Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Security of Transports"
Date: 2002-10-24
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: air transport, cooperation policy, maritime transport, terrorism, transport network, transport policy, transport safety

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394th PLENARY SESSION, 24 OCTOBER 2002

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Security of Transports’

(2003/C 61/28)

On 23 April 2002, in a letter from Mrs Loyola de Palacio, the Commission asked the European Economic
and Social Committee to draw up an exploratory opinion, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, on the ‘Security of Transports’

On 23 April 2002 the Committee Bureau instructed the Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and
the Information Society to prepare the work on the subject.

At its 394th Plenary Session of 24 October 2002, and in view of the urgency of the matter, the European
Economic and Social Committee appointed Dr Bredima-Savopoulou as rapporteur-general and adopted
the following opinion by 93 votes to one, with five abstentions.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in
the US the world is facing enormous uncertainty. The shock
waves from those tragic events have spread throughout the
world and ramifications are being felt in almost every facet of
our lives.

Preventive and operational safety and security have
1.2.
assumed a higher profile than ever before and have been
placed at the top of policymakers’ priority lists. It is note-
worthy, however, that an internationally accepted definition
of terrorism does not exist.

1.3.
The need to enhance security worldwide is imperative
and recognised by governments and industry alike. Perfect
security is an impossible objective. In times of serious crisis
there is a tendency to try to conceive every possible contin-
gency and to find measures that could prevent that eventuality.
However, no matter how serious the security threats may be,
such intense security measures cannot be sustained for more
than a few days at a time. In order to make sensible judgments
about when to apply security measures, and their degree of
intensity, it is necessary to better understand the types and
likelihood of risks faced by the transport network.

1.4.
In the aftermath of the 11 September the shipping and
airline industries demonstrated their full support to the need
to defeat terrorism and other threats to the security of ships
and aircraft. Security is an issue where par excellence all links
in the transport chain should be involved in order to achieve
tangible results. All links should bear their share of responsi-
bility, otherwise the ‘weakest link’ will be the target of terrorists
in order to infiltrate into the system.

Organisation (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organ-
isation (ICAO) can provide. Rail security appears to be largely
focused on national level initiatives whilst terrorism in road
and inland waterways transport has received relatively little
attention. However, through the door-to-door concept involv-
ing several modes of transport all modes of transport are
inevitably concerned by the increased security considerations.
Hence, an interoperability of the integrated logistical chain is
required.

2. The impact of security measures

2.1.
Tighter security requirements and a series of surcharges
have also affected the cost of transporting goods by sea and
air (1). For international sea shipments, this has included
notification requirements, more frequent Coast Guard inspec-
tions and tugboat escort obligations, which have resulted in
increased costs and longer waiting times. For airfreight, higher
security-related cost at airports led to the application of
security charges, higher commercial insurance premia and war
surcharges for certain sensitive regions.

A recent OECD Report (2) on the impact of the terrorist
2.2.
attacks of 11 September on international trade suggests that
‘the cost of time delays, paperwork and compliance relating
to border crossing ranged from 5 % to 13 % of the value of
the goods involved’ and that ‘security measures could add a
further 1 % to 3 % to these costs. It would be essential that
governments avoid imposing disproportionate bureaucracy or
costs. Furthermore, the costs that fall properly to governments
should not be charged to transport providers’.

1.5. Maritime and civil aviation security is a global problem
posed by terrorism and unlawful acts and as such it requires
global attention and global solutions that only the respective
international organisations, namely the International Maritime

(1) OECD The Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 17.7.2002
Economic Department Working Paper No. 34: OECD Transport
Security and Terrorism Council of Ministers, 2.5.2002.

(2) TD/TC/WP (2002) REV1/702002.

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2.3.
Shipping and civil aviation must continue to serve the
flow of international trade effectively and efficiently and, to
ensure this, ships, aircraft, airports and port facilities must
adequately be prepared for the possibility of encountering
terrorist attacks or other forms of criminal
intentions. If
security procedures become too stringent the business of
transporting goods could grind almost to a halt, which would
give terrorists the success they were seeking.

measures should take into account any adverse implications
on the performance of the human element (fatigue, stress,
etc.). Transport workers are bound to be affected by the
implementation of security measures. The European philos-
ophy and culture sustains a strong respect for the human
rights and any reaction to threats of terrorism should not
disregard these long cherished principles.

