Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Nuclear safety in the European Union
Date: 2002-11-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Union, nuclear fuel, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, standard, waste management

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 6.11.2002
COM(2002) 605 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Nuclear safety in the  European Union

INTRODUCTION

1.

2.

The  Green  Paper  entitled  "Towards  a  European  strategy  for  security  of  energy
supply",  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  29  November  2000,1  provided  the
opportunity  for  an  open,  objective  and  rational  debate  on  nuclear  energy  to  take
place.  On  26  June  2002,  the  Commission  adopted  the  final  report  on  the  Green
Paper,2 which concluded that "the range of  choices available to the Member  States
has to be as wide as possible, without prejudice to their sovereignty in these matters.
The nuclear option remains open to those EU Member States who would like it."

Civil  nuclear  activities  are  regulated  in  the  European  Union  by  the  EURATOM
treaty,  signed  in  1957.  This  created  a  Supply  Agency  with  the  aim  of  ensuring
regular  and  equitable  supply  of  nuclear  materials  to  European  users  and  a
EURATOM  safeguards  capability  to  make  certain  that  nuclear  materials  were  not
diverted from their intended use. Some 250 inspectors are currently engaged on this
task.  A  report  in  February  2002  by  a  group  of  high-level  experts  convened  by  the
Commission  concluded  that,  in  order  to  include  the  entire  concept  of  nuclear
security, the possibility of enlarging the task of nuclear inspectors to include physical
protection should be explored.3 The arrangements put in place by the Treaty together
with  Community  legislation  guarantee  the  most  effective  control  in  the  world  of
nuclear  materials.  Indeed,  the  complementarity  between  the  activities  of  the
EURATOM  Supply  Agency  and  EURATOM  security  control  provides  the
framework  for  the  global  responsibility  of  the  EU  over  the  whole  fuel  cycle,  from
nuclear materials to waste.

Nevertheless, the main purpose of the EURATOM treaty was to supervise the secure
management of nuclear installations, including a high standard of health protection.
A  broad  set  of  specific  measures,  distinct  from  those  which  had  evolved  under  the
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been developed in the field
of  radiation  protection.  Paradoxically,  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  has  not
developed in the same  way, although it  is supposed  to  provide  concrete  guarantees
for  protecting  populations  against  ionising  radiation,  an  area  in  which  the
Commission  has,  for  a  number  of  years,  had  undeniable  technological  expertise  in
the form of the Joint Research Centre (JRC). It is therefore appropriate to add safety
standards for nuclear installations during and at the end of their working lives to the
legislative  corpus  dealing  with  radiation  protection,  as  requested  by  the  European
Council, in particular at its meeting in Laeken, and by the European Parliament in the
Rübig report, adopted on 8 July 2002, on the Commission’s report on the activities of
the EURATOM Safeguards Office in 1999-2000.

1

2

3

COM(2000)769,  29  November  2000:  "Towards  a  European  strategy  for  the  security  of  energy  supply".
Office for Official Publications of the EC, 2001, ISBN 92-894-0319-5
COM(2002)321 final, 26 June 2002: Final report on the Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the
security of energy supply"
SEC(2002)658:  Communication  from  Mrs  de  Palacio  in  agreement  with  Mr  Kinnock  “Mission  of  the
EURATOM Security Control Office and revision of the organisation chart of DG Energy and Transport”,
adopted on 26 June 2002

2

                                                
3.

4.

5.

The forthcoming inclusion of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe,
of which the first steps are scheduled for 2004, is unprecedented in the history of the
development  of  the  European  Union.  The  history  of  these  countries  during  the
twentieth  century  and  the  nature  of  their  economic  development  has  created  a
particular focus on a subject little touched upon in previous enlargements - that of the
nuclear sector. As the Green Paper on security of energy supply stressed, dependence
on  imports  to  meet  energy  needs  in  the  candidate  countries  does  not  differ  much
from  that  of  the  present  EU  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  the  nuclear  sector  will
have to receive more attention in the context of an enlarged EU.

Of the candidate countries, seven have nuclear power plants a total of 22 reactors. Of
particular  relevance  to  2004  is  that  five  of  the  ten  countries  expected  to  enter  the
Union in 2004 have between them 19 reactors . The nature of the relationship of the
candidate  countries  with  the  Russian  Federation,  resulting  from  their  former
dependence on the Soviet Union, and the requirement for them to adopt all elements
of  Community  law,  has  brought  to  light  a  new  objective  need  for  Community
intervention  in  the  nuclear  sector,  regardless  of  choices  in  energy  policy
subsequently made by the new or existing Member States.

This  fifth  enlargement  exercise  has  raised  previously  unconsidered  issues  about
nuclear  safety.  Firstly,following  an  analysis  by  nuclear  safety  authorities,  Agenda
2000 identified those reactors which should be decommissioned in the near future, as
they  could  not  be  upgraded  at  a  reasonable  economic  cost.  Secondly,  a  safety
analysis  prompted  the  European  Council,  in  co-operation  with  the  Commission,  to
give  clear  guidance  as  to  the  improvements  which  would  have  to  be  made  for  the
candidate countries to attain the high level of safety required by the Cologne Council
(June 1999).

This  Community  evaluation  exercise  provided  a  European  perspective  on  nuclear
safety. The Laeken European Council in December 2001 internalised this perspective
by asking for reports on nuclear safety to be presented on a regular basis. This would
not be possible without the establishment of  a Community  reference framework  on
nuclear safety standards. Concrete actions have been undertaken by the Community
in the field of nuclear safety, largely for the benefit of candidate countries.  Today we
are in the rather paradoxical situation where Community action on nuclear safety in
third  countries  is  internationally  acknowledged  while  domestic  action  remains
limited.

A  significant  number  of  nuclear  installations  in  the  European  Union  are  coming
towards  the  end  of  their  active  lives.    Some  Member  States  such  as  Belgium  are
considering  whether  to  retain  nuclear  installations  on  their  territory.    Germany  has
taken  the  plunge  and  will  permanently  close  its  last  nuclear  plant  in  2021.    In  the
candidate  countries, the European  Union has  requested  the  closure  of  eight  nuclear
reactorsbetween 2002 and 2009: Bohunice 1 and 2, Kozloduy 1 to 4 and Ignalina 1
and  2.  These  facts,  independent  of  any  energy  choices  made  by  Member  States
themselves,  underline  the  need  for  clear  provisions  to  be  put  into  place  in  the
electricity sector , in all Member States and candidate countries, in order to fund the
decommissioning  of  power  stations.  These  provisions  will  have  to  guarantee  that
these  closures  can  be  achieved  according  to  the  highest  safety  standards.
Decommissioning  nuclear  power  stations  requires  the  commitment  of  considerable

3

sums of money. The sums required for complete rehabilitation of the site of a nuclear
power station are in the order of 15% of the total investment cost of each reactor to
be decommissioned, which can be  anything  from 200  million  euros  to  more  than  a
billion.

While  Member  States  which  have  nuclear  power  stations  have  made  financial
provisions  to  ensure  the  availability  of  sufficient  funds  to  cover  the  expense  of
decommissioning  such  plants,  their  approach  to  the  management  of  these  funds
varies  significantly  from  one  Member  State  to  another.  In  addition,  the  current
situation involves disparities which are a hindrance to the smooth functioning of the
internal market and undermine healthy competition in the electricity sector.

The  European  Parliament  has  drawn  attention  (in  the  context  of  the  debate  on  the
proposed  directive  on  common  rules  for  the  internal  energy  market)  to  the  adverse
effects that misuse of decommissioning funds could have on competition. Sufficient
funds obviously have to be available to cover decommissioning costs, but it  is  also
necessary to ensure that those funds are used only for those activities.

Although the candidate countries have similar laws concerning the establishment of
funds of this type, the funds available are in general inadequate, having been put in
place only relatively recently. For the early closure of nuclear power plants, the need
for funds is even more  pressing.  The Phare programme,  along with Euratom  loans,
can  partially  subsidise  and  compensate  for  the  shortfalls,  but  completion  of  the
internal  energy  market,  along  with  environmental  considerations,  will  require  the
introduction  of  new  rules  for  the  enlarged  EU  to  ensure  the  availability  and
sufficiency of funds.

6.

Whatever  the  future  of  nuclear  technology,  whatever  uses  it  is  put  to,  for  energy,
industrial or medical purposes, and whether one is for or  against its use in  general,
the  management  of  radioactive  waste  resulting  from  such  uses  calls  for  radical
solutions.  The  final  report  on  the  Green  Paper  shows  that  "one  major  lesson  to  be
drawn  from  the  Green  Paper  debate  is  that  the  future  of  this  industry  depends  on
finding  a  clear  and  unequivocal  answer  to  the  question  of  the  processing  and
transportation of radioactive waste."4

There has not so  far  been an  active policy in  favour  of permanent disposal  of  high
level radioactive waste. High level radioactive waste has been building up for nearly
half  a  century  in  temporary  means  of  storage  which  vary  from  country  to  country,
either  at  the  power  plants  themselves  (as  irradiated  nuclear  fuel)  or  in  temporary
storage  sites.  This  type  of  temporary,  and  at  present  indefinite,  storage,  sometimes
above ground, raises concerns, particularly in the light of the events of 11 September
2001, as to the vulnerability to terrorist attack of such sites.

As the Green Paper on security of energy supply emphasised, the nuclear option can
only be pursued if a satisfactory and transparent solution can be found to the question
of  the  management  of  nuclear  waste.  Opinion  surveys  recently  undertaken  by  the

4

In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  transport  of  nuclear  materials,  the  Commission  expects  to  present  a
Communication on this specific subject, possibly accompanied by legislative proposals.

4

                                                
Commission5confirm this analysis and show that a clear policy for the management
of  nuclear  waste  would  significantly  improve  public  attitudes  to  the  use  of  nuclear
power. It is therefore necessary for the EU to ensure that Member State decisions are
taken within a reasonable time and with future generations in mind.

According to most experts,  permanent deep disposal is the best  known solution for
the  long-term  management  of  radioactive  waste.  Research  into  the  technology  of
radioactive waste management, which has led to a reduction in long-life radioactive
elements,  has  not  yet  resulted  in  a  practicable  alternative  to  geologicaldisposal.  It
must  nevertheless  be  pursued  in  order  to  give  future  generations  access  to  new
technologies  for  the  treatment  of  radioactive  waste,  such  as  transmutation,  in  the
hope that  in due course  waste  can be  significantly  reduced. This  is why  90 million
euros  have  been  allocated  to  research  into  waste  management  under  the  sixth
research framework programme (2002-2006). The Joint Research Centre, for its part,
will  devote  in  6th  Framework  Programme  significant  efforts  towards  actions  in  the
field of waste management research

7.

Enlargement has also brought a new context to the continuing difficulties regarding
trade  in  nuclear  materials  with  the  Russian  Federation.  Russia  is  an  important
supplier  of  nuclear  materials  (natural  uranium  and  enrichment  services).  Since  the
beginning of the 1990s, Russia has sold onto the market more significant quantities
of  natural  uranium  and,  in  particular,  has  offered  uranium  enrichment  services  at
prices below those on the world market.

This situation led to the adoption by the Euratom Supply Agency in 1992 of a policy
of diversification of supply sources, in order to avoid  excessive  dependence  on  the
Newly  Independent  States.  A  first  attempt  at  an  agreement  on  trade  in  nuclear
materials was not successful because of the very hard line taken by the Russians in
their  attempt  to  obtain  the  best  deal.  Negotiations  undertaken  since  under  the
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (signed in Corfu on 24 June 1994) have not
been successful and the issue of trade in nuclear materials has not yet been settled.6

In  the  absence  of  agreement  between  the  parties,  the  Council  and  the  Commission
adopted  a  joint  declaration  (Declaration  of  Corfu7)  stipulating  that  the  share  for
European  uranium  enrichers  should  be  maintained  at  around  80%  of  the  European
market. The principle of setting a limit was also confirmed for natural uranium.

