Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Operation of the Euratom Safeguards Office in 2001
Date: 2002-10-17
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, report, supervisory body

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 17.10.2002
COM(2002) 566 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Operation of the Euratom Safeguards Office in 2001

.REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Operation of the Euratom Safeguards Office in 2001

1.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A  reevaluation  of  ESO’s  missions  related  to  the  implementation  of  Chapter  VII  of
the Euratom Treaty has been conducted in the second half of the year 2001. It led to
recommendations made to the Commission on ESO’s objectives, working methods,
internal structure and management policy.

A  changing  environment  for  the  nuclear  industries  activities,  but  also  in  the  legal
framework  in  which  safeguards  are  applied,  led  ESO  to  take  the  initiative  of
preparing  a draft  for a new  regulation,  replacing  the  existing  Regulation  (Euratom)
n° 3227/76, in force for more than 25 years.

Reporting  by  the  nuclear  installation  operators  on  nuclear  materials  flows  and
inventories  was  fulfilled  in  compliance  with  Euratom  treaty  requirements.  All  data
was checked and clerical errors or inconsistencies corrected.

Verification activities conducted by ESO inspection staff led to the conclusion that,
apart from some discrepancies between evaluations carried out by operators and ESO
inspectors, which are in the process of being solved, no diversion of nuclear material
from its intended use was established.

Effective  cooperation  between  ESO  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency
(IAEA)  on  the  territory  of  the  EU  resulted  in  confirmation  –  reflected  in  the
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 2000 issued by the IAEA - that no evidence
of  nuclear  material  diversion  or  misuse  of  equipment  or  facilities  placed  under
safeguards in the EU was found.

In  addition  to  its  global  conclusions,  the  SIR  2000  identified  some  areas  for
improvement concerning different technical aspects and verification procedures. The
need  of  enhanced  cooperation  with  the  IAEA  for  the  implementation  of  the
Additional Protocols to the existing safeguards agreements was clearly stated.

Founded on the legal basis of the Euratom Treaty, ESO activities are financed by two
different  budget  appropriations,  one  concerning  general  functioning  of  ESO  as  any
other service of the Commission and  the  second  one  related  to  specific  operational
costs in the field of nuclear safeguards. Details on the way in which the budget was
spent in 2001 are provided in this report.

As  an  overall  conclusion  of  the  Annual  Report  2001,  it  may  be  stated  that  the
objectives  defined  for  ESO’s  activities  as  set  out  in  Chapter  VII  of  the  Euratom
Treaty were satisfactorily met.

2

2.

MISSION AND LEGAL BASIS OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

The  task  of  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  (ESO)  is  to  ensure  that  within  the
European  Union  nuclear  material  is  not  diverted  from  its  intended  use  and  that
safeguarding  obligations  assumed  by  the  Community  under  an  agreement  with  a
third  state  or  an  international  organisation  are  complied  with.  Chapter  VII  of  the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly called the
Euratom Treaty, and the implementing Euratom Regulation No. 3227/76 as amended
constitute the legal basis of Euratom Safeguards1.

3.

THE  YEAR 
SAFEGUARDS OFFICE

IN  REVIEW:  MISSION  AND  FUNCTIONING  OF  THE  EURATOM

3.1.

Implementation of the Results of the Internal Commission Audit

Following  the  July  1999  announcement  of  President  Prodi  concerning  the
organisation  of  the  new  Commission,  a  general  inspection  of  the  structures  of  the
Euratom Safeguards Office was carried out. The Inspectorate General of the Services
(IGS) examined and reported upon the Euratom Safeguards Office’s objectives and
the  extent  to  which  these  are  fulfilled,  its  working  methods,  its  structure  and
organisation, its use of resources, its management and its relation with headquarters
in  Brussels.  The  report,  dated  15  May  2000,  listed  thirteen  recommendations  that
were gradually implemented during the year 2001.

The  first  three  recommendations  concern  the  missions  of  the  Euratom  Safeguards
Office and the way in which they were implemented. The IGS suggested that a High
Level Expert Group address these issues (see point 3.2 below).

The  other  recommendations  concern  mainly  issues  related  to  the  organisation  and
internal  management  of  the  ESO.  All  of  them  are  in  the  process  of  being
implemented or are awaiting additional orientations to be provided in the final report
of the High Level Expert Group.

3.2.

High Level Expert Group

The first recommendation of the IGS proposed the creation of a High  Level Expert
Group (HLEG) to “undertake a review of Euratom Safeguards goals and objectives
with the view of making appropriate recommendations…”

Such HLEG was established by the Commission in June 2001. The mandate assigned
to it encompassed the following themes:

(1) 

redefine  the  ESO’s  mission  and  its  operational  objectives  to  reflect  today’s
circumstances,  while  taking  into  account  the  Commission  obligations  under
Chapter  VII  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  other  relevant  international
agreements based on this Treaty;

(2) 

draw  up  a  Mission  Statement  for  ESO,  and  a  procedure  to  update  it
periodically;

1

For further details, see chapters 2 and 3, of the 1999-2000 Annual Report (COM(2001) 436 final)

3

                                                
(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

analyse  ESO’s  workings  methods  and  inspection  procedures,  and  identify
implementation assessment methods thereof and performance indicators;

assess  the  cost-benefit  ratio  between  the  related  resources  and  ESO’s
obligations/responsibilities;  set  up  an  order  of  priorities  to  improve  overall
efficiency at a constant level of resources;

propose more  efficient  and  transparent reporting mechanisms  between ESO,
the Directorate General TREN and the Commissioner in charge;

propose  improved  communication  mechanisms  about  ESO's  activities  with
other European institutions, with Member States and with the public;

assess a better complementarity implementation between ESO and the IAEA
inspectors on the territory of the European Union;

spell  out  the  possible  consequences  of  these  proposals  in  terms  of  internal
organisation, human and financial resources, and status; distinguish  the  core
functions  of  the  Commission  from  the  tasks  that  can  be  delegated  and
outsourced.

Three experts were appointed: a former Vice-President of the European Commission;
a past Deputy Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
(Head  of  Safeguards  Department);  a  retired  Vice-President  of  an  Industrial  Group
active in the areas of  energy, nuclear and transport. The  HLEG  received  secretarial
support from an official of DG TREN (Brussels) and technical support from a team
of officials of the Euratom Safeguards Office.

The  HLEG  has  broadly  considered  in  its  work  the  activities  of  the  Euratom
Safeguards Office over the last two decades. The Group has noted with satisfaction
the efforts already undertaken by the new management since 20002.

3.3.

Preparation of a new Regulation

The  Euratom  Treaty  (Art.  79)  requires  that  a  regulation  defines  the  nature  and  the
extent of the requirements to be fulfilled by the nuclear operators.

The  existing  Regulation  (Euratom)  no.  3227/763,  in  force  since  1976,  defines  the
obligations of the operators of nuclear installations towards the Commission as far as
declaration of the basic technical characteristics of the installations and reporting of
nuclear material accountancy is concerned.