New security measures should be balanced in relation
2.4.
to the objectives they pursue, their costs and impact on traffic.
Hence, it is necessary to consider carefully the proposals and
assess whether they are realistic and practically feasible. They
should not unduly restrain the personal human rights of the
citizens nor the constitutional order of individual states, thus,
serving the purpose of terrorists.

2.4.1.
The cost and the distribution of cost of security
measures should be based on estimates of reasonable measures
that could be put in place in order to prevent or reduce the
risk of terrorist attacks. The analysis should measure the actual
cost of implementation, direct and indirect costs to transport
providers and shippers (e.g. delays and additional equipment),
impact on world trade and distortions on trading patterns (by
trade being re-directed to areas of lesser security).

2.4.2.
Unilateral measures are unacceptable, especially
when they are applied asymmetrically and to the detriment of
the interests of
third countries. Unilateral and arbitrary
measures should be avoided since they hamper world trade by
raising bureaucratic as well as other obstacles, and eventually
leading to distortions of competition and adverse economic
effects.

Given the international character of maritime and air
2.4.3.
transport, security requirements should be based on reciprocal
arrangements, uniformly applied and enforced without dis-
crimination and must allow for the most efficient flow of
trade.

2.4.4.
Precautions against an attack will require infor-
mation, hence, it will be a duty of all transport operators to
pass any information or suspicions that they have to the
authorities and keep informed their personnel.

Unavoidably,

2.4.5.
the enhancement of security will
involve costly arrangements in terms of hardware (infrastruc-
ture and equipment) and software (manpower and training).
Care should be taken to avoid disproportionate technical
arrangements which may be seen as protectionist and promot-
ing commercial interests. Furthermore the scope and level of

2.4.6.
There is an increasing danger of imposing upon ship
and aircraft crews and on port authorities directly or indirectly
policing responsibilities that normally fall upon government
agencies. Such responsibilities are beyond their traditional
duties and may expose them to physical risks and emotional
stress.

3.

Insurance implications

the 11 September,

In the aftermath of

3.1.
insurance
implications in sea and air transport have been tremendous.
There was a total withdrawal of war risk cover by commercial
insurers. When commercial war-risk cover was offered again,
it was at more than ten times the cost that had previously
existed. The insurance industry raised its premia by between
0.03 and 0.05 per cent ad valorem, but this partly offset the
decline recorded in the last decade. Terrorism insurance
became largely unavailable. Consequently governments had to
step in and cover risks deemed too large for the private sector.

3.2.
The new security measures had also an impact on the
insurance market. Cover for inevitable delays resulting from
the intense security measures had to be considered. Moreover,
very expensive sophisticated high tech scanning equipment
had to be purchased and insured (1).

3.3.
In the maritime field the geographical areas where
additional premia are applicable and the periods of their
application were extended unreasonably. There is a widespread
perception that the 11 September events have been used as an
excuse for the imposition of unreasonable premia. Nowadays,
a dialogue between shipowners and insurers is ongoing with a
view to reaching more sensible solutions to the problem.

(1) The cost of security equipment is very high, e.g. a container

scanner in the port of Rotterdam costs EUR 14 m.

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3.4.
Regarding air transport, aviation war-risk underwriters
were seeking extra premia. The extra cost of insurance of US
carriers, was borne by the US government. Given the insurance
challenges, the US government provided airline companies
with direct financial help and reinforced airline security. In
order to avoid disruption of the air traffic the EU Finance
Ministers have approved a code of conduct that sets the
conditions under which EU governments may sustain aviation
insurance. The code of conduct enabled Member States so
wishing, either to pay insurance premia linked to the ‘risk of
war and terrorism’ for their airline companies or to grant them
a State guarantee against such risk. The EESC supports the
above EU initiative aiming at the viability of EU airlines.

3.5.
Since there are indications for a return to an acceptable
commercial aviation insurance situation, the Member States
airline-insurance guarantees will not be prolonged. In a move
to end the continuous difficulties in finding adequate insurance
cover
the Commission has proposed minimum aviation
insurance requirements for all carriers using the EU airspace,
i.e., a minimum liability per passenger and per kg of cargo. In
the long run, a mutual fund scheme to cover third party
liability for terrorism at reasonable cost appears to be an
alternative.