Over the course of the Energy  Dialogue  ongoing between Russia and the EU  since
October  2000,  Russian  demands  have  become  more  ambitious,  citing 
the
incompatibility of measures taken within the framework of the Declaration of Corfu
and World Trade Organisation rules, and creating confusion about the existence of a
30%  quota  for  all  energy  products  imported  into  the  EU.  Negotiations  on  other

5

6

7

A survey undertaken in October-November 2001 by the Commission established that a large majority (2/3)
of those polled agree that if the management of nuclear waste can be safely and satisfactorily resolved, the
nuclear  power  option  should  remain  open  as  a  means  of  electricity  production  (Eurobarometer  2001  –
Public Opinion in Europe on Nuclear Waste)
In the absence of agreement between the two parties, the PCA does not directly deal with trade in nuclear
materials. Under Article 22, the parties agree to take all the necessary measures to reach agreement on trade
in nuclear materials by 1 January 1997.
The Declaration of Corfu has not been published.

5

                                                
subjects  of  common  interest  have  also  been  affected.  Every  official  meeting,
including  EU-Russia  summit  meetings,  is  treated  as  another  opportunity  for  the
Russians to protest about restrictions and to call for a satisfactory resolution on trade
in nuclear materials, which has been blocked since 1994. The EU-Russia Summit of
29 May 2002 concluded that "... The existing situation with respect to the import of
nuclear materials  to  the  EU  Member  States  is  a  matter  of  concern  for  the  Russian
side. We agreed, in accordance with article 22 of the PCA and in the context of EU
enlargement, to reach a mutually acceptable solution."8

The  operating  environment  for  the  market  in  nuclear  materials  has  changed
significantly since the beginning of the 1990s, in the world as a whole as well as in
Europe and Russia. The nuclear disarmament agreements, and above all the prospect
of  enlargement  including  countries  which  have  Soviet-type  nuclear  power  stations
for  which  Russia  is  practically  the  only  fuel  supplier,  mean  that  a  new  long-term
framework  for  current  supply  policies  needs  to  be  considered.  For  the  European
Union, this is also an appropriate time to make clear to the Russian authorities that
the  opening  of  negotiations  on  trade  in  nuclear  materials  should  also  provide  a
platform  for  concrete  discussion  about  the  safety  of  first-generation  power  stations
still in operation in Russia.

8.

The  lack  of  a  Community  frame  of  reference  for  safety  in  nuclear  installations,
uncertainty as to the availability of financial means to ensure safe decommissioning,
the  lack  of  safe  solutions  to  the  management  of  nuclear  waste  and  the  mack  of  a
framework for trade in nuclear materials with Russia provide other areas in which it
is desirable to develop Community legislation.

The  Commission  is  responding  to  this  challenge  and  to  its  undertaking  of  26  June
2002, with the adoption of the follow-up report to the Green Paper, to bring forward
as  soon  as  possible  a  proposal  paving  the  way  to  a  true  Community  approach  to
nuclear safety and allowing rapid progress towards lasting solutions to the question
of the management of radioactive waste.

8

Joint Statement by V. V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, J. M. Aznar, President of the European
Council/High representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, and R. Prodi, President of
the Commission of the European Communities, Moscow, 29 May 2002, Annex 2

6

                                                
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NUCLEAR SAFETY IN THE UNION,

A.
FROM THE CONCEPTION TO THE DECOMMISSIONING OF INSTALLATIONS

1.

Safety at nuclear installations: extending Community competence

1.1.

Improving safety at nuclear installations: an imperative in an enlarged Union

a)

The Union has insufficient means

The  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom)  contains
provisions  allowing  the  Community  to  regulate  the  use  of  nuclear  energy  by  the  Member
States, in particular as regards nuclear safeguards and health protection.

Nuclear  safeguards9  are  the  responsibility  of  the  Community  pursuant  to  Chapter  7  of  the
Euratom  Treaty.  A  team  of  250  inspectors  at  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  carries  out
inspections in order to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted for unauthorised purposes.

The  safety10  of  nuclear  installations11 is  not  a  responsibility  so  explicitly  established  by  the
Euratom Treaty. When it was being negotiated in the 1950s, the nuclear industry was still in
its infancy. It was therefore self-evident that nuclear power should be promoted. That is why
the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  is  the  responsibility  of  the  nuclear  operators  under  the
supervision of their national authorities.

Pursuant  to  Article  2(b)  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  Community  shall,  as  provided  in  this
Treaty: "establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general
public  and  ensure  that  they  are  applied."  Chapter  3  of  the  Treaty,  concerning  health
protection,  contains  provisions  concerning  basic  standards  with  regard  to  protection  against
ionising radiation.

Chapter  3  of  the  Treaty  has  been  used  in  the  main  with  regard  to  radiation  protection.
Concerns about this subject had been expressed for a number of years before the Treaty was
drafted,  in  particular  as  a  result  of  the  use  of  radioactivity  in  the  medical  sphere.  Radiation
protection came into being as a discipline derived from medical radiology in order to protect
medical personnel using x-ray generators.

It is, however, undeniable that maintaining a high level of nuclear safety is one of the tasks
assigned to the European Atomic Energy Community. Nuclear safety and radiation protection
are  now  two  closely  linked  concepts  serving  a  common  health  protection  objective.
Consequently, it is now no longer possible or desirable to separate these two disciplines.

Hitherto, the Community has not  made  full  use  of  its  powers  with  regard  to  nuclear  safety.
However,  the  Commission  has  actively  intervened  in  connection  with  the  harmonisation  of
nuclear  safety  practices  for  over  25  years,  in  particular  under  the  Council  resolutions  of

9  Nuclear  safeguards  are  measures  concerning  access  to  and  the  protection  and  use  of  nuclear  material  and
radioactive substances. In practical terms, this concept covers physical protection and non-proliferation
checks.

10  Nuclear  safety  concerns  the  measures  introduced  to  guarantee  efficient  and  safe  design  and  operation  of

nuclear installations.

11  Nuclear  installations  is  the  term  generally  used  to  cover  nuclear  fuel  cycle  installations  (in  particular  civil

reactors, research reactors, reprocessing plants and enrichment plants ...).

7

                                                
22 July 197512  and  18 June 199213  on  the  technological  problems  of  nuclear  safety14.  The
prospect of enlargement has highlighted the need for greater action.

Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which was undoubtedly the most serious accident
in  the  history  of  atomic  energy,  and  the  G-7  Summit  in  Munich  in  1992,  the  EU  began  to
concern  itself  with  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  in  the  Central  and  Eastern European
countries and the Republics of the former Soviet Union.

The work carried out in the Community framework in order to bring nuclear installations in
the candidate countries up to a high level of safety allowed a European perspective to emerge
in  this  context.  This  perspective,  developed  for  the  candidate  countries,  is  universal  and
should constitute the foundations for a reference method for evaluating the safety of nuclear
installations in the Member States as part of a Community approach.

The standards drawn up under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency make an
important  contribution  to  improving  nuclear  safety,  but  they  are  not  legally  binding  and
cannot  always  be  directly  applied  to  the  technological  realities  of  the  European  nuclear
industry. Moreover, the Community adoption and adaptation processes are much quicker than
the  intergovernmental  decision-making  mechanisms.  This  is  a  problem  with  which  the
European Community has already been confronted in the maritime and aviation spheres.

Protection from ionising radiation is also a concern after the end of the active life of a nuclear
installation. In practice, the final shutdown of a nuclear installation marks the start of a new
phase with the objective of lifting the radiological protection restrictions imposed while it was
in  operation.  These  restrictions  are  due  to  the  presence  of  large  quantities  of  radioactive
materials in the form of structural materials, equipment, operational waste and spent fuel.

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  remove  these  materials  and  to  subject  them  to  the  treatment
appropriate  to  their  physical  characteristics  and  their  levels  of  radioactivity,  in  accordance
with  safety  standards  in  force.  All  activities  involved  in  decommissioning  produce  large
quantities  of  waste.  It  is  the  ultimate  disposal  of  radioactive  wastes  which  accounts  for  the
majority of the costs of decommissioning.

At national level there are legal provisions setting out a strategy for decommissioning nuclear
installations. These provisions define responsibilities for the different activities involved and
set up mechanisms for the provision of sufficient financial resources to deal with the expenses
arising  from  the  various  activities  at  each  phase  of  the  decommissioning  process,  including
the long term management of radioactive waste and spent fuel cells.

It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  there  are  significant  variations  between  countries  in  the
amounts of money involved, not only as a function of the size of the industry but also because
of  variations  on  the  methodology  for  estimating  the  costs  of  decommissioning.  These  costs
depend  heavily  on  chosen  decommissioning  strategies,  methods  for  calculating  future  costs
and  assumptions  about  the  future  avolution  of  financial  variables.  Approaches  to  the
regulation  of  financial  resources  for  decommissioning  also  vary  significantly  between
Member States of the Union.

12 OJ No C 185 of 14 August 1975, p. 1.
13 OJ No C 172 of 18 June 1992, p. 2.
14  By  this  is  meant  “nuclear  safety”.  Confusion  often  arises  due  to  the  translation  of  both  the  french  “sûreté”,

“sécurité” into the english

8

                                                
As nuclear industries are not immune from financial risk, the question of the consequences of
possible  non-availability  of  reservces  must  be  considered.  A  situation  where  a  State  would
have  to  take  on  the  costs  of  decommissioning  due  to  the  insolvency  of  the  responsible
operator could not be justified to taxpayers or to other operators who had made more adequate
provisions or managed them better.

Decommissioning work therefore involves major  financial  resources.  In  order  to  avoid  risks
to human health and to the environment it is necessary to guarantee, at Community level, that
financial  resources  will  be  available  for  the  completion  of  decommissioning  work  in
conformity with safety standards. To this end, specific regulations must be put in place for the
creation of decommissioning funds, to which the operators of nuclear installations will have
to contribute throughout  the  active life of  the  installation. These regulations  must  guarantee
the availability and adequacy of funds at the time of decommissioning operations.

b)

Commission and Council evaluation of candidate countries

In the absence of a common reference system for evaluation purposes, it was necessary for the
Commission and the Council to draw up an evaluation methodology. In parallel with this, the
dispute  between  the  Austrian  and  Czech  authorities  about  the  Temelin  power  station  was  a
perfect illustration of the need for a common reference method.

Evaluation methodology

In 2000 the Commission and the Council developed a methodology based on texts and work
with  differing  legal  status.  Two  major  elements  were  identified.  On  the  one  hand,  the
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency's  Nuclear  Safety  Convention  and,  on  the  other  hand,
what the Council described as common principles and opinions of the Union. It was stressed
that there was at present within the EU a high degree of convergence as regards technical and
organisational requirements.

The  methodology  selected  to  define  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety  to  be  achieved  by  the
candidate countries consists of comparing the practices and  rules and regulations in force in
the  candidate  countries  with  those  of  the  Member  States.  This  universal  methodology
constitutes the foundation for a  reference method  for the evaluation  of the safety  of  nuclear
installations.

The evaluation was carried out by the Commission and the Council in 2001 on the basis of
this methodology and made it possible to draw up recommendations which were sent by the
Commission to each candidate country in July 2001. It is specified in them that they must be
regarded as clarifications of  the common position of  the  Union  on  the  Energy  Chapter  (14)
with regard  to  nuclear safety. The candidate countries were invited to accept  them  formally
and indicate a timetable for their implementation.