During  the  25  years  the  Regulation  has  been  in  force,  a  number  of  developments
have  occurred,  not  only  in  the  nuclear  industry  and  in  information  technology,  but
also  in  the  legal  framework  under  which  safeguards  are  applied  (i.e.  The  New
Partnership  Approach  agreed  between  the  Commission  and  the  IAEA  in  1992  and
the Protocols Additional4 to the Safeguards Agreement between the Community, the
Member States and the IAEA).

2

3

4

The HLEG submitted its report to the Commission in February 2002.
Commission Regulation (EURATOM) no. 3227/76 of 19 October 1976, OJ L 363, 31.12.1976, p. 1
OJ L 67/1 of 13.3.1999

4

                                                
Therefore, the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  took  the  initiative  of  working  out  a  new
draft Regulation which would review existing obligations under Regulation 3227/76,
cover the new reporting requirements imposed by the Additional Protocols and allow
for modernised reporting systems in line with state of the art information technology.

During  2001,  a  dedicated  task  force  within  the  ESO  prepared  a  draft  of  the  new
Regulation, which after the successful consultations with other Commission services,
was approved by the Commission on 22 March 20025.

4.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW: EURATOM VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

4.1.

Nuclear Material Accountancy

The  European  Union  area  contains  the  full  range  of  nuclear  fuel  cycle  activities,
although  they  are  not  evenly  dispersed  throughout  the  Member  States.  The  nuclear
material inventories in the installations under safeguards are constantly growing. For
example, the plutonium stocks during  the  last decade increased  from  203 tonnes in
1990  to  about  548  tonnes  at  the  end  of  2001.  It  has  special  safeguards  interest
because of the sensitive nature of this material. During the same period, the total of
all  types  of  uranium  inventories  in  the  European  Union  increased  from  200 400
tonnes to about 314 610 tonnes at the end of 2001.

The nuclear installation operators reported all nuclear material inventories and flows
to  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office.  These  reports  amount  to  about  1.5  million
accountancy  lines  per  year,  the  large  majority  of  which  is  already  received  by
electronic  means.  All  these  data  are  checked  for  internal  and  external  consistency
(transit  matching)  and  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Co-operation
Agreements with third countries.

All  clerical  mistakes  and  inconsistencies  revealed  during  2001  could  be  corrected
after consultation with the operators involved.

Accountancy  reports  were  also  sent  to  the  IAEA  in  fulfilment  of  the  obligations,
undertaken by the European Union in  the  framework of its  Safeguards Agreements
with  the  IAEA.  During  the  period  covered  by  this  report,  the  quality  and  the
timeliness of the reports met with the satisfaction of the IAEA.

4.2.

Inspection Efforts and results

In 2001 inspection activities conducted by the Euratom Safeguards Office amounted
to  7  661  man-days,  showing  a  reduction  of  about  9%  in  comparison  with  the  year
2000.

Such an evolution results from the combination of three factors:

– 

– 

a slight reduction in the staff available for the conduct of inspections (- 1,5%);

a temporary slow down of activities in important reprocessing installations;

5

Ref.: COM(2002) 1999

5

                                                
– 

the  progressive  development  and  implementation  of  new  and  more  rational
approaches,  agreed  case  by  case,  allowing  for  substantive  increases  in  global
efficiency of the inspections undertaken during the second half of the year.

An  approximate  distribution  of  the  inspection  efforts  made,  according  to  the  major
types  of  installations,  shows  that  about  50%  of  the  effort  was  spent  in  the
reprocessing  facilities  (see  4.2.1  below)  and  associated  stores,  25%  in  Enrichment
and  Fabrication  facilities  (see  4.2.2  to  4.2.4)  and  another  25%  in  power  reactors,
research reactors (see 4.2.5) and other nuclear facilities (see 4.2.6).

The main concerns and/or results achieved in the course of the inspection activities
for each type of installations under control are summarised hereafter.

4.2.1.

Reprocessing facilities6

The  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  installation  at  Sellafield  (THORP)  operated  from
April 2001 to the end of the year. The verification activities gave satisfactory results.
The  Verification  of  the  Physical  Inventory  (PIV)  2001  was  successful.  However,  a
problem emerged in the second half of the year, whereby the operator's input sample
results  appear  biased,  due  to  a  change  in  the  method  used  for  the  analysis.  The
impact was noticed by the inspectors and the operators' internal control system. The
issue is subject to investigations and is  expected to be  resolved before the  Physical
Inventory Verification in April 2002.

The  results  of  the  inspection  activities  in  all  areas  of  the  Magnox  reprocessing
facilities were satisfactory. The implementation of the tightened safety  and  security
measures  and  working  rules  on  the  Sellafield  site  tended  to  complicate  the
organisation and smooth running of the routine verification activities in the Magnox
installations.  The  so-called  "Written  Scheme  of  Work  for  Euratom  and  IAEA
Inspectors", issued by BNFL in the UK to strengthen the safety procedures resulted
in significant additional administrative burden for the inspectors.

Beyond the routine inspections, the focus of ESO activities in Sellafield in 2001 was
on  granting  the  approval  by  the  Commission  for  the  chemical  processing  of
irradiated materials in THORP (according to art. 78 Euratom, second paragraph)
and the preparation of a series of outstanding legal documents (Particular Safeguards
Provisions,  PSP’s).  The  under  art.  78  approval  was  finally  granted  by  the
Commission  on  November  27;  the  PSP  for  Thorp  came  into  force  by  the
Commission Decision of 11/07/2001. Further PSP’s entering into force in 2001 were
those for the Site Rail Sidings - Magnox Fuel, the Fuel Handling Plant – Decanners,
the  Euratom  On-Site  Laboratory  Sellafield  and  the  THORP  receipt  and  storage
ponds.

At the two reprocessing plants at La Hague (France), routine verifications made on
all  Plutonium  input  and  output  flows  allowed  the  confirmation  of  COGEMA
declarations. Like in the previous year, it was still not possible to draw conclusions
within  the  timeliness  foreseen  because  of  delays  in  declarations  of  some  analysis
results used for accountancy balance by the operator. From October 2001, a new link

6

At reprocessing facilities, spent fuel assemblies received from power reactors are processed chemically
to separate uranium and plutonium from the highly radioactive fission products. The separated nuclear
materials can be re-introduced in the fuel cycle

6

                                                
for  transfers  of  Uranyl  nitrate  between  the  two  reprocessing  plants  was  made
operational and the transfers were verified. Due to the reduction in human resources,
Uranium outputs are no longer routinely checked.

The  verification  of  the  basic  technical  characteristics  (BTC)  of  the  new  plutonium
conditioning  line  was  successfully  performed  in  co-operation  with  the  operator
COGEMA.

Annual  inventory  verifications  of  the  two  processes  and  of  the  two  plutonium
storages at La Hague have been conclusive.