4. Maritime Security

4.1. Maritime security in perspective

4.1.1. While the 11 September attacks involved aircraft
and airports, ships and maritime transport infrastructure are
vulnerable to terrorist risks. Ships could be used as a weapon,
to launch an attack,
to transport weapons or dangerous
materials and by sinking to disrupt transport infrastructure
(e.g. port entrance, canal passage). Chemical and gas carriers
and laden oil tankers are particularly vulnerable and present
increased dangers. Containers carried by ships could also be
used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or terrorists. In
view of the potential danger, the US has put in place the most
extensive provisions to protect its ports and vessels. No other
country has as yet unilaterally and drastically altered their
current security arrangements for shipping.

attacks as such. However, cargo ships have been the victims of
acts of piracy and armed robbery. The total number of
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported
to have occurred from 1984 to 2002 was 2 650.

Therefore, the assessment of risks should focus on
4.1.3.
the probability and the possible seriousness of the risks, e.g.
geographic location, transport mode characteristics, ease of
access, risk exposure, institutional and legal problems facing
security measures.

4.1.4.
Security measures related to shipping should be clear
in respect of requirements related to vessels, crews, passengers,
shipper, consignees, terminal operators, road and rail carriers
involved in international trade and should be appropriate to
the level of threat assessed.

4.2. The work in IMO

4.2.1.
Concern about unlawful acts which threaten the
safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews
has been addressed by IMO since the 1980s.

Pursuant to the Achille Lauro incident (1985), IMO
4.2.2.
adopted a resolution and two circulars
recommending
measures to prevent unlawful acts against the safety and
security of passenger ships (1).

4.2.3.
In 1988 IMO adopted the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf (SUA Convention and Protocol). The above
instruments entered into force on 1.1.1992 (2).

4.2.3.1.
The preparatory work leading to the adoption of
these treaties took place at the same time as that leading to the
adoption of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971.

4.2.3.2. Moreover, IMO established a correspondence gro-
up to address the revision of the SUA Convention and Protocol
in order to facilitate international cooperation as a means of
combating unlawful acts, including terrorist attacks.

In comparison with aircraft and with the exception
4.1.2.
of the highjack of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, no other
passenger ship or cargo ship have been the target of terrorist

(1) A.584(14), MSC/Circ.443, MSC/Circ.754.
(2) Number of contracting states is 67 and 60 respectively.

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4.2.4.
Following the 11 September attacks the IMO sought
to urgently reassess the state of international regulations
dealing with security. At the instigation of the US, the IMO
held ad-hoc meetings of an Intersessional Working Group of
the Maritime Safety Committee on 11-15 February 2002, 15-
24 May 2002 and 9-13 September 2002.

4.2.5.
It has been decided by IMO that the new measures
to enhance maritime security would form the International
Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities and that
the basic elements would be contained in amendments to
Chapter XI of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS). The IMO measures are expected to be
adopted by a Diplomatic Conference on 4-13 December 2002.
These measures will concern the following issues:

4.2.9.
Containerisation is very open but it is this openness
that makes it prone to terrorist action. The sea transport of
containers is only part of the multimodal transport chain and
there is a need to ensure security at all stages including
shippers, forwarders and carriers. The role of frontier agencies,
in particular customs administrations,
in controlling the
international movement of containers is crucial and instrumen-
tal. Customs administrations worldwide have a long history of
controlling containers in conjunction with other national and
international
law enforcement agencies and relevant trade
bodies. The World Customs Organisation has a vital role to
play in developing a comprehensive container security system
in co-cooperation with interested international organizations
and in consultation with the associations of shippers, for-
warders and carriers. Part of the system should cover the
responsibility to issue and control proper cargo declarations
for containers.

— automatic identification systems for ships;

— ship and offshore installation security plans;

— a ship security officer/a company security officer;

— port facility security plans and port facility vulnerability

assessments;

— container security measures;

— information on ship, cargo, crew and passengers.

Issues of particular interest where further inter-
4.2.6.
national and national work will be necessary include the
security of port areas, the application of measures to ports and
the security of containers.

4.2.7.
The IMO measures will cover the ‘Ship/port’ interface,
namely the immediate shore security threat towards the ship
and vice-versa including anchorage and the movements of the
ship in port. The remainder will be addressed by IMO in
cooperation with ILO and other relevant organisations (e.g.
World Customs Organisation,
International Association of
Ports and Harbours, International Harbour Masters Associ-
ation).