Two fundamental conclusions can be drawn from this evaluation. Firstly, confirmation of the
need  to  close  the  reactors  which  cannot  reasonably  achieve  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety
(Kozloduy  1-4  in  Bulgaria,  Ignalina  1-2  in  Lithuania  and  Bohunice  1  and  2  in  Slovakia).
Secondly, the fact that the safety of the other reactors in the candidate countries can, subject
to  varying  degrees  of  improvements,  be  brought  to  a  level  comparable  to  that  which  now
exists within the EU for equivalent reactors.

The implementation of these recommendations has  been  monitored  by  the  Commission  and
the Council. Work started in January 2002 concluded  with a Report  on the situation carried

9

out  by  peer  review,  published  in  June  2002.  Nevertheless,  the  implementation  of  some
recommendations  will  be  phased  over  several  years,  including  beyond  enlargement,  and
monitoring  will  have  to  be  carried  out  in  order  to  check  compliance  with  the  commitments
entered into by these countries before their accession.

If there is no common reference framework for the monitoring of the recommendations in the
post-accession period, the EU could be accused of differential treatment between the new and
present Member States. For the former, the Union would have a watching brief over the safety
of their nuclear installations while for the latter it would not intervene. Such a situation would
not be fair.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF TEMELIN

In relation to the post-accession period, the settlement of the dispute between the Czech and
Austrian authorities about the starting-up of the Temelin power station situated in the Czech
Republic near the Austrian frontier, is a particularly interesting case.

The  starting-up  of  the  Temelin  power  station  considerably  worsened  relations  between  the
two countries. The Commission acted as conciliator to facilitate dialogue between the Czech
and  Austrian  authorities.  The  conciliation  work  was  formalised  in  the  context  of  a  protocol
signed  in  December  2000  in  Melk  between  the  Austrian  and  Czech  authorities,  with  the
participation of the Commission.

Under  Chapter  IV  of  this  protocol,  concerning  nuclear  safety,  the  Czech  Republic,  Austria
and the Commission embarked upon a "trialogue" on 29 subjects of concern to the Austrian
authorities.  The  final  report  on  the  discussions  carried  out  in  the  context  of  this  process
stressed that, while it was impossible to reach agreement on all the questions, the objective of
what is now referred to as the Melk process, namely the facilitation of dialogue between the
two States, had been achieved.

Thanks to the Commission's intervention, the Czech Republic and Austria managed to resume
discussions in a less emotionally charged framework. On 29 November 2001 the two States
agreed,  under  the  mediation  of  the  Commission,  a  process  for  the  monitoring  of  the  Melk
Protocol. Monitoring  will  be  carried out in  the  framework  of  a  bilateral  agreement  between
the two States. Under this agreement, Austria should have a watching brief over the safety of
a Czech nuclear installation.

This watching brief of one State over the nuclear safety of an installation in another State is
an  atypical  mechanism.  Clearly,  if  there  had  been  common  safety  standards,  the  solution
would have been much simpler. These standards would have served as a reference for Austria
and  taken  over  by  the  Czech  Republic  as  part  of  the  Community  acquis.  The  Commission
would then have intervened as a matter of course to verify that the acquis had been suitably
taken over.

Lastly it should be noted that, in parallel with this process, the safety of the Temelin power
station  was  evaluated  by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  in  the  same  way  as  the  other
nuclear installations in the candidate countries. The results of this evaluation showed that this
power  station,  subject  to  the  implementation  of  the  proposed  recommendations,  had  a
satisfactory level of nuclear safety.

10

It is therefore time for the Community fully to exercise its competences in the field of nuclear
safety.  It would be paradoxical for the Community to be able to intervene to evaluate safety
at  nuclear  installations  in  candidate  countries  while  action  within  the  enlarged  Union
remained limited.  The Community has an adapted legal base for this purpose.

1.2

The legal means to improve safety at nuclear installations

It  is  no  longer  desirable  to  consider  nuclear  safety  in  a  purely  national  perspective.  Only  a
common  approach  can  guarantee  the  maintenance  of  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety  in  an
enlarged EU with 28  Member  States.  Action  by  the  Community  in  this  connection  must  be
founded on a solid legal basis in the founding texts. It is on this basis that a new approach to
nuclear safety can be developed.

Since this is an area which concerns the use of nuclear energy, the legal basis is clearly to be
found in the Euratom Treaty. The Treaty's provisions concerning health protection provide a
general framework containing the elements of a legal basis for Community responsibilities for
nuclear safety. Beyond the purely legal aspects, this competence is, moreover, recognised by
the Council.

a)

Community competence

To  quote  the  preamble  to  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  Member  States  are  on  the  one  hand
"resolved to create the conditions necessary for the development of a strong nuclear industry"
and on the other hand "anxious to create conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards
to the life and health of the public". In addition, pursuant to Article 2(b), the Community has
the  task  of  establishing  "uniform  safety  standards  to  protect  the  health  of  workers  and  the
general public and ensure that they are applied".

Chapter  3  of  the  Treaty,  concerning  health  protection,  contains  provisions  concerning  the
basic  standards  with  regard  to  protection  against  ionising  radiation.  The  Treaty's  founding
fathers  were  concerned  to  give  the  Community  explicit  powers  with  regard  to  health
protection. The latter concerns both radiation protection and nuclear safety.

Radiation protection may be defined as all  measures aimed at protecting human beings  and
the  environment  against  ionising  radiation.  Safety,  on  the  other  hand,  concerns    measures
aimed  at  establishing  and  maintaining,  in  nuclear  installations,  effective  defences  against
potential radiological risks in order to protect individuals, society and the environment against
the damaging effects of ionising radiation emitted by these installations. These two disciplines
have a common health protection objective, namely protection against ionising radiation.

The conclusions of the Advocate-General in connection with the Commission's appeal against
the Council decision authorising the Community to accede to the Nuclear Safety Convention15
are very informative. He asserts that "given current scientific knowledge, it is neither possible
nor  desirable  to  maintain  artificial  boundaries  between  radiation  protection  and  nuclear
safety". He also concludes that "the fact that Member States  maintain  exclusive  competence
with  regard  to  the  technological  aspects  of  safety  does  not  prevent  the  Community  from
adopting  legislation  laying  down  certain  requirements  with  regard  to  safety,  licensing,
inspection, evaluation and application mechanisms".

15 Conclusions of Advocate-General Jacobs presented on 13 December 2001, Case C-29/99.

11

                                                
This analysis tends  to confirm  the  close  link  which  exists  between  these  two  concepts.  The
Community's  responsibilities  extend  beyond  radiation  protection  in  the  strict  sense  of  the
term.  As  stressed  by  the  Advocate-General  in  his  abovementioned  conclusions,  "an
interpretation with regard to subsequent practice is particularly legitimate and potent when
the drafting of the articles concerned isobsolete, and they have not been amended since then".
The Euratom Treaty was drafted in the 1950s and, for the most part, has not been  amended
since. Lastly, it should be recalled that the case law of the Court of Justice has confirmedthe
broad application of the radoprotection objective.

The provisions  of Chapter 3 of the  Euratom  Treaty  allow  the  assertion  that  the  Community
has powers with regard to the safety of nuclear installations. The basic standards mentioned in
Article 30 should be supplemented in order to cover this area. To this end, Article 32 provides
that  the  basic  standards  may  be  revised  or  supplemented.  The  drafters  of  the  Treaty  thus
created a system which could evolve in order to enable the Community not only to amend its
health  policy  but  also  to  extend  its  scope.  In  this  regard  it  is  worthwhile  recalling  that  law
deriving  from  chapter  3,  Title  II  of  the  Euratom  treaty,  mainly  Directive  96/29/Euratom16,
represents  a  coherent  and  developing  package  which  is  today  comprised  of  about  twenty
provisions  of  various  kinds,  regulating  among  other  things  the  medical  uses  of  ionising
radiation17,  information  to  be  provided  in  radiological  emergencies18,  the  transport  of
radioactive waste and radioactive substances19, etc..

b)

Competence recognised by the Council

With  the  development  of  the  European  nuclear  industry,  convergence  at  Community  level
became necessary in order to support the Member States in their efforts to harmonise safety
practices. The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the technological problems of nuclear
safety recognised that it was the Commission's responsibility to act as a catalyst in initiatives
taken  at  international  level  with  regard  to  nuclear  safety.  As  a  result  of  this  resolution,  the
Commission set up several expert groups dealing with nuclear safety matters. These  groups,
in  which  representatives  of  the  safety  authorities  of  the  Member  States  participate,  have
actively  contributed  to  the  harmonisation  of  nuclear  safety  practices.  Following  another
Council Resolution dated 18 June 1992, participation in these expert groups was extended to
representatives of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Republics of
the former Soviet Union (NIS).

Similarly, it should be recalled that the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has been a major player
for  many  years,  as  far  as  research  is  concerned,  in  order  to  improve  the  safety  of  nuclear
installations.  Its  technical  expertise  with  regard  to  fuel  cycle  safety  and  reactor  safety  is
undeniable  and  internationally  recognised.  The  JRC  also  assists  the  Commission  in  the
evaluation of tenders and the results of projects conducted in the context of the PHARE and
TACIS programmes.

In  a  Decision  dated  21 March 1994  the  Council  authorised  the  Commission  to  make
borrowings, the proceeds of which would be assigned, in the form of loans, to the funding of
projects to increase the safety and efficiency of the nuclear facilities in certain CEEC and NIS

16 OJ No L 159 of 29 June 1996 p.1
17 Directive 97/43/Euratom, OJ No L 180 of 9 July 1997 p22
18 Euratom Decision 87/600, OJ No L 371 of 30 December 1987, p 76; and Directive 89/618, OJ No L 357 of 7

December 1989 p31

19 Directive 92/3/Euratom, OJ No L 35 of 12 February 1992, p24; and Regulation (Euratom) n° 1493/93, OJ No

L 148 pf 19 June 1993 p1

12

                                                
countries. Recourse to this mechanism made it possible, for example, to improve the safety of
reactors 5 and 6 at the Kozloduy power station in Bulgaria. Lastly, it should be stressed that
since 1990 the Community has devoted some EUR 220 million to improving the safety of the
nuclear installations in the candidate countries.

As already indicated, the Cologne European Council in June 1999 asked the Commission to
ensure  that  high  safety  standards  are  applied  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Following  on
from this request, the safety of nuclear installations in the candidate countries was evaluated
by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  in  2001,  making  it  possible  to  arrive  at  a  European
perspective  with  regard  to  nuclear  safety  agreed  by  the  fifteen  Member  States  and  the
Commission.

A situation where intervention by the Community with regard to  nuclear  safety  within third
countries is recognised and welcomed at international level, while its internal action remains
limited,  cannot continue on the eve of an unprecedented enlargement at a time when nuclear
safety  issues  are  so  fundamentally  important.  The 
  Laeken  European  Council  in
December 2001  marked  the  transition  from  reflection  conducted  in  the  perspective  of
enlargement  to  that  of  a  global  political  vision  at  the  level  of  the  enlarged  EU.  One  of  the
conclusions  of  this  meeting  was  that  "the  European  Council  undertakes  to  maintain  a  high
level of nuclear safety in the Union. It stresses the need to monitor the security and safety of
nuclear  power  stations.  It  calls  for  regular  reports  from  Member  States'  atomic  energy
experts, who will maintain close contacts with the Commission".

The conclusions of the Laeken Council apply the Cologne conclusions to within the EU, the
objective  of  both  sets  of  conclusions  being  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety.  The
methodology  developed  to  evaluate  the  safety  of  the  nuclear  installations  in  the  candidate
countries is universal, as described by the Council, and it should be possible to use it to make
a comparable evaluation within the EU.