The  decommissioning  plan  for  the  Dounreay  (UK)  reprocessing  facility  includes
inter  alia  the  removal  of  nuclear  material  from  a  number  of  areas  on  the  site.
Accordingly, safeguards activities during the 2nd half of the year were dominated by
the  sealing  of  SNR7  (MOX)  fuel  elements  for  shipment,  an  activity  which  was
undertaken successfully. In  addition, there were two  physical inventory  verification
(PIV)  inspections  at  Dounreay  during  the  year.  These  activities,  as  well  as  routine
verifications  were  conclusive.  The  quality  of  safeguards  at  Dounreay  greatly
improved  in  2001  since  site  management  implemented  improvements  as  requested
by the Euratom Safeguards Office.

4.2.2.

Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX)8

At  the  end  of  the  year  2001  the  British  Authorities  gave  their  consent  for  the
operation of the Sellafield MOX fabrication Plant (SMP). The facility is expected
to introduce Plutonium in the process by March 2002. The verification of the Basic
Technical  Characteristics  has  been  completed.  The  commissioning  of  Euratom
equipment for collection and treatment of data is prepared to start routine operations.
Data transmission tests (state of health information) to Luxembourg started in April
2001. The Uranium PIV did not give rise to comments.

An  incident  of  erroneous  declarations  of  a  shipment  of  a  small  quantity  of  Natural
Uranium to  another  British installation was  investigated  by  BNFL  and  measures  to
avoid  recurrence  were  taken.  PSP  (Particular  Safeguards  Provisions)  for  this
installation were drafted and are being reviewed.

The  Sellafield  MOX  Demonstration  Facility  (MDF)  status  changed  from
Manufacturing Facility to Support Facility. The inspection activities did not give rise
to major problems.

Inspections  were  carried  out  successfully  together  with  the  IAEA  under  the  New
Partnership Approach (NPA) arrangements at the MOX fabrication plant in Dessel,
Belgium. Some equipment failures occurred during the early part of the year which
led to re-verification of material.

Increased inspection effort was dedicated to the MOX fabrication plant of Cogema
Cadarache following the new inspection approach followed since 2000. This meant
a high frequency inspection regime and the installation of new NDA (non-destructive

7

8

Schnell Neutron Reactor (DE)
In MOX Fuel Fabrication Plans, the plutonium oxide produced in reprocessing installations is used in a
mixture with uranium oxide to fabricate MOX fuel elements for subsequent use in nuclear power plants.

7

                                                
assay)  equipment.  In  the  year  2001  Euratom  inspection  objectives  were  fully
satisfied.

The safeguards operations  at  MELOX in Marcoule, France  continued at  the  usual
good level. The undue delays in presenting items sampled for non-destructive assay
during  interim  verifications  were  addressed  by  ESO  and  the  operator  is  taking
measures  to  avoid  recurrence.  The  annual  Physical  Inventory  Verification  of  the
plant was conducted by ESO inspectors in July, with satisfactory results.

At  the  Siemens  MOX  Fabrication  Plant  and  BfS  Hanau  (Germany)  the
decommissioning activities continued throughout 2001 and for the first time included
the Plutonium bulk handling part of the installation. Despite the fact that there is no
longer  any  production,  this  site  still  has  a  large  safeguarded  direct  use  material
inventory. Verifications were conclusive.

4.2.3.

Enrichment Facilities9

The  Eurodif  gas-diffusion  enrichment  plant  in  Pierrelatte  was  subject  to  high
frequency  (weekly)  inspection  throughout  2001,  including  one  Physical  Inventory
Verification.  During  these  inspections  all  of  the  Low  Enriched  Uranium  (LEU)
output from the plant was verified. However, neither the input of natural uranium nor
the  tails  were  verified  systematically  due  to  limitations  in  resources.  There  was  no
evidence found that the civil material in the facility was anything other than properly
accounted  for.  However,  constraints  placed  by  France  on  the  inspectors  due  to  the
"particular  status"10  of  the  facility  and  the  large  stocks  of  nuclear  material  present
mean that the level of the achieved safeguards assurance is somewhat limited.

All three URENCO centrifuge enrichment plants in the Union (Almelo-NL, Gronau-
DE and Capenhurst-UK) are safeguarded together with the IAEA, the one in the UK
having been voluntarily offered for safeguards by the UK authorities. The safeguards
approach  includes  verification  of  all  feed  material  before  it  is  connected  to  the
process  and  all  product  or  tails  material  before  it  is  shipped  from  the  facility.
Verifications  done  in  addition  to  accountancy  checks,  include  weighing,  Non
Destructive Assay, Destructive Assay and containment & surveillance measures. On
that  basis,  the  operator  declarations  of  nuclear  material  flow  and  inventory  were
deemed acceptable.

For  reasons  of  commercial  sensitivity  as  well  as  proliferation  risk,  access  to
centrifuge cascade areas is highly restricted. Therefore, in the course of 2001, a new
generic safeguards approach incorporating an appropriate mix of different measures
has been formulated and presented to the plant operators of all centrifuge enrichment
plants.  The  innovation  mainly  concerns  the  consolidation  of  existing  and  recently
developed  techniques  (such  as  HPTA11)  applied  for  the  direct  confirmation  of
absence of high enriched uranium production in plant areas with restricted access.

9

10

11

Modern Light Water  Reactors  need  fuel  with  about  3  to  5  percent  of  the  fissionable  uranium  isotope
U235. As natural uranium contains only 0.7 percent of this nuclide, an enrichment process is needed to
achieve  the  desired  concentration.  In  the  European  Union,  two  companies  offer  this  service  for  civil
customers: URENCO and EURODIF
Due to the presence in the installation of material not under safeguards.
High Performance Trace Analysis

8

                                                
4.2.4.

LEU and HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion Facilities12

Routine  inspections  and  Inventory  Verifications  at  the  Fuel  Fabrication  Plants  at
Juzbado  (ENUSA,  Spain)  and  Västerås  (Westinghouse  Atom  AB,  Sweden)  were
performed  with  satisfactory  results.  In  October  2001,  Westinghouse  Atom  reported
an erroneous shipment of an "empty" container to Ranstad Mineral (Sweden) which
contained  Nuclear  Material.  The  matter  was  evaluated,  and  recommendations  to
avoid  recurrence  were  made  by  ESO  to  the  operator.  The  PSP  for  Westinghouse
Atom came into force in 2001.

At  the  FBFC  LEU  fabrication  plant  in  Belgium,  three  new  reference  rods  were
brought  into  use  following  a  rigorous  procedure  of  procurement,  analyses,  and
continuity  of  knowledge.  These  will  be  used  to  confirm  safeguards  verification
measurements  on  production  rods  at  monthly  inspections.  New  methods  and
equipment  for  waste  and  scrap  material  measurements  were  initiated  and  partially
tested during the PIV. The results of the PIV were satisfactory.

At  COGEMA  Pierrelatte  (France),  inspections  were  carried  out  as  necessary  in
accordance with the operational plan in order to verify the transfers of civil material
to  and  from  a  (non  safeguarded)  process,  imports,  exports,  and  some  receipts  and
shipments.  One  annual  inventory  was  carried  out.  There  was  no  evidence  that  the
civil  material  in  the  facility  was  anything  other  than  properly  accounted  for.  The
large  stocks  of  material  at  the  facility  mean  that  the  achieved  level  of  safeguards
assurance is somewhat limited.