The record of the history of the ship and infor-
4.2.10.
mation on ownership will respond adequately to the security
concerns regarding transparency. Ships will be required to
maintain a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR). The CSR is
intended to provide on board record of the history of the ship,
with respect to information on the flag, date of registration,
name and IMO number of the ship.
It will also include
information on the registered owner(s), charterer(s), classifi-
cation societies, the ISM Code documentation. Furthermore,
information on who appoints the crew, who fixes the use of
the ship and who signs the charter party on behalf of the
owner will be readily available.

4.2.11.
The IMO has agreed in principle to accelerate the
fitting of existing ships with Automatic Identification Systems
(AIS). However, the determination of the final date for the
carriage requirement is being left until the December 2002
Diplomatic Conference.

5. The EU perspective

5.1.
The proposals or action that have been put forward
internationally within the IMO framework seem to strike a
fairly ‘good balance’ between the necessity to ensure free
circulation of goods and persons and the necessity to provide
the highest possible protection against terrorist attacks.

The IMO has considered the issue of application of
4.2.8.
Port Vulnerability Assessment (PVA) requirements for ‘small
ports’ and ports ever hardly called at by ships engaged in
international voyages. Although it was recognised that the
PVA requirements might not be applicable to all ports of a
flexibility was considered necessary to close the
country,
maritime security loop for those cases when and where a
security risk might arise.

5.2.
Although some IMO measures may later be transferred
into Community legislation, the adoption of new international
measures should not lead to delays in Community legislative
procedures. There is a need to coordinate the decision-making
processes in international fora and at the EU level in order
to avoid possible inconsistencies between international and
Community rules.

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5.3.
The European Council in Seville (21-22.6.2002) invited
closer cooperation among the Member States in the fight
against terrorism. It also welcomed the progress achieved since
11 September in incorporating the fight against terrorism into
all aspects of the EU’s external relations policy.

The EU ports should adopt common standards to
5.4.
heighten port security against terrorism before other countries
take unilateral measures. Unilateral
and discriminatory
measures that may result in the classification of foreign ports
as ‘safe’ and blacklisting of ‘unsafe’ in terms of detecting illegal
immigrants and terrorists are unacceptable as they may lead to
market distortion and could jeopardise the smooth flow of
international trade. Furthermore, individual initiatives of cer-
tain EU customs authorities to conclude bilateral agreements
with the US Customs pre-empt EU collective action and
undermine the desirable framework of future arrangements
that need to be reciprocal and collaborative. Screening at the
port of loading (EU) instead of the port of discharge (US) is a
Herculian task. The EESC supports the European Commission’s
stance in challenging the legality of these bilateral agreements.
This move should be seen in light of legal considerations
concerning the EU’s competence in external trade relations.
The EESC also supports EU action to pursue talks with the US
in order to arrive at an arrangement giving equal treatment for
all cargoes (containers) originating from the EU and to transfer/
integrate the bilateral arrangements in multilateral agreement
(WCO).

Concern arises with the prospect of adoption by the
5.5.
US of rules that the rest of the world may not be in a position
to follow, thereby causing confusion for ships, shipowners and
ship/ port interface. The US maritime security initiative allows
the US government to undertake foreign port assessment, with
the ship’s entry into the US being conditional on proof that
the port of origin provided effective cargo screening and other
anti-terrorist measures. The volume of trade with the US may
provide a measure of the significance and the impact of the
initiative. The cruise ship industry carries more than 6.5 million
Americans annually on passenger vessels. Six million loaded
containers, 156 million tons of hazardous material and nearly
one billion tons of petroleum products enter in US ports each
year. The total container movement between Europe and
North America (US, Canada and Mexico) in 2001 amounted
to 6 177 000 units (1). Approximately 22.5 % of container sea
traffic bound for US ports originates from nine mega-ports in
seven EU States.

5.5.1.
The sheer volume of trade with the EU and other
parts of the world should induce the US to seek realistic
solutions in cooperation with its trade partners. Conversely,
the EU realising the potential impact of various and variable
measures in other parts of the world should assume a leading
role for the establishment of a global system in the interest of
all. The EESC urges the EU to initiate a dialogue with the US
and other countries to discuss sovereignty, data sharing,
container inspection procedures, reciprocity and other issues
of mutual concern. It is an opportunity for the EU to show a
higher profile. Past and recent experience in many parts of the
world has proved that focusing only on policing measures has
limited effect. A policing strategy is not a secure strategy in a
non-secure world. There is an urgent need for the EU to take
the lead internationally in developing a broader framework for
security which will address also the causes of terrorism and
not only seek to eliminate its effects.

