WRITTEN QUESTION E-2330/02 by Cristiana Muscardini (UEN) to the Commission. Reply to question E-1474/02 — Directive on investment services.
Date: 2002-07-26
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: company law, consultancy, financial institution, financial legislation, financial occupation, freedom to provide services, insider trading, investment company, legal status

C 137 E/72

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

12.6.2003

Reply

(6 February 2003)

The Council notes that in her question the Honourable Member assumes that there is already a Human
Rights Dialogue between the EU and the Iranian authorities. It is true that the question of human rights is
one of the numerous political issues that have already been discussed by the EU and Iran at the six-
monthly meetings that have taken place in the framework of the enlarged political dialogue.

However, it was only at its meeting in Luxembourg on 21 October 2002 that the Council formally decided
to open an official Human Rights Dialogue with Iran. That dialogue is expected to begin in December
2002.

Nevertheless, the formal establishment of a Human Rights Dialogue with a certain country does not
prevent the EU from denouncing breaches of human rights in that country, particularly in the appropriate
international fora, or from raising the matter in meetings with the third country concerned at every level,
as the EU has done with Iran.

(2003/C 137 E/081)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2330/02

by Cristiana Muscardini (UEN) to the Commission

(26 July 2002)

Subject: Reply to question E-1474/02 (cid:1) Directive on investment services

The reply to my previous question (E-1474/02 (1)) on the directive on investment services prompts me to
request these further clarifications:

1. Who would certify authorisation to provide investment advice?

2. Why should initial authorisation be envisaged solely in the form of a licence for an investment firm?
Would it not be advisable to maintain a clear distinction between those providing investment advice
within company structures (banks, firms, etc.) and those operating under a different status? Or is the
directive aimed at excluding the latter?

3. Which bodies would regulate advice linked to an investment portfolio and which would regulate non-

portfolio based advice?

4. What kind of firewalls does the Commission intend to put in place to avoid conflicts of interest

between investment advice providers and investment banking activities?

5. With a view to savers’ interests, why does the Commission not intend to put in place obligations
requiring the physical separation of brokerage organisations (which process stock market orders) and
organisations which manage and own assets? Would it not be a good idea to learn from the front-
running scandals involving Knight Trading, a large Nasdaq brokerage firm?

(1) OJ C 92 E, 17.4.2003, p. 59.

Answer given by M. Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(16 September 2002)

After having received a significant number of responses during the public consultation and having
carefully considered their contents, the Commission is finalising its proposal for the revision of the
Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the
securities field (1)). The proposal is expected to be adopted by the Commission before the end of this year.

The Commission is therefore unable, at present, to disclose its final position concerning the proposal and,
in particular, the regulatory treatment of investment advice.

12.6.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137 E/73

Nonetheless, the Honorable Member is reminded of the following features of the present Investment
Services Directive which the Commission did not propose to modify during the recent consultation:

(cid:1) the authorisation to provide investment services is granted by the competent authorities, which are

appointed by Member States;

(cid:1) the present definition of

investment

firms allows Member States to consider (cid:1) under certain

conditions (cid:1) that undertakings which are not legal persons be considered as investment firms;

(cid:1) there is a clear distinction between the service of individual portfolio management and the service of

investment advice.

The Commission has identified the management and prevention of conflicts of interest as an important set
of issues which warrant more effective operational coverage in the revised Directive.

The Commission is now considering how best to address these points.

(1) OJ L 141, 11.6.1993.

(2003/C 137 E/082)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2333/02

by Markus Ferber (PPE-DE) to the Commission

Subject: WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

(26 July 2002)

What is the Commission’s general attitude to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control?
Where does it stand on the individual obligations such as abolishing subsidies for tobacco growing,
payments from industrialised countries to help developing countries implement the Convention, financial
aid in converting from tobacco to other products, banning cigarette machines, banning sales to young
people, etc?

Does the Commission consider it sensible (cid:1) as the Council demands in its conclusions on the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted in June 2001 (cid:1) to make resources available to
in the light of political developments in
developing countries? It seems for example very doubtful
Zimbabwe, one of Africa’s largest tobacco-producing countries, whether Mr Mugabe should be provided
with even more EU funds for his policies.

Why have the Commission and Council not involved the European Parliament in the negotiations and
conclusion of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control?

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(30 September 2002)

The Commission very strongly supports the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), and plays a very active part in the FCTC negotiations. In fact, the Commission
is of the opinion that the FCTC process provides a unique opportunity for influencing the global climate
for tobacco control policy, and for curbing the tobacco epidemic which leads to the loss of four million
lives every year world-wide. In fact, if current trends continue, the WHO estimates that this toll will rise to
ten million by 2030.

In the FCTC negotiations, the Commission does not speak on its own behalf, but only on behalf of the
Community and its Member States. Moreover,
takes the floor only on issues under Community
competence, while those under Member States’ competence are dealt with by the Presidency. In many
crucial tobacco control areas covered by the FCTC, the Community showed a strong and united position,
which was fully supported by a large number of delegations, and thus established itself as a major player in
tobacco control at a global level.

it

As far as tobacco subsidies within the Union are concerned, the Commission is committed to phasing out
these subsidies. This means that the phasing out of subsidies will have to go along with simultaneously