At  COMHURHEX  Pierrelatte  and  Malvesi  (France),  annual  inventories  were
performed.  There  was  no  evidence  that  the  civil  material  in  the  facilities  was
anything other than properly accounted for.

At  the  LEU  fabrication  plant  of  FBFC  in  Romans-sur-Isère  (France),  the  annual
Physical Inventory of the plant was verified by ESO inspectors in August. Although
there was no  evidence of diversion,  several shortcomings  were detected and had to
be corrected by the operator.

The annual Physical Inventory Verification at CERCA, HEU Fabrication plant in
Romans (France) is still unsatisfactory, as the operator could not provide a computer-
readable  list  of  inventory  items.  Recently  however  the  operator  made  an  offer  for
developing a software that will allow him to extract the relevant data on a computer-
readable  device.  Active  neutron  counting  was  performed  on  four  finished  fuel
assemblies  fabricated  by  CERCA  for  the  Research  Reactor  in  Garching,  Germany.
The measured items remain under Euratom seals.

At  BNFL  Springfields  (UK),  because  of  the  size  and  diversity  of  the  plant,  the
continuous  nature  and  high  frequency  of  imports  and  exports,  a  weekly  inspection
regime  is  maintained.  Inspection  effort  is  gradually  shifting  toward  heavy
concentration on the new oxide fuel complex and related facilities. There is a policy
in place of verifying  all  receipts  and  shipments  subject  to  advance  notifications,  as
well as sealing of all exports from the EU. The inspections have brought to light an

12

At  LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants,  fuel  assemblies  are  produced  from  low  enriched  uranium  (LEU)  for
subsequent  use  in  nuclear  power  plants.  In  HEU  Fuel  Fabrication  Plants,  fuel  elements  for  research
reactors using high-enriched uranium (HEU) are manufactured

9

                                                
erroneously  reported  transfer  of  material  from  Sellafield,  systematic  weight
differences  among  some  imported  drums,  and  a  large  shortfall  in  the  enriched-
uranium category in the mixed installations of Springfields at the PIV. Requirements
to the operator regarding measurement uncertainties to allow for better evaluation of
the material balances have been defined.

At  the  LEU  fuel  fabrication  plant  at  Lingen  (Germany)  the  inspectors  have
undertaken  actions  in  order  to  further  improve  the  quality  of  the  nuclear  material
balance. This included revised procedures for reporting shipper-receiver differences
on receipt of UF6 material. Furthermore, in line with a request from inspectors, the
operator  reduced  the  relatively  high  amount  of  non-homogeneous  scrap  material
present at the plant to improve the quality of the PIV assessment.

4.2.5. Nuclear Power and Research Reactors13

The  planned  routine  and  PIV  inspections  at  power  reactors  in  Belgium  and
Germany  were  performed  as  planned  and  gave  satisfactory  results,  including
however in several cases follow-up and additional inspection effort.

In terms of inspection resources required by activities in connection with the loading
and  sealing  of  CASTOR  flasks  in  Belgium  and  Germany,  Greifswald  (Germany)
was the most important site, and this despite several licensing problems that resulted
in a lower than anticipated loading programme by the operator. During 2001 almost
one  thousand  assemblies  were  verified  and  placed  under  containment  and
surveillance.

High  priority  continues  to  be  given  to  reactors  using  MOX  fuel  in  NNWS  (see
footnote 16). Despite several  serious  safeguards  problems  due  to  equipment  failure
or operator error, quick reaction meant that potential safeguards anomalies could be
obviated (on two occasions by re-measuring the fresh MOX assemblies).

A further problem was the verification of fresh MOX fuel that was not loaded to the
core  during  the  annual  refuelling.  In  certain  cases  it  was  difficult  to  convince
operators to accept this additional burden.

In  the  UK,  draft  PSP  proposals  for  AGRs  were  handed  over  to  the  operators  for
comments.  A  meeting  between  Euratom,  British  Energy  and  DTI  (Department  of
Trade and Industry) on these proposals is planned for early 2002.

Spanish  reactors  surveillance  encountered  some  problems  during  2001.  ESO
currently intends to install completely new systems in five such reactors in order to
apply full NPA. Following a safeguards problem in 2000 as a result of operator error
in  one  Spanish  LWR,  the  core  fuel  was  successfully  re-established  in  2001  by  a
highly intrusive NDA method.

13

Most of the nuclear power reactors operated in the European Union are of the Light Water Reactor type
(LWR),  i.e.  the  reactors  are  cooled  and  moderated  with  normal  water.  In  addition,  the  UK  operates
MAGNOX and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) which are moderated with graphite and cooled
with CO2 gas. The operation of LWRs using LEU is characterised by long periods (12-18 months) of
continuous  operation.  These  periods,  when  the  in-core  fuel  is  inaccessible,  are  followed  by  outages
typically lasting 2-4 weeks when about one third of the (used) core fuel is exchanged for fresh fuel from
Fuel Fabrication Plants. LWRs are inspected during this outage period when all the fuel is accessible for
verification

10

                                                
Controls at the High Flux Reactor site at Petten (NL) had to be accentuated in 2001
because  of  the  increase  in  the  stocks  in  the  storage  pools  following  the  lack  of
transport  possibilities  for  spent  fuel.  The  possibilities  for  recycling  of  the  uranium
into  the  production  of  fresh  targets,  thereby  alleviating  the  problem,  are  being
studied. In this respect it has to be noted that starting even a small reprocessing plant
will  require  Commission  approval.  In  the  meantime  the  reactor  was  stopped  on  a
temporary basis at the request of the Dutch Government due to concerns associated
with the ageing of the pressure reactor vessel.

4.2.6. Other installations or facilities

At Sellafield (UK), the inspection activities in the  input stores  (irradiated fuel)  and
the  output  store  (Plutonium  Oxide)  gave  satisfactory  results.  However,  persistent
technical  problems  with  the  operators  equipment  caused  long  delays  in  the
performance of the planned inspection activities in some of the spent fuel ponds.

The PSP for Ranstad Mineral (waste treatment facility in Sweden) came into force
in 2001.

At  Berkeley  Technology  Centre  (UK),  the  problems  mentioned  in  the  last  ESO
report  relating  to  the  physical  follow  up  of  nuclear  material  have  now  been
overcome.

A  revised  draft  version  of  the  Facility  Attachment  for  COGEMA  La  Hague
concerning  the  area  for  receipt  and  reconditioning  of  unirradiated  MOX  fuel  for
Japan, inspected jointly with the IAEA, has been sent to France.

Continuity  of  knowledge  has  been  lost  three  times  during  2001  for  the  LWR
irradiated  fuel  storage  ponds  at  La  Hague,  inspected  jointly  with  the  IAEA.  All
three  anomalies  were  triggered  by  the  operator  following  lighting  problems.  These
losses  that  rendered  necessary  the  re-establishment  of  the  inventory  knowledge
constituted a heavy load for inspections.