Security measures should be of such a nature to avoid
5.6.
deflection of
traffic in favour of some ports (because of
increased security measures) to the detriment of other ports.
Moreover, security measures should not discriminate between
liner/tramp shipping calling at EU ports.

5.7.
The EESC proposes that all EU Member States not
parties to the SUA Convention and its Protocol be urged to
ratify both instruments (2).

5.8.
Any EU action should take into consideration econ-
omic aspects, such as analysis of who pays for security
measures and the competitive impact of security requirements
on publicly and privately owned ports. The maritime industry
has recognised the need for comprehensive anti-terrorism
legislation and is prepared to share some of the costs of
improved security measures.

5.9.
The EU interest should focus primarily on an assess-
ment of questions linked not only to security of persons
working in the sector (seamen, port workers) but also to
security of port terminals. The EU has to determine the means
of a better identification of risks involved and to propose
procedural/technological solutions in order to reduce them.

( 1) Containerisation International, April 2002.

(2) Belgium, Ireland and Luxemburg have not ratified as yet.

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5.10.
Ship and port facility security is a risk-management
activity. This assessment is a sovereign decision made accord-
ing to the judgment of each Member State. However, as in
various areas of maritime safety, EU action to establish uniform
standards and procedures will prove indispensable. Common
personnel training to respond to increased security demands
will achieve harmonisation of procedures at reduced costs.
Therefore, the entire logistical chain will have to change its
business procedures in the long run to cater for security
considerations.

transit to and from their ships. Security considerations will
have to be reconciled with the 108 Convention security
considerations. It is anticipated that the format of identity
documents, which will be issued by the seafarers’ country of
nationality, will be standardised through the development of
machine readable documents.

5.11. Member States in coordination must conduct port-
facility security assessments. The EESC believes that an over-
arching port security plan must form the framework to
establish port facility plans. Seaports are often very open and
exposed and, by the very nature of their role in promoting the
free flow of commerce, may be susceptible to large scale
terrorism that could pose a threat to coastal environment and
industrial, commercial and administrative centres and their
resident or working populations. Effective physical security
and access control in seaports is fundamental to deterring and
preventing potential
threats to seaport operations, cargo
shipments and ships. The EESC believes that the establishment
of Port Security Committees will allow to combine efforts
(customs,
of port authorities, government representatives,
immigrations, etc.), port users and other interested parties
involved in security.

Security assessments should have three essential
5.12.
components. First, they must identify and evaluate important
assets and infrastructure that are critical to the port facilities as
well as those areas or structures that, if damaged, could cause
significant loss of life or damage to the port facilities’ economy
or environment. Second, the assessment must identify the
actual threats to those critical assets and infrastructure in order
to prioritise security measures. Finally, the assessment must
address vulnerability of the port facilities by identifying their
weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, protection
systems, procedural policies, communication systems, trans-
portation infrastructure, utilities, and other areas within the
port facilities that may be a likely target.

5.13.
Effective access control would require a photo ID for
all persons boarding a ship in a port. Without such measure
the ship would not be able to exercise control over persons
boarding and leaving the ship and would therefore be unable
to ensure the security as required by the ship security plan.
Under the ILO 108 Convention seafarers can be exempt from
normal visa requirements for the purpose of shore leave or for

The EESC notes that practical and cost implications
5.14.
might deter wide implementation of any new ID requirements.
The use of biometric templates to verify the identity of the
holder could give rise to human rights and data protection
concerns. Moreover, reconciling the above exercise with the
Schengen visa requirements will be an additional consideration
as far as the EU is concerned.

5.15.
The EESC urges speedy ratification of the 108 Con-
vention by the EU Member States that have not done so. With
respect to port workers, IMO and ILO will urgently resolve the
matter and the EU should give its full support to that effect.
Pending international action, the EU may consider transitional
arrangements along the lines of the identified need for access
control of government employees whose duties require access
to ships.

Increased security measures will necessitate

5.16.
a
strengthened cooperation between the various administrations
of
the EU Member States (immigration, customs, airport
authorities and port authorities). Equally important is the need
for coordination between the European Commission services
involved.