The Commission considers that the legal and political conditions are now met to establish a
Community system for the safety of nuclear installations.

2.

A new approach to the safety of nuclear installations

A common approach is now essential.  This will provide a binding legal framework, a single
framework for  control, and a single criterion for the interpretation of standards.     Along the
lines  of  the  existing  national  systems,  a  Community  approach  to  the  safety  of  nuclear
installations  should  comprise  two  aspects.  On  the  one  hand,  a  set  of  standards  and,  on  the
other,  a mechanism for the verification  of  compliance  with  the  standards.  This  will  make  it
possible, where appropriate, to penalise failure to comply with Community standards.

2. 1.

Common standards

A Community approach to the safety of nuclear installations does not necessarily entail laying
down  detailed  technical  safety  standards.  A  system  of  this  kind  should  not  duplicate  what
exists already within the Member States.

Account  should  be  taken  of  what  the  Member  States  have  already  established.  However,  it
must  be  acknowledged  that,  despite  increasingly  marked  harmonisation  in  this  connection,
nuclear  safety  measures  remain  very  different  from  one  Member  State  to  another.  This
diversity  of  national  rules  and  principles  does  not  mean  that  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety

13

does  not  exist  within the  EU.  However,  it  is  not  guaranteed  that  it  will  be  maintained.  The
Community approach should address this particular point.

a)

Existing standards

There  exists  a  set  of  principles  which  can  constitute  the  basis  for  a  legally  binding
Community approach. These could be formalised in the context of a Community text based in
the  main,  initially,  on  elements  contained  in  the  IAEA's  Nuclear  Safety  Convention.  This
Convention  does not contain  detailed technical rules. However,  it  lays  down  a  precise  legal
framework constituting the basis for a nuclear safety system. All the Member States and the
majority of the candidate countries (with the exception of Estonia and Malta) are parties to the
Nuclear Safety Convention.

However, it should be noted that the Convention applies only to nuclear power stations. Given
the development of the European nuclear industry, it would be desirable to broaden the scope
to include all civil nuclear installations.

Formalising  these  standards  in  a  Community  text  would  supplement  the  basic  standards
provided  for  in  Article  30  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  so  as  to  cover  the  safety  of  nuclear
installations. Since the Treaty entered into force, several directives have revised the standards,
the last one dating from 13 May 1996 (Directive 96/29 (Euratom)20. However, it will not be a
question  of  revising  that  directive,  which  lays  down  basic  standard,  but  of  drafting  a  new
directive  to  supplement  them.  In  concrete  terms,  the  "basic  standard"  concept  should  cover
both radiation protection and the safety of nuclear installations.

Clearly,  such  a  Community  approach  to  safety  cannot,  ultimately,  be  restricted  simply  to
taking over the relevant provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. However, the latter
can provide a starting point on which there should be agreement since all the Member States
have  to  implement  them  already,  supplemented  by  other  elements  in  order  to  assemble  a
legally binding set of provisions.

b)

Evolving standards

Developing  common  standards  with  regard  to  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  entails
revising them, and therefore, in accordance with Article 32 of the Euratom Treaty, a specific
procedure has to be followed. Article 31 provides that basic standards are to be worked out by
the Commission after obtaining the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific
and  Technical  Committee  from  among  scientific  experts  in  the  Member  States  and  after
consulting  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  After  consulting  the  European  Parliament,
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, establishes the basic standards, acting by a
qualified majority.

In  practical  terms,  the  development  of  European  safety  standards  will  need  to  take  into
account the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the field of nuclear
safety. The IAEA has been working in this area for many years. It will also be necessary to
take  into  account  in  particular  the  results  of  the  work  of  the  Nuclear  Regulators  Working
Group (NRWG), and especially the common positions adopted it, together with the work of
the  Western  Nuclear  Regulators  Association  (WENRA)  with  regard  to  harmonisation.  The
methodology  worked  out  by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  to  evaluate  the  safety  of  the

20

OJ No L 159 of 29 June 1996, p.1.

14

                                                
nuclear installations in the candidate countries will also be an important element to be taken
into consideration.

As this is an area in which there are already major national provisions, it is desirable that the
Commission should be able to benefit from the experience of the Member States in order to
ensure that the common standards evolve in a harmonised fashion. To this end, it must rely on
the Committee envisaged in Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty.

Initially, the Community system will be based on a corpus of minimum standards. However,
it will establish a legal framework comprising a mechanism allowing the standards to evolve.
One of the first tasks of the Article 31 Committee will therefore be to work out a corpus of
legally binding operational standards, on the basis of the abovementioned studies, which can
serve  as  a  common  reference  point.  On  the  basis  of  these  standards,  verifications  can  be
carried  out  within  the  Member  States.  To  avoid  any  difference  of  treatment  between  the
current  Member  States  and  the  new  Member  States,  the  legal  regime  will  need  to  be
operational on the date of the enlargement of the Union, i.e. 1 January 2004. That date  will
mark  the  start  of  the  practical  application  of  this  Community  approach,  which  will
subsequently evolve.

The  common  standards  are  part  of  an  ongoing  process.  It  is  not  a  question  of  defining  a
corpus  of  technical  standards  applicable  to  nuclear  installations.  The  objective  of  the
Community  standards  will  be  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety
within  the  EU.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  this  system  should  rely  on  the  expertise  of  the
national safety authorities. The Community system is complementary to national systems.

c)

Regular reports

In  accordance  with  the  Nuclear  Safety  Convention  and  the  conclusions  of  the  Laeken
European Council, Member States will be obliged to transmit reports on the measures taken to
meet their obligations and on the state of safety of installations under their supervision. These
reports will be examined by Member States and the Commission in the framework of a “peer
review” mechanism.

2.2

A system of independent verification

Establishing a system of independent verification is an essential element of the credibility and
effectiveness  of  a  Community  approach  to  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations.  Unlike  the
inspections conducted by the Euratom Safeguards Office, the  frequency of which at a  given
installation  may  be  high  because  of  the  sensitivity  of  nuclear  material  with  regard  to  non-
proliferation, the frequency of nuclear safety checks does not normally need to be as high.

The verification  system  will be  based  in  the  main  on  the  technical  expertise  of  the  national
safety authorities. It is not actually necessary to develop a group of Community inspectors, as
is the case for the control of nuclear materials. Community control will focus on checking the
wayin  which  safety  authorities  carry  out  their  tasks,  rather  than  carrying  out  on-site  safety
checks  of  nuclear  installations.    It  will    not  extend  to  on-site  checks  of  safety  conditions  at
nuclear installations

Such a system should be more acceptable to the Member States. It would have the benefit, as
far as the Commission is concerned, of  providing  nuclear  safety experts not  entailing major
budgetary implications, or at least costing much less than a team of permanent inspectors. The
system  would  therefore  be  perfectly  attuned  to  the  nature  of  the  activities  to  be  conducted.

15

The Member States will be obliged to propose experts, specifying their expertise, to be called
upon by the Commission for independent verifications within the Member States. Clearly, the
Commission  alone  will  be  responsible  for  deciding  what  to  verify  and  deciding  on  any
subsequent action. At the beginning of the year the Commission will draw up a programme of
verifications  which  it  intends  to  conduct  in  the  course  of  the  year  in  question.  Once  this
programme is adopted, it will contact the experts designated by the safety authorities which it
intends to use, to ensure that they are available on the dates in question. Wherever possible,
the  Commission  will  endeavour  not  to  disrupt  the  normal  workings  of  the  national  safety
authorities when requesting the secondment of the experts.

In good time in advance of the verification, the experts will receive all the documents needed
to  perform  their  tasks.  A  coordination  meeting  will  be  held  at  the  Commission  prior  to  the
verification.  A  notification  announcing  the  verification  will  be  sent  to  the  authorities  of  the
Member  State  where  the  verification  is  to  take  place.  The  latter  will  be  able  to  contest  the
composition  of  the  team  of  experts  authorised  to  conduct  the  verification  but  must  provide
good reasons for doing so.

On the basis of the reports following the verifications, the Commission will be able to make
observations  which  may  lead  to  the  necessary  measures  being  taken  to  ensure  safety  at
installations.  The Commission will also be obliged to publish, every two  years, a report on
the state of nuclear safety within the EU.

As previously mentioned, the need for protection against ionising radiation does not stop with
the  end  of  the  active  life  of  a  nuclear  installation.  Safety  concerns  continue,  to  various
degrees, during decommissioning operations.

3.

Adequate financial resources to ensure safety

3.1.

Ensuring the availability of funds for decommissioning

Maintaining  a  high  level  of  safety  in  nuclear  installations,  during  their  active  life  as  in  the
decommissioning phase, requires adequate resources to be available.

Decommissioning  a  nuclear  installation  is  a  major  industrial  undertaking  which  can  take
many years. The cost of decommissioning operations can be very high. To deal with these it is
necessary that financial resources should be available. These will have to be provided for by
the  operator  during  the  active  life  of  the  nuclear  installation.  It  is  essential  that
decommissioning operations can begin at once in conformity with a high level of safety.

The main concern of the general public, of national authorities and of operators is to ensure
that  safety  and  radioprotection  obligations  will  be  fulfilled  on  decommissioning.  The
availability of the financial resources necessary for decommissioning of nuclear installations
must be guaranteed.

It is also essential to avoid any possibility that the decommissioning of a nuclear installation
will not be able to start as planned, is not carried out according to the appropriate procedures,
or is abandoned before completion due to a lack of resources.

The  consequence  of  such  a  situation  would  be  that  a  substantial  quantity  of  radioactive
material would not be monitored or managed in an acceptable way, with severe implications
for  radiological  safety.  Under  such  circumstances,  one  of  the  fundamental  objectives  of  the
Euratom Treaty would not be met. In fact, as already mentioned, the Community must, under

16

article 2 of that  Treaty,  “establish  uniform  safety  standards  to  protect  the  health  of  workers
and of the general public and ensure that they are applied”. The Community has adopted basic
standards in the field of radioprotection21 for this purpose. Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty
therefore provides the legal base for Community action in this field.

At present, operators make use either of company resources or of contributions to externally
managed funds set up by various mechanisms for this purpose.

Electricity  from  nuclear  power  is  produced  at  nuclear  plants  with  a  long  active  life,  on
average forty years (in the absence of a political decision to turn away from nuclear power or
to extend the active life of installations). Given the sums envisaged and despite the fact that
they will not be used until decommissioning, the operator should take into account during the
productive life of the nuclear installation not only technological, social and economic issues
relating  to  the  cost  of  production  but  also  the  financial  viability  of  the  project  as  a  whole,
including the decommissioning of installations.

Even if reserves are set aside to enable decommissioning to be undertaken and to ensure the
management  of  radioactive  waste  and  of  spent  fuel  cells,  the  fundamental  question  is  to
ensure the availability of these resources in the long term, several decades hence. To this end,
the creation of decommissioning funds with their own legal personality distinct from that of
the  operators  and  specifically  earmarked  for  the  decommissioning  of  their  nuclear
installations is the best option to achieve the objective of decommissioning the installations in
conformity  with  all the  necessary safety  conditions.  In  the  case  where  exceptional  and  duly
justified reasons make such a separation of funds impossible, the management of funds could
continue to be undertaken by the operator, provided that the availability of assets to cover the
costs of decommissioning operators is guaranteed.

On the basis of regular information from Member States, to be provided every three years, the
Commission will produce a periodical report on the state of the funds and will undertake, if
necessary,  measures  to  address  irregularities  which  could  compromise  the  completion  of
decommissioning.