At the CLAB14 storage ponds in Sweden, a transport container was not available for
verification in April 2001. The verification of the fuel assemblies, though postponed,
was  successful.  A  first  draft  of  the  Particular  Safeguards  Provisions  for  this
installation has been sent to Sweden.

4.3.

Global evaluation of the safeguards activities

During  the reporting period of 2001,  in-field  statistical  evaluation  of  the  difference
between  physical  inventory  and  book  inventory  was  carried  out  at  the  moment  of
Physical Inventory Verifications in fuel fabrication plants to support timely decisions
about the material balance for that specific period.

For MOX fuel fabrication plants, part of the evaluation activities focussed on similar
recent  historical  differences  with  a  view  to  assess  whether  or  not  long-term
systematic  measurement  errors  exist  in  the  measurement  system  on  which  the
accounting records are based.

14

Centrallagret För Använt Bränsle (Spent Fuel Storage Facility)

11

                                                
For large-scale plutonium production plants the evaluation activities consisted, inter
alia, in drawing-up procedures to evaluate declarations of nuclear transformations15
and in re-verifying scale calibration parameters.

In enrichment plants, historical Operator-Inspector differences based on Destructive
Analysis16  were  analysed  in  order  to  determine  and  assess  the  inspector’s  and
operator’s measurement uncertainties. The results of these activities did not give rise
to any concerns and lead to the routine follow-up of such activities.

5.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW: SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES UNDER THE NPA17

5.1.

The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report

The  Safeguards  Implementation  Report  (SIR)  of  the  IAEA  covering  the  joint
activities on the territory of the EU in 2000 was made available to ESO in early June
2001. A meeting at the IAEA headquarters took place in the second half of June to
review the findings and discuss details relating to nuclear installations in the EU. At
the same time a critical analysis of the content of the SIR was prepared as a working
paper from the Commissions services and sent to the Council for examination by the
experts of the Atomic Questions Group. The mechanistic findings reported in the SIR
were the subject of extensive review and evaluation within ESO. A joint ESO/IAEA
review meeting was held in November 2001 to identify facts worth noting and agree
on recommendations for improvements when appropriate.

All in all, the SIR 2000 concluded that there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear
material or misuse of equipment or facilities placed under safeguards in the European
Union.

Nevertheless,  the  SIR  complained  about  slow  progress  in  the  conclusion,  approval
and entry into force of the IAEA Additional Protocols in the EU, despite their main
aim were to facilitate the detection of illicit nuclear activities in less reliable areas in
the world.

It should, however, be mentioned that the SIR 2000 recognised the efforts made by
ESO  to  prepare  for  the  implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocols  when  they  will
enter into force in the European Union.

For  the  first  time,  the  SIR  mentioned  that  increased  co-operation  with  regional
systems of nuclear materials accounting, such as the one established by the Euratom
Treaty,  could  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  verification  by  the  IAEA  and  its  cost
efficiency and welcomed further improvements along these lines.

Better use should be made by the IAEA of the safeguards results of regional systems.
This  would  allow  the  Vienna  Agency  to  concentrate  its  limited  means  where
increased controls are needed and justified.

15

16

17

Nuclear transformation is the increase or decrease in the quantity of nuclear material due to capture or
radioactive decay
Destructive Analysis is a qualitative and quantitative determination of a characteristic of a sample, and
aims  at  establishing  the  total  quantity  and  composition  of  nuclear  material  present  in  the  items  being
measured
New Partnership Approach

12

                                                
As  a  conclusion,  the  SIR  noted  a  downward  trend  regarding  illicit  trafficking  in
nuclear materials. No serious case had been reported in the last two years in the EU.

In  addition  to  its  global  conclusions,  the  SIR  2000  made  recommendations  for
improvement  in  specific  areas.  These  recommendations  may  be  summarised  as
follows:

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

shipment of  Partially  Filled or  Empty  Transport Containers  should take place
Prior to Core Opening at LWRs;

advanced  notification  for  movement  of  empty  or  partially  filled  containers
should be requested by ESO and information transmitted to the IAEA in good
time to facilitate inspection activities;

a number of solutions have been identified to the generic problems associated
with  Plutonium  Production  in  Large  Research  Reactors.  The  risks  in  these
types of facilities will  be eliminated after  the installation  of the  most  suitable
Power Monitors at the facilities concerned;

all  LWR  MOX  facilities  were  successfully  verified  and  passed  safeguards
criteria,  showing  improvement  through  enhanced  co-operation  with  ESO,
prompt  follow-up  actions,  smooth  (but  cost-ineffective)  execution  of  short
notice inspections and use of underwater cameras;

corrective  actions  need  to  be  taken  during  or  soon  after  a  Containment  and
Surveillance  failure  is  detected.  The  IAEA  considers  important  to  further
install protective covers on seals and back-up open core surveillance systems.
The  IAEA  should  fully bear the  cost  of this redundant  equipment  not  needed
by ESO;

problems  occur  according  to  the  IAEA  mechanistic  system  when  nuclear
material  remains  in  closed  shipping  containers,  over  long  periods  or  when
nuclear  materials  at  reactors  are  present  in  the  form  of  rods  in  closed
containers, rendering it not easily accessible.

Improvements in the way in which the NPA will be implemented in the future shall
contribute  further  to  a  more  even  cost  sharing  between  the  two  inspectorates  and
better  consistency  between  conclusions  drawn  in  the  SIR  and  those  resulting  from
full safeguards activities conducted by the ESO.

5.2.

Preparation for the entry into force of the IAEA Additional Protocols

The  main  aim  of  the  Additional  Protocols  is  to  increase  the  IAEA’s  capabilities  to
detect  undeclared  nuclear  material  and  activities  that  are  in  violation  of  the  NPT
(Non Proliferation Treaty) provisions.

This  expanded  legal  authority  of  the  IAEA  contained  in  the  Additional  Protocol
encompasses  three  main  categories  of  new  measures:  (a)  information  on  nuclear
activities  and  on  nuclear  related  research  to  be  provided  to  the  IAEA  in  a
comprehensive way; (b) complementary physical access to locations beyond purely
nuclear  installations  to  be  granted  to  the  IAEA  for  the  purpose  of  verifying  this
information, (c) new technologies to be used by the IAEA to apply safeguards in  a
more effective and cost efficient manner.

13

These new measures may also affect the activities and responsibilities of the Euratom
Safeguards  Office  on  the  territory  of  the  European  Community.  The  Commission
might therefore be committed to carry out new tasks after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocols, namely:

(1) 

(2) 

to  provide  the  IAEA  with  the  information  required  as  far  as  it  concerns
nuclear  material  and  related  sites  for  all  Member  States  of  the  European
Union;

to implement all measures related to the Community’s Joint Research Centre
(JRC),  including  those  which  the  Protocol  sets  out  for  States,  in  close
collaboration with the State on whose territory an establishment of the JRC is
located.