The cooperation of the shipping industry should be
5.17.
sought
in promoting security awareness. Any additional
security measures should take into account other threats to
ship/crew security such as drug trafficking, piracy, armed
robbery and stowaways. The EESC notes that for a number of
years ships and seafarers face an escalation of piracy and
armed robbery incidents at sea. The current emphasis on
maritime security should be seen also as an opportunity to
finding solutions to the piracy problem. However, the safety
and working conditions of transport workers should not be
put at risk when dealing with such cases. Thus, actions dealing
with the threat of terrorism will also serve the aim of dealing
with other illegal acts (trafficking in drugs or people, piracy).
When considering the economic costs of security measures
the benefits achieved should be taken into account.

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5.18.
Care should be taken to avoid any imbalance between
vessel security and port facility security that may result in
forcing upon vessels and their operators the obligation to
provide additional quay security to redress the imbalance.
Costs that fall properly to governments should not be charged
to the industry.

ensure the security of civil aviation. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) convened a Ministerial Confer-
ence on Aviation Security (Montreal 19-20.2.2002) which
agreed a global strategy for strengthening aviation security
worldwide and establishing the basis of an Aviation Security
Plan of action.

5.19. Member States should develop efficient methods of
handling information on cargoes typically based on a single
point of lodgement of information and on electronic systems.
In particular, for containers there is a need for comprehensive
data interchange between all parties concerned with their
movements. The EESC believes that the system already estab-
lished under Directive 93/75/EEC on reporting requirements
for dangerous or polluting goods should be expanded to cater
for the exchange of the data required to be submitted.

5.20.
The EESC believes that the early implementation of
the Galileo system (planned to be operational by 2008) will
permit a very precise identification of ships and containers
and, thus, facilitate attainment of the objective of increased
security.
In the meantime, an effort should be made to
accelerate the operational phase (2003-2008) of the Egnos
project, the precursor of Galileo, which relies on American
GPS and the Russian GLONASS and monitors their integrity
and implement it alongside Galileo.

5.21.
Under the anticipated IMO measures ships will be
subject to control in ports of the Member States and may be
inspected, consistent with international law for the purpose of
determining their compliance with the applicable require-
ments. In cases of violations ships may be subject to delay,
detention, restriction of operations, expulsion from the port,
or denial of entry into port. The EESC proposes that timely
amendments to the Port State Control Directive (95/21/EC)
should be drafted to give effect to the expansion of the scope
of port state control.

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) only has a
5.22.
security benefit if signals can be received ashore, analysed and
acted upon. The EESC proposes close monitoring of timely
compliance of Member States with the relevant obligation
under the proposed reporting Directive.

6. Civil aviation security

6.1. Civil aviation — a risk

6.1.2.
Given the global nature of air transport, security
measures need to be coordinated internationally and where
necessary bilaterally to be effective. It is more important than
ever that the entire aviation industry works together towards
the common objective of
increased security. Preventive
measures can no longer be left solely to the local authorities
or even the responsible national authorities. Therefore, the EU
should coordinate activities on aviation security with ICAO
and should make reference to relevant ICAO standards as far
as possible.

6.1.3.
The EESC shares the view that not all adjustments of
security measures can be implemented effectively and uni-
formly with immediate effect but a realistic, gradual process
will be required to cope with the necessary recruitment and
training of personnel and the alterations of infrastructure.

6.2. Onboard security

6.2.1.
Regarding onboard security the ICAO recently adopt-
ed standards relating to the incorporation of security into the
design of aircraft and other in-flight security measures. The
ICAO flightdeck security standards will require that passenger-
carrying aircraft of 60 passengers or more, or with a maximum
certificated take-off weight of 45 500 kg be protected from
intrusion and ballistic threats. This requirement is not manda-
tory until November 2003.

However, the US corresponding rule requires that
6.2.2.
certain US air carriers must install reinforced flightdeck doors
by 9.4.2003, i.e. 7 months earlier than the ICAO requirements.
Since the US authorities considered it unacceptable to create
two levels of flightdeck protection for the same operations to
and from US airports by foreign operators, therefore the rule
will apply to aircraft belonging to foreign carriers engaged in
air transportation serving the US.

6.1.1.
Civil aviation security has two components: On
board security and ground security. The Convention on
International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7.12.1944
(Chicago Convention) provides for minimum standards to

6.2.3.
A few governments, including those of France and
Germany have started deploying sky marshals, US and British
carriers have taken significant steps to ensuring the sanctity of
through cockpit-door reinforcement and the
the cockpit
worldwide increase in the number of bags being physically
inspected has benefited security.