The  creation  of  external  funds,  managed  on  prudential  principles,  enables  the  long  term
availability of funds to ensure the maintenance of a high level of nuclear safety throughout the
decommissioning phase to be guaranteed.

The  need  to  harmonise  the  methodology  for  estimating  future  decommissioning  costs  has
already been  emphasised.  It  is  also  necessary  to  provide  for  transitional  measures  to  enable
the enterprises involved, where necessary, to minimise the impact of the transfer of significant
sums of money to external funds.

The Commission  has in mind  a  transitional  periodof  at  least  three  years  after  the  entry  into
force  of  measures  taken  by  Member  States  as  a  consequence  of  Council  adoption  of  this
Directive.

21 COM 96/29 Euratom

17

                                                
3.2.

The position of candidate countries

In  June  1999  the  Cologne  Council  asked  the  Commission  to  ensure  the  application  of  high
safety standards in Central and Eastern Europe. On the basis of this mandate, the Commission
proceeded in two stages. Firstly, it identified the reactors which should be closed. Secondly,
in conjunction with the Council, it adopted a methodology for evaluating the safety of nuclear
installations in the candidate countries.

As explained in the Green Paper, the future of nuclear energy remains uncertain in Europe. It
depends  on  several  factors,  including  the  safety  of  reactors  in  the  candidate  countries.
Accordingly, the EU has requested some of these countries to close their nuclear reactors. In
return, the EU contributes towards the cost of decommissioning and offers funding.

a)

The reactors concerned

Three  candidate  countries  are  concerned  by  the  early  closure  of  nuclear  reactors:  Bulgaria
((Kozloduy  1  to  4),  Lithuania  (Ignalina  1  and  2)  and  Slovakia  (Bohunice  1  and  2).  In  June
2002,  Lithuania  undertook  to  close  Ignalina  2  by  2009.  The  Commission  is  expecting
Bulgaria  to  take  a  decision  this  year  on  the  early  closure  of  Kozloduy  3  and  4.  The  EU
considers that the date for closure should be 2006, to be confirmed in the accession treaties.

International  experts  consider  that  these  reactors  have  major  design  faults  that  cannot
realistically be rectified at a reasonable cost. In addition, the report of the Western European
Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA),22 an association bringing together representatives
of the safety authorities of nine EU Member States, published in March 1999, clearly asserts
that, despite all the efforts already made to improve the units concerned, they cannot reach an
acceptable degree of safety by Western standards.

The  Commission  relied  on    international  expertise  to  draft  the  text  of  Agenda 2000  which
confirms the closure dates for five units and determines that final decisions will be taken for
three other reactors in 2002.

b)

The cost of decommissioning and how to fund it

Through  the  PHARE  Programme,  the  Community  has  for  a  number  of  years  been  funding
projects in  the  nuclear  sector  in  the  candidate  countries,  several  of  which  concern  activities
relating to final closure, including waste treatment, fuel storage and the planning of activities.

The high cost of decommissioning

the  Community 

international
Through  PHARE, 
decommissioning funds managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD),  since  in  the  case  of  the  three  countries  concerned  by  the  early  closure  of  power
stations,  it  is  clear  that  the  national  funds  for  decommissioning  will  not  have  sufficient
resources to cope with all the work needed until complete dismantling.

the  main  contributor 

the 

to 

is 

At its most recent meeting, on 24 and 25 October 2002, the European Council confirmed that
“in view of  Lithuania’s  confirmation that Unit  1  of  the  Ignalina  Power  Plant  will  be  closed

22 Germany, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden.

18

                                                
before  2005  and  of  its  commitment  that  Unit  2  will  be  closed  by  2009,  a  programme  for
supporting  activities  relating  to  the  decommissioning  of  the  INPP  will  be  established”.
Specifically,  the  Council  said  that  “The  commitment  appropriations  foreseen  for  this
programme will be 70 million euros for each of the years 2004 to 2006.”  Finally, the Council
confirmed  that  “the  European  Union  in  solidarity  with  Lithuania  confirms  its  readiness  to
provide  adequate  additional  Community  assistance  to  the  decommissioning  effort  beyond
2006”.

The Council also indicated that “to continue the pre-accession aid planned under PHARE for
the decommissioning of the Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant in Slovakia,  20  million euros in
commitment appropriations are foreseen for each of the years 2004 to 2006.”

The Council stated that “estimated figures are to be revised as appropriate on the basis of the
spending  profile  for  the  decommissioning  activities  of  the  Ignalina  and  Bohunice
decommissioning  funds.    PHARE  commitments  are  above  expectations  for  Ignalina  and
below expectations for Bohunice.”

Financial perspectives

The  Commission  has  not  entered  into  any  commitments  beyond  2006,  although  the  most
significant  funding  needs  will  appear  in  the  following  years,  taking  into  account  the
abovementioned decommissioning timetables.

It  is  certain  that  the  reluctance  of  Lithuania  and  Bulgaria  to  commit  themselves  to  closure
agreements was due to the lack of a clear financial agreement on the part of the Commission,
in  particular  for  the  period  2007-2010.    The  Commission  should  therefore  pay  particular
attention to these two countries in  preparing  a future financial package

B.

THE MANAGEMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Half a century of developing nuclear energy in the world and accumulating radioactive waste
has not resulted in the creation of national policies in Europe - or in the rest of the world - for
permanently  solving  the  problems  created  by  all  waste  of  nuclear  origin.  However,  as  the
Green  Paper  on  the  security  of  energy  supply23  emphasised,  the  nuclear  option  can  only  be
pursued if a satisfactory and transparent solution is found to the question of the management
of nuclear waste. Opinion polls carried out recently by the Commission24 have confirmed that
the safe and reliable management of waste is an essential part of any debate on the future of
nuclear energy.

The  issue  mainly  arises  for  the  most  dangerous  waste  from  the  back-end  of  the  fuel  cycle.
This  waste  represents  5%  of  the  total  volume  of  nuclear  waste  but  contains  95%  of  the

23

24

COM(2000) 769 of 29 November 2000: "Towards a European strategy for security of energy supply",
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001, ISBN 92-894-0319-5.
Eurobarometer No. 56, 2001 – Europeans and Radioactive Waste
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/pdf/eb56_radwaste_en.pdf).

19

                                                
radioactivity. It is currently held in storage at or near the surface in temporary storage sites.
This storage method, which is at present indefinite, raises concerns about the vulnerability of
such sites, particularly in the light of the events of 11 September 2001.

The search continues for a solution to the problem of the disposal of waste. Different disposal
possibilities  have  to  be  developed  based  on  the  most  recent  technological  advances  and
guaranteeing the highest level of safety.

Based on these experiences, it can be said that deep disposal is currently the most feasible and
reliable  option  and  that  the  construction  and  operation  techniques  are  sufficiently  well-
developed to be implemented.  In this field, there are several underground laboratories in the
European Union and Switzerland which study in detail the most promising geological layers.
In  Europe,  Sweden  and  Finland  have  already  opted  for  deep  disposal  and  have  carried  out
initial feasibility investigations. Nevertheless, the disposal of waste in the sites that have been
chosen  cannot  take  place  before  2015-2020.  Estimates  of  disposal  costs  vary  from  one
country to another, but they represent a small percentage of the total cost of kWh production.

Although deep geological disposal is a permanent solution, if more specialised technological
solutions are found in the future that offer increased levels of safety at a reasonable cost, the
waste  can  be  retrieved  at  a  later  date.  This  is  possible  thanks  to  the  basic  "concentrate  and
confine" strategy which ensures that waste remains isolated from the environment and stable
for centuries after being buried.

New  technologies  for  the  treatment  of  radioactive  waste,  enabling  a  reduction  in  long-life
radioactive  elements,  have  not  yet  resulted  in  an  alternative  to  geological  disposal  but
represent an important complementary strategy. At the same time as developing deep disposal
sites,  the  development  of  new  technologies  should  be  pursued  in  order  to  offer  future
generations  the  possibility  of  having  more  effective  methods  for  treating  waste,  such  as
"partitioning and transmutation" technology for  example.  For  this reason, the sixth Euratom
research framework programme for 2002-2006 has allocated part of the money  available for
radioactive waste to research on new technologies in paralled with research on disposal.

Regardless of the choices which will be made in the future in terms of energy policy, existing
waste  has  to  be  disposed  of  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  the  long-term  protection  of  public
health and the environment.

1.

The management of waste: issues still to be resolved

Nuclear  energy  has  been  exploited  for  civil  use  for  five  decades.  The  quantities  of  waste
accumulated over this period can be described as limited in volume and the question of what
to do with this waste has never been at the top of the agenda. However, the responsibility for
resolving  the  problem  of  the  long-term  management  of  this  waste  cannot  be  passed  on  to
future generations.

1.1

The current situation

The main activities which produce radioactive waste are:

20

– 

– 

– 

– 

a)

nuclear  electricity  generation,  including  back-end  nuclear  fuel-cycle  activities  and
the decommissioning of nuclear facilities;

the operation of research reactors;

the use of radiation and radioactive materials in medicine,  agriculture,  industry and
research;

processing of material containing naturally-occurring radionuclides.

Situation in the European Union

In  total,  approximately  40  000  m3  of  waste  is  produced  each  year  in  the  whole  of  the
European  Union,  the  majority  coming  from  activities  relating  to  the  production  of  nuclear
electricity.

Although the permanent disposal of short-life and low-level waste can take place using tried
and  tested  technology,  this  is  only  practised  in  five  Member  States  which  have  nuclear
reactors (Finland, France, Spain, Sweden and the UK). In Germany, disposal operations have
been  undertaken  in  the  past  for  this  category  of  waste,  but  neither  Belgium  nor  the
Netherlands  has  developed  this  option  and  these  two  countries  are  currently  storing  their
waste  in  temporary  centralised  national  depots.  Similar  temporary  and  indefinite  storage  is
practised in the Member States that do not have a nuclear power programme.

Spent fuels and high-level/long-life waste is stored near reactors, in reprocessing plants or at
any other site where the waste is produced, pending a permanent solution. No country in the
world  has  yet  implemented  disposal  of  this  waste,  and  the  degree  of  progress  towards  this
permanent  solution  varies  considerably  from  country  to  country.  In  the  European  Union,
Finland  and  Sweden  are  perhaps  the  most  advanced,  with  long-established  programmes  for
the  development  of  deep  disposal.  However,  even  in  Finland,  it  will  be  at  least  eight  years
before final authorisation is given for the development of the only site which is currently the
subject  of  research.  Belgium  has  been  carrying  out  research  on  deep  disposal  for  several
years.  In  France,  work  is  in  progress  to  bore  an  access  shaft  to  an  underground  laboratory.
Germany has a promising site which cannot be used for the time being for political reasons.
Some  Member  States  are  reassessing  all  their  options  as  well  as  the  associated  decision-
making processes. However, others are practising a "wait-and-see" policy.

b)

The precarious storage situation in the candidate countries

In candidate countries with nuclear power stations and research reactors that were built by the
Soviet Union, spent fuel management has become a crucial issue in the last decade because it
is no longer possible to send this material back to Russia for reprocessing or storage under the
same  conditions.  As  a  matter  of  urgency,  these  countries  have  had  to  construct  temporary
storage facilities for their spent fuel. Little or no progress has been made in implementing real
programmes for the longer-term management of spent fuel.

Regarding  less  hazardous  operational  waste  from  nuclear  power  stations,  only  the  Czech
Republic  and  Slovakia  have  operational  disposal  sites.  Several  countries  have  Russian-
designed  repositories  for  non-fuel  cycle  radioactive  waste.  However,  these  facilities  do  not
always meet current EU safety standards. In some cases, the waste may have to be retrieved
and trasferred to other installations.