With a view to ensure a smooth implementation of the Additional Protocol in the EU
after  its  entry  into  force,  two  field  trials  (JRC  at  Petten  and  VTT  in  Helsinki)  are
currently being carried out to test the modalities for the information flow required by
the  IAEA,  for  the  delimitation  of  nuclear  sites  and  the  arrangements  for
complementary access.

In other areas subject to the rules of the Additional Protocol considered unanimously
by  the  EU  Council  as  of  sole  Member  States  responsibilities,  Annex  III  of  the
Protocol foresees, nevertheless, a possibility to transfer the implementation of these
measures to the Commission if the responsible Member State so wishes. This transfer
would  require  a  formal  decision  by  the  Commission  accepting  to  carry  out  the
task(s).

So far, seven to eight Member States18 (out of the 13 NNWS)19 have expressed their
intention to request the Commission to implement these measures on their behalf20,
but the detailed modalities for such a transfer would not be identical.

On several occasions the Commission made clear that it was not prepared to accept
new activities  – especially  outside  its  formal  responsibilities  –  without  receiving  at
the same time, from the budget authority, the resources needed in order to implement
them properly.

Therefore, up to now the Commission has clearly indicated that it was not prepared
to  accept  the  transfer  of  responsibilities  pertaining  solely  to  the  Member  States.
Nevertheless, preparatory work has already been carried out on a limited scale with
the  objective  to  assess  the  implications  for  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  of  the
additional tasks under consideration.

18

19

20

Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  Portugal,  the  Netherlands  and  still  awaiting  formal
confirmation Italy
Non Nuclear Weapon States
A  legally  binding  commitment  by  a  Member  State  to  transfer  the  implementation  of  measures  to  the
Commission can only occur after entry into force of the Additional Protocol in form of a so-called side-
letter that will have to be sent to the IAEA

14

                                                
6.

THE  YEAR 
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES

IN  REVIEW:  PROGRESS 

IN  SAFEGUARDS  TECHNOLOGY  AND

During the year 2001 priority has been given to the introduction of new technology
into  the  field  to  replace  obsolete  instrumentation.  In  connection  with  this  activity
appropriate  computer  hardware  and  software  for  nuclear  data  acquisition  and  data
interpretation have also been implemented.

The most important areas of progress during the year were:

– 

– 

– 

Installation and routine application of a new digital video surveillance system
in plutonium bulk handling plants. The new digital surveillance systems afford
possibilities  to  enhance  data  treatment  and  to  facilitate  review  optimising
available human resources. They also open the possibility for data transmission
of  recorded  images  to  headquarters  with  a  view  to  reducing  manpower
requirements in the field.

The  design  and  configuration  of  a  new  transponder  seal  provides  the
opportunity for on site verification, which will not only improve the inspection
efficiency  but  also  reduce  the  overall  annual  usage  and  enhance  the  handling
logistics  back  at  headquarters.  The  IAEA  have  been  closely  involved  during
the different  phases  of the testing  and  implementation  of  this  new  safeguards
product.

Important  progress  was  made  on  the  implementation  of  evaluation  tools
developed to facilitate the interpretation of measurement data. In addition tests
on  the  feasibility  of  data  transfer  to  and  from  ESO  headquarters  by  satellite
have been carried out using the ASTRA facility located in Luxembourg.

7.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

7.1.

European Parliament (EP)

The  1999-2000  ESO  activities  report  is  the  subject  of  an  EP  initiative  report.  For
2001  activity  was  dominated  by  M.E.P.’s  questions  related  to  nuclear  safety  and
security.  The  interest  focused  on  the  possible  consequences  of  terrorist  attacks
against  nuclear  installations,  the  leak  of  radioactive  effluents  into  the  environment
and the licensing of the Sellafield MOX facility by UK government authorities.

7.2.

Enlargement

The  project  set  up  to  ease  the  implementation  of  the  Euratom  Nuclear  Material
Accountancy System by countries candidate to EU accession, via software tools and
the  required  hardware  progressed  well.  Representatives  of  the  applicant  countries
actively contributed to the project through their participation in a steering committee,
which also ensures that the tool is tailor-made to their needs.

7.3.

Member States

While the Euratom Treaty stipulates that the Commission deals directly with nuclear
material operators, ESO considers regular contacts with Member States authorities as
essential  for  the  smooth  implementation  of  safeguards  in  the  respective  States.  In

15

addition, discussions took place with a number of Member States to prepare for the
implementation of the measures of the Additional Protocol.

The Atomic Questions Group of the Council was briefed on the progress made in the
preparation  of  the  implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol,  the  revision  of  the
Euratom  Regulation  no.  3227/76  (see  footnote  2)  and  the  IAEA  Safeguards
Implementation Reports for the Member States of the European Union.

7.4.

Euratom agreements

For  the  period  covered  by  this  report,  the  three  Community  nuclear  co-operation
agreements into force,  respectively  with  the  United  States  of  America,  Canada  and
Australia,  were  implemented to the satisfaction of all Parties involved. This was in
particular confirmed during the bilateral technical Working Group and Consultation
between Euratom and Australia that took place in Canberra in June 2001.

The Euratom Safeguards Office actively participated in the on–going negotiation of a
nuclear co-operation agreement between Euratom and Japan. The progress achieved
during  the  negotiation  rounds  that  took  place  in  2001,  gives  hope  for  a  successful
conclusion of the agreement in the near future.

Concerning  a  future  nuclear  co-operation  agreement  with  China,  and  following  the
interest expressed by parties involved, a draft negotiation mandate was submitted by
the  Commission  to  the  Council.  It  is  expected  that  the  mandate  will  be  approved
during the first half of 2002, so that the negotiations could start soon after.

8.

EURATOM SAFEGUARDS RESOURCES

8.1.

Budget appropriations

Article  174  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  specifically  mentions  the  necessity  to  include
appropriations in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure related to the
activity of nuclear safeguards.

Founded  on  this  legal  basis  the  safeguards  activities  are  financed  by  two  types  of
budget appropriations:

(1) 

(2) 

a general “functioning” appropriation involving the costs of ESO’s overheads
such  as  officers’  salaries,  rental  of  headquarters’  offices,  general  IT
equipment,  telecommunications,  etc.  (Part  A  of  the  Budget,  lines  A0-5010,
A0-7002,  A0-7010,  A0-7030),  as  well  as  a  specific  appropriation  for  the
medical  survey  and  the  radiation  protection  of  the  inspectors  (Part  A  of  the
Budget, line A0-1420);

specific  “operational”  appropriations  foreseen  for  the  expenditure  of  ESO,
directly related to nuclear safeguards such as mission costs, rental of offices
on site (including on site laboratories), purchase of technical  equipment and
samples  taking  and  analysis,  contracts  for  services  (i.e.  maintenance  and
repairs),  transportation  of  equipment  and  samples,  training,  etc..,  necessary
for Euratom safeguards activities (Part B of the Budget, sub-chapter B4-2).

