed for a further six months, without easing of sanctions, on 21 October
2002. In the Council Conclusions, which are fully supported by the Commission, the Union once again
urged the restoration of democracy, the pursuit of national reconciliation, and the protection of human
rights in Burma/Myanmar.

(1) OJ L 285, 23.10.2002.
(2) OJ L 287, 8.11.1996.

(2003/C 268 E/031)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3296/02

by Dominique Vlasto (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(21 November 2002)

Subject: Sale of spare parts to clock and watchmakers in the European Union

The Commission’s attention has already been drawn to the fact that clock and watchmakers are finding it
more and more difficult to obtain the spare parts required to repair watches of certain luxury brands. This
applies particularly to watches sold by Swiss manufacturers, who impose restrictions on the sale of spare
parts to independent clock and watchmakers in the European Union.

This distribution policy, modelled on that for luxury goods, has become widespread and is now followed
by most of the clock and watchmaking industry. Watch manufacturers who no longer supply spare parts
to watchmakers have developed their own repair centres, thus securing a repair monopoly and denying
consumers the option of choosing who carries out the repair.

1. Where a producer has a less than 30 % share of the relevant market, the Commission considers that
there is no restriction of competition. What is the position if a group of producers, none of which exceeds
the 30 % threshold, imposes the same restriction on the distribution of spare parts? In such a case, what
can be done to offset the negative effects on competition?

2.
The Commission has proposed new rules for the car distribution sector. Why should it not propose
new rules for the watch distribution sector to safeguard the livelihood of the thousands of independent
clock and watchmakers?

In the specific case of watches from Swiss manufacturers, can the Commission indicate whether there

3.
is any prospect of an early solution to this difficulty?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(9 January 2003)

The ban on restrictive agreements in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty applies also to restrictive vertical
agreements where the manufacturer has less than 30 % of the relevant market when such agreements
appreciably affect
trade between Member States. Because the Commission recognizes that vertical
agreements caught by Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty may result in more positive than negative effects it

C 268 E/28

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

7.11.2003

has issued Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (1), hereafter Block
Exemption Regulation, which exempts certain restrictive vertical agreements from the application of
Article 81(1), provided the supplier or buyer has less than 30 % of the relevant market.

The Commission may withdraw the benefit of the said Block Exemption Regulation if, in a particular case,
it finds that access to the relevant market or competition within the relevant market is restricted by the
cumulative effect of parallel networks of similar vertical restraints implemented by competing suppliers. In
addition, the Commission may, by means of regulation, declare that where parallel networks of similar
vertical restraints cover more than 50 % of a relevant market, the Block Exemption Regulation shall not
apply to all vertical agreements containing specific restraints in that market.

The Commission wishes to stress that also in the field of watches, it can and will address any restriction of
competition using Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, provided such restriction has an appreciable effect
on trade between Member States.

The Commission does not consider that the particularities of the watch manufacturing industry justify the
adoption of a Block Exemption Regulation applying specifically to watches. In particular, the Commission
considers that environmental and safety issues directly related to the repair and maintenance of motor
vehicles cannot, as such, be transposed to watches.

The Commission is aware of the commercial practice being developed in the Swiss watch manufacturing
industry and currently is examining whether a watch manufacturer’s refusal to supply spare parts to
independent watchmakers may violate Community competition law, including Article 82 of the EC Treaty,
especially in cases where the watch manufacturer is not located in the Union.

(1) OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.

(2003/C 268 E/032)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3317/02

by Jan Mulder (ELDR)
and Herman Vermeer (ELDR) to the Commission

(22 November 2002)

Subject: Lawfulness of a ban on vehicle movements at night in Austria

Is the Commission aware of the ban on movements at night between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. between
1 October and 1 April which the Austrian Government recently introduced for goods vehicles of more
than 7,5 tonnes on the A12 between Kundl (at kilometre 20,369 near Wörgl) and Ampass (at kilometre
86,780 near Innsbruck)?

Austria says that it has taken the measure to reduce the strain on the environment along that route.
Accordingly, movements by vehicles with a NOX discharge level below 3,5 g/kWh are exempted from the
measure. The transport of highly perishable foodstuffs and periodicals such as newspapers plus emergency
shipments of medicines are also exempted from the scope of the measure. Exemptions for flowers and
ornamental plant products, which are usually also perishable, cannot be expected from the Austrian
Government.

As a result of the measure, serious economic damage is being done to the ornamental plant sector as a
whole, since products are arriving late at their destinations. A typical feature of the sector is the fact that, if
the transport chain is interfered with or slowed down, there is a quantifiable impact on product quality
and, hence, on prices obtained.

To what extent is this Austrian measure affecting the trans-European network compatible at all with
European law and the principle of free movement of goods it lays down? The measure would furthermore
appear to discriminate against non-Austrian hauliers’ transit movements.