21

1.2

Limited Community and international provisions

The principles governing the management of all hazardous waste must guarantee a high level
of  public  and  worker  safety  and  environmental  protection.  In  the  case  of  spent  nuclear  fuel
and radioactive waste, the application of these principles must ensure that individuals, society
and the environment are protected from the harmful effects of ionising radiation.

In  recent  years,  these  principles  have  also  been  the  focus  of  action  at  Community  level,
involving research, and legislative and policy initiatives.
The approach adopted in the Community action plan25 and the associated strategy has been to
encourage harmonisation and cooperation amongst the Member  States in order to ensure an
equivalent  and  acceptable  level  of  safety  throughout  the  European  Union.  The  most  recent
report on  the situation regarding radioactive waste management  in  the European  Union was
published  in  199926.  The  Commission  has  also  recently  published  a  similar  report27  on  the
candidate countries.

The management of radioactive waste has been, and still is, one of the main  subjects of the
Community  framework  programmes  on  research  into  nuclear  fission.  A  key  aspect  of  these
programmes is the support for research activities in underground research facilities, allowing
the collection of fundamental data on the host rock and the experimentation on possible future
disposal  techniques.  Advanced  techniques  for  the  chemical  and  nuclear  separation  and
minimisation  of  long-life  waste  (usually  collectively  referred  to  as  "partitioning  and
transmutation") are also important areas of research.

The basic safety standards for protecting the health of the general public and workers against
the dangers of ionising radiation underpin the harmonisation of the fundamental principles of
waste  management,  and  provide  a  common  and  internationally  approved  level  of  radiation
protection  throughout  the  European  Union.  The  most  recent  revision  of  the  basic  safety
standards  dates  from  199628,  with  implementation  in  national  law  on  13  May  2000.  In
addition, Chapter III of Title II of the EURATOM Treaty establishes a Community system for
the  monitoring  and  control  of  international  shipments  of  radioactive  waste29.  Under  the
environment chapter of the EC Treaty, the Environmental  Impact Assessment Directive  and
its amendments30

31 is also highly relevant to the radioactive waste sector.

There  are  also  a  number  of  international  conventions  that  have  a  major  role  to  play  in
establishing  common  practice  and  levels  of  safety  in  the  international  arena.  The  most
important is the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of  Radioactive  Waste  Management32,  which  was  negotiated  under  the  aegis  of  the
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  and  entered  into  force  on  18  June  2001.  The
accession  of  the  European  Community  and  EURATOM  to  this  Convention  is  currently  the

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

Council resolution (92/C 158/02) of 15 June 1992 on the renewal of the Community action plan in the
field of radioactive waste.
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  “Communication  and  fourth  report  on  present
situation and prospects for radioactive waste management in the European Union”, COM(98) 799 of 11
January 1999.
Commission report EUR19154.
Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996.
Council Directive 92/3/EURATOM of 3 February 1992.
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985.
Council Directive 97/11/EEC of 3 March 1997.
Text available from the IAEA - INFCIRC/546 (24 December 1997).

22

 
                                                
subject of a Commission proposal33. In addition, the IAEA is currently preparing a series of
documents  on  all  aspects  of  the  safety  of  radioactive  waste  management,  including
recommendations regarding the safe disposal of all categories of radioactive waste.

2.

Towards a safe solution

The Commission considers that the time  has  come to  take  concrete  decisions in the field of
radioactive  waste  management,  with  regard  to  both  the  promoting  of  final  disposal  and
stepping  up  research  in  this  field  in  general.    This  does  not  preclude  alternative  solutions
arising from future scientific progress.

2.1.

A choice in favour of disposal

Even  though  significant  quantities  (over  2  000  000  m3)  of  the  least  hazardous  category  of
radioactive waste have been disposed of in the European Union in the past, not all countries
currently  have  operational  disposal  sites.  This  category  of  waste,  which  accounts  for
significantly  larger  quantities  than  the  more  hazardous  categories,  presents  no  major
technological  challenges  regarding  its  disposal  but  nonetheless  requires  close  supervision
while in temporary storage.

In  the  case  of  the  more  hazardous  waste,  there  is  a  broad  international  consensus  that  deep
disposal in stable geological formations is the best management option. Through a system of
multiple containment barriers and a suitable choice of host rock formation, this waste can be
isolated for extremely long periods of time, thus ensuring that any residual radioactivity will
have insignificant levels of  concentration. This strategy of deep disposal  greatly reduces the
risk of accidental human intrusion and is essentially passive and permanent, with no need for
further human intervention or institutional control.

Nevertheless,  delays  in  a  number  of  Member  States  regarding  the  identification  and
authorisation  of  suitable  sites,  particularly  in  the  case  of  deep  geological  repositories,  are  a
cause for concern. During this time, the quantities of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste
held  in  temporary  surface  storage  sites  continue  to  increase.  These  surface  facilities  require
active  measures  such  as  monitoring  and  maintenance  to  ensure  a  permanently  high  level  of
safety  and  environmental  protection.  This  is  an  unacceptable  burden  to  pass  on  to  future
generations.  Furthermore,  following  the  events  of  11  September  2001,  the  vulnerability  of
such surface facilities to terrorist attack has also highlighted the need to act now.

After  years  of  doubts  and  procrastination,  particularly  in  terms  of  political  reluctance,  it  is
high time that the Member States finally made a commitment to the implementation of a real
timetable for carrying out the final disposal of all radioactive waste. In particular, the Member
States  of  the  European  Union  should  adopt  programmes  for  the  deep  disposal  of  high-level
and  long-life  radioactive  waste.  They  will  therefore  be  obliged  to  take  decisions  on
authorising the choice of disposal sites and the operation of these sites by the prescribed dates.
To  this  end,  the  Commission  proposes  that  Member  States  should  commit  themselves  to  a
fixed  timetable of national programmes  for the  disposal  of  radioactive  waste  in  general  and
deep  disposal  of  highly  radioactive  waste  in  particular.    They  will  have  to  take  decisions
authorising the choice of disposal site (national or  regional) by 2008 at the latest for  highly
radioactive waste and to bring the sites into  operation  by  2018  at  the  latest.    For  low-level,
short  life  radioactive  waste,  disposal  must  be  implemented  at  the  latest  by  2013.    The

33

COM (2001) 520 final of 15 October 2001.

23

                                                
Commission’s  expectations  as  regards  the  observation  of  these  deadlines  by  member  States
will not prevent the implementation of other solutions which may arise from future scientific
developments.

2.2.

Increasing funding for research

Even if geological disposal ensures the necessary isolation of waste for very long periods of
time,  research  should  nevertheless  continue  and  be  stepped  up  in  order  to  optimise  the
technology and application methods. However, deep disposal must not lead to a reduction in
the  level  of  research  in  other  areas  of  radioactive  waste  management,  such  as  new
technologies  for  minimising  the  quantities  of  such  waste,  from  which  new  options  might
conceivably emerge in the future.

The Community  framework programme has played, and  will continue to play,  an  important
role  in  promoting  research  and  development  in  the  field  of  radioactive  waste.  The  sixth
Euratom  research  framework  programme  for  2002-2006  has  allocated  EUR  90  million  to
research  into  waste  management.  The  Joint  Research  Centre,  for  its  part,  is  devoting  a
significant part of its available resources to action in the field of waste management research.
Several Member States have their own research and development programmes funded either
from national budgets or by the nuclear sector. Nevertheless, these programmes do not have
the capacity to tackle all issues.

In accordance with the "polluter pays" principle, the operators that generate the waste should
participate more intensively and more visibly in research and development. To this end, and
in order to increase the level of co-operation between these programmes and the exchange of
information  at  Community  level,  the  Commission  intends  in  due  course  to  propose  to  the
Council the creation of one or more Joint Undertakings, in line with Chapter 5 of Title II of
the EURATOM Treaty, to be responsible for steering specific research programmes on waste
management. These Joint Undertakings, based on a voluntary agreement with industry and the
Member  States,  will  bring  together  funding  from  the  Joint  Research  Centre,  the  Member
States and industry.

CONCLUSIONS

In  view  of  the  necessity  of  improvements  in  nuclear  safety  and  the  Union’s  undertaking  to
pave the way to a true Community approach in this field, the Commission has adopted drafts
of  coherent  and  complementary    of  measures  for  transmission  to  the  Council,  once  the
opinion of the Article 31 expert group has been received, with a view to the adoption of:

a framework Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles on safety in
nuclear installations during and after their active lives in the enlarged EU, with a view
to  introducing,  in  due  course,  common  safety  standards  and  control  mechanisms  to
guarantee  the  application  of  common  methods  and  criteria  throughout  the  enlarged
Union. The Directive also requires adequate financial resources to be available for the
safety  requirements  of  nuclear  installations  during  their  working  lives  and  on
decommissioning.

a Directive on the management of radioactive waste, prioritising geological disposal of
waste as the safest method of disposal in the present state of the art. It provides that
Member  States  should  adopt  national  programmes,  according  to  a  pre-set  timetable,

24

for the disposal of radioactive waste in general and deep disposal of highly radioactive
waste  in  particular.  Member  States  are  required  to  decide  on  national  or  regional
disposal sites.

In  addition,  the  Commission  is  putting  to  the  Council  a  draft  Council  decision
authorising  the  Commission  to  negotiate  a  Euratom  agreement  with  the  Russian
Federation on trade in nuclear materials. This agreement will be based on the relevant
provisions  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  will  have  to  take  account  of  the  reality  of  the
market  in  the  enlarged  European  Union  and  of  the  specific  nature  of  the  candidate
countries’ relations with the Russian Federation in this area. At the same time, it will
have  to  protect  the  interests  of  European  consumers  and  the  viability  of  European
industries,  particularly  the  enrichment  industries.  The  new  agreement  will  include
regular  monitoring  of  all  trade  in  materials,  whether  supplied  to  utilities  or  to
enrichment industries. This decision is the subject of a separate Communication.

25

ANNEXES

ANNEX A:  THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS AT NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Decommissioning  a  nuclear  installation  includes  all  the  activities,  technological  and
regulatory, aimed at lifting all radiological restrictions applicable to the installation.

In practice, it is recognised that an installation is decommissioned when the buildings used for
nuclear purposes have been demolished. There are no more radioactive materials on site, and
it  is  possible  to  move  to  a  new  status.  The  IAEA  has  defined  three  stages  in  the
decommissioning process which are still referred to by the nuclear sector:

–  Stage  1:  Remove  nuclear  materials  and  radioactive  wastes  produced  during  active  life.
Leakproof barriers remain in place. Access points are locked and sealed. The installation is
monitored for radiological activity and is still subject to physical protection measures.

–  Stage  2:  The  restricted  zone  is  reduced  to  a  minimum.  All  buildings  and  equipment  are
decontaminated/dismantled, apart from the reactor building and associated materials in the
nuclear centres. Monitoring levels are reduced.

–  Stage  3:  Dismantling  of  the  remaining  structures  and  materials.  All  materials  whose
radioactivity  is  still  above  threshold  levels  are  sent  for  definitive  disposal.  The  site  is
available for alternative uses.

These three stages can be undertaken in a single continuous process or extended by quite long
intervals  (up  to  a  hundred  years  between  stages  2  and  3).  A  distinction  is  therefore  made
between continuous and staged decommissioning.

Reasons  for  choosing  a  particular  strategy  are  radiological  and  financial,  but  may  also  take
into account political considerations.