16

For 2001, the specific operational appropriations in the EU Budget for the Euratom
Safeguards Office represented € 17.7 Mio. From that amount € 17.562 Mio (99.2%)
were actually committed. The sharing of the expenditures were as follows:

(cid:1)  Inspection mission costs (travel means,

daily allowances):

€ 4.5 Mio (26%)

(cid:1)  Rental of offices for the inspectors on inspected

sites (and related equipment costs):

€ 0.75 Mio (4.3%)

(cid:1)  Purchase, installation, maintenance and repairs of
equipment on sites, including informatic means,
analysis of samples, related costs such as transport,
consumables, spare parts, etc.:

(cid:1)  Investments made in large scale plutonium bulk

handling plants and related maintenance, operation
and logistics:

(cid:1)  Administrative and technical assistance, training
for inspectors, and other expenses (including
special insurance coverage:

€ 4.45 Mio (25%)

€ 7.4 Mio (42%)

€ 0.5 Mio (3%)

The number of inspections on site, after a stabilization in the last 3 to 4 years, have
been reduced in  2001,  in  parallel  to  an  increase  of  stand  by  equipment  and  remote
controlled systems in the installations.

Major  investments  related  to  large  Plutonium  bulk  handling  installations  have
already been completed. The costs of those plants still represent an important part of
the  expenditures.  Out  of  the  €  7.400  Mio  annual  costs,  more  than  50%  currently
represent maintenance and technical support on the existing equipment.

8.2.

Human and other Resources

8.2.1.

Staff Resources and Utilisation

The  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  employs  a  team  of  officials,  including  inspectors,
plus  appropriate  administrative  and  logistical  support  in  its  headquarters  in
Luxembourg, which accounted for 269 permanent posts, at the end of 2001.

Of  these  posts,  208  were  allocated  to  staff  having  the  status  of  nuclear  inspector
according to art. 81 of the Euratom Treaty.

8.2.2.

Safeguards Equipment

The Safeguards equipment used by the inspectors fall into two main categories. The
first  corresponds  to  Non  Destructive  Assay  (NDA)  measurements  that  are  used  by
inspectors to assure themselves that the physical quantities of nuclear material in the
facilities correspond to the notified accountancy values. The methods used are based
upon neutron and gamma measurement techniques.

17

The second category corresponds to Containment and Surveillance (C&S) measures.
These are in the form of video camera surveillance and seals and prevent the loss of
knowledge on verified material.

Further  efforts  have  been  made  in  2001  to  rationalise  and  standardise  the  range  of
hardware  and  software  equipment  used.  The  hardware  of  both  NDA  and  C & S  is
based upon commercially available products. The software used for the data analysis
of  both  neutron  and  gamma  measurements  in  attended  mode  applications  were
developed specifically for safeguards applications.

8.2.3

Support by the Commission Joint Research Centre

The Commission Joint Research Centre provides scientific and technical support to
the  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  inspectorate  for  both  routine  activities  in  the
laboratories  and  related  development  work  for  future  improvements  to  safeguards
activities  through  the  Commission  Research  and  Development  programme.  In  the
Fifth Framework Programme for the year 2001, the support included provision for 58
man/year  and  a  specific  credit  of  €  1.72  Mio  distributed  principally  between  ITU
(Karlsruhe)21 and IPSC (Ispra)22.

The co-operation between ESO and the JRC was mainly focussed on  the  following
areas:

– 

– 

– 

concerning  the  Transuranium  Institute  in  Karlsruhe:operation  of  the  On-Site
Laboratories,  Sample  Analysis  at  ITU  and  in-field,  High  Performance  Trace
Analysis, and Nuclear Forensic Analysis, improvement of analytical methods;

for  the  IPSC  Ispra  Institute:  General  Scientific  and  Technical  Support  in  the
areas  of  Health  Physics,testing  of  Equipment  and  instruments;  technical
training  and  calibration;  measurement  and  counting  support,  development  of
sealing and surveillance techniques;

from the IRMM23 Geel: Analytical Activities in the domain ofanalytical quality
control and provision of high quality nuclear reference materials.

For  the  operation  of  the  On  Site  Laboratories  at  La  Hague  and  Sellafield,  an
administrative arrangement entered into force between the ESO and ITU (Karlsruhe),
to  provide  the  necessary  appropriately  trained  staff  (20  persons)  for  the  running  of
the  laboratories  throughout  the  year.  The  cost  of  this  arrangement  € 1.7 Mio
corresponds to a total of 340 missions per annum.

21

22

23

Transuranium Institute (JRC)
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements

18

                                                
9.

OTHER ACTIVITIES WITH ESO INVOLVEMENT

9.1.

Nuclear Safety, physical protection and illicit trafficking

In  the  enlargement  context,  ESO  provided  technical  expertise  required  in  the
evaluation  of  the  nuclear  safety  standard  in  Eastern  European  nuclear  installations,
and, contributed to the overall co-ordination effort in the nuclear safety evaluation.

After  the  tragic terrorist  attacks on 11  September, and like almost all  other  nuclear
operators  and  holders  of  nuclear  material,  ESO  examined  the  adequacy  of  existing
physical  protection  measures  and  made  an  effort  to  further  strengthen  activities  in
that field through acquisition of relevant expertise and training.

The  Euratom  Safeguards  Office  continued  to  play  an  active  role  in  experts  groups
where  prevention  and  detection  mechanisms  and  communication  and  intervention
procedures are discussed. ESO also worked in close co-operation with the IAEA and
maintained informal contacts with national authorities, Europol and other dedicated
agencies.

9.2.

Support to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

ESO  continued  to  provide  support  to  the  IAEA  and  the  international  safeguards
community  for  the  development  of  the  Strengthened  and  Integrated  Safeguards
System. It assisted the IAEA in the development of new safeguards approaches to be
implemented  in  States  where  the  IAEA  will  be  able  to  conclude  that  no  State
clandestine  nuclear  material  or  activities  exist.  ESO  also  assisted  the  IAEA  in  the
development  of  new  concepts  for  the  use  of  State  and  Regional  Systems  of
Accountancy and Control, the use of inspections announced at short notice  and the
resolution of anomalies.

Within  the  existing  framework  of  the  New  Partnership  Approach,  which  is  an
integral  part  of  the  safeguards  co-operation  between  ESO  and  the  IAEA  in  the
European  Union,  information  is  regularly  exchanged  concerning  new  safeguards
equipment and instrumentation. Both organisations work closely together in the field
to  optimise  the  financial  and  human  resources  in  the  establishment  of  an  effective
safeguards  infrastructure  within  the  European  Union.  The  synergy  through  this  co-
operation  greatly  benefits  the  IAEA  in  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the
discharge  of  their  obligations  in  the  EU.  It  is  now  time  for  the  ESO  also  to  draw
some benefit from the implementation of the NPA signed in 1992.

19

10.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

For  the  activities  carried  out  by  the  ESO  during  the  period  of  2001  the  following
conclusions can be drawn:

(1) 

As suggested by the report of the IGS in 2000, the mission of the ESO and its
existing  safeguards  approaches  were  reviewed  by  a  HLEG  established  by  a
the
implementation  of 
in  June  2001.  The 
Commission  decision 
recommendations made will be carried out during the period 2002-2003.

