WRITTEN QUESTION E-2122/02 by Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Fisheries — Hague Preferences.
Date: 2002-07-17
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: aquaculture, common fisheries policy, conservation of fish stocks, fishery management, fishing controls, fishing fleet, international waters

C 28 E/188

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

6.2.2003

Did the problems in the organisation of Opekepe and in the overall control system (Commission
influence the decision not to clear the accounts and to impose

2.
answer to question E-0466/2002 (2))
financial corrections?

(1) OJ L 160, 18.6.2002, p. 28.
(2) OJ C 172 E, 18.7.2002, p. 200.

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(13 September 2002)

Article 1 and 2 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 of 25 October 1999 laying down detailed
rules of the application of Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 set out the form and content of accounting
information that the Member States must hold at the disposal of the Commission for the purposes of the
clearance of
the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guarantee Section
accounts (1) (X-table data) and the way it is to be forwarded.

The Member States must forward this information, in form of computer records, to the Commission by
the 10th February 2002, along with the annual accounts of the paying agencies.

In the case of Greece, the information was not received by the deadline, and data received later was
incomplete.

The Commission considers that it is vital to receive adequate accounting information and will not clear the
accounts of any paying agency that does not provide this information. As Greece has not provided the
information, the Commission is not yet in a position to propose to clear the accounts of the Greek paying
agency for the EAGGF financial year 2001. Consequently, for the 2001 financial year, the accounts of the
Greek paying agency are disjoined from the decision of the Commission of 12 June 2002 on the clearance
of the accounts of Member States’ expenditure financing by the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, for the 2001
financial year and shall be the subject of a future clearance Decision.

From the above, it is clear that the disjunction of the accounts of the Greek paying agency is unrelated to
the corrections that may be applied for problems in the overall control system. Problems with the general
organisation in Greece are clearly behind the failure to deliver the computer data required, but these
problems pre-dated the existence of Opekepe.

(1) OJ L 295, 16.11.1999.

(2003/C 28 E/213)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2122/02

by Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(17 July 2002)

Subject: Fisheries (cid:1) Hague Preferences

The principle of relative stability which seeks to distribute fishing opportunities based on traditional fishing
rights and the maintenance of fisheries-dependent communities, has been elaborated by virtue of the
Hague Preference system which, for its part, seeks to address the special needs of Ireland and the northern
parts of the United Kingdom.

Can the Commission provide assurances that these special needs will continue to be recognised and that
the Hague Preferences system will not be undermined in the reform of the common fisheries policy which
is currently under review?

6.2.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28 E/189

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(29 July 2002)

The Commission has made it clear in Section 3.3 of its Communication on the reform of the Common
Fisheries Policy (1) that it wishes to maintain relative stability and within this concept to ‘take account of
Hague Preferences, thereby removing any uncertainty about how relative stability is to be applied’.

(1) COM(2002) 181 final.

(2003/C 28 E/214)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2123/02

by Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

Subject: CFP reform and potential legal challenge

(17 July 2002)

The principle of relative stability was laid down in Article 4(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 (1)
of 25 January 1983, the substance of which is restated in Article 8(4) of Council Regulation (EEC) No
3760/92 (2) of 20 December 1992, and was further recognised by virtue of the Spanish and Portuguese
Acts of Accession. The principle has since been elaborated and reinforced by the Court of Justice (for
example but not limited to, Joined Cases C-418/00 and C-419/00, Case C-120/99, Joined Cases C-61/96,
C-132/97, C-45/98, C-27/99, C-81/00 and C-22/01, Case T-196/99 and Case C-4/96).

The acquis communautaire has
relative stability as
fundamental to the common fisheries policy. How can the Commission therefore justify any weakening
of a fundamental principle, as outlined in its recently published reform package, without opening up the
whole reform to legal challenge?

therefore firmly entrenched the principle of

(1) OJ L 24, 27.1.1983, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 389, 31.12.1992, p. 1.

(2003/C 28 E/215)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2124/02

by Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

Subject: Future of fisheries-dependent communities

(17 July 2002)

The European Court of Justice has clearly reinforced the principle of relative stability based on the original
text of Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 (1) as a principle which is intended to ensure for each Member
State a share of the Community’s TACs, determined essentially on the basis of the catches from which
traditional fishing activities and the local inhabitants dependent on fisheries and related industries of that
Member State benefited before the quota system was established (see, for example, Case C-4/96).

Adjusting the principle of relative stability, as proposed by the European Commission in its CFP reform
proposals, to a principle under which allocations should be based on an average share of catches over the
preceding 5 or 10 years and eventually eliminating the principle of relative stability, would be contrary to
the very essence of the principle and why it was established and has been consistently reaffirmed.
Adjusting and/or eliminating the principle would jeopardise the future of fisheries-dependent communities
which depend on their historical fishing rights being protected. Can the Commission therefore provide a
clear explanation as to how it will bear responsibility for destroying fragile communities where there is
often no alternative employment and, in so doing, undermining or eliminating what is a firmly established
fundamental Community principle?

(1) OJ L 24, 27.1.1983, p. 1.