The operator of a nuclear installation is responsible for the strategy and for the provision of
the  necessary  resources  for  decommissioning  work  and  waste  management.  Nevertheless,
these decisions will be strongly influenced by national nuclear policy, of which the objectives
include the following:

–  The safety of nuclear and industrial operations

–  Minimisation of radioactive and conventional waste

–  Safe long term management of waste products

–  Minimisation of radiological and industrial risks

26

–  Minimisation of environmental impacts

–  Minimisation of socio-economic consequences

The longer certain operations are put off, the more their radiological impact will be reduced,
at the same time reducing the total cost of decommissioning operations (net present value).

Assumptions about future financial variables also play a significant part in the estimation of
costs,  given  the  long  delays  (which  can  extend  to  several  decades  if  not  over  a  century)
between the stages of decommissioning.

Estimates  of  the  levels  which  decommissioning  funds  will  need  to  reach  by  the  time  of  the
end  of  the  active  life  of  an  installation  will  therefore  be  significantly  affected  by  strategic
decisions about the programming of decommissioning activities.

27

ANNEX B – THE SITUATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING FUNDING SCHEMES BY MEMBER
STATE

Country Description of the Decommissioning Funding Scheme

B

(cid:1)  Each electricity  company  must  set  up  a financing  plan  that is the  subject  of a

special agreement with the state.

(cid:1)  The financing is covered by an internal fund directly managed by the utility (in
the  future,  assets  concerned  could  be  necessarily  identified  in  the  balance
sheet).

(cid:1)  The  fund  is  fed  by  annual  contributions.  In  the  case  of  nuclear  power  plants,
thirty years after the commissioning of the plant, these contributions, added to
accrued  interest,  have  to  represent  12  per  cent  of  investment  expenditure
(interest during construction excluded) currently necessary for the construction
of an equivalent plant.

(cid:1)  Provisions  are  discounted  according  to  a  rate  revised  every  5  years  by  the
Electricity  and  Gas  Control  Commission  composed  of  representatives  from
Electrabel, Labour and the State. This rate was fixed at 8,6%in 1999.

(cid:1)  The  nuclear  utilities  are  discussing  with  the  authorities  about  the  transfer  of
these reserves to an external fund, kept in a separate company, Synatom, 100%
owned  and  managed  by  the  main  utility,  with  a  "golden  share  "  to  the
Government. A three year transition period is envisaged.

(cid:1)  Synatom already manages the spent fuel and related waste.

(cid:1)  This company would be allowed to lend money to the utility, although strictly at

market rates.

New directive implementation impact:

- Resources are been collected to satisfactory level.

-  The  new  external  fund  to  be  created  would  comply  with  the  Directive
"externalisation" requirement, but independence, and ring-fencing from the utilities
finances should be enforced.

-The  Belgian  system  under  negotiation  shows  that  they  could  well  adapt  to  the
Directive in a rather short period (3years).

28

D

(cid:1)  Electricity  companies  assume 

the
decommissioning,  including  costs.  They  take  their  own  initiative  concerning
burdens  and  dues,  based  on estimated costs  and  the  expected  operational  life-
span of the installations.

the  responsibility  of  all  aspects  of 

(cid:1)  Provisions  are  made  according  to  the  decommissioning  cost  evaluated  in

nominal terms.

Since  1999  they  have  been  discounted  at  a  real  discount  rate  of  5,5%.The
provision period is 25 years.

(cid:1)  There are no constraints on assets allocation corresponding to these provisions.
Management principles are specific to each utility in accordance with Landers
fiscal authorities.

(cid:1)  The licensees build up financial reserves to be prepared for the follow-up costs
connected  with  the  operation  of  a  nuclear  power  plant  such  as  the
decommissioning  and  dismantling  of  the  installations,  and  the  treatment  and
disposal  of  radioactive  material  including  spent  fuel  elements.  These  reserves
are tax-free. So far, reserves amounting to €35 Billion _are set aside, of which
about 45 % are earmarked for decommissioning and dismantling and about 55
% for waste management.

Due to the changes in taxation that came into force in 1999, part of these reserves
will  have  to  be  dissolved.  This  is  mainly  because  the  reserves  now  are  subject  to
yield interest of 5.5 % until the time of probable use. The means to be provided to
cover  decommissioning  and  waste  management  costs  are  thus  composed  of  the
sums annually set aside as well as an interest of 5.5 %.

New directive implementation impact:

The costs of decommissioning seems higher than in other Member States.

(cid:1)  The  transition  period  need  be  sufficiently  long,  although  impact  will  vary

depending on the possibility to transfer fixed assets to the new funds.

29

E

(cid:1)  The  responsibility  of the decommissioning  operations  and  the  management  of
the waste (including final disposal) is handed over to the state owned company
ENRESA

(cid:1)  The future decommissioning costs are analysed and subject to an annual review
presented  in  the  framework  of  the  general  Plan  for  radioactive  wastes,  that  is
then submitted to the government.

(cid:1)  Cost are appraised in real terms and discounted at a 2,5% real rate.

(cid:1)  To face future expenditures, ENRESA manage a fund fed by a tax on electricity
sales  which  represents  an  average  value  of  3  Euro/MWh  both  for
decommissioning and end fuel cycle burdens.

(cid:1)  The  calculation  method  of  the  proportional  part  relies  on  the  following
principle:  yearly  incomes  are  proportional  to  the  electricity  output  for  each
plant. The burden  is  calculated by  dividing  the total  estimated and  discounted
expenditures by the overall discounted electricity generation.

New directive implementation impact:

No/minor impact. The Spanish model fits in the present Directive proposal.

FI

(cid:1)  According  to  the  law  costs  of  nuclear  waste  management  (including
decommissioning  costs)  are  responsibility  of  electricity  companies.  Necessary
funds for future investments linked to wastes management have to be collected
to set up the National Fund for nuclear waste management.

(cid:1)  Dismantling costs must be financed during the first 25 year of plant operation.

(cid:1)  This  fund  is  managed  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Business  through  the

State Management Fund (VYR).

(cid:1)  At present the Fund’s capital is mainly contributed by Fortum and TVO.

(cid:1)  These  contributors  are  entitled  to  borrow  money  from  the  Fund  against
securities.  At  a  time  these  loans  may  be  at  most  75%  of  the  confirmed  fund
holding of the loan-taker. The State has a right to borrow the sum not borrowed
by the contributors at the same percentage of interest.

(cid:1)  Furthermore,  the  nuclear operators  must  propose  securities,  under  the  form  of
non nuclear assets, to cover their liabilities which are not covered by the assets
of the fund.

(cid:1)  Every year, company Fortum (ex-IVO) and Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) have to
draw  up  a  provisional  cost  assessment  for  the  burdens  until  the  end  of  the
current  year.  Costs  are  appraised  in  nominal  terms  following  the  current  cost
level, without discounting.

30

New directive implementation impact:

The Finnish model basically complies  with  the  Directive.  Lending  money  back  to
operators  might  present  the  problem  of  the  separation  of  financial  risks,  but
securities in place seem should be enough guarantee.

F

(cid:1)  Electricity  de  France  (EDF)  assume  the  responsibility  for  all  aspects  of  the
decommissioning,  including  financing.  EDF  has  its  own  initiative  concerning
burdens  and  dues,  based  on estimated costs  and  the  expected  operational  life-
span of the installations.

(cid:1)  Provisions are calculated  for  each  reactor  in nominal term  during  30  years  on
the  basis  of  the  decommissioning  expenses.  Provisions  are  re-evaluated  each
year by taking into account the both effect of inflation and , if necessary, real
escalation of decommissioning costs. The approach is conservative because the
provisions are not discounted.

(cid:1) 

In  accordance  with  the  fiscal  authorities  ,these  provisions  are  not  taxable  and
there is obligation to manage part of the funds according to rules approved by
the state by deposit them in a separate, but not outsourced, account.

(cid:1)  The  provisioned  amounts  have  been  used  in  recent  years  to  start  the
decommissioning  of  the  oldest  NPP  .These  funds  were  partly  used  as
investment  in  new  assets  and  also  contributed  to  diminishing  the  company
liabilities (debts).

(cid:1)  EDF makes an accounting provision for NPP decommissioning costs by taking
a  percentage  on  each  kWh  sold.  The  amount  of  the  accounting  provision
appears in EDF's accounts. EDF is fully responsible for the fund management.

(cid:1)  Decommissioning costs are based on an average decommissioning cost (258.86
euros  98  per  installed  kW)  fixed  by  the  ministry  of  industry.  This  cost  is
updated each year using the retail price index of the GDP.

The  total  cost  of  decommissioning  French  NPP  amounts  to  16.2  billions  of
euros 98 (about 15%of investment).

(cid:1)  Another specific fund exists to finance storage and processing of nuclear waste.

It represents 16.6 billions of euros 98.

31

New directive implementation impact:

Although  EDF  has  recently  started  the  creation  of  an  internal  fund  managed  by
agents,  it  is  small  and  certainly  does  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of
externalisation raised by the Directive.

The  migration  to  the  external  funds  model  will  require  big  financial  movements,
whereas present accounted for liabilities are not easily convertible in tangible funds
overnight.

A transitional period of around 3 years may be necessary in this case.

I

A specific state managed Fund is made up of a levy on the price of the electricity,
added  to  former  resources  accumulated  by  ENEA  and  already  transferred  to  the
Fund .

A  state  owned  company,  SOGIN  manages  the  Fund  and  is  responsible  for  the
dismantling works. So the dismantling burdens are not the responsibility of ENEL (
ex-operator)  or  ENEA  (Search  and  development  committee  for  nuclear  and
substitution energies) anymore

The National agency that will manage the waste and the final repository will receive
the corresponding share of the fund.

New directive implementation impact:

The  external  Fund  in  place  complies  would  comply  with  the  Directive.  But  all
plants are shutdown. Directive would in practice not apply to Italy

NL

(cid:1)  Provisions are made by the operators but the responsibility is decentralised.

(cid:1)  The  company  COVRA  is  responsible  for  the  waste  management  strategy  and

receives yearly a sum from utilities.

(cid:1)  The  utilities  set  aside  provisions  for  decommissioning  in  their  accounts,  by

taking from the price of the kwh.

(cid:1)  One plant (Dodewaard) is ready for dismantling

New directive implementation impact:

Only  the  Borssele  plant  could  be  affected  by  the  Directive  (if  not  closing  earlier)
total  decommissioning  and  waste  management  is  already  calculated.  Part  of  the
provisions  already  transferred  to  the  waste  agency  COVRA.  The  impact  is  quite
limited.

32

S

(cid:1)  According to Swedish legislation, costs related to the end fuel cycle, including
the decommissioning of nuclear plants, are the responsibility of reactor owners.

(cid:1)  A due is retained on the electricity production from nuclear  origin,  during  the
first 25 years of operation. These dues are handed over to the state and gathered
as  funds  in  the  Bank  of  Sweden,  the  Nuclear  Waste  Fund,  one  fund  for  each
reactor owner. They are calculated on the basis of a 4% return rate until 2020
and 2,5% after.

(cid:1)  The money can be used by the utilities and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste
Management  Company  (SKB-AB),  created  by  the  utilities,  for  the  ongoing
activities  as  the  work  progresses.  The  Nuclear  Power  Inspectorate  (SKI)  has
responsibility for ensuring that the money has been properly used. At the end of
1998 a total of more than 23,000 MSEK had been accumulated in the funds.

(cid:1)  Each year the public authorities determine the level of this due for each plant.
The  decision  of  public  authorities  relies  on  SKN  proposals.  The  fee  has  for
some years now been between 0.01 and 0.02 SEK/kWh.

(cid:1)  The  legislation  requires  the  reactor's  owner  to  proceed  each  year  with  a
calculation of whole operations costs  related to the irradiated fuel,  radioactive
wastes (including final disposal) and decommissioning.  These calculations  are
used  as  a  basis  for  the  dues  proposal.  They  are  drawn  up  by  the  Swedish
Company of Fuel and Nuclear Wastes management (SKB) and presented to the
SKN in an annual report.

