WRITTEN QUESTION E-2223/02 by Nuala Ahern (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Russian nuclear energy industry.
Date: 2002-07-23
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EAEC, EU relations, Russia, group of leading industrialised countries, international aid, nuclear industry, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear policy, nuclear safety

6.3.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 52 E/139

Nonetheless, the Community rules (i.e. Regulations (EEC) No 4060/89 (5) and No 3912/92 (6) on the
elimination of controls performed at the Community’s internal frontiers, and the Act of Accession of
Austria) stipulate that such checks are to be carried out on a random basis and may not result in normal
traffic being held up unduly. In addition, they must be performed as part of the ordinary checks performed
in a non-discriminatory manner throughout a Member State’s territory.

The Commission is aware of the practices reported by the Honourable Member whereby the drivers of
lorries or coaches found to exceed the authorised weight are required to use the services of local
companies which provide them with additional vehicles.

Following the usual procedure, the Commission has contacted the Austrian authorities to express its
concern at this situation, which it will examine in the light of the Austrian Government’s reply.

(1) Council Directive 96/53/EC of 25 July 1996 laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the
Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum authorised
weights in international traffic, OJ L 235, 17.9.1996.

(2) Council Directive 96/96/EC of 20 December 1996 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating

to roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers, OJ L 46, 17.2.1997.

(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation

relating to road transport, OJ L 370, 31.12.1985.

(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in road transport, OJ L 370,

31.12.1985.

(5) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4060/89 of 21 December 1989 on the elimination of controls performed at the

frontiers of Member States in the field of road and inland waterway transport, OJ L 390, 30.12.1989.

(6) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3912/92 of 17 December 1992 on controls carried out within the Community in the
field of road and inland waterway transport in respect of means of transport registered or put into circulation in a
third country, OJ L 395, 31.12.1992.

(2003/C 52 E/159)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2223/02

by Nuala Ahern (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(23 July 2002)

Subject: Russian nuclear energy industry

Is the Commission party to the agreement concluded in late June in Canada between the G-7 and Russia
which will result in aid amounting to USD 20 billion being granted to resurrect the moribund Russian
nuclear energy industry by massively subsidising plutonium MOX fuel, when it is clear that Euratom is
manifestly incapable of applying safeguards and security measures to existing EU nuclear plants and that
Russia cannot apply robust physical protection and security measures on its existing nuclear facilities?
What is Euratom’s current role in assisting in safeguards implementation in Russia?

Answer given by Mrs. de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(13 September 2002)

The Group of eight most industrialised countries (G8) launched in the Kananaskis summit (Canada, 26 and
27 June 2002) a global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction to
develop, co-ordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded co-
operation projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear security and
safety (including environmental) issues. Up to now, several G8 countries have announced contributions
ranging from USD 1 billion per year (United States) to US Dollars 200 million over 10 years (Japan).

C 52 E/140

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

6.3.2003

The Commission has not pledged any additional contribution, over and above the EUR 100 million per
year already being provided through the TACIS programme to improve nuclear safety. However, the
Commission is involved in a Union Joint Action on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Russian
Federation, where more than EUR 15 million have been devoted to the destruction of chemical weapons
and to the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium in Russia.

As confirmed recently by the Parliament (1), the Euratom safeguards in existing nuclear plants on the
territory of the Union are applied in full compliance with the requirements of Chapter VII of the Euratom
Treaty.

As regards to whether Russia can apply robust physical protection and security measures on its existing
nuclear facilities, the Commission would like to state that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, physical
protection of nuclear stockpiles and facilities became a major concern to the international community. The
United States, in particular, has also made a major effort to improve physical protection measures at
Russian installations. The situation has improved significantly since then.

The Russian Federation has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which
entered into force on 8 February 1987.

Beside physical protection matters, the Commission is helping Russia to put in place a state system of
accountancy and control of nuclear material. The TACIS programme earmarks funds since 1994 for
improving the Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control in Russian Federation.

(1) A5-0196/2002, Report on the Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council: Operation of the

Euratom Safeguards Office 1999-2000 (cid:1) Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy.

(2003/C 52 E/160)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2230/02

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

Subject: Piracy, terrorism and the identification of ships

(23 July 2002)

Following a study into the vulnerability of transport systems in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the
leaders at the G8 summit in Calgary approved a series of measures designed to prevent ships from being
infiltrated and to make it easier to identify them. Does the European Union have plans to put forward any
legislative proposals in this area?

In recent years, there have been increasing reports of piracy, especially in the South China Sea, but also in
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central America and the Mediterranean. These acts of piracy frequently
involve criminal gangs and loss of life amongst ships’ crews whose families are rarely able to obtain justice
or even to discover the fate of their relatives. Some of the pirates steal ships to order in particular areas of
the world. Their activities are made easier by the ease with which fraudulent certificates are obtained.
Some government officials in the South-East Asia region are believed to turn a blind eye to these practices,
although the Indian Government has tried hard to stamp out the practice, with the Indian Navy achieving
some notable successes in the Bay of Bengal.

its 74th session in June 2001,

the Maritime Safety Committee of

At
the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) received the results of a research study on fraudulent practices associated with
certificates of competency and endorsements which was funded by the Governments of Cyprus, the United
Kingdom, Norway, the European Union and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
Of the maritime administrations which responded to a questionnaire designed to cast light on the issue of
unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency and equivalent endorsements, 39 % had
reported a total of 12,635 detected cases of forgery, and, in particular, those issued under Chapters V and
VI of the Revised International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for