WRITTEN QUESTION E-2159/02 by Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Air accident in southern Germany and safety conditions in airspace.
Date: 2002-07-18
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: air safety, air space, air traffic control, common transport policy, systems interconnection, transport accident

C 309 E/202

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

12.12.2002

coordinate Europe’s air traffic control systems. As things stand at the moment, a plane flying between, for
example, Rome and Paris, is handled by six different air traffic control centres during the course of its
journey. This situation is fraught with coordination difficulties aggravated by the fact that the various
centres do not use the same computer systems. Experts are not ruling out the possibility of the inquest
into this latest accident finding that this succession of
‘mini control centres’ that are not properly
coordinated poses an additional threat to air safety.

Would the Commission not agree that there is an urgent need for it to monitor the effectiveness of the
arrangements for coordinating European control centres, on which planes flying over Europe depend, in
least with a view to the
order to ensure that
establishment of a ‘single European sky’?

they provide the necessary safety guarantees, not

(2002/C 309 E/233)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2159/02

by Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(18 July 2002)

Subject: Air accident in southern Germany and safety conditions in airspace

The probable cause of the collision between a Russian passenger Tupolev 154 aircraft and a Boeing 757
over southern Germany was the fact that the automatic system in the Zurich control tower giving warning
of possible collisions was not in operation. This news has increased concerns over the safety of flights in
European airspace. Recently, and before the tragic accident, mention was being made of the problems
caused by the increasing frequency of flights and related allegations were published. For example, British
air traffic controllers believe that since the beginning of the year the number of instances in which safety
was jeopardised in their airspace has doubled. Often they are unable to hear the pilots they are monitoring,
aircraft disappear from the radar screens, their computers often shut down and aeroplanes cannot maintain
the correct safety distances. Greek pilots,
in turn, believe that the new system for vertical separation
between air corridors (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (cid:1) RVSM) creates risks because the technical
procedures recommended by Eurocontrol have not been completed.

The Commission:

1. Can it confirm the information regarding the temporary deactivation at the time of the accident of the

automatic system providing early warning of imminent danger?

2.

Is it aware of the above-mentioned allegations by air traffic controllers and pilots, or other similar
accusations? Might they be relevant to the air accident in Germany?

3. What steps does it intend to take to ensure that the increased frequency of flights does not give rise to

risks for passengers?

Joint answer
to Written Questions E-2130/02 and E-2159/02
given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(22 August 2002)

The information available on the collision between two aircraft over Lake Constance does not, at this stage,
allow us to draw any conclusions as to the cause of the accident while the enquiry is still under way. The
information would appear to confirm that the automatic warning system on the ground was not in use
because it was being serviced. Following the tragedy, the Commission stressed that it was premature to
directly connect the problems which arose at the time of the accident, where human error also seems to
have been a major factor, with the solutions offered by the Single European Sky initiative. However, some
considerations of a general nature are valid today, as they were before the accident occurred.

The growth in air traffic in recent years has put more pressure on national air traffic control systems. More
data is exchanged between control centres and there is greater coordination between them. Rules must be
observed regarding airspace structure, data exchange, means of communication and the procedures to
follow if the system breaks down. Responsibility for ensuring that the rules are correctly observed and are
effective lies first with the service providers and, second, with the national authorities, who must monitor
their application.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 309 E/203

Although the information provided by Eurocontrol and the service providers points to a consistently high
level of safety, the European system does have several shortcomings:

(cid:1) air traffic control capacity has not been sufficiently increased to deal with the growth in traffic;

(cid:1) control centres are not sufficiently interoperable at present, mainly because so many different systems

are in use;

(cid:1) the present configuration of airspace (control areas and routes) dictated by national interests does not

minimise conflict situations and the risk of accident;

(cid:1) the ‘privatisation’ of service providers has not been accompanied by the setting up of national
supervisory bodies responsible for ensuring that the rules are observed and imposing penalties when
they are not.

The aim of the Single European Sky initiative is to improve the situation, i.e. increase capacity, improve
interoperability (of systems and procedures), organise airspace more efficiently and ensure that the rules
are being correctly observed.
It will enable common rules to be introduced regarding procedures,
equipment and training and provide for contingency planning to reduce the risk of accident and guarantee
a high level of safety.

Following recent events, on 12 September 2002 the Commission will meet with the Directors-General for
Civil Aviation from the Member States and countries associated with the Union (Switzerland, Norway and
Iceland) to discuss air transport safety issues.

(2002/C 309 E/234)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2132/02

by Bartho Pronk (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(17 July 2002)

Subject: Working Time Directive and volunteers

In its reply to Written Question E-1241/00 (1) by Mrs Lynne, the Commission stated that Directive 93/104/
EC (2) does not recognise the concept of ‘voluntary work’. Indeed, this may indirectly be deduced from the
directive itself, Article 7 of which lays down that Member States shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that all workers are entitled to at least four weeks’ paid leave per annum. It may be concluded from
In the Netherlands, this directive was
this article that volunteers are not covered by the directive.
transposed by the Working Hours Act of 23 November 1995. Section 1(1) of the Act lays down that the
definition of ‘employer’ includes any person who, without being an employer or employee as referred to in
the first paragraph, causes another person to perform work under his authority. The Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment interprets this provision so restrictively that in many cases volunteers are covered
by it, with the unfortunate result that voluntary work is seriously impeded.

Does the definition given in Section 1(1) of the Netherlands Working Hours Act comply with

1.
European legislation?

2.
Is not voluntary work by definition incompatible with the word ‘authority’, as it consists of work
carried out without compulsion, of the individual’s own free will and without pay, whereas authority
implies the potential exercise of power, which cannot apply in relation to a volunteer, who may at any
time decide not to continue to perform the work?

3.
Is the way in which the Ministry of Social Affairs interprets and applies Section 1(1) of the
Netherlands Working Hours Act, particularly with regard to voluntary work, compatible with European
law?

Are the Netherlands authorities right to invoke European law with reference to the formulation,

4.
interpretation and application of this section?

(1) OJ C 46 E, 13.2.2001, p. 153.
(2) OJ L 307, 13.12.1993, p. 18.