(cid:1) 

In  the  latest  cost  calculation,  the  total  undiscounted  future  costs  were  50
BnSEK,  in  2002  money  values.  The  total  cost  for  decommissioning  of  12
reactors has been estimated to 17,000 MSEK.

(cid:1)  By elaborating on its proposal for its contribution, SKN takes into account all
pertinent factors, such as aggregated costs, the expected reactors life span and
interest on provisions put into funds.

New directive implementation impact:

No/minor impact. The Swedish model fits in the present Directive proposal.

33

UK

(cid:1) 

In the United Kingdom, electricity companies assume the responsibility for all
aspects of the decommissioning, including financing.

(cid:1)  Provisions are re invested by the operators in their financial or fixed assets.

(cid:1)  British  Energy  has  set  up  an  external  fund  to  cover  dismantling  expenditures,
including  stages  two and three, including  the  dismantling  waste.  Expenditures
related  to  reactor  unloading  after  the  plant  shut  down  (stage  one)  and
expenditures related to final disposal of spent fuel realted waste are not covered
by the funds but directly provisioned to the balance-sheet of British Energy.

(cid:1)  The fund is worth 0.4 £bn (2001) and receives 18 £million a year for the nine

BE stations

(cid:1)  BNFL created a fund in 1994, that was cancelled in1997 to return to a provision

system.

(cid:1)  Expenditures are based on the estimated disbursement schedule and discounted.

The rate was 3% in 1999

(cid:1)  British  Energy  bases  these  expenditures  on  the  "  safe  store  "  strategy  that
consists of doing the minimum essentials at the time of the plant shut down and
then to wait for the decrease of the radioactivity for at least a century.

(cid:1)  The ultimate stage of the dismantling would begin 80 years for the stage threen

for an AGR plant type and 20 years for Sizewell B.

(cid:1)  Actuaries retain an anticipated profitability rate of 3,5  %  in  nominal  per  year,

after tax for assets invested in the British Energy Funds.

(cid:1) 

It is the differential between the rate of discount of the debt and the profitability
rate of assets, that contributes, with the evolution of the assets market value and
the evolution of dismantling costs, to define the net revalorization amount of the
debt, that is counted as a financial burden in British Energy balance.

(cid:1)  The  duration  of  the  period  of  reserve  constitution  corresponds  to  the

amortisation period of the plants

New directive implementation impact:

The  external  fund  is  already  operational  in  the  case  of  BE  and  independently
managed. The question remains on the coverage of the cost of final disposal of the
spent fuel related waste, which are not accounted for in the fund.

The Magnox reactors, belonging to Magnox Electric (BNFL) will be dismantled on
a  very  long  timeframe.  The  funding  will  be  provided  by  the  state  on  top  of  the
provisions (insufficient) to be accumulated through operation revenues.

34

ANNEX C – DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS IN THE EU

(Updated April 2002)

AUSTRIA

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Austria

BELGIUM

NAME

BR3 MOL

TYPE

PWR

EUROCHEMIC (Dessel)

-

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

1962-87

1965-80

-3

-3

Small reactor plant

Reprocessing plant

DENMARK

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

DR-2

Hot cells

DR

1959-1975

1964-1990

2

2

Building re-used

Building re-used

FINLAND

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Finland

FRANCE

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

G1 MARCOULE

G2 MARCOULE

G3 MARCOULE

GCR

GCR

GCR

1956-68

3*

Small power reactor

-2

-2

Small power reactor

Small power reactor

1959-80

1960-84

35

CHINON-A1

CHINON-A2

CHINON-A3

CHOOZ A

St LAURENT A1

St LAURENT A2

EL 4 Monts d’Arrée

EL 2 SACLAY

EL 3 SACLAY

PEGASE Cadarache

RAPSODIE Cadarache

TRITON Fontenay

MELUSINE Grenoble

GCR

GCR

GCR

PWR

GCR

GCR

HWR

HWR

HWR

PWR

FBR

PR

PR

1963-73

1,a

Small power reactor

1965-85

1966-90

1967-91

1969-90

1971-92

-2

-2

-2

-2

-2

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

1969-90

-3*

Small power reactor

1952-65

1957-79

3*

3*

Small power reactor

Small power reactor

1963-74

3,b

Small power reactor

1967-83

1959-82

1958-88

-2

3

-2

Small power reactor

Small power reactor

Small power reactor

MINERVE Saclay

LW-PR

1954-76

3*

Small power reactor

ZOE Fontenay

HW

1948-75

3,a

Small power reactor

NEREIDE Fontenay

LW-PR

1959-82

PEGGY Cadarache

GCR

1961-75

3

3

3

3

-2

3*

3*

Small power reactor

Small power reactor

Critical Assembly

Critical Assembly

Source fabrication plant

Pilot plant for Elan II B

Fuel reprocessing plant

1964-74

1960-83

1970-73

1968-70

1969-79

1966-80

3,c

Waste vitrification plant

1968-75

-1*

Dry processing pilot cell

1964-85

-2*

Radiometallurgy lab,13 cells

1957-84

3*

-1

Plutonium metallurgy

Large power reactor

CESAR Cadarache

MARIUS Cadarache

ELAN II B La Hague

ELAN II A La Hague

AT 1 La Hague

PIVER Marcoule

ATTILA

RM 2

BUILDING 19 Fontenay

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

SUPERPHENIX

FBR

1986-98

36

GERMANY

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

HDR Grosswelzheim

KKN Niederaichbach

KRB A Gundremmingen

KWL Lingen

MZFR Karlsruhe

VAK Kahl

AVR Jülich

THTR 300 Hamm-Uentrop

KKR Rheinsberg

KGR 1 Greifswald

KGR 2 Greifswald

KGR 3 Greifswald

KGR 4 Greifswald

KGR 5 Greifswald

KNK-II Karslruhe

KWW Wurgassen

Otto-Hahn ship reactor

BWR

HWR

BWR

BWR

HWR

BWR

HTR

HTR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

FBR

PWR

PWR

1970-71

1973-74

1967-77

1968-77

1966-84

1962-85

1969-88

1987-88

1966-90

1974-90

1975-90

1978-90

1979-90

1989-90

1979-91

1975-94

1968-79

FR-2 Karlsruhe

HWR

1961-86

FRJ-1 Merlin Jülich

RFR Rossendorf

PR

PR

1962-85

1957-91

FRN TRIGA III Neuherberg

TRIGA

1972-82

FRF-2 Frankfurt

TRIGA

1977-83

FRG-2 Geesthacht

PR

1963-95

Nukem Hanau

WAK Karlsruhe

HOBEG Hanau

-

-

-

1962-88

1971-90

1962-88

37

-3

-3

-3

2

-3

-3

-1

-1

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-2

0

3

2

-2

-3

2

2

-3

-3

-3

-3

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Fuel fabrication plant

Reprocessing plant

Fuel fabrication plant

Siemens Brennelementwerk Hanau

-

1968-91

0

Uranium/MOX 
plant

fuel 

fabrication

Fast critical assembly

SNEAK

SNR

FBR

Small power reactor

GREECE

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Greece

IRELAND

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Ireland

ITALY

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

GARIGLIANO

LATINA

CAORSO

TRINO

AVOGADRO Compes

ISPRA-1 (EU)

Galileo Galilei,Cisam,Pisa

ESSOR Ispra (EU)

BWR

GCR

BWR

PWR

PR

HWR

PR

HWR

1964-78

1963-86

1978-86

1964-87

-2

-2

-1

-1

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

1959-71

2,b

Small reactor plant

1958-74

1963-80

1967-83

-2

2

-2

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

LUXEMBOURG

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Luxembourg

38

NETHERLANDS

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

DODEWAARD

BWR

1968-1997

0

Small power reactor

PORTUGAL

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

No decommissioning activities in Portugal

SPAIN

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

VANDELLOS 1

GCR

1972-89

-2

Large power reactor

JEN-1 Madrid

ARB1 Bilbao

ARGOS Barcelona

PR

Arg

Arg

1958-87

1962-74

1963-77

CORAL Madrid

FBR

1968-88

1

1

-3

3

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

SWEDEN

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

AGESTA

R1 Stockholm

KRITZ Studsvik

HWR

GR

PWR

1964-74

1954-70

1959-75

Alpha-lab Studsvik

Laboratory

1960-75

1

3

3

3

Small power reactor

Zero power research reactor

Zero power research reactor

Other installations

UNITED KINGDOM

NAME

TYPE

Oper. Period

STAGE

COMMENTS

DFR Dounreay

FBR

1963-77

-1

Large power reactor

39

PFR Dounreay

WAGR Windscale

SGHWR Winfrith

BERKELEY 1

BERKELEY 2

HINKLEY POINT A

HUNTERSTON A1

HUNTERSTON A2

TRAWSFYNYDD 1

TRAWSFYNYDD 2

WINDSCALE Pile 1

WINDSCALE Pile 2

Merlin Aldermaston

BEPO Harwell

DMTR Dounreay

DRAGON Winfrith

ZEBRA

DIDO Harwell

PLUTO Harwell

GLEEP

NESTOR

B212 Caesium plant (S)

B206 Solvent recovery (S)

B29 Fuel storage (S)

B205 Fuel reprocessing (S)

B204 Fuel reprocessing (S)

B207 Uranium purification, (S)

Co-precipitation plant (S)

FBR

AGR

HWR

GCR

GCR

GCR

GCR

GCR

GCR

GCR

GR

GR

PR

GR

HWR

HTR

-

HWR

HWR

GR

Arg

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1975-94

1962-81

1968-90

1961-89

1961-88

1965-2000

1964-90

1964-89

1965-93

1965-93

-1

-3

-1

-2

-2

-1

-2

-2

-2

-2

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

Large power reactor

1950-57

-2,d,e

Small reactor plant

1951-58

-2,e

Small reactor plant

1

2

1

1

2

-1

-1

2

1

-3

-3

-1

-3

-3

-3

?

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Fast critical assembly

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Small reactor plant

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

1959-62

1948-68

1958-69

1965-76

1967-82

1956-90

1956-90

1947-90

1961-95

1956-58

1952-63

1952-64

1957-68

1952-73

1952-73

1969-76

40

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1953-82

1952-85

1953-86

1956-86

1960-86

1970-88

1964-88

-3

3,f

-3

-3

-2

-3

-3

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Other installation

Uranium enrichment plant(C)

B100-103 U recovery (S)

B209 Pu finishing plant (S)

B203 Pu recovery plant (S)

B30 fuel storage pond (S)

B277 fast reactor fuel prod(S)

B205 Pu corridors (S)

Description of terms:

REACTOR TYPES

GCR

Gas-cooled reactor

HWR

Heavy Water moderated reactor

PWR

Pressurised water reactor

PR

Pool type reactor

FBR

Fast-breeder reactor

BWR

Boiling water reactor

HTR

High temperature reactor

Arg

Argonaut type reactor

AGR

Advance gas-cooled reactor

GR

Air-cooled graphite reactor

DECOMMISSIONING STAGES

0 Decommissioning announced

1 Decommissioned to stage 1

2 Decommissioned to stage 2

3 Decommissioned to stage 3

3* Decommissioned to stage 3 without civil engineering

-x Decommissioning in progress upwards stage x

COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

a

Partly converted into a museum

B Converted into a spent fuel facility

C Equipment dismantled, building to be reused

41

Be re-used for...

D Contains damaged fuel elements

E Chimney being partially dismantled

F Used as radioactive waste store

S Sellafield (UK)

C Capenhurst (UK)

42