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6.3. Ground security

6.3.1.
On 14 September 2001 the EU Transport Council
decided that it was necessary to implement the essential
measures to prevent unlawful acts against civil aviation set out
in Document 30 of the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC) (1). The EESC in its opinion (28.11.2001) (2) on the
Proposal for a Regulation on establishing common rules in the field
of civil aviation security (3) welcomed the proposal insofar as it
was a fast and adequate answer to ensure a high level of security
by taking action to prevent acts of unlawful interference against
civil aviation.

6.4.

The EU perspective

6.4.1.
The 11 September events demonstrated that air
transport has been misused by terrorists to attack governments.
However, the air transport industry itself is not the intended
target of terrorist activity and should not be responsible for
the cost of preventive measures. Therefore, the reinforcement
of certain security measures by the public authorities in the
wake of the attacks directed against society as a whole and not
at the industry players must be borne by the public authorities.

6.4.2.
All adjustments of security measures, including the
change of security measures’ recommendations into manda-
tory legal requirements should be subject to a cost/benefit
analysis and to a check of their operational implications. It
should be underlined that within the EU the financing of
security for air transport currently differs from country to
country. The cost is borne by the government in some States,
paid for by a special departure tax in other States, and financed
directly by air-transport operators in others.

6.4.3.
The EESC expresses its concern about the financing
of existing and new security measures. It believes that govern-
ments’
financial obligations in this field must go further.
Indeed as is the case for other modes of transport, airports are
national
frontiers and it should be the responsibility of
governments to ensure the highest level of national security
for their citizens at these borders. The security issue demands
a harmonised approach in the EU and governments should
undertake coordinated action in drawing up a comprehensive
policy for financing and guaranteeing the highest level of
security possible for air travel.

6.4.4.
The EESC recalls its opinion on the Regulation
establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation
security (4) whereby it was established that ‘it is unfair that
airports and airlines should bear the additional expenditure.
Securing public safety at airports should be shouldered by the
Member States’.

The EESC notes that the US Congress adopted an
6.4.5.
emergency package of measures, part of which will be
allocated to the safety and security of air transport. No cost
reimbursement for additional security measures is available
from EU Member States for European carriers so far. Conse-
quently, a distortion of competition between European and US
air carriers by contrasting policies regarding the allocation of
cost for security measures must be avoided. However, the
EESC believes that new technical norms should not be
introduced under the guise of increased security whilst in fact
serving other purposes (e.g. commercial promotion of new
equipment, protectionism).

6.4.6.
In light of the above considerations, the EESC takes
the view that the draft Regulation on common rules for civil
aviation security should also deal with the cost of funding of
security and not leave this issue for subsequent legislation. The
competitive position of EU airlines has to be taken into
account in deciding about the funding of security measures.

6.4.7.
The EESC reiterates its previous call that the other
pieces of proposed legislation dealing with civil aviation
security should be promoted and adopted as soon as possible.

The EU cannot adopt measures applicable in third
6.5.
country airports. Therefore,
it should devise a mechanism
assessing whether third country airports meet the essential
security requirements. Failure to meet such requirements may
lead to further discrepancies between the security levels of EU
countries. Such discrepancies should lead to the consideration
of an important aspect of security, namely the segregation of
passengers and its likely impact in operational, human and
financial terms.

( 1) ECAC is a voluntary association of European aviation authorities
which has adopted a number of recommendations, notably in the
field of civil aviation security.

( 2) TEN/097.
( 3) COM(2001) 575 final — 2001/0234 (COD).

(4) OJ C 48, 21.2.2002, p. 70.

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6.5.1.
The EESC believes that the EU should aim at introdu-
cing measures that would not conflict with on-board security
measures adopted by the US. Furthermore, since the security
risk is not at the same level all over Europe, there is a need for
flexibility based on the corresponding risk assessment.

6.6.2.
The EESC does not believe that the arming of the
crew with lethal weapons offers an alternative solution, as the
disadvantages could be much greater than the benefits. On the
other hand, the potential use of non-lethal protective devices
in the cabin area for use in emergencies should be further
assessed.

6.5.2.
Efforts should concentrate on preventing individuals
and/or items presenting a security risk from boarding or being
placed on the aircraft. The primary focus of action should be
ground security, laying with the responsibility of governments.