(2) 

Concerning the results of the verification activities:

(a)  Matching  problems  between  measurements  and  corresponding
notifications made by operators on the one side, and inspection results
on the other side persisted in some plants; explanations were found or
investigations are still going on;

(b) 

however,  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  overall  results  no  significant
indication for the  diversion  of  nuclear  material  from  its  declared  use
was found.

(3) 

Concerning activities at specific installations:

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

The  Commission’s  approval  required  under  Article  78,  §  2,  of  the
Euratom treaty for the operation of the THORP reprocessing plant in
the nuclear complex at Sellafield was granted in November 2001. The
negotiations  of  several  PSP’s  for  other  sites  were  also  successfully
concluded over the year;

a new safeguards approach for the URENCO enrichment facilities was
developed and  discussed  with  the  operator  concerned  and  the  IAEA.
This  new  approach  which  draws  heavily  from  HPTA  techniques  is
better  suited  to  protect  commercially  sensitive  technology  and
information while providing the assurances required;

the safeguarding activities carried out in France in mixed installation,
or  installations  of  “particular  status”,  encountered  still  a  number  of
difficulties  even  if  serious  progress  has  been  registered  relating  to
safeguards assurances;

the Destructive Assay (DA) analysis of Plutonium and other samples
collected in reprocessing plants was possible because of the existence
of  the  onsite  laboratories,  avoiding  the  administrative  and  practical
obstacles caused by the transport authorisations needed for  a transfer
of samples from other bulk installations to the ITU (Karlsruhe);

in reactors, a substantial increase in the loading of transport containers
with spent fuel elements for interim storage was experienced with the
associated pressure on resources for the ESO.

20

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

A  further  improvement  in  the  co-operation  with  the  IAEA  was  achieved,
reflected  in  the  SIR  which  confirms  the  conclusions  drawn  by  ESO  on  the
non-diversion of nuclear material from its declared use.

First  experience  has  shown  that  the  increased  reliance  on  unattended
surveillance/containment  and  remote  monitoring  systems  can  lead  to
efficiency  gains  in  the  use  of  resources,  even  if  manpower  needs  were  not
reduced substantially.

The co-operation with the JRC was carried out in a smooth and very effective
way, and, thereby contributed substantially to the effectiveness of ESO and to
the  JRC’s 
recognition  and
competitiveness in the international arena.

in  overall  scientific  expertise 

increase 

(7) 

All in all, the objectives defined for ESO’s activities as set out in Chapter VII
of the Euratom treaty were attained in the year 2001.

21

Annexes

Table no. 1 – Quantities of nuclear material under Euratom safeguards
End 20001) End 20011)
 548

End 1990
203

End 1995

 525

406

Plutonium
Uranium

Total
HEU2)
LEU3)
NU4)
DU5)

Thorium

200 400
13
32 000
44 000
124 400
2 600

269 100
11
46 700
51 400
171 000
4 600

310 400
 10
55 500
53 700
201 200
4 500

314 610
 10
57 000
52 700
204 900
4 500

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Quantities based on final reported data
High Enriched Uranium
Low Enriched Uranium
Natural Uranium
Depleted Uranium

Table no. 2 - Inspection activities of Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO)

Person days of
inspection in:
Non Nuclear
Weapon States
France
UK
Total

1999

2412

3492
2871
8775

2000

2113

3426
2895
8434

2001

2328

2934
2399
7661

22

Table no. 3 – ESO’s Staff Situation End 2001

Distribution of staff per grade among the Units and the 6 actions of the Nuclear
Safeguards Activities

Actions
(numbered according to
ABB*) nomenclatures)
1) Nuclear
Material
Accounting
2) Evaluation of

safeguards results
3) Methodology and

approaches of control

4) Inspections on site
5) Logistic, Technical and

IT Support

6) Management, Financial
and Administrative
support

TOTAL

*) Activity Based Budgeting

A-grade
officials

B- and C-grades
Support staff

TOTAL

3

3

5

42
9
6
5

73

20

3

5

97
37
11
23

196

23

6

10

139
46
17
28

269

Table no. 4 – ESO’s Budget 2001

Expenditures committed for the specific appropriations

Table no. 4 A

Line B4-2000 : Safeguard inspections, training and retraining of inspectors

Topics

a) Studies, convocation of experts, publications
b) Mission Costs
c) Transportation

for staff and equipment

d) Rental of offices and special services on sites
e) Internships and Training
f) Special insurance
TOTAL

Expenditures (Thousand €)
11
3,800
700

750
200
40
5,501 (out of 5,600)

23

Table no. 4 B

Line B4-2020 : Sampling and analyses, equipment, specific work, provision of
services and transport

Topics

a) Administrative and technical assistance
b) Purchase of surveillance equipment
c) Purchase of measurement equipment
d) Purchase of equipment for seals
e) Purchase  and  maintenance  of  computing
equipment directly linked to inspections

f) Costs for destructive analysis
g) Equipment  spares,  repairs,  accessories

and maintenance

h) Consumable items, purchase of sources,

transport of radioactive materials

i) Monitoring  (warning  system  based  in

Luxembourg)

j) Software (Accountancy program,
Management and IT Firewall)

Expenditures (Thousand €)
214
429
1,132
378
424

65
378

265

239

1,137

TOTAL

4,661 (out of 4,700)

Line B4-2021 : Specific safeguards for large-scale plutonium processing plants

Table no. 4 C

Topics

a) Sellafield – BNFL (THORP, MOX)
b) La Hague – COGEMA (UP3, UP2)
c) Cadarache – COGEMA
d) Marcoule – MELOX
e) Dessel – BELGONUCLEAIRE
f) On site laboratories (initial investments

and operations)
g) Software (on sites)
h) Maintenance & repairs (Equipment,
hardware and software support)

i) Software development (new applications,

new equipment )

TOTAL

Expenditures (Thousand €)
642
857
46
70
43
3,355

401
1,153

833

7,400 (out of 7,400)

24

Table no. 4 D

Line A0-1420 : Health checks for staff exposed to radiation

Topics
a) Gamma spectrometry and Toxicological

Expenditures (Thousand €)
45

analysis (non standard)

b) Measurement equipment (dosimeters)
c) Maintenance and calibration
d) Material, services and other
contamination controls

e) Mission costs (for body-counter)
f) Other running expenses
TOTAL

53
5
44

56
18
221 (out of 224)

Table no. 5 – ESO’s Budget 1991-2001 (Mio €)

Evolution of expenditure for the specific budget appropriations

Budget Line
Safeguard inspections, training
and retraining of inspectors
(B4-2000)
Sampling and analyses,
equipment, specific work,
provision of services and
transport
(B4-2020)
Specific safeguards for large-
scale plutonium processing
plants
(B4-2021)
Health checks for staff
exposed to radiation
(A0-1420)
TOTAL

1991
2.5

1995
4.2

2001
5.5

2.3

3.2

4.7

2.6

0.1

7.5

10

7.4

0.3

0.2

19.5

17.8

25