7. Conclusions

There is a need to review the measures and pro-
6.5.3.
cedures for airside access control and in particular the degree
of trust placed on airport-based employees when entering
restricted zones. If one can enter a restricted area with ease,
the benefits of enhanced passenger screening have been
negated.

The EESC welcomes the European Council’s invitation
7.1.
for closer cooperation among the Member States in the fight
against terrorism. It also welcomes the progress achieved since
11 September in incorporating the fight against terrorism into
all aspects of the EU’s external relations policy.

Failure to address the concern may jeopardise the
6.5.4.
objective to establish a ‘common secure area’,
in terms of
aviation security. This objective, commonly known as One-
Stop Security (OSS)
is to apply the appropriate security
measures at the point of origin only, thereby removing the
requirement for these measures to be repeated at the point of
transfer.

6.5.5.
The ECAC 30 air cargo security system could also be
used in devising a container security system in the maritime
sector. The ECAC 30 is based upon the ‘Known shipper’ system
and the issuance of consignment security certificate. However,
the ECAC 30 concept cannot be applied to tramp shipping
in view of its fundamental differences from container/liner
shipping as well as from air transport.

6.6.
The stakeholders should be an integral part of the
security process that includes the drafting, implementation
and quality control of security measures. Airlines operating to
States should have a right to see the inspection reports and/or
any recommendations made, since they will be directly
exposed to security risks as a result of any shortcomings by
States or airports.

7.2.
The EESC firmly believes that a policing strategy is not
the EU
a secure strategy in a non-secure world. Hence,
should take the lead internationally in developing a broader
framework for security which will address the causes of
terrorism and not only seek to eliminate its effects.

7.3.
The need to enhance security worldwide is imperative
and recognised by governments and industry alike. Increased
security measures will necessitate a strengthened co-operation
between the various administrations of the EU Member States
(immigration, customs, airport authorities and port authorities)
and increased coordination between the European Com-
mission services involved.

Shipping and civil aviation must continue to serve the
7.4.
flow of international trade effectively and efficiently and, to
ensure this, ships, aircraft, airports and port facilities must
adequately be prepared for the possibility of encountering
terrorist attacks or other forms of criminal intentions.

7.5.
Given the international character of maritime and air-
transport security requirements should be based on reciprocal
arrangements, uniformly applied and enforced without dis-
crimination and must allow for the most efficient flow of
trade.

6.6.1.
The EESC is of the opinion that the deployment of
sky marshals should be left to individual airlines and individual
governments. The acts of unlawful
interference should be
prevented on the ground. However, where the State mandates
the use of armed in-flight security personnel, they should be
provided by the State which must have the responsibility for
funding, selecting and training such personnel.

7.6.
. Security is an issue where all links in the transport
chain should be involved and through the door-to-door
transport are affected by security
concept all modes of
considerations at varying degrees. Hence, an interoperability
of the integrated logistical chain is required.

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7.7.
There is a need to coordinate the decision-making
processes in international fora and at the EU level in order
to avoid possible inconsistencies between international and
Community rules. Unilateral and arbitrary measures should be
avoided since they hamper world trade by raising bureaucratic
as well as other obstacles, and eventually leading to distortions
of competition and adverse economic effects.

7.8.
Bilateral agreements of some EU customs authorities
with the US authorities in the context of the US container
security initiative are inconsistent with a unified EU approach
and they undermine EU solidarity. For this reason, the EESC
supports EU action to pursue talks with the US with a view
to transferring/integrating the bilateral arrangements in a
multilateral agreement.

7.9.
New security measures should be balanced in relation
to the objectives they pursue, their costs and impact on traffic.
They should not unduly restrain the personal human rights of

the citizens nor the constitutional order of individual states,
thus, serving the purpose of terrorists.

7.10.
Transport workers are bound to be affected by the
implementation of security measures. The European philos-
ophy and culture sustains a strong respect for the human
rights and any reaction to threats of terrorism should not
disregard these long cherished principles.

7.11.
New technical norms should not be introduced under
the guise of increased security whilst in fact serving other
purposes (e.g. commercial promotion of new equipment,
protectionism).

7.12.
EU Governments have the responsibility to ensure
the highest practical level of national security commensurate
with the threat for their citizens at their borders, including
ports and airports. They should undertake coordinated action
in drawing up a comprehensive policy for financing and
guaranteeing the highest level of security possible for sea and
air travel.

Brussels, 24 October 2002.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Roger